


NSA review completed

25 February 1973

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS\*

1. The following paragraphs contain a comprehensive listing of Communist actions since 28 January which we consider to be clear violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements. Three principal types of Communist activity are discussed: (a) the movement of substantial numbers of new North Vietnamese troops toward and into South Vietnam; (b) the large and continuing flow of military equipment and supplies from North Vietnam to the south; and (c) the combat activity instigated by Communist forces in both South Vietnam and Laos after the respective deadlines (28 January and 22 February) by which combat was to end in the two countries.

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\* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

DIA Review Completed.



A. Continued Infiltration of North Vietnamese Troops in Violation of the Agreement

3. [redacted] North Vietnamese troops have continued to move into South Vietnam since the ceasefire became effective on 28 January. A number of infiltration groups of the North Vietnamese Army have been observed moving through southern Laos toward South Vietnam since that date. All together, they total about 13,000 troops, and we know that several thousand of these troops had not even left North Vietnam as of 28 January, so it cannot be argued that Hanoi is merely allowing those troops already in the pipeline as of the 28th to finish their journey. Many of these 13,000 troops are still in southern Laos and have not yet crossed into South Vietnam, but we already know the areas to which they have been assigned.

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4. In addition to these regular troops, [redacted] Hanoi is trying to infiltrate, in clandestine fashion, many hundreds of civilian and military specialists into South Vietnam and nearby border areas of southern Laos.

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5. Finally, North Vietnam has recently moved a complete regiment of engineer troops into southern Laos, and is preparing to move two battalions of this regiment into the southern half of South Vietnam and assign the third battalion to the central highlands. In South Vietnam's northernmost province of Quang Tri, another clear-cut violation has occurred: a North Vietnamese radar company has moved from Laos into the Khe Sanh area of Quang Tri in the weeks since the ceasefire.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese in Violation of the Agreement

6. Since 28 January the North Vietnamese have continued to move large quantities of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam and into Laos and South Vietnam. The rate at which these supplies and equipment are being moved is at least equal to and may be greater than that of the pre-ceasefire period. [redacted]

[redacted] we can say categorically that North Vietnamese war materiel has moved into South Vietnam in violation of the settlement agreement.

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7. The following shipments of equipment and supplies have been definitely identified as having crossed the border into South Vietnam since 28 January. (None of these shipments has gone through authorized entry points.)

- (a) [redacted] 25X1  
a steady flow of North Vietnamese traffic, averaging six trucks per day, was observed moving east from southern Laos into Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam on Route 9.
- (b) [redacted] 25X1  
five North Vietnamese trucks and two tanks were observed moving east on Route 9 about to cross the border into Quang Tri Province.
- (c) [redacted] 25X1  
33 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed inside South Vietnam, on Route 9 to the west of Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province.
- (d) [redacted] 25X1  
six North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed on Route 9, to the west of Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province.
- (e) Three new equipped, occupied, and operational SA-2 missile sites have been set up in the Khe Sanh area by the North Vietnamese since the ceasefire. The equipment for these sites was almost certainly brought in after the ceasefire, and hence was brought in in violation of the agreement.

8. The following shipments of North Vietnamese equipment and supplies within southern Laos and eastern Cambodia are clearly earmarked for South Vietnam, though they have not yet been observed crossing the South Vietnamese border.

- (a) [redacted] 25X1  
a total of 1,252 North Vietnamese vehicles were observed in Laos near the point where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam

meet (the tri-border area). At least 255 of these vehicles were observed moving toward the central highlands of South Vietnam. At least 281 were moving toward the southern half of South Vietnam.

