

SECRET

SECRET

STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE

VOL. 5

1961

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

JOB NO. 287-93194A
BOX NO. 1
FOLDER NO. 5
TOTAL DOCS HEREIN 1



VOL. 5 NO. 1

WINTER 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING

DOC	1	REV DATE	30-4-80
ORIG CUSP	11	CVI	11
ORIG CLASS	5	PRCS	502
JUST	22	NEXT REV	20/10
		AUTH	HR 10-2

SECRET

All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence community.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

SECRET

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITOR

PHILIP K. EDWARDS

EDITORIAL BOARD

SHERMAN KENT, *Chairman*

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

Contributions to the *Studies* or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through *Secret*.

For inclusion on the regular *Studies* distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor,

CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
The 1960 Studies in Intelligence Award	faces 1
Great Frusina Revisited: The Problem of Priority Positive Intelligence	Wallace E. Seidel 1
<i>Redesign for an obsolescent intelligence organization.</i> SECRET	
The Yo-Yo Story: An Electronics Analysis Case History	Charles R. Ahern 11
<i>Reconstruction of a Soviet missile-guidance system.</i> SECRET	
Psywar by Forgery	Alma Fryxell 25
<i>Black intelligence support for Sino-Soviet propaganda.</i> SECRET	
Classified Listing of Articles in Volume IV	53

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

SECRET/

SECRET/

25X1

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Galahad: Intelligence Aspects . . . Charles N. Hunter <i>Combat intelligence, command problems, and the OSS contribution to Merrill's Marauders.</i>	A1
Machines and the Chinese Name . . . Guy P. Webb <i>Standards for the wanton romanization of charac- ters.</i>	A29
The Progress of Pinyin . . . J. N. Wong <i>A new endemic standard Chinese language system.</i>	A35
Edward Bancroft (@ Edwd. Edwards), Estimable Spy John P. Vaillancourt <i>A high-level penetration that duped Benjamin Franklin.</i>	A53
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	
<i>World War II</i>	A68
<i>The Economic War</i>	A72
<i>Miscellany</i>	A75

25X1

SECRET/

SECRET/

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

SECRET [REDACTED]

THE 1960 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

The first annual *Studies* award of \$500, for the most significant contribution during 1960 to the literature of intelligence, has been made to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] published in the Fall 1960 issue. Although other contributions were considered more significant in the historical sense, of broader general interest, or more immediately applicable in the work of the community, [REDACTED] submission represents best the kind of constructive thinking that the *Studies* especially desires to promote. Among the several other candidates earnestly considered for the 1960 award, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] printed in the Winter issue, is distinguished as particularly meritorious.

SECRET [REDACTED]

SECRET

The evolution of intelligence as knowledge demands a redesigning of intelligence as organization.

GREAT FRUSINA REVISITED: The Problem of Priority Positive Intelligence Wallace E. Seidel

In 1949 Sherman Kent referred to strategic intelligence as "the intelligence of national survival"¹ and elsewhere, more lexicographically, as "high-level foreign positive intelligence."² This paper is focused in its particulars on one aspect of the highest-priority positive intelligence problem of today, that of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile, especially the ICBM. In a larger sense, however, its subject is the change that has taken place during the past decade in the kinds of knowledge that constitute strategic intelligence and the meaning of this change in terms of what kind of organization and activity is needed to produce the intelligence of national survival.

The New Knowledge

When we first visited Great Frusina with Mr. Kent, the evaluation of her strategic stature was presented as requiring knowledge of "the situation, the non-military instrumentalities, the force in being, and the war potential" of the state.³ Now, little more than ten years later, the development of thermonuclear weapons and missiles able to carry them half way across the earth in a matter of minutes has put a different face on the last two of these concepts: the Soviet force in being has taken on overriding significance as a constant threat to our national survival; and the mobilization of war potential, on the other hand, is now largely bereft of meaning in the context of the general war. The enemy's military research and development programs and his plans for making new

¹ *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

SECRET

1

SECRET

Great Frusina Revisited

weapons operational have replaced his mobilization potential as a factor in his strategic stature.

The effect of these changes on the nature of strategic intelligence activity is to elevate the strategic importance of getting what used to be considered military departmental information—order of battle—on the force in being, and to reduce radically the time factor in all our intelligence-policy equations, both for force in being and for weapons under development. In “the long-range intelligence of . . . grand strategy”⁴ the time range has been greatly compressed, both for those who decide the policy and to an equal or even greater degree for the collectors and producers of the intelligence. The U.S. decision makers are currently faced with the prospect of nuclear missile forces which can effect virtually immediate delivery of an almost annihilative blow and for which there is as yet no active defense.

Mr. Kent could state a decade ago that “as a general proposition every country knows a great deal about all other countries’ forces in being and a great deal about most of their weapons.”⁵ As every intelligence officer concerned with the problem today knows, the verity of this generalization with respect to Soviet guided missile systems leaves much to be desired. The critical thing is that the decline in the quality and quantity of our information on the enemy’s weapon systems, in being and under development, is occurring at just this time, when U.S. policy makers require a more immediate and greater fund of information than ever before. This was the point of President Eisenhower’s statement of 25 May 1960, following the loss of the U-2 and the collapse at the Summit:

Our safety . . . [demands] effective systems for gathering information about the military capability of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.⁶

Another time compression in the new strategic intelligence, besides the prospective suddenness of attack and potential

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁶ *New York Times*, May 26, 1960, p. 16.

Great Frusina Revisited

SECRET

brevity of war, is the continuing acceleration of change in military technology. To the policy maker this brings a two-fold problem—higher rates of obsolescence and increased costs for weapon systems. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery has pointed out:

The statesman of a century ago was given more than a generation to adjust national policies to the change from coal to oil in the world’s navies. But today such adjustment must occur, in historical terms, overnight. An example: National security planners had scarcely begun to adapt policy to the fact of fission weapons in the world’s arsenals, when the vastly more destructive fusion weapon entered upon the scene. . . . While the pace of technological change has quickened, the cost of failure to make appropriate policy adaptations has risen—exponentially.⁷

These “appropriate policy adaptations” are dependent upon information which only the intelligence community can provide. An intelligence problem of such magnitude and complexity cannot be solved with the order-of-battle apparatus of a decade ago.

A third point at which time is a factor is in the process of translating a weapons system idea into the reality of a field capability. Here management control techniques and planning have succeeded, despite greatly increased complexity and an esoteric technology, in compressing the development-production-operation cycle in varying degrees, according to the state of the art and the urgency of the requirements. The USSR, as well as the United States, has employed such organizational techniques in its missile programs and thus further shortened our lead time in the strategic intelligence problem.

Although we have been thinking here primarily about immediate prospects in the ICBM field, it must be recognized that our new strategic intelligence problems are neither unique thereto nor likely to diminish. The ever accelerating rate of technological change has already thrust similar problems before us in such areas as anti-submarine warfare, anti-missile weapons, and space systems for war and peace.

⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Report No. 1026, 86th Congress, 2d Session, “Organizing for National Security,” (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 13.

SECRET

Great Frusina Revisited

Organizational Patching

A recognition of the fundamental change in the character, increase in the importance, and decrease in the availability of the positive intelligence necessary for the strategic equation leads us to revisit the analysis of intelligence as organization. In doing so we may profit by using Mr. Kent's criteria to ask ourselves some pertinent questions. Have we been "willing to undertake heartbreaking reorganization when the balance sheet so indicates"? Have we permitted units or organizational forms to achieve "a vested interest" in what is no longer pertinent to our priority problems? Have we achieved the "fluidity of structure" and "the ability to shift power . . . as unforeseen [or even foreseen] peak loads develop"?⁸

The organizational history of intelligence research components under the impact of the Soviet missile problem does reveal an effort to adjust to the new situation. In CIA, for example, the question of Soviet technical developments in the missiles field was attacked ten years ago by organizing a Guided Missile Branch within one of the divisions of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and before the decade was half over that branch had itself become a division. Outside the field of technical development, in order to meet the more pressing need for knowledge of the Soviet missile force in being or in immediate prospect, there was meanwhile organized a small Guided Missile Staff in one of the economic research divisions of the Office of Research and Reports to study Soviet production of the weapons for issue to the armed forces, and by the end of the decade this staff had become one of the largest branches in that Office. It managed to harness enough experience to supply some of the information of broad scope required for national estimates on the Soviet missile program. And most recently there has been an effort to pool both scientific and economic intelligence resources in a Task Force devoted to the Soviet LRBV program, particularly the ICBM threat.

Helpful as these adjustments are, I submit that they represent half-way measures, an ad hoc response of vested interests rather than the heartbreaking reorganization for a unified weapons system approach to the whole strategic problem that would demonstrate fluidity of structure. Even the "Task

⁸ Kent, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

Great Frusina Revisited

SECRET

Force," really only a coordinating mechanism, is not a device that can weave together the scientific and technical research done by one component and the study of weapons system programming, costing, production, and operational deployment done by another. The continued division of line control and supervision still prevents any integrated approach to the research problem.

To conceive the kind of organizational measures that could, and in my view should, be taken, we might draw by analogy from outside of intelligence, from the typical development program for the missile system itself. This, like the missile intelligence problem, has all the attributes of complexity, specialized knowledge, high priority, and unmatched urgency. Here specialists organized according to their component of the problem work on assigned tasks with no certainty whether and how soon they will be accomplished. Nevertheless the requirements for each task are so organized and the specifications for each component product so calculated that all will be compatible in the final assembly, the finished system. It is therefore necessary, as the program proceeds, continuously to modify the design of the overall system as the original requirements for individual components cannot be met or on the other hand are modified by favorable findings that had not been foreseen. *To carry out such a program requires centralized planning and line control of contributing components working as an integrated team, so supervised as to assure that all elements being developed at any given time will be compatible in the system as then conceived.*

The missile intelligence problem, indeed the entire Soviet strategic intelligence problem, requires a similar set of organizational controls. The endless adjustment of its interwoven elements can be achieved only by *central definition of the objectives of individual intelligence components engaged in research, support, and collection* and a constant evaluation of their progress toward these objectives. The integration of the complex and specialized tasks involved cannot be relegated to a committee, a special assistant, or a "gadfly" with any hope of carrying out an effective program. It can be accomplished only by a working organization composed of specialists from the several components and *a management center with the power of direct control.*

SECRET

*Great Frusina Revisited**The House Divided*

We have seen that the nature of strategic intelligence knowledge has changed considerably, particularly in its time component, and that the compression of time has been accompanied by an increase in substantive complexity and specialization which our research organizations have failed to counter with a planned and integrated program. We have also noted a decline in the quality and quantity of information on the enemy's strategic capabilities in the weapons field, a decline for which there has been a tendency for those engaged in intelligence research to blame those engaged in collection activities, and vice versa. The fault lies rather in an imperfect understanding of the nature of the problem.

At the heart of this problem, as far as the CIA effort is concerned, lies the fact that the Agency is a house divided between intelligence collection and intelligence research. Mr. Kent noted a decade ago that the segregation of covert collection activities was dictated by the need for secrecy, and he pointed out that "unless this clandestine force watches sharply it can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows the mechanisms of security to cut it off from some of the most significant lines of guidance, it destroys its own reason for existence."⁹ In today's highest-priority intelligence problems, I suggest, the segregation of intelligence collection from research is a luxury we can no longer afford.

The difficulties of integration are undoubtedly manifold and great, but they cannot be more cogent than those of continuing to stumble along our separate ways. First among these is that of compensating for the time compression we have noted, of meeting the urgency of the key problems. Segregation requires the interposition of a duplicative liaison structure, with an inevitable loss of precious time and in many instances an attenuation of the specialized substantive data required for the intelligence product. Second, collection resources cannot be brought into full play on the esoteric, complex, and changing requirements for data without interaction between the progress of the research effort and the peculiarities of collection tradecraft. Finally, the insulation of research specialist from collection specialist prevents the comparative analysis of

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

Great Frusina Revisited

SECRET

collection resources essential to an integrated, centralized, problem-oriented effort and to coordinated planning research for such an effort.

In a word, the segregation of the collection activity can but prevent a truly integrated approach to the priority strategic intelligence problem. Its need for secrecy must be weighed against the urgency of this problem. In the integrated research and collection effort with the best-known accomplishments of the recent past, the U-2 program, the risk to our national security was considerably greater than in any ordinary covert collection operation one might conceive. Yet secrecy was forced to yield to need, and relatively large numbers of both research and collection personnel worked together on the centrally directed task.

Agency and Community

The change in the character of strategic intelligence has had a marked effect on departmental intelligence organizations, activities, and policies, and these would be fruitful subjects for separate discussion in detail. After more than a decade of central intelligence, however, CIA is legally and by established precedent the only organization whose primary business is intelligence coordination and integration. It is therefore the proper one to take the lead in solving the strategic intelligence problems of today, which, however analogous to the order of battle of a bygone era, transcend in their implications and complexity the responsibilities of any single departmental intelligence organization. If the Director of Central Intelligence is to advise the National Security Council on these topmost questions of national security, he must have an organization capable of providing him with the results of integrated collection and research. The matter has become too large and complex for post facto integration through the intuitive applications of staff officers and the ad hoc considerations of joint committees. As the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote recently, "This is a critical level of intelligence production . . . where intelligence usually triggers the broad changes in defense policy that can set off a whole series of national programs."¹⁰

¹⁰ Laurence H. Frost, "Intelligence as a Support to and a Responsibility of Command," *ONI Review*, Vol. 15, No. 9 (September 1960), p. 388.

SECRET

Great Frusina Revised

In our quite proper concern in recent years with the threat of Soviet economic and political offensives, we should not lose sight of the ultimate fulcrum of strategic power, as pointed out by a recent study prepared for the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate:

As long as the cold war continues, American foreign policy must be based on a defense policy designed to ward off Soviet threats against the free countries of the world. While military defense needs to be supplemented by economic, psychological, and other policies, the provision of adequate appropriate military strength is the precondition of free world security.¹¹

The provision of adequate military strength is in large part dependent upon adequate intelligence about Soviet weapons systems, present and prospective; and the provision of this intelligence, we have suggested, requires a problem-oriented program bringing together existing research and collection resources into a centrally controlled unit.

There is still one further requirement. This unified organization must contain, as an integral part, a working-level group concerned with problem analysis and planning. This type of unit, analogous to the R & D and "Advanced Projects" units in the creation of weapon systems, has been conspicuous in the intelligence community by its absence. There has been a tendency to put the planning function on the policy management level, in isolation from the detailed substantive realities. The planning group here contemplated is one of experts, conversant in detail with the problems of today and of tomorrow. It must be not only substantively qualified but at the same time cognizant of the comparative capabilities of the resources it can call upon to accomplish its objectives. Its work must be at a tempo corresponding to the urgency of the problems it has to deal with, and its solutions must be given force by representation in policy management.

¹¹ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 1st Session, *United States Foreign Policy*, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy." A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University, No. 8 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 1.

Great Frusina Revised

SECRET

Such an integration of intelligence planning, production, and collection should provide for the definition of objectives, a rapid response to requirements, the constant evaluation of progress, and adequate control over a dynamic process. It should make possible a more economical and thorough exploitation of our finite resources. It would not, of course, guarantee success; but with current organizational forms clearly an impediment to success, a refusal to reorganize would augment the possibility of failure, along with the prospect of higher expenditures and greater risks.

It is time for us to give new meaning to the production of "high-level foreign positive intelligence" and bring all our resources to bear on the first-priority national intelligence objective through positive action. Soviet security is only half our enemy; the other half is the flight of time, our most precious commodity. Whether we shall waste it or use it wisely seems in large part to depend upon our ability to recognize the deficiencies in our current efforts and overcome our parochialisms. Upon our success or failure could ultimately hinge the survival of the nation.

SECRET

*Exemplary but unusual history
of the detection and reconstruction
of a Soviet missile-guidance system.*

**THE YO-YO STORY:
An Electronics Analysis Case History
Charles R. Ahern**

Electronic components are a critical part of modern weapons systems, less dispensable than some of their more obviously important features. It is possible to conceive of an air defense system without interceptor aircraft, for example, but it is not possible to conceive of one without electronic devices, systems, and techniques. Intelligence on the electronic portions of Soviet weapons systems has therefore become a key item in our knowledge of these systems. Here is a case history of community teamwork in gaining such intelligence on an unprecedented type of radar control for surface-to-air missiles in the Soviet air defense system. The story features a concerted effort to obtain observations, an imaginative analysis, a lucky break, and an excellent follow-through by research and development.

Herringbones and Ventilators

In the early 1950's U.S. and British intelligence posted a lookout for signs of the Soviet deployment of surface-to-air missiles in readiness for defense against air attack. Toward the end of 1953 some unusual road networks were seen outside of Moscow, which, although they did not have the anticipated configuration of missile sites, were at least located at points where missile installations might be expected. As the pattern of these locations began to develop a more intense search for them was made. By the autumn of 1954 quite a number of reports consistently described the networks as comprising three more or less parallel roads a mile long intersected by some ten cross roads about a half mile in length in a herringbone pattern. There was nothing in the reports that would particularly excite the curiosity of the specialist in electronics intelligence.

SECRET

11

MORI/HRP PAGES 11-23

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story




Figure 1. Herringbone Road Complex

During the last quarter of that year U.S. and UK attachés began to report details of other features around the herringbone complexes in the Moscow area. In September a British observer, without making specific reference to it in the body of his report, indicated in a sketch that there was a "barracks area" some distance away, more or less in line with the axis of the herringbone and connected with it by a road. After a couple of weeks this report was amplified and a different possible barracks area located. The original "barracks," according to the revised description, seemed to be a long grass-covered bunker with a concrete hand-stand at one end. The observer noted that large ventilators at this end of the bunker flapped with what seemed extraordinary violence, even when the fairly high wind blowing at the time was taken into consideration.

A week later, when two U.S. attachés were a half hour out from Moscow on a plane bound for Leningrad, one of them noticed an unusual installation on the ground. It had a look of newness and activity about it. He didn't get a very clear impression of any buildings on the site; his eye was caught by the motion of two large wheels installed in a pit with a ramp leading down to them. Each wheel, he reported, was like a thin yo-yo, with twin flat disks spinning at an angle to the horizontal. He estimated their speed at about 60 rpm and said they appeared to wobble on their axes. He had difficulty describing the nature of this wobble; it appeared to be a kind of "even undulation throwing the outside edges [of the disks] a foot or two from their planes of rotation." His sketch is shown in Figure 2.

12

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

SECRET




Figure 2. Observer's Sketch of Yo-Yo

SECRET

13

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

This report proved to be a remarkably accurate description of the device thereupon nicknamed the Yo-Yo,¹ considering that the observer had only five or ten seconds to take in the details of something never before seen or heard of. His companion on the flight, seated on the other side of the plane, had in the course of the trip spotted one of the herringbone sites, and when he returned to Moscow a few days later he reported it in response to the standing order for observations on these. When the two men checked their observation times they realized that the Yo-Yo and the herringbone had been seen simultaneously, and that there might be a connection between them. They astutely guessed that the Yo-Yo might represent some kind of missile guidance system, and this comment in the report brought it to the attention of electronics intelligence analysts.

A month later, about the beginning of December, British observers riding on a train southeast of Moscow noticed a fenced area with a microwave antenna on a pole at one end. In the center of the enclosure there was an earth bunker with one open end facing the pole. There they saw a "double rotating disk array," each disk, they judged, about ten feet in diameter and making about 120 revolutions per minute. The plane of the disks was inclined at about 45 degrees from the horizontal. The observers had the impression that the disks either had serrated edges or were polygonal structures given a disk-like appearance by the rotation.

In February 1955 this same site was observed and photographed by U.S. personnel. Their photography was not of a scale or quality to convey any clear idea of the shape of the Yo-Yo, but their observations, erroneous in part, did correct and refine some of the earlier information. They reported that the two disks were each about 20 feet in diameter and about 12 inches thick. They thought them both vertical, at right angles to each other. They were not sure whether they were double, and if so whether the two halves rotated in the same or opposite directions. They estimated the rotation to

¹ Soviet Bloc electronics items are assigned *nicknames*, as opposed to code names or cover names, to provide a common nomenclature in the collection and production of intelligence. These nicknames are selected and agreed upon on a tripartite basis among electronics intelligence representatives of the United States, the UK, and Canada.

The Yo-Yo Story

SECRET




Figure 3. Sketch of Disks Seen One on Edge and One Full-face.

be about 40 rpm and stated that there was no wobble, an optical illusion of one being given by the viewing angle and the serrated edges. Figure 3 is a sketch supplied with this report.

At this stage it was by no means clear that the herringbone complexes had anything to do with missiles. No missile had been seen on the sites, and the road arrangement would have been equally suitable to housing development or crop or ammunition storage. Even if they were surface-to-air missile sites, it was not firmly established that the Yo-Yo was uniquely related to them. Further, there was nothing about the Yo-Yo to indicate that it was an electronic device; the reports on it did not even convey any clear idea of what it looked like. One offhand opinion received from British experts was that it might be a rock crusher.

Nevertheless, under the good-humored assumption that "if no one can figure out what it is, it must be electronics," the Yo-Yo reports were laid before the joint gatherings of community electronics specialists at that time sponsored by the old Military Electronics Working Group. Beginning in January 1955, the Yo-Yo was brought up at each meeting of the MEWG for many months. For the present, however, there was little that the electronics analyst could do but speculate as to what the observers had really seen and request more detailed information, especially photographs.

By the summer of 1955 it had become more or less clear that the Yo-Yo did bear a specific relationship to the herringbone complexes. The herringbones were arranged so that their length was always along a radial line from Moscow. The Yo-Yo bunker was situated on this same line, centered on the herringbone, and always about a mile nearer to Moscow. The

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

Yo-Yo itself was invariably at the herringbone end of the bunker. But the true shape and appearance of the Yo-Yo remained uncertain.

Early in August 1955 a packet of photographs was brought to CIA electronics analysts. Picturing a Yo-Yo southeast of Moscow, they had been taken, happily, from several different angles. These photographs revealed, at last, what the Yo-Yo really looked like. The observers had for the past year been more or less correctly and accurately describing what they had seen, but the descriptions were incomplete. The "disks" were truncated equilateral triangles assembled in pairs in the Star of David configuration. There were two such assemblies, one in the vertical Moscow-herringbone plane and the other (of which an edge is visible in the accompanying reproduction) at right angles tilting up 45 degrees from the horizontal toward the herringbone. The early "violent flapping of the ventilators" and wobbling wheels were now comprehensible optical interpretations of the two assemblies in rotation.

Analysis and Synthesis

The analyst, as is usually the case in electronics intelligence, thus found himself confronted with a fully developed Soviet device deployed in the field. In these circumstances his task is one of unravelling what the Soviet designer was




Figure 4. Photograph of Bunker with Yo-Yos at Right End

16

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

SECRET

attempting to achieve, the reverse of the original design process. Whereas the Soviet designer is given a set of performance specifications and proceeds by selecting available techniques, components, and production processes and by making the inevitable technical compromises to reach his final design, the analyst must work backward from the finished design to arrive at the designer's objective. In this process he must also take care that his thinking is not controlled by concepts of how an item would be designed in the United States: the Soviet concept of equipment use is usually quite different from ours, at least in electronics.

In the absence of any similar, previously known piece of equipment from which to extrapolate, the analysis of the Yo-Yo problem had to begin with a basic assumption as to the general purpose of the device—that it was designed to control surface-to-air missiles launched from the herringbone area (though no missiles had yet been seen). Granted this assumption, the problem became that of figuring out how missiles could be guided by an apparatus with such an appearance as that shown in the photos and the placement and behavior described in the observer reports. The analytic point of departure was the consideration that, however the Yo-Yo worked to guide the assumed missiles, it would have to provide information with sufficient accuracy on both the missile's target and the missile itself in three coordinates—range, elevation, and azimuth.

In virtually all surface-to-air missile guidance systems this tracking of the missile and its target is done by a system of radar antennas, say of parabolic form, that point toward missile and target and focus beams of radio energy on them, much as a searchlight does with its visible beam. Before the Yo-Yo photos were received the possibility could not be ruled out that it too was such a large parabolic reflector imperfectly observed and poorly described; but the form shown in the photos was clearly no conventional variety of antenna system. All the available descriptive information indicated that the Yo-Yo disks retained their relative position while rotating. This meant that only the edges of the disks could point upward and away from Moscow, the direction in which radar antennas should be looking for enemy aircraft and should guide missiles to attack them. The straight sections of these

SECRET

17

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

edges seemed the most likely portion for antenna apertures. This reasoning provided the germ of a solution.

The straight sections were about 20 feet long and perhaps 8 inches wide. An aperture of these proportions could be expected to produce a transverse fan beam about 30 times as broad in the plane of its short dimension as in that of its length.² Given the orientation, arrangement, and rotation pattern of the disks, it appeared that on each rotation of each two-disk assembly six of these narrow beams, one from each straight edge, would scan a volume of space extending above and beyond the herringbone complexes. The size and number of the apertures had apparently been one of the requirements on the mechanical designer: since six would have made a huge, unwieldy single disk, he had divided them between two Star-of-David triangles.

The six beams from the tilted Yo-Yo would thus scan the air approaches to Moscow in azimuth and those from the vertical assembly would scan it in elevation. Both sets could provide range data on any target or missile in the volume of space scanned. With the whole volume covered, the antennas would not need, like a searchlight or parabolic radar, to stop scanning in order to follow a target or the defense missile, but would provide position data on these in the course of continued scanning. In such a system, therefore called "track-while-scan," memory devices would be needed to develop the track by maintaining continuity of information during the intervals between the individual antenna scans. Such devices were considered possible.

A series of calculations, based on guided missile performance requirements as well as radar needs, were then undertaken. Guided missile analysts furnished estimates of the probable range of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and the size of their warheads. The former provided limits for certain technical characteristics affecting the range requirement of the radar; the latter helped define its accuracy requirements. In all, two dozen or more technical factors entered the calculations. These had to be weighed against one another in reaching the compromises that are always forced upon the system designer:

² The dimensions of the beam are inversely proportional to those of the aperture that produces it.

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

SECRET

for example, if the operating frequency were too low, accuracy would be poor and transmitter power requirements excessive; if it were too high, the rapid scanning rate of the antennas and the narrowness of the beams would make too few pulses hit the target.

As the design for a missile guidance system evolved from this process, a check was made with analysts in the field of vacuum tubes and other electronic components to insure that it did not call for techniques or components beyond Soviet capabilities. Finally a design was established that took into consideration the missile, the operating principle of its guidance, the technical characteristics of the radar, the accuracy of the system, and its anticipated capabilities.

One task remained—to re-examine the entire solution against any possible alternatives in the light of all reports and photographs, inquiring whether everything reported could be accounted for in the solution and whether anything required by the solution and not reported would seriously weaken it. Each alternative solution that came to mind failed to account for some aspect of the reported data or required a capability on the part of Soviet technology that appeared unreasonable. One suggestion, for example, was that the Yo-Yo antennas would simply radiate energy to illuminate the target for a homing system in the missile. Such a system might work, but because of the discontinuous nature of the radar signal it would require the inclusion of memory devices in the homing gear of each missile. This elaborate provision seemed unlikely. Furthermore, the homing illumination theory was inconsistent with the configuration of the Yo-Yos: a single pair of disks should give adequate illumination, so the two at right angles to each other would be an unnecessary complication.

Testing the tentative answer to a problem is a fairly standard procedure, but testing this answer was a particularly demanding task because of its startling implications. If it was right, the Soviets had not continued in the direction taken by the original German wartime development of surface-to-air missile guidance nor in that of postwar Western efforts, which were based on extensions of the German work. Instead, making a clean break with precedent, they had arrived at a design that was inherently capable of dealing with multiple

SECRET

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

targets simultaneously. The data on the target or targets were apparently translated automatically into missile command guidance; there were no indications of a homing system on the missile.

This analysis, which required some three weeks from the time the photos were received, was made the basis for a Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report incorporating its conclusions and presenting a list of probable technical parameters.³ The publication of the report would ordinarily have been the end of the matter; but the Yo-Yo story is unique. For one thing, the report found, with its unprecedented conclusions, a by no means unanimous initial acceptance among the elements of the intelligence community concerned with electronics and guided missiles. For another, it was brought in December 1955, through a series of steps initiated by Army intelligence, before the Technical Advisory Committee on Electronics of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, and the Committee recommended that a project be initiated to build a prototype or mock-up of the Yo-Yo as therein conceived. The mock-up technique, used during World War II, had led to an assessment of the capabilities of the German radars and was invaluable in developing electronic countermeasures to foil them, but its use had not been common in the decade following the war.

In March 1956, at about the same time it became fairly well established that missiles were actually emplaced on the herringbone complexes, the mock-up contract was let through Army Ordnance and work on it begun.

Exploitation of a Break

Meanwhile the Dragon Returnee Program had been working on repatriated German scientists and technicians who had been taken to the U.S.S.R. after the war. Many of these gave information of some value to electronics and guided missile intelligence, but it appeared that the Soviets had carefully kept the German electronics specialists insulated from developmental work in military electronics, especially in the heavy radar field, where the results of Soviet efforts were becoming increasingly evident from other sources. After sev-

³Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report, CIA/SI 51-55, 6 Oct. 1955, "YO-YO, A Possible Soviet Missile Guidance System."

20

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

SECRET

eral years of experience with returnees, the chances of finding one who knew about the development of specific high priority electronics items were privately judged at about one in ten thousand.

In the fall of 1956, however, a year after the publication of the Yo-Yo analysis, one of the Dragon returnees, Christian Sorge, who it was thought might have information on a different missile system, called attention during his routine preliminary debriefing to a new development on which he had worked from 1950 to 1952, a system for guiding surface-to-air missiles called the B-200. He said that it used a very strange-looking antenna system, which he then sketched on a sheet of paper for the interrogator. The interrogator, looking at




Figure 5. Sorge's Sketch of B-200 Antenna

the superimposed equilateral triangles Sorge had drawn, recalled the published Yo-Yo analysis and realized with considerable excitement that Sorge had knowledge more important than had been supposed. As the preliminary debriefing continued, the identity of the B-200 with the analytic conception of the Yo-Yo was established at some dozen points.

The intelligence community now organized a team of specialists to assist in Sorge's debriefing. Their efforts brought out more and more technical details, especially of the memory portion of the system, the complex electronic tracking circuitry made necessary by the adoption of a guidance system dependent on the discontinuous data of scanning antennas. It was this critical part of the B-200 system, fortunately, that Sorge had worked on. By the time his debriefing had

SECRET

21

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

been completed he had provided many new insights, as well as having confirmed some 25 or 30 facts hypothesized in the analytic reconstruction. One curious reaction to the initial correlation between the analytic report of October 1955 and Sorge's information had been the suspicion that the report might have fallen into KGB hands, who through Sorge were now feeding it back to the interrogator. This fear was quickly dispelled by the amount of detail and consistency in Sorge's data.

Sorge said that he and several others, having signed contracts with the Soviet authorities for additional work in 1950 and 1951, had been assigned tasks on the B-200 system, which had apparently been conceived by 1949. In addition to the details of circuit designs, he described some of the testing programs for the prototype that began in 1952, and his information was supplemented by that from some of the others who had returned. But in 1952 they had all been removed from B-200 development and placed in non-sensitive activities for a cooling-off period of three or four years prior to repatriation.

Follow-Through by R&D

The group of specialists assisting in the debriefing of Sorge included personnel from the Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratory, the contractor for the Yo-Yo mock-up project. As details of the tracking system and other portions of the B-200 were brought out by interrogation, they were promptly included in the development work, effecting important changes in its direction. As a major example, although the analytic report had hypothesized a separate computer for each missile-target engagement, the DOFL people had decided that the Soviets would use a single large digital computer. Sorge's statement that separate analog computers were in fact called for in the design now brought about a timely reorientation in the mock-up project. It was fortunate that the project was already contracted for and under way when Sorge appeared: at least a year and perhaps more was saved by having a research team assembled and working on the problem before being overwhelmed by such a volume of detailed information.

As it was, the development project, begun in April 1956, did not yield a prototype installation that could be tested until early in 1958. The results of the test program showed the

22

SECRET

The Yo-Yo Story

SECRET

Soviet B-200 to constitute a major technological advance in radar tracking systems. An additional surprise was that it performed much better than expected when tested against electronic countermeasures, jamming; but the technique of dropping chaff was effective against it if properly employed. The B-200 was found to have an angle accuracy as great as 0.05° on strong targets and a range accuracy of 25 yards; this meant that missiles in the range of 20 to 25 miles would not need a homing radar of their own. Its low-altitude capability was much better than the Germans had estimated, being limited only by the terrain around the installation.

The ability of the system to cope with multiple targets was confirmed; the ability of one installation to direct as many as 20 or 25 simultaneous target-missile interceptions, as claimed by the Germans, seems to depend only on whether the Soviets choose to provide the necessary computer for each interception.

Thus the Yo-Yo story, which began with the reports of a few alert observers who noticed some unusual installations in 1953 and 1954, ends with the tests of the mock-up system in the autumn of 1958. It raises some interesting questions, for example how quickly the Sorge information would have been believed if the Yo-Yo sites not been seen, reported, and analyzed. Even with the analytic report in hand, some of the specialists involved in the debriefing doubted much of what Sorge said in the early stages. The approach of the analytic report itself, the setting out to design a Soviet electronic system on the basis of its physical appearance, was unique; it succeeded largely because the design was so different from anything theretofore developed.

The concern of electronics analysts about the new Soviet guidance system has remained undiminished, because our information on its internal workings ends with the 1950-1953 period, and what the Soviets may have done in the intervening years to improve its performance is a continuing problem. Several studies have considered what improvements *could* be made in the B-200, but no intelligence information has come to light on any that *have* been made. And now the recent appearance of a second-generation missile guidance system, Fruit Set, which might be loosely described as a mobile Yo-Yo, is tending to push the original B-200 into the background.

SECRET

23

SECRET

Case study of how the Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services provide black support for overt psychological warfare themes.

PSYWAR BY FORGERY

Alma Fryxell

There is nothing new about the use of forged documents in the psychological warfare operations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services, especially in pursuit of particular aims within a single country; West Germany, for example, has been flooded with them for years. But the years 1957 and 1958 saw a noticeable increase in internationally distributed propaganda-by-forgery supporting the general Bloc objectives of discrediting the United States and other Western countries and of promoting division in the West. For these two years and the first half of 1959, 18 such forgeries surfaced in facsimile have been discovered, and a number of other instances wherein the text of a purported document was quoted without attempt at reproduction or a document was at least falsely reported to exist makes a total of 32 cases available for study from this period.

Some of these were sniper shots at individual important targets, without relation to any of the others and usually without any further follow-up; but most of them—25—were interconnected into nine distinguishable series, and some formed rather elaborate progressions in prolonged campaigns given heavy play in the overt propaganda media. The false documents were many of them originally surfaced in the overt Bloc media, but a greater number were planted, especially in the underdeveloped countries, in small "independent" newspapers subsidized for such purposes or otherwise controlled. Several were transmitted to their targets through diplomatic channels and a few by covert mailing.

The orchestration of these varied media in a coordinated campaign requires central direction. We know that black propaganda is a function of the Bloc foreign intelligence services under close direction from high Party echelons. It is

SECRET

25

MORI/HRP PAGES 25-51

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

possible that the entire Bloc show is directed by a unit of the CPSU Central Committee and run by the KGB through its liaison officers with the other services.

Single Documents

An example of the isolated false document is provided by the most recent of the cases in this period, the only one concerned with Black Africa. On 4 March 1959 the Hungarian press agency MTI transmitted in French to its outlets in Europe the purported text of a document signed by the prime minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky, and by the "head of the European organization of Central Africa, Alfred Finsent,"¹ which declared that it had been officially decided to transfer African nationalist prisoners "to another concentration camp where all those who would not express their resolution to break with African nationalism would be exterminated." MTI explained that this meant the Hola camp in Kenya, and reported further:

The African prisoners involved number about 80,000. If, after interrogation, they refuse to disown the Nationalist movement they will be thrown into ditches called "poison wells" filled with poisoned water. Within a few days the poisoned water will penetrate the body and kill. . . . The Cairo bureau of the Kenya African Association states that according to their knowledge, 35 Africans have already been exterminated "experimentally" by this procedure . . .

MTI's sensational disclosure of this perhaps too heinous plan was not picked up and used, as far as we know, in other media during 1959.

A more ambitious single-shot effort was made in June 1958 by the Czech intelligence service. It forged, with accurate duplication of format and style, an entire issue of *Ceske Slovo*, a bona fide newspaper published in Munich by Czech émigrés, and mailed it black from Munich and Vienna to current and former subscribers, using one genuine mailing list it had acquired some years earlier by unknown means and another recently obtained by burglarizing the *Ceske Slovo* offices. The

¹ Apparently a bad transliteration from Cyrillic through Arabic, along with a garbled title. Alfred Vincent was chairman of the Organization of European Members of the East African Central Legislative Assembly. Neither Cyrillic nor Arabic has a c, and Arabic has no v.

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

forged edition carried anti-West propaganda and announced that the newspaper was going out of existence because its editors were disillusioned with the West. In an exceptional follow-up, articles from it were quoted as authentic not only by the official *Rude Pravo* but by Party papers in Austria and Luxembourg and a non-Party Chicago monthly, *Svobodne Ceskoslovensko*, that follows the propaganda line of the Czech regime. The Western CP organs are generally not used in the distribution of Bloc forgeries.

A particularly dangerous kind of forged document was put into the mail on 5 July 1957 by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung, the East German equivalent of the KGB, which in January of that year had been assigned psychological warfare as a major operational responsibility. In France that summer one of the biggest news stories was the killing of the Strasbourg police chief's wife on 17 May by a bomb mailed her husband in the guise of a gift package. There had been mailed at the same time and in the same Paris post office a batch of particularly vicious hate-letters to French officials and private citizens in Paris and Alsace-Lorraine, and the conviction was growing that these and the terrorist bomb stemmed from the same source. The letters, demanding the return of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, were one of several series of Nazistic letters and leaflets signed "Kampfverband fuer ein Unabhaengiges Deutschland," an organization since determined to have been invented by the HVA for agitatory purposes (and given a fraternal plug in a May 1958 broadcast from Radio Moscow warning the French against it and implying that it was secretly supported by the West German government).

The single document mailed on 5 July 1957 was a deep and dexterous thrust evolved from the fictitious Kampfverband's campaign. Addressed to a high French official in West Germany, it was a forged letter from Elim O'Shaughnessy, head of the Political Division of our Bonn embassy, calling the State Department's attention to the activity of German reactionary and ultranationalist groups and recommending that the U.S. Government support these groups and use them. Having been delivered thus simply to its target, the French government, the forgery was never published or replayed in any way. It was convincing enough to have caused genuine damage in U.S.-

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

French relationships—except that it had been typed on the same machine as some other HVA psywar productions.

The remaining four individual cases were mere allegations of the existence of incriminating documents, made once and not repeated. One concerned the Near East: on 1 December 1958 the Czech press agency CTK attributed to "the Cairo press" a report that the new Sudanese government had found among the old government's papers some secret documents showing U.S. bribery of high Sudanese officials. The other three were targeted in the Far East and appeared in the Bombay *Blitz*, a Soviet-controlled "independent" weekly—a State Department directive to Ambassador Bishop in Thailand that he "screen the loyalties of the King and his government members"; a secret pact between Premier Kishi and Secretary Dulles "to permit use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia"; and a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to President Eisenhower warning that "every third soldier" in the Nationalist army was disloyal.

The Taipei Cables and Indonesia


Blitz was also the vehicle for an extended if not very sophisticated series of facsimile forgeries devised to take advantage of the 24 May 1957 riot at the American embassy in Taipei. On 14 September it prepared its readers for the forgeries by reporting rumors that Ambassador Rankin was in trouble and might be dismissed because some of the embassy's important secret documents had been lost when the premises were raided by the rioters. In its issue of the following week it reproduced the first of these documents, two cables to Washington wherein Ambassador Rankin discusses with some obliquity the methods to be used in assassinating Chiang and others in his entourage and recommends the murders be disguised as accidents. The text was couched in allusive terms for the sake of verisimilitude, but in its accompanying comment *Blitz* removed any uncertainty its readers might have had about its meaning and left nothing to their imagination. This is the usual Bloc practice in the surfacing of verbatim forgeries; but the rest of the Taipei series used less subtle texts.

The next issue of *Blitz*, 28 September, reproduced the heading and first lines of two fabricated cables from Ambassador

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

Allison in Indonesia to the Department, as "repeated to Taipei," and quoted their full texts. One urged increased aid, including combat units from Formosa, for dissident Indonesian movements; the other reported progress in intrigues to overthrow Sukarno and gave directions for packaging arms shipped from Formosa and Malaya to the Darul Islam. The same treatment was given the final item in the series, in *Blitz*' 12 October issue. Beginning on the same page that disclosed the Kishi-Dulles secret pact, there was reproduced



28

SECRET


SECRET

29

SECRET

a cable from Washington which deplored the tendency of SEATO members exhibited at its Canberra session to use the pact to obtain economic aid, reminded U.S. ambassadors that "control over the armed forces of the Asian members of SEATO remains our prime objective," and outlined steps to keep the local governments in line. *Blütz* apologized that the

American Plot To Overthrow Sukarno



PROOF POSITIVE FROM TAIPEH DOCUMENTS

HONGKONG: The machinations of American gangster-diplomacy which has made the Philippines a pawn in the cold war, have now overawed the government of President Sukarno in Indonesia and replace it by military rule.

News of this year were reported in BLITZ at that time.

Now irrefutable proof comes in the shape of documents which were obtained by the editor at Taipei following the release of the documents relating to the life of the late President Sukarno published last week in BLITZ—see page 10.

Here is a copy of the telegram from the American Embassy in Manila to the Department which was sent to the State Department on March 9. The telegram is No 473 of the Department.

March 9 at 5:30 P.M. Its text is as follows:

473, March 18, 5 p.m.
 Majumi leaders again insist on the necessity of increasing military aid to the DI and TH forces now operating in Sumatra, West Java and elsewhere in Indonesia. In view of the grave deterioration in the position of the DI and TH forces, they request that such aid should not be limited to the delivery of arms and ammunition, but that troops and other needed units from Formosa be sent to help the DI forces.

Can our Ambassador in Taipei ascertain if it is possible to take any registrable decision on this question?

* * *

The second telegram is No. 490 of March 26, 1957:

The following telegram has been sent to the Department and the State Department:

190, March 26, 9 p.m.
 Your telegram No. 1178 of

MARCH 22, 1964.

Manjumi leaders have already taken the additional measures to deepen the political crisis. With the support of the individual already known to you (This appears to be a reference to Dr. Mohammed Hatta—Editor), Natsir was able to secure a definite refusal from his party's central executive to join the new government. Sukarno has guaranteed full support for the Manjumi by the PSI both in overturning the National Party and forming a new government under the control of the Manjumi and their supporters, and also in the move to discredit Sukarno. As already reported, a joint communique

I think that with the help of this agreement, the Government will be able to get control of the army and replace Naustion by Sabroto. Simbolon suggested that Deputy Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, in my view, assistance to the military increases in Sumatra must be increased through the military. He said that the military of the Marjanis' failure to rise power, a Sumatran government could be formed which would be a military government. The individuals known to you from my past five four Sumatra went to the military and the present contact with the leaders of the Rante and Garuda military council. The DI and the military council the DI and the military council for this purpose.

These copies of the telegrams speak for themselves. Not only does US diplomacy seek to support the government of Indonesia by buying off stooges but by transfer of units from Formosa to help the DI forces." Even at a minor detail as the camouflage to be used for packing American arms is not omitted.

sh Atrocities In Oman

From A Correspondent
British Military Authorities in Bahrain

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Date: March 21, 1957

Code: 072

Reaching: March 27, 11 a.m.

AMERICAN BULGARIAN
THAIPIR

1957, March 21, 12:30 p.m.

SECRET

The Manila Daily Bulletin of the Canberra Session.

The recent session of the Council of the Manila Pact has revealed a tendency on the part of some of its members such as Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines to use the organization primarily as an additional source of economic

Proof Of Subversion In Taipei Document

International Gangsterism Of American Embassies

HONG KONG: "We must strengthen the positions of our friends in local governments and support those who are being less affected by nationalist ideas," directs a telegram from the State Department of the United States to its embassies in Asian countries.

The tone of this telegram No. 100-100000, dated March 21, which was received by the American Embassy in Hong Kong, is in line with the policy of the United States in Taipei. It goes to the extent to which it states that the privilege of being

Military Nature Of Treaty

- 1: "the strengthening of cooperation with leaders of the opposition parties who show understanding of the tasks facing our free world,"
- 2: "improve upon those in power that their position directly depends on their loyalty to the United States."

text was incom-
page of this te-
After some m-
given further p-
of Rankin's pl-
Radio Peking
cabled views on

LONDON: Startling information has reached London that Japanese Premier Kishi and U.S. Secretary of State Dulles signed a secret military agreement during Mr. Kishi's visit to Washington in last June.

I can reveal exclusively to BLITZ that the agreement allows the U.S. to use Japanese armed forces in military operations in any part of the Far East.

The U.S. in return, threw a sop to the Japanese Government by promising the establishment of a U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Committee to supervise military operations in the two countries.

The actual signing of the agreement was witnessed by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Kishi took place on September 1, 1951, in Washington, D.C. I am sure that the discussion on such a place had been going on many months before the signing.

Probably this agreement is

WORLD TIDES

Beginning Of A New Epoch

Baby RAMESH SANGHVI
BLITZ'S FOREIGN COMMENTATOR

THE SOVIET BABY MOON, revolving round our earth at nine hundred kilometers in the virgin space and completing each revolution in approximately ninety-six minutes heralds a new age in the history of human race. With the firing of the rocket which sent the Baby Moon in the outer space an epoch ended. A long, long age when humans were bound to the earth has passed away.

The glory of this epochal achievement goes gravally to the vitality and vigour of human hand and human mind. However, particularly it is to the eternal credit of the Soviet science and engineering, of the countless men and women in the Sovietland that this dream of the Vedas

First, mankind has broken the chains binding it to the earth. The unknown space beyond is now within its reach. We have speculated about the cosmic world, given names to the various planets and, on the basis of meagre and indirect evidence, formed certain beliefs. All this will

plete because "the lower portion of the program was torn off during the nine months' delay the items in this Taipei may to vulnerable selected audience" against Chiang was broadcast there on 30 December. The State Department and SEATO were picked up at the turn

text was incomplete because "the lower portion of the second page of this telegram was torn off during the riots."

After some months' delay the items in this Taipei series were given further play to vulnerable selected audiences. The story of Rankin's plot against Chiang was broadcast to Taiwan by Radio Peking on 30 December. The State Department's cabled views on SEATO were picked up at the turn of the year

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

by the pro-Communist weekly *La Patrie* published in Bangkok, the capital of the only proper Southeast Asia mainland member of SEATO. On 3 February 1958 Radio Moscow added details implicating Ambassador Cummings in the U.S. subversion of Indonesia documented in the forged Allison cables and broadcast an account of it to the United Kingdom. On 6 April the Djakarta *Berita Minggu*, another controlled "independent" weekly, announced that the authenticity of the Allison cables had been confirmed, and Peking's news agency NCNA carried this confirmation in its English-language transmission for Europe.

This late replay of the Allison cables merged them into another series concerned with Indonesia. The outbreak of open rebellion there in early 1958 brought new specific and heavily played charges that the United States had planned the revolt and was covertly giving it military support. On 22 March *Blitz* told its readers that U.S. officers at SEATO headquarters in Bangkok had been ordered to submit immediately an opinion on the construction of U.S. atom bases in Sumatra:

It is known here that a Top Secret agreement has been concluded by the Indonesian separatists with the SEATO and American groups, which provides for both SEATO and U.S. bases in "free" Sumatra. This agreement was finalized after secret talks which took place recently in Tokyo between Col. Sumunul, representing the "Separatist Government" of the Ussain-Shafuruddin rump, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy.

This report was followed up on 15 May, in the Rangoon weekly *The Mirror* (a third controlled "independent"), by the text of a letter said to be from rebel leader M. Samsuddin to Ambassador MacArthur, evidently on the subject of implementing the atom-base agreement. It began:

Your phone call proved to be real magic. The meeting . . . was very useful. We have agreed on practically all the details. Now, I hope, ties will remain permanent and we will receive all necessary materials without delay.

Soon, however, it became necessary to counter the effect of the United States' publicized friendly negotiations with the Sukarno government, and a new forgery was promptly launched to show that the U.S. public attitude was merely a smoke-screen. On 8 June *The Mirror* printed the text of a purported letter from naval intelligence chief Rear Admiral Lau-

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

rence Frost to the rebel leader Kawilarang, telling him "not to despair just because the U.S. issued statements expressing on the surface 'no interference' in the Indonesian civil war. We will continue giving assistance to you through Taiwan and the Philippines and other channels." After two weeks this story was repeated in a chronic Indonesian vehicle for plot charges, the "independent" Djakarta *Bintang Timur*, and its version was carried by the Chinese NCNA and a week later in Soviet domestic broadcasts.

