

28 Nov 65

NOV 23 16 01 65

SECRET NOFORN

So-84931-65

DI	AP	J2	HMCC
AP	AF	CJCS	CSA
ST	D/JS	CHO	
AG	XX	EJCS	CSAF
PLG	SO	JRC	CXC

VZCZCKNA499  
 OO YEKADV  
 DE YAMHIN 08 28/1355Z  
 O 21330Z ZYH  
 FM BGEN MCHRISTIAN J2 MACV  
 TO LT GEN CARROLL DIA  
 INFO BGEN BROWN J2 CINCPAC  
 ZEM

SECRET NOFORN MAC 6016 INTEL SECTION ONE OF THREE  
 REFERENCE: DIA 06931 DTG 262341Z NOV 65.

FOLLOWING IS A VERBATIM COPY OF THE J2 MACV BRIEFING WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO SEC DEF AT 1450 HOURS 23 NOV 65

QUOTE:  
 THE AMBASSADOR, SECRETARY MCNAMARA, GENERAL WHEELER, I WILL PRESENT OUR ESTIMATE OF THE VC/PAVN BUILDUP AND THEN, BASED UPON CAPABILITIES, FORECAST ENEMY STRENGTH AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966.

I WILL ALSO LIST PROBABLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION AND VULNERABILITIES.

THE OVERALL STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE DRV LAO DONG PARTY IS THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONQUEST OF THE RVN. THE FIRST PART OF THE PLAN, IN ESSENCE, CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM POLITICAL AND MILITARY BASE. HAVING ESTABLISHED A SECURE BASE OF OPERATIONS AND FORGED THE RVN FORCES INTO A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, THE COMMUNISTS WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE INTO THE FINAL PHASE, THE ANNEXATION OF THE ENEMY. BY MID 1964 THE VC WERE WELL ON THEIR WAY TO ACCOMPLISHING THESE GOALS. INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM THE DRV TO THE RVN VIA LAOS AND CAMBODIA HAD BEEN IMPROVED, SEA INFILTRATION WAS ALSO IN FULL SWING AND THEIR LOGISTICAL SYSTEM AND BASE AREAS WERE WELL ESTABLISHED.

A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMUNIST PLAN IS THE ATTAINMENT OF "STRATEGIC MOBILITY". STRATEGIC MOBILITY IS THEIR ANSWER TO OUR TACTICAL MOBILITY. THEIR OBJECTIVE IS TO AMASS SUFFICIENT NUMBERS OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS TO BE CAPABLE OF POSING A SUFFICIENT THREAT IN WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS WHICH WILL NOT ONLY TIE DOWN LARGE NUMBERS OF ALLIED FORCES IN STATIC DEFENSIVE ROLES, BUT WILL ALSO ALLOW THEM TO DESTROY SELECTED TARGETS AT A TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR CHOOSING. IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THE FORCE STRUCTURE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN "STRATEGIC MOBILITY" HANOI APPARENTLY DECIDED TO INTRODUCE REGULAR PAVN TROOPS INTO THE RVN. INDICATIONS THEREOF CAN BE TRACED TO AS EARLY AS APRIL 1964 WHEN THE 325TH PAVN INFANTRY DIVISION BEGAN AN ACCELERATED TRAINING PROGRAM IN THE VICINITY OF DONG HOI IN THE DRV.

THE INFILTRATION OF PAVN REGIMENTS IN ORDER OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS SHOWN ON THIS VIEWGRAPH. (VIEWGRAPH NO. 1 ON)

DIA and JCS review(s) completed.

THE THREE REGIMENTS OF THE 325TH PAVN DIVISION ARRIVED AS FOLLOWS:

THE 95TH REGIMENT IN DECEMBER 1964, THE 101ST IN FEBRUARY 1965 AND THE 18TH IN APRIL 1965. A NON-DIVISIONAL PAVN REGIMENT, THE 32ND, WHICH TRAINED AT SON TAY AND NUAN HAI, DRV, INFILTRATED INTO THE RVN SHORTLY AFTER THE 95TH. ANU/I REGIMENT INFILTRATED INTO QUANG TRI IN JULY. WE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THE EXACT TIME OF ARRIVAL OF THE 42ND REGIMENT. THE 250TH REGIMENT TRAINED AT PHU BINH DISTRICT, THAI NGUYEN PROVINCE IN THE DRV AND WAS FORMED FROM INDIVIDUALS DRAFTED FROM HANOI AND THAI NGUYEN PROVINCE, DEPARTING NORTH VIETNAM IN LATE JUNE, THE 250TH ARRIVED IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN QUANG DUC PROVINCE IN MID SEPTEMBER.

WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE 325TH DIVISION LEFT CADRES FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF A SECOND 325TH DIVISION PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE FROM THE DRV IN LATE 1964 EARLY 1965. PRISONERS CAPTURED EARLY IN THE PLEI ME BATTLE IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF THE NEW 325TH DIVISION. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATED THAT THE NEW 325TH DIVISION HAD, IN FACT, FORMED THREE MORE REGIMENTS. ONE OF THESE REGIMENTS, WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AS THE "SONG LAM" REGIMENT, DEPARTED THE DRV IN JULY AND ARRIVED IN THE RVN IN EARLY OCTOBER. THIS UNIT WAS GIVEN SEVEN DAYS TRAINING AND RESUPPLIED PRIOR TO ATTACKING PLEI MEI CAMP. A VIET CONG CAPTIVE FROM THE "SONG LAM" REGIMENT STATED THAT THE OTHER TWO REGIMENTS OF THE NEWLY REFORMED 325TH DIVISION WERE ALSO TO INFILTRATE INTO THE RVN. HOWEVER, THE TIME FRAME WAS NOT SPECIFIED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE OTHER TWO REGIMENTS OF THE RECENTLY RECONSTITUTED 325TH DIVISION ARE EITHER INFILTRATING OR ARE IN THE LATE STAGES OF INFILTRATION PREPARATIONS.

ONE OF THE PAVN UNITS WITH WHICH THE 1ST AIR CAV DIV WAS IN CONTACT AT PLEI ME WAS THE 66TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH PAVN INFANTRY DIVISION WHICH ARRIVED IN COONTRY IN OCTOBER 1965. AS REPORTED BY MAGV IN MARCH 1965, ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH DIVISION HAD BEEN PREPARING TO INFILTRATE INTO SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE LAST YEAR. ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH DIVISION WERE ALSO REPORTED AS PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACK ON THE ROYAL LAO ARMY (FAR) OFFICERS SCHOOL AT DONG HENE, LAOS, IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR. PRISONERS TAKEN AFTER THIS ATTACK REVEALED THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE 9TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION WHO WERE ON THEIR WAY TO INFILTRATE INTO THE RVN, AND HAD BEEN DIVERTED IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PATHET LAO IN THEIR ATTACK ON DONG HENE. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE 9TH IS UNKNOWN.

IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE 66TH MAY HAVE BROUGHT THEIR 120MM MORTARS WITH THEM. IF TRUE, THEY WILL BE THE FIRST 120MM MORTARS INTRODUCED INTO RVN.

900

SECRET NOFORN

NNNN