- (b) [redacted] a North Vietnamese transportation battalion in the tri-border area of Laos was observed turning over 30 vehicles to Communist military officers from the southern provinces of South Vietnam, and ten vehicles to Communist officers from the central highlands of South Vietnam. 25X1
- (c) [redacted] a North Vietnamese logistics unit in southern Laos just west of the DMZ was observed preparing large vehicle formations to transport cargo to the coastal regions of central South Vietnam. 25X1
- (d) [redacted] thirteen vehicles carrying ordnance were observed headed toward the southern half of South Vietnam from a major North Vietnamese logistic unit located near Tchepone in southern Laos. 25X1
- (e) [redacted] six vehicles hauling 85mm artillery were observed headed toward the southern half of South Vietnam from a major North Vietnamese logistic unit in the tri-border area of Laos. 25X1
- (f) [redacted] the North Vietnamese have moved or are in the process of moving some 400 tanks down through southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia. These tanks are all clearly to be assigned to Communist units in the southern three-quarters of South Vietnam or Cambodia. Similarly [redacted] large amounts of artillery are moving through the Lao panhandle at this time, and that most of it is also destined for the southern three-quarters of South Vietnam. 25X1
- (g) [redacted] Viet Cong supply units in South Vietnam's MR 4 were told on 8 February of a plan to relocate all war 25X1

materiel presently stockpiled in Cambodia to South Vietnam. Each Viet Cong village supply unit in South Vietnam was ordered to prepare storage facilities for 100 to 150 tons of supplies.

9. In addition to the cases above, [redacted] shipments in southern Laos clearly earmarked for South Vietnam in violation of the settlement agreement, [redacted] on other North Vietnamese logistics activity throughout the Lao Panhandle. Historical patterns indicate that much of this activity also involves supplies destined for South Vietnam.

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(a) About 1,100 trucks moved through the Ban Karai Pass from North Vietnam into southern Laos [redacted] This pass is one of the major entry points from North Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh trail system. We know that cargo on these trucks included more than 2,000 tons of food and more than 1,000 tons of ordnance. There were smaller quantities of communications gear, tank accessories, and other commodities. [redacted]

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[redacted] at least 38 trucks per day moved south through the Ban Karai Pass.

(b) [redacted] a 70-vehicle North Vietnamese convoy was observed transporting ammunition in the area of eastern Laos between the DMZ and the Ashau Valley. In the same area a total of 194 North Vietnamese vehicles were observed [redacted], and 233 were observed on [redacted].

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(c) [redacted] sixteen North Vietnamese vehicles were observed transporting 57 tons of ordnance to a major storage area near Tchepone, southern Laos. [redacted] 51 vehicles were observed carrying cargo to the same storage area. All the cargo was ordnance.

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[redacted]

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(d) [redacted] 52 North Vietnamese vehicles were observed moving south in the Muong Nong area of southern Laos.

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10. In the DMZ area, we have the following additional evidence of heavy supply activity in support of North Vietnamese military forces.

(a) [redacted] a North Vietnamese logistic unit near the DMZ reportedly formed a special "vehicle command" to facilitate the southward movement of supplies to the Quang Tri area.

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(b) [redacted] 23 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed on Route 561A northwest of Quang Tri City.

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(c) [redacted] 105 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed on Route 1033A inside the western DMZ. [redacted] 230 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed on Route 102B near its intersection with Route 1032A in the western DMZ.

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(d) [redacted] 13 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed moving south on Route 1033A in the western DMZ.

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(e) [redacted], large numbers of North Vietnamese cargo trucks were seen transporting supplies on various routes in the western DMZ area. On Route 608 north of Khe Sanh, 22 trucks were observed [redacted]. On Route 1032A ten trucks were seen. Sixty-two trucks were observed on Route 102B on [redacted] and 59 trucks were observed there on [redacted], 16 trucks were seen on Route 1033.

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11. Inside North Vietnam north of the DMZ there is [redacted] North Vietnamese intent to violate the ceasefire agreement.

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[redacted]

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(a) [redacted] two rail cars of military supplies were unloaded at a location in the central panhandle of North Vietnam. Included in the supplies were 26 tons of munitions specifically earmarked for South Vietnam.

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(b) [redacted] eight tons of grenades were being shipped through the central panhandle of North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

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12. Finally, there has been one confirmed instance of North Vietnam shipping supplies into South Vietnam by sea in violation of the agreement.