We happen to have some details on the mechanics through which such counterfeit texts would be placed in *The Mirror* or another of the half-dozen receptive Burmese papers. The KGB rezidentura at the Rangoon embassy would receive them from Moscow in Russian, translate them there into English, and pass them in this form to the more or less controlled press outlets. The papers would do their own translating into Burmese, but the rezidentura would check the published texts against the original Russian and report any variations to Moscow.

Expansionist Israel

A most complex and enduring misinformation series using the full orchestra of rumor campaign, diplomatic whispers, planted intelligence information, press allegations, and published forgeries began half a year after the abortive British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. In mid-March 1957 rumors began circulating in official and diplomatic circles in Paris that the French and Israeli General Staffs were working together on a plan for a new joint action against Egypt. When the rumors were traced it was learned, first, that they had no foundation in fact and, second, that all traceable such tales had a single local point of origin—one André Ulmann, director of a small "independent" weekly, *La Tribune des Nations*, but notorious as a pro-Soviet propagandist. During the first weeks of April these rumors were complemented by intelligence reports received from Lebanon and from Italy to the effect that France "was launching a plot in cooperation with Israel." The Italian report said that "the Israeli press has not mentioned the matter, but details are being discussed publicly."

On these subtle foundations the campaign was openly elaborated in the fall. On 12 October the Bombay *Blitz* carried

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

a long article exposing "Israeli plans to dismember the Arab states and organise an empire":

A *Blitz* correspondent in a West Asian country had an opportunity of getting acquainted in detail with a secret strategic plan of the Israeli General Staff. We may be able to publish the plan in full in future.

It envisages military operations against the countries bordering on Israel. . . . In general, the Plan provides for the annexation of the territory bounded by the Suez Canal, the River Litani and the Persian Gulf. . . .

The scheme takes into account the circumstance that Israel will not be able to rely on victory if she acts alone. In this connection, assistance on the part of the U.S.A., Britain and France is envisaged beforehand. The Plan especially emphasizes that "the U.S. is interested in a clash between Israel and the Arab States" and that "the U.S. interest in the strategic points of the Middle East is explained by the striving to strengthen her positions in this oil-rich area."

A month later, in fulfillment of its promise, *Blitz* put out a 78-page booklet, entitled *Dagger of Israel*, containing the "Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army for 1956-57, translated from the original in Hebrew." This document, an obvious fraud, is a rambling, badly written tract with the details given in the October article as its propaganda climax. The book had been in preparation, according to its introduction, since March, i.e., the time when the "French-Israeli General Staff" rumors had appeared in France.

After this the drive apparently went into winter quarters, but it was renewed the following spring. On 4 April 1958 Mikhail Stepanovich Rogov, Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Paris and a KGB officer, told a Western diplomat—who of course told his government—that the USSR was currently "worried about increased French-Israeli political and military cooperation." The next day *Blitz* took up the refrain, with slight variations:

Diplomatic circles at Tel Aviv report that the Israeli Armed Forces command is elaborating jointly with the French Army General Staff a so-called "Plan of Preventive Hostilities" against the UAR. . . . Meantime, Israel is frantically seeking other alliances. . . . The Americans are now helping her to an alliance with the anti-Arab NATO member Turkey.

U.S. involvement, not to be left thus subordinate, was the main burden of another *Blitz* article on 19 April reporting

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

that Secretary Dulles had announced in a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee "that the United States would support the demands of the Ben Gurion Government on enlarging the territory of Israel at the cost of the Arab lands." Recounting the year-old rumors of secret joint planning by the French and Israeli General Staffs, *Blitz* said that the U.S. Government had been kept fully informed of the plan by both the French and the Israeli government.

In October the secret Israeli strategic plan surfaced a year earlier by *Blitz* was included, as a ten-page excerpt, in a 147-page book published by the State Publishing House for Political Literature, in Moscow, under the title *The State of Israel—Its Position and Policies*. Presented as a "history of Israel and the Zionist movement," the book as a whole is a vicious propaganda attack, of the misinformation variety, against the State of Israel, all of its political parties except the CP, and "the Zionist bosses"—the United States in particular and the West in general. It seems to have been designed for use in Communist study groups, assuming a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on the part of the reader. But its similarity in other respects to *Blitz*'s less comprehensive *Dagger of Israel* is great enough to present the possibility that both manuscripts were prepared in the same place, if not written by the same individual. It is notable that rather crude material like this Israeli plan and Admiral Frost's reassurance to the Indonesian rebels, designed for unsophisticated targets in Asia and the Near East, is deemed suitable for the more knowledgeable but carefully warped Soviet audience.

In November a new edition of the book *Arab Dawn* published by *Blitz* carried the author's statement that he had learned in October, in Beirut, "of the latest in the series of Anglo-American plans to 'cut Nasser down to size,' which France has since endorsed." The plan, "scheduled to take place next spring or earlier," provided for Western action against Lebanon, Iraq, and the Sudan. In addition, however:

A supplementary plan has been attached to the main project. The supplementary document introduces the latest plan of the Israeli General Staff to take over the West Bank of the Jordan River by means of a swift blitzkrieg. The Israeli plan, which apparently has the approval of the CIA, the British Ambassador in Beirut and the U.S. Ambassador in Tehran . . . is built around the

SECRET

SECRET

35

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

possibility of either the flight or the assassination of King Hussein of Jordan in the near future.

The "Israeli General Staff" canard, now enshrined in an official Soviet publication, can continue indefinitely with variations its role as a part of the Bloc psychological warfare arsenal. On 13 April 1959 the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied with protest a report published in the Moscow *Red Fleet* that the Chief of the Israeli General Staff had come to Ankara toward the end of March and held secret talks on the question of Turkey's support of Israel for an attack against the Arabs, especially against the UAR, in the near future.

Other Near East Forgeries

Alleged U.S. intrigues against the UAR, a side-line in the elaborate Israeli effort, were the whole theme of a shorter but equally important series of forgeries. On 9 April 1958 the clandestine Bizim Radio, located in Leipzig but broadcasting in Turkish as from Turkey, carried the following "news item":

Report from Cairo—The American State Department has sent a secret directive to its envoys in the Middle East with a view to overthrowing the UAR. The directive points out that Soviet influence in the Arab countries has increased owing to Soviet recognition of the UAR and urges the envoys to use every means to spoil Soviet-Egyptian relations.

On 26 July, a fortnight after the Iraqi coup, a document answering to this description was published in facsimile by the Cairo daily *Al Ahram*. It purported to be a State Department "circular letter" over Assistant Secretary Rountree's signature, cabled on 17 April to diplomatic missions in the Middle East. Explaining that any apparent softening of U.S. policy toward the UAR was merely a tactical device, it stated that one of the principal aims in the Middle East was to destroy the UAR by splitting it into its original Syrian and Egyptian components, to stop the growth of Egyptian influence, and to spoil Soviet-UAR relations.

This forgery was apparently thought convincing enough to be given rather wide play in the overt Bloc media, most heavily to domestic and Near East audiences but also to Europe and South Africa. On 2 August *Blitz* carried it, making explicit the supposition that the incriminating document had come to light in Baghdad as a result of the Republican coup. In De-

36

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

خلاصة ما رايته ، اننى بعينى ، باذنى ، وجدتنى وجها لوجه امام الحرب فى احد المطارات ، كنت استطيع ان اعد اكثر من ألف طائرة . كلها من ذلك النوع الاستراتيجى ، الذى يستطيع ان يحمل احدى القنابل فيها حيث يتعين عليها ان تهوى وفى احد الطرق ، كانت الحشود تسدق ، دبابات على القطار واما اول لها ولا آخر وفى احد المكاتب رابت ماريشالات ، وجنرالات ، ولقد احسست ان اصا وعودة - فى اللحظة التى تصلى البشرية كلها الا تجرد فان لمسات خف نالها قوى مدمرة لا يستطيع خيال على الارض ان يتصور مدى آثارها وقال لى احد جنرالات الجو وهو يشير الى داورية من الطائرات تصعد اا

ING TELEGRAM

AMERICAN EMBASSY, BAGHDAD

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

CPLAPP (2)

CONTROL 2279
RECD: April 18, 1958
10 40 AM

FROM: WASHINGTON

ACTION: BAGHDAD, CIRCULAR 11 April 17, 5 30 PM

This circular letter is being sent by the State Department to all U.S. diplomatic representatives in the Middle East on the subject of the United States' policy in regard to the United Arab Republic.

The State Department reaffirms that the basic objectives of the U.S. policy in relation to the U.A.R. remain unchanged. It stresses anew that expansion of Egypt's sphere of influence is counter to the Joint Resolution of the Congress on the Middle East, strengthens Arab nationalism, encourages anti-Western and particularly anti-American tendencies in the Middle East and Africa, undermines the Baghdad Pact, an important link in the strategic network of the free world, and impairs the position of Israel the interests of which the U.S. can in no way ignore.

2. The fact that actual control over the transportation of Middle East oil to Europe both through the Suez Canal and via all the pipelines to the Mediterranean is now concentrated in Cairo seriously endangers American interests in this area. The U.A.R. is now in a position to exert pressure upon the U.S. and other western powers. This possibility can become a formidable weapon in the hands of President Nasser if he happens to fall back on the Soviet bloc in the future.

وثيقة سرية من سفارة أمريكا في بغداد

FIRST PAGE OF ROUNTREE CIRCULAR

SECRET

37

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

cember, when Rountree visited the Near East, Radio Cairo and NCNA revived the story again.

The Rountree circular, like the Taipei cables, did look more or less like the real thing, but it could not stand up under close examination. Its "Confidential/Security Information" classification was one discontinued in November 1953; there is no "circular letter" in Department nomenclature, and a "circular instruction" is not transmitted by cable; its numbering was bad, a real Circular 11 having been transmitted nine months earlier; the form on which it was typed had been replaced in August 1955; State messages are not signed by an Assistant Secretary but only by the Secretary or Acting Secretary. Operational carelessness is also evident in Bizim Radio's having described it eight days before its purported date and three months before the Bagdad coup was supposed to have made it available.

The Rountree forgery was followed up in late March and early April 1959 by one other, sent anonymously in photostat to some papers and parliament and government members in the Near East and passed around in intelligence circles there. It was ostensibly a letter from Under Secretary Robert Murphy assuring Ambassador McClintock in Lebanon that "Nasser is not the man we shall support" since "you are right to note that we have nothing in common with Nasser and his kind" and adding, with obvious reference to the UAR and Iraq, that "You certainly are aware of what I have in mind when I say that after the snakes devour each other, the jungle becomes safer!" It was never published or otherwise replayed.

The presence of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958 had been the occasion for another brief false document campaign. On 11 August Radio Bagdad reported that "in Lebanon, Saeb Salam has received a cable from four American paratroopers expressing their desire to volunteer for service in the people's forces." The cable was never produced nor the story elaborated, but on 25 August the outlawed *Beirut Al-Masaa* surfaced a forged letter addressed to members of the U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon and signed "John H.," purportedly an officer in the 79th U.S. Engineer Battalion. This American officer, after a salutation which showed that he was given to the use of Britishisms like "79th Engineers" and "officers and

38

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

other ranks" and to solecistic military abbreviations, wrote as follows:

I arrived together with a group of American officers from Munich on 27 July in a Globemaster aircraft. . . . A few days ago we received orders to remain in Lebanon for 15 months to safeguard the peace and security of the United States.

There are also plans to undertake large scale works with the object of transforming the airfields of Rayack and Koin't into American atomic bases; furthermore, 5 rocket launching pads will be erected along the Lebanon-Syrian border. More atomic weapons will be dispatched soon to Lebanon, and Beirut harbor will be transformed into America's principal naval base for its Near Eastern Fleet.

One cannot fail to realize that the object of all these preparations is to wipe out the millions of Arabs who are struggling for their national independence. . . . That is why I am asking you, my comrades, to demand that we be withdrawn from Lebanon to the United States quickly, and if we truly love our country we should return there without further delay. American officers and troops: Don't allow yourselves to be fooled; don't allow yourselves to become involved in military adventure for the benefit of any of the war-mongering factions!

The Chinese NCNA, picking up this story, credited the illegal *Beirut Al-Masaa* for it; but Soviet media—TASS, the *Daily Review of the Soviet Press* distributed by the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow, and a widely broadcast Radio Moscow commentary—introduced it with only the phrase, "It has become known here," and they gave the writer's name as "Johnson" rather than "John H.," apparently having been furnished a different draft of the forgery.

Irresponsible U.S. Atom Pilots

The black support of propaganda campaigns aimed at Europe was more sophisticated. The principal series began with a Khrushchev statement possibly designed for the purpose, possibly only later recognized as exploitable. In his interview with Hearst and two other American journalists on 22 November 1957, Khrushchev stressed the danger inherent in a continuous airborne, nuclear-armed SAC alert and continued, according to TASS:

When planes with hydrogen bombs take off that means that many people will be in the air piloting them. There is always the possibility of a mental blackout when the pilot may take the

SECRET

39

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

slightest signal as a signal for action and fly to the target that he had been instructed to fly to. Under such conditions a war may start purely by chance, since retaliatory action would be taken immediately. . . .

In such a case a war may start as a result of sheer misunderstanding, a derangement in the normal psychic state of a person, which may happen to anybody. . . . Even if only one plane with one atomic or one hydrogen bomb were in the air, . . . it would be not the Government but the pilot who could decide the question of war.

Some five months later, on 7 May 1958, the official East German *Neues Deutschland* reproduced what purported to be a letter dated 27 March from Assistant Defense Secretary Frank B. Berry to Secretary McElroy reporting that 67.3 percent of all USAF flight personnel had been found to be psychoneurotic, a condition which led to all sorts of phobias, excessive drinking, drug-taking, sexual excesses and perversions, and constant card-playing were mentioned as further evidence that "moral depression is a typical condition of all crew members making flights with atomic and H-bombs."

Although perhaps convincing to the man in the street, this forgery was full of errors. The letter format would hardly have been used for this kind of report. The vague "group of experts" said to have reached the medical findings would have been named, and no such obscure and ineffectual corrective measures as "further improvement of aircraft equipment" would have been proposed. There is much wrong military terminology—*Internal Zone*, *Air Force Command* and *AFC*, the *Patuxent River AFB (Md)*, the *Cooke AFB (Calif)*. More esoterically, Dr. Berry happened to be away on an official trip on the date of the letter; and finally, it was typed either on a machine assembled in composite from several different makes or one of unknown foreign manufacture.

The letter was widely publicized in the overt media, especially to European audiences. After a month the *Delhi Times*; perennial purveyor of Bloc propaganda, replayed it, and this gave TASS and *Izvestia* reason to run it again, crediting the *Delhi Times*. After almost three months more, on 30 August, the *Bombay Blitz* carried it, explaining that it had been published "early this month" in *Neues Deutschland*. The replay copy, fabricated for *Blitz* had apparently been delayed in

40

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

neurotiker ,Rauschgift- gen

Präsident, das heißt mehr
als ein Psychoneurose
Betroffenen ihrer Flug-
sicherheit. In der normal
psychischen Zustand
kann, von der Aktivität
des Bewusstseins herge-
leitet, eine unkontrollier-
bare, unvorhersehbare
Reaktion zu Stande
kommen.

folgendes Beispiel:
Ein Pilot, der durch
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
kommt, wird als
psychoneurotisch
bezeichnet.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

Die psychoneurotischen
Piloten sind in der Lage,
eine unkontrollierbare
Reaktion zu Stande
zu bringen, die zu einer
unvorhersehbaren
Reaktion führt.

transit. By August several more installations in the serial had appeared.

Having provided official evidence that Khrushchev's "pilot who could decide the question of war" was by a two-thirds majority mentally unstable, the planners of the campaign soon fell into an unplanned (one hopes) bit of luck. A mechanic on a USAF base in the UK managed to get into the air in a non-operational Air Force bomber he was neither au-

SECRET

41

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

thorized nor qualified to fly and crashed shortly after takeoff, killing himself. This dramatic example of irresponsibility, reported in the press on 14 June, was seized upon by Radio Moscow and linked with the Berry letter on 17 and 18 June.

The next installment was offered on 3 July: the Soviet embassy in London handed the British Foreign Office and released to the Western press a letter from a USAF pilot stationed in England threatening to drop an atomic bomb off the English North Sea coast in order to alert British opinion to the danger of accidentally triggering a nuclear war. Radio Moscow of course immediately linked this aberration with the Berry letter and the crashed bomber, and the sensational character of the forgery together with its solemn official transmittal aroused extensive comment in the non-Communist press throughout the Western world. No doubt in the hope of repeating this delightful burst of publicity, the Soviet embassy on 9 July released two more letters along the same lines but varying in detail and on 15 September still a fourth; but these were virtually ignored by the press.

The last act of the campaign began on 2 October, when *Neues Deutschland*, reentering as the chief protagonist, claimed to have learned through the indiscretion of a USAF officer stationed at Kaiserslautern that SAC commander General Power had recently issued orders forbidding any planes carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs to make flights over U.S. territory. During the next two months the dire implications of this prohibition, together with the Berry letter, were widely played by Bloc media, including the clandestine Radio Espana Independiente, first to Europe and then to the Near and Far East. By the end of November even *Blitz* had received and printed its copy.

France, Germany, and the Sahara Oil


On 22 January 1958 *Neues Deutschland* reproduced, partly in facsimile, a devious and rambling forged letter which it said had been written by former Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., to "the American capitalist Curtis, who is now in Venezuela." Its purpose was clearly to recruit Curtis for the job of wresting control of the Sahara oil fields away from France and obtaining ownership for U.S. oil companies in or-

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

USA-Monopole greifen

Aufschlußreicher Brief



der to clip the wings of "the Gallic rooster." There were references to German-U.S. conniving against France and to a "big NATO reorganization [sic]." Other Bloc media picked up the story and publicized it for several days, especially to Europe and North Africa.

About a month later a forged letter to Secretary Dulles from Ambassador David K. E. Bruce in West Germany was mailed

SECRET

43

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

anonymously to some prominent journalists and other individuals in France and England. It read in part:

It is no secret for the Germans that our policy in Europe is based on the principle the more pressure Germany brings on Britain and France in Europe, the more reasonable they become in Asia and Africa. The West Germans share our view that the sick woman of the Seine is no longer capable of being a good housewife. However, it is possible to discern a certain anxiety in the business community here as to whether German banks will have the future opportunity to expand their exports of capital to French Africa, particularly to the Sahara. Do you not therefore consider it expedient for us, Sir, to give the Germans emphatic assurances that we will continue to help them in the matter of the Sahara, as in other matters, since only a common effort will make it possible for us to consolidate our own positions in this area?

This covert thrust, rather like the O'Shaughnessy forgery of the preceding summer urging U.S. support of neo-Nazi movements at the time of the Kampfverband letters, was never carried into the open, and no kind of follow-up has been reported.

The Summit Conference

Later in 1958 there was another campaign of brief duration centered on U.S. policy, but this was targeted world-wide. On 22 May *Rude Pravo* printed the text of a letter allegedly written to Chancellor Adenauer by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, reading in part:

The highest representatives of the West German armament industry support Adenauer's policy of remilitarization without reserve and emphatically ask Adenauer to frustrate all attempts toward a relaxation of international tension, to prevent the convening of the Summit Conference, and to reject, along with the United States, the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Publicity for this item was confined to Czech media, but on 7 June the East German press agency ADN published what it claimed to be the German translation of a "secret instruction from the U.S. State Department sent to the chiefs of U.S. missions abroad" laying down a U.S. policy of sabotaging negotiations for the summit conference. During the following week this forgery was carried to audiences all over the world by Radio Moscow and other Bloc media, and it was revived again a month later for the Near East.

44

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

Rockefeller-Dulles Views on World Domination

The most ambitious of the black propaganda campaigns of the 1957-59 period in point of intended world impact, and the last to be described here, used as its main exhibit a forged letter from Nelson Rockefeller to President Eisenhower outlining a plan for U.S. domination of the world through use of economic assistance as a wedge and cloak for military pacts and political control. It was surfaced by *Neues Deutschland* in facsimile excerpts and full-text translation on 15 February 1957. Subheads inserted into the translated text by the paper give an idea of the message its forgers wished to convey:

*American prestige catastrophically lowered
What is good for Standard Oil is good for the U.S.
How we established NATO
State Department counted on war with China
Iranian foreign policy under our control
Economic "assistance" leads to military ties
Egypt will bog down and need our "assistance"
The hooked fish needs no bait
Forcing neutral states in the desired direction
Bringing others' colonies under our control
About the "selflessness" of American assistance
The objective: to secure military alliances*

The forgery was a credible one in general tone and phrasing (one passage has been spotted as taken almost verbatim from a *New York Times* article), but its execution was really quite unskillful. There are the usual British spellings—*favour*, *economising*, *emphasising*—and some British phrases—"the Flag follows trade," "the hooked fish needs no bait," "ramming home." There are bad translations, apparently from German—"my friends" used in the sense of *Partei Freunde* or *politische Freunde*; the writer's "tiresome" discussion with the convalescent President, where *ermuedende* should have been rendered "tiring." Purportedly written in January 1956, the letter refers in past tense to the visit of Sir Anthony Eden, who did not arrive until 30 January. Worst is the slipshod typing job—indented salutation, uneven touch, ragged margins, strikeouts, errors in punctuation and spelling. It

SECRET

45

Psywar By Forgery

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

URGENTUENHES L

• Berlin. „Neues Deutschland“ ist in der Lage, heute unserem Volke und der Weltöffentlichkeit den authentischen Text eines geheimen Schreibens zur Kenntnis zu bringen, das der Erbe des größten amerikanischen Öltrusts, Standard Oil Corporation, Nelson A. Rockefeller, im Januar 1956 an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, Dwight D. Eisenhower, gerichtet hat. Der Text, der uns in englischer Originalfassung und in vollem Wortlaut vorliegt, stammt aus einer unbedingt zuverlässigen Quelle.

[illegible]

Ausschnitt aus dem vertraulichen Schreiben Rockefellers an Eisenhower

Bonn fürchtet Wiedervereinigungsprogramm der SED

Bonn (ND). In zunehmendem Maße wird in deutschen bürgerlichen und adenaurenen Zeitungen gefordert, im Wahlkampf nicht die Frage der Wiedereingliederung zu behandeln. Die Antwort auf die Zeitungen gab das „Klerus-Blatt „Christ und Welt“ am 8. Februar. In einem ausführlichen Kommentar wird die Frage des Wiedereingliederens des SED verlan-

was done on a prewar machine made in eastern Germany. Mr. Rockefeller's real correspondence is done on an electric typewriter with particular attention to neatness and carefully correct spelling and punctuation. The forger was also clearly

braucht

It uns fremd-
stabile lang-
bunden sind.
den Subsidien
1 von militä-
ger gesehe-
ich mit dem
ab die Erzie-
agen wir an
tat. Zeitigen
et entgegen-
senz zur Un-
seiner be-
stärkten. So-
rdschaftliche
nen nur so-
fassende Re-
und jegliche
m Zaum zu

6 auch Not-
a regulieren
apitalinvesti-
in viele na-
werden kön-
privaten in-
le Opposition
e Politik z
et erhöhte
uellen Wir-
die sich
wischer oder
toll sollte d
r einheimi-
t, die bere-
ten und so-
n notwendig
sie auf d
n betreffe
Themen

1 uns
lenke
nder ein, d
i oder d
si der w
er Subsid
auf gel
unter dem
enen ökon
ten würd
lich mach
militärisch
se Grund
laß die E
Beziehun
ndes erms
n der e
1. In neu
endenz un
die über
B. der c
Hilfe d
wir hol
hine uns
stitutionen
oder E

To put the problem in a nutshell - our policy must be both "global" i.e., embrace every part of the world and also "total" i.e. include political, psychological, economic, military and special methods integrated into one whole. In other words the task is to hit all our horses in a single team. To illustrate my point of view better I want to attempt some analysis - even if it is a superficial one - of some aspects of our foreign policy as it has been conducted in Europe and Asia.

In Europe we started with economic aid. It is quite possible that without the Marshall Plan we would have found it much more difficult to form NATO. That in fact happened. In this case was that a coordinated foreign policy, using every kind of pressure, resulted in the creation of what we hoped was a solid military union. Even earlier within NATO itself say that it suffers from undue emphasis on the tactical aspects at the expense of the economic factors which played such a big role in formation.

In this our efforts were far less successful. The principal reason for this, in my belief, are clearly stated: the concept of force was not used, and the military side of the military alliance was largely ignored. The importance of preliminary economic preparation for the alliance was wished to make.

This underestimation of the vital economic aspects on the part of the State Department was the cause of the failure of the NATO as the League of the States Department was of sand. And I would prefer to see the sand removed. The American tradition has been that "the flag for free trade" is the flag for the world. It is nearly plausible, however, that the numbers of NATO would want to be involved in the world. The State Department's collection.

2. In order to strengthen and, if possible, to broaden these alliances we must draw up a program of economic development extensive enough for us to have in Asia, Africa and other underdeveloped areas a political and military influence of the same order as the influence obtained through the Marshall Plan in Europe. That is why the main line of our program allocation for underdeveloped countries should be channeled through bodies set up to serve our military alliances. This should serve to make the alliances themselves more attractive if necessary, certain changes in the form of these alliances should be

In other words, wherever possible we should emphasize the economic aspects of our alliances. We should vividly and vigorously stress the advantages which we would derive from the economic use of our alliances, but we should do it more flexibly and carefully than hitherto. In the past we have sometimes tied up the provision of economic aid with demands to join the military alliance. In such a senseless manner we have lost potential allies who were alienated. It is necessary for us to act carefully and patiently, and in the early stages confine ourselves to securing very modest political concessions from our allies in exchange for our economic aid. We should not insist on any concessions in return. The way will then be open to us, but at a later stage, to step up both our political price and our military demands.

You seemed to be ruled by these considerations when you agreed to offer economic aid to Egypt to help it with the construction of the Aswan Dam. If the Egyptian Government accepts this aid a situation will be created in which Egypt will inevitably become bogged down in over-ambitious construction and will need our support for a long period of time. I think it logical to extend this type of co-operation to other countries. And in particular never to forget the theory of cumulative rather than immediate political demands on which it is based.

5. In line with this I suggest that those countries to which economic aid is to be extended, should be divided into three groups, different methods and forms of economic co-operation being applied to each of these groups.

First of all, we should pick out the countries with anti-communist governments friendly to us, which are already bound to the U.S. through military and economic agreements. These countries should be divided

unaware that Mr. Rockefeller dislikes frequent use of the pronoun "I."

Such errors as these, however, to the predominant extent that the forgeries are aimed at public opinion rather than officialdom, detract less from their effectiveness than one might expect. Once the forged documents have achieved their initial impact on the public mind, especially in underdeveloped

SECRET

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

areas, denials and official exposures are likely to be met with skepticism, if indeed they come to public notice at all. Radio Moscow promptly mounted a major effort to publicize the Rockefeller letter and carried it during the following week in dozens of broadcasts in all languages, initially favoring audiences in underdeveloped countries but then broadening to include western Europe. It was assisted by other Bloc media and auxiliary press outlets outside the Bloc.

On 10 March another false document was surfaced in *Neues Deutschland* to sharpen up one aspect of the Rockefeller revelation, the grasping colonialism of American policy, as a weapon particularly effective against Near East targets. A purported memorandum from Secretary Dulles to the President written in the last half of December 1956 and urging vigorous U.S. action to step into the Near East power vacuum, it was paraphrased with quotes and described as proof that the Wall Street views of Rockefeller formed the basis for the U.S. Government policy manifest in the Eisenhower Doctrine since enunciated.

This occasioned another week-long burst of overt propaganda playing on both documents, mostly for the benefit of the Near East. Covert assets were also employed: in late March an East German trade delegation official met secretly with Arab League personnel and arranged to have the two forgeries translated into Arabic for hand-out to the governments of member states. In November, with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon, publicity for the documents was renewed, and by the end of that month more than a hundred instances of replay had been reported, some 80 percent of them world-wide Moscow broadcasts. Even in 1960 the Rockefeller letter continued to crop up—in February in a Hanoi news dispatch, in March in the Bagdad CP organ *Ittihad al-Shaab*, and in July in a broadcast from Peking to South Asia.

Patterns and Current Progress

It is notable that although the massive overt propaganda facilities of the USSR, seconded by the almost comparable media of Communist China, had the preponderant role in exploiting all nine of the black campaigns studied, neither of them did the original surfacing of any of the forgeries (unless you count the London embassy a propaganda facility in trans-

48

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

SECRET



NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
ORGAN DES ZENTRALKOMITEES DER SOZIALISTISCHEN EINHEITSPARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS

Berlin, Sonntag, 18. März 1957

„Neues Deutschland“ veröffentlicht Geheim- Memorandum von Dulles

Feststellungen
des amerikanischen Außenministers Dulles
über die schwere Niederlage des Imperialismus im Nahen Osten,
über das gestiegene Ansehen der Sowjetunion bei den
arabischen Völkern,
seine Vorschläge an Präsident Eisenhower:
Wie sich die USA die Herrschaft über die Erdölvorkommen
des Nahen Ostens sichern,
wie sie neue, mit Atomwaffen ausgerüstete militärische Stütz-
punkte im Nahen Osten errichten
und durch propagandistische Winkelzüge die Öffentlichkeit der
arabischen Länder irreführen sollen,
sind in einem geheimen, von Dulles dem USA-Präsidenten
unterbreiteten Memorandum enthalten.
Eine inhaltliche Wiedergabe dieses Geheimmemorandums, in
dem sich Dulles die Vorschläge des von uns veröffentlichten
Rockefellerbriefes zu eigen macht, veröffentlichen wir auf
Seite 3 unserer heutigen Ausgabe mit dem Titel „Der Feind
der arabischen Freiheit“.

mitting the four U.S. pilot letters or Khrushchev's complicity in opening the unstable-pilot campaign). Of the overt Bloc media the German were most frequently used for surfacing, but even they brought out only six of the 32 false documents.

There were doubtless other individual forgeries during this period that have not come to light, but our list of nine internationally distributed multiple-forgery series is probably fairly complete. It is therefore of interest that they form an almost regular pattern of geographical targeting for the two years in which they were initiated—in 1957 one each aimed at Europe, Asia, the Near East, and the world at large, with none specifically for the western hemisphere; in 1958 the same, but an extra one for the Near East. If this pattern reflects norms imposed on KGB planning sections, 1958 must have created in the Near East section some Heroes of Socialist

SECRET

49

SECRET

Psywar By Forgery

Forgery, and there should have been a shake-up of the Western Hemisphere staff. Perhaps this is what produced in 1960 the covertly circulated forged Dillon airgram exposed by the State Department on 2 September, referring to "the program set up [by the United States] to liquidate the Castro regime" but dated 5 February, when Under Secretary Dillon was out of town, and marred by formal errors and one of those ineradicable British spellings, "defence."

More seriously, the pattern of recent forgeries suggests that Sino-Soviet black psychological warfare operations, like overt propaganda attacks, may be not only sensitive to the opportunities provided by hot spots around the world, as one might expect, but also subject to administrative damping during efforts to relax East-West tensions. From March 1959 through May 1960 only two new forgeries of the type under discussion appeared, one in *Blitz* for the Far East and one in *Neues Deutschland* for Europe. But between the collapse at the Summit and the U.S. election of a successor to President Eisenhower, production was increased sevenfold, on a neat schedule of one new forgery per month.

One of these, happily countered by the State Department before publication, was photocopies mailed to Tokyo newspapers of a purported U.S. embassy memorandum showing that Japan-based U-2 planes were going to be hidden temporarily on Okinawa and then secretly returned to Japan. But the hottest spot of 1960 has of course been Africa. In April MTT's 1959 story of concentration camps and poison wells, credited to the Afro-Asian Permanent Secretariat in Cairo, was used in a speech by a UAR delegate to the Afro-Asian conference in Conakry. In June appeared a forged paper revealing British and American imperialist plots against the newly independent African countries. And in early September, with Lumumba still ascendant in the Congo, Leopoldville newspapers received copies of a frank "letter from Under Secretary Dillon to Ambassador Timberlake":

Limit your contacts with Lumumba's political opponents to a minimum, especially with Tshombe's people, although they should not be discontinued for a moment. We of course are certain that after what he received in Washington, Tshombe will not go back on us, at least of his own free will. God only knows what these blacks are likely to do. It would be difficult to find more mercenary creatures


Psywar By Forgery

SECRET

in the whole world. At present, we here do not envisage a more suitable candidate for the post of Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo. At present he seems to be the only suitable replacement for the high-handed postal clerk who stands on the pedestal as the "liberator of the Congo."

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

25X1



Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

Allen's <i>Soviet Economic Warfare</i>	MILTON KOVNER
Cleveland's <i>The Overseas Americans</i>	PETER J. DORONDO
Klestadt's <i>The Sea Was Kind</i>	LOUIS THOMAS

SECRET

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE


Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET/



Intelligence Articles V 1

SECRET/



Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

Faulty intelligence and other factors that brought a bold campaign to Pyrrhic victory.

GALAHAD: INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS

Charles N. Hunter

The six-month saga of Galahad's action in Burma has been sketched as a part of the larger history recorded in Romanus and Sunderland's *Stilwell's Command Problems*,¹ and more recently it has been told in vivid detail and with greater accuracy in Charlton Ogburn's *The Marauders*,² the unit's nickname invented and popularized by the press. The Army account is marred by omissions and errors, however, and skillful a narrator as Ogburn is, he was not in a position to view the campaign in its command and intelligence aspects nor to take fully into account the failures in planning, coordination, and intelligence that characterized CBI Theater operations under General Joe Stilwell's erratic and nepotistical direction.

Formed on the unorthodox image of Orde Wingate's Chindits, Galahad was used to surprise the enemy—General Tanaka's crack 18th Division, which had fought in Malaya and captured Singapore before participating in the conquest of Burma—in the rear by circling his flank through almost impassable mountain jungles. In the first half of 1944 it made three such flanking penetrations to facilitate the cautious advance of Stilwell's Chinese forces south and east toward Myitkyina—one to the enemy rear at Walawbum, one to Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng above Kamaing, and the last, most daringly, to Myitkyina. In all three it was successful in its immediate objectives; but all three, thanks in part to deficiencies in theater intelligence, were disappointing in the follow-up.

¹ Washington, D.C., 1956. One of the series *The U.S. Army in World War II* which form the official history produced by the Department of the Army. "Galahad," originally a code name for the project to send an unorthodox American force into Burma, in practice came to designate the force itself.

² New York: Harper, 1959.

Galahad

At Walawbum Tanaka's supposedly trapped forces escaped their Chinese pursuers over trails that Colonel Joe Stilwell, Jr., his father's G2, had not suspected to exist. At Inkangah-tawng the roadblock, fumbled through lack of air photos and other reconnaissance, was withdrawn on the basis of dubious intelligence amid a confusion of poor communications and uncertain lines of command, and then vulnerable Kamaing was left unmolested in favor of a defensive action that cost exhausted Galahad severe casualties at Nhpum Ga. At Myit-kyina Galahad's designated objective, the airfield, was seized with sensorially neat precision, but what should have been the following quick occupation of the town was turned by lack of planning, international and interservice involvements, and the manipulation of intelligence into a grueling ten-week siege.

Provisions for Intelligence

Intelligence and reconnaissance platoons were organized in each of Galahad's three battalions, and these of course played a key role in the penetration missions; but no regimental intelligence staff had been planned and no personnel were provided for one either originally or by CBI Theater. We had no field manuals covering intelligence. The nearest thing to intelligence personnel assigned us was a detachment of Japanese linguists, Nisei, under the supervision of Lieutenant William A. Laffin, to interpret prisoner interrogations. These I had kept busy on shipboard publishing a daily paper and starting to record the history of Galahad, a record they continued to maintain until they became too few and overwhelmed with other duties. When, during training in India, a combat exercise against some of Wingate's columns demonstrated the need for an intelligence staff, Laffin, although he had very little military experience and none at all in intelligence, was made the S2.

This turned out to be a wise and fruitful appointment. Laffin was mature, physically active, and intelligent, and getting him oriented in combat intelligence was no great chore. All the Nisei, together with Jack Girsham of the Burma Rifles, who remained with us throughout, became excellent interrogators; but Laffin's linguistic skill was so highly developed that he could determine a Japanese prisoner's home prefecture without questioning him, simply by his accent. His apparent

Galahad

clairvoyance would so astound the homesick and discouraged Japanese that they would break down very quickly and hold nothing back.

To brief ourselves on our projected area of operation we had had on shipboard the advantage of a library of some sixty books on Burma and Southeast Asia, arranged for by G2 in the Pentagon on General Weckerling's own initiative; but two efforts to get first-hand information on the immediate terrain before we jumped off from Ledo were aborted. General Merrill, who had finally been assigned to command Galahad under the designation 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), and I arranged to fly as supercargo on a photographic mission over the projected operations area, but the plane had to turn back after an hour or so in the air. And three officers Merrill had sent, one from each battalion, to reconnoiter the road under construction down into the Hukawng valley as far as Stilwell's forward headquarters at Shingbwiyang and to be briefed there were not permitted to return in time to do us any good: they reported back that on Stilwell's behalf General Boatner, his chief of staff, had dressed them down and questioned their courage for wanting to leave the forward area so soon. This incident gave Galahad the first impression of the headquarters to which it was assigned and a foretaste of what was in store for it.

Walawbum

The move out from Ledo, on 7 February, was made after dark for security reasons. The whole Galahad project was supposed to be highly secret. We had sailed under the not very convincing cover of medical replacements, and I had made an example of one young officer who had talked too much—to CIC men by bad luck—when we put in at Noumea to pick up our third battalion. When I had turned him over to MacArthur's G2 at Brisbane, General Willoughby had warned me that security in the CBI theater was poor to the point of being non-existent. He had been right: the night after we started our southeast march to the fighting zone Tokyo Rose announced that American combat troops were for the first time marching down the Ledo road.


Galahad

Our first mission was to feel our way around the east flank of the front near Maingkwan, where Stilwell's Chinese had for some time been stalled by elements of Tanaka's 18th Division, and set up a roadblock at some unpredetermined point south of the enemy. For this kind of operation, and particularly for the selection of a good roadblock site, air photos are invaluable; but at this time, and continuously until well after the airstrip at Myitkyina was taken, photographic coverage was unsatisfactory. Air photos of an area of operations were likely to arrive after we had already passed it and no longer had any use for them. From what I learned later of Stilwell's method of planning, or rather his impatience with detailed planning, I imagine that the Air Corps probably received directives for photoreconnaissance missions too late to produce results on time. It gradually became obvious that we were following an artist's sketch rather than architects' blueprints in the campaign.

Laffin had secured all the information available about known Japanese positions, but whether we had got far enough east to clear the Japanese right flank had to be determined by patrols of the I and R platoons, which therefore suffered Galahad's first combat casualties as they ran into enemy patrols rounding the bends of trails. One scout was wounded and one killed during our first day in enemy-held territory. General Sun Li Jen's liaison officer with Galahad, a Colonel Lee, who had brought with him his orderly and little else except a cheerful and cooperative attitude, was incredulous about Galahad's dispersed methods of operation. To the day he left us at Myitkyina he continued to express amazement and concern over the distances at which the I and R platoons operated away from the battalions. They were in fact generally beyond the range of the portable FM SCR 300 and so had to carry a heavy 284 on muleback.

Ogburn describes well the eight-day march on this first mission, punctuated by river crossings and supply drops, the successful placing of a double block at Walawbum and three miles up the road at a river crossing, Galahad's baptism of fire as it held against the Japanese counterattacks, Roy Matsumoto's tapping of the Japanese telephone line and interception of reports and orders, including Tanaka's eventual

Galahad



A5

A4

order to withdraw, and Galahad's relief on 7 March by the Chinese coming down from the north. He also refers to the loss of a bag of silver rupees in the withdrawal and says that Lt. Col. Osborne, his battalion commander, still chides him as responsible for it. He was not: I had this silver, the 5000-rupee headquarters portion of our 20,000 of secret intelligence funds, buried at Walawbum in order to lighten loads on our depleted complement of mules. There was little demand for silver in Burma, and still less for the thousands of Japanese yen and the trinkets some stateside expert had had included in our equipment. Food, medical attention, parachute cloth, and needles and thread were our most valuable currency.

The operation at Walawbum broke a long stalemate and effected a significant advance down the Kamaing road. In its failure to entrap the Japanese the Stilwells, father and son, played the key roles. It was a glaring deficiency in young Joe's theater intelligence not to have discovered that Tanaka's forces had constructed a route of withdrawal south and west of Walawbum. And the elder Joe did not know what his own forces were doing: on 8 March, twenty-four hours after Merrill had pulled Galahad out and broken communication with theater headquarters, Stilwell ordered a coordinated action by Galahad and the Chinese forces. When he learned that Galahad was gone he decided, says the official history, "that his orders to Merrill had not been clear enough." Why were communications not maintained and why weren't orders reduced to writing? There is an Army way of doing things, and there was a Stilwell way.

The uncertainty of theater intelligence was impressed on me personally a few days later, when I was flown to Stilwell's headquarters to get approval for our plan for the next mission. The headquarters staff criticized our proposed routes as ones on which we would have to carve drop zones out of the jungle to receive our supplies. When I said that Galahad's British experts, Jack Girsham and Evan Darlington—the latter a former area political officer who, knowing the country and the people intimately, kept us supplied with Kachin guides—thought there were ample open areas for drops, Stilwell commented caustically, "If the terrain is like that, how come I don't know about it?"

This time Galahad was to split up from the start, Osborne's 1st battalion with the 113th Chinese regiment behind it marching on a tight circle over the Jambu Bum to cut the road around Shaduzup, and the other two battalions sweeping wide up the Tanai Hka to put in a block closer to Kamaing, a road-head of considerable importance. *Command Problems* tells how Merrill did not want to divide his force but was hampered in making his proposals to Stilwell by "extremely faulty coordination" amounting to a "hoarding of information": he had not been informed that a force of Kachins under OSS Detachment 101's Lieutenant Tilly, operating on the route to Shaduzup, was available to guide and screen the march. In Galahad we had the impression that the two Stilwells didn't set much store by 101.³ First battalion learned of Tilly's existence, as Ogburn narrates, in an almost accidental meeting half way to Shaduzup after unwittingly fighting a joint action with him against a Japanese patrol.

Merrill was told before we set out, however, that at Naubum on the Tanai Hka, where 2nd and 3rd battalions would pass, Detachment 101 had a field headquarters for Kachin guerrilla activities and had carved out of the jungle an airstrip big enough for liaison planes, keeping it camouflaged except when planes were actually landing or taking off. Approaching Naubum after several days' march, we saw first an unofficial representative of the guerrillas, a strangely uniformed individual leaning against a tree. Without insignia to indicate his nationality or status, he was sporting an Australian wide-brimmed felt hat turned up, British style, on the left side. Stocky and good looking, with a black beard on his otherwise cleanly shaven face, he reminded me instantly of my Irish uncle Jack McNary. He was chewing on a twig and seemed to be trying to hide his intense interest behind a faint but impish grin. Such was my first glimpse of the Christian Brother missionary Father James Stuart, whom I later came to consider a trusted friend, a gentleman, and a true man of God.

A7

Galahad

The OSS unit was commanded by Captain Curl, a wiry old soldier with the finest beard I have ever seen on any human being. Deep auburn in color, it was carefully brushed back from a precision part in the exact center of his chin into two luxuriant flowing waves. It reminded me of an old painting of the prow of a clipper parting the waters of the Indian Ocean as it sailed into the burnt-orange sunset. Curl made us welcome to his headquarters, where he was protected by a circular screen of trail blocks and watchers forty miles in diameter that no Jap had yet lived to penetrate. He said he was prepared to march south with us with 300 Kachins.

Getting acquainted with these OSS people was a delightful experience. The next morning, silently and unannounced, a file of seven elephants, trunks holding tails ahead and one with a young calf at her side, was led in by Kachin mahouts and halted in front of General Merrill. Captain Curl was putting them at Galahad's disposal. We tried them out at our next supply drop in the demanding job of clearing the drop zone promptly. They and their mahouts proved quick-witted at learning the business and were regularly so used thereafter. As far as I can ascertain, Galahad is the only American combat force ever to have included elephants as a regular part of its combat train.

As we moved on we were now preceded by a scouting detachment of the OSS Kachins, who from this time on worked under Laffin's direct supervision. Curl's men had also thoughtfully built a foot bridge for us where the trail crossed the Tanai before rising with incredible steepness some 2000 feet to Janpan. Curl personally guided the Galahad battalions up this trail; although he was suffering from a bad knee, he insisted on marching with the column. And at Janpan, when I arrived with an advance guard some two hours ahead of Merrill, I was amazed to watch the Kachins, with the help of the village experts, build a rainproof shelter for him, complete with door and a fireplace for cooking, before the main column began to arrive.

None of the Janpan villagers had ever in his entire life seen so many human beings assembled in one place. As the column continued to pass through the village to its bivouac area on the far side, they became convinced, Father Jim Stuart told

Galahad

me that night, that with this number of men engaged the war would surely soon be over.

Inkangahtawng

It was good to have Curl's knowledge of the country, because it was time to decide on the location of our projected roadblock and we had no air photos of the area. Along the march we kept expecting the requested photos of the terrain ahead of us, but when they were dropped they always covered only country we had already passed through. Now, moreover, on 20 March, we received a message giving us the additional mission of blocking the trails running north along the Tanai against any Japanese moving from the south to threaten the Chinese left flank below Walawbum. Half of Lt. Col. Beach's 3rd battalion was assigned to undertake this job with the help of the OSS Kachins and patrol the trails south of Auche, while I took the other half and the 2nd battalion, under Lt. Col. McGee, to establish a block somewhere on a five-mile stretch of the Kamaing road around Inkangahtawng. Merrill would stay at Janpan.

We had got as far as Auche and taken our last air drop when another of Stilwell's "Hurry up" messages—we had received one on the way to Walawbum that made us abandon at a drop site a good part of the supplies we had just received—caused the time for the roadblock to be set up some 36 hours. Now, in addition to having no air photos, we would have no time for reconnaissance, and would simply have to blunder across the Mogaung river through the Japanese positions and out onto the Kamaing road. I was not even sure the Mogaung was fordable, although the Kachins thought it was.

Blunder we did. On 24 March McGee, whom I had sent ahead while I saw to preparing an airstrip for evacuations, got across the Mogaung and found Inkangahtawng dead ahead and too well fortified for the reinforced patrols he sent to envelop it. He dug in 300 yards from the road and withstood repeated counterattacks and shell fire. I couldn't reach him by radio, but I wasn't worried because I expected to catch up with him and take over before he could get hit very hard. In the meantime, however, McGee received a message from Merrill—my own radio operators were having difficulty communicating with Janpan—to the effect that a captured map showed two

Galahad

Japanese battalions moving to outflank our blocking force. Although it was not an action message, McGee decided to withdraw. When I took a liaison plane to look over the blocks I supposed by now established and perhaps to land on the road, I found his battalion marching back up the trail.

I could not object to Merrill's dealing directly with McGee because of the communications difficulties, but in my opinion this message should not have been sent. It transmitted unverified information from a source that could easily have been a plant. If I were being outflanked by a force close enough to endanger my mission and didn't know it, I should have been relieved and sent back to the infantry school for a refresher.

Back at Manpin, at the base of the hills and the point closest to Kamaing on our route, I finally got through to Janpan and we were instructed to move rapidly to Auche to block the trail north. Beach's patrols were fighting a delaying action against Japanese forces advancing north from Kamaing. We took a supply drop before leaving Manpin, and while it was being cleared an OSS Chinese agent appeared. Operating under a code name, he relayed information by radio to Lt. Col. Ray Peers, commander of Detachment 101. He said that a large Japanese force had left Kamaing on a trail to Auche only four or five hours ago, according to a reliable native informant, a purveyor of milk to the Japanese officers' mess in Kamaing.

Luckily the evening patrol of fighter planes came over as I was digesting and plotting this information, and I asked the flight leader to verify it. When he reported back that the tail of a column could be seen disappearing up the trail in question, I designated it a target and the fighters proceeded to work the Japs over. We knew they were successful, for they returned some time later to buzz Manpin, pull up in a steep climb, and end with the barrel-roll signifying *Mission accomplished*. Working with Galahad was a pleasure for the fighter pilots and a relief from supporting the Chinese. We pinpointed targets for close-in strafing and bombing and we checked and reported results of missions flown, whereas the Chinese designated whole areas as targets, never reported results, and were quite unreliable in reading maps.

A10

Galahad

It seemed to me, on the basis of all information available, that with this detachment of Japanese out of the way the important installation at Kamaing must now be wide open; and here I sat with a battalion and a half of troops just five or six miles away. I radioed Merrill for permission to move in on the place; it would be a bigger coup than our now abandoned Inkangahtawng project and would cut off the rear of the Japanese forces we had been ordered to intercept at Auche. To my disappointment I was told to withdraw; I still believe it was a golden opportunity that should have been exploited.