[redacted] large stocks of supplies were observed on a beach in southern Quang Ngai Province, and a small cargo vessel -- probably a North Vietnamese infiltration trawler -- was observed a few miles off shore with its hold open and possible cargo still on deck. A small boat was along side. [redacted]

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[redacted] Communist forces had destroyed a South Vietnamese coastal radar site in the area.

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C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

13. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces from 28 January through 24 February is shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (18-24 Feb) Level of Action	
	Major <u>1/</u>	Minor <u>1/</u>	Major	Minor
MR 1	352	1,447	75	327
MR 2	87	551	20	125
MR 3	76	835	10	147
MR 4	<u>151</u>	<u>1,562</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>349</u>
TOTALS	666	4,395	146 (193) <u>2/</u>	948 (1,012) <u>2/</u>

1/ DOD Definitions of major and minor violations are contained in the Annex.

2/ Denotes totals of previous week.

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14. Immediately before the ceasefire, major combat erupted in two areas of South Vietnam. These were along the banks of the Cua Viet River in northern Military Region (MR) 1 and in the vicinity of Tay Ninh City in MR 3. In northern MR 1, the South Vietnamese marines launched an 11th-hour attack to establish a salient at the mouth of the Cua Viet River. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched counter-attacks after the commencement of the ceasefire against the marines. Within three days the marines were forced to return to their former positions north of Quang Tri City. In MR 3, the Communists attempted a major gain unacceptable to the GVN. In this confrontation the Communists attempted to seize and hold portions of Tay Ninh City, reportedly to establish a post-ceasefire capital. Heavy fighting continued well after the ceasefire in that area until the Communists were defeated and forced to withdraw.

15. Concurrently with these major military operations, a contest developed for the control of a large number of hamlets countrywide where the Communists considered themselves sufficiently strong to hazard an overt military effort to wrest control from the GVN.


16. In addition, the enemy launched an effort throughout the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to interdict lines of communication (LOCs) in an attempt to isolate population centers and to separate the military region commands of RVNAF. The enemy was successful in blocking -- for a period of some days -- major inter-provincial routes in MR 1 and MR 2, but farther south government forces prevented Communist units from blocking any major routes in MRs 3 or 4 for more than a brief period. The only major highway where there are presently difficulties is Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum cities in the central highlands. This road was officially declared open on 21 February and remains officially open now. Enemy forces in the Kontum Pass area, however, pose a continuing threat to road security.

17. Since the signing of the truce, the enemy has employed attacks by fire as one of his principal tactics. These artillery, rocket and mortar attacks vary in magnitude from a single round to a significant barrage of fire. While attacks-by-fire in some instances may have a specific military purpose, ordinarily they are not employed in this manner. Instead, the enemy uses this form of activity as an economical means to demonstrate his presence and continued military capability. In brief, it is a technique used to terrorize the populace and to raise doubts in their minds concerning the GVN's ability to protect them.

18. The following is a chronological listing of the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week (18-24 February):

MILITARY REGION 1:

- (a) On 18 February, in the ARVN airborne zone south and southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy directed 13 attacks-by-fire totaling 650 rounds of mixed ordnance at airborne units.
- (b) On 19 February, 23 miles west-northwest of Tam Ky, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an attack-by-fire of 37 rounds of 82mm mortar.
- (c) On 19 February, 31 miles southeast of Quang Ngai, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received a ground attack by an enemy force.
- (d) On 19 February, in the ARVN Airborne Division zone, southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy launched 16 attacks-by-fire totaling 555 mixed mortar rounds against airborne forces.
- (e) On 19 February, eight miles northwest of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an attack-by-fire of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar.
- (f) On 19 February, 13 miles southwest of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an attack-by-fire of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar.
- (g) On 19 February, 31 miles south-southeast of Quang Ngai, elements of an ARVN ranger battalion received an enemy ground attack.
- (h) On 20 February, elements of the airborne division, southwest of Quang Tri City received three attacks-by-fire totaling 89 rounds of mixed ordnance.
- (i) On 20 February, 14 miles southwest of Hue, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar during an attack-by-fire.



- (k) On 20 February, elements of a reconnaissance company received an attack-by-fire of 70 rounds of 60mm mortar.
- (l) Three miles southwest of Quang Tri City on 22 February elements of an airborne battalion received an attack-by-fire consisting of 41 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
- (m) Thirteen miles southwest of Hue on 22 February elements of an infantry battalion received two separate attacks-by-fire totaling 70 rounds of mixed mortar and B-40 rocket fire.

MILITARY REGION 2:

- (a) On 20 February, 19 miles northwest of Qui Nhon, elements of a reconnaissance company were attacked by an unknown-size enemy force.
- (b) On 20 February, three miles northwest of Phan Thiet, elements of an RF battalion received an attack-by-fire of 40 rounds of 82mm mortar.
- (c) Approximately 10 miles north-northeast of Bonh Son on 21 February, elements of two infantry battalions and a subsector headquarters received three separate attacks-by-fire totaling 73 rounds of 60- and 82mm mortar and 107mm rocket fire.
- (d) Ten miles southwest of Kontum City on 22 February, elements of an ARVN ranger battalion received a ground attack.
- (e) Fourteen miles northeast of Ban Me Thuot on 23 February elements of an infantry battalion received a ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 3:

- (a) On 18 February, six miles south of Tay Ninh, elements of a PF platoon received an attack-by-fire of 50 rounds of 60mm mortar.



- (b) On 19 February, 11 miles southeast of Song Be, elements of an RF company received an attack-by-fire of 50 rounds of 82mm mortar.
- (c) On 19 February, 29 miles south of Dau Tieng, elements of an RF battalion and an ARVN tank company were attacked by an enemy force.
- (d) Five miles west of Song Be on 21 February, elements of a Regional Force Battalion received an attack-by-fire consisting of 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.
- (e) Thirteen miles south-southwest of Song Be on 23 February, elements of a regional force company received an attack-by-fire, consisting of 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire.
- (f) On 24 February, the village chief of Loc Khae, about 20 miles south of Tri Tam, was assassinated.
- (g) On 24 February, about 15 miles north of Truc Giang, a US UH-1H helicopter with ICCS markings received ground-to-air fire by a SA-7 missile.

MILITARY REGION 4:

- (a) On 18 February, 24 miles northeast of Ca Mau, a district town was struck with five rounds of 82mm mortar fire.
- (b) On 19 February, two miles west of My Tho, elements of an RF battalion received an enemy ground attack.
- (c) On 19 February, 22 miles east-northeast of Chau Doc, elements of an armored cavalry squadron and a reconnaissance company were attacked by an unknown-size enemy force.
- (d) On 20 February, six miles west of Vi Thanh, a PF outpost received an attack-by-fire of 50 rounds of 82mm mortar.
- (e) Five miles northwest of Tri Ton on 21 February, elements of a ranger battalion received two separate attacks-by-fire totaling 70 rounds of mixed 60- and 82mm mortar fire.
- (f) Fourteen miles southwest of Vi Thanh on 21 February, elements of a regional force battalion and the Vinh Tuy



base received two separate attacks-by-fire totaling 57 rounds of mixed 60- and 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket fire.

(g) Twelve miles south of My Tho on 21 February, an enemy force entered a hamlet and assassinated the hamlet chief.

(h) Four miles north of Vi Thanh on 22 February, elements of a regional force battalion received a ground attack.

D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in Laos Since the Settlement Agreement on Laos Went into Effect


19. Enemy-initiated ground contacts and attacks by fire have continued throughout Laos since the cease-fire agreement went into effect at 1200 hours local (0500Z), 22 February 1973. The most notable violation was an intense attack that resulted in the rout of irregular forces from Paksong. This attack began before the truce deadline, but continued after the deadline had passed. The enemy has continued to shell and probe positions west of Paksong, where the government troops are regrouping. North of the Bolovens Plateau, enemy military activity in northern Laos intensified on the 22nd, when a government battalion northwest of Saravane was dispersed by an enemy attack. A small government unit northwest of Khong Sedone was also hard hit by an enemy attack on the 23rd.