Nhpum Ga

What followed were Galahad's darkest days so far. McGee's battalion, moving back exhausted from Auche to Nhpum Ga on 28 March, was attacked and within two or three days cut off from 3rd battalion and the headquarters staff, which had taken up position in a valley to the north to protect the airstrip at Hsamshingyang. Merrill had a heart attack and was evacuated. As the situation became critical Father Stuart informed me that the Kachins might pull out at any time. Nevertheless, on 3 April, I ordered Kachins substituted for patrols wherever possible and all able men assembled for a determined drive to relieve McGee. As this drive made progress the Kachins perked up again and began to feel out the trails.

In the meantime Osborne's 1st battalion, after a brilliantly professional job of reconnaissance by its I and R platoon, had surprised the Japanese at Shaduzup on 28 March, set up a block, and held it against counterattacks until relieved by the Chinese with their pack artillery. Osborne's men were now ordered back over the long roundabout trails, the sum of both forces' earlier routes, to join us. They arrived on 7 April after a forced march on short rations. Exhausted as they were, and with dysentery and malaria widespread among them, 250 were found fit for immediate employment. With these and the help of air photos which had finally arrived, I was able to order a flank attack around the right side, protected by a diversionary move on the left, which cut the Japanese supply line.

By 9 April, Easter Sunday, the Japanese had had enough and pulled out. We were ordered not to pursue. McGee's men had performed a near miracle in holding out against what

A11

Galahad

we thought was an enemy battalion; after the war we learned that it was two mixed battalions of infantry reinforced by a company of artillery. This force, the main Japanese reserve in north Burma, was badly mauled, and its withdrawal ended any serious enemy threat to Stilwell's forces there.

As I walked into the defense perimeter that Sunday I paused to look at a motionless horse whose gray color I did not recognize. On close examination I was stunned to find that every inch of his body except his hooves was covered with inanimate gray flies, gorged with the flesh of the poor animal, too weak to flick his tail. Battered animals, also covered with flies, lay with legs grotesquely extended in protest where they had fallen and died from shell fire, thirst, or starvation. An all too familiar nauseating odor lay over the area, heavy as a London fog.

McGee took me around the perimeter, reviewing the events of the past ten days. Here a soldier took a direct hit from a mortar and had to be buried in his foxhole; that scarred tree was used by a bazooka man to fragment his shells over the bunched-up Japanese; this was where Matsumoto crept forward and listened to the Japanese officers giving their attack orders; here a soldier shot his buddy in the morning mist; and there a lieutenant, unrecognized without his glasses, was shot by his own men. The Japanese, in their haste, had left several dead behind, including the bloated lower half of a body that looked for all the world like a pair of football pants stuffed with gear for an out-of-town game. Galahad had 52 dead, 302 wounded, and 77 evacuated sick, as against more than 400 Japanese killed; but it was badly weakened and needed a rest.

Arang

About the time we had got Nhpum Ga cleaned up Colonel Hank Kinnison, Stilwell's G3 at NCAC, visited us at Hsamshingyang and said that Stilwell was seriously thinking of organizing a task force to seize the airstrip at Myitkyina, head of navigation on the Irrawaddy, the northernmost railhead and the main Japanese base in north Burma. Although we considered this idea of Stilwell's a wild dream, involving as it would the crossing of the jumbled Kumon range in the rains preliminary to the coming monsoon, I thought the staff would

Galahad

benefit from the exercise of preparing a study on its feasibility while the men and animals were getting back into condition. Laffin made a study of the terrain. Working from our maps, such as they were, and questioning the OSS Kachins and local villagers, he selected routes that might be negotiable over the mountains and south to Myitkyina. Father Stuart was an invaluable help, not only because of his own knowledge of the country but because he could evaluate for our purposes a Kachin estimate of the usability of a trail.

When, a few days later, I was asked to send a staff officer to Stilwell's headquarters, I gave him the staff study to take along as of possible use, incomplete as it was and scratched with pencil on all kinds of paper. Merrill, on his feet again and active at headquarters, incorporated it into plans he had been making for our next mission and presented it to Stilwell within a couple of hours. Galahad was ordered back to Naubum, where the Myitkyina Task Force would be formed.

Naubum, Curl's once recon-dite retreat, was alive with activity. Many new bashas had been built around the airstrip, now uncammouflaged with two liaison aircraft parked brazenly in the open. Merrill was there; he was to command the task force. His executive officer would be Colonel John E. McCammon, a Chinese-speaking officer newly brought from Stilwell's Kunming headquarters, for the task force would consist of Galahad and two Chinese regiments being flown in over the hump from China. I was to command a subordinate Task Force "H" comprising Osborne's 1st battalion and the 150th Chinese regiment, under Colonel Huang, plus a Chinese battery of 75-mm. pack howitzers. Kinnison would have a similar "K" force composed of Beach's 3rd battalion and the other Chinese regiment.

Jack Girsham and Laffin would be with H force. During the few days at Naubum Laffin made an intense study of the trails, leading or sending Kachins out to test routes that looked possible. The problem was not just to find a trail over the mountains, but to find a route that the animals with their heavy packs could take. He finally selected one and proposed that it be tried out all the way to Arang on the other side of the range.

A12

A13

Galahad

The OSS people could talk by radio with Arang, where there was a secret setup similar to Captain Curl's at Naubum, and I asked them to have Arang dispatch a patrol to Naubum over the proposed route to check it. In a few days the four-man patrol reported in with the information that it was passable and with invaluable detail about it. Laffin was sent ahead with some Kachins and an engineer officer to improve it as far as they could.

On 27 April we set out, K force in the lead to cut off to the left from Ritpong for a feint at Nsopzup on the Myitkyina-Sumprabum road, H force to continue via Arang and attack the Myitkyina airfield with a target date of 12 May, and what was left of McGee's battalion, reinforced by 300 Kachins, to take a more direct route south of ours, providing security on the right flank as far as Arang. Past the improved first portion of the trail the going was brutal. Third battalion, in K force, lost twenty animals with their loads of ammunition and equipment; they would slip in the mud and roll down the mountainside. H force lost several. I once found a soldier struggling along with a pair of obviously heavy saddle bags in addition to his pack; they contained 1500 silver rupees, H force's intelligence funds. He was first incredulous and then dismayed when I ordered him to throw away the supposedly precious burden he had clambered down 200 feet to retrieve from his dead pack-horse.

We reached Arang, the OSS headquarters on the Kumon eastern slopes, behind schedule, having been delayed as far as Ritpong by the straggling tail of K force column. At Ritpong K force had met unexpected Japanese resistance and we had slipped on through without being observed by the enemy. Arang was a pleasant little spot, where we could take our last relatively safe air drop, evacuate those unfit to continue, and receive the latest intelligence and any changes in plan. I was never given any estimate of the Japanese strength to expect at Myitkyina, but I did receive here a large air photo of the town and one of its airfield, about two miles west of the town nearer the downstream settlement of Pamati.

Merrill flew in at Arang. Since I was going to impose radio silence from about the time H force left Seingneing, we agreed on a set of code words to keep him informed and to enable

Galahad

me to order the necessary resupply of food and ammunition when we had taken the airstrip. Galahad carried on its collective human and animal back only enough ammunition for ten to twelve minutes of fire from all weapons, and immediate resupply would be imperative if there were any kind of fight. The codes were as follows:

Cafeteria lunch: H hour minus 48.

Strawberry sundae: H hour minus 24. Ready resupply transports.

In the ring: Attacking. Transports take off.

Merchant of Venice: Field secure; no repairs needed. Transports land.

If I judged that the field needed repair, engineers would land by glider. I repeatedly pressed Merrill for instructions on what to do after taking the airfield, whether to take the town and whether to cross the river, but he would only say, "Don't worry. I'll be the first man on the field and take over."

Merchant of Venice

We marched south from Arang behind a screen of 75 OSS-trained Kachins under the command of Lt. Bill Martin. Laffin stayed at the head of the column with Martin. In two days we reached Seingneing, which was reported to have been occupied by the Japanese at one time. Laffin, scouting it, found no signs of recent occupation, and we could therefore take a supply drop here. I tried to make use of this last opportunity to evacuate those too sick to go on: dysentery and a strange new fever which we eventually found to be mite typhus had become rampant. A few litter planes got in and out of the improvised airstrip until the wind shifted, but then after a near crash on the short take-off the pilots could no longer risk it. We had to leave two officers and 32 men there in charge of Major Tom Senff, who had a wrenched back and an infected throat. Somehow my request that they be taken care of was lost at headquarters, and they were left untended for five days until Senff in desperation limped the twenty miles to find us at Myitkyina.

There were two exasperating incidents with the Chinese at Seingneing. First, I found that they had got tired of carrying the rather heavy batteries of their radios and had thrown

Galahad

them away some days before, and so couldn't be used in a dispersed operation. And now the commander of the pack howitzers wanted to leave all his ammunition behind because he had several lame horses and mules. It took about two hours to convince him that his battery without ammunition would be as useless as the radios without batteries.

Having radioed *Cafeteria lunch*, we left Seingneing in the afternoon on 15 May, planning a night march in order to cross the Mogaung-Myitkyina road half way to Myitkyina by early daylight. We were a small force—under 400 Americans, fewer than 800 Chinese rifles, and an untested battery of the lightest of light artillery—to be attacking an important enemy base, and everything depended on achieving surprise. The column could get across the road in three hours by daylight; at night it would take a great deal longer. Moreover, air observation and Kachin road watchers indicated that any large-scale use of the road occurred under cover of darkness. This schedule should give the men a chance to rest the following night before attacking on the morning of 17 May.

We were guided on this furtive march by one particular OSS Kachin whose knowledge of the country was a major factor in our successful approach; he had formerly been a forest ranger in the Pidaung National Forest through which we were moving. We also had at the head of the column three or four OSS agents of Anglo-Burmese extraction, not very aggressive but likable men. Like the sons of other mixed marriages throughout the Orient, the war had put them in the difficult position of having to choose between their opposing inherited loyalties and made them treasonable to the side they chose against. They had now irrevocably committed themselves to the Anglo-American war effort, and they were scared: as we neared the road crossing they would nervously step aside on the trail at every opportunity to relieve themselves. I wondered each time whether they would come back, but they always did. Courage is essentially self-control under frightening conditions, and these OSS agents had it.

Bill Laffin himself was in a similar or worse position. The son of an American retired sea captain and his Japanese wife, he had been repatriated on the Gripsholm after signing a pledge not to wage war against Japan. His parents remained in Japan under the watchful care of the Kempi Tai; it would

Galahad

go ill with them and him if he were captured by his mother's people. I often wondered from what source he drew the calm courage that complemented his unfailing dignity and sense of decency. I admired him.

In the wee hours of that night, as we made our way through the intense darkness, I was radioed for permission to use a flashlight: our Kachin guide had been bitten by a snake, perhaps a hamadryad, and the doctor wanted to examine and treat him. The column halted, waiting for the verdict on our one indispensable man. His leg was swelling fast, Doc McLaughlin reported, and it would endanger his life to go on. I said he had to go on. "It will kill him," Doc answered. "We'll have to let him rest at least two hours." I told Doc he had to go on until he collapsed; too much depended on him. I sent my horse forward and told Laffin to disregard Doc's orders and put the Kachin on it and get going. McLaughlin, governed by selfless devotion to his profession and the precepts of the Hippocratic oath, could not bring himself to endanger a human life; but a commander must put the success of his mission above all other considerations.

It was not long now before our guide, in great pain but still in command of his faculties, said that the Mogaung-Myitkyina road lay ahead. Laffin and OSS Lieutenant Martin scrupulously refrained from setting foot on it; they wanted me to have the honor of being the first to cross this so important little ribbon of gravel. Sending security detachments a mile out on either side in the gray dawn, we crossed unobserved and without incident. When the whole column was across I had the radio unslung and transmitted *Strawberry sundae*—"H minus 24; ready supply transports."

The next crossing was the railroad, at a point some five miles from its terminus at Myitkyina. Here we expected no trouble, and had none. Herbie, one of our Nisei, climbed a telephone pole and tapped the line; there was nothing of importance on the wire. We did not cut it, not wanting to bring a repair crew down the tracks on us. Beyond the railroad lay the village of Namkwi, on the east bank of the Namkwi Hka. As a precautionary measure I had Martin and his Kachins round up the entire population, man, woman, and child, and bring them along as our guests for the night.

Galahad


Elated at having reached our point of assault without being discovered, we bivouacked on the river south of Namkwi and spent a busy evening gathering information. Martin and his OSS agents engaged the villagers in long periods of questioning about the Japanese strength and habits, the condition of the airstrip, etc., until they were squeezed dry of what they knew. After dark Laffin sent a patrol to reconnoiter the airfield, and its leader got through and actually onto the runway and back without being seen, although Japanese were all about. As a result of these efforts I was in possession by midnight of excellent information on which to base an attack order, as follows:

The Japanese worked on the airfield at night, repairing any bomb damage incurred during the day. The repair crews were billeted on the far side of the strip toward the Pamati end. At Pamati there was a Japanese military police headquarters for the area. There was no wire around the airfield, and the revetments around the strip which I had noticed on my air photo and had been worried lest they be fortified were not. The 55-gal. oil drums the photo showed checkerboarding the field were still there. Cover was sparse, and observation points between us and the field were lacking. Laffin's patrol had plotted a compass course that could confidently be used as an axis of attack.

It was learned also that a train left Myitkyina for Mogaung at about eleven every morning, that in Myitkyina there had been 2000 Japanese some time ago, and that the Japanese had 25 geishas in the area. (This last item became one of absorbing professional interest to Herbie, who by the time the city fell on 3 August had an accurate list of the names of all of them.)

The attack, at 10:30 the next morning, 17 May, went like clockwork, like part of a peacetime maneuver. As the troops moved out we sent our message *In the ring*, the signal for our supply transports to take off. The Chinese swept across the field and dug in on the east, toward Myitkyina, against shell fire. Osborne took Pamati and, leaving a platoon there to hold it, proceeded upstream toward the Zigyun ferry south of Myitkyina, the ultimate objective I'd given him. OSS Lieutenant Martin and his Kachins first blew up the railroad bridge

Galahad



over the Namkwi—the train escaped, coming through apparently ahead of schedule while the charges were still being placed—and then supervised the local villagers in the job of rolling the oil drums off the runway.

A19

Columbo

Galahad

By mid-afternoon the field was operational. I radioed *Merchant of Venice* for transports to come in and land. We had difficulty getting an acknowledgement, so I asked the leader of a flight of P-40's that shortly flew over—with orders to support us, but we had no targets—to relay it in again.

Then the clockwork went crazy. The planes came in promptly, but they brought no ammunition, no food, no General Merrill, only sundry goods and personnel not ordered, not wanted, and not needed. First it was gratuitous engineers, landing in gliders with great hazard to Col. Huang's men at the edge of the field. Then came a 50-caliber antiaircraft battery that proved useless. Then a battalion of the 89th Chinese infantry regiment that had to be disposed someplace where they wouldn't shoot up the troops doing the fighting. What with taking care of all these arrivals I had no time for running the battle. The afternoon was a nightmare. *Command Problems* says it was General Stratemyer of the Army Air Force who "intervened and upset the planned schedule." Why he was allowed to intervene and why Merrill or someone with authority from Task Force or Theater headquarters didn't arrive I still do not know.

Chinese Fiasco

The next morning, 18 May, Stilwell did fly in. He would have been welcome if he had brought food and ammunition, or even an idea of what we were to do next. But he brought only a dozen correspondents anxious to show how brave they were in visiting the combat zone. He did not say where Merrill was, and plans to follow up the success of our mission apparently had simply not been laid: when I told him that I was going to send the 150th Chinese against the town as soon as the supplies came in, he merely grunted, neither agreeing or disagreeing.

This day and the next, however, with ammunition low, I had to hold the Chinese in position east of the airfield. Osborne took the Zigyun ferry crossing but ran completely out of food and had to be withdrawn. On the 18th we lost Bill Laffin. I had asked him to take a liaison plane to find K force, whom we couldn't reach by radio, and deliver a message outlining our situation. He was in the air when a flight of Zeros, hiding behind a cloud formation that regularly hangs over the

Irrawaddy bend at Myitkyina, heard our fighter patrol radio that it was getting low on gas and was returning to base a few minutes early, before its relief arrived. The Zeros came in, and Laffin's plane either was shot down or crashed trying to get away. This was the only air attack we ever had. My orderly was killed, my own face was pock-marked by spent dum-dum fragments, and considerable damage was done to the fighter planes parked on the field. Stratemyer could just as well have kept his ack-ack at home: it consumed a lot of food and ammunition, but no Zeros.

On the 19th still no supplies. Merrill flew in, but so unannounced and briefly that I saw him only in time to wave an astounded goodbye as he was taking off. After reporting to Stilwell that afternoon he had another heart attack that put him permanently out of the campaign. He had visited my headquarters, however, and been given our intelligence estimates that there had been between 400 and 500 Japanese in Myitkyina at the time of our attack on the field, that these had grown in a matter of hours to about 2000, and that now there were two and a half battalions, with more coming up from the south. With a supply of ammunition we could have kept going and got into the town on the 17th or 18th; now it would be more costly. Merrill reported these estimates to Stilwell, but curiously and perhaps with a purpose it was the 400-500 figure that stuck in young Stilwell's mind at his father's Shaduzup headquarters and in the mind of the intelligence officer at Myitkyina Task Force headquarters, at this time inexplicably still back at Naubum. More on this later.

The supplies finally arrived on the 20th. The 150th, ready to go, moved out against the town, beginning with an embarrassing fumble. I had unwisely given Colonel Huang an azimuth as axis of advance; he read his compass wrong, got off in the wrong direction, and had to come back and start all over. This time we lined his regiment up in a column of battalions, a simple attack formation not easily fouled up. The initial assault was successful beyond imagination, carrying to the railroad station in the heart of the city. But when overs from Japanese fire intended for the leading battalion began to hit those following in column, the latter stupidly opened fire on their own troops ahead of them; the British lend-lease uniforms the Chinese wore were indistinguish-

Galahad

able except by their helmets from the Japanese. Then the entire regiment broke and ran, leaving close to three hundred dead or dying in the streets. It was every man for himself, and stragglers were even collected by McGee's force now arriving at Namkwi four miles away.

The Siege

On 21 May Merrill was formally replaced by Col. McCammon, his executive, who began to organize a new task force headquarters at the airfield. He would be commanding the 30th and 50th Chinese divisions, whose remaining elements were then arriving, as well as all of Galahad, which was now under my command; but he kept the two stars of his ad hoc Mexican promotion in his pocket. Osborne's battalion was kept at the airfield to guard it and the headquarters. The rest of Galahad—McGee at Namkwi and K force at last at Charpate—was assigned to provide security on the north and attack Myitkyina from there. Hardly a man of Galahad was by now free of dysentery or malaria or typhus, and the evacuation rate had become alarming.

McCammon was a reluctant debutant, and not well. He mounted one attack that failed. His reports to Stilwell were pessimistic. An atmosphere of apprehension, fear of an all-out Japanese attack to retake the field, began to prevail, not shared by Galahad. On 30 May Stilwell abruptly relieved McCammon and put Boatner, his own chief of staff, in command. I was given makeshift reinforcements in the form of two American engineer battalions from the Ledo road whom I was to introduce to combat operations. At this time Stilwell could probably have got the 36th British division to take Myitkyina, but having, in his own words, "burned up the Limeys" by his coup in seizing the airfield, he insisted on keeping it an American-Chinese show.

General Boatner almost immediately ordered an attack, but it got nowhere. Then in the early days of June the town was completely invested by the Chinese on the south and the Americans on the north. The original Galahad almost disappeared during this time. The doctors ordered first McGee and then Beach evacuated with the bulk of their battalions. Osborne, held inactive at the airfield against my wishes, was down to 18 officers and about 350 men. An unorganized batch

Galahad

of the greenest of green replacements were formed into what we called 2nd battalion New Galahad and placed at Mankrin to block a small road running north along the river. On 4 June I had set up my headquarters at Radahpur, where the main road out from Myitkyina forks west to Mogaung and north to Sumprabum, and there it was to remain for the next two months. South of Radahpur, about half way to Myitkyina, the two engineer battalions, by now reliable combat forces in a limited defensive role, were in position on either side of the road. The siege began.

During June and July the question of the Japanese strength in Myitkyina became a sore subject between my headquarters on the one hand and task force and theater headquarters on the other. After Jack Girsham and our Nisei had interrogated some fifty prisoners and talked to hundreds of evacuees from the town, it was very clear that over 2000 of the enemy were still alive there. Yet the figure 400-500 had become so fixed at the headquarters on the airfield and in Shaduzup that they would not revise it even when more than that were known to have been killed in and around the beleaguered town. Our positive unit identifications and casualty counts were brushed aside.

It is my personal belief that this ostrich-like attitude was adopted in order to deceive the Chinese troops and shame them for their lack of aggressiveness. Young Stilwell could not have been so ignorant of the situation as the intelligence estimates he furnished us all through June and July indicated; if he was he should have been relieved. Neither the Chinese nor Galahad fell for this deliberate manipulation of intelligence, if that is what it was; it only gave us a complete lack of confidence in any intelligence information put out by our higher headquarters. Information received from above was carefully analyzed and then usually discarded.

Galahad's estimate of 2000 was still 'way short of the correct figure, as we learned after the war from Japanese officers, for a very simple reason. Every Japanese soldier we had hitherto killed or captured had been found to have his name and unit marked in India ink on the fly of his breeches. In June we began to find bodies without this marking, and so could not tell whether they had belonged to units already identified or to new ones. Our estimates, therefore, based on the known

Galahad

Galahad

organizational strength of positively identified units, were incomplete, and we did not suspect that at one point in the battle there were some 4,500 enemy troops opposing us.

While thus underestimating Japanese strength for the benefit of the forces under his command, General Boatner was attempting to create a quite different impression in General Stilwell's mind. Here he dangled the prospect of losing even the airfield, saying in one report, "On the face of it it might appear that we have plenty here on the field for protection. Such is not the case; we in fact have only a prayer." Galahad would actually have welcomed an all-out banzai attack from the Japanese, having long since learned that these offered the best opportunity for rapid mass slaughter of the enemy. As it was, June under the monsoon dragged on as a month of frustration—sodden foxholes, one futile assault by a Chinese force, then advances measured in yards, everything in short supply, more casualties from combat, disease, and self-inflicted wounds among the green troops than we could handle, more green replacements. Still we never lost confidence that the job would eventually be accomplished.

I participated in one psychological warfare effort, a broadcast by loudspeaker beginning with Japanese folk-songs and then bringing me on to offer the Japanese soldiers a safe and convenient means of surrender. One of our Nisei translated, and surrender passes were dropped over the Japanese lines. The project flopped: the first Japs that tried to use the passes unfortunately approached Chinese positions and were shot.

On 25 June Mogaung fell to a joint British-Chinese attack, and Myitkyina became the last enemy rallying point in the area. The Japanese who had invested Fort Hertz in the north were also being withdrawn, ambushed and harried on their way south by the OSS Kachins. Galahad, astride all the roads north of Myitkyina, had to be constantly looking over its shoulder and hunting down Japanese trying to infiltrate into the city through the fields and down the river. Since the New Galahads were not good at patrolling and couldn't be relied upon to carry out independent missions, I had assembled the best of the Old Galahads, now scarce as hen's teeth, and organized a Headquarters Reconnaissance and Security Platoon. It did an effective job, using scouts from a mercenary force

of 30 or 40 local Gurkhas who took their pay sometimes in silver from the intelligence funds, more often in food for their families.

The Fall

Also on 25 June Stilwell relieved Boatner and put General Theodore Wessels from SEAC in command. Now for the first time we had at Myitkyina a commander with whom we could communicate. He visited every frontline unit, talked to the officers and men, and was receptive to suggestions. Although the first major effort he ordered, on 12 July, turned into disaster when supporting B-25's bombed our own positions and annihilated a platoon of New Galahad—in a small-scale replica of what happened at about the same time to General Bradley's troops trying to break out of the Normandy beachhead—morale began to improve and our daily attacks carried farther.

In mid-July Colonel Ford, the British commander of Ft. Hertz, came through with a party of British and a couple of OSS men; they told us that they had seen little evidence of Japanese. On the way back they did jump a large body that had got inside our own outposts; but this was the last large-scale Japanese attempt at infiltration, and we could now spend less time looking over our shoulder.

Air photos of the Japanese positions also now began to arrive in response to my long-repeated requests for frequent coverage. With these and the large photo I had been given at Arang, which was so much better than any map that I had studied it constantly, it became possible to select individual buildings and other points as targets for the artillery, the 4.2-inch mortars, and bombing. Galahad had the exclusive use of one fighter-bomber flown by Captain Allred, who had been with the group supporting us throughout the campaign and became in effect a member of the organization. Using his P-51 as heavy artillery, he could be trusted to drop 500-lb. bombs close to our own lines and to strafe within 50 yards of them. Our artillery too, built up to six howitzers, had trained itself to an extremely high peak of efficiency. At 2000 yards the gunners on a single piece could get seven rounds on the way before the first one hit the target.

Galahad

One of the new air photos of the positions opposite Galahad, taken after a night of heavy rain, showed the roads leading from the town to the Japanese lines as dark in color for some distance and then lighter from there on. I studied it for hours trying to find the reason for this phenomenon, and then the solution hit me like an electric shock wave. The roads changed color at the point where the nightly traffic ceased on each; and therefore a concealed Japanese position must lie near each of these points. After further daylight air reconnaissance we began to destroy them systematically.

On another photo I noticed a patch of ground with many dark furrows across it, each of which terminated, along a very irregular boundary, in a faint blurred line on what seemed to be fine green lawn. After long pondering it struck me that the faint lines were rows of buried oil drums, with the dark furrows ones that had been dug up. I designated the former a target, and was shortly gratified to see large clouds of black smoke billowing from the area. A trained PI team would have discovered these things much sooner; it had been years since I had studied photo interpretation.

An additional battalion of New Galahad, under Lt. Col. Gestring, had been in training at the airfield, and now, though still undertrained and very inexperienced, it constituted the maneuver force we had been needing for sixty days. Stilwell proposed using this force to cross a lake-like flooded padi on the left flank of the engineers' position, take an uncompleted airfield the Japanese had been building, and enter the north part of the town. The rest of the town would then be not worth holding. I agreed, provided that the attack were properly supported by concentrated artillery and mortar fire and that late air reconnaissance and photo coverage were accomplished in time to give all officers and key NCO's identical photos in lieu of maps.

These conditions, with the usual exception of the air photos, were met, the attack was well planned, and on 26 July Gestring carried it out with success. His men established themselves firmly in the north section of the town. I held them there, telling headquarters that now it was time for the Chinese to move. Closing a ring is a delicate operation; I didn't want my men beyond the creek that forms a natural boundary between

Galahad

the north and south parts of Myitkyina, for fear the Chinese would fire on them. The rest of Galahad I put to mopping up from the north, searching every inch of ground in its assigned area.

The Japanese commander, now facing certain defeat, committed suicide. On 3 August the Chinese made a ceremonial attack on the few Japanese left in the south part of the town, and it was announced that Myitkyina was in allied hands. The north Burma campaign, along with Galahad and my services in the CBI, was finished.

Numeral code and Wade-Giles romanization of Chinese characters as the basis of standardized name files for electronic processing.

MACHINES AND THE CHINESE NAME

The Biographic Register falls among the number of "specialized intelligence files," which, according to a recent article in these series, "can be indexed according to unambiguous features like names, nationalities, and locations" and which are therefore "the logical ones on which to try the first EDP applications"¹—i.e., electronic machine filing and retrieval. With this warning, it were well for all those who have to do with the reporting, recognition, and retrieval of Chinese names to prepare ourselves against the age of the computer so imminent upon us. For although a Chinese name may be more amenable to unambiguous filing than an estimate of the world situation, it frequently has ambiguities of its own, and the disconcerting effects of these can be mitigated only by the joint action of both reporters and processors.

The purpose of this paper is to explain to those who are not specialists in Chinese how the difficulties arise and to recommend courses of action in which both specialists and non-specialists will have a hand. Neither the problem nor the solution is at all new, but both become more urgent with the advent of the machine, which needs a set of precise rules to replace the intuitive know-how of the specialist manual processor.

Forms of Chinese Name

The Chinese has basically one family name (hsing) and one personal name (ming), written as a combination of ideographic characters. The great majority have a single hsing and a double ming, the latter hyphenated when romanized, as in CHANG Wen-yu. But sometimes the ming is single, as in Hu Ning; and here Ning, being a perfectly good surname, may be

¹ IV 4, p. 70.

The Chinese Name

mistaken for one. Sometimes only the surname is double (OU-YANG Wu), and more rarely both are hyphenated (OU-YANG Shan-tsun). Sometimes there is a supplementary Western name, placed last in indexing, as CHANG Wen-yu James.

These basic forms offer no unusual problems. The trouble begins when the Chinese are found romanizing their names according to the dialect they speak, according to some variant system, or arbitrarily, according to no system at all. For example: A useful list of Chinese names was obtained in the roster of a certain organization. They were signatures in ideograph. A translator correctly rendered one of them as CHANG Hsiung-mou, and just in case he gave also the Cantonese version, CHEUNG Hung-mou. But when CHANG himself romanized his signature for another organization's roster, he was found to use the spelling CHANG Hson-mou. Another of the ideograph signatures was correctly transliterated as LIN Chi-po, or Cantonese LAM Kai-poh; but LIN, registering later with an American society, signed his name as LAM Kai-bor. Women are likely to be even less predictable: tracing a young scientist named Wei Han-hsing we found that she had got married and sported an anomalous two surnames with a truncated given name—CHENG Wei Han-hsin.

Thus it is difficult, even when we start with a name in characters or in correct romanization, to anticipate what variant of it may be used in practice. The search for an individual named Lo, for example, necessarily involves a search of all those using the surnames, Lo, Loë, Loa, Locke, Loh, Loo, Lou, Low, Lowe, and Luo. It is still worse when we start with a solecistic romanization and try to get back to the original. Following are some of the names listed in the University of Michigan's 1958-59 *Directory of Students from Other Lands*, together with the original characters in standard Mandarin romanization, as best we can construct them:

As Listed	Probable Correct Form
DJUH Cornelia Yin-ying	Jou Yin-ying
DUH Ben Fu	Te Ben Fu
JAING Jerome Tsair	JENG ? ?
LIM Yen-san	LIN Yen-san
Kwok Eugenia Chi Ngo	Kuo Chih-wu
Yip, Sidney	YEH ? ?

The Chinese Name

These promiscuities are perpetrated by the individual Chinese themselves. An additional layer of random mutation is introduced by the variant systems through which Chinese names pass in other languages. Most frequent in this category is their appearance in an attempted transliteration from Cyrillic, as in the following examples:

Cyrillic Transliteration	Correct Form
VAN Yao-chen	WANG Yao-cheng
VAN Tzun-Tzyuan	WANG Ts'ung-ch'uan
FYN Li-Ta	FENG Li-ta

In German an initial CH usually becomes TSCH (TSCHANG for CHANG) and I or Y becomes J (JEH for YEH and Ji for I or Yi). In French the initial CH may become TCH or TZ (TCHao and TCHENG, but Tzou). And most recently the Communist Chinese on the mainland have been propagandizing a new and different romanization system of their own, Pin Yin, wherein, for example, CHANG becomes ZHANG, CH'EN becomes QIAN, and HSUEH is rendered XUE.²

Standardization for Machine Systems

The obvious authoritative standard for a Chinese name is the characters that represent it. The nearest approach in roman letters to this standard is what we have called above the "correct" romanization in Mandarin, that of the modified Wade-Giles system adopted by the U.S. Government.³ Forms can be converted to Wade-Giles from other systematic renderings—Cantonese, Cyrillic transliteration,⁴ Pin Yin—by the use of tables, which for purposes of prospective automation might even be incorporated into computer programs. But if we base our electronic storage and retrieval system entirely on the Wade-Giles romanization, we still build in ambiguities because many of the Wade-Giles forms are homonyms, each rep-

² For a full discussion of Pin Yin (or Pinyin, as it is rendered under its own system), see the article immediately following in this issue.

³ Set forth in *Key to Wade-Giles Romanization of Chinese Characters*, Army Map Service, 1944.

⁴ There is a *Russian-English Conversion Table for Chinese Syllables*, compiled by Robert B. Nielson, Library of Congress, and a table entitled in Russian *Chinese Names*, by Frank Dornan, which shows variant Cyrillic renderings of many Chinese names and gives the English equivalents.

The Chinese Name

representing several different characters. Some of them, CHIEN, CHIAO, and HSIEN, for instance, each stand for any one of 20 to 30 different names.

There is fortunately at hand a ready-made system for designating the characters themselves, and one peculiarly well adapted to machine processing—the Standard Telegraph Code used for many years by the Chinese in radio and cable communications. In it each character is assigned a four-digit number that with few exceptions uniquely and unequivocally represents it. In intelligence this code has come to be used increasingly as a means of precise reference—by field officers in reporting, by analysts in telephone consultations, and in inter-agency memoranda. It seems clear that Biographic Register's romanized alphabetical files should be complemented, in so far as possible, with the STC numerals, especially in a system of electronic storage and retrieval.

There remains, however, the problem of getting the names cited originally whenever possible in characters or their Telegraph Code equivalents, and otherwise in standard Wade-Giles form—a big problem, because the sources are varied and far-flung, mostly not under our control. It is not too early now to attack this problem, along with that of other non-roman names of the Far and Near East, by providing the initiative and vigorous leadership for a committee with representation from Government, the academic world, the Asian associations, librarians, etc., which would have the contacts and influence to promote the necessary changes from current practices. Some of the steps that could be taken are embodied in the following recommendations.

Contracts for bibliographic and abstracting coverage should stipulate that Chinese names be presented in the standard Wade-Giles, when possible with characters or STC numerals, that project supervisors be qualified linguistically to implement this clause, and that transliteration from Cyrillic be done according to the conversion tables cited above.

Editors of international technical journals and reference books printed in English should be acquainted with the need to give Chinese names in the standard form, to require that Chinese authors and contributors furnish Wade-Giles versions of their names in addition to any arbitrary signature they

use, and to see that any indexed irregular name forms be cross-referenced to the Wade-Giles form.

University registrars and organizations awarding scholarship or travel grants should be asked to cooperate in requiring the Wade-Giles form of name, with characters, on applications for grants and university enrollment. Faculty rosters should give any Chinese names a similar treatment, as well as the rosters published by Chinese organizations from time to time covering Chinese students and faculty members in American universities. Western names used in combination with the Chinese, as in WANG Fu-jen Paul, should be appended. Married names of women students should of course be cross-referenced to their maiden names.

Chinese language courses given in government agencies should include some training in the name-handling aspect of the language.

International usage of the Wade-Giles form as an alternative to other national versions of Chinese names should be promoted by presenting the problem of variant forms through such international channels as the Library of Congress and national groups in France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and the USSR. It could be pointed out that a courtesy could be done that part of the English-speaking world interested in the Chinese people by printing the standard English version only once, in parentheses, with the signature or byline of an article or on the first mention of a name.

Status report on the Communist latinization of Chinese, with implications for intelligence practices.

THE PROGRESS OF PINYIN

If the Communists have their way in China, the age-old characters of the Chinese language will finally join the Egyptian and Mayan hieroglyphics and the more recently buried Vietnamese ideographs in oblivion. Like Kemal Ataturk's a few decades ago, the Communists' effort to remold the nation includes a drive for drastic changes in a language ill suited to science and technology, to education of the masses, to the communications of a directed economy, to their international purposes. Much of the heritage that was dear to old China, obnoxious to the new, will also be buried with the old language: future generations of school children, taught from latinized textbooks, will not be able to read the undesirable ancient classics. The gentility of the cursive characters will be replaced by the classlessness of proletarian typefaces.

The language reform program of the Communists is a three-pronged drive. The first spearhead, aimed at the simplification of Chinese characters, has made the most progress. Some 2,000 characters are now accepted in the simplified form and used in textbooks and newspapers. Even family surnames are now shortened, although when General Hsiao Hua of the Chinese People's Liberation Army began using the short form of his surname in public dispatches instead of the ample there was much comment among scholars of the old school.

A second aspect of the language reform is the promotion of the Peking dialect as *putunghua*, the "common tongue" or national language. The Nationalists had introduced a *kuoyu* or "national speech" that selected from both northern and southern pronunciations, adopting for example the pronunciation *shui* used south of the Yangtse for the Peking (then Peiping) *ju*, "auspicious." Now it is again *ju* in the *putunghua* officially accepted for use in schools, broadcasting, etc.

A35

Pinyin

Pinyin

Evolution of Chinese Writing

Shell and Bone Characters B.C. 1700-1400	僕	漁	龜	雞	馬
Ta-chün B.C. 776-A.D. 250	僕	漁	龜	雞	馬
Hsiao-chün B.C. 250-A.D. 25	僕	漁	龜	雞	馬
Li-shu A.D. 25-220	僕	漁	龜	雞	馬
Kai-shu A.D. 380- present day	僕	漁	龜	雞	馬
Current Simplified Forms	仆	渔	龟	鸡	马
Meaning	servant	to fish	turtle	chicken	horse

(From Tao-tai Hsia's *China's Language Reforms*, Yale Institute of Far Eastern Languages, New Haven, 1956, p. 106.)

The third drive, the most revolutionary, the most significant for intelligence, and the one with which this paper is concerned, is that for *latinhua*, latinization, and is officially known as Hanyu Pinyin Fangan, Program for the Chinese Language in Phonetics. Pinyin, "phonetics," has come to denote the particular system of representing spoken Chinese in Latin letters—determined by the arbitrary values, including tonal qualities, given them—that is now being propagandized by the regime. Ostensibly the system is intended only to provide an aid for learning the standard (Peking) pronunciation of Chinese characters, a purpose which has so far governed most of its uses. The long-range aim, however, seems to envisage the Chinese coming to use only Pinyin and eventually dropping the characters. Wu Yu-chang, chairman of the Chinese Language Reform Committee, who as a refugee in the Soviet Union in the early days saw the Pinyin system being developed by philologists and who feels confident that China's millions will some day be using it in their daily work, specified as much in 1955:

Traditional Chinese writing is the product of feudalism. It has become a tool for the oppression of the proletariat and a stumbling block to mass education. It is not suited for the modern era. China must replace its outmoded character system with Pinyin.

Intelligence-wise, the impact of Pinyin is already being felt. Biographic registers and other filing systems organized by character sequence or according to the Wade-Giles alphabet must recognize and convert the new forms found in source materials. Plant names and trademarks are appearing in Pinyin. Pinyin signs have been put up on public buildings, streets, railway stations, and road posts. There are indications that as soon as place names can be standardized Pinyin maps may be issued. Government organs have already announced "draft" lists of Pinyin provincial and county names.¹

¹ A list published on June 15, 1958, by the Peking *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* (Language Reform) carried this explanation: "A total of 2,128 names of places on the county level and above are contained in this list; including those on Taiwan. The basis for this list is the publication *A Draft Gazetteer of the Administrative Division of the Chinese People's Republic* published by the Ministry of Interior in December 1955 and revised according to various State Council directives on administrative changes in China issued up to September 1957." The *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* (*Wenzi Gazette* in Pinyin) is the official organ of the Chinese Language Reform Committee of the State Council.

Pinyin

Pinyin

Development and Introduction of the System

The Latin alphabet used in Pinyin consists of the identical 26 letters used in English, except that the *v* is reserved merely for quotations from other languages and incidental special uses. Provision is made for an umlaut and other diacritical marks, but these are dropped in common usage. Several letters and diphthongs are pronounced quite differently than in English—*c* like “ts,” *q* like “ch,” *x* like “hs,” *z* like “tz,” *zh* like “dj.” The chart following gives some examples of the wide variations between Pinyin and the Wade-Giles romanization accepted as official by the U.S. Government. The influence of Cyrillic is evident in the random samples listed at the end.

Wade-Giles	Pinyin	English Phonetic Approximation
<i>Initials</i>		
cha	zha	jah
ch'a	cha	chah
chia	jia	jeeah
ch'ia	qia	cheeah
chih	zhi	jih
ch'ih	chi	cheeh
chin	jin	jean
ch'in	qin	chean
chou	zhou	joe
ch'ou	chou	cho
chu	zhu	joo
ch'u	chu	choo
chu umlaut	ju	jooch
ch'u umlaut	qu	chooch
hsi	xi	she
i	yi	yee
jan	ran	run
kai	gai	guy
k'ai	kai	kye
pang	bang	bahng
p'ang	pang	pahng
ta	da	dah
t'a	ta	tah
tsa	za	jah
ts'a	ca	chah
tzu	zi	jzu
tz'u	ci	tsuh

Wade-Giles	Pinyin	English Phonetic Approximation
<i>Finals</i>		
lien	lian	len
lung	long	loong
ch'ung	ch'iong	choong
hsieh	xie	sheh
mieh	mie	meh
<i>Romanized Cyrillic</i>		
zhan	zhang	chang
zhen'	zhen	chen
tsan	zang	tsang
tszen	zeng	tseng
chen'	chen	ch'en
chzhan	zhang	ch'ang

The Russians, as a matter of fact, took an early initiative in latinizing Chinese² and participated in developing precursors of the Pinyin. In 1928 the Chinese Scientific Research Institute, then part of the Communist Academy in Moscow, proposed that a Latin alphabet, rather than the more difficult Cyrillic, be used for Chinese. In 1929 Chu Ch'iu-pai, a Chinese Communist leader studying in the Soviet Union, and the Russian philologist Kolokov devised a Latin-letter system for Chinese. In 1931 a conference in Vladivostok attended by Wu Yu-chang, Lin Po-ch'u, Hsiao San, Wang Hsiao-pao, and Soviet scholars E. H. Draizhova and B. Ya. Starogyd drafted a 28-letter latinhua alphabet.³

² Not that they pioneered the alphabetization. The possibilities were considered as early as the 16th and 17th centuries by philologists of other nations. The Manchu government gave some thought to an alphabet in 1894 when echoes of the Meiji Restoration in Japan reached the mainland. During the Literary Renaissance in China after World War I, Dr. Hu Shih and others introduced Pai-hua (colloquial Chinese) and a system of phonetics which enjoyed some popularity. In 1926 the official sanction was given to the alphabetization of Chinese when the National Language Romanization Research Committee organized by Dr. Lin Yu-t'ang and others introduced the Gwoyeu Romatzyh system, which in 1932 was replaced by the Gwoin Chanyong Tsyhhuay system promulgated by the Nationalist government. Abroad, the English literary world has long accepted the Wade-Giles system, later modified to become the official U.S. standard, and the newer Yale University system. Missionaries working in Fukien, Taiwan, and Kwangtung have also introduced roman alphabets for previously unwritten local dialects.

³ Wen-tzu Kai-ko No. 21, 1959.

⁶ Peking, NCNA, May 10, 1960.

“填韵母”答案

“填韵母”答案

1 文豪 改革	1 完全	W	E	N	Z	I				G	A	I	G	E			
2 面貌	3 拼音	A		I						E							
3 幸福	4 字母	N		N	I	A	N	M	A	O							G
4 会唱	5 学习	Q		U						I							U
5 革命	6 革命	U	P							N	G						
12 人民 公社	10 姓	A	I		X	I	N	G	F	U							A
	15 真	N	N	U					O								C
			Y	E	H	U	I	H	U	A							
			I	X					U								H
		R	E	N	M	I	N			G	O	N	G	S	H	E	

¹⁰ *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 7, 1960.

Pinyin

well-known *People's Daily* appearing unfamiliarly as *Renmin Ribao*, the old *L'Impartial* as *Dagongbao*.¹¹ In a list of names appearing on page 3 of the August 25, 1960, issue of *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Pinyin was inserted after characters whose pronunciation might be in doubt: the characters for (Chang) I-yuan (1728-3354-3283) were followed by the Pinyin (*Zhang*) *Yiyuan*, that for Chi (8042), a rare Chinese surname, by *Qi*, that for Tai (0086/3141), a national minority in Yunnan Province, which is often mispronounced without vocalization, by the Pinyin *Dai*.

English-speaking foreigners wishing to learn Chinese through the medium of Pinyin are given assistance in a "Language Corner" of *China Reconstructs*, organ of the China Welfare Institute. Abroad, the Soviet Union, whose press immediately hailed the introduction of Pinyin,¹² makes it a required course for all students specializing in Chinese studies at Moscow University and uses it in Boarding School No. 11 and other schools teaching Chinese.¹³ In North Korea, the full text of the Chinese Pinyin program as proclaimed in 1958 was carried by *Korean Linguistics*, issued by the Korean Academy of Sciences. In March 1960 a Japanese goodwill mission under Zenmaro Toki, Chairman of the National Language Commission of Japan, visited China to study the language reform

¹¹ Other new names in the capital are *Congren Ribao* (Daily Worker), *Beijing Ribao* (Peking Daily News), and *Guangming Ribao* (Kuang-ming Daily News). In Shanghai there is *Xinwen Ribao* (Daily News) and *Jiefang Ribao* (Liberation Daily); in Canton, *Guangzhou Ribao* (Kuang-chou Daily News), *Yangcheng Wanbao* (Canton Evening News), and *Nanfang Ribao* (Southern Daily News). Further afield are *Qingdao Ribao* (Tsingtao Daily News), *Harbin Ribao* (Harbin Daily News), *Qinghai Ribao* (Tsinghai Daily News), *Xizang Ribao* (Tibet Daily News), *Neimenggu Ribao* (Inner Mongolia Daily News), and *Yili Ribao* (Ili Daily News of Sinkiang).

¹² In 1958 articles on the Pinyin system were carried by *Izvestia*, March 23rd; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 24th; *Sovetskaya Moldavia*, June 12th; *Moskva Pravda*, March 13th; *Problemy Vostokovedeniya*, No. 2; and *Sovremennyy Vostok*, No. 8.

¹³ Russian words are also transliterated into Pinyin for the convenience of the Chinese: *Kenimuningong* for Kremlin Palace, *Nijita Henxiaofu* for Nikita Khrushchev, *Liening* for Lenin, *Kitayi* for China, *Kamuunizimu* for Communism, *situjiante* for student, *wuqieliu* for teacher, *malique* for child. (*Wen-tzu Kai-ko* Nos. 12 and 22, 1959.)

Zuwei Zhongguo wenzi gaige gongzuo de lao gongzuoren yuan,
kandaole miqian Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi nian lai de wenzi
gaige gongzuo de weida chengjiu: hanzu jianhua fang'an de shun-
li tuxing, jue daduoshu zhong-xiaoxue he shifan xuexiao de yuwen
ke dou yi shiyong putonghua jinxin jiaoxue quan-guo ye you 5000
wan xiaoxuesheng kaishi xuexi pinyin-zimu — zhen shide women
huanxin guwu! Zhaxie chengjiu shi gen Dang de lingdao he guan-
hui shi fenbukai de.

"Wenzi Gaige" zazhi shang suo fabiao de youguan putonghua
pingbihui de chengji, tabie shi women gaoping.

Quan-guo Renmin Daibiao Dahui puzhun de Hanyu pinyin
fang'an dui women jiaoxue gongzuo, tabie shi zai xuesheng de fa-
yin fangmian, shi yige qiangyoudi gongju. Bifang shuo: Moske-
Daxue Dongfang Yuyan Xuexuan bianxie de Hanyu jiaokeshu li
jiu guangfan shiyongzhe zhaxie pinyin zimu.

Women xiangxin Zhongguo Wenzi Gaige Weiyuanhui zai Dang
de lingdao xia zai fuiguang putonghua, xiaomie wenming, jinyibu
tigao renmin de wenhua shuiping, ba tamen jiaoyucheng shehui-
zhuyi de jiji jianshezhe zhaxie zhongda renwu jiang dadao geng
weidao chengjiu.

Dang Weidao Shiyue Shehuizhuyi Geming sishi er zhou zhiji
xiang Zhongguo Wenzi Gaige de lao gongzuoren yuan he xin gan-
bu zhi reled tongzhi jingli!

Shi Pingqiang
Long Guowu (Sovetskaya E.K.)
Zhou Songyun
Si Tade (Czapogys B.2.)

1959 nian 10 yue 28 ri.

PINYIN FELICITATIONS FROM A SOVIET SCHOLAR ON THE DECENNIAL OF THE
REPUBLIC

Pinyin

program.¹⁴ In India and Pakistan, however, Moslems are reported angry at the Pinyin plot to wipe out the cultural heritage of the Moslems in Sinkiang.¹⁵

Pinyin in Science and Technology

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has created a special committee to study the application of Pinyin to the field of Chinese science. Junior researchers organized Pinyin classes in the science center at Chung-kuan Ts'un near Peking, beginning in June 1958 with an enrollment of over 600.¹⁶ It is expected that Pinyin will facilitate the machine translation of scientific articles. Pinyin words have been proposed that often approximate foreign words in use in the different sciences.¹⁷ Scientific and technical periodicals carry such Pinyin titles as *Kexue Tongbao* (Science Bulletin), and *Kexue Ximwen* (Science News).¹⁸ Although *Scientia Sinica* still uses its old Latin title, it lists the names of its editorial committee in Pinyin.¹⁹

In November 1959 the Geographical Transliteration Committee of the State Bureau of Surveying and Cartography announced draft regulations for the transliteration of minority

¹⁴ Tokyo, *Akahata*, March 23, 1960.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, February 28, 1960.