20. In the Panhandle to the north of Paksong two irregular battalions operating along Route 13 northwest of Thakhek were dispersed on 24 February by a sharp NVA attack. Scattered contacts also occurred to the east of Thakhek since the ceasefire began.

21. In northern Laos, friendly irregulars at Sala Phou Khoun were attacked by Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist forces, reportedly supported by two tanks, on 23 February. These government forces continued, as of 24 February, to receive small ground probes and heavy attacks by fire.

22. Several enemy attacks by fire and ground contacts also continued in the Plaine des Jarres area through 23 and 24 February. Friendly forces west of the Plaine were hit by over 600 rounds of indirect fire from NVA units on the 23rd. Another heavy attack by fire of some 400 rounds was directed against friendly positions northeast of Long Tieng on the same day. Other Communist-initiated clashes occurred near Xieng Khouangville after the ceasefire was signed.

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2. Definition of "major" and "minor" ceasefire violations:

Paragraph 13 of this memorandum contains a table listing the total number of Communist-inspired ceasefire violations since 28 January. The determination of whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based upon the following criteria, which have been established by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Major Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities, or population centers:

- Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, or rocket fire within a short period of time or sporadically over a period of hours.
- Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground attack with or without supporting fire.
- Are subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving extensive use of mines and demolitions.



Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities, or population centers:

- Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, rocket, or small arms fire following an extended period during which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were received.
- Receive a small ground probe, unsupported by significant mortar, artillery, or rocket fire, following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.
- Are subjected to one or a very few small terrorist attacks involving use of mines and demolitions following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.

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DER



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Ret to  
D/S

4 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Communist Violations of Vietnam and Laos  
Settlement Agreements

1. Attached are five copies of the second weekly report on Communist violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements which you requested at the 23 February meeting of the WSAG. This report covers the period from 25 February through 3 March 1973. We plan to send the next report on this subject to you on Friday, 9 March, and subsequent reports on each Friday thereafter.

2. This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Both agencies are in full agreement with the conclusions and with all specifics of the report.


3. I am sending copies of this report to all members of the WSAG, to Secretary Rogers, Secretary Richardson, and to the Directors of DIA and INR.

James R. Schlesinger  
Director

Attachment

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4 March 1973

Second Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS\*


(This report covers the week from 25 February  
through 3 March 1973)

The Key Points

- North Vietnamese troops, military equipment and supplies continued to move southward toward and into South Vietnam during the week, in a clear violation of the Vietnam settlement agreement.
- Although the agreement has now been in effect for over a month, there is good evidence that the southward flow of equipment and supplies has increased to levels above those of one year ago.
- The southward flow of North Vietnamese manpower is slightly below but is approaching last year's level for the period since the beginning of the dry season (1 October to 1 March).
- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists in violation of the ceasefire terms has declined slightly in South Vietnam, and markedly in Laos, during the week.

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\* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.



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The Details

(NOTE: This is the second in a series of weekly reports detailing recent Communist actions which we believe to be violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements. [REDACTED])

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A. Continuing Infiltration and Redeployment of North Vietnamese Personnel in Violation of the Agreement

1. During the past week we continued to receive incontrovertible evidence that Hanoi is still infiltrating personnel toward South Vietnam in violation of the settlement agreement. The latest evidence indicates that several hundred additional military and civilian specialists began moving south from North Vietnam last week, and that other groups of infiltrators continued to move southward in the Laos panhandle during the week. All together, there are now about 30,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators moving through the pipeline. Of these, at least 6,000 personnel, including both regular combat troops and civilian and military specialists, probably have left their starting point in North Vietnam since 28 January. While the combat personnel included in this number appear to have begun their trip in the first ten days or so after the ceasefire, some of the specialists did not start their trip southward until 26 February. [REDACTED]

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2. During the past week, no major integral Communist units (i.e., as distinct from infiltration groups containing replacement fillers for existing units) were detected moving into or out of South Vietnam. One minor unit, however -- an NVA armored battalion -- was observed on 28 February on the border between southern GVN MR 1 and Laos. We do not know precisely when the unit first arrived at the border, but it probably arrived recently. The battalion is almost certainly part of the large amount of armor previously noted

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deploying south in the infiltration system since late October 1972. Most Communist main-force units now within South Vietnam are resting and refitting in what is basically a standdown posture, and are engaged in establishing more permanent base areas.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese in Violation of the Agreement

3. The information contained in the following paragraphs covers the movement of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam and into Laos and South Vietnam during the past week. Taken as a whole, our evidence indicates that large amounts of supplies continued to move, especially through-out southern Laos. Within South Vietnam, pervasive reports of vehicles on the move -- many of them transporting weapons and ammunition -- clearly indicate that Communist supply activities are also continuing there at substantial levels.

4. The following indications of Communist logistic activity have been observed on roads within South Vietnam in the areas of the Laos border since 24 February and probably reflect supplies which have entered South Vietnam during that time.

(a) On Route 608 north of Khe Sanh, there were 32 North Vietnamese cargo trucks observed [redacted] There were 20 cargo trucks and 6 unidentified vehicles seen on this route [redacted]

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(b) Thirty North Vietnamese cargo vehicles were seen moving on Route Q9D west of Khe Sanh on [redacted] There were 7 trucks observed on this route on [redacted]

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(c) [redacted] there was an average of 4 trucks per day observed moving eastward probably carrying supplies on Routes 9 and 548 in northern Quang Tri Province.

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(d) [redacted] as of mid-February, military supplies were continuing to enter Thua [redacted]

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Thien Province from Laos, and that base areas where the supplies were to be stored were being established in the mountains about 25 miles southwest of Hue.

(e) [redacted] the North Vietnamese may now be deploying 130mm artillery field guns into GVN MR 3.

[redacted]

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5. In addition to the above supply activity observed within South Vietnam, we are receiving further evidence of increasing North Vietnamese logistic movements throughout the Lao panhandle and northeastern Cambodia. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involves supplies destined for South Vietnam.

[redacted]

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(a) [redacted] southbound truck movements through the Ban Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass between North Vietnam and southern Laos increased significantly.

[redacted] southbound trucks observed in the Ban Karai Pass averaged 69 per day during this period as compared with 52 per day the previous week, while the average number of southbound trucks moving through the Ban Raving Pass rose to 27 daily during the current reporting period, compared with 17 during the previous week.

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(b) [redacted] over

5,160 enemy trucks were observed in southern Laos. Of the total, at least 330 were specifically headed toward South Vietnam -- and primarily for the southern half of South Vietnam.

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[redacted]

(c) During the same period [redacted] over 60 trucks on roads leading into northern South Vietnam from Laos. More than half of these trucks were heading east toward the South Vietnamese border. In addition, [redacted] an 18-truck convoy loaded with supplies moving south along the Lao-South Vietnamese border just west of Quang Tri Province on 24 February.

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(d) [redacted] about 50 North Vietnamese vehicles were observed moving cargo on Route 922 in the eastern Lao panhandle.

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(e) [redacted] a total of 16 North Vietnamese vehicles -- probably cargo trucks -- were observed moving south from the Ban Bac area in southern Laos.

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(f) [redacted] 14 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were seen on Route 912B in Laos immediately west of the Ban Karai Pass.

(g) A substantial number of vehicles (the exact number is unknown but is less than fifty) were observed returning from northeastern Cambodia to the tri-border area of Laos [redacted] to participate in logistic activity in the latter area.

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(h) [redacted] a North Vietnamese logistic unit in the tri-border area of Laos was observed while receiving 15 vehicles loaded with supplies. Thirteen of the vehicles were carrying some kind of machinery.

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6. Inside North Vietnam, additional evidence continued to accumulate during the week on the movement of military supplies within North Vietnam toward northern Laos, southern Laos, or South Vietnam.