¹⁶ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko*, August 30, 1958.

¹⁷ In chemistry, *zirkon* for zirconium, *krogenin* for cryogenium, *karat* for carat, *karbakol* for carbacholum, *krom* for chromium, *kasin* for quassin, *kinamin* for quinine, etc. In medicine, *naomoyan* for meningitis, *guanjie huanong* for swelling of the joints, *jizing* for acute, *manzing* for contagious, etc. Some space-age terms are *zhangji feizheng* (interplanetary travel), *yuzhou huofian* (space rocket), *yuanshineng feiji* (atomic airplane), *qianshui kechuan* (submarine passenger ship), *jiatong* (communications).

¹⁸ Others are *Diqiu Wuli Xuebao* (Acta Geophysica Sinica), *Qixianzue Yibao* (Meteorological Translation Journal), *Dizhi Yu Kantan* (Geology and Prospecting), *Wuli Yibao* (Physics Translation Journal), *Dian Shijie* (Electricity World). These Pinyin titles are now used in Moscow's Referativnyy Zhurnal (Journal of Abstracts). Referativnyy Zhurnal - Khimiya, No. 16 for 1960, for example, carried #65998 *Zaozhi Gongye* and #66017 *Huaxue Tongbao*.

¹⁹ Some of these men are Ma Da You (Maa Dah-you), Qian Xue Sen (H. S. Tsien), Ye Du Pei (Chu Thay Yap), and Zhang Xi Jun (H. C. Chang). The unsystematic old names in parentheses point up the potential value of Pinyin in providing a standard system of romanization for the storage and retrieval of biographic data.

Pinyin

nationality place names into Pinyin.²⁰ Pinyin spellings for the provinces and regions of China have been standardized according to the chart on page A46. Moreover, committees are at work standardizing Pinyin spellings of geographical names for the entire world.²¹ These groups face the problem of

²⁰ In brief summary as follows (from the Peking *Ti-ti Chih-shih*, "Geographical Knowledge," No. 11, 1959):

1. All Han place names should be transliterated according to the Hanyu Program for Pinyin. For example, instead of the Chuang pronunciation *Guangsai*, the Peking pronunciation *Guangxi* should be used for the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region.

2. If the pronunciation of a place name is not the same in Han and a minority language, the Pinyin transliteration should generally follow the Han pronunciation. But the pronunciation of the minority nationality may be accepted in special cases. For example, use *Urumqi* instead of *Wu-lu-mu-ch'i* and *Xishuangbanna* instead of *Sipsuangbanna*.

3. Use Han place names such as *Bailingmiao*, but add the native name, *Bat Halga*, below.

4. Where more than one minority language is prevalent, use the officially accepted language. For example, in Sinkiang use the Uighur *Tashkurgan* instead of the Tadjik *Warshide*.

5. Use the dominant minority pronunciation instead of the local minority pronunciation. For example, in the Xishuangbanna Dai nationality area in Yunnan province, a river is locally called *Namkinli*, but in the standard Dai Yunjinghong language it is the *Namkindi*. The latter should be adopted. For a certain town in Inner Mongolia the name *Huh Hot* should be used instead of the local pronunciations *Hoh Hot*, *Goh Got*, and *Hohe Hota*.

²¹ Some of the draft transliterations in *Yameilijia* (the Americas) are *Bari* for Brazil, *Jianada* for Canada, *Guba* for Cuba, *Mozige* for Mexico, *Banama* for Panama, and *Bilu* for Peru. In *Afeilijia* (Africa): *Kamailong* for Cameroons, *Jiana* for Ghana, *Qieniya* for Kenya, *Gangguo* for Congo, *Madafiasijia* for Madagascar, *Molugge* for Morocco, *Aiji* for Egypt, *Duoge* for Togo, *Sanggeiba* for Zanzibar, and *Aerjiliya* for Algeria. In *Yaziya* (Asia): *Jianpusai* for Cambodia, *Xilan* for Ceylon, *Chaorian* for Korea, *Feilubin* for the Philippines, *Yindunizhiya* for Indonesia, *Riben* for Japan, *Taiguo* for Thailand, and *Yuenan* for Vietnam. In *Ouluoba* (Europe): *Bilishi* for Belgium, *Deyizhi* for Germany, *Xila* for Greece, *Falanzi* for France, *Yidali* for Italy, *Nansilafu* for Yugoslavia, *Heland* for the Netherlands, *Aodili* for Austria, *Ruidian* for Sweden, and the east European *Baojialiya* for Bulgaria, *Jiekesiluofuko* for Czechoslovakia, *Xiongyali* for Hungary, *Polan* for Poland, *Luomaniya* for Rumania, and *Aerbania* for Albania. Some geographical designations in *Sulian* (the Soviet Union) are *Mosko* for Moskva, *Gruzia* for Grusinskaya, *Hasak* for Kazakhskaya, *Baioros* for Belorusskaya, and *Oros* for Rossiyskaya.

Pinyin

WADE-GILES	PINYIN	WADE-GILES	PINYIN
Anhui	Anhui	Kwangsi	Guangxi
Chekiang	Zhejiang	Kwangtung	Guangdong
Fukien	Fujian	Liaoning	Liaoning
Heilungkiang	Heilongjiang	Ninghsia	Ningxia
Honan	Henan	Shansi	Shanxi
Hopei	Hebei	Shensi	Shanxi
Hunan	Hunan	Shantung	Shandong
Hupeh	Hubei	Sinkiang	Xinjiang
Nei-meng-ku	Neimenggu	Szechwan	Sichuan
Kansu	Gansu	Taiwan	Taiwan
Kirin	Jilin	Tibet	Xizang
Kiangsi	Jiangxi	Tsinghai	Qinghai
Kiangsu	Jiangsu	Yunnan	Yunnan
Kweichow	Guizhou		

whether to pinyinize geographical designations according to the local pronunciation or according to international usage, whether Paris for example is properly Pah-ri' or Pair'-iss. One writer contended that Dublin should be listed as *Balia-keli*, Pinyin for the Gaelic Baile Atha Cliath.²²

Pinyin in Communications

The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs promptly issued an order for the adoption of the newly promulgated system in the postal and telegraphic service. The text of the order with an explanation of the regulations governing the use of Pinyin is given in the September 30, 1958, issue of *Wen-tzu Kai-ko*.²³

²² *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 4, 1959.

²³ In summary:

1. Pursuant to the decision of the fifth session of the First National People's Congress made on February 11, 1958, telegraph messages may be transmitted in Pinyin.
2. The 26 letters of the Pinyin alphabet will be used. A *y* may be inserted before a *u* to indicate an unlaute.
3. Pinyin may be used for all categories of domestic messages.
4. Pinyin messages in secret code may be transmitted only by military and government organizations and organizations granted permission by the government.
5. Only messages written in approved Pinyin and clear text will be accepted for telegraphic transmission.
6. Designations of telegraph offices and message rates will be those now in current use.
7. Pinyin telegrams may be addressed to telegraph registration numbers, *youxian* (post office boxes), or *dianhua haoma* (telephone num-

Pinyin

Pinyin traffic was initiated on a trial basis on October 1, 1958, National Anniversary Day, to and from Peking, Shanghai, and Chungking. The Shanghai Post and Telecommunication Bureau implemented the order of the Ministry by issuing a notice announcing acceptance of Pinyin messages as of October 1, 1958, at all post and telecommunication bureaus.

Wen-tzu Kai-ko (No. 8) of August 1958 carried a model Pinyin message for bank transfers, by which for example the Yuan County Merchandising Company, with account number 2401 at the Provincial Bank, could effect a telegraphic transfer of 10,000 yuan to the provincial authorities. Under the old method the telegram would have read, "(2401) (10,000) (0337-4905-0361-0674-0448-3387) (0064-1874-1421)," with 24 message units and requiring four processing steps. In Pinyin it is simply "(2401) (10,000) Y. X. Gonsi liru. Jing Qiaoxiao," with only 13 units in clear text requiring no processing. Bank messages could be further simplified by abbreviating the Pinyin words for currency units—*w* for wan (10,000), *q* for qian (thousand), *b* for bai (hundred), *y* for yuan (dollar), *j* for jiao (dime), and *f* for fen (cent).

The national railways are making wide use of Pinyin. The main railway station in the capital has the sign *Beijing Zhan* (Peking Station) across its front entrance. Inside is a *Junren Houcheshi* (Military Personnel Waiting Room). The post office in Peking is marked *Beijingshi Youju*. On October 1, 1959, the Ministry of Railways ordered the serial markings on all rolling stock changed to Pinyin. Open freight cars now

bers). To expedite delivery, the names and addresses of senders and recipients should be backstopped in characters.

8. Pinyin messages may be transmitted in single or connected words. Conversion into characters will be done on request.

9. Five letters or fewer constitute a Pinyin unit and the fee is three cents per unit.

10. Pinyin messages will not be accepted for international traffic; including Hong Kong and Macao.

A supplement to the regulations points out that the official Pinyin spelling of Chinese characters is given in a "Chart of Common Pinyin" issued by the Language Reform Publishing House in May 1958. The supplement also declares that the transmission of domestic messages in secret code is governed by Telegraph Regulation No. 39 and that messages in Pinyin must carry the notation "HY" (Hanyu) to indicate that the message is not in a foreign or minority nationality language. (*Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 11, 1958.)

Pinyin

use the designator *C* in place of the old phonetic "x," closed cars *P*, and coaches *RZ*. Locomotives are designated *DK*, *ET*, and *JF* (Jiefang).²⁴

Discussing the use of Pinyin in railway dispatch work, the staff of the Shanghai Railway Bureau made suggestions for short forms to use for railway traffic. Thus *n* could be used for nien (year), *y* for yue (month), *r* for ri (day), *5c* for wuci (fifth train), *fr* for fahuoren (shipper), *sr* for shouhuoren (consignee), *t* for ton, *d* for dan (picul), etc. It was also suggested that the last letter of a doubtful word be doubled; for example, since "bu" in the message "40t shengtie bufa" could mean either 40 tons of wrought iron *reshipped* or *not shipped*, the latter meaning could be indicated by writing "40t shengtie buufa."²⁵

On July 1, 1958, railway telegraph offices in the Tsingtao, Weihhsien, and Chefoo stations began using Pinyin. In the Tsinan railway bureau over 200 cadres are said to be studying Pinyin part or full time, and it is claimed that eighty percent of the Nanking railway office staff are learning to use Pinyin in their operations.

Communication publications bear titles in Pinyin along with the traditional characters. A common one in every city is the *Dianhua Haobu* (telephone book). Some communications journals are *Luxingjia* (Traveller), *Tiedao Zhoukan* (Railway Weekly), and *Wuxiandian* (Wireless). The latter carries Pinyin sectional headings—*Aihaozhe Xiaozhizuo* (Innovations of the Hobbyists), *Dajiatan* (Everybody's Comments), *Shijie Zhi Chuang* (Window of the World), *Weishemma* (Why?), *Kankan Xiangxiang* (Look and Think), *Wuxiandian Wenda* (Questions and Answers on Radio), and *Duzhe—Zhuzhe—Bianzhe* (Reader—Writer—Editor).²⁶

Pinyin in Military Usage

On June 10, 1960, the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army directed the armed services to implement an April 22nd decree of the Party Central Committee that Pinyin be universally adopted in training; the armed forces must be unified, it said, and this can be accom-

plished only if a common language is used. All instructors, educational and dramatic personnel, interpreters, and motion picture workers were ordered to become conversant with the new system.²⁷

Even earlier, however, at a Second Cultural Work Conference of the armed forces held in Peking in November 1959, Deputy Director Liu Han of the propaganda section had reported considerable progress in the use of Pinyin in the armed forces: the Shen-yang Military District had early in 1958 ordered all its subordinate military units and training institutions to use Pinyin; the Navy had adopted it in July for visual communications like semaphore and flash signals; most military schools were using it. Troops from Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Chekiang, and Kiangsu, who usually have strong local accents, were beginning to learn correct Chinese through the phonetic writing.²⁸

In 1960 a concerted effort was being made to teach recruits Pinyin, thereby simultaneously improving their vocabulary and pronunciation. It is said to require usually some 30 to 40 hours of instruction. Book I of an anti-illiteracy textbook series being published by the Army's General Political Department is written in Pinyin, and other military publications transliterate their titles and difficult words in the text.²⁹ Illiterate recruits for communication battalions from Kwangtung province and the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region are said to have learned Pinyin in three or four months with the help of teaching aids like "Pinyin poker" and "military termi-

²⁴ *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 11, 1960.

²⁵ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 23, 1959.

²⁶ The Pinyin titles of some important military publications are *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army News), *Jiefangjun Huabao* (Liberation Army Pictorial News), *Jiefangjun Zhanshi* (Liberation Army Soldier), *Jiefangjun Wenyi* (Liberation Army Literature and Art), and *Hangkong Zhishi* (Aeronautical Knowledge). A few military terms are *junfu* (uniform), *junguan* (officer), *junhao* (insignia), *junhuo* (ammunition), and *junli* (discipline). A short item entitled "Jiefangjun Baoweizhe Women" (The People's Liberation Army is Defending Us) reads: *Jiefangjun shushu shouli nazhe qiang, bupa fengchu yuda; bupa hurude taiyang. Tamen ririyeye baowei zuguo, gonggu, guafang. (The People's Liberation Army, rifle in hand, is not afraid of the wind, rain or fiery sun. Day and night, it defends the homeland and strengthens national defense).* (From *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* Nos. 19 and 23, 1959.)

²⁷ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 22, 1959.


²⁸ *Wen-tzu Kai-ko* No. 2, 1959.

²⁹ Peking, *Wu-hsien-tien* (Wireless), September 19, 1959.

Pinyin

Pinyin

Pinyin



nology contests," and training in radio operation could therefore be reduced from a year to six months and still yield a five-fold improvement in transmissions.³⁰ At a Third National Demonstration Conference on teaching *putunghua* held in Peking during August 1960, several Army units were cited for their excellence in Pinyin semaphore signalling.

Pinyin in Commerce and Literature

Advertisements in the mainland press now carry such Pinyin phrases as *Meidu Dianchi Chang Zhi*, "Beautiful Capital Battery Works." In August 1959 Shanghai merchants were ordered to use Pinyin in their signs. A box of shoe polish has on its cover *Matou xieyou Di 2 Huaxueshe* (Horse Head shoe polish made by No. 2 Chemical Works). Other trademarks are *Bailusi Pijiu* (White Crane Beer) and *Hanqiao Pai* (Han River Bridge Shoes). China's latest luxury sedan (with a scented mahogany dashboard and silk floor rugs) is called *Hongqi* (Red Flag). The picul is now *dan* and the catty *jin* (.5 kilogram).

Some familiar names for theaters and parks in Peking are now written in advertisements and signs as *Xin Zhongguo* (New China), *Dahua* (Great China), *Zhongshan Gungyuan* (Chung-shan Park), *Beihai* (Imperial Palace Lake), *Shoudu* (Capital), *Erhtong* (Children's). China's largest domestic book distributor, the New China Bookstore, is rendered *Xinhua Shudian*, its international counterpart *Guozhi Shudian*.³¹ English-language news dispatches are beginning to use Pinyin titles without translating them, for example that of *Red Flag*, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which is cited simply as *Hongqi* in the transmissions of the New China News Agency.

Implications

It can thus be seen that the replacement of the old writing with the new phonetic alphabet, although it is not being accomplished overnight, is making substantial progress under the steady pushing of the regime, and that after less than three years we in intelligence are beginning to feel its effects. It would be premature to say that we should be giving active

³⁰ *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, May 26, 1960.

³¹ *Peking Review*, June 16, 1959.

Pinyin

consideration to the adoption of Pinyin ourselves in Chinese gazeteers, maps, biographic registers, alphabetical files, language training, and standard nomenclature; aside from the still experimental status of some phases of the Communist program and our uncertainty about the rapidity of its future progress, the new system would be a hindrance in processing material concerning or obtained through the Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere in the anti-Communist diaspora. But we should at least be keeping up with the Communists in our familiarity with the Pinyin forms, and as we set up new systems we should design them with an eye to convertibility to Pinyin. Otherwise we may find ourselves stuck, in a decade or two, with passing the bulk of our material through a superfluous routine of conversions into and out of the then antiquated and artificial Wade-Giles. We have succeeded in remaining for more than eleven years the frightened ostrich with respect to a single Communist rendering, Peking, but we should not try it for a whole language.

Sketch of a successful British penetration at high level into the American Revolutionary effort.

**EDWARD BANCROFT (@ Edwd. Edwards),
ESTIMABLE SPY**

The American Revolution, as John Bakeless illustrates with copious detail in his recent book,¹ teemed with spies and undercover agents, military and political, on both sides. What often seems surprising, in the hindsight of the current age of highly organized espionage, is that rather inexpertly camouflaged penetrations went undetected by those on the other side astute enough to employ clandestine means themselves, who therefore should have known what to expect of the enemy. Certainly a man with Benjamin Franklin's reputation for astuteness should not have been taken in and milked for years by a British agent making his maiden venture into espionage. Yet Edward Bancroft, whom Franklin appointed, worked with, and defended as private secretary to himself and Silas Deane, American commissioners in Paris, did just that, with untold damage to the American cause. Praised, accused, and vindicated, he maintained his cover almost in perpetuity. When his agent role was unmasked he had been dead for 68 years.

The story of this man of many talents has never been assembled and published in one piece. Sufficient material is extant, however, scattered in scholarly papers on the history of the times, to afford glimpses of his life and the outlines of his potent espionage activity against the Americans in Paris, made possible by his native ability and abetted by the failure of Benjamin Franklin and others to take the most elementary counterintelligence precautions.

Recruitment of a Polymath

Bancroft was born in Westfield, Massachusetts, on January 9, 1744. Little is known of his childhood and youth. Although it has been said that he had no formal education,

¹ *Turncoats, Traitors and Heroes*, reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 1, p. 101.

Edward Bancroft

there is some evidence that he was once a pupil of his future employer Silas Deane, formerly a schoolmaster.² This circumstance, if true, may have contributed to the close relationship which later developed between the two men. Bancroft did not remain long in his native country, for before about 1766, when he took up residence in England,³ he had served as a sailor and had stayed long enough in Dutch Guiana to gain considerable knowledge of the natives' habits, customs, and religion: in 1769 he wrote a treatise on this subject that gained him scholarly acclaim.

In England he studied medicine and was ultimately elected a member of the College of Physicians. His interests were by no means confined to medicine, however. He was a contributor on American subjects to the *Monthly Review*, and he became an editor of this periodical. In 1769 he published his *Remarks on the Review of the Controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies*, which helped considerably to establish his reputation as an authority on that vexatious problem. It was through his writings that he came to know prominent men like Doctor Priestley and Benjamin Franklin. His attainments in scientific work won him membership in the Royal Society, and in the technological field he became something of an inventor in the processing of textiles.

These slim facts, about all that is known of his life outside his activities during the revolutionary period, are sufficient to establish that he was an unusually versatile and accomplished man. Because of his work as doctor, scientist, anthropologist, and political historian, he came to the attention of important men of the times and was welcomed into the most exclusive circles of the enlightened, cynical society of 18th-century Europe. About his personal life we know even less than about his several professional careers; and we can only guess what motivated him to add espionage to his list of professional accomplishments. It seems probable that money was a factor: he gambled on the stock exchange, and some of his writings indicate a strong concern and an occasional anxiety for the sources of his income.

² "Edward Bancroft," in *Dictionary of American Biography*, Johnson, et al., editors, Vol. 1, pp. 563-564.

³ See his "Memorial to the Marquis of Carmarthen," in *American Historical Review*, XXIX, pp. 493-495 (from Stevens Facsimiles).

Edward Bancroft

The immediate reason for his turning British spy was apparently his friendship with Paul Wentworth. This man, a member of a famous New Hampshire family, had spent many years in England, and when the Revolution came he cast his lot with the mother country. His connections were such—he was related to the Marquess of Rockingham—that he rose high in court circles and was offered an important job in the British Secret Service. He bargained well, agreeing to work against American interests only on the assurance of getting in addition to his salary a seat in Commons and a baronetcy, these to be tendered at the end of hostilities. Bancroft himself says⁴ that it was Wentworth who first approached him on the matter of giving information to the British concerning American negotiations in Paris, and his statement has been accepted by historians.⁵ There is documentary support for it in the fact that his contractual agreement with the British Secret Service was prepared in Wentworth's handwriting.⁶

This agreement, not made until some six months after Bancroft had begun reporting to the British in July 1776, committed His Majesty's Government to pay him a sum of money outright and several hundred pounds per year thereafter in return for specified information to be supplied to Wentworth and to Lord Stormont, King George's Ambassador in Paris. How extensive the British requirements were for coverage of the American-French target and how importantly Bancroft figured in their expectations can be seen in the following excerpt:

Information to be supplied to Wentworth:

The progress of the Treaty with France, and of the assistance expected, or commerce carried on or in any of the ports of that Kingdom.

The same with Spain, and of every other Court in Europe.

The agents in the foreign islands in America, and the means of carrying on the Commerce with the Northern Colonies.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See Burton J. Hendrick, *The Lees of Virginia*, pp. 280-281, and Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin*, p. 580.

⁶ Hendrick, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-283.

Edward Bancroft

Edward Bancroft

The means of obtaining credit—effects and money; and the channels and agents used to apply them; the secret moves about the Courts of France and Spain, and the Congress agents, and tracing the lines from one to the other.

Franklin's and Deane's correspondence with the Congress, and their agents; and the secret, as well as the ostensible letters from the Congress to them. Copies of any transactions, committed to papers, and an exact account of all intercourse and the subject matter treated of, between the Courts of Versailles and Madrid, and the agents from Congress.

Subjects to be communicated to Lord Stormont:

Names of the two Carolina ships, masters both English and French, description of the ships, and cargoes; the time of sailing, and the port bound to.

The same circumstances respecting all equipments in any port in Europe together with the names of the agents employed.

The intelligence that may arrive from America, the captures made by their privateers, and the instructions they receive from the deputies.

How the captures are disposed of.¹

The Penetration

The fulfillment of such demanding requirements would have been beyond even Bancroft's abilities if he had not had the remarkable access to information already demonstrated in his first reports to the British. His principal source was Silas Deane, whom the nascent States of America, in one of their first diplomatic ventures, had sent to France in 1776 to try to secure French aid. Americans had long been abroad seeking commercial and financial arrangements, and the several colonies had been sending their representatives to London for many years; but these men were not practiced in the protocol prescribed for the envoys of free governments, and there was no reservoir of American personnel trained to cope with the intricacies of European, and in particular French, court procedure. Silas Deane, in many respects well qualified for his role as commissioner to France, would find his Connecticut Yankee background of ill stead against the wiles of French politics. He needed the guidance of a man of the world, and Edward Bancroft was eminently suited to provide that guidance.

Benjamin Franklin was responsible for the writing of Deane's instructions. Presumably aware of Deane's diplo-

matic deficiencies, recalling his friendship with the scholar and scientist Dr. Bancroft, then living in England, and mindful of the Doctor's defense of American rights published in 1769, he included specific directions that Deane write Bancroft in London and ask him to come to Paris.² This Deane did when he arrived in Bordeaux on June 6, and after a month's delay while Bancroft recovered from an illness, the two men met in the French capital.

Bancroft spent most of July in Paris with the American commissioner. Deane freely confided to him all the plans of the Congress and its hopes for French assistance, and even took him along to his meetings with French Foreign Minister Vergennes. The course of these negotiations was minutely recorded by Deane in the evenings for the confidential information of the Congress. But Bancroft occupied his evenings in exactly the same way: with just as much careful detail, with just as much secrecy, and with far greater literary art, he put to paper the same facts. These were the reports that later found their way to Lord Suffolk, head of the British Secret Service.³

In the early weeks of the Deane-Bancroft relationship, the association was loose and informal, and Bancroft made no move to take up permanent residence in Paris. During the summer and fall he made several trips back and forth from London. When Benjamin Franklin arrived to reinforce Deane's effort, Bancroft played the role of warm friend and assistant to both of them. A third commissioner, however, who arrived with Franklin, the Virginian Arthur Lee, he evidently spent little time trying to cultivate, perhaps because that rather irritable gentleman was not often taken into the confidence of his fellow commissioners and because he kept separate quarters at Chaillot, some distance from Passy, the center of American activity.

By early 1777 Bancroft's services had become so indispensable in the eyes of the commissioners that he was offered the position of secretary to Deane and Franklin and residence with them at their headquarters at Passy. So at about the

¹ "Letter of Instruction," in *Deane Papers*, Vol. I, pp. 123-126.

² "Narrative of Edward Bancroft," in *Deane Papers*, dated August 14, 1776 (from Stevens Facsimiles, #890), Vol. I, pp. 177-184.

³ Samuel Flagg Bemis, "British Secret Service and the French-American Alliance," in *American Historical Review*, XXIX, pp. 477-478.

Edward Bancroft

Edward Bancroft

same time he was formally commissioned as a British spy, he was asked by his target sources to work for them, to live in the same house with them, and to accept a salary from their government. So highly was he regarded that Deane wrote to the Congress:

Dr. Bancroft having been involved in the suspicion of being privy to the firing of stores at Portsmouth an incident in his life which is not altogether clear, and finding himself growing obnoxious to the administration and their partisans, left England early in the year 1777, and came to Paris, where he most assiduously devoted his time and abilities to the service of his country, and assisted the Commissioners in writing for them, and by keeping up a correspondence with his friends in London, from whom good and useful information was obtained.

And again:

Though I have several times mentioned Dr. Bancroft and his services, I cannot in justice to these States, to him, and to my own feelings, omit saying that he was early sent for, by order of Congress, from London; that he sacrificed all his prospects there, and during the whole time of our negotiations in France, devoted himself to the Service of country; that he acquired the esteem and confidence of persons of rank and character in France, as well with the political and commercial, as with the literary characters in that kingdom.¹⁰

Modus Operandi

Whenever possible Bancroft made copies of all instructions received by the commissioners from the government in Philadelphia, as well as communications exchanged between them and Vergennes, and forwarded them to Wentworth or Stormont, according to his instructions, for transmission to Lord Suffolk. But when there was no opportunity to copy the documents on the spot he simply removed them from the house at Passy and took them or sent them to the British Embassy for duplication. Then he would return them to the commission files the next time he got a chance.

How he managed to keep his communications secure is not altogether clear. He did find good pretenses for frequent excursions to England, but the information could not always wait for such trips. In Paris he had the task of outwitting the numerous spies and counterspies that dogged the steps

of every official there. Vergennes employed a veritable army of agents whose sole duty was to keep watch on the activities of every American in Paris, including Franklin, Deane, and Lee; in the complicated web of intrigue which surrounded American-French negotiations, no one was trusted. It must have required great forethought and alertness to avoid both chance apprehension by the Americans and the deliberate surveillance of the French.

We do know something of the mechanics of his communications system. He was instructed to relay most of his information in dispatches addressed to certain individuals, and "anyone who might accidentally discover these dispatches would think that he had stumbled upon an illicit love affair; they were to be written 'in gallantry,' upon white sheets of paper, with liberal spaces between."¹¹ The real message, of course, was written in the intervening spaces in a "white ink" for which only Lord Stormont possessed the developer.

Bancroft got his letters to the British Embassy through a dead drop. A member of the Embassy staff went every Tuesday evening after half past nine to the south terrace of the Tuileries, where there was a certain tree with a hole at its root. In this hole was a bottle which would contain any information from Bancroft for Stormont. The bottle was sealed and tied at the neck with ordinary twine about a half yard in length, the other end of which was fastened to a peg of wood. The peg was split at the top to hold a small white card that would make the spot visible in the dark.¹²

The regular visits to the same spot on the same night of every week, the white card in the peg, and the sealed bottle hanging on a piece of twine should inevitably, one might think, have betrayed Bancroft's activities to the French. But the measure of excellence is success; and this method proved effective and safe for several years. Even more glaring, though better explainable, is the fact that the American commissioners, even after it became clear that many of their principal secrets were known to the British, never subjected their secretary to the simple security checks that would have revealed or prevented his depredations.

¹⁰ "Silas Deane's Narrative, Read Before Congress," in *Deane Papers*, Vol. III, pp. 144-204 (pp. 180 and 201).

¹¹ Hendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

¹² *Ibid.*

Edward Bancroft

Edward Bancroft

One of Bancroft's most effective ruses was to dwell at length on the danger in which he found himself in England, both in the last months of 1776 when he still maintained a residence there and thereafter on his trips to London, ostensibly to gather information for the Americans. (As arranged by Whitehall, where he was most frequently to be found while in the city, he did carry back to Franklin and Deane some news of British war plans which appeared to be valuable but in reality could do no harm to the Imperial cause.) The intimations of danger begin on a note of bravado:

This has been a day of Fasting & Prayer for the Subjugation of America. I have however in defiance of the Royal Proclamation been dining at Mr. Walpoles with some well disposed Friends & making merry.¹⁷

But they soon become explicit and serious, if still brave:

70 [Grand], 177 [Priestley], 31 and other friends of mine have expressed for some days, and especially since the Bill to suspend Habeas Corpus, great fears for my safety; and this morning 70 advised me very strongly to think of going soon to 68. I am not subject to unreasonable fears, and I do not think there is yet sufficient reason to profit by this advice, although I must confess that I think that before long the position of every faithful American will be dangerous here, and mine is even now extremely disagreeable. People of position in this country begin to think that it is unreasonable and even dangerous to keep up any intimacy with us, and my best friends, although they continue to show me hospitality, evidently desire to do it as secretly as possible, and one hears in public from those who are enemies of America nothing but insults and most insolent invectives against the colonists and their friends.¹⁸

Not content with this verbal camouflage, Bancroft and his superiors in the Secret Service followed it up with a live demonstration, arranging that during one of his visits across the channel he should be arrested and imprisoned on charges of aiding the Americans. It was a convincing act, in spite of his having to be released shortly to get on with his work for

¹⁷ Bancroft to Deane (London, December 13, 1776), in "The Deane Papers, Correspondence Between Silas Deane, His Brothers and Their Business and Political Associates 1771-1795" in *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 56-58.

¹⁸ Bancroft to Deane (London, February 7, 1777) (reprinted from Stevens Facsimiles, #635) in *Deane Papers*, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 482-486.

the Service, and the lesson did not fail to take on the Americans in France. In despair, Deane wrote to Robert Morris:

... Doctor Bancroft is arrested in London for corresponding with and assisting us—This worthy man is confined in the Bastille of England, for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus has enabled the wicked tyrant and his slaves to make a Bastille of every prison in England.

I feel more for Doctor Bancroft than I can express; he deserves much from us; consequently will be pursued with the utmost rigour by them, though nothing capital, not even the correspondence can be proved. I wish we may be able to assist him.¹⁹

The welcome that awaited Bancroft on his return to Paris from his "harrowing experience" can be imagined. To a man who was willing to risk so much, receiving in return relatively little from his native country, Franklin and Deane were anxious to make any amends in their power. While they were limited in financial capabilities, they could repay Bancroft in loyal friendship, and here they did not stint. This was precisely the reward he needed.

Real Dangers

Bancroft's very efficiency in providing the British with authentic data on the American-French negotiations and with countless reports on the sailings and cargoes of French ships bound for America threatened his undoing as the information was exploited. Lord Stormont used it as the basis for heated demands that France cease violating its official neutrality by helping the revolutionaries, and the implications of the solid factual support adduced to back up the British protests were not lost on Vergennes, Louis XVI, and others in Paris. Almost everyone of any note in the circle of negotiators became suspect. Even the true source, Bancroft, did not entirely escape suspicion; but his well-nourished friendships, along with his own agility and luck, served him well.

Anxious to protect himself from too close scrutiny, Bancroft did not hesitate, presumably with British blessing, to expose others whom he claimed were British spies or who actually were minor ones. He was the key agent in Paris, and if his safety dictated the sacrifice of smaller fry he could not

¹⁹ Deane to Robert Morris (Paris, March 16, 1777), *ibid.* Vol. II, pp. 24-25.

Bancroft

Edward Bancroft

scruple. In a nicely worded letter he warns Deane, with a forthrightness that begets confidence in his own loyalty, of a reputed spy and traitor:

Since writing the preceding, I have been with a friend whose veracity I can rely on; and who tells me some particulars it becomes you to know, viz., That Dr. Williamson, of Pennsylvania, who came over hither with Mr. Ewing, and who (though ostensibly a zealous American) is secretly a Spy in the service of Government, and has been in Holland some time, collecting intelligence, is now arrived in Paris for the same purpose . . .¹⁸

With equal forthrightness, in the same letter, he assesses his own services:

All that can be done without money, I am constantly doing, and indeed from my connections I am able to do much more without it, than most persons with an allowance for Secret Services, as liberal as the Powers of Europe generally make to their Ministers.¹⁹

Of the several persons who at times had reason to be suspicious of Bancroft, Arthur Lee was the most persistent in his accusations. Even as early as the fall of 1776, the commissioner from Virginia presented to his colleagues what seemed to be incontrovertible proof that Bancroft spent a large part of his time on his London trips, not with the friends of America, but with the Privy Council.¹⁸ But Franklin turned a deaf ear to Lee, however convincing his proof of Bancroft's duplicity. For this Bancroft could thank not only his own persuasive personality, but an incident in the history of the relationship between the old Pennsylvanian and the Virginian.

During the 1760's one of the greatest land development schemes ever conceived for America was proposed for most of the land in the Ohio valley and surrounding territories. A number of competing groups sought some form of franchise for this task from the British Government, and the two foremost factions were one led by Franklin, the Walpoles, and other friends and one comprising the Lee family and other prominent southerners. The Vandalia project, as it was called, aroused a bitter enmity among all would-be partici-

pants in the tremendous boondoggle, and not the least was that created between Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee. Apparently Franklin was not so magnanimous that he could forget his personal feelings to judge objectively Lee's accusations, which as it turned out were more right than he could prove.¹⁹

Moreover, Foreign Minister Vergennes blunted the effect of Lee's suspicions by pointing the finger elsewhere, at William Carmichael, another secretary to the American mission. Bancroft endorsed Vergennes' proposal that Carmichael be returned to America, although he knew that this action could not secure his own position: the information leaks would still be noted. To protect himself further he gave circulation to the story that the spy was in reality none other than the Revolution's great benefactor, Caron de Beaumarchais. Probably not many fell for that, but at least it served the purpose of deflecting the spotlight from himself for a while.²⁰

Arthur Lee, who had realized immediately that the attempt to discredit Beaumarchais was merely part of a smoke screen, was able to establish for a fact in June of 1778 that Bancroft was in direct communication with the government in London.²¹ He lost no time in letting Franklin know about the situation. If ever Bancroft had cause to worry, it was now. But again his luck held; Franklin refused point blank to believe the evidence. Nothing Lee could do would convince the old man that his close friend was really a spy and the enemy of America.

We think of Franklin as one of the shrewdest diplomats this country has ever produced and a man who never got the bad end of a bargain; but of all the dupes of history surely none can best his record in the Bancroft case. He allowed personal relationships to color his judgment, and his country suffered the consequences. For although the cause of Empire was lost, it was not for any lack of intelligence from Paris, and the cause of freedom was certainly hurt by Bancroft's activities.

¹⁸ Bancroft to Deane (September 13, 1776), *ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 237-243.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

²⁰ Hendrick, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

²¹ *Ibid.*; see chapter XI.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 289.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

Edward Bancroft

Edward Bancroft

De Mortuis

Proof of Bancroft's role during the Revolution did not appear until 1889. In that year the secret papers of Lord Auckland, assistant to Lord Suffolk of the British Secret Service,²² were made public. One of the documents in the collection was a detailed statement to Lord Carmarthen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 1784, in which Bancroft presses his claim for reinstatement of his pension for services rendered. Since it is the only account we have in his own words of his betrayal of the country of his birth, it deserves to be entered in the record.

EDWARD BANCROFT'S MEMORIAL TO THE MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN

In the month of June 1776, Mr. Silas Deane arrived in France, and pursuant to an instruction given him by the Secret Committee of Congress, wrote me in London, requesting an interview in Paris, where I accordingly went, early in July and was made acquainted with the purposes of his Mission, and with every thing which passed between him, and the French Ministry.

After staying two or three weeks there, I returned to England, convinced, that the Government of France would endeavour to Promote an Absolute Separation, of the then United Colonies, from Great Britain; unless a speedy termination of the Revolt, by reconciliation, or Conquest, should frustrate this project. I had then resided near ten years, and expected to reside the rest of my Life, in England; and all my views, interests and inclinations were adverse to the independency of the Colonies, though I had advocated some of their Claims, from a persuasion, of their being founded in Justice. I therefore wished, that the Government of this Country, might be informed, of the Danger of French interference, though I could not resolve to become the informant.

But Mr. Paul Wentworth, having gained some general knowledge of my Journey to France, and of my intercourse with Mr. Deane, and having induced me to believe, that the British Ministry were likewise informed on this Subject, I at length Consented to meet the then Secretaries of State, Lords Weymouth and Suffolk, and give them all the information in my power; which I did, with the most disinterested views; for I not only, did not ask, but expressly rejected, every idea of, any reward. The Declaration of Independency, was not then known in Europe, and I hoped, that Government, thus informed of the Danger, would prevent it, by some accomodation with the Colonies, or by other means.

²² Lord Auckland was William Eden, a forefather of Sir Anthony. He had been Paul Wentworth's immediate superior during the Revolution.

It had been my original intention to stop after this first Communication; but having given the first notice of a beginning intercourse, between France and the United Colonies, I was urged on, to watch and disclose the progress of it; for which purpose, I made several Journeys to Paris, and maintained a regular Correspondence with Mr. Deane, through the Couriers of the French Government. And in this way, I became *entangled* and obliged to proceed in a kind of Business, as repugnant to my feelings, as it had been to my original intentions.

Being thus devoted to the Service of Government, I consented like others, to accept such Emoluments, as my situation indeed required. And in Feb'y 1777, Lord Suffolk, to whom by Ld Weymouths Consent, my Communications were then made, formally promised me, in the King's Name, a Pension for Life of £200 pr an. to Commence from the Christmas preceeding. This was for Services *then rendered*; and as an inducement for me to go over and reside in France, and continue my services there, until the Revolt should terminate, or an Open rupture with that nation ensue, his Lordship farther promised, that when either of these Events should happen, my permanent pension of £200 pr an. should be increased to £500 *at least*.

Confiding in this promise, I went to Paris, and during the first year, resided in the same House with Dr. Franklin, Mr. Deane etc., and regularly informed this Government of every transaction of the American Commissioners; of every Step and Vessel taken to supply the revolted Colonies, with Artillery, Arms etc.; of every part of their intercourse with the French and other European Courts; of the Powers and instructions given by Congress to the Commissioners, and of their correspondence with the Secret Committees etc. and when the Government of France at length determined *openly* to support the Revolted Colonies, I gave notice of this determination, and of the progress made in forming the two Treaties of Alliance and Commerce, and when these were signed, on the Evening of the 6th of Feb'y, I at my own Expense, by a special Messenger, and with unexampled dispatch, conveyed this intelligence to this City, and to the King's Ministers, within 42 hours, from the instant of their Signature, a piece of information, for which many individuals here, would, for purposes of Speculation, have given me more than all that I have received from Government. Afterwards, when that decisive measure, of sending Count D'Estaing with the fleet from Toulon, to Commence Hostilities at the Delaware and New York, was adopted, I sent intelligence of the direct object and Plan of the Expedition.

I had originally explained to Lord Suffolk my Determination to quit this business, whenever an Open War with France, should destroy, what had been my principal inducement to meddle with it; I mean, the hope of preventing a Separation of the revolted Colonies; And as this war now appeared unavoidable, I requested that the King's Ministers would, as soon as practicable, provide

Edward Bancroft

other Sources of information, and permit me to withdraw myself. This request however was never granted. But to fulfill the promise made by my Lord Suffolk my permanent Pension was increased to 500£ per an. and regularly entered, in Book Letter A. payable to Mr. P. Wentworth for the use of Edwd. Edwards; the name, by which, for greater Secrecy, it had been long before agreed to distinguish me.

In June 1780, the King's Ministers, reflecting that this Pension had been given as the reward of *Antecedent* Services, and that it would be unreasonable, to require a longer Continuance of them, without a farther recompense, agreed to allow me an additional yearly sum of £500, so long as I should reside in France; and they encouraged me to expect that this last Sum, or at least a Considerable part of it, would be ultimately added to my permanent pension, in case Government should be satisfied with my future services. I accordingly received from his Majesties Treasury the Stipulated annual allowance of £1000 until the month of April 1782; when the Change of Ministers, with Mr. Burkes Bill, created some difficulty on this Subject. But the matter being Explained to my Lord Shelburne, he took care, before his resignation, to secure and pay me through the then Secretary of State, for foreign Affairs, (my Lord Grantham), a full years Sallary, though the last quarter was not then due.

In June 1783, I came to London, and informed Lord North (to whom my latter information had by particular direction been addressed) of my intention of going to America, where I offered my Services, in promoting measures and dispositions, favourable to the interests of this Country, as well as in giving information of the State of things there, and of the views and proceedings of Congress etc. I likewise reminded him, of the encouragement which I had received to expect that the second 500£ pr. an. or at least a part of it would be made permanent like the first, adding that if my services in America, were accepted, it would as I presumed, in any case, be thought reasonable, to Continue to me, at least while there, the same allowance as had been made me in France. With this Proposition, his lordship appeared to be satisfied, but at a subsequent interview, he referred me to Mr. Fox for a decision respecting it, as well as for the payment of a quarter Sallary, then due, alledging, that Mr. Burke's Bill, had made it absolutely necessary to provide for me, through that Department.

I accordingly saw and conversed with Mr. Fox respecting my situation and propositions, which he promised to consider of; but as I had not foreseen any difficulty, or delay, and had already agreed, and Paid for, my Passage to Philadelphia, I was obliged to follow the Ship to the Downs, on the 12th of August 1783, before any decision was made, and indeed, whilst Mr. Fox was out of Town. I however informed him, by Letter, on the evening of my departure, that he might expect the Continuation of my

Edward Bancroft

Services to Government whilst in America, and requested that the quarters Salary, then due, might be paid to Mrs. Bancroft. She accordingly soon after received £250 for that Quarter; since which nothing has been paid for my account.

On my part, I have endeavoured, as far as practicable, whilst absent, in America, to render myself useful to the British nation and Government. Great Events indeed did not occur for Communication, and the ill temper produced in America by the Proclamation, respecting the intercourse from thence to the West Indies, did not allow me to do all I had hoped, in promoting sentiments and dispositions favourable to this Country; though I endeavoured it, and I think with some little success, in particular Channels and Connections; and I have endeavoured, occasionally, to vindicate the late measures of this Government, in Newspapers, particularly under the Signature of Cincinnatus, against the Publications of Common Sense.

One years Salary was due to me at midsummer last, which I request the payment of: what it shall be, must depend on the King's pleasure, and that of his Ministers: I make no Claim beyond the permanent pension of £500 pr. an. for which, the Faith of Government has been often pledged; and for which, I have sacrificed near eight years of my Life, and my pursuits in it; always avoiding any Kind of appointment, or emolument from, as well as any sort of Engagement to, any Government in the United States; in the full determination, of remaining to the end of my Life, a faithful Subject to my natural and most Gracious Sovereign.

In Dr. Bancroft's Sept. 17, 1784.

ST. JAMES'S 16th Sept'r 1784.^a

It is curious that the outcome of Bancroft's effort to claim what he thought was due him is not known. Of the latter half of his life we know only that he lived comfortably and respectably in England, where he published several scientific and scholarly works. He died in Margate in 1821, to the last, as he was determined, a loyal subject of the King.

^a Bancroft Memorial, *op. cit.*

A67

A66

Recent Books: World War II

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

WORLD WAR II

DIE SCHWEIZ IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. Edited by H. R. Kurz. (Thun: Ott Veriag. 1959. Pp. 400. Sw. fr. 44.50.)

This handsome memorial volume dedicated to the Swiss defense effort during World War II is made up of three dozen essays authored for the most part by the wartime heads of the various defense agencies and branches of the military service. To those who are accustomed to viewing the war from the standpoint of one or another of the belligerents, the story of the protective measures taken by an apprehensive bystander offers a new perspective.

Swiss military activities were by no means confined to mere preparation against eventualities, especially in the air: the fighter planes responded during the five years to 7,379 violations of their aerial borders. Initially these were almost all German, and when some of the German planes were shot down the Nazis undertook deliberate reprisal actions in which they came off second best. In 1942 and 1943 the violators were chiefly British bombers on night raids, and there was little trouble with them. It was left for the bigger and better American daylight raids in 1944 to make the bigger and worse mistakes, most notably that on April Fools' Day when they dropped some 400 high explosive and incendiary bombs on Schaffhausen, causing many casualties and damage estimated at ten million dollars.

Three of the essays are on intelligence subjects. The wartime Chief of Army Intelligence illustrates his doctrinal discussion of the principles of military intelligence with the example of his organization's reconstruction of German intentions in the spring of 1940. A source he had in the German High Command—who had revealed three weeks in advance that the Germans would occupy Denmark and Norway—reported in April that an attack on France through Holland and Belgium could be expected any time after 8 May. There would be troop movements also in southern Germany, he said, but these would pose no threat to Switzerland, being designed only to tie down French forces on the upper Rhine. All Swiss agent nets in southern Germany were concentrated on

providing confirmation of this interpretation, and they were able to keep their government reassured, in spite of a welter of ominous rumors, during the shocking events of May. Moreover, as the German forces were being assembled in their jump-off positions, the Swiss were able, according to this account, to foresee through order-of-battle information and an analysis of the strategic situation that the main thrust would come through Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes, whereupon Guderian's panzer army would probably drive to encircle the Allied forces in northern France, as in fact it did.

In the counterintelligence field there are articles on the counterespionage and countersubversion efforts of the Army and of the Federal Police. It is noted that in this war, in contradistinction to World War I, Switzerland was marked for eventual take-over by the Germans, subversion through Nazi and Nazi-front organizations was a real threat, and Swiss defenses were the target of massive espionage operations. One has the impression from these essays that although subversion was fairly well held in check, the counterintelligence forces, in spite of thousands of arrests, came nowhere near coping with the German spies, and that the Germans learned whatever they wanted to know. There is brief mention of the belligerents' intelligence activities against each other in Switzerland and by way of example a summary account of the Rote Kapelle and the Rado net.

Not strictly intelligence, but of intelligence interest, is an essay on the secret negotiations which led to the surrender of the German forces in Italy at the beginning of May 1945. It is contributed by Max Waibel, who with his compatriot Max Husmann and the Italian baron Luigi Parrilli first took the initiative in bringing representatives of the belligerents together and then when it seemed the negotiations had broken down persisted in renewing them for their successful conclusion. From its beginnings on 21 February, when Parrilli after several weeks' waiting for a visa came to Switzerland to enlist his friend Husmann as mediator, the effort had gradually progressed by 19 March from negotiation through the intermediaries between Allen Dulles on the one hand and representatives of SS General Wolff on the other, with respective conditions for surrender a world apart, to a face-to-face meeting between General Wolff and Allied generals which

Recent Books: World War II

made satisfying progress. Then Himmler got wind of what was going on, and he and Hitler and also Stalin took various obstructive measures. Finally on 22 April the Allies broke off the negotiations.

The next day, however, General Wolff showed up with Marshal Graziani and a delegation having full powers to surrender all the German forces in Italy, expecting to proceed to Allied headquarters to sign the capitulation. Waibel put the delegation up as his house guests in Lucerne while Allied agreement to receive it was sought. This was not immediately forthcoming; but on 29 April, at last, the capitulation was accepted by Field Marshal Alexander at Caserta. Waibel regrets only the delays caused first in March by Himmler's action and then on 22 April by the order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to break off the talks: "On 23 April, when the German plenipotentiaries entered Switzerland, the Allies were still south of the Po. It would have spared much blood and destruction if the Allied attack across the Po hadn't had to be carried out."

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH. By William L. Shirer. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1960. Pp. 1245. \$10.)

In this product of many years of labor Mr. Shirer sweeps the unwearied reader compellingly through his thousand and more pages of the history of Nazi Germany. He weaves into an epic unity the personalities, ideas, events, intrigues, and political and military campaigns that engendered, characterized, and finally terminated what he calls a twelve-year Age of Darkness. It is a Wagnerian theme, and he has done it justice.