(a) A North Vietnamese Army logistics unit to the south of Vinh was observed receiving nine barges loaded with supplies [redacted]

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[redacted] over 100 tons of supplies per day had been transiting through this logistics unit in the period immediately before [redacted]

(b) [redacted] 18 cargo trucks transporting munitions were observed moving from the Vinh area of North Vietnam westward along Route 7 toward northern Laos. [redacted]

[redacted] the destination of these munitions was in fact northern Laos.

(c) [redacted] another convoy of 10 North Vietnamese trucks was observed moving on Route 7 inside North Vietnam toward northern Laos.

7. In the immediate DMZ area, there was the following additional evidence of resupply activity in support of North Vietnamese military forces.

(a) [redacted] sustained numbers of trucks were continuing to move southward through the DMZ as [redacted]. On that date, about 30 trucks were observed entering a North Vietnamese truck park located in the western DMZ near the Lao border in a one-hour period. In addition, southbound trucks were observed crossing a pontoon bridge in the eastern DMZ. Also on the 22nd, truck parks observed south of the DMZ in eastern Quang Tri Province contained many more trucks than when the same truck parks had been observed several weeks earlier.

(b) A convoy of 18 North Vietnamese cargo trucks was seen moving on Route 102B in the western DMZ on [redacted]

(c) Ten North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed moving southward on Route 103 in the DMZ area on [redacted]

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C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

8. In South Vietnam, the total numbers of Communist initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for last week (25 February through 3 March) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action		Last Week (25 Feb-3 Mar) Level of Action	
	Major <u>1/</u>	Minor <u>1/</u>	Major	Minor
MR 1	420	1,683	68	236
MR 2	105	643	18	92
MR 3	102	931	26	96
MR 4	<u>178</u>	<u>1,853</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>291</u>
Totals	805	5,110	139 (146) <u>2/</u>	715 (948) <u>2/</u>

1/ DOD definitions of major and minor violations are contained in ANNEX III.

2/ Denotes totals of previous week.

9. During the past week, the number of major violations decreased slightly from 146 to 139. The greatest reduction occurred in MR 4 which reported 27 major violations as opposed to 41 the previous week. The number of reported minor violations also decreased from 948 to 715, and the largest decrease (from 327 to 236) took place in MR 1.



10. The following is a chronological listing of the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week (25 February - 3 March):

MILITARY REGION 1:

- (a) On 24 February, in two separate attacks three miles southwest of Quang Tri City, enemy elements fired a total of thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds in the vicinity of a GVN airborne battalion.



TOTAL MAJOR AND MINOR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM



X=Cease-fire date - 28 January 1973 (GMT)  
 (All days thereafter are referred to as X+1, X+2, etc.)

Numbers at bottom depict major cease-fire violations



25X1

- (b) On 25 February, 14 miles south-southwest of Da Nang on Route 537, enemy sappers destroyed one span of a bridge, closing the road.
- (c) On 26 and 27 February, in the Airborne Division sector southwest of Quang Tri City, enemy units fired a total of 1,030 mixed artillery, mortar and recoilless rifle rounds in 21 attacks-by-fire. One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.
- (d) On 28 February and 1 March, in the Airborne Division sector southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy directed seven attacks-by-fire of 270 mixed mortar and artillery rounds against airborne units. One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.
- (e) On 28 February, 12 miles south-southeast of Da Nang, a US UH-1H helicopter displaying ICCS markings and carrying two ICCS passengers (one Canadian and one Indonesian) received ground fire while landing.
- (f) On 1 March southwest of Quang Tri City, elements of two ARVN airborne battalions received five separate attacks-by-fire (ABFs) totaling 158 mixed 60mm/82mm mortar rounds.
- (g) On 2 March, 10 miles northwest of Tam Ky, an element of an RF battalion received an ABF of 50 rounds of 82mm mortar and 30 rounds of B-40 rockets followed by a ground attack.
- (h) On 2 March, 18 miles west of Tam Ky, an element of an ARVN infantry battalion received an ABF of 20 rounds of 82mm mortar and four AT-3 missiles followed by a ground attack.
- (i) On 2 March, southwest of Quang Tri City, elements of three ARVN airborne battalions received four separate attacks-by-fire totaling 115 82mm mortar rounds.
- (j) On 2 March, nine miles west of Hue, enemy forces attacked elements of two infantry battalions on five separate occasions with a total of 472 rounds of mixed 60mm/82mm mortar fire. One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 2:

- (a) On 25 February, 11 miles south-southwest of Kontum City, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN ranger battalion.
- (b) On 27 February, 14 miles north-northwest of Kontum City, a US UH-1 helicopter displaying ICCS markings and carrying representatives of all ICCS member nations received ground fire.
- (c) On 27 February, 15 miles north of Qui Nhon, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 3:

- (a) On 24 February, seven miles south-southwest of Dau Tieng, enemy gunners shot down a VNAF UH-1 helicopter.
- (b) On 26 February, six miles northeast of Tay Ninh, enemy forces fired 90 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 107mm rockets in the vicinity of an RF battalion.
- (c) On 1 March, two miles southwest of Lai Thieu, enemy forces assassinated the hamlet chief of Dan Bri hamlet.

MILITARY REGION 4:

- (a) On 24 February, 12 miles northeast of Vinh Long, enemy forces attacked elements of an infantry battalion.
- (b) On 26 February, 10 miles north-northwest of Vinh Long, enemy forces fired 70 rounds of 60mm mortar into a Popular Force outpost.
- (c) On 26 February, 10 miles south-southeast of Vi Thanh, enemy forces attacked elements of an infantry battalion.



- (d) On 27 February, 10 miles northeast of Chau Duc, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN infantry battalion.
- (e) On 28 February, seven miles south-southeast of Sa Dec, the hamlet chief of Tan Thuan hamlet was assassinated.
- (f) On 1 March, six miles southeast of Tan Phu, the hamlet chief of Tan An hamlet was assassinated.

D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Past Week

11. The fighting in Laos has diminished considerably during the past week. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred on each day of the past week and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the ceasefire agreement on Laos.

- On 26 February, one major incident occurred in MR IV of Laos, where enemy forces attacked a government position near Thateng on the northern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. A 120-man friendly unit was dispersed with eleven men killed and six wounded. Elsewhere, activity was sporadic and light. General quiet prevailed in the previously active Plaine des Jarres and Paksong areas.
- On 27 February, activity continued to decline throughout the country. Two incidents were reported in northwest MR I of Laos, where heavy shelling drove friendly forces from Muong Moug. Elsewhere, enemy units on the Bolovens Plateau followed up the previous day's attacks in the Thateng area.
- On 28 February, the level of fighting further decreased. Enemy forces continued to harass friendly troops to the south of Thateng on the Bolovens. Elsewhere, the only significant enemy-initiated action was a shelling



attack and subsequent ground attack which drove friendly forces from forward positions west of Bouam Long in Lao MR II.

- On 1 March, scattered small incidents which were initiated by the Communists occurred in MR III and MR IV of Laos, but there was no other significant activity.
- On 2 March, only scattered small incidents were reported.
- On 3 March, activity was also at a very low level.

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## ANNEX III

Definition of "major" and "minor" ceasefire violations:

Paragraph 8 of this memorandum contains a table listing the total number of Communist-inspired ceasefire violations reported by the GVN, both for the past week and for the whole period since the ceasefire became effective on 28 January. The determination of whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based on the following criteria, which have been established by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Major Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities or population centers:

- Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, or rocket fire within a short period of time or sporadically over a period of hours.
- Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground attack with or without supporting fire.
- Are subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving extensive use of mines and demolitions.

Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities or population centers:

- Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, rocket, or small arms fire following an extended period during which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were received.
- Receive a small ground probe, unsupported by significant mortar, artillery, or rocket fire, following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.
- Are subjected to one or a very few small terrorist attacks involving use of mines and demolitions following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.