Fastidious historians may complain that the author's loathing of the whole phenomenon of National Socialism unduly colors his work. It is true that this repugnance and his sense of outrage at all those who failed to stop Hitler, coupled perhaps with journalistic habits of expression, result in some caricaturing. Hitler at the height of his power is too often called "the former Austrian corporal," Goering almost invariably "the fat Reich Marshal"; it is always the "befuddled" Rosenberg, "toady" Keitel, the "spineless" Brauchitsch, etc. Schellenberg and several of the lesser Nazis are successively

Recent Books: World War II

introduced as "intellectual gangsters." There are frequent sarcastic jibes at the gullibility of Western politicians, at the arrogance and hypocrisy of the Nazis, and above all at the German generals' capitulation to Hitler. The monstrosity of Nazism were plain enough without such editorial captions.

But these are superficialities. Beneath them the history is laid out with scholarly objectivity. Based directly on the millions of captured official German documents and private papers, most of them unpublished, and postwar interrogations and testimony of the principals, it takes into account also all the many memoirs and the fewer scholarly works on the Third Reich that have appeared since its fall. The value of Mr. Shirer's work nevertheless lies less in the presentation of new evidence—although some new facts are adduced—than in its synthesis of all the complex threads of political action, diplomatic negotiation, dissident plotting, war strategy, and occupation policy into an animated tapestry of record.

The intelligence specialist will similarly find his interest in *The Rise and Fall* in this synoptic view. There is nothing about resistance activity in the occupied areas, little on Allied or even on German intelligence. The German resistance is well sketched, but only sketched. Yet Mr. Shirer conveys a clearer idea of the sporadic, fragmented, irresolute, and blundering German opposition than one can reach through any of the individual memoirs or in recent scholarly works like Gerhard Ritter's.¹ And intelligence proper, one concludes, on almost all of the major political and military surprises, would have been ample if only it had been believed. It is again and again noted that details of the prewar diplomatic negotiations, secret and behind scenes, were known to those being schemed against, often apparently through communications interception. There were massive forewarnings of the attacks on Poland, on Denmark and Norway, on the Low Countries and France, on the USSR, in North Africa, on the Normandy beaches, and some even of that in the Bulge. One comes away with the impression that only the USSR kept its military secrets fairly well; and here also much knowledge that was obtained of Soviet strength was useless because Hitler refused to believe it.

¹ *The German Resistance*, reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* IV 2, p. A48.

Recent Books: Economic

THE ECONOMIC WAR

SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE. By Robert Loring Allen.
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. 1960. Pp. 293.
\$5.)

In a subject area which has thus far given rise to so few serious published works, Robert Loring Allen's *Soviet Economic Warfare* must be welcomed as a noteworthy pioneer effort. It is a pity, however, that the work falls short of fulfilling its stated promise "to record the salient features of Communist foreign economic relations in a systematic and coherent fashion" at a time when a clearer understanding of the Soviet economic challenge has perhaps never been more imperative. It is all the more regrettable when such a work represents the culmination of a three-year research project in which more than 20 scholars participated, writing nearly threescore research papers, monographs, and books on Soviet foreign economic policy.

As a compendium of useful statistics and detailed anecdotes of Soviet foreign trade organization and practice, *Soviet Economic Warfare* undoubtedly makes some contribution to public awareness of the facts and figures of the Soviet economic offensive in underdeveloped countries outside the Bloc. But in his concentration on the *what* of the Soviet trade drive, the author has tended to neglect the vastly more important *why* and *how* of such a policy. While one can agree with him that the Soviet Union, through its economic and political support to underdeveloped countries, seeks firmly to secure their "national liberation" and ultimately their absorption into the Soviet orbit, the key question for the Communists (and for the West) is how economic assistance alone can hope to exert a decisive influence on the social order of underdeveloped countries where political power remains in the hands of the anti-Communist national bourgeoisie, where the means of production are largely privately owned, and where free enterprise remains the predominant influence on economic development. On this question Dr. Allen is disappointingly silent.

The Soviet Union's recent reversal of the classical concept of trade following the flag must be regarded as but one com-

ponent of a highly integrated political, diplomatic, and psychological campaign which, in the semantically deceptive guise of "coexistence," wages an unceasing struggle to extend Soviet power and influence throughout the non-Communist world. To treat Soviet foreign economic policy in isolation, apart from the larger political objectives of the USSR, or indeed to treat Soviet policy in underdeveloped areas without reference to Soviet objectives in the industrial West, as this work does, is to make impossible any really effective understanding of the challenge posed by Soviet "economic warfare."

Dr. Allen's strong anti-Soviet emotions (he rather needlessly hastens to assure us at the outset that his "personal sympathies are opposed to Soviet economic and political concepts and practices") often seem to becloud his more objective judgement and result in a host of debatable assertions not easily reconciled with the facts or even with each other. The Soviet approach to international trade, for example, is described by the author both as one of "remaining aloof from the world economy" (p. 61) and as "having emerged from its economic isolationism" (p. 241). The Soviet system of state trading is assessed as contributing to a "relatively inflexible, bureaucracy-ridden system which often finds itself incapable of adjusting to the continual vicissitudes inherent to international trade" (p. 73) and also as providing the USSR with "greater bargaining power, more sensitivity to the state of affairs, greater flexibility in meeting particular situations" (p. 44). A presumed shift in internal cost structure in the USSR is adduced as motivating a "recognition . . . of the cost-reducing opportunities that appear in international trade" (p. 46), but elsewhere we find "there is little evidence to suggest . . . that the Soviet Union exports for traditional, comparative cost purposes" (p. 71).

Finally, in the author's overzealous efforts to prove his proposition that Soviet foreign economic policy is "engaged in undermining the efforts of underdeveloped countries to establish equitable economic, political and social systems," he dwells on the incidental and transient, confuses tactics with strategy, and too often subordinates the scholar to the propagandist. The result is a needless reiteration of the Bloc's

Recent Books: Economic

obviously evil intentions in underdeveloped countries, to the virtual denial of any legitimate commercial interests in the area. For the specialist in the field, *Soviet Economic Warfare* is a work of limited horizon and debatable conclusions better suited to the overseas libraries of the USIA than to an intelligence collection. For a keener insight into the motives and implications of the Soviet economic offensive in underdeveloped countries, the calmer and more closely reasoned analysis of Joseph Berliner's *Soviet Economic Aid* (New York, 1958) is to be preferred.

MISCELLANY

THE POLICY MACHINE: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy. By Robert Ellsworth Elder. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1960. Pp. 238. \$4.50.)

Our principal interest in this book lies in its 25-page chapter on the intelligence arm of the Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The author has been well briefed on INR's general organization and some of its functions, but he gives rather more space to its current intelligence activity and rather less to its research work than this reviewer would have done. On its role in the community, especially its very important role in arriving at National Intelligence Estimates, he lets on that official secrecy makes "published facts for tracing the procedures used in developing [these documents] . . . scarce as hen's teeth." There is published, of course, one solid gold, outsized hen's tooth on this very subject—the Ransom book¹—which Mr. Elder, oddly enough, acknowledges in a footnote but otherwise neglects.

In a few good sentences he copes with the major problem of the intrusion of policy into intelligence and vice versa. He does not, however, bear down on it, nor does he really get at how it is complicated by the flow into INR of operating Foreign Service Officers with no prior intelligence experience.

The book as a whole is disappointing: the real problems of policy formulation get lost in the mechanistic approach that the title suggests.

THE OVERSEAS AMERICANS. By Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1960. Pp. 305. \$5.95.)

This is the latest of a tremendous amount of useful writing on the subject of overseas duty by members of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, probably the most prominent of the institutions arrayed in increasing numbers against the problem of Americans' performance abroad. The burgeoning concentration on this problem, one feels, tends to

¹ H. H. Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, reviewed in *Intelligence Articles* II 4.

Recent Books: Miscellany

overemphasize the difficulties of adaptation to a foreign culture. In the anxiety to prepare for "culture shock" it may be forgotten that many of the shocks are pleasant surprises; wives and children are likely to be treated as additional vulnerabilities rather than a help in cushioning shocks and enhancing pleasant surprises; the plunge into a foreign culture is presented as too generically different from what happens when New Englanders visit the American Southwest or Southerners come to Yankee land; it is too little considered that many Americans have at least a vestigial feeling for the foreign culture from which they came, and many others live in or near communities in which elements of such cultures persist. Nevertheless the problem is a real one, and it is analyzed here intelligently, in depth, with particularity, and without jargonized scientification.

The authors' analysis, based mainly on interviews with Americans working in a representative sample of countries outside Western Europe and with the local foreign nationals affected, lays the groundwork for their constructive discussion of what can be done to improve American performance overseas. With respect to the selection of personnel for overseas duty, "still more an art than a science," they make a real contribution to the groping for criteria, requiring among other qualifications some evidence of "environmental mobility." They evaluate with good perspective the virtues and limitations of both language training and quickie orientation programs. They make revolutionary long-range proposals for U.S. education, calling for language studies early in the public schooling, college courses in particular areas and in cross-cultural problems, a "live option" of taking part of the college work abroad, and graduate studies that prepare not only for a profession but for following a profession overseas.

To effect these changes, finally, that would build overseas-manship into our educational system rather than graft it on behind, they propose that a National Foundation for Overseas Operations, after the pattern of the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, be established in the Executive Branch with the responsibility for coordinating research, dramatizing the nation-wide attack on the problem, and giving financial assistance to deserving efforts.

A76

Recent Books: Miscellany

THE SEA WAS KIND. By *Albert Klestadt*. (New York: David McKay. 1960. \$4.50.)

A number of books have been written about the experiences of those who, like this author, escaped by sea from the Philippines to Australia during World War II. Albert Klestadt's account, however, is above average because of its perspective, objectivity, and technical accuracy in matters maritime. Its value as a history of the first year of the war in the Philippines rivals its value as an escape story. Although the author strongly favored the Allied cause, he was not an American citizen, and the objectivity with which he viewed the fall of the Philippines may make his version of some events more reliable than those presented by emotionally involved Americans and Filipinos.

Having lived in Japan as a refugee from Nazi Germany long enough to learn the language, Klestadt left for Singapore on the eve of Pearl Harbor, but got only as far as Manila, where he was trapped by the Japanese attack. After the first few days of the occupation he managed, with his knowledge of the Japanese language and Japanese ways and with papers identifying him as a stateless person from Germany, to bluff his way out of the city and south through Luzon to the coast. A sailing enthusiast with many years of small-boat experience, he succeeded in island-hopping to Australia in a year's time, one of the few to make it entirely by small sailboat. Ironically, there was no place in the Allied naval forces for this mariner "of uncertain status, but of no uncertain allegiance," and he ended up fighting out the war with the Australian Army.

A77

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET ☐

STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



VOL. 5 NO. 2

SPRING 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

SECRET ☐

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

25X1
SECRET []

All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence community.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

25X1
SECRET []

SECRET []

25X1

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITOR

25X1

EDITORIAL BOARD

SHERMAN KENT, Chairman

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

25X1

Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components.

SECRET []

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

Contributions to the *Studies* or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through *Secret*.

For inclusion on the regular *Studies* distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor,

CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Priority National Intelligence Objectives Ludwell L. Montague	1
<i>View from the upper edge of the guidance gap.</i> SECRET	
Intelligence Photography Kenneth E. Bofrone	9
<i>Essential elements of good ground photos.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	
Snapshots at Random Jane Schnell	17
<i>Intelligence product of the camera fan's fun.</i> OFFICIAL USE	
Human Scent and Its Detection Spencer Tebrich	25
<i>Toward scientific exploitation of a neglected sense.</i> OFFICIAL USE	
Cover: Property Restitution Frederick D. Barathy	39
<i>A postwar U.S. program without benefit of intelligence and counterintelligence participation.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	
Communication to the Editors	45
<i>Amateur psychodiagnosis of Dr. John.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	51
<i>The German service's first effort at pressagentry.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	
<i>Shape of tomorrow seen from yesterday.</i> OFFICIAL USE.	

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

Page

"Truth" Drugs in Interrogation . . . George Bimmerle	A1
<i>Narcosis in therapy and police practice, with possible applications in intelligence.</i>	
Impunity of Agents in International Law	A21
<i>M. C. Miskovsky</i>	
<i>Precedent and authority in Powers' circumstances.</i>	
Operation Columba T. J. Betts	A35
<i>British pigeon fanciers give their all.</i>	
English Mission H. H. Cooper	A43
<i>Glimpses of the sixteenth-century popish underground.</i>	
Public Texts in Intelligence	A51
<i>Walter Pforzheimer and the Editors</i>	
<i>Bibliography of basic English-language readings.</i>	
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	A61
<i>Intelligence in U.S. national strategy</i>	A64
<i>Military intelligence in action</i>	A68
<i>Clandestine operations</i>	

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

25X1
SECRET

THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.

Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

25X1
SECRET

SECRET

Evolution and role of "the most broadly controlling document in the field of requirements."

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

Ludwell L. Montague

Clyde Heffter, in the "Fresh Look at Collection Requirements" which he takes in a recent issue of the *Studies*,¹ notes the "conspicuous hiatus" between such high-level guidance documents as Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/3, Priority National Intelligence Objectives, and the collection requirements actually produced at the working level, particularly with respect to the question of determining relative priorities among such requirements. He invites discussion of the problem of "how to formulate needs and priorities in such a way as to facilitate the satisfaction of needs in a degree roughly proportionate to their priorities, through the most effective use of the collection means available."

In the nature of the case, collectors are likely to be more keenly aware of this problem than people working in other phases of the intelligence process, but its existence and gravity should be of concern to researchers and estimators as well, for it is their work that ultimately suffers from any diffusion and misdirection of the collection effort. The hiatus between general guidelines and practical requirements that Mr. Heffter points out is real, and its consequences are serious. He has considered it from the collectors' viewpoint. The purpose of this article is to complement his analysis with an examination from the other side of the gap—specifically, to describe the development of the PNIO concept and to review what the PNIO's are and are not intended to be. Conclusions as to what is wanting for the determination of practical priorities are substantially the same from either point of view.

Evolution of the PNIO's

From the outset it was understood that the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the coordination of

¹ IV 4, p. 43 ff.

SECRET

1

SECRET

PNIO's

U.S. foreign intelligence activities included a responsibility to provide authoritative guidance for intelligence collection and production from a national (as distinguished from departmental) point of view. To this end, National Security Council Intelligence Directive 4, adopted by the NSC in December 1947, prescribed two specific duties:

- (1) To prepare "a *comprehensive outline* of national intelligence objectives [generally] applicable to foreign countries and areas."
- (2) To select, on a current basis, the sections and items of this outline having *priority* interest.

By "comprehensive outline" the drafters of NSCID 4 meant an integration of such then existing departmental documents as the Army's *Index Guide* and the Navy's *Monograph Index*. What they had in mind has actually been accomplished by the preparation of the National Intelligence Survey outline (*NIS Standard Instructions*, June 1951). However, the publication of DCID 1/2 (15 September 1958) was considered necessary to meet the formal requirement for a "comprehensive outline" of national intelligence objectives.

The 1947 directive had the fault of prescribing a method rather than a mission. Manifestly, national intelligence objectives have never been determined by the selection of "sections and items" from a "comprehensive outline." They are no longer required to be in NSCID 1, of 15 September 1958, whose subparagraph 3b (1) is the present-day survivor of the original NSCID 4.

The fact is that no priority national intelligence objectives were formulated until 1950, and that their provenance then was unrelated to NSCID 4. In May 1950 the Joint Intelligence Committee produced JIC 452/7, "Critical Intelligence Objectives of the Department of Defense with Respect to the USSR." This document identified as critical intelligence objectives five generalized aspects of Soviet military capabilities. In September its text, with the addition of two highly generalized references to political warfare, was adopted as DCID 4/2, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives." In June 1952 this DCID was amended to cover explicitly not only the USSR but also "its Satellites (including Communist China)."

SECRET

PNIO's

SECRET

The preoccupation of DCID 4/2 with Soviet military capabilities was a natural consequence of its origin and of the circumstances of the time, the shooting war then in progress in Korea. In August 1953, however, an armistice having been signed, the adequacy of the DCID as priority guidance for a *national* intelligence effort was questioned. The Board of National Estimates was directed to study the problem and to propose a suitable revision. Its study, in consultation with research and collection personnel throughout the Agency, extended over a period of ten months, followed by six months of inter-agency coordination.

It was represented to the Board that the almost exclusively military character of DCID 4/2 resulted in claims of priority for the collection of any desired item of military information over any other information, no matter how significant the latter might be in relation to the national security. Such claims were plainly out of consonance with the current estimate (NIE 99, October 1953) that, for the near term at least, the Kremlin would probably avoid military action with identifiable Bloc forces, that the active threat to U.S. security was likely to be a vigorous Communist political warfare campaign designed to undermine the Western power position, and that there was danger of a weakening of the unity of the Free World. They were also plainly out of consonance with NSC 162/2, Basic National Security Policy (October 1953), which emphasized a need for intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of friendly and neutral states as well as of the Soviet Bloc.

The Board concluded that the list of priority national intelligence objectives must be expanded to cover at least the most significant of these non-military concerns, and that there must also be some discrimination between military objectives of greater and of lesser consequence. This expansion of the list and need for discrimination within it led to the development of three general categories of priority within the listing. A single list in absolute order of priority was considered infeasible and also undesirable, as likely to introduce self-defeating rigidity into the system.

The revised DCID proposed by the Board of National Estimates and adopted by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

SECRET

3

SECRET

PNIO's

(DCID 4/4, December 1954) was the prototype of the present DCID 1/3 (4 January 1961). The differences between the two represent only those adjustments normally to be expected as responsive to developments in the situation.

Criteria for PNIO Selection

The DCID has an annex that sets forth certain criteria to govern the selection of priority national intelligence objectives. A gloss on these criteria is in order at this point.

It is stipulated, first, that the PNIO's should be directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy. Through its role in the preparation of national intelligence estimates, the Board of National Estimates is cognizant of the intelligence requirements of the NSC and its subordinate policy boards. It is also cognizant of the most critical problems inherent in the estimates required to meet their needs. Its identification of these substantive problems as priority national intelligence objectives can provide a basis for identifying priority research and collection requirements, but of course does not in itself define such requirements.

Second, since the bulk of the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of routine intelligence collection and research, the PNIO's should be limited to the critical problems which require special attention and effort. This principle should be axiomatic. There is, however, constant pressure to make the listing more inclusive, with a consequent danger of its becoming so nearly all-inclusive as to deprive the word "priority" of meaning. This pressure, which apparently springs from a desire to get everyone's favorite topic listed as a priority objective in order to insure that it will not be neglected, has to be resisted.

Third, in order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, the DCID should be designed to remain valid over an extended period. This consideration requires the exclusion of topics of momentarily urgent, but transitory, interest, which will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case. The present practice is to review and revise the DCID annually, the process sometimes extending the period between revisions to as much as eighteen months.

SECRET

PNIO's

SECRET

Fourth, since broad generalities are of little practical use, the PNIO's should be specific enough to provide discernible guidance for the allocation of research and collection resources, but not so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection requirements. The application of this criterion presents the greatest difficulty in the formulation of PNIO's and is the source of complaints from those collection personnel who refuse to accept them, with Mr. Heffter, as "a constitution which requires both laws and courts to interpret it." The criterion has served on the one hand to rule out the kind of generality found in the 1950-52 DCID 4/2, and on the other to keep the PNIO in rather broad terms, especially in comparison with specific collection requirements—that is, to maintain its character as the statement of a critical substantive intelligence problem rather than an itemizing of the essential elements of information needed for its solution.

Role of the PNIO's in Guiding Research and Collection

The function of the PNIO's as stated in the DCID, is to serve as a *guide* for the coordination of intelligence collection and production. They are intended to be only the first step in a process beginning with a need for information felt at the national policy planning level and extending to the servicing of specific collection requirements in the field.

In this first step, the Board of National Estimates, with the advice of other Agency offices and in coordination with USIB representatives, identifies the critical substantive problems inherent in the general body of intelligence required for purposes of national security policy. This is as far as estimators can properly go in relation to the total problem. The identification and formulation of collection requirements related to these priority national intelligence objectives requires analysis by research personnel to determine the elements of information essential to a solution of the problem, the elements already available or readily obtainable through research, the additional information obtainable through routine collection and the residual information of such critical importance as to warrant a priority collection effort.

Obviously, not every bit of information somehow related to a priority national intelligence objective will be required with equal urgency. Many are procurable by routine means. It is

SECRET

5

SECRET

PNIO's

therefore necessary that research personnel exercise discrimination and restraint in formulating collection requirements, claiming priority for only those aspects of a priority objective that actually do require a priority collection effort. As Mr. Heffter has pointed out, the criterion here is not a possible incidental relationship of the collection requirement to a PNIO, but the importance (the essentiality) of the desired information for a solution of the critical problem designated in the PNIO and its unavailability from other sources. If research analysts present unjustified claims for priority collection, citing some not cogent relationship to a PNIO, collectors must exercise their own judgment and authority in rejecting them.

If a particular system of intelligence collection is unable to satisfy all of the legitimate requirements levied upon it, determinations have to be made as to which requirements will be accorded priority. In this operational context, however, priority can never be determined solely by reference to the PNIO's. One requirement related to a PNIO and certified by a responsible research agency to be a really essential element of information, being well suited to the particular mode of collection, may consequently be accorded the desired priority. Another such requirement may be totally unsuited to that mode of collection and therefore unworthy of any consideration whatever, no matter what the PNIO to which it is related. All sorts of gradations are possible between these two extremes. In these circumstances collection officers must assume the responsibility for deciding between the importunate claimants for their services. Their decisions may be informed and guided by the PNIO's and other instruments that Mr. Heffter cites, but they must be made primarily in terms of the collector's expert professional knowledge.

Problems such as these are inherent in the administration of intelligence research and collection. No reformulation of the PNIO's could obviate them—unless, indeed, the PNIO's were to be transformed into a community-wide listing of coordinated collection requirements in an absolute order of priority. Even if this were done, something like the present PNIO's would then have to be reinvented to guide the coordinators of collection requirements. The problem lies, not in the PNIO's, however imperfect they may be, but in the gap

6

SECRET

PNIO's

SECRET

between them and the scramble to obtain priority for individual collection requirements.

What Can Be Done About It?

In 1954 the Board of National Estimates was keenly aware that the formulation of PNIO's was only a small part of the total problem. It recommended that the then Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination be directed to review existing procedures for the development and coordination of collection requirements in relation to the PNIO's, and to propose improvements. The Special Assistant made such a study and concluded that no action was advisable. Like Mr. Heffter, he considered that a single community-wide mechanism for coordinating collection requirements, assigning priorities to them, and allocating particular collection resources to their service would be a Rube Goldberg contraption, more a hindrance than a help. The Board of National Estimates would heartily agree. It had not meant to propose the invention of such a machine, but it had hoped that serious study of the subject might bear such fruit as a more general understanding of mutual responsibilities and more systematic procedures for cooperation in the common cause.

For six years, however, the gap has remained, and collectors as well as estimators evidently find it to be not a Good Thing. And now Mr. Heffter comes forward with some constructive suggestions and a welcome invitation to professional discussion of the problem. Rejecting as impractical the idea of a community-wide coordination of collection requirements in priority order, he suggests that the situation could be alleviated if more systematic use were made of the findings of the several USIB subcommittees under their assigned authority, in their respective fields, "to recommend . . . intelligence objectives within the over-all national intelligence objectives, establish relative priorities on substantive needs, review the scope and effectiveness of collection and production efforts to meet these objectives, and make the necessary substantive recommendations to the departments and agencies concerned." This would be precisely the kind of implementation of the PNIO's which the Board of National Estimates has advocated for many years.

SECRET

7

SECRET

PNIO's

CONFIDENTIAL

More important than any procedural proposals, however, is Mr. Heffter's recognition of the fundamental need for a truly professional doctrine and discipline in relation to this subject. The professional discussion which he seeks to stimulate is a necessary step toward the satisfaction of that need.

It is now time for someone to join the discussion from the viewpoint of the research components of the community.

Elastic requirements for useful photos, but stringent specifications for the best.

INTELLIGENCE PHOTOGRAPHY

Kenneth E. Bofrone

In the days and months after the Nazi blitzkrieg suddenly overran France, British topographic intelligence, ill prepared to support the evacuation at Dunkirk and subsequent raids on the French coast, resorted to photo intelligence from post cards, travel folders and brochures, and tourist snapshots collected by public appeal.¹ That they were driven to this kind of improvisation illustrates the wisdom of building up in advance an intelligence photo collection even on objects and areas where no intelligence need is foreseen. It also shows that casual photos taken without any regard to the requirements of a photo interpreter can be useful. Nevertheless their usefulness is increased and the interpreter's work eased in proportion as his requirements—most of them stemming from his need to take measurements—are fulfilled.

There are times when a single photograph is the documentary evidence upon which a critical decision must be based. The specially skilled personnel of a photographic intelligence center may spend days and sometimes weeks exploring with their computers and precision measuring devices a single 35 mm. negative, extracting information that could not be imagined to reside in it. It may yield only one required fact, but sometimes that tiny piece of acetate and silver becomes the key to a cabinet full of hitherto inaccessible secrets. In the story of the Yo-Yo missile guidance system told in a recent issue of the *Studies*,² photographs of a grass-covered bunker ending in two large triangular discs provided the critical information that led to a break-through.

¹ See James Leasor's *The Clock with Four Hands*, reviewed in *Studies* IV 1, p. 99.

² V 1, p. 11 ff.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photography

The history of these Yo-Yo prints also illustrates the tribulations imposed on the photogrammetrist trying to get his measurements when the necessary technical data does not accompany the film. The make of camera that took them was not reported, nor the focal length of the lens, nor any estimate of camera-to-target distance. Even the size of the negatives was uncertain, there being no black border to show that they had not been cropped. Nevertheless a crude indicator for scale was found—a number of cows shown beyond the bunker in one of the pictures. These were identified as of the Angus breed, the average hip-to-ground height of Angus cattle was obtained from the Department of Agriculture, and the task of triangulation could begin. The resulting measurements of the visible parts of what turned out to be a new kind of radar system were later verified by repeated photographic coverage as being within 10% of the actual dimensions.

Measurements

When the focal length of the lens and the camera-to-target distance are known, the scale of the image on the negative is immediately available as their quotient. Measurements of the target's image, usually made in hundredths or thousandths of a foot, can be converted by this scale into the target's true dimensions:

$$\text{image dimension} \times \frac{\text{distance}}{\text{focal length}} = \text{true dimension}$$

The scale will be accurate, of course, only for objects in a plane at exactly this distance from the plane of the camera lens; the computation of the size of objects shown nearer to the camera or farther away is more complex.

If the focal length is not reported, but an object of known size—preferably something better standardized than cows—is shown, the scale will be the quotient of a measured dimension of that object's image by its true dimension; and the size of other objects in the same range plane can then be found with the formula:

$$\text{unknown image dimension} \times \frac{\text{known true dimension}}{\text{known image dimension}} = \text{unknown true dimension}$$

Photography

CONFIDENTIAL

For the most accurate measurement of fine detail, however, the photogrammetrist uses angular measurements and trigonometric computations, based on the angular field of view of the lens and the size of negative used in the camera. The standard 50 mm. lens for a 35 mm. camera, for example, takes in a horizontal angle of 38.2° and a vertical angle of 26°, while a 400 mm. telephoto lens takes in only 5½° by 3½°. At a given range the lateral distance from the center point of the field of view to one of its extremes will be the product of the range distance by the tangent of half the maximum angle in question.


Fortunately, measurements are not always needed, even of military equipment in denied areas. Specialists on the type of equipment in question can often identify a known model by its distant, poorly defined silhouette, and the knowledge that such a piece of equipment was seen in that location is what is important. New models or modifications of old ones are a different matter; their capabilities have to be determined by the measurement of critical parts. And here especially the refinements that make the difference between a tourist snapshot and the most informative photograph, while small, are important. They are of two kinds, qualities inherent in the negative itself and a sufficiency of accompanying data about it.

Photographic Requirements

The first requirement is the highest resolution—sharpness of image—of which camera and film are capable. It can be achieved by focusing the lens properly, by holding the camera steady, and by using a relatively high shutter speed (1/1000th second or faster) to minimize camera and subject movement. The film, when there is a choice, should also be selected with a view to resolution; and here, unless light is good and motion minimal, it is necessary to compromise between fast film and the slower fine grain. Panatomic-X (ASA 25) or its equivalent is an excellent choice when light conditions are good and the finest detail is necessary. For poor light or when a very fast shutter is required, films such as Tri-X Pan (ASA 200) should be used. As a compromise, Plus-X Pan (ASA 80) is the best all-purpose film. Color film is desirable only when color is an important feature of the subject; that now on the mar-

CONFIDENTIAL

Photography



Print from 35 mm. negative taken with a Lietz 400 mm. telephoto lens at a distance of 700 feet. Note the required black border.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photography

CONFIDENTIAL

ket gives rather poor resolution as the color fringes blur into one another. With improvements, film of the type of Eastman's Kodacolor may in the future be the answer to this problem.

The second requirement is that photographs not be cropped. If a print is submitted it should be made from the full negative. The analyst's ability to take fine measurements from a photograph is keyed, as pointed out above, to knowledge of the angular field of view of the camera lens and the size of the negative used. If a print has been cropped or masked, the angular relationship is left without its frame of reference. But if prints are made with a little of the negative's clear margin showing on all four sides, the resulting black border assures the interpreter that he is working with the full frame.

Third, if a print is submitted, the contrast should be neither light nor heavy, but medium. The details important to photo-analysis are frequently in shadow areas, which would be blackened by heavy contrast. But whenever possible, the original negatives, not prints, should be submitted. The best of prints will contain only about 35 of the 200 to 300 different tonal shades of gray that the negative may have, and each tone may represent additional information. The photogrammetrist, to be sure, will not use the original negative for fear of damaging it, but he will make a positive transparency that has all the qualities of the negative by contact printing on a piece of film designed for this purpose.

Accompanying Data

The analyst can sometimes improvise, as we have seen, but he will be able to get the most out of each photograph if it is accompanied by the following information:

Where the picture was taken—geographic location, province, city, town, and as nearly as possible the exact position. On a train the notation might be, "Ten rail clicks south of milepost 147 on x-y rail line," or on the highway, "300 yards SSE of intersection of highways N30 and N12." Further, the compass direction in which the camera was pointed; the more accurate the azimuth reading the more valuable the photo will be.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photography

Date and time. Precision as to the time of day within five minutes will give the analyst a secondary method of making height determination by reference to astronomic data on sun position computed for the area in question.

Make and model of camera; different models may have different frame sizes, the Robot "Star," for example, producing a 1" by 1" negative and the Robot "36" a 1" by 1 3/8". Paramount is the importance of recording the focal length of the lens, which is always engraved on the front of the lens rim.

Camera-to-subject distance, with method of measuring it—paced, map reference, eye estimate, etc.

Any unusual conditions at the scene—sounds, smells, colors, smoke, anything that might help to identify an unknown activity.

For all these purposes some system of numbering the exposures to key them to the data is necessary. Film for 35 mm. cameras is convenient in this respect because each frame is numbered during manufacture.

Special Techniques

Every lens has a distortion pattern of its own, displacing the photographic image from its true position. When the camera and lens to be used on a photographic mission are available to the photo analyst, he has them calibrated on an optical bench, recording the distortion pattern of the lens and the precise alignment between lens and plane of film. This calibration in advance is not often possible, but the photographer can easily provide calibration data himself. He stands, with his camera, between two parallel lines, such as the curbs of a street, or even better a straight stretch of railroad tracks, and makes one exposure looking down these lines with camera held level in normal position. Then he turns the camera 90° about its lens axis so that the horizontal dimension of the frame is vertical and makes a second exposure of the same view from the same position. If these two negatives are submitted along with the photos taken by the camera, the optical technician can plot the pattern of distortion and compute its effect on measurements in the latter.

Photography

CONFIDENTIAL

A real photographic study of a subject requires views from various positions, even if they can be taken from only one direction—distant views to show the entire area and the position of the subject in its environs; medium ones for definition of the relationships of components of the subject to each other; close-ups for details of structure, size, and functioning of individual components. These three kinds of view can be taken either by moving progressively closer to the target or by successive use of wide-angle, normal, and telephoto lenses. There is no such thing as too many photographs of a subject, particularly of telephoto views, in which atmospheric interference and the foreshortening of the field present additional problems to the photo interpreter.

When a subject is too broad or tall to get into a single frame, it can be covered by a series of exposures—a procedure called panorama or partial cyclorama. The photographer takes a position at an identified point and starts with a picture of one of the extremes. Then from the same position he takes a second shot with a 30% to 40% overlap of the first, and so continues until he has covered the area. If possible, this procedure should be duplicated from a second or even third position, recording the relationship of each camera position to the others.

Of all the techniques used in ground photos, stereophotography probably has the greatest versatility and value. The simulated third dimension can be of great help in distinguishing between components of a subject or several similar objects in proximity to one another. Although 35 mm. stereo cameras are available on the market, they are of little use at distances beyond 50 or 60 feet. Stereophotographs at greater distances are best made with an ordinary camera, taking pictures of the same object from two or more slightly separated stations with the optical axis of the lens parallel in all shots. As a rule of thumb, the distance between camera stations should be one foot for each 100 feet of range. This distance, called the stereo base, should be reported. Stereophotographs can be made from a moving vehicle by holding the camera in fixed position and making successive exposures as rapidly as possible. The interval between exposures and the speed of the vehicle, if they can be estimated, will provide a stereo base.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photography

These refinements of technique, together with accurate and complete data accompanying submitted films, enhance the intelligence value of reports based upon photography. But the elaboration of sophisticated requirements should not be allowed to obscure the most important requirement: *Take pictures.*

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*Intelligence market for the
product of the camera fan's fun.*

SNAPSHOTS AT RANDOM

Jane Schnell

Everyone who has taken photographs in a foreign country has collected potential ground photographic intelligence. The traveller turns his camera upon anything that excites his interest—the civil engineer on peculiarities in the construction of dams, roads, bridges, and city buildings; a woman perhaps on clothing, jewelry, and hair styles; a doctor on things related to disease and therapy; a farmer on crops and tools and methods of farming. The more widely travelled the man behind the camera and the broader his interests, the more discriminating he is likely to be in photographing subject matter peculiar to a particular place. But the potential intelligence thus collected is often lost; there are two minimum requirements for transforming it into actual photo intelligence. One is that the pictures must be identified, at least by the name of the place or subject, the direction the camera was facing, and the date. The other is that they must get to the market.

The most omnivorous and insatiable broker for the photo intelligence market is the CIA Graphics Register. If you have a batch of photos taken anywhere abroad, properly identified and preferably with negatives, the Register would like to look them over. If they were taken in London or Paris or Vienna, say, the pickings may be slim, but the Register would like to decide for itself. And if it knows in advance that you are going to have a tour in some less well frequented place, it may be interested enough in promoting your hobby to supply you with camera and film. With a minimum of effort, adding to the pictures you normally would take anyway a notation of the place, time, and direction and as much descriptive data as you can, you are likely to produce some useful photos.

Targets of Opportunity

The results will be much better, however, if you add to this minimum effort a little more and become as familiar as you

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Snapshots at Random

can with photo collection manuals and lists of requirements on the area. Graphics Register can refer you to general publications on these subjects;¹ and attaché offices in all the U.S. diplomatic missions have such manuals and requirements lists in detail for their particular areas. You can pick out of the listings a few things that are of interest to you and accessible for photographing in the course of your normal day-to-day activities. One standing requirement, for example, is photographs of prominent persons in almost any field, especially the military, political, economic, and scientific. If an election is coming up and campaigning is in progress, why not take a few pictures of the speakers? If they are within 50 feet of a 35 mm. camera, the heads can be enlarged to an identifiable likeness. The closer the better, naturally, but the main thing is to get them on film and in focus.

The fact that an object may have been photographed previously by no means disqualifies it: changes, or the absence of changes, in it over a period of years or of weeks may be important. And changes aside, it is amazing how many pictures of the same object can be taken without telling the whole story. Although I must have seen hundreds of photographs of the Eiffel Tower before I went to France, it wasn't until I walked under it that I realized the first balcony has a big hole in it. So looking up, I photographed the tower through the hole; and then, just for fun, I kept trying to find another photograph that showed there was such a hole in the middle of the balcony. It was three and a half years before I saw one. A good photographic practice is to take the normal view of an object and then try to think up a different viewpoint and take that also. Few people look up, and it is often by looking up that you find an extraordinary picture.

If a new gas storage tank is being built in the city where you are stationed and you drive past it going to work every day, why not photograph it once a week or once a month? The photos will tell how long it takes to build it, what types of materials and methods of construction are used, and how much gas storage capacity is being added. Maybe you don't know what a gas storage tank looks like, and all you see is a

¹ See appended bibliography for a sample list.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Snapshots at Random

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

big tank being built. Take a picture of it anyway; obviously it is built to store something. What you don't know about it the analyst will. That is what he is an analyst for, but he can't analyze it if you don't get him the pictures.

Captions

A bit of extra effort put into captioning your shots will pay off, too. One kind of information you may not be in the habit of noting for your own purposes, technical data, may be of importance to the Register. This includes the kind of camera and lens, the type of film, and the speed of exposure, as well as a serial number for each roll and frame. You should especially make note if you have used a telephoto or wide-angle lens. Information on the type of film and exposure speed will not only assist in its development but also make it possible for you to get advice on how to correct any mistakes you make and improve your technique.



Roll 20, frame No. 3. 2 May 1959. 1100 local time.
Malaya, Kelantan state. Town, road, waterway.

Main road between Kota Bharu and Kuala Trengganu looking south at ferry toward village of Jerteh. Note cut at right for bridge under construction (see frames 1 and 2 for other shots of bridge).

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Snapshots at Random

Most important, however, is good identifying data about each picture. The essential elements are the date (and the time of day may be useful); the precise place; the subject or subjects, with special note of particular features of intelligence interest; and the direction the camera was facing, by compass or with reference to landmarks. It might be noted, for example, that frame no. 7 of roll 2 was exposed at 1330 on 17 November, one mile east of Otaru, Hokkaido, on the road to Sapporu, looking north and showing a Soviet trawler in the bay. Or from a second-floor street window of the Hotel Europe in Bangkok, looking down on a passer-by identified as so-and-so on his way to the corner to hail a samlor.

These essentials can frequently be supplemented to advantage with additional comments or with printed matter bearing on a particular picture. Perhaps the idea of the target came from facts you read in the newspaper; clip the article out and send it along. You find your way around unfamiliar cities with the help of guidebooks, free tourist maps, and maps bought at local survey offices or book stores. The analyst can use the same material to find his way around your photographs; if you can't send copies, at least make reference to the tools of travel you used. In the absence of printed material it is extremely useful to draw a sketch showing the relationship of pictured objects. A sketch is particularly good when there are several shots of the same subject from different vantage points, or of different subjects near each other, or of subjects that are not mapped. The analyst never complains that he is given too many facts about a picture.

Spies and People

You may want to shoot beyond your targets of casual opportunity and make trips or excursions expressly for the purpose of getting useful pictures. Fine; but since you are presumably abroad on some other government business, it is paramount that you remember you are taking pictures for fun. You should never take photos at the risk of your proper work, your purpose in being there. This need for discretion is of course a greater limitation in some places than in others. Once you have decided upon a target, the thing to do is become as familiar with it as possible, learn for sure just what the limitations of law and discretion are, and forget completely

Snapshots at Random

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

why you want the pictures. Try to take them for some other reason than intelligence collection.

I once wanted to photograph a new electric power plant in Malaya. So far as I knew, nobody would question my taking the pictures; but it is a little odd for a girl to go around photographing power plants. First, I had to find it, somewhere around a certain town. I drove out the main road from that town, which finally passed under some high power wires. After taking pictures of the road in both directions, and the wires and towers in both directions, I drove on, planning to take the next road turning off either right or left parallel with the wires. But at the next turn a sign pointed to the power plant.

I photographed the side road and then drove down it until I came to a one-way bridge with a policeman at each end and the power plant on the other side. The first policeman waved me to a stop. I got out of the car, camera in hand, and went up and asked him why. He said I had to wait a few minutes, the Sultan was coming. I asked what was the big building on the other side of the river. "That's our new power plant," he said proudly. "That's nice," I said, "Does it work now?" "Oh, yes." "Golly," I said, "Can I take a picture of it?" "Sure, why don't you go to the other end of the bridge, you get a better shot." So I shot a lot of pictures, some including the bridge and a nearby railway bridge, with a lot of kibitzing, until the Sultan came past in his Mercedes. Then I thanked the policeman and left, congratulating myself that nothing could have been easier. If I'd been as smart as I thought I was I'd have got a good picture of the Sultan and one of the policeman. No matter how much you see, if it isn't in your camera it's worthless.

The biggest hazard to the camera fan who has ulterior motives is people—himself, ordinary people, and people who might suspect him. If you act suspicious even the ordinary people will become suspicious. If you act quite ordinary even the suspicious people will think you quite ordinary. That is why it is important for you to forget the reason you are taking your pictures. Just take them; but know what you will say if you are questioned. Sometimes if people are watching me take pictures it makes me nervous, so I retaliate by turning my camera on them to make *them* nervous. In the places

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Snapshots at Random



Roll 27, frame 11. February 1960.
Burma, Kachin state, Shwegu village. Sociological.
Man cutting bamboo.

I've been they are either so pleased they stop being inquisitive or suspicious or else they are embarrassed and go away. I have been told that in the Middle East they often throw things, and that in the Soviet bloc it can be quite dangerous; but in Asia usually they giggle. Some friends of mine in Borneo used a polaroid camera to divert the people with pictures of themselves while they took candid shots. One Dyak requested a photo of the tattoo on his back; he had never seen it!

The necessary equipment for ground intelligence photography consists of one camera and plenty of film. A camera like a pair of shoes, is an individual and personal matter. I prefer a 35 mm. negative because its 20 or 36 frames per standard roll last longer without changing film, and larger cameras are too heavy and bulky. I would not use a smaller one in the subminiature class, except for some special reason; the negative is so small that enlargement potential is seriously limited. And ordinary people, if they bother to think about it, think spies use tiny cameras that can be hidden. If you

Snapshots at Random

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

go around more or less like a tourist with a popular-sized one you avoid being conspicuous.

There are many publications on cameras and photographic techniques, on special lenses, on the respective advantages of black-and-white and color, of fine-grain and fast film. I haven't tried to touch on these subjects. All I have tried to do is point out that an opportunity exists for travellers interested in photography to make a considerable contribution to basic intelligence through collecting ground photos. I collected them because I thought it important, because it helped me learn about the place where I was living, and because it was fun.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- The Guide for Graphics Coordinators. INR/State, October 1960. An excellent new handbook.
- A Manual for the Collection of Ground Photography and Related Data. Bureau of Aeronautics, NAVAER 10-35-650, March 1953. This is the best previous guide, illustrating many techniques and giving many examples.
- Techniques for Producing Good Ground Photography for Intelligence Purposes. Secret. Photographic Intelligence Memorandum, CIA/ORR, GP/I-198, 18 July 1956.
- Volume 4—Political Affairs, of Foreign Service Manual. TL:PA-28, 7-25-60.
- A Guide to the Collection of Ground Intelligence Photography on Ports and Harbors. Confidential. Photographic Intelligence Memorandum, CIA/ORR, PIM-2, September 1957.
- Amateur Photography from Commercial Aircraft. Secret. Photographic Intelligence Memorandum, CIA/ORR, GP/I-205, 14 August 1956.
- Intelligence Collection Guidance Manual—Intelligence Photography. Confidential. Air Force Manual 200-9, 1 February 1955.
- Intelligence Collection Guidance Manual—Industrial Recognition. Air Force Manual 200-7, 15 December 1955.
- Intelligence Collection Guide—Telecommunications. Confidential. Army Pamphlet 30-100, July 1955.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*Nature, source, and behavior of
a human characteristic vulner-
able to intelligence exploitation.*

HUMAN SCENT AND ITS DETECTION

Spencer Tebrich

The olfactory sensibilities of dogs have made them a useful adjunct of intelligence and security services for as long as such services have existed. In World War II the German and currently several East European counterintelligence organizations have made notably regular use of them for tracking and identifying suspects, fugitives, and subjects of surveillance. It is curious that this anachronistic animate operational aid has simply been accepted into the age of science and technology without much effort to discover whether it could be replaced or improved upon, to define its precise capabilities with a view to countermeasures, or even to determine how it really works. The very familiarity of the fact that a dog can detect a man's odor from a considerable distance and can also distinguish one person from another by odor alone may explain why there has been little serious consideration of the parameters of the dog's capabilities or what it is about a human being that he smells.

Just what is the odor that a dog identifies as human scent? This is the first question that must be answered in a systematic inquiry into the phenomenon. Knowledge of the nature of this odor would open the way to a definition of the abilities of the dog. It would make possible experimental studies to determine the effects of weather, terrain, and other factors on the persistence and spread of the scent. It would provide a base point in the search for techniques to neutralize human odor or otherwise counteract the effectiveness of dogs. Since every person appears to have a different odor, it could also lead to a technique for identifying individuals. A more visionary but still potential outcome of the study of human odor could be the development of a "mechanical dog," a device that would automatically detect the presence of an individual by his scent.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

25

MORI/HRP PAGES 25-37

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

These eventual applications of value to intelligence cannot be approached, however, until the basic questions are answered. This paper summarizes the results of current research in this field.

Characteristics of the Scent

In 1924 L. Löhner, of the Physiological Institute of the University of Graz, published a paper comparing human and canine perception of human odor.¹ In an experiment devised to determine if humans could differentiate between individuals by odor, he had used a group of males between 20 and 40 years old, racially similar agrarian people from the Bavarian Alps. All were given the same diet during the testing period and they bathed before each test. Then they took sun baths with test cloths on various parts of their bodies—armpits, pubic region, the hair on the head, and, for a hairless region, the upper back or the palm of the hand. With practice, the men could distinguish among cloths which had been on different parts of the body, but they could not distinguish one individual from another. Löhner apparently didn't get dogs to sniff these cloths, but he pointed out that trailing dogs can take a scent from clothing off any part of the body, and he concluded that whereas humans differentiate among odors from different regions of the body, dogs recognize some common component which identifies the individual.

In another paper, published in 1926, Löhner reported some experiments with a female Doberman pinscher and blocks of wood which had been held by various individuals.² He said the dog could identify a block which had been touched by only one finger for a period of one or two seconds. Furthermore, the human odor was not masked when odorous substances such as bergamot, oil of cloves, or wild marjoram oil were applied to the test blocks. Trying to determine how long a block retained the hand scent, he found that it was lost faster in warm weather than in cold, and most slowly if the block was kept in a closed jar. It was not removed by soaking for two minutes in warm water, but could be eradicated

¹Löhner, L., *Pflüger's Archiv für die Gesamte Physiologie des Menschen und die Tiere*, 202, 25-45, (1924).

²Löhner, L., *Pflüger's Archiv für die Gesamte Physiologie des Menschen und die Tiere*, 212, 84-94, (1926).

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

by placing the block in a hot air dryer at about 150° C. for five to ten minutes or in boiling water for ten minutes.

It is possible to draw several conclusions about the nature of human scent from these experiments and from other evidence.

First, the odorous substance must be somewhat volatile, since it could be removed by hot air. There are other considerations that support this conclusion. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a dog could detect a person from a distance if the odorous material were not volatile. In one series of our own experiments, portions of trails were laid by rowing a boat along the shore of a lake, and it was found that a dog, trailing on shore, could determine which way his human quarry had gone without its having set foot on the ground. The shore line must therefore have been marked for him by vaporized scented matter.

Second, its volatility can nevertheless not be very high under ordinary conditions. Since it remains on sticks and clothing for a considerable length of time, it must have a fairly low vapor pressure.

Third, it must be rather persistent (in the chemical warfare sense), hence chemically stable and relatively dense with respect to air. Dogs can follow a trail hours after it was laid, and their actions indicate that pockets of scent collect and persist in particular places under the proper conditions.

Fourth, since warm water did not remove the scent from Löhner's test blocks, it is not readily soluble in water. There is evidence that a dog can identify an individual by scent, although apparently with more than usual difficulty, even after a number of successive baths. Either it is very difficult to wash the scent off even with soap, or else it is replaced rapidly after a bath.

Some of our own experiments lead to further conclusions. In these a male Labrador retriever named Skimmer, after sniffing the hand of one individual, would select a stick he had handled from among three or four handled by other persons. The experimental variations of this basic test procedure were each repeated at least three times, a different set of sticks being placed in different order on a different section of a wooden floor at each repetition. In practice the tests were

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

not necessarily consecutive: it was found the dog would lose interest after a few hours of work on any single day.

In one set of tests, although Skimmer was still given the individual's scent by holding a hand over his nose, he selected the right stick just as well if, instead of having been held in the hand, it had been placed only under the arm or had only been rubbed through the hair. A female miniature poodle named Onyx, given the hand scent of an individual, also readily selected a stick which had only had contact with his hair. This essentially was a continuation of Löhner's experiment, demonstrating that the hand, armpit, and hair all contain some common element by which a dog identifies a person.

In another series of tests, however, the sticks were not handled, but urine samples from the four test individuals applied to them; and Skimmer could not identify these sticks.

Then an attempt was made to extract the odorous material from samples of hair. Hair cuttings from the four test individuals were treated with a fat solvent, carbon tetrachloride or perchloroethylene. When the solvent was removed by evaporation at room temperature, there remained a small amount of very pale yellow fatty material which had a slight and not unpleasant odor. It was solid at room temperature, liquid under body heat. These extract samples were tested on Skimmer as follows.

Three individuals each handled a stick, but the fourth's was marked only by a small amount of the material extracted from his hair sample. Skimmer, given a hand scent by the fourth individual, readily picked the correct stick. The test was repeated, using a different person's extract each time, always with success. It was also reversed, all four sticks being handled but the dog given the scent from one of the bottles of extract. Again he could equate the extract with the hand scent on the stick. The experiment was repeated on Onyx, the miniature poodle, with the same results. But when a stick was rubbed with the hair which remained after the extraction process, Skimmer could not identify it.

Thus it is possible to obtain from human hair an extract which contains the odor identifying the individual. Moreover, since several weeks or even some months elapsed between the cutting of the hair and the tests with Skimmer,

28

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the experiments also indicate that an individual's characteristic odor does not change over quite a period of time. It could be that a person's scent is a permanent individual characteristic.

The additional conclusions one can draw from these experiments may be summarized as follows.

Fifth, dogs appear to find some common individual scent produced by different parts of the human body, whereas to a human the different parts of the body have different odors. Urine, however, does not contain the individual's scent.

Sixth, the substance of human scent, although not very soluble in water, is susceptible to fat solvents and can be extracted from hair by the use of these.

Seventh, the characteristic scent does not change from day to day.

Source of the Scent

If we assume, as we have, that what a dog identifies as the characteristic scent of an individual is the property of some very specific material, and if we further assume, as seems reasonable, that this specific and characteristic material would have a unique source, the next step would be to look about for the most probable source for it. Since it is transferred to an object by contact with the skin or hair, the scent is apparently present on the skin; and a logical source for it might therefore be one of the various secretions normal to the human skin.³

The skin is normally covered with a part aqueous, part oily film made up of the secretions of several different types of glands. Some of these glands are found all over the body, others only in certain parts. The most familiar of them is that which produces the eccrine sweat whose evaporation serves to control body temperature. It is about 99% water, and the materials that make up the remaining 1% are very similar to those of urine. The glands are all over the body, the rate at which they operate depending on temperature, exercise, and emotional factors. Eccrine sweat probably has

³The information on skin secretions in this section is derived from Rothman, Stephan, *Physiology and Biochemistry of the Skin* (University of Chicago Press, 1954).

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

29

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

some odor, one which becomes more noticeable with bacterial decomposition.

Another type of gland produces a kind of sweat known as apocrine, which contains fatty as well as water-soluble ingredients. There are apocrine sweat glands in all the hairier parts of the body (armpits, perimamillary regions, mid-line of the abdomen, pubic and anal regions) except on the head, where they are found only in the external ear canal and the nasal vestibule, not in the scalp or on the face. Apocrine sweat contains odorous materials, and the odor becomes more pronounced with bacterial decomposition; it is probably the main source of so-called "body odor." These glands do not respond to temperature changes, but they are readily activated by mental stimuli. In animals, at least, they appear to be related to sexual attraction. Beyond that, not much is known as to why they exist.

A third set of glands secretes a fatty material that serves to lubricate and protect the skin. These are called sebaceous glands, and their secretion sebum. There are sebaceous glands over the entire body except for some parts of the feet, the palms of the hands, the palm sides of the fingers, and between the fingers. But sebum is found on all parts of the skin, including those where there are no glands, because it flows over the skin very rapidly. It is said to be very difficult to get even a small portion of the palm free from sebum, and it is estimated that it flows over wet skin at the rate of some 1.3 inches per second.

Sebum is liquid at body temperature, a solid at ordinary room temperature. Chemically, it is a very complex mixture of free and combined fatty acids, wax alcohols, sterols, terpenoids, and hydrocarbons, with compounds of relatively high molecular weight predominating. Many of the compounds do not occur anywhere else in the body. If it is removed from the skin, the glands operate very rapidly to replace it, but when the sebum layer reaches a certain thickness they slow down and stop until it needs renewal again.

In order to complete the catalog of organic materials found on the skin, it should be mentioned that a small amount of fatty material is released by skin cells that are in process of being discarded. This process is quite slow.

30

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

If we now examine each of these skin secretions in the light of what we know about human scent, we should be able to decide which of them is the most likely source of the scent, or whether several are equally possible sources.

Of eccrine sweat, the 1% that isn't water is water-soluble. But Löhner's experiments indicated that human scent is not readily soluble in water, and we found that an individual's scent can be extracted from a hair sample by using a fat solvent. Moreover, eccrine sweat contains materials similar to those found in urine, which we concluded does not carry the characteristic odor of the individual. So eccrine sweat does not appear to be a good candidate.

Apocrine sweat, since it is the main cause of the familiar "body odor," might be supposed to be the source of the individual's characteristic scent. But we saw that dogs can as readily take a scent from a person's hand or the hair on his head as from his armpit, the only one of these three areas equipped with apocrine glands. So if we stick to our assumption of a single unique source for human scent, apocrine sweat is also a poor candidate.

The fatty material from the decomposition of skin cells is produced so slowly that it could not be replaced promptly after having been removed by a good bath. Yet a dog can detect the human scent even after a series of baths. We can therefore probably ignore skin cells as a source.

This elimination leaves sebum the only remaining candidate. It seems reasonable that such a fatty substance containing heavy alcohols and hydrocarbons and having a point of fusion between room and body temperatures would have the limited volatility, the persistence, and the solubility characteristics we have attributed to human scent. The rapid replacement of sebum removed from the skin would explain why the most thorough bath or series of baths does not eliminate the individual scent. Sebum, like the hair extracts by which Skimmer identified our test individuals, is soluble in fat solvents; in fact, these extracts were prepared in the same way many investigators of sebum have obtained their samples. There does not seem to be any reason why sebum could *not* be the source of individual scent, and we may therefore make the working hypothesis that it is, although it cannot be said

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

31

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

we have proved that it is the unique source or that other skin secretions do not also contain the scent.

From this hypothesis it would not follow that sebum is the only thing about an individual the dog can smell. There are, in fact, observations indicating that dogs do use other human odors as cues. Those who work with police dogs have observed that they sometimes seem to be drawn to a person for no other reason than that he has done something which he fears will be detected. The cue here could be a copious amount of one of the emotionally controlled secretions, say apocrine sweat. If sebum provides an ever-present identification of the individual, the variable intensity of apocrine and perhaps eccrine sweat odor may give an indication of his emotional state.

Individuality of the Scent

In 1955 H. Kalmus, of University College, London, published a paper on the ability of dogs to discriminate between identical twins.⁴ In a series of experiments with trailing dogs and retrievers he found that they could distinguish between identical twins when confronted simultaneously with both scents, but that if they were presented only one scent at a time they would confuse one with the other. No other pairs of individuals, even blood relatives, were so confused. Kalmus concluded that there is more similarity between the scents of identical twins than between those of other individuals and inferred that individual scent is probably genetically controlled.

If it is true that scent is genetically controlled, and if the source is sebum, there should be a marked difference in the composition of the sebum of different species. There is, Rothman says,⁵ "It seems that the chemical composition of sebaceous gland and other skin products shows more striking species differences among mammals than that of any other organ or organ product." For instance, human sebum contains a good deal of squalene (a compound structurally related to cholesterol), which is replaced in sheep sebum (wool fat, lanolin) by a structurally similar terpenoid called lanosterol. Such differences in composition could produce major

⁴Kalmus, H., *British Journal of Animal Behavior*, 3, 25-31, (1955).
⁵See footnote 3.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

species differences in scent, if one grants that the components are odorous to the dog.

It is not so easy, however, to account for the fact that each individual appears to have his own characteristic scent. It would be absurd to suppose that each individual's sebum contains some unique chemical compound to produce his individual scent. But the complexity of sebum and the possibility of structural variations within its many compounds makes another hypothesis possible. Of the fatty acid series, all the normal straight-chain monobasic acids from seven to twenty-two carbons (both odd and even) have been identified in human sebum. These include both saturated and unsaturated chains with one, two, and three double bonds. The wax alcohols present an equally large array of related compounds, this time with both straight and branched chains present. If one postulates individual variations in the comparative quantity of even a few of these components, there could be a large number of possible combinations. Only five individual compounds each present in any one of ten possible proportions would give more than 600,000 combinations.

Thus it could be surmised that human scent, as a species, is the property of a major component (or set of components) characteristic of human sebum (say squalene), but that each individual has a unique mixture of various minor ingredients (say certain fatty acids or long-chain alcohols). Individual scent would be a blend, the major scent modified by various additives, like a series of different perfumes compounded on the same basic theme. Such chemical individuality is not without precedent, and it may even turn out to be the rule that the chemistry of living organisms displays individual variations around some central theme. In blood groupings, which have been studied rather extensively, it has been found that each individual appears to have his own characteristic pattern of blood types and sub-types, while genetically related individuals (racial groups) show characteristically similar patterns. It is possible, by determining the presence or absence of a comparatively few factors, not only to identify blood as human, but also to obtain information about the donor's genetic background and, potentially at least, to identify the individual.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

Parameters of Detection

If one is willing to make a number of simplifying assumptions, it is possible to estimate the approximate amount of human odor a dog would have available at a given distance from a man. The calculation is rather crude, but at least it gives a quantitative idea of the order of magnitude of the dog's ability.

Take a man standing in a field with a wind blowing across his body and a dog 100 yards down wind. Scent is transferred from the man's body to the air and is carried down wind to the dog. We will assume the man and dog have maintained their positions long enough that a continuous cloud of scent is present between them. As it goes down wind, the cross section of the cloud will grow larger and the concentration of the scent in the air smaller in rough proportion to the square of the distance. The concentration at any particular point will vary, however, not only with the rate of emanation of the scent, wind speed, and distance, but also with corrective factors expressing the effects of weather and terrain on the width and height of the cloud, the earth's drag on the part of the cloud near the ground, and the tendency of the concentration to decrease with altitude.

Having noted the apparent similarities in limited volatility, density, and persistence between human scent and chemical warfare agents, we shall adopt the values for these corrective factors that have been worked out for the travel of clouds of chemical warfare agents. Prentiss⁶ gives values for conditions which he lists as "favorable," "average," and "unfavorable" for a chemical gas attack. These conditions equally well describe good, average and poor working conditions for a dog.

For the rate of transfer of the scent from man to air we can make an estimate on the following basis. Rothman⁷ estimates that an adult produces an average of at least 200 micrograms of sebum per minute. We have noted that the sebum layer on the skin tends to maintain equilibrium, being replen-

⁶Prentiss, Augustin M., *Chemicals in Warfare* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1937).

⁷See footnote 3.

Human Scent

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ished as fast as it is lost. So we can use this average rate of sebum production to represent the average rate at which it is transferred to the air. But presumably not all the many ingredients of sebum are odorous to the dog, and we shall therefore arbitrarily take ten percent of this rate, or 20 micrograms per minute (2×10^{-2} mg/min) as the rate of transfer of the scent from man to air.

Taking this expression as the rate of scent transfer, a distance of 100 yards, a wind speed of 6 miles per hour, and the values of corrective factors for "average" conditions, we get a concentration of scent available to the dog of approximately 10^{-12} milligrams per milliliter of air. For "favorable" conditions, using a wind speed of 2 mph, the concentration would be about 10^{-11} mg/ml, and for "unfavorable" conditions, with a wind speed of 12 mph, it would be about 10^{-13} mg/ml. It is possible, to judge from practical experience, that under "unfavorable" conditions 100 yards would be a little beyond the dog's effective range.

The spread between the concentrations available to the dog under favorable and under unfavorable conditions is about two orders of magnitude (10^{-11} to 10^{-13} mg/ml). Since scent concentration varies inversely with the square of the distance when everything else is constant, a variation in the distance by a factor of 10 would give this concentration change of two orders of magnitude. It jibes well that a practical rule of thumb for the effective range of a sentry dog's detection by scent is 50 to 500 yards, depending on conditions, a minimum and maximum distance separated by our factor of 10.

The concentration of scent available to the dog is exceedingly small. The value obtained for "average" conditions (10^{-12} mg/ml) represents only one millionth of a microgram of odorous material in a liter of air, a microgram being a millionth of a gram. By weight, since a liter of air weighs somewhat over one gram, this means that the air 100 yards down wind contains one ten thousandth of a millionth of one percent of the odorous material.

Although these results seem at first sight incredible, man in his own sense realm can also detect by smell exceedingly small amounts of odorous materials in air; and there are several substances which he can recognize in concentrations simi-

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Human Scent

lar to those just calculated. Some minimum concentrations detectable by humans are the following:⁸

vanillin	10 ⁻¹⁵ mg/ml
synthetic musk	10 ⁻¹⁵ mg/ml
mercaptan	10 ⁻¹⁵ mg/ml
skatol	10 ⁻¹⁵ mg/ml

In the light of these data, our fantastically small figures for the concentrations a dog can detect are not particularly unreasonable. It is only necessary to make the obvious postulate that some things which have little or no odor to a human must be quite odorous to a dog.

Toward Intelligence Applications

These tentative findings should provide a beachhead for scientific study of the detection of human scent and its present and potential applications in intelligence work. With respect to the current use of dogs for security patrol and tracking and to the converse problem of evading them, the parameters of the dog's ability and the influence thereon of weather, terrain, and other factors can be defined more precisely in laboratory and field experiments when controlled by measured quantities of sebum in refinement of the uncertain emanations of an individual. If the constant odorous component of human sebum, which we have suggested above may be associated with squalene, can be identified and isolated, chemical experimentation should in time turn up a counteracting agent. Potentially, at least, physical or chemical analysis of the variant minor components appears also to offer an alternate means of positive individual identification.

The more universally important senses, because they are more important, have in the past century been supplemented with inorganic aids which make them much more capable than the animal originals. We have long been accustomed to seeing and hearing much more by means of instruments than with our natural powers, and to recording sights and sounds by mechanical artifact. Once we have identified the medium of human scent analogous to the light and air vibration which stimulate sight and sound, it seems reasonable to

⁸Moncrieff, *The Chemical Senses* (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1946).

Human Scent

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

suppose that we shall also find mechanical means to improve upon animal olfactory capabilities and not only to detect but to record the otherwise unknown presence of an individual. Our mechanical dog, when he is born, should be much more unobtrusive than his natural ancestor, should be able to tell us just whom he has smelled, and should maintain a reliable permanent record of his visitors.

CONFIDENTIAL

A striking instance of the post-war hiatus in U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence activity.

COVER: PROPERTY RESTITUTION

Frederick D. Barathy

Of the many opportunities presented Soviet intelligence in the early postwar years to work unhampered in the Allied occupation zones of Germany, probably none was more nearly ideal than that offered by the large, unprecedented program for the return of confiscated property from the U.S. zone, under which the Military Government played helpful host to restitution missions from the countries looted by the Nazis, including those of the Soviet Bloc, from late in 1945 to June of 1949. Although virtually no instances of intelligence activity were detected, the presumption remains, reinforced by certain indications, that the Soviets took full advantage of the situation. The obverse opportunities, on the other hand, for U.S. intelligence recruitment of Bloc mission members apparently went unexploited.

Operation of the Program

Established for the just purpose of restoring to its rightful owners property of all kinds, from art treasures to industrial plants, that had been removed to Germany from the occupied countries, the program was administered by a Restitution Control Branch of the Military Government headquartered at Frankfurt am Main and directing, under the policy guidance of a small staff in Berlin, a field organization with units in the individual *Laender*. These would locate claimed property, the mission of the claimant country would come to identify it, and the property would be placed under Military Government control until it could be shipped out. Each claimant mission was assigned an RCB officer to work with it, but unless it was a large and active mission—like the French, with a staff of up to 30 members—it would share his time with several other missions.

CONFIDENTIAL

39

MORI/HRP PAGES 39-4

CONFIDENTIAL

Property Restitution

Czechoslovakia and Poland, Yugoslavia, the USSR, and ultimately the early Axis allies Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had felt the Nazi heel and seen many of their national assets forcibly removed to Germany. They especially wished to recover scientific equipment, important precision machinery, refined minerals, and industrial materials thus commandeered. In its anxiety to put to rights the injustices perpetrated by the Germans, the U.S. Military Government welcomed the missions from these countries into a setup for intelligence operations about as perfect as can be imagined. The missions not only had a good legitimate reason for being in West Germany but enjoyed official recognition, a sympathetic attitude, and logistic support. They could bring in a healthy complement of regular personnel—about 30 for the Bloc countries together—and additional specialists without restriction for knotty restitution problems. There was almost no surveillance and a liberal policy toward travel. No restriction was placed on communication with home governments. It was normal that chiefs of mission or their deputies would periodically go home to report progress and receive instructions.

It is true that mission officers were required to get RCB orders for their travel in the zone—a regulation to which the Bloc missions in particular religiously adhered—and that as a rule their RCB officer would accompany them on their property inspection trips. This was not a counterintelligence practice, however, but a safeguard against the possibility of illegitimate deals between the mission officer and the property holder at the expense of the claimant. The few cases of such illicit activity reported would bring the warning that a second offense might result in expulsion of the officer as persona non grata. Some offenders were removed by their own chiefs of mission.

Grounds for Suspicion

In 1947 a member of the Yugoslav mission, reported for trying to obtain technical information from a German metal manufacturer while ostensibly on restitution business, was given such a warning. By this time, with the cold war in full bud, the suspicion was growing that the Bloc countries were using their missions for non-restitution activities. Casual surveillance of their members was attempted, partly with Military

CONFIDENTIAL

Property Restitution

tary Government personnel and partly with the Army CIC; but no further evidence of improper behavior was detected. The whole emphasis of policy, moreover, remained on European restoration rather than on counterintelligence or other cold war measures. Surveillance, the monitoring of travel, the double-checking of mission activities, and even obstruction of the shipment of war-essential materials were held to a minimum: it was feared that such acts might be officially protested as unfriendly by the governments concerned.

The only major U.S. use of the restitution program to gain leverage in a cold war issue had occurred earlier, in 1946, when an American plane was downed over Yugoslavia. RCB received instructions then to withhold shipment of a considerable amount of agricultural equipment until the political ramifications of the incident could be settled. The shipment was delayed, in fact, for several months.

The Bloc missions were in general of high caliber, prompt, assiduous, and capable in presenting claims and handling cases. Only the Soviet mission was comparatively aloof and not very punctual or thorough. It did effect restitution of some machinery and some university libraries, but on the whole manifested little interest in the program. Although its staff accreditation time was tremendous, its office was frequently closed and the whereabouts of its personnel unknown; but when it was open there were always at least two officers there.

A final sign of the likelihood of ulterior activities in the Bloc missions was given in their reaction at the end of 1948 to plans for phasing out the program for a few months and then closing it down. By now the bulk of the restitutions had been made, and for many of the missions the cost of continuing to maintain a staff in Germany would be altogether out of proportion to the value of the property they might still recover. Nevertheless there was an avalanche of protests, not only from the missions themselves, whose staffs might have had a personal reluctance to return to the comparative austerity of life in their homelands, but from the governments they represented, especially in the Bloc. It was argued that three years and a half was not enough for the intricate work of locating looted property and tracing and proving ownership, and that the Americans had dragged their feet on some of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Property Restitution

most lucrative claims. But the Military Government was adamant, and June 1949 saw the end of the unique and expensive U.S. program.

Dissidence and Defection

Although U.S. intelligence apparently took no advantage of the program to recruit members of the mission staffs, a number of the Bloc officers defected on their own initiative, especially toward the end. During the initial stages, two Hungarians temporarily attached to the Hungarian mission pleaded with U.S. officials for assistance in removing the assets of a textile factory—money, stock, and some personnel—out of Hungary to the West, preferably to the United States. The Military Government could not act, of course: it was policy not to disturb political relations with any country engaged in the restitution program. It had to take the same correct attitude toward an intriguing plan of the Czech mission to withhold shipment of a sizeable amount of recovered precious stones and jewelry, sell them, and give the proceeds to the Czech exile movement then beginning to form in the United States.

Early in 1948 the Polish mission chief, a rough and outgoing but shrewd man, told the RCB that his deputy had been caught buying marks on the black market, a common practice, and would be sent home. Such charges were not a matter for RCB action except as the Military Government, on German complaint, might decree an offender's expulsion. Within a few days, however, the deputy decamped to New Zealand, and it was learned from his colleagues that the black market charge had been trumped up in an effort to forestall his politically motivated defection.

A Hungarian specialist brought in to work on the restitution of certain types of property with which he was familiar also defected in 1948, shortly after his job was completed, to England. Two other Hungarians fled to Sweden when the program was closed down.

With one other dramatic exception, the bulk of the staffs of the Bloc missions returned meekly home to their police states in June 1949. It was known to the top officers of the RCB that the chief of the Czech mission, an astute, well educated,

CONFIDENTIAL

Property Restitution

CONFIDENTIAL

and very courteous gentleman, planned not to go back. But he had the calm audacity, after closing his mission with all the proper formalities, to return to Prague and ship out some of his personal property before leaving for England under the very noses of the Czech authorities.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Inside Darkest John

Dear Sirs:

In "The Defections of Dr. John,"¹ Delmege Trimble provided us with an intriguing recital of facts but with only clues about their causes. Probing of the wellsprings of John's defection and redefection is necessary because of the wounds already inflicted by turncoats on the Western body politic and the menacing likelihood of deeper cuts to come unless we learn to detect betrayal before it is unsheathed.

Early in his article Mr. Trimble points to the utility of psychological probing: "Erich Ollenhauer may have come closer when he remarked, after John redefected and began to show increasing signs of a persecution and messiah complex, 'This is a case for the psychiatrists rather than the politicians.'"² It is.

One psychiatrist who has studied and written extensively about people like Otto John is Dr. Edmund Bergler. Two of his books² are particularly pertinent to an understanding of both the case at hand and the dynamics of clandestinity, including spy-handling and spy-catching.

In the varicolored spectrum of intelligence types, the figure who often seems on first encounter the strangest and most obscure is the psychic masochist. He appears to move in an irrational world of his own. In fact, however, he is not living in another world, as closer acquaintance shows; his values are not random but rather reversed and also unconscious. Unlike the perversion masochist, the psychic masochist derives no conscious gratification from the forces that drive him. Stabilized on the level of rejection, as Bergler would put it, he devotes his life to death, bondage, and the pursuit of unhappiness.

No layman's summary of Bergler's work in masochism can be accurate, and lack of space increases the distortion. But

¹ *Studies IV* 4, p. 1 ff.

² *The Basic Neurosis* (Grune and Stratton Inc., New York, 1949) and *Principles of Self Damage* (Philosophical Library, New York, 1959).

CONFIDENTIAL

45

CONFIDENTIAL

Darkest John

it may not be too far off Bergler's mark to say that the masochist

- (1) felt deprived, as a child, of his mother's comfort, food, or affection;
- (2) tried to retaliate, could not, repressed retaliatory wishes, and instead found pleasure in being refused or denied by his mother and, later, by a mother substitute;
- (3) became an injustice-collector who, with unconscious cunning, now contrives situations that can end only in his own defeat and humiliation; and
- (4) savors, like the connoisseur he is, each drop of self-pity: "Wrongs like these are done only to me."

The masochist complains loudly but accepts and even provokes new injuries from the source of his grievances. He suspects slights and hidden disparagements in situations that seem perfectly straightforward to others. His career is likely to be one of high promise and "inexplicable" failure. He is prone to other neurotic, chiefly hypochondrial, symptoms. In his love-life he tends to equate sex with the forbidden and to be or seem promiscuous in order to be found out and punished.

How well does John fit Bergler's pattern? Unfortunately, Mr. Trimble tells us nothing of Otto's parents or of his relationships with them. But he does say that "Otto felt no fraternal jealousy" of his "younger, brighter, and sturdier" brother. Here is repression with a vengeance.

We find that Otto studied assiduously for the German foreign service and then, in opposing Hitlerism because of conscious moral revulsion, subconsciously chose the one course guaranteed to destroy his prospects. Moreover, he did not join forces with an effective opposition party or group. And when World War II erupted, he became "a chief promoter" of the fantasies of Prince Ferdinand and his hopeless pretensions to the vanished Hohenzollern throne. Again his instinct for the fated failure was unerring.

In 1941, acting as a go-between among some anti-Nazi groups that had achieved an "ineffectual half-dozen different attempts to remove Hitler," John seemed to deviate from the masochist's pseudo-aggression by getting in touch with the Allies and providing information. The next year, however,

46

CONFIDENTIAL

Darkest John

CONFIDENTIAL

"he was turned in to the Gestapo by an aging and jealous prewar mistress." Psychologically it is no accident that John chose this harpy for his Nemesis. His service for the British had been only the prelude to the disaster that he ensured when he handed to the vindictive mother-substitute the weapon that she promptly turned against him. Here, as elsewhere in his life, John acted in a way that seems wholly illogical but is actually completely consistent with the goal of self-destruction.

Released, he was able for a time to ensure the failure of his mission to the British simply by refusing to name the conspirators whom he represented and thus provoking suspicion about himself. When faced with the threat of restored confidence in 1944, he was rescued because "the British ascertained that he had transmitted information concerning allied military intentions to Berlin." It would be helpful to know how the British uncovered this fact. Was John their source, directly or not? And why, incidentally, was he providing intelligence to a government that he was supposedly sworn to destroy?

The documentary evidence bearing on John's whereabouts on 20 July 1944—the lists of applicants for Spanish visas and the travel manifests—leaves little doubt that he was in Spain when the climactic day arrived. More interesting than his absence from Germany is his later lying about it and, especially, the clumsiness of the lie. Almost anyone who was at OKW headquarters that day and who survived could have exposed its falsity. Moreover, Otto told not one story about his role in the plot, but several. It is as though, subconsciously, he wanted his falsehoods discovered, wanted to be charged as a fraud whose claim to significant anti-Fascism—the hub of his public life—was spurious.

We learn that in 1946, after seeing a film about the Belzen concentration camp, John had "a species of nervous breakdown" and that "the lower part of his face began to discharge a pus-like fluid." The conscious frustration that he adduced as the cause of these phenomena is unconvincing. Nervous breakdowns are the product of intolerable unconscious stress, not of witting frustration. Bergler, who has written at length about the oral basis of masochism, would probably find

CONFIDENTIAL

47

CONFIDENTIAL

Darkest John

it significant that the fluid was discharged from the region of the mouth. But why 1946, when the danger and tension of war had ended? Perhaps the answer lies not in what the Germans did to the inmates of Belzen but in what they did not do to John. "He revisited with the wrath of a prosecutor the country which he had fled as a political persecutee. He kept aloof from other Germans . . . trying unsuccessfully to pose as an Englishman . . ." Here was behavior designed to arouse the indignation, perhaps even the contempt and hatred, of his fellows. Here was a chance to collect an accusation worse than *liar*, the epithet of *traitor*. But it did not happen, because the Germans were then preoccupied with their own problems.

Three years later he did manage, by extreme provocation, to evoke a little hostility among his countrymen. Appearing as "the chief German assistant to the British prosecution" and "deliberately twisting facts and evidence to the advantage of the prosecutors," he annoyed a number of his compatriots. Consequently there were no conversion symptoms and no breakdown in 1949. In fact, as Rudolf Diels³ relates, John now sought out, in Wiesbaden and elsewhere, the very Germans likeliest to despise him, and solicited their aid in obtaining governmental employment!

In 1949 John also married—"the mother of the girl he had been expected to wed." We remember that the mistress who turned him in to the Gestapo was also "aging." The pattern of the dominant, punishing mother is repeated in the marriage. An American who knew both Otto and his wife recalls how she ruled him and how he, the conversationalist, was mutely attentive in her presence. It is also consistent that John kept his mistress after his marriage and continued to share in the sultry parties at Wowo's apartment. There was always the tingling chance that his wife-mother would find out—and spank.

The fact that John succeeded in becoming BfV chief may seem incompatible with the theory of deep psychic masochism. His success was not a result of chance, an idiot good fortune that persisted in smiling blindly no matter how he tried to

³ *Der Fall Otto John, Hintergründe und Lehren* (Goettinger Verlagsanstalt, 1954).

CONFIDENTIAL

Darkest John

CONFIDENTIAL

win her frowns. On the contrary, he moved realistically and effectively to eliminate his chief rival, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz. But as Bergler has pointed out repeatedly, clever neurotics play for high stakes. The attainment of eminence, the immediate goal, ensures a deeper and more disastrous fall, the ultimate goal.

From the moment of John's appointment, like the moment of his marriage, he invented naughty irresponsibilities that were likely to lead to punishment. He started by hiring a Soviet spy or ex-spy as his secretary. He embarked upon projects so ridiculous as to guarantee humiliation as failure's bonus. Senior police officials and high-ranking members of the West German government began to detest him. Then—at last!—the attacks began, and John could delectate while complaining "about the bad things people were saying about him," could be gleefully "convinced that the newspaper story of changes planned by the Interior Minister was aimed at him."

The "enemies" whom he had created were all "Nazis," of course. John's preoccupation with what he considered the Nazi threat is revealing. Both before and after his defection to the East, he complained shrilly about the "growing influence of the Nazis." No matter what Fascist tendencies the analytic eye could discern in the Germany of 1954 (or can spot today), avowed Nazis were hard to find. Aggression against them was unreal, was pseudo-aggression. Bergler has pointed out that masochists, like other neurotics, are incapable of real aggression and show only its counterfeit.

The BfV chief attended the 20th-of-July decennial and "made an exhibition of himself, sobbing loudly and denouncing two other mourners as Gestapo agents." It is hard to imagine conduct better calculated to evoke a punch in the nose than calling a 20th-of-July mourner a Gestapo stool-pigeon. By this time John's deterioration had progressed, one suspects, through deepening psychic masochism toward paranoia.

After this outbreak the chancellery might have obliged him by kicking him out had he not owed his appointment to the occupying powers. Bilked of the boot, he had to move out on his own. And so Otto, in the ultimate act of pseudo-aggression, ran away from home.

CONFIDENTIAL

Darkest John

CONFIDENTIAL

He knew, from his own experiences in Britain and the BfV, that refugees and defectors encounter suspicion more often than acceptance. He had every right to expect, at the very least, a couple of sound psychic slaps, so that he could turn the other quivering little cheek. But what happened? A full-dress press conference attended by 400 Western and Communist reporters. Plans for a Ministry of German Unity, which he would head. A prolonged visit in the USSR. And even in the West, "a surprisingly good British press."

Hell hath no fury like a masochist unscorned. Now he had to go back; there was no other way to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

If the West had understood Otto John, if some superior had been kind and sagacious enough to slip him just a crust of insult now and then, he might have been one of the most brilliant intelligence officers in Europe. Instead, he was regarded and treated like a normal person. Inevitably, he considered respect and kindness a form of weakness. Inevitably, he became more disturbed the more he was cheated of pleasure-in-displeasure. The West tried to use John not only without understanding him but, as it happened, in contravention of his nature. It was like trying to turn over a garden with a tennis racquet.

Consequently his life followed the course of his own unconscious choosing and became the debacle toward which he had aspired from his youth. Misunderstood, mistreated, and maligned, he can now look forward to a serene old age, his heart warmed by the dear familiar curses, his faith in mankind renewed by the jeers of the younger generation. At last he has what he wanted.

At our cost.

ALFRED PAUMIER

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

GEHEIM (Secret: A Documentary Report on the German Secret Service). By Wolfgang Wehner. (Munich: Suddeutscher Verlag. 1960. Pp. 317. DM 14.80.)

For fourteen years Reinhard Gehlen observed a virtual fetish of secrecy for himself and his emerging Bundesnachrichtendienst. A series of articles in the German weekly *Muenchner Illustrierte*, beginning in November 1959, which now appears in book form as *Geheim*, abruptly—though probably only momentarily—reverses this policy. Since the author's efforts are BND-inspired, it is to be presumed that someone in the BND is convinced this effort will impress friends, inspire in the German public a supreme confidence in the BND, and cause hostile services to quake in their boots.

Unfortunately, the book is not likely to have any of these effects. It is an odd and poorly organized mixture of case reviews, history of the Gehlen organization and its General Staff predecessor, Fremde Heere Ost, and ostensibly accurate material on the American and German intelligence community in postwar West Germany. The case reviews are unimpressive substitutes for spy novels; they reveal a good bit less than the opposition has exposed. The BND is represented as dominating and inspiring the entire postwar development of intelligence collection in Germany. The book creates an unwarranted caricature of an omniscient General Gehlen. Its incredible image would have been complete had it reproduced the double-page photograph accompanying one of the *Muenchner Illustrierte* installments showing the almost never photographed General treading water in Lake Starnberg and had captioned it "General Gehlen collecting naval intelligence."

It is to be hoped that the BND, an increasingly effective intelligence ally, will develop a sense of balance in its public relations and come to cultivate neither unreasoned staff secrecy nor a yen for eliciting hero worship.

QUINCY BEHNFIELD

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Recent Books

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND THE SHAPE OF TOMORROW. By William M. McGovern. (Chicago: Regnery. 1961. Pp. 191. \$4.00.)

None of us whose Washington battle-stations lay at the bosom of the wartime intelligence community can forget the lieutenant professor or associate commander William McGovern. A less martial figure never wore uniform. In our one-time university jobs we had had academic colleagues who occasionally appeared before their classes tieless, uncombed, or in mismatched shoes; but somehow, upon joining the colors, even the most unconscious of them managed to spruce up to dress requirements. Not so the splendid McGovern: one day he had forgotten his shoulder boards; on another, the top and bottom parts of the uniform were of different fabrics; on another, a button of his tunic would be widowed of its buttonhole or his overseas cap stuck on backwards; almost always down his front would run the track of cigar ashes.

It is reported by sources believed to be usually reliable that Admiral King twice crossed Constitution Avenue specifically to correct such derelictions. The story is credible, for Commander McGovern, then late of the Northwestern University faculty and a walking storehouse of knowledge, horse sense, and good ideas, had become the Navy's chosen instrument on the Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee. One is led to speculate that Admiral King—not generally known for the quality of forbearance—realized that one price of McGovern's contribution to high-level intelligence work was the incandescent eccentricity of his military bearing.

Some sixteen years after the fact, Professor McGovern has addressed himself to *Strategic Intelligence and the World of Tomorrow*. Both the title and the chapter headings—"Can the Future be Foretold," "Secret Intelligence," "Economic Intelligence," "Ethnological Intelligence," "Ideological Intelligence," "Prospects for the Future," and "Grand Strategy and National Policy"—hold out an alluring invitation to the devotees of this journal.

Never was a deadfall more artfully baited. The guile of the late Colonel Green of the *Infantry Journal* in thinking up George Pettee's title, *The Future of American Secret Intelli-*

52

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MORI/HRP PAGES 52-54

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Recent Books

gence, is innocence itself by comparison; after all, Pettee did write a useful essay on his wartime experience with overt economic intelligence and targetting. The McGovern book's title is as good as any other, if you grant that it had to be published; its faults lie in the very substance of practically every paragraph of its hundred and ninety pages of text.

To begin with, internal evidence strongly suggests that the book was dictated in very short order and not very carefully proofed for repetitions, contradictions, confusions, and errors of fact. The frame of reference and parts of the text are clearly derived from Professor McGovern's wartime experience, other parts from his general knowledge and a desultory study of open literature, and one part at least, it seems, from his lecture notes on some prewar anthropology course. There is little of it that will not appear simplistic, irrelevant, out of date, or incorrect to the relatively well-informed reader. These are strong words, but let me illustrate—I hope not unfairly—what I have in mind.

1. Early on, the following appears: "By means of radar our men were able to spot the approach of enemy vessels or enemy aircraft long before they were visible to the naked eye. . . . Unfortunately radar does not function below the surface of water, but the newly developed sonar was able to overcome this handicap in large measure." There are many similar sentences throughout the book, e.g.: "The armed forces of Iran are not nearly as good as those of Turkey . . ." (p. 164). "I am sure that Italy will remain true to her treaty obligations, but I seriously doubt she can render any spectacular military assistance" (p. 161). "The situation in Black Africa, Africa south of the Sahara, inhabited mostly by Negroes, is somewhat confused" (p. 158). "If [the armed forces of Indonesia] were drawn into a military conflict with the Western powers, they would present no serious menace" (p. 159). This sort of statement is what I have in mind when I say simplistic.

2. In the economic chapter great stress is laid on the intelligence of raw material distribution—a matter whose importance has been known to strategists for generations, and a primary canon for both intelligence and strategic planning since these arts have come of age. It is not that what he says is wrong, it is that he says it in a context which suggests that both the intelligence community and the stockpilers of

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

53

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Recent Books

SECRET

25X1

OCDM have been woolgathering and need to be prodded into action.

3. The ethnological chapter is the longest (40 pages), the chattiest, the fullest of irrelevancies, and probably the most dated. It contains a note on the principal races of the world, it takes account of prejudices and animosities between them, it gives a few pages to language and its role in the formation of national character, and ditto for religion, with the comment that he is in favor of religious toleration and that he does not believe Arabs and Israelis will become reconciled to each other "in the immediate future." It is unkind but true to note that the tone and many of the ideas seem closer akin to nineteenth than to twentieth century thinking.

4. In the chapter on ideology, which he feels to be a "very important" and to this reader's surprise "a much neglected source of strategic intelligence," we are sunk deep in the past. His examples of right- and left-wing totalitarianism are not those of today: Marx, Lenin, and Hitler get several pages and Mao a brief mention; but to Stalin, Khrushchev, Franco, Castro, and the others of the present era there is no reference at all. He introduces nationalism as a phase of ideology and again draws upon history for lessons. We are presented some vignettes of ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and then on into the French Revolution and the nineteenth century. There is almost nothing about present-day nationalisms. If his intent is to let the past point out its own lessons I have two quarrels with him: a) his references to the past contain too many errors to carry conviction, and b) most of the lessons which he derives just do not apply to today's situations. One's understanding of men like Diem, Nkrumah, Sukarno, Nasser, etc. who today cause us most concern is not improved by the implied analogy. Indeed he considers not a one of them nor the particular kind of nationalism each represents, and his historical elucidations, ostensibly in aid of the intelligence estimator, are accordingly of little or no concern even if they are correct.

But let me stop. This is a book which adds little if anything to the sparse literature of our calling. Even sadder, it does no favor at all to the reputation of a man who justifiably cut quite a swath in World War II intelligence.

SHERMAN KENT

54

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET

25X1

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

Holt and Van de Velde's <i>Strategic Psychological Operations</i>	Marsha Timfield
Books on military intelligence	Lyman Kirkpatrick
Bailey's <i>The Conspirators</i>	John Rondeau

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET

Intelligence Articles V 2

*Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.*

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

Effects of narcosis and considerations relevant to its possible counterintelligence use.

"TRUTH" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION

The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to obtain information from an uncooperative source and as persistent as his impatience to shortcut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation, physical coercion has at times been substituted for painstaking and time-consuming inquiry in the belief that direct methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens, writing in 1883, rationalizes a grisly example of "third degree" practices by the police of India: "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence."

More recently, police officials in some countries have turned to drugs for assistance in extracting confessions from accused persons, drugs which are presumed to relax the individual's defenses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been trying to conceal. This investigative technique, however humanitarian as an alternative to physical torture, still raises serious questions of individual rights and liberties. In this country, where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in police work, their use has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still occasionally flare into the open.

The use of so-called "truth" drugs in police work is similar to the accepted psychiatric practice of narco-analysis; the difference in the two procedures lies in their different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical truth that may be used against the suspect, and therefore almost solely with *probative* truth: the usefulness of the suspect's revelations depends ultimately on their acceptance in evidence by a court of law. The psychiatrist, on the other hand, using the same "truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, is primarily concerned with *psychological* truth or psychological reality rather than empirical

"Truth" Drugs

fact. A patient's aberrations are reality for him at the time they occur, and an accurate account of these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable recollection of past events, can be the key to recovery.

The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, helping to heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice, has provided an exceedingly durable theme for the press and popular literature. While acknowledging that "truth serum" is a misnomer twice over—the drugs are not sera and they do not necessarily bring forth probative truth—journalistic accounts continue to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up a few spectacular "truth" drug successes and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and more widely employed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.

Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information from an uncompliant source is *ipso facto* of interest in intelligence operations. If the ethical considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narco-interrogation in police work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services must at least be prepared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of "truth" drugs, their characteristic actions, and their potentialities, positive and negative, for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an adequate defense against them.

This discussion, meant to help toward such an understanding, draws primarily upon openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from criminal investigative practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherapy.

Scopolamine as "Truth Serum"

Early in this century physicians began to employ scopolamine, along with morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of henbane, scopolamine was known to produce sedation and drowsiness, confusion and disorientation, incoordination, and amnesia for events experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep answered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.

"Truth" Drugs

In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas, obstetrician, that a similar technique might be employed in the interrogation of suspected criminals, and he arranged to interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose guilt seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men denied the charges on which they were held; and both, upon trial, were found not guilty. Enthusiastic at this success, House concluded that a patient under the influence of scopolamine "cannot create a lie . . . and there is no power to think or reason."¹⁴ His experiment and this conclusion attracted wide attention, and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched upon the public consciousness.

The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of House's experiment in the *Los Angeles Record*, sometime in 1922. House resisted the term for a while but eventually came to employ it regularly himself. He published some eleven articles on scopolamine in the years 1921-1929, with a noticeable increase in polemical zeal as time went on. What had begun as something of a scientific statement turned finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of truth serum" on behalf of his offspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward behavior and stubbornly proud of its minor achievements."¹¹

Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces may have used it extensively.^{2, 16} One police writer claims that the threat of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions from criminal suspects, who are told they will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water.¹⁶

Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine was shortly disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, and physiological phenomena such as headache, rapid heart, and blurred vision, which distract the subject from the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat

"Truth" Drugs

and reducing secretions that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully, dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking, even in a tractable subject.

The Barbiturates

The first suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart and his associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulants, were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic patient who had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed, opened his eyes, and even answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to established methods of therapy.

At about this time police officials, still attracted by the possibility that drugs might help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses, turned to a class of depressant drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger, head of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, was using barbiturates on reluctant suspects, though police work continued to be hampered by the courts' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumscribed instances.

The barbiturates, first synthesized in 1903, are among the oldest of modern drugs and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2,500 have been prepared, and about two dozen of these have won an important place in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are prescribed by physicians in the United States each year, and they have come to be known by a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goofballs," Luminal, Nembutal, "red devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies," etc. Three of them which are used in narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodium amytal (amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser extent secenal (secobarbital).

As with most drugs, little is known about the way barbiturates work or exactly how their action is related to their chemistry. But a great deal is known about the action it-

"Truth" Drugs

self. They can produce the entire range of depressant effects from mild sedation to deep anesthesia—and death. In small doses they are sedatives acting to reduce anxiety and responsiveness to stressful situations; in these low doses, the drugs have been used in the treatment of many diseases, including peptic ulcer, high blood pressure, and various psychogenic disorders. At three to five times the sedative dose the same barbiturates are hypnotics and induce sleep or unconsciousness from which the subject can be aroused. In larger doses a barbiturate acts as an anesthetic, depressing the central nervous system as completely as a gaseous anesthetic does. In even larger doses barbiturates cause death by stopping respiration.

The barbiturates affect higher brain centers generally. The cerebral cortex—that region of the cerebrum commonly thought to be of the most recent evolutionary development and the center of the most complex mental activities—seems to yield first to the disturbance of nerve-tissue function brought about by the drugs. Actually, there is reason to believe that the drugs depress cell function without discrimination and that their selective action on the higher brain centers is due to the intricate functional relationship of cells in the central nervous system. Where there are chains of interdependent cells, the drugs appear to have their most pronounced effects on the most complex chains, those controlling the most "human" functions.

The lowest doses of barbiturates impair the functioning of the cerebral cortex by disabling the ascending (sensory) circuits of the nervous system. This occurs early in the sedation stage and has a calming effect not unlike a drink or two after dinner. The subject is less responsive to stimuli. At higher dosages, the cortex no longer actively integrates information, and the cerebellum, the "lesser brain" sometimes called the great modulator of nervous function, ceases to perform as a control box. It no longer compares cerebral output with input, no longer informs the cerebrum command centers of necessary corrections, and fails to generate correcting command signals itself. The subject may become hyperactive, may thrash about. At this stage consciousness is lost and coma follows. The subject no longer responds even to

"Truth" Drugs

noxious stimuli, and cannot be roused. Finally, in the last stage, respiration ceases.^{10, 28}

As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a barbiturate injected intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive drunkenness, but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours. Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric patient in tension. His features slacken, his body relaxes. Some people are momentarily excited; a few become silly and giggly. This usually passes, and most subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.

The descent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be divided as follows:

- I. Sedative stage.
- II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).
- III. Unconsciousness, without reflex even to painful stimuli.
- IV. Death.

Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia, stages I and II may last only two or three seconds.

The first or sedative stage can be further divided:

- Plane 1. No evident effect, or slight sedative effect.
- Plane 2. Cloudiness, calmness, amnesia. (Upon recovery, the subject will not remember what happened at this or "lower" planes or stages.)
- Plane 3. Slurred speech, old thought patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware of painful stimuli.

Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but it can be extended by further slow injection of the drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative stage on the way to full consciousness.

A6

"Truth" Drugs

Clinical and Experimental Studies

The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogation. Louis A. Gottschalk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews,¹³ cites 136 references; but only two touch upon the extraction of intelligence information, and one of these concludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old police methods and do *not* depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found only three published experimental studies that he deemed worth reporting.

One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers.²² The subjects, soldiers, were at first sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, but as the interview proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.

The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized, untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.

Gerson and Victoroff¹² conducted amytal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric patients, soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital, Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who, neither ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under scrutiny, urged each of them to discuss his social and family background, his army career, and his version of the charges pending against him.

The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.

Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned

A7

"Truth" Drugs

first about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed before receiving the drug. Whenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up himself the charges pending against him before being questioned about them. If he did this in a too fully conscious state, it proved more effective to ask him to "talk about that later" and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion, delaying the interrogation on his criminal activity until he was back in the proper stage of narcosis.

The procedure differed from therapeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting, the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick, mumbling, and disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduced by injecting more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.

The interrogation technique varied from case to case according to background information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patient's attitude under narcosis, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend, as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the amnesic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory and sense of self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the details of what he had "already described." When it was obvious that a subject was withholding the truth, his denials were quickly passed over and ignored, and the key questions would be reworded in a new approach.

Several patients revealed fantasies, fears, and delusions approaching delirium, much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. But sometimes there was no way for the examiner to distinguish truth from fantasy except by reference to other sources. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist, another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and yet another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased goods from the participants. Testimony concern-

"Truth" Drugs

ing dates and specific places was untrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. His veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had happened, the patient at times managed to conceal the truth unintentionally.

As the subject revived, he would become aware that he was being questioned about his secrets and, depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the degree of his disillusionment with the doctor, grow negativistic, hostile, or physically aggressive. Occasionally patients had to be forcibly restrained during this period to prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrogate. Some patients, moved by fierce and diffuse anger, the assumption that they had already been tricked into confessing, and a still limited sense of discretion, defiantly acknowledged their guilt and challenged the observer to "do something about it." As the excitement passed, some fell back on their original stories and others verified the confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 17 admitted the validity of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier accounts.

With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and Victoroff conclude that persistent, careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, but cannot eliminate them altogether.

At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a lie while under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yale²⁵ administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and professionals, who had previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective stories to cover them. In nearly every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the true story.

Under the influence of the drug, the subjects were cross-examined on their cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neu-

"Truth" Drugs

rotic individuals with strong unconscious self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both confessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth, confessing to offenses never actually committed.

In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants, most notably amphetamine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These drugs, used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates, produce an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories which has been of help in diagnosing mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention, unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel *et al.*⁷ maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptions. Once the drug takes hold, they say, an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand, says that this claim is extravagant, asserting without elaboration that the study lacked proper controls.¹³ It is evident that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics (tranquillizers), should be further explored.

Observations from Practice

J. M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation is of doubtful value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under the influence of barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in giving untruthful answers, or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathic personality, in particular, appears to resist successfully the influence of drugs.

MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who, having agreed to narco-interrogation, received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little or no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime, including burial of the body. Indeed he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From time to time he would request that more amytal be injected."²¹

"Truth" Drugs

MacDonald concludes that a person who gives false information prior to receiving drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of little value for revealing deceptions, and that they are more effective in releasing unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppressed information.

Another psychiatrist known for his work with criminals, L. Z. Freedman, gave sodium amytal to men accused of various civil and military antisocial acts. The subjects were mentally unstable, their conditions ranging from character disorders to neuroses and psychoses. The drug interviews proved psychiatrically beneficial to the patients, but Freedman found that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by their revelations. He was unable to say on the basis of the narco-interrogation whether a given act had or had not occurred. Like MacDonald, he found that psychopathic individuals can deny to the point of unconsciousness crimes that every objective sign indicates they have committed.¹⁰

F. G. Inbau, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, who has had considerable experience observing and participating in "truth" drug tests, claims that they are occasionally effective on persons who would have disclosed the truth anyway had they been properly interrogated, but that a person determined to lie will usually be able to continue the deception under drugs.

The two military psychiatrists who made the most extensive use of narcoanalysis during the war years, Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel, concluded that in almost all cases they could obtain from their patients essentially the same material and give them the same emotional release by therapy without the use of drugs, provided they had sufficient time.

The essence of these comments from professionals of long experience is that drugs provide rapid access to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubtful validity as empirical truth. The same psychological information and a less adulterated empirical truth can be obtained from fully conscious subjects through non-drug psychotherapy and skillful police interrogation.

"Truth" Drugs

Application to CI Interrogation

The almost total absence of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs and the spotty and anecdotal nature of psychiatric and police evidence require that extrapolations to intelligence operations be made with care. Still, enough is known about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the possibilities for their use in interrogations.

It should be clear from the foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniques of normal interrogation. In some respects, indeed, the demands on his skill will be increased by the baffling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced output. And the tendency against which he must guard in the interrogatee to give the responses that seem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened by drugs: the literature abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is extremely suggestible.

It seems possible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic state might be put to advantage in the case of a subject feigning ignorance of a language or some other skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton²⁰ found sodium amytal helpful in determining whether a foreign subject was merely pretending not to understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom of a profession he was trying to hide.

There is the further problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a resistance source. The accumulated knowledge about "truth" drug reaction has come largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confidence. The subject in narcoanalysis is usually motivated *a priori* to cooperate with the psychiatrist, either to obtain relief from mental suffering or to contribute to a scientific study. Even in police work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat may be dominant, a relationship of trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is administered by a medical man bound by a strict code of ethics; the suspect agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis in a desperate bid for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist, however apprehensively;

"Truth" Drugs

and finally, as Freedman and MacDonald have indicated, the police psychiatrist frequently deals with a "sick" criminal, and some order of patient-physician relationship necessarily evolves.

Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal" individuals in a hostile or genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a general sense of euphoria, ease and confidence, and they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness and communicability."¹⁹ Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narco-interrogation.

From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining the psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British narcoanalyst William Sargant recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response and abreaction.²¹ In the drunken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would communicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative, colleague, physician, immediate superior, or any other person to whom his background indicated he would be responsive.

Even when rapport is poor, however, there remains one facet of drug action eminently exploitable in interrogation—the fact that subjects emerge from narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal, even when they have not. As Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix, this psychological set provides a major opening for obtaining genuine confessions.

Technical Considerations

It would presumably be sometimes desirable that a resistant interrogatee be given the drug without his knowledge. For narcoanalysis the only method of administration used is

"Truth" Drugs

intravenous injection. The possibilities for covert or "silent" administration by this means would be severely limited except in a hospital setting, where any pretext for intravenous injection, from glucose feeding to anesthetic procedure, could be used to cover it. Sodium amytal can be given orally, and the taste can be hidden in chocolate syrup, for example, but there is no good information on what dosages can be masked. Moreover, although the drug might be introduced thus without detection, it would be difficult to achieve and maintain the proper dose using the oral route.

Administering a sterile injection is a procedure shortly mastered, and in fact the technical skills of intravenous injection are taught to nurses and hospital corpsmen as a matter of routine. But it should be apparent that there is more to narcotizing than the injection of the correct amount of sodium amytal or pentothal sodium. Administering drugs and knowing when a subject is "under" require clinical judgment. Knowing what to expect and how to react appropriately to the unexpected takes both technical and clinical skill. The process calls for qualified medical personnel, and sober reflection on the depths of barbituric anesthesia will confirm that it would not be enough merely to have access to a local physician.

Possible Variations

In studies by Beecher and his associates,³⁻⁶ one-third to one-half the individuals tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals most likely to react to placebos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The non-reactors are those clinically

A14

"Truth" Drugs

more rigid and with better than average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-reactors have been found.

Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and post-hypnotic suggestion: hypnosis could presumably prevent any recollection of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against his will or unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation,²³ asserts that it is doubtful, despite many apparent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced in resistant subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotize a subject unaware, but this would require a positive relationship with the hypnotist not likely to be found in the interrogation setting.

In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved through hypnotic trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.

Defensive Measures

There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of this, the best defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that on emerging from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how much he has revealed he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.

The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become positive features of the defense posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is intoxicated, wavering between deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is garbled and irrational, the amount of output drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the in-

A15

"Truth" Drugs

terrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.

Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be to undergo a "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs, and this familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligence service, the trial exposure of a particular operative to drugs might provide a rough benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in narcosis.

There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction intentionally or accidentally induced by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with prolonged use, and the barbiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subjects received large doses of barbiturates over a period of months. Upon removal of the drug, they experienced acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every respect like chronic alcoholics.

Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little likelihood that they would be administered regularly over a prolonged period, barbiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary service were intent on creating addiction in order to exploit withdrawal, it would have other, more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptoms.

The hallucinatory and psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline, marihuana, LSD-25, and mescaline are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic interrogation. These drugs distort the perception and interpretation of the sensory input to the central nervous system and affect vision, audition, smell, the sensation of the size of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and LSD-25 have been used to create experimental "psychotic states," and in a minor way as aids in psychotherapy.

Since information obtained from a person in a psychotic drug state would be unrealistic, bizarre, and extremely diffi-

"Truth" Drugs

cult to assess, the self-administration of LSD-25, which is effective in minute dosages, might in special circumstances offer an operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceivably, on the other hand, an adversary service could use such drugs to produce anxiety or terror in medically unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from actual insanity. An enlightened operative could not be thus frightened, however, knowing that the effect of these hallucinogenic agents is transient in normal individuals.

Most broadly, there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and that anyone who can withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do so in narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus appear to lie within the individual.

Conclusions

The salient points that emerge from this discussion are the following. No such magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by disrupting defensive patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, but even under the best conditions they will elicit an output contaminated by deception, fantasy, garbled speech, etc. A major vulnerability they produce in the subject is a tendency to believe he has revealed more than he has. It is possible, however, for both normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation; it seems likely that any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of the process and its limitations. There is an acute need for controlled experimental studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants but also to stimulants and to combinations of depressants, stimulants, and ataraxics.

REFERENCES

1. Adams, E. Barbiturates. *Sci. Am.*, Jan. 1958, 198(1), 60-64.
2. Barkham, J. Truth Drugs: The new crime solver. *Coronet*, Jan. 1951, 29, 72-76.
3. Beecher, H. K. Anesthesia. *Sci. Am.*, Jan. 1957, 198, p. 70.
4. Beecher, H. K. Appraisal of drugs intended to alter subjective responses, symptoms. *J. Amer. Med. Assn.*, 1955, 158, 399-401.

"Truth" Drugs

5. Beecher, H. K. Evidence for increased effectiveness of placebos with increased stress. *Amer. J. Physiol.*, 1956, 187, 163-169.
6. Beecher, H. K. Experimental pharmacology and measurement of the subjective response. *Science*, 1953, 116, 157-162.
7. Brussel, J. A., Wilson, D. C., Jr., & Shankel, L. W. The use of methedrine in psychiatric practice. *Psychiat. Quart.*, 1954, 28, 381-394.
8. Delay, J. Pharmacologic explorations of the personality: narcoanalysis and "methedrine" shock. *Proc. Roy. Soc. Med.*, 1949, 42, 492-496.
9. deRopp, R. S. *Drugs and the Mind*. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1960.
10. Freedman, L. Z. "Truth" drugs. *Sci. Am.*, March 1960, 145-154.
11. Gels, G. In scopolamine veritas. The early history of drug-induced statements. *J. of Crim. Law, Criminol. & Pol. Sci.*, Nov.-Dec. 1959, 50(4), 347-356.
12. Gerson, M. J., & Victoroff, V. Experimental investigation into the validity of confessions obtained under sodium amytal narcosis. *J. Clin. and Exp. Psychopath.*, 1948, 9, 359-375.
13. Gottschalk, L. A. The use of drugs in information-seeking interviews. *Technical report #2, ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18(600) 1797*. Dec. 1958. Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.
14. House, R. E. The use of scopolamine in criminology. *Texas St. J. of Med.*, 1922, 18, 259.
15. Houston, F. A preliminary investigation into abreaction comparing methedrine and sodium amytal with other methods. *J. ment. Sci.*, 1952, 98, 707-710.
16. Inbau, F. G. *Self-incrimination*. Springfield: C. C. Thomas, 1950.
17. Kidd, W. R. *Police interrogation*. 1940.
18. Legal dose of truth. *Newsweek*, Feb. 23, 1959, 28.
19. Lindemann, E. Psychological changes in normal and abnormal individuals under the influence of sodium amytal. *Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1932, 11, 1083-1091.
20. Lipton, E. L. The amytal interview. A review. *Amer. Practit. Digest Treat.*, 1950, 1, 148-163.
21. MacDonald, J. M. Narcoanalysis and criminal law. *Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1954, 111, 283-288.
22. Morris, D. P. Intravenous barbiturates: an aid in the diagnosis and treatment of conversion hysteria and malingering. *Mil. Surg.*, 1945, 96, 509-513.
23. Orne, M. T. The potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation. An evaluation. *ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18(600) 1797*, Dec. 1958. Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.
24. Pelikan, E. W., & Kensler, C. J. Sedatives: Their pharmacology and uses. Reprint from *The Medical Clinics of North America*. W.B. Saunders Company, Sept. 1958.
25. Redlich, F. C., Ravitz, L. J., & Dession, G. H. Narcoanalysis and truth. *Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 1951, 107, 586-593.

A18

"Truth" Drugs

26. Rolin, J. *Police Drugs*. Translated by L. J. Bendit. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
27. Sargant, W., & Slater, E. *Physical methods of treatment in psychiatry*. (3rd ed.) Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1954.
28. Snider, R. S. Cerebellum. *Sci. Am.*, Aug. 1958, 84.
29. Uhr, L., & Miller, L. G. (eds.). *Drugs and Behavior*. New York-London: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960.

A19

Legal grounds for holding another nation's agents not personally liable for their directed violation of a nation's laws.

IMPUNITY OF AGENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

International rules and institutions have existed from the earliest days, but it was not until the nineteenth century that there were developed the foundations between European states which form our present-day international law. The Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of modern states representing great concentrations of military and political power led to the development of the rules by which nations sought to govern one another. At the same time the concept of a power constituting the sole source of international law and with it an explanation of the concept of sovereignty.

The rules of international law and sovereignty in a sense limit each other; and the treatment of crimes like espionage and international law is confronted with what Philip C. Jessup calls the "taboo of absolute sovereignty." The international law is jealous of its power to punish those who would undermine its authority, and the principle of international law can apply in matters affecting the internal affairs only at the discretion of that state. Emerich de Vattel, whose book *Le Droit de la Guerre* had a great influence on American political philosophy, was one of the early writers in international law who stressed that nations "put up with certain things although they are not worthy of condemnation, because they are necessary by force without transgressing the liberal principles of international relations and thus destroying the foundation of society." Vattel was particularly concerned with the rights, duties, and responsibilities of nations in times of stress.

¹ *Law of Nations*. Fenwick, Trans. (Washington: American Association of Washington, 1916.)

MORI/HRP A21-A34

Impunity of Agents

Principles of National Jurisdiction

The concept of sovereignty carries along with it the rule that the laws of a country are supreme within its own territorial limits. Consequently, generally speaking, whether a particular act constitutes a crime is determined by the laws of the country within whose borders it was committed. In extension of this *territorial* principle for determining national jurisdiction, however, there have been developed, in accordance with the varying experience of individual nations, at least four other pragmatic principles which a state may choose to follow in determining whether it can try a person criminally for acts committed in violation of its laws. A *nationality* principle would determine jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the person committing the offense, so that his own state would try him under its law. Under a *protection* principle, jurisdiction would go to the state whose national interest was injured by the offense, wherever it was committed. A *passive personality* principle would similarly determine jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the *person* injured. And a *universality* principle, finally, would give it to the state having custody of the offender.² In any case, however, a state may claim jurisdiction only with respect to an act or omission which is made an offense by its own laws.

The principle of *territorial* competence is basic in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it has been incorporated in many other modern state codes. Its basis is the sovereign, which has the strongest interest, the best facilities, and the most powerful instruments for repressing crimes in its territory, by whomever committed. It is obvious that under the territorial principle the sovereign must exercise exclusive control over the acts of persons within its territory; there is no question of its right of jurisdiction to punish acts that constitute a threat to its authority.

The concept of sovereignty is so strong, however, that it may also, in the *protective* principle of jurisdiction, push beyond state borders with power to try persons outside engaging in acts against the security, territorial integrity, or po-

² Research in International Law Supplement to the *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 29 (1935).

Impunity of Agents

litical independence of the state. This principle was formulated in statutes of the Italian city-states in the 15th and 16th centuries, and many modern states apply it to both aliens and citizens. Conflicts arise, of course, where the prohibited acts are carried on in another state in which such acts are not illegal. Without agreement, it is difficult to see how the protective theory can be effective in such cases without an infringement of the sovereignty of the second state.

In the United States, the rule seems to be that the protective principle is not applied unless the legislation designating the crimes so specifies. In the Soviet Union, espionage cases apparently do fall under the protective theory of jurisdiction. In the October 1960 *International Affairs*, G. Zhukov wrote:

It should be noted that American plans of space espionage directed against the security of the USSR and other Socialist countries are incompatible with the generally recognized principles and rules of international law, designed to protect the security of states against encroachments from outside, including outer space.

This position would give the USSR (and other Bloc countries) jurisdiction over espionage offenses against them, no matter where perpetrated.

Scope of Immunities

On the other hand, the USSR has, in effect, recognized the immunity of American military attachés within its territory by not prosecuting the charges of espionage leveled against them. It thus honors the provisions of international law and agreement whereby officers, diplomatic representatives, consuls, armed forces, ships, aircraft, and other persons and instrumentalities of a state may be immune from the exercise of another state's jurisdiction even under the territorial principle and consequently not subject to legal penalties.³

While diplomatic immunity as applied to embassy officials is universally accepted, the question of what persons outside

³ "Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development Under International Law and Application in United States Practice," by William Barnes. Department of State Bulletin, 1 August 1960.

Impunity of Agents

Impunity of Agents

this category can claim a similar immunity becomes more difficult. There is nevertheless some authority in international law for the proposition that if a man is a duly commissioned agent of his government, albeit without diplomatic immunity, any illegal acts he performs within the scope of his duties may still be considered not his personal violations but his government's national acts, raising questions public and political between independent nations. Under this theory the offended nation ought not try the individual before ordinary tribunals under its own laws but should seek redress according to the law of nations.⁴

This theory and variations of it have found acceptance in a number of situations. For example, in the Claims Convention between France and Mexico of 25 September 1924, Mexico assumed liability for certain acts of its revolutionary forces, accepting the even broader principle that the "responsibility of the State exists whether its organs acted in conformance with or contrary to law or to the order of a superior authority."⁵ The applicability of the theory in any particular case depends, of course, not only on its being accepted by the offended nation but also on an acknowledgment by the offending nation that the offender is in fact its commissioned agent, that it authorized or now adopts his acts as its public acts. For this reason texts on international law have denied its application to the acts of secret political agents and spies:

... An agent ... secretly sent abroad for political purposes without a letter of recommendation, and therefore without being formally admitted by the Government of the State in which he is fulfilling his task ... has no recognized position whatever according to International Law. He is not an agent of a State for its relations with other States, and he is therefore in the same position as any other foreign individual living within the boundaries of a State. He may be expelled at any moment if he becomes troublesome, and he may be criminally punished if he commits a political or ordinary crime. ...

Spies are secret agents of a State sent abroad for the purpose of obtaining clandestinely information in regard to military or political secrets. Although all States constantly or occasionally send spies

abroad, and although it is not considered wrong morally, politically, or legally to do so, such agents have, of course, no recognized position whatever according to International Law, since they are not agents of States for their international relations. Every State punishes them severely when they are caught committing an act which is a crime by the law of the land, or expels them if they cannot be punished. A spy cannot legally excuse himself by pleading that he only executed the orders of his Government, and the latter will never interfere, since it cannot officially confess to having commissioned a spy.⁶

Nevertheless governments do sometimes officially confess to having commissioned their clandestine agents and do interfere in their prosecution under the law of the offended land. Although the several historical cases on record have not afforded a fully adequate test of this ground for claiming personal impunity they do include some in which the offended nation has accepted it. In three cases the United States has been involved.

Paramilitary Raid

During the 1837 insurrection in Canada the rebels obtained recruits and supplies from the United States. A small steamer, the *Caroline*, was used for this purpose by a group encamped on the American side of the Niagara River. On 29 December 1837, while moored at Schlosser, on the American side, with 33 American citizens on board, this steamer was boarded by an armed body of men from the Canadian side under the orders of a British officer. They attacked the occupants, wounding several and killing at least one American, and then fired the steamer and set her adrift over Niagara Falls. The United States protested. The British Government replied that the piratical character of the *Caroline* was established, that American laws were not being enforced along the border, and that destruction of the steamer was an act of necessary self-defense.

In November 1840 British citizen Alexander McLeod was arrested by New York State authorities on a charge of murder.

⁴ Secretary of State Webster to Attorney General Crittenden, 15 March 1841. See 2 Moore International Law Digest 26 (1906).

⁵ Hackworth 557 (1943).

⁶ H. Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law* (Longman's, 7th ed., 1948), Vol. I, pp. 770, 772.

Impunity of Agents

der in connection with the Caroline affair. On 13 December 1840 Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington, asked on his own responsibility for McLeod's immediate release, on the ground that the destruction of the *Caroline* was a "public act of persons in Her Majesty's service, obeying the order of their superior authorities," which could, therefore, "only be made the subject of discussion between the two national Governments" and could "not justly be made the ground of legal proceedings in the United States against the persons concerned." On 28 December 1840 the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Forsythe, replied that no warrant for interposition in the New York State case could be found in the powers with which the Federal Executive was invested, and he also denied that the British demand was well founded.

When on 12 March 1841, however, Mr. Fox presented the British Government's official and formal demand for McLeod's release on the same grounds, Daniel Webster, who had meanwhile become Secretary of State, wrote to the Attorney General communicating the President's instructions and laying down the following principle:

That an individual forming part of a public force, and acting under the authority of his Government, is not to be held answerable, as a private trespasser or malefactor, is a principle of public law sanctioned by the usages of all civilized nations, and which the Government of the United States has no inclination to dispute.

Webster answered the British on 24 April, admitting the grounds of the demand, but stating that the Federal Government was unable to comply with it. He apparently believed, however, that the British action would give New York State cause to exempt McLeod from prosecution. McLeod brought a habeas corpus proceeding, but his discharge was refused by the New York court. He was brought to trial on the murder charge and acquitted. In a final note to Lord Ashburton disposing of the Caroline matter, Mr. Webster wrote:

This Government has admitted, that for an act committed by the command of his Sovereign, *jure belli*, an individual cannot be responsible in the ordinary Courts of another State. It would regard it as a high indignity if a citizen of its own, acting under its

Impunity of Agents

authority and by its special command in such cases, were held to answer in a municipal tribunal, and to undergo punishment, as if the behest of his government were no defense or protection to him.⁷

Confidential Factfinder, No Spy

On 18 June 1849 Secretary of State Clayton issued to Mr. A. Dudley Mann, who was then in Europe, instructions for a mission it was desired he undertake as a special and confidential agent "to obtain minute and reliable information in regard to Hungary," then in revolt against the Austrian Imperial Government. Mr. Mann proceeded to Vienna, where he found the revolution practically quelled, and therefore did not visit Hungary. The text of his instructions, however, was made public in 1850 when President Taylor released it to the U.S. Senate in response to a Senate resolution. The Austrian chargé d'affaires in Washington, Mr. Hulsemann, then entered an official protest, declaring:

Those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of sending Mr. Dudley Mann on such an errand, should, independent of considerations of propriety, have borne in mind that they were exposing their emissary to be treated as a spy. It is to be regretted that the American Government was not better informed as to the actual resources of Austria and her historical perseverance in defending her just rights. . . the Imperial Government totally disapproves, and will always continue to disapprove, of those proceedings, so offensive to the laws of propriety; and that it protests against all interference in the internal affairs of its Government.

Mr. Webster, by now again Secretary, replied:

. . . the American Government sought for nothing but the truth; it desired to learn the facts through a reliable channel. It so happened, in the chances and vicissitudes of human affairs, that the result was adverse to the Hungarian revolution. The American agent, as was stated in his instructions to be not unlikely, found the

⁷The texts of the early diplomatic communications regarding the Caroline affair and the McLeod case can be found in the report on *People v. McLeod*, 25 Wend 482 (N.Y. 1841). Others can be found in British and Foreign State Papers 1841-1842, volume 30. 2 Moore 24 (1906) contains a complete summary of the affair. So does "The Caroline and McLeod Cases" by P. Y. Jennings, appearing in 32 Am. Jr. Int. Law 82 (1938). The latter also contains information on the aftermath of the case in which McLeod sought reimbursement from a Claims Commission. A learned critique by Judge Talmadge of the decision in *People v. McLeod* is found in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (N.Y. 1842). Text-books such as BISHOP p. 584 (1953) and 1 HYDE 239 (2d Edition 1931) give summaries of the affair.

Impunity of Agents

condition of Hungarian affairs less prosperous than it had been, or had been believed to be. He did not enter Hungary nor hold any direct communication with her revolutionary leaders. He reported against the recognition of her independence because he found she had been unable to set up a firm and stable government. He carefully forebore, as his instructions require, to give publicity to his mission, and the undersigned supposes that the Austrian Government first learned its existence from the communications of the President to the Senate.

Mr. Hulsemann will observe from this statement that Mr. Mann's mission was wholly unobjectionable, and strictly within the rule of the law of nations, and the duty of the United States as a neutral power. He will accordingly feel how little foundation there is for his remark that "those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of sending Mr. Dudley Mann on such an errand, should, independent of considerations of propriety, have borne in mind that they were exposing their emissary to be treated as a spy." A spy is a person sent by one belligerent to gain secret information of the forces and defenses of the other, to be used for hostile purposes. According to practice, he may use deception, under the penalty of being lawfully hanged if detected. To give this odious name and character to a confidential agent of a neutral power, bearing the commission of his country, and sent for a purpose fully warranted by the law of nations, is not only to abuse language, but also to confound all just ideas, and to announce the wildest and most extravagant notions, such as certainly were not to have been expected in a grave diplomatic paper; and the President directs the undersigned to say to Mr. Hulsemann that the American Government would regard such an imputation upon it by the cabinet of Austria, as that it employs spies, and that in a quarrel none of its own, as distinctly offensive, if it did not presume, as it is willing to presume, that the word used in the original German was not of equivalent meaning with "spy" in the English language, or that in some other way the employment of such an opprobrious term may be explained. Had the Imperial Government of Austria subjected Mr. Mann to the treatment of a spy, it would have placed itself without the pale of civilization, and the cabinet of Vienna may be assured that if it had carried, or attempted to carry, any such lawless purpose into effect in the case of an authorized agent of this Government the spirit of the people of this country would have demanded immediate hostilities to be waged by the utmost exertion of the power of the Republic—military and naval.*

German Saboteur

Werner Horn, a German, was indicted in the Federal District of Massachusetts for unlawfully transporting explosives early in World War I from New York to Vanceboro, Maine.

* 1 Moore 218 (1906)

Impunity of Agents

Horn claimed immunity from trial upon the indictment in a petition for habeas corpus. His contention, which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit called "without precedent," was as follows:

That your petitioner is an officer in the army of the empire of Germany, to wit, a first lieutenant in the division of the aforesaid army known as the Landwehr; that a state of war exists between the empires of Great Britain and Germany, which state of war has been recognized by the President of the United States in an official proclamation; that your petitioner is accused of destroying part of the international bridge in the township of McAdam, province of New Brunswick and Dominion of Canada; that he is now held in custody by the respondent on the charge of carrying explosives illegally, which allegation, if true, is inseparably connected with the destruction of said bridge; that he is a subject and citizen of the empire of Germany and domiciled therein, and is being held in custody for the aforesaid act, which was done under his right, title, authority, privilege, protection, and exemption claimed under his commission as said officer as described aforesaid.

Claiming thus that the felony for which he was indicted was incidental to an act of war cognizable only by the law of nations, Horn quoted Webster's statement in the Caroline affair: "That an individual forming part of a public force, and acting under the authority of his government, is not to be held answerable as a private trespasser or malefactor, is a principle of public law sanctioned by the usages of all civilized nations, and which the Government of the United States has no inclination to dispute." The Circuit Court did not dispute the principle, but, noting that "this exemption of the individual is on the ground that his act was a national act of his sovereign," held that the petition failed "entirely to show either express or implied national authority for doing the acts charged in the indictment; therefore no question of international law is involved, and the District Court has full jurisdiction to proceed to trial of the indictment found by its grand jury."

European Cases

In 1887 the German Government arrested and put on trial one Schnaebeler, a French customs inspector who had operated

* Horn v. Mitchell, 232 F. 819 (1st Cir., 1916). Affirmed on other grounds 243 US 247 (1917).

Impunity of Agents

a network of secret agents in Germany. The arrest was made during an official visit he paid to Germany to hold a customs conference. In the course of his interrogation he admitted that he had been inciting German nationals to treason. The French Government intervened on the grounds that Schnaebele enjoyed extraterritorial protection during his visit to Germany. These grounds, which obviated any need for French acknowledgment of his commission as a subversive agent, were apparently considered sufficient: Bismarck ordered Schnaebele released.¹⁰

In the 1920's the Italian secret service, using Italian agents in Switzerland, lured one Cesare Rossi from his Swiss hotel room to the Italian enclave at Campione, where he was arrested and taken to Italy. The Swiss Government protested these "acts attributable to the authorities of another state" which "not only violate national dignity but which also cause a state of unrest and suspicion . . ." It is not known whether the Italian authorities acknowledged such an attribution of their agents' acts in the diplomatic talks which followed, but the affair was settled in de facto accordance with the principle of agent impunity: on 21 November 1928 the Swiss Government announced that it considered the matter closed, since the Italian official involved in illegal intelligence activities had left Switzerland and two Italian nationals who had illegally relayed information had been deported.¹¹

In Sweden there is apparently a trend toward the rule that if an apprehended agent is acknowledged by his government to have been acting under orders he cannot be brought to trial in the apprehending country; his illegal acts become a matter for diplomatic discussion between the two governments. A case since World War II on which details are not available was disposed of in this way by a Swedish court.¹²

War and "Imperfect" War

None of these cases offers a precise precedent for one in which a peacetime espionage agent is apprehended by the target country and then released to his government upon its

¹⁰ Johannes Erasmus, *The Intelligence Service* (Institute of International Law, Goettingen University, 1952), p. 55.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹² Believed to be documented in Rytts Juidiskt Arkiv No. 15, 1946.

Impunity of Agents

acknowledgment of his commission. In those that are otherwise quite close, war is an element in the circumstances, with the offended nation often a third party. Webster's final note on the Caroline affair specifically cited *ius belli*. The blamelessness of the mere instruments of a government waging however unjust a war is well recognized. Vattel wrote:

But as to the reparation of any damage—are the military, the general officers and soldiers, obliged, in consequence, to repair the injuries they have done, not of their own will, but as instruments in the hands of their sovereign? It is the duty of subjects to suppose the orders of their sovereign just and wise . . . When, therefore, they have lent their assistance in a war which is afterwards found to be unjust, the sovereign alone is guilty. He alone is bound to repair the injuries. The subjects, and in particular the military, are innocent; they have acted only from a necessary obedience.¹³

Yet there appears to be a similarity between the wartime situation in which a uniformed member of a force gathering information behind enemy lines, when captured, is treated as a prisoner of war rather than executed for spying and the peacetime situation of an intelligence agent whose acts are acknowledged and adopted by the sending state. In both the agent is a mere instrument of the state. The basis for the traditional practice of holding the agent personally responsible seems to be the clandestine nature of his acts. When these are adopted by the sending state they are no longer clandestine, and the ultimate responsibility is fixed.

As for *ius belli*, texts on international law recognize that no clean-cut distinction can be made between war and peace in this respect. A contemporary authority cites some of the older texts for the proposition that:

If a country feels that it is being threatened by the unlawful conduct of another country—such as perhaps by preparations for aggression—that country should be free to protect itself against such a threat with the help of defensive measures. This includes the employment of agents for the purpose of determining enemy intentions.¹⁴

¹³ 3 Vattel, Section 187.

¹⁴ Erasmus, *op. cit.*, p. 115, footnote 120, citing Heffter-Geffcken (p. 495), Venselow (p. 227), Vattel (pp. 598 and 607), and Rogge, *Nationale Friedens-Politik* (p. 596).

Impunity of Agents

The older texts point out various types of hostile acts short of formal war that a sovereign might commission his subjects to perform.¹⁵ Judge Rutherford says:

If one nation seizes the goods of another nation by force, upon account of some damage, etc., such contentions by force are reprisals. There may be likewise other acts of hostility between two nations which do not properly come under the name of reprisals, such as the besieging of each other's towns, or the sinking of each other's fleets, whilst the nations in other respects are at peace with each other. These are public wars, because nations are the contending parties. But as they are confined to some particular object, they are of the imperfect sort . . ."

Vattel commented that:

A war lawful and in form, is carefully to be distinguished from an unlawful war entered on without any form, or rather from those incursions which are committed either without lawful authority or apparent cause, as likewise without formalities, and only for havoc and pillage.¹⁶

He indicated that all hostile acts were lawful wars, if made with lawful authority and apparent cause, and "not for pillage and havoc." This rule had its application in admiralty cases. Justice Story stated:

Every hostile attack of a piratical nature in times of peace, is not necessarily piratical. It may be by mistake, or in necessary self-defense, or to repel a supposed meditated attack by pirates—it may be justifiable, and then no blame attaches to the act; or, it may be without just excuse, and then it carries responsibility in damages. If it proceed further; if it be an attack from revenge and malignity, from gross abuse of power and settled purpose of mischief, it then assumes the character of a private unauthorized war, and may be punished by all the penalties which the law of nations can properly administer.¹⁷

¹⁵ Judge Talmadge discusses this point in his learned critique of the decision in *People v. McLeod*, cited in footnote 7 above.

¹⁶ 2 Rutherford, Section 10, as cited in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (NY 1842).

¹⁷ 3 Vattel, Section 67.

¹⁸ The Marianna Flora. The Vice-Consul of Portugal, Claimant. 24 US (11 Wheat. 1, 41) 1 (1826); 6 L. Ed. 405, 414.

Impunity of Agents

These texts, therefore, in enunciating the principle of personal impunity, are not speaking of war only in terms of formal declared war, but including also hostile acts when otherwise peaceful conditions exist. As Rutherford points out:

In the less solemn kinds of war, what the members do who act under the particular direction and authority of their nation, is by the law of nations no personal crime in them; they cannot, therefore, be punished consistently with the law, for any act in which it considers them only as the instruments, and the nation as the agent."

A principle of international law which emerges from a study of the older texts might then be stated as follows. *Where an individual, under orders from his sovereign, commits a hostile act upon a foreign nation, this cannot be said to be a controversy between individuals, to be decided by a court under domestic law where there is a common judge and arbiter. This is a controversy between nations, who admit no judge except themselves.* While this rule arose during periods of historical development when concepts of hostilities and relations between nations were much more rudimentary than at present, the basic problems of the rights and responsibilities of nations were similar to what they are now. This principle has been recognized by the United States since the early days of the Republic. The third Attorney General of the United States, writing to the Secretary of State on 29 December 1797, declared:

It is well settled in the United States as in Great Britain, that a person acting under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is not amenable for what he does in pursuance of his commission to any judiciary tribunal of the United States."

Broader Considerations

We have not attempted in this discussion to take into account the broader implications of general international acceptance of a rule of law that the state is responsible for all the acts of a subject carried out pursuant to orders of the sovereign. It can easily be seen that a nation might demand

¹⁹ 2 Rutherford, Section 18, as cited in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (NY 1842).

²⁰ Quoted in 26 Wend Appendix 663 (NY 1842).

Impunity of Agents

limitations placed on the rule, and in many cases a nation might totally reject the rule for its purposes. Questions such as the following would have to be pondered by all nations. Could a murder committed pursuant to orders by an agent of a foreign nation be permitted to go unpunished if the foreign nation demanded his return? What would be the implications for a small nation if a strong nation flooded the country with illegal espionage agents acting under orders, and upon capture made a request for their return? Would war or the threat of war as an alternative to punishment act as a deterrent on the use of authorized confidential agents collecting information from foreign countries?

Some of these questions have been raised in the past and have moved many writers not to recognize the right of a sovereign to expect the return of an agent who pursuant to orders has committed an offense against another sovereign. We have not attempted to present here the opposing viewpoint of these writers or to discuss the limitations on the rule of personal impunity as it appears in international law. The purpose of this paper has been simply to explore the precedents and authorities in international law to determine if there is any basis for the proposition that a government has the right to the return of one of its officers who has been apprehended abroad for criminal acts committed pursuant to its orders. There is such a basis.

A wistful wartime offering from pigeon fanciers, accepted with indulgence by Allied intelligence, is vindicated by the enemy.

OPERATION COLUMBA

T. J. Betts

In early March 1944, when SHAEF staff in London was beginning to go all out with preparations for the June invasion of Normandy, we in G-2 were approached by a group of British pigeon fanciers determined to volunteer to intelligence the services of their pigeons. Their argument was simple: they bred carrier pigeons which were guaranteed to return to their owners' lofts; could we not use these birds in some way to bring information back from Europe?

Actually, carrier pigeons were already being used quite successfully as a link between the French Resistance and various intelligence headquarters in London. They had proved effective and valuable in supplementing the overtaxed and precarious radio links that were so hard to establish and so easy to blow. Thus the pigeon fanciers' idea was not novel. But we did not see how birds that would return to lofts scattered all over England would fit into systematic communication with resistance or espionage operations: checking up on our messages would keep us paging pigeons from one end of the UK to the other.

The best idea we could conjure up was a scatter-shot project. It was known that northwest France, Belgium, and Holland formed a region that was saturated with pigeon breeders. There might be some prospect of results if we dropped the offered pigeons by parachute at random in that region. They would be packaged in neatly crated pairs with an attached letter saying in effect: *These birds if released will return to England. If you are a pigeon breeder, hold them until you or your friends have something to tell us. If you don't keep pigeons, give them to someone who does and let him take it from there.* From the counterintelligence viewpoint the pro-

Operation Columba

posal seemed very safe, since carrier pigeons do not possess national characteristics, are resistant to interrogation, and once in a loft would be indistinguishable from local birds. The real question was whether any substantial number of recipients would have anything of significance to tell us.

Light Risk, Low Stakes, Little Return

As we weighed the potential of such an operation, we came more and more seriously to doubt that, while safe, relatively simple, and very cheap to mount in terms of energy expended, it would pay off at all appreciably in terms of information received. In other words, it came to a balance but the weights on each side of the scale were so slight that the whole thing looked insignificant. The project might therefore have been turned down but for the deciding weight cast in by the attitude of the pigeon fanciers. They were earnest, decent people, and their pigeons obviously represented their greatest treasure in a grim, war-torn world. They all tended to be thin; we suspected that they were sharing their scanty rations with their birds. Above all, we were conscious that they were seeking to give up their most dearly loved possessions in the Allied cause. You just can't say no to a high sacrifice offered in the hope that it will help. And it might pay off, after all: surprise jackpots had been hit in the past. So we adopted the scheme, dubbed, naturally, in a staff thickly laced with University dons, "Operation Columba."

The work-up of the plan was uncomplicated. The pigeon men provided neat standard travelling cases, each adapted to and containing two feathered tenants. The parachute designers, accustomed now to delivering anything by air from a jeep to the *Daily Mail*, quickly whipped up the necessary gear. The American and British Air Forces agreed without demur to drop our birds in the course of their regular night operations. G-2 contributed the letter, printed in French, Flemish, and Dutch, that was to find the pigeons friends and homes on the other side of the Channel.

Only two snags appeared. One was of apprehension. While the Air Force commanders and their staffs had been very cooperative, we were morally sure that opposition would spring up eventually at the pilot level. It was quite true that the operation involved no additional danger; the planes would drop

Operation Columba

the birds from normal flight altitudes and without having to pinpoint their targets. Nevertheless we could understand the natural feelings of the pilot who, keyed up to his best to deliver a massive load of destruction at great personal risk, would find himself sidetracked en route by Operation Columba. It was too much like stopping off at the supermarket on the way to your wedding. We knew, before the first pair of pigeons was dropped, that we could soon expect ungracious references to what might euphemistically be rendered "those fluttering birds." We realized thoroughly that a long life for Columba depended on getting early results.

The second hazard was brought out by the pigeon fanciers themselves. They told us something that most of us had never known and that had not greatly impressed those who at one time or another had had cognizance of it. It seemed that total war had included pigeon warfare earlier. When Britain had braced to meet invasion in 1940, fears had arisen that enemy agents in England might be using carrier pigeons as a means of secret communication with the Continent. As part of the counterespionage campaign it had therefore been decided to ban destruction of the predatory hawks, falcons, and kestrels nesting in the chalk cliffs along England's east coast. Now our men pointed out that the predators would not discriminate between patriotic British pigeons and treacherous Axis birds; please then would we have these enemies of the pigeon restored to their true status as vermin. Grumbles arose in G-2: was this a pro-intelligence or an anti-hawk project? Nevertheless we went ahead and had the predators declared free game. This wrapped up the operation, and in about a week after it had come to our attention the first pigeons were dropped behind enemy lines.

A week went by without a reaction. Then a second. Then a third. Comments on "those fluttering birds" began to bubble up to us through the chain of command. We also began to harden ourselves for the task of telling the pigeon men that their patriotism, devotion, and sacrifice had come to nothing. Then in the fourth week a delegation of the pigeon fanciers came up to see us. A bird, one bird, had returned! It had brought back a message. The message, to the effect that there were "lots of Germans around Lier," was however hardly news.

Operation Columba

While not substantively helpful, the return provided some encouragement; at least it would stave off the day of reckoning with our pigeoners. We reported the good news to the Air Forces, possibly with a little exaggeration of the information's importance, and asked for Columba's continuation. The airmen loyally obliged.

This general sequence was repeated as the pattern of the whole operation until it came to its natural end with the Normandy invasion. Every two weeks or so, just as our hope for the pigeons was at the vanishing point, in would come another vague, unenlightening message. In all, after the dispatch of hundreds of birds, five or six responses were recorded. None of them had material intelligence value.

Modest Jackpot by Accident

But that was not the whole story. As the pigeon dropping went on, we began to get indications of uneasiness among the German military government people in the Low Countries. They had picked up, of course, a few parachuted crates and so become aware of Operation Columba almost from its first implementation. They could not have been very anxious about it as an Allied source of information, but apparently they became outraged at their inability to control this physical penetration of their defenses. From underground sources we received reports of enemy fumings and proclamations, the latter ranging from paternal and advisory to minatory and vindictive.

Pigeon fanciers were warned against harboring strange birds. They were threatened with liquidation of their cotes in the event of detection. Later they were told that harboring of alien pigeons was espionage and carried with it the penalty of death by shooting. No one, apparently, was ever shot for this offense, nor so far as we could find out were any lofts destroyed (although healthy apprehensions may well have hastened some of the birds, stringy as they were, into the pot rather than into the cote). Our original calculation that there is nothing self-betraying about a pigeon in a loft seems to have held up: the Germans' intentions were probably lethal enough, but they just never caught anybody.

All this sound and fury, however, did have a fine subversive effect on the pigeon fanciers and their friends. These people,

Operation Columba

as we had already noted among their British colleagues, felt that a man's inalienable right to the pigeons of his choice was subject to no question. The stronger the German reaction, the more the pigeon men lined up with the Resistance. And as they perceived that the enemy was unable to identify violators and reluctant to resort to mass reprisals over such ridiculous things as pigeons, the curve of local effrontery and rebelliousness shot up. The whole affair became cumulative, and what had started out as a dubious intelligence operation developed into a serious contribution to the build-up of resistance.

Nor was even this all, we discovered after reentry into the Continent. As a matter of routine we had cleared Operation Columba in advance with the deception specialists. They had given us an almost perfunctory response to the effect that from their point of view they saw no harmful implications in the undertaking. But the Germans found implications. After they had picked up a few baskets of parachuted birds, their intelligence began a systematic plotting of the points of impact. It was not long before they could conclude that the drops were all falling north of the Somme River and the historic Amiens-Abbeville line. Now why was this? they asked themselves, and gave themselves a pregnant answer.

They might have reconstructed our thought that the pigeon-rich lowlands formed the safest and most logical area for the random dropping of carrier birds. But no; to them it was abundantly clear that this was only one more symptom of Allied interest in the Strait of Dover at its narrowest. Clearly we would try to cross the water hazard near Calais, just as any systematic professionals would, including themselves. They could not have regarded the pigeon-drop locations as primary evidence, but they came to accord them distinct value in confirmation of a theory that was already pretty well established. Thus Operation Columba made a small but significant unplanned contribution to the deception scheme that masked the Allies' intent to land in Normandy, well to the south and across the Seine from the Pas de Calais.

To sum up, then, this operation, undertaken as an inconsequential gamble with little expectation of returns was an intelligence failure; but

Operation Columba

a definite plus in contributing to the saturation of local enemy counterintelligence faculties and in building up opposition and resistance to the Germans; and a significant though minor element in the Allies' deception scheme.

Reflections

This story of an intelligence failure, attended in its planning and execution by doubts and annoyances, has in retrospect the virtue of being gently amusing. But if the debris is looked over dispassionately, certain typical and permanent values can also be found in it.

Columba was launched primarily in order to take some advantage of unused resources. Many, if not most, intelligence operations are similarly undertaken in terms of the means available rather than of the ends sought. The happy picture of the unerring intelligence officer laying out his essential elements of enemy information and then devising foolproof means to check them out is a much idealized depiction of the state of the art.

Operation Columba was very much like trying to catch minnows with a salmon net: the shiners all got away. Unfortunately most intelligence operations have this shortcoming in greater or less degree, because the devising and creation of intelligence means is usually a slow and rigid process. Either you have to tailor a particular activity to one precise end, a process which is expensive and time-consuming, or you have to resort to a standardized procedure that never quite fits the precise needs of the moment.

No intelligence operation is an island. In the case of Columba we owed our plusses in subversion and deception to this fact. It is equally easy to damage or blow another operation by the execution of a project that in itself is sound, safe, and reasonable. The danger zone, of course, extends beyond the area of intelligence: the adversary can often derive material profits from intelligence operations which we have effectively executed but which nevertheless give him leverages—military, economic, or political. The work of the intelligence planner is not done until he answers satisfactorily both questions: *what happens if I fail?* and *what happens when I succeed?*

Operation Columba

All this seems to point toward one major conclusion. If intelligence is a science, as we all hope it is, then it clearly belongs among the social sciences. This is not because its field and findings are often vague, as epitomized in Operation Columba. It is rather because its ultimate application is to man. We may search for statistics, for technical and technological characteristics, for the existence and capacities of such things as roads and bridges, but in the last analysis we are always trying to find out what some men are going to do with these data and these means. We may be forced to analyze all capabilities, but each such analysis is also a tacit confession that we are unable to work out exactly what the other fellow is doing or plans to do.

This is not to be construed as an assertion that precision is alien to intelligence. Fuzzy problems are usually those that demand the most rigorous approach. Thus the sociologists, like ourselves, have continual recourse to the electronic computer. Thus the economists, like ourselves, resort to the theory of games and other advanced studies in probabilities. Intelligence is indeed a product of disciplined and precise thought; but its techniques, mechanisms, and occasional incantations should not blind us to the fact that its ultimate objective is the searching penetration of the mind of man.

*Clandestine methods of the
Jesuits in Elizabethan England
as illustrated in an operative's
own classic account.*

ENGLISH MISSION

It is generally realized that the Jesuits of the renaissance were adept in the conduct of affairs requiring secrecy. But knowledge of the clandestine methods they used is not general, even among intelligence officers whose experience would give them a special appreciation of the subject. Considerable insight into these methods is offered in a priest's own narrative of his experiences operating underground in Elizabethan England. Written in Latin after his mission was completed, the book was made accessible to modern English readers ten years ago.¹ Its highlights can be quickly summarized.

In early November 1588, John Gerard, S. J., aged 24, acting under the direction of the Rome headquarters of the Society of Jesus, made with three other priests of the Society a clandestine entry into his native country. It was only a few months after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and the Queen's security agents were alert for strangers even in remote provinces. Landed near Norfolk in the dark of night, they found that every path they tried led to a farm house where dogs set up an alarm. They had to hide in a clump of trees and wait in the rain for daylight. At dawn each went his own way, according to immemorial usage in such circumstances.

Gerard's story describes, step by step, how he found Catholics to shelter him and enable him to reach London, where he reported to Fr. Garnet, the Superior on the English Mission, to begin his 18 years of undercover duty in England. Captured in 1594 and imprisoned for four years, he made a famous escape from the Tower of London and successfully resumed his clandestine activity. It was not until the exposure of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, which brought down upon

¹ John Gerard, *The Autobiography of an Elizabethan*, translated from the Latin by Philip Caraman. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1951.)

English Mission

the Jesuits the full crushing force of an aroused State and made the extermination of priests seem inevitable, that he was exfiltrated under diplomatic cover in the entourage of the Spanish Ambassador.

Gerard apparently put his story into writing for the guidance and benefit of trainees at a training and staging area in Belgium. Later he became Confessor to the English College in Rome, where he died at the age of 73. A study of his experiences, even at this remove in time, shows the primal and inevitable nature of certain methods required for successful clandestine action. Above all, it shows the ruling power of motivation. To see these fundamentals demonstrated in an unfamiliar cultural context renews one's sense of their force.

Tradecraft

Organization and line of authority in the Society were not complicated. The commanding officer was the General of the Society of Jesus, at Rome. Staff-wise, English affairs were taken care of on behalf of the General by Father Persons, an English Jesuit at headquarters. In the English College at Rome English recruits were trained for duty in their native country. The Superior on the English Mission resided under cover in England and reported directly to the General. Communications were maintained by means of couriers over whom a high degree of control was exercised through religious sanctions.

Although Gerard's book is not in any modern sense a tradecraft manual, it is possible to derive from it a confident sense of how he and his Superior made expert use of the standard paraphernalia of covert action—cover, aliases, safe houses, secret printing presses, invisible ink.

Gerard, having been brought up a member of the upper class, was able to maintain successfully the cover of a gentleman at leisure. He was the object of the candid envy of other priests because he was familiar with the technical language of falconry—a useful resource in idle conversation with laymen. He was a tall, dark man, "very gallant in apparel, and being attended with two men and footboy is exceedingly well horsed." When visiting the sick, he amended his cover to that of a doctor.

English Mission

The construction of hiding places, or what the security police called "priest holes," became a matter for experts. The skill of these "hides" specialists is shown in the fact that after a raid on a safe house or on a large manor house, followed by a close search lasting over a week, priests sometimes emerged faint and tottering from hideouts concealed between walls, under gables, or beneath fireplaces. An especially skilled carpenter called Little John died mute under torture rather than reveal the whereabouts of the hides he admitted having constructed.

On occasion it became necessary to provide clandestine burials for priests who had died on the English Mission. These were effected at night near a deserted monastery or ruined abbey.

Funds were obtained from the laity. Members of certain great Catholic families poured money into Gerard's coffers; he seems never to have lacked in this regard. He remarks on the expense of the various houses it was necessary for him and his Superior to maintain in London and in the country. He was able to offer annuities to persons in a position to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission: he granted a liberal one to a prison warder who had been of some service to him in the Tower.

Specialists in audiosurveillance and interrogation may note with particular interest the incident of a warder who, feigning friendship for an imprisoned priest, offered to show him how he might talk secretly "through a cleft in the wall" with the priest in an adjoining cell. The place was "purposely so contrived that the sound of their words must needs be carried to another place, not far off, where this keeper would stand and some other with him, to have a double witness in their double hearing."

The Jesuits themselves appear to have made use of counter-intelligence deception. After Gerard's escape from the Tower, the Government received a false report that he was about to go to Ireland. "Gerard hath been lately in London, and hath disguised himself with an artificial beard and periwig of a brown color, somewhat dark. His beard is very long, cut after the spade fashion, very even and formal." (When

English Mission

an Elizabethan spoke of a "very long" beard, he *meant* long, upwards of two feet.)

Prison

Gerard's basic instructions forbade him to meddle in political matters, and he professed loyalty to the Queen and to England. The question of whether a Catholic priest could be loyal to a Protestant government was the subject of much English dialectic, entailing as it did an ambiguity which the State found it increasingly difficult to live with. It was only after the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot, however, that the ambiguity became intolerable;² at the time of Gerard's arrest in the spring of 1594 the temper was still in some respects relaxed. Moreover, Gerard's connections with those in high places were good.

Refusing to disclose any information that would help the authorities in arresting others on the English Mission, he spent three years confined with other priests and Catholic laymen in the Clink, where the guards grew fat on regular bribes. In return for these payments the inmates were allowed facilities for saying mass, hearing confession, and receiving visitors. Needless to say, it was not money alone that made this possible; there was considerable popular feeling in favor of the old church. During this time in the Clink, and later in the Tower itself, Gerard successfully maintained clandestine correspondence with his Superior and others, including the "saintly and martyred widow" who kept his safe house, which was used even during his imprisonment to shelter young recruits for the English College until passage to the Continent could be arranged.

He continued operating thus under relatively slight handicaps until a certain priest who seemed "a little unsteady" and perhaps jealous of "all the people he saw coming to me" turned informer and told the authorities that Gerard received letters in the Clink from Rome and Brussels. "Two of the

²The atmosphere created by uncertainty as to what was treasonable is indicated in a passage from John Donne, who had a Catholic background and delayed for years his commitment to the Church of England. Donne is calling down a curse upon an enemy:

"May he dream of treason, and think to do it, and confess, and die, And no record tell why."

English Mission

Queen's pursuivants came without warning to my room with the head warder. Providentially they found no one with me except two boys—I was giving them instructions before sending them abroad." They found nothing but a hair shirt under Gerard's doublet, but he was taken to the Tower of London for safer keeping. His new warder went to the Clink to fetch a mattress from Gerard's friends and returned with money and instructions to treat him well.

Three days later, however, before the Lords Commissioners,³ when Gerard refused to disclose details relative to his foreign correspondence or the whereabouts of his Superior, a warrant for putting him to torture was produced. The Lords Commissioners begged him not to force them to such a loathsome measure. These formalities over, he was hung from his wrists, his feet dangling, for about 5 hours. This was to be repeated daily until he either confessed or died. The Commissioners left the room after it became apparent he would not speak.

He was eventually helped back to his cell.

On the way we met some prisoners who had the run of the Tower, and I turned to speak to my warder, intending them to overhear.

"What surprises me," I said, "is that the Commissioners want me to say where Father Garnet's house is . . . I will never do it, even if I have to die!"

I said this to prevent them spreading a report that I had confessed. I also wanted word to get around through these men that it was chiefly concerning Father Garnet that I had been questioned, so that he might get to hear and look to his own safety. The warder was not pleased at my talking in their hearing.

The message got through to Father Garnet. In a report to the General of the Society, written eight weeks later, Garnet says: "He [Gerard] hath been thrice hanged up by his hands until he was almost dead, and that twice in one day. The cause was for to tell where his Superior was . . ."

The authorities did not carry through to the end. Although Gerard was rendered physically helpless for a time, he seems to have largely recovered in the following months.

³Edward Coke and Francis Bacon were among them.

English Mission

He resumed his usual cell life, performing the Society's discipline, known as the Spiritual Exercises, and conducting his clandestine correspondence. He explains in some detail that he used orange juice instead of lemon or citron for invisible ink because once orange juice has been brought out with heat it stays out, whereas the other two fade away. Consequently the recipient of a letter written in orange juice will know whether or not it has been read. "If it has been read and contains something that compromises him, he can disown it." As a matter of routine, he never used true names in his letters.

Escape

Gerard's escape from the Tower exhibits good planning, teamwork, and a variety of clandestine techniques. In a small tower nearby there was a Catholic layman, John Arden, who had been in prison for ten years under sentence of death. He walked daily on the roof of his tower and eventually he and Gerard began to communicate by signs. The warder was coaxed and bribed to allow Gerard to visit Arden to say mass. He even sent his wife to get the things necessary for the sacrament from Gerard's assistant, John Lillie, in the city. With mobility thus established, Gerard observed that Arden's tower was quite close to the moat, "and I thought it might be possible for a man to lower himself with a rope from the roof on to the wall beyond the moat." Arden was eager and willing but had no outside help; Gerard had Lillie. He sought the permission of his Superior to make the try, and Father Garnet agreed to it provided the risk of life was not too great.

Then I asked John Lillie and Richard Fulwood (he was attending Father Garnet at the time) whether they were prepared to take the risk, and, if they were, to come on a certain night to the far side of the moat, opposite the squat tower I had described . . . They were to bring a rope with them and tie it to a stake; we would be on the roof of the tower and throw them an iron ball attached to a stout thread, the kind used in stitching up bales. They must listen in the darkness for the sound of the ball touching the ground, find the cord and tie it to the free end of the rope. This done, we would draw up the rope by pulling the other end of the cord which we held in our hands. I told them to pin a piece of white paper or a handkerchief on the front of their jackets, for we wanted to be sure of their identity before throwing the cord. Also, they were to bring a rowing boat so that we could make a quick get-away.

English Mission

The first attempt aborted because of unwitting intruders on the riverside. On the second attempt, which proceeded as planned, Gerard's physical condition was such that he almost collapsed while clinging to the rope; but it was successful. By daybreak he was with Father Garnet at a safe house in the country. He was careful to make arrangements to protect the illiterate warder of his cell from possible punishment. Although this man had refused a large bribe to let his prisoner walk out, he had for some months been willing to carry letters and to grant what he judged to be harmless favors. In return, Gerard arranged his flight to the house of a friend a hundred miles from London and gave him an annuity of 200 florins a year, which enabled him to live comfortably with his family.

Gerard had eight more years of undercover work in England. He was particularly successful with the old established families in the conservative counties. His physical endowment and social position, combined with his undoubted abilities and the aura of special interest arising from the perils he had endured and still faced, gave him an almost hypnotic influence over certain men and women and insured for his Society a ready source of shelter, hospitality, and money. In the course of his mission he sent at least 30 recruits to the Continent.

He was the only one to survive of the four priests who landed together in 1583. Two were executed in Fleet Street three years later; the third was active for a number of years before he gained, to use the language of the time, the crown of martyrdom. The Superior was executed in the aftermath of the Powder Plot, along with many others with whom he had worked.

Motivation

The purposes of a clandestine mission are basic to the motivation of its agents. For the Jesuits martyrdom was a glory, and their motivation was rooted in acceptance of this end. Although the ultimate aim of the English Mission, to return Canterbury to Rome, was not achieved, its operatives were regarded as accomplishing the mission when they were able to perform rites for those who otherwise would have been deprived of them, to make converts, to send recruits to the College, and above all to suffer martyrdom.

English Mission

A lay intelligence service must make do with a motivation less absolute than that afforded by religion. If the cogency of its purposes declines or the achievement of its avowed end becomes remote, it risks making the means the end. Then operations tend to be admired as demonstrations of technique, professionalism may become a fetish, and the mere apparatus of intelligence proliferates as results lose definition. The maintenance of an inspired service depends on the maintenance of an inspired policy for it to serve. In this sense, we get the motivation we deserve.

*A selection of the most broadly
informative books on intelli-
gence available in English.*

PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE

Unclassified writings on an activity so well protected from public inquiry as intelligence must necessarily show great deficiencies when assessed as material for professional reading. Some number of the thousands of books published in this field have professional value, to be sure, but many of these are devoted to recording the story of particular individuals or isolated episodes rather than to a study of the nature or the history of intelligence. The following bibliography has been selected from among books available in English that are the most broadly illuminating or at least serve to fill important gaps in the picture. Whether viewed as a symposium on intelligence methods or as a composite history of intelligence they are at many points grossly inadequate, but they do offer matter that should be part of the intelligence officer's basic equipment.

The selections fall into the following categories:

The Intelligence Process—theory, procedure, organization

Operational History:

From the earliest times up to World War II

Activities of the Western Allies in World War II

Organized resistance under the Nazis

German intelligence in World War II

The Soviet Services

Evading Capture and Escape from Imprisonment

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS— Theory, Procedure, Organization

Ladislav Farago, *WAR OF WITS: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence*. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1954. Pp. 379.)

The only comprehensive unclassified essay covering both the organization and procedures of world intelligence agencies and their activities in the espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and propaganda fields. Marred by theoretical crudities, factual inaccuracies, and uncritical

Basic Texts

journalism, it nevertheless is useful as a composite of the most important information on intelligence doctrine publicly available in 1954. With source citations and index.

[Available in translation as *Det Tysta Kriget* (Stockholm: Ljås Forlag, 1956), and *Les Secrets de l'Espionnage* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1955).]

Sherman Kent, *STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE for American World Policy*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1949. Pp. 226.)

Foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production, by the present Chairman of the Board of National Estimates. Lays down many principles which have since become established in practice.

[Available in translation as *Inteligencia Estratégica para la Política Mundial Norteamericana* (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, Biblioteca del Oficial, 1951), and in pirated Japanese and Chinese editions]

Harry Howe Ransom, *CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. 287.)

The best current account of the development, organization, and problems of the U.S. intelligence system, with particular attention to the production of national estimates. Includes a valuable bibliography.

Roger Hilsman, *STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS*. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1956. Pp. 187.)

An academic study of the theory of intelligence, with emphasis on its relation to policy. Valuable for its provocative thesis that policy is likely to go its own way in disregard of intelligence, while intelligence tends to turn scholar, gathering and piecing together facts for their own sake. The author has recently become director of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Washington Platt, *STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1957. Pp. 302.)

A study of intelligence production from the perspective of the working analyst, with an emphasis on useful tools and methods which makes it tend to treat social science methodology as something peculiar to intelligence. The author had experience in combat intelligence during World War II and in intelligence production thereafter.

Don Whitehead, *THE FBI STORY: A Report to the People*. (New York: Random House. 1956. Pp. 368.)

A laudatory account of FBI operations, both anticriminal and in the maintenance of internal security.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *The FBI Story* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1957); *Le F.B.I.* (Paris: Morgan, 1957); *Le Storia dello FBI* (Milan: Sugar Editore, 1958); *Historia del F.B.I.* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena, 1958).]

A52

Basic Texts

U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: A Report to the Congress*. (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. 76.)

The unclassified report of the intelligence task force of the second Hoover Commission, under the chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark. Considers problems of intelligence at the national and departmental levels, including those of personnel and security administration and functional organization.

[Also published as House Document No. 201, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955]

OPERATIONAL HISTORY

Through World War I

Richard Wilmer Rowan, *THE STORY OF SECRET SERVICE*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran. 1937. Pp. 732.)

The best comprehensive history of espionage and its practitioners from Bible days to the end of World War I. Often sketchy and sometimes overdramatized, the treatment is generally sound and at its best illuminated by perceptive reflections on the ways of human kind.

[Also available in a British edition, *The Story of Secret Service* (London: John Miles Ltd., 1938).]

John Bakeless, *TURNCOATS, TRAITORS AND HEROES*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1959. Pp. 406.)

The most nearly complete account of espionage in the American Revolution, covering—in an impossible attempt at encyclopedic narrative—both sides' activities on the American continent. The author has had extensive military intelligence experience.

Philip Van Doren Stern, *SECRET MISSIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR*. (New York: Rand McNally. 1959. Pp. 320.)

Integrated and annotated anthology of the best accounts of clandestine operations undertaken by both North and South during the American Civil War.

Admiral Sir William James, *THE CODE BREAKERS OF ROOM 40: The Story of Admiral Sir William Hall, Genius of British Counter-Intelligence*. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1956. Pp. 212.)

Biography of Britain's Director of Naval Intelligence during World War I, by the officer in charge of communications intelligence. Centers on the decipherment of German messages, including the notorious Zimmermann telegram.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *The Eyes of the Navy* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1956). For other reading on this subject, see Chapter IX, "Secret Intelligence—1917-1919," in *The Sky Was Always Blue*, by Admiral Sir William James (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1951); *The Man of Room 40*, by A. W. Ewing (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1940);

A53

Basic Texts

40 O.B., by Hugh Cleland Hoy (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1932); and *The Zimmermann Telegram*, by Barbara W. Tuckman (New York: Viking, 1958)]

Herbert Osborn Yardley, *THE AMERICAN BLACK CHAMBER*. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1931. Pp. 375.)

Querulous history of the first modern U.S. organization for communications intelligence, by its founder and director during World War I and through the twenties.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Secret Service in America* (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1940); *Le Cabinet Noir Américain* (Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1935); *Amerikas Svarta Kam-mare* (Stockholm: Tidens Forlag, 1938)]

The Western Allies in World War II

Constance Babington-Smith, *AIR SPY: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II*. (New York: Harper, 1957. Pp. 266.)

Description by a leading RAF photo interpreter of the development of photo intelligence techniques first by British and then by Allied personnel and their use in the European theater. Shows the role of air photography in planning the D-Day landings, in bombing and damage assessment, in industrial analysis, and in learning the secrets of German countermeasures, radar, and the new "V" weapons.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *Evidence in Camera* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1958)]

Even Edward Samuel Montagu, *THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1954. Pp. 160.)

Account of a classic British hoax which misled the Germans about the coming Allied invasion of Sicily. The body of a Marine officer was floated onto a beach in southern Spain with secret documents indicating that Greece would be the point of invasion. Illustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documentation, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions. The author was in charge of this operation.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *The Man Who Never Was* (London, Evans Brothers, 1953); *De Man Die Niet Bestond* (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1954); *L'Homme Qui N'Existait Pas* (Paris: Juillard, 1954); *Mies Jota Ei Ollutkaan* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1954). For further study see: Ian Colvin, *The Unknown Courier* (London: William Kimber, 1953); and Sir Alfred Duff Cooper, *Operation Heartbreak* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), a fictionalized version of the operation]]

Richard Collier, *TEN THOUSAND EYES*. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958. Pp. 320.)

Probably the best English-language account of the Resistance agent networks in France which under the direction of Free French Head-

Basic Texts

quarters in London secured information on the beach and inland defenses of Hitler's Atlantic Wall.

[Available in foreign editions: *Ten Thousand Eyes* (London: Collins, 1958); *La Guerre Secrète du Mur de l'Atlantique* (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1958); *Tiendinsend Ogen* (Hoorn: U.-M. "West Friesland," 1958)]

Philip John Stead, *SECOND BUREAU*. (London: Evans Bros., 1959. Pp. 212.)

Wartime history of the regular French military intelligence service, comprising the Deuxième Bureau and its supporting organizations for clandestine collection and counterespionage. Based on French-language accounts and on conversations with many officers of the service, it shows the difficulty experienced in maintaining operations after 1940 in double clandestinity, secret from both the Germans and the Vichy Government.

Joint Committee of the Congress, *REPORT: Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. Pp. 580.)

Summarizes the exhaustive congressional hearings on the surprise Japanese blow, details the prior intelligence available, and analyzes the poor coordination displayed in its collection, evaluation, and dissemination.

[For the full text of the congressional hearings see *Hearings Before The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, Parts 1-39 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945-46)]

Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *SUB ROSA: The O.S.S. and American Espionage*. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1946. Pp. 237.)

Fragmentary but authentic examples of OSS clandestine intelligence and paramilitary operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The authors were OSS parachutists.

[Available in a Swedish edition: *O. S. S.* (Stockholm: Ljüs, 1947)]

Elizabeth P. MacDonald, *UNDERCOVER GIRL*. New York: MacMillan, 1947. Pp. 305.)

A rather too sprightly feminine travelogue which nevertheless contains in autobiographical form the most detailed information publicly available on OSS operations, especially in black psychological warfare, in the Far East.

Colonel Allison Ind, *ALLIED INTELLIGENCE BUREAU: Our Secret Weapon in the War against Japan*. (New York: David McKay, 1958. Pp. 305.)

Kaleidoscopic scenes from the operations of the clandestine AIB amalgamated from American, British, Australian, and Dutch personnel under General MacArthur's command in the Southwest Pacific. The author, its Deputy Controller, emphasizes the activities of the Australian Coast Watchers concealed on Japanese-held islands, but also devotes

Basic Texts

sections to guerrilla and agent activity in the Philippines and to sabotage operations.
[For further reading see Eric A. Feldt, *The Coastwatchers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948; New York: Ballantine Books, 1959)]

Resistance under the Nazis

Maurice James Buckmaster, *SPECIALLY EMPLOYED: The Story of British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance*. (London: Batchworth Press, 1952. Pp. 200.)

The work of the French Section of the British Special Operations Executive as described by its chief. Covers the organization of resistance, many aspects of tradecraft, and the operations of a number of individual agents in France.

[For further reading on this subject see Buckmaster's *They Fought Alone* (New York: Norton, 1958; and British editions)]

Rémy (Gilbert Renault-Roulier), *MEMOIRS OF A SECRET AGENT OF FREE FRANCE*. Vol. 1: *The Silent Company*, June 1940-June 1942. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948. Pp. 406.)

The first of Rémy's six volumes on his experiences. Describes his escape from France and his joining the Free French Intelligence Service in London, his trips back to set up an agent net, and his second escape with his family.

[Volume II has also been translated, as *Courage and Fear* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1950). The other four are: *Comment Meurt Un Réseau* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947); *Une Affaire de Trahison* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1947); *Les Mains Jointes* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1948); . . . *Mais le Temple Est Bâti* (Monte Carlo: Raoul Solar, 1950)]

David Lampe, *THE SAVAGE CANARY: The Story of Resistance in Denmark*. (London: Cassell, 1957. Pp. 236.)

High spots and personalities of the Danish resistance, with much material on resistance tradecraft.

[Published also as *The Danish Resistance* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1960) and in Danish as *Den Utaemmede Kanariefugl* (Copenhagen, Gyldendal, 1957)]

David Armine Howarth, *ACROSS TO NORWAY*. (New York: William Sloane, 1952. Pp. 286.)

The story of Norwegian escapees assembled at a British base in the Shetland Islands (where the author was deputy commander) to sail their small boats back and forth as transport for saboteurs, agents, and refugees. Also describes contacts with the Norwegian resistance and evasion from capture by the enemy.

[Originally published in England under the title *The Shetland Bus* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1951)]

A56

Basic Texts

Christopher Montague Woodhouse, *APPLE OF DISCORD: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting*. (London: Hutchinson, 1951. Pp. 320.)

An authoritative account of Greek resistance against the Germans during World War II and the internal postwar struggle, with emphasis on the political background. Col. Woodhouse commanded the Allied Military Mission to the Greek guerrillas.

Germany in World War II

Ian Goodhope Colvin, *MASTER SPY: The Incredible Story of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. Pp. 286.)

Ambivalent attitude and pro-Allied activities of the head of the German Abwehr, based on published documents and interviews with many of his former associates. Climax is the Admiral's involvement in the plot to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, for which he paid with his life. [Available in the following foreign editions: *Chief of Intelligence* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1951); *L'Amiral Canaris, Notre Allié Secret* (Paris: Editions de la Paix, 1955); *Admiral Canaris, Chef des Geheimdiensten* (Vienna: Wilhelm Frick Verlag, 1955); *Canaris* (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1956); *Mysteriet Canaris* (Bergen: John Griegs Forlag, 1952). For further reading see: Karl Heinz Abshagen, *Canaris* (London: Hutchinson, 1956); Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954)]

Walter Schellenberg, *THE LABYRINTH: Memoirs*. (New York: Harper, 1956. Pp. 423.)

Political intrigues and intelligence accomplishments in the Third Reich through the eyes of Himmler's chief of foreign intelligence.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *The Schellenberg Memoirs* (London: André Deutsch, 1956); *Le Chef de Contre-Espionnage Nazi Parle* (1933-1945) (Paris: René Juilliard, 1957); *Los Secretos del Servicio Secreto Alemán* (Barcelona: Mateu, 1958); *Memoiren* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959)]

Herman J. Giskes, *LONDON CALLING NORTH POLE*. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953. Pp. 208.)

Story of a remarkable radio deception set up by the Germans after their capture of a Dutch officer parachuted into Holland by the British SOE to work with the resistance; undetected for nearly two years, it netted 54 agents and quantities of British weapons and explosives parachuted in to the Dutch. Contains also material on other operations of the Abwehr's counterintelligence branch. The author was chief of the counterespionage unit in Holland.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *London Calling North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); *Abwehr III F* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij]

A57

Basic Texts

de Bezige Bij, 1949); *Londres Appelle Pole Nord* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958); *La Burla Maestra De La Guerra* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1954); *Spione Überspielen Spione* (Hamburg: Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1951). For further study see Pieter Dourlein, *Inside North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); Joseph Schreider, *Das War das Englandspiel* (Munich: Walter Stutz Verlag, 1950)]

Charles Wighton and Gunter Pets, **HITLER'S SPIES AND SABOTEURS:** Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General Lahousen. (New York: Henry Holt, 1958. Pp. 285.)

General Lahousen headed the Abwehr's sabotage section during part of the war. This elaboration from his diary gives case histories of his agents in Great Britain, Ireland, and South Africa and of the saboteurs he landed by submarine on the U.S. coast who were rounded up by the FBI.

[Published in Great Britain under the title *They Spied on England* London: Odhams Press, 1958]]

THE SOVIET SERVICES

Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, **THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE.** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Pp. 408.)

Historical development and philosophical bases of the Soviet state security services from the establishment of the Cheka in 1917 until 1956, presented largely through the accounts of defectors and victims. The editors have contributed documentation and an excellent summary. [Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Methuen & Co., 1957)]

David J. Dallin, **SOVIET ESPIONAGE.** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. Pp. 558.)

A scholarly historical study of Soviet intelligence activities in Europe, Canada, and the United States, based on published materials, some unpublished documents, and interviews with former Soviet agents and others.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Die Sowjetespionage* (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956); *Espionaje Soviético* (Buenos Aires: Agora, 1957)]

Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney, **THE SECRET WORLD.** (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. Pp. 334.)

With its four appendices the most detailed and factual compilation, for all its character as an exposé, on the organization and activity of Soviet State Security from 1946 to 1953.

[Published in Great Britain under the same title (London: Arthur Barker, 1960)]

Basic Texts

Alexander Foote, **HANDBOOK FOR SPIES.** (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949. Pp. 273.)

Classic case history of the operation of a Soviet wartime intelligence net. The author was a senior member of a group of agents in Switzerland collecting information from Germany and reporting to Moscow by radio.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Handbook for Spies* (London: Museum Press, 1949); *Les Secrets d'un Espion Soviétique* (Brussels: Editions de la Paix, 1951); *Handbuch für Spione* (Darmstadt: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1954); *Manual Para Espias* (Barcelona: Editorial AHR, 1954)]

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION . . . to Investigate . . . the Communication . . . of Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power. (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1946. Pp. 733.)

Details on Soviet espionage, subversion, and agent recruitment in Canada officially uncovered after Igor Gouzenko's defection in 1945. [Available in the following foreign-language editions: *Russisk Spionage i Canada* (Copenhagen: Schultz Forlag, 1947); *Le Rapport de la Commission Royale* (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946)]

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ESPIONAGE. (Sydney: Government Printer for New South Wales, 1955. Pp. 483.)

An excellent account of Soviet espionage and subversion in Australia brought to light by the defection in 1954 of MVD agent Vladimir Petrov and his wife.

[See also: *Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Royal Commission* (New On Espionage; Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956; London: André Deutsch, 1956). *Empire of Fear* is also available in foreign editions: *L'Empire de la Peur* (Paris: Morgan, 1957); *Imperio del Miedo* (Mexico City: Ediciones Zenit, 1957); *Fryktens Land* (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1956); *Sant Vittnesbörd* (Stockholm: Sven-Erik Berghs Forlag, 1956)]

EVASION AND ESCAPE

Aidan Merivale Crawley, **ESCAPE FROM GERMANY: A History of R.A.F. Escapes during the War.** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956. Pp. 291.)

The sanitized version of an official history prepared for the British Air Ministry. Describes the escape intelligence organizations (one of which the author headed) in the German POW camps and the prisoners' continual efforts, successful and unsuccessful, to get away.

[Available in the following foreign editions: *Escape from Germany* (London: Collins, 1958); *R. A. F. Te Woet* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Nieuwe Wleken N. V., n. d.)]

Basic Texts

Clay Blair, Jr., BEYOND COURAGE. (New York: David McKay. 1955. Pp. 247.)

Stories of American airmen who, shot down behind enemy lines in the Korean War, evaded capture and returned.
[Available in the following foreign editions: *Beyond Courage* (London: Jarrolds Publishers, Ltd., 1956); *Met de Moed der Wanhoop* (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Het Spectrum, 1955)]

A60

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

INTELLIGENCE IN U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

STRATEGIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde. (University of Chicago Press. 1960. Pp. 237. \$5.50.)

Half doctrinal discussion and organizational proposals, the other half case studies of three propaganda campaigns, this is a useful addition to the limited store of analytical-case-study literature available on psychological operations, particularly propaganda. Although the subject of propaganda is predominant, the authors did not intend to limit themselves thereto: their thesis is that "the United States has failed to develop total strategies [because] it has never truly understood the nature of the psychological instrument" and its relationship to the three traditional instruments of statecraft, the military, the economic, and the diplomatic. (The charge should rather be that it has lagged in implementing an acute recognition of these things on the part of many of its officials.) They propose a cabinet-level organization for Strategic Psychological Operations not only to carry on the propaganda functions hitherto inadequately handled by information agencies but also to oversee the psychological aspects of military, economic, and diplomatic programs.

This SPO proposal, complete with organization charts and detailed functional breakdowns, may be over-elaborate and to some extent unrealistic. Solution of the problem of psychological effectiveness by the creation of a new agency is too simple. It misses the fundamental point made over the past ten years by psychological advisers and special committees, most recently by the President's [Sprague] Committee on Information Abroad, that the problem can be met only by breaking down resistances, especially in the middle echelons of certain agencies, through prolonged education and motivation, that mere changes in machinery will not suffice. The authors nonetheless make an able presentation of the problem and suggest some of the changes necessary for its solution.

A61

Recent Books: U.S. Strategy

tion. Further, their discussion gives the reader an introductory acquaintance with the multiplicity of coordinated functions and activities involved in launching propaganda programs.

The analytical section is good as an introduction to the basic elements of propaganda, but too brief (some 56 pages), having been subordinated to the elaboration of the SPO organization. It treats only white propaganda attributed to official sources, omitting, except for a brief reference to black radio, gray and black propaganda. The first half of the section covers objectives, doctrine, techniques, and tactics. Only the more obvious tactics such as deception, enlightenment, terror, and reassurance are discussed. Indirect propaganda is mentioned, but there is no acknowledgement of more sophisticated tactics such as the oblique approach, the kiss of death, overcommitment of the opponent, quotation out of context, and so forth.

The second half of the analytical section is devoted to intelligence requirements, an essential subject which is often neglected in handbooks on propaganda techniques. The need for comprehensive intelligence upon which to base propaganda operations is clearly presented in a discussion of the selection of audiences, their availability, receptivity, and responsiveness, the credibility of the message, and the like. The importance of accurate intelligence in depth is also well illustrated in the hundred-odd pages of case histories that form Part II of the book, particularly in the detailed presentation of Radio Free Europe's efforts to determine which messages might provoke fruitful responses from the various segments of its audience.

The three case studies of Part II not only describe comprehensive propaganda campaigns in detail but support the authors' charge that the United States has failed to exploit the psychological aspects of diplomatic, economic, and military programs and to integrate them with propaganda operations in an overall psychological strategy. The three are well selected to illustrate different situations and different combinations of the instruments of statecraft—military coordination of all activities in wartime Italy; an uncoordinated use of diplomatic, economic, and psychological instruments in the

A62

Recent Books: U.S. Strategy

all-out effort to swing the 1948 Italian elections; the activity of a private propaganda organization, Radio Free Europe, in support of U.S. foreign policy in East Europe during the 1950's.

The position of the authors with regard to SPO and propaganda could have been more simply presented in their introductory chapter. Here their attempt to be succinct and definitive bogs down in concepts and definitions that form a frame of some distortion. It is an unfortunate beginning for a book which otherwise is clear, direct, and especially in case study, rich with material for thought.

AMERICANS AT WAR: The Development of the American Military System. By *T. Harry Williams*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1960. Pp. 139. \$3.50.)

Originally delivered by the author as three J. P. Young Lectures in American History at Memphis State University in October 1956, this work traces the character of the American military system from the Revolution to 1860, its Civil War bifurcation into the systems of the North and of the South, and its subsequent development to the modern era of global conflict. The book is notable here for the striking fact that in all this span the subject of intelligence is not once broached, an omission hardly conceivable in any comparable history of European military development. It is pointed out that Elihu Root's use of the German General Staff as a model in his reorganization of the U.S. Army early in the present century was one of the few influences from abroad on our military organization. Perhaps our historical fear of an overly strong military establishment was one of the reasons why our war efforts through World War II have been largely improvisations, why little thought had been given in advance to who the enemy would be or where the war would be fought. In any event, nothing could make it clearer than this broad outline of the development of the American military system that only in the most recent years has intelligence as a military function entered the ken of the American commander.

A63

Recent Books: Military

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION

HITLER CONFRONT'S ENGLAND. By Rear Admiral *Walter Ansel*. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960. Pp. 348. \$7.50.)

This is a study of amphibious operations, a thing as old as warfare, yet unique in the twentieth century. In the days when each man carried all the weapons he would use and armies lived off the countryside, such operations were a matter of having enough boats to get the men across the water. Now they have been transformed in their requirements for planning, logistics, and intelligence by new dimensions such as air power and the transportation of tanks and heavy equipment to land on heavily defended hostile shores.

The first major German amphibious operation in World War II was the invasion of Norway—successful, but incurring heavy naval losses at the hands of the British. Then after the devastating blitzkrieg that overran the Low Countries and France and trapped the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, there occurred one of those mysteries of the war that can be explained only by the personality of Adolf Hitler. Although the German armor was ready and eager to smash the British, Hitler held it back and allowed the B.E.F. to make its amphibious escape relatively unscathed. Then followed Operation Sea Lion, the plan for an amphibious move against England.¹

Walter Ansel's well-researched analysis, based on official documents and interviews with most of the available senior German officers who were concerned, reaches some interesting conclusions. Hitler didn't try to crush the British at Dunkirk because he was confident he could make terms with them. For the same reason, and also because the rapidity of the blitzkrieg's total success was unexpected, there was no planning what to do after the fall of France. The Germans sat on the Pas de Calais looking across the Channel without the vaguest idea of their next move. And when the planning for Operation Sea Lion was ordered, it was of such short duration—a deadline of about two months from the start—so unrealistic, and so uncoordinated that it is difficult to believe

¹ See also *Operation Sea Lion*, by Peter Fleming (New York, 1957).

Hitler was ever serious about it. By comparison with Operation Overlord, the Allied planning for the Normandy landing, the German effort was ridiculous. It impels the reader to Admiral Ansel's apparent conclusion that Hitler thought he could talk the British out of the war.

The book is plentifully interlarded with intelligence references: the reasonably accurate air reconnaissance reports of the Luftwaffe, the not-so-accurate overestimates of British ground order of battle, and the assessments of the naval intelligence staff. But most striking to the intelligence professional is how the lack of any centralized coordinating and estimating led the Germans into major errors. If they had tried Sea Lion, the Nazi disaster would have dwarfed that of Xerxes at Salamis.

MONS: The Retreat to Victory. By *John Terraine*. (New York: Macmillan, 1960. Pp. 224. \$4.50.)

This excellent book is an account of the first battles fought by the British Expeditionary Force in Europe in World War I. At one point its intelligence-minded author comments, "It is hard to think of a day of war when action on such a huge and momentous scale was conducted in such a fog of uncertainty and misconception." Elsewhere he quotes the first Von Moltke's remark at a staff conference, "Gentlemen, I have observed that there are always three courses open to the enemy, and that he usually takes the fourth." Both of these observations characterize the appalling intelligence estimates on both sides in the initial battles of the war.

On the Allied side the French staff failed to take into consideration the altered conditions of twentieth century warfare, to recognize the German plan of operations, and to conceive of the strength of the German Army. They were convinced the Germans would not use reserve divisions. Their estimate of the strength of the German right wing, which drove through Belgium, was nearly 100% off—15 corps as against an actual 28. They remained blind to the possibility of a German advance through Belgium conducted in enormous strength until it became a reality: it was 15 August before they finally saw that the main German effort was in the north.

Recent Books: Military

The British underestimated German enterprise; one of the things that Kitchener believed that it could be a long war, "that the Germans were about to attempt one of their much-advertised enveloping maneuvers on a scale that nobody has so far conceived." He felt more and more certain that the B.E.F. might easily advance into a gigantic trap.

The Germans were also blind. "Engrossed with their own sweeping maneuvers, [they] knew little about their enemies. They had no idea, for example, of the whereabouts of the B.E.F." They were left behind at the intelligence turning point: "At the Supreme Headquarters of both the French and German Armies decisions of the first importance were taken on August 25th. The pendulum of error took a definite swing across the line of battle; as Joffre shed his delusions, Von Moltke became more and more immersed in his, with results that were to prove fatal to the German cause."

Mr. Terraine's book should be required reading for military intelligence officers as well as military commanders.

STRINGFELLOW OF THE FOURTH: The Amazing Career of the Most Successful Confederate Spy. By *R. Shepard Brown*. (New York: Crown Publishers. 1960. Pp. 307. \$4.00.)

The late Douglas Southall Freeman, probably the foremost historian of the Confederacy, noted that material on the activities of one Frank Stringfellow was very scarce. Mr. Brown's book on these activities does not now invalidate this observation, but tends to confirm it: one gets the impression that the author's reconstruction of many of the episodes involving Stringfellow rests on rather meager evidence, and there is more in his book about well-known battles than there is about its hero.

Stringfellow was a scout and spy assigned to the Fourth Virginia Cavalry, taking his orders directly from Jeb Stuart and, after Stuart's death at Yellow Tavern, from Robert E. Lee. He unquestionably scored amazing successes in crossing Union lines and operating as an agent in both Washington and Alexandria. On his first mission he crossed into Alexandria, assumed the cover of a dentist's assistant, and set up a network of informants with such dispatch that he

Recent Books: Military

was back in time to do scout duty at the battle of First Manassas. He went to a Union Army regimental dance disguised as a girl. He again went behind Union lines to visit his mother, slightly wounded when the family home was shelled during the Wilderness battle. He spent some time in Washington trying to set up a network and was spotted by Pinkerton's counterintelligence men. He was a scout on Stuart's ride around McClellan's army in front of Richmond.

Although Stringfellow's exploits are documented in dispatches and in a series of lectures he gave after the war, these sources obviously provided lean pickings for his biographer.

Recent Books: Clandestine

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

THE CONSPIRATORS. By Geoffrey Bailey. (New York: Harper, 1960. Pp. 306. \$4.95.)

The complex of events known as the great Soviet purges remains, even two decades after its close, obscure to Western observers. No satisfactory account of what really occurred can yet be reconstructed. None probably will be, until the hoped-for day when Soviet archives are opened.

The author of this book, writing under the pseudonym Geoffrey Bailey, makes an attempt to explain one of the major facets of the purges—the destruction of Marshal Tukhachevskiy and the flower of the Soviet high command on the eve of World War II. His valiant effort is not completely successful, but he does contribute to an understanding of the case.

The Bailey thesis seems to be derived largely from Walter Krivitskiy, who contended that the evidence used by Stalin against his generals had been manufactured by the Gestapo and fed to the Soviets through White Russian military organizations abroad. According to Krivitskiy, Stalin had General Evgeniy Miller, Chief of the Russian Armed Services Union, a White organization with headquarters in Paris, kidnapped during September 1937 in order to conceal the German origin of the evidence he had used. The not altogether clear Krivitskiy account, however, also indicates that the Soviet authorities, aside from the fabricated German evidence, had discovered (or thought they had discovered) evidence of a real conspiracy in the Red Army.¹

Bailey believes that an army conspiracy against Stalin did in fact exist, and there is some support for this view in other sources. For what it may be worth, Alexander Orlov, a defector from State Security, says he was told that there was an army conspiracy.² Walter Schellenberg, a leading figure in German intelligence, believed that there was a real Soviet generals' plot against Stalin which Reinhard Heydrich betrayed to the Russians by means of evidence that was fabri-

cated in part.³ Wilhelm Hoettl, an Austrian who entered the German intelligence service only in 1938, is not certain that a generals' plot actually existed, but does state that Heydrich forged materials to prove its existence.⁴ On the other hand, there were indications for a time after the exposure of Stalin's "errors" that Marshal Tukhachevskiy and other officers associated with him had been posthumously rehabilitated by the Soviet regime. If there were firm evidence of actual conspiracy by Tukhachevskiy, it is not likely that his good name would be restored.

Bailey undertakes to weave into his book the story of a series of intelligence operations that have no connection with the Tukhachevskiy case and little relationship to each other. The thread on which these beads are strung is the émigré Russian Armed Services Union, its operations against the USSR, and Soviet counterintelligence activity against it. The latter was centered in the fascinating and incredible "Trust" operation which developed from 1921 to 1927: utilizing controlled anti-Soviet agents and organizations within the Soviet Union and penetrations of the White Russian military organizations abroad, the Soviet security service was able to neutralize, manipulate, and destroy the counterrevolutionary effort sponsored by ex-tsarist officers from points outside of the country.

There is a direct methodological connection, bridging the political change of the Bolshevik revolution, between the OGPU's Trust and the Okhrana's Assev, who operated in the first decade of the century. The line is also direct from OGPU to its successors—the NKVD, the MVD, and the KGB of our own day. No one who engages in current intelligence operations in or against the USSR can afford to ignore the security lessons which the Trust case contains. This part of Bailey's story, of considerable value to the intelligence expert, will confuse the lay reader with its complexity and the flow of unconnected incidents.

¹ Walter Schellenberg, *The Schellenberg Memoirs* (London, 1956), pp. 40-49. See also the similar story of Alfred Naujocks, who claims to have supervised the fabrication and personally sold it to a Soviet agent, in Gunter Peis's *The Man Who Started the War* (London, 1960), to be reviewed in a future issue.

² Wilhelm Hoettl, *The Secret Front* (New York, 1954), pp. 77-87.

³ Walter Krivitskiy, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London, 1940), pp. 233-266.

⁴ Alexander Orlov, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* (New York, 1953), pp. 236-237.

Recent Books: *Clandestine*

"Bailey," who is clearly a white Russian refugee, makes much use of undocumented information from refugee circles and refugee publications. Most of this data, since it is not sourced, cannot be evaluated. The footnotes in the book convey an impression of scholarship not borne out by the material used, and many of the references actually cited are secondary sources. The bibliography, nevertheless, although not providing much support for the text, will be useful to students of Soviet intelligence operations. The photographs of personalities that illustrate the volume are also worth while, many of them now rarely seen and difficult to locate.

Although Bailey certainly has not said the last word on the Tukhachevskiy case and its antecedents, he has performed a useful service in summing up the word-of-mouth and other material on the subject that is presently available, scattered and never properly explored. One could only wish that he had also sourced and evaluated these verbal accounts that have circulated among the émigrés for years.

MINISTER OF DEATH: The Adolf Eichmann Story. By *Quentin Reynolds, Ephraim Katz, and Zvy Aldouby.* (New York: Viking, 1960. Pp. 246. \$5.00.)

Adolf Karl Eichmann will ultimately rank close to the top of the list of the Nazi perverts. He was probably individually responsible for more mass murder of Jews than any other German. Still fresh in the public mind is his abduction from Argentina by the Israeli intelligence service last May, fifteen years after his disappearance in Europe, and the resulting crisis in relations between Israel and Argentina, whose sovereignty was undoubtedly violated. It is notable that this crisis could be laid to rest, after U.N. Security Council hearings, principally because the Israeli Government steadfastly refused to admit advance complicity in the operation.

While the Eichmann case has focused world attention once again on the Nazi extermination program, it represents to the intelligence officer one of the great professional operations of postwar days. Quentin Reynolds, with the assistance of two Israeli journalists, has given the first comprehensive report on the intelligence aspects of the case in this book, the first quarter of which is devoted to the work of the

Recent Books: *Clandestine*

Israelis in locating Eichmann. The last part traces his wanderings and desperate efforts to hide over a fifteen-year period, and about a hundred pages in between describe his wartime career and the atrocities he committed.

The excellent investigative job of the Israelis—and especially their persistence—can be pointed up by a brief recapitulation of Eichmann's escape effort. At the war's end he tried to organize a redoubt in the Austrian Alps and found that nobody wanted to be caught with him. He was rejected by his former associates in the S.S.; posed as a Luftwaffe corporal and was interned in a PW camp; escaped; posed as a Waffen S.S. lieutenant in another PW camp; escaped; worked as a lumberjack. A Nazi underground reportedly got him to Rome and then Damascus, where he worked for two years with other Germans in the import business. In June 1950 he went to Argentina and got a job with a construction company in Tucumán, where he was reunited with his family for the first time. Then followed a variety of jobs in several South American countries, a year in the Middle East, and back to Buenos Aires in 1959. During this period he used at least six aliases.

After the war the Sheruth Yedioth, underground intelligence service of the Haganah,⁵ commenced a systematic tracing of Nazi war criminals who had gone into hiding. A special squad of five was put on the Eichmann case. Their work, interrupted in 1948 by the Arab-Israeli war, was later resumed by the General Security Service which operates under Israel's Central Institute for Intelligence and Security.

The search was extensive and painstaking, for Eichmann had covered his tracks well. An agent was posted to watch his father's electric appliance shop in Linz, and another as a maid in his wife's household in Bad Aussee. One agent spent months tracking down a photograph of the fugitive. Another located a document in his handwriting. X-rays showing a skull and collarbone fracture were found. Dozens of false leads were traced. Finally Frau Eichmann was picked up on a visit to Austria and followed back to Argentina. The Israeli airline El Al announced its inaugural

⁵ See Dekel's *SHAI*, reviewed in Intelligence Articles IV 2, p. A49.

Recent Books: Clandestine

flight to Buenos Aires. The return trip carried Eichmann and his captors.

Two paperbacks also deal with the case. *Eichmann: The Man and his Crimes*, by Comer Clarke (New York, Ballantine Books, 1960. Pp. 153), chiefly a recitation of Eichmann's atrocities, has little accurate information about the intelligence episode. *The Case Against Adolf Eichmann*, edited by Henry A. Zeiger with a foreword by Harry Golden (New York Signet, 1960. Pp. 191), is a compilation of captured documents, war-crime statements, affidavits, etc., dealing with the Nazi effort to exterminate European Jewry, and is not even concentrated exclusively on Eichmann.

SECRET ☐

25X1

STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



VOL. 5 NO. 3

SUMMER 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING

SECRET ☐

25X1

SECRET

All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence community.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

SECRET

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITOR

EDITORIAL BOARD

SHERMAN KENT, *Chairman*

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components.

SECRET

SECRET

All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence community.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

SECRET

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITOR

EDITORIAL BOARD

SHERMAN KENT, *Chairman*

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

Contributions to the *Studies* or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building [] and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through *Secret*.

For inclusion on the regular *Studies* distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, [] For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor, []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

CONTENTS

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Principles of Deep Cover C. D. Edbrook	1
<i>Do's and don't's of long-term nonofficial cover.</i>	
SECRET	
Cover in Unconventional Operations	
Harvey B. McCadden	31
<i>Some considerations in the re-examination of irregular war.</i>	
SECRET	
The Collector's Role in Evaluation . . . Bruce L. Pechan	37
<i>Probability and significance of "unevaluated" information.</i>	
SECRET	
Psywar in Intelligence Operations . . John Brockmiller	49
<i>Four facets of interaction between distinct functions.</i>	
SECRET	
[]	
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	65
<i>Heydrich assassination.</i>	
SECRET	

25X1

SECRET

25X1

SECRET ☐

THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.

Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

SECRET ☐

SECRET

Cardinal considerations in placing covert personnel abroad in quasi-permanent private citizen positions.

PRINCIPLES OF DEEP COVER

C. D. Edbrook

The simplest and therefore the most used device an intelligence service has for getting its unwelcome officers covertly into other countries is to assign them to cover jobs in its government's diplomatic missions, consulates, and other official representations there. The Soviet bloc services call this "legal" cover, most Western services simply "official" cover. Aside from providing for communications home, a secure place to work, and a measure of protection from prosecution for espionage, it has the advantage that the cover duties can usually be made light enough to leave most of the officer's time free for intelligence activity. The official position also opens the way to many useful contacts, although it precludes others. It has the accompanying disadvantage that the disguise is a pretty shabby one. It requires no Herculean counterintelligence effort to determine which foreign officials probably have intelligence connections; they can be kept deniable, but not really secret. Moreover, some kinds of intelligence activity cannot be carried out from an official position.

It is therefore necessary to supplement the "legals" with "illegals," the intelligence officers under official cover with operatives under "deep" cover, living as legitimate private citizens with such authenticity that their intelligence sponsorship would not be disclosed even by an intensive and determined investigation. These officers are sometimes career staff employees of the intelligence service and sometimes citizens of either the sponsoring or another country with a contract or agent relationship to the service. For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of them all as "agents," although they are in a different category from the indigenous agents recruited locally by a case officer. They do have an agent

SECRET

1

SECRET

Deep Cover

relationship to an official-cover case officer, for they must usually depend on the official-cover people—the “legal rezidentura” in Soviet usage, the “station” in ours—for their communications and administrative support and, at least in most Western practice, for direction and operational guidance.

Nonofficial cover is sometimes used for brief ad hoc missions and fixed-term operations, but the difficulties and advantages of really deep cover are felt most in a long-range operation of indefinite duration, one expected to continue as long as it produces useful information, perhaps through the full career of the agent. Infiltration into high circles of another government, an opposition group, a military clique, or an ethnic minority, or, for a Western service, penetration into an Orbit installation or the leadership of a Communist party are types of missions for which deep cover of indefinite durability may be required. It is the principles of this kind of cover that concern us here.

Primacy of the Objective

Because the deep-cover agent must usually devote a large share of his time to carrying on his ostensible legitimate occupation, his intelligence production is quantitatively small. He is therefore an expensive agent, justified only by the uniqueness of the information he produces or can be expected in long term to produce. The establishment of a deep-cover operation should consequently derive without exception from the objective to be achieved, not from the availability of the agent or the opportunity for cover. Although this principle should be self-evident, it is not in practice unusual that an intelligence service begins with an agent who wants a deep-cover assignment, tries various kinds of cover on him for size, and then, more or less as an afterthought, finds a plausible mission for him. Negligence of the objective through a preoccupation on the agent's part with the establishment of cover is another frequent fault. In one case on record a young man was permitted to spend four years exclusively building cover for himself, being required only to attend a university in the target area and then establish himself as a salesman there. By the time he was in a position to start producing he had lost interest in the intelligence objective and resigned.

2

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

Importance for Planners

Sometimes the unfailing symptoms of a big hurry to go nowhere in particular betray the fact that the planners of an operation have lost sight of its long-term objective. Some years ago the cover specialists of an agency were asked to produce immediately a “flexible cover” that would give an agent “mobility,” not much work in the way of cover duties, and “a logical reason for interest in diversified local groups.” It was not specified in what way the cover was supposed to flex, to what places the agent should be able to move, or in what kinds of local groups he should have an interest. There was available, however, a cover position in market research which seemed to meet these requirements and in which the agent had had some experience; but this would require him to take a month's training prior to departure, and it was therefore rejected. So he was put into free-lance writing, although he had had no experience in that field. The hope that an operation so thoroughly conditioned during its formative stage by an early departure date would somehow serve an intelligence purpose was of course a vain one: when old Mobile and Flexible came back two years later he had produced nothing.

The rational preparation and conduct of an operation can have no other guide than its purpose, and this purpose must therefore be defined at the outset. Mobility and flexibility may indeed be required by some assignments: a scientist or labor expert, for example, whose intelligence assignment requires him to meet target colleagues at professional conferences in a number of neighboring countries needs a cover job that gives him sufficient time and a plausible reason to attend these conferences. But other intelligence missions can be fulfilled only by agents whose cover work keeps them in a certain place, and there are on record cases in which a deep-cover agent has been unable to give the necessary attention to his operations because his cover job kept him constantly moving about. The end must determine the means.

The purpose should also be a worthy one. A deep-cover mission is not justified if it can do no better than wander along the fringes of an intelligence target, eliciting scraps of information and misinformation, or “collect operational infor-

SECRET

3

SECRET

Deep Cover

mation available in the normal course of cover work and spot potential agent material." It is wasteful to have a deep-cover agent doing the routine jobs that can be done just as well by an official-cover man or his ordinary local agents and informants. The targets that call for deep cover are those to which official government representatives lack access or in which they must conceal their interest or from which only an independent channel will elicit information not meant for official consumption.

The primacy of the objective does not imply that there is a rigid sequence in which cover and agent cannot even be considered until the objective has been determined. It means only that the intelligence objective should be established before the steps are taken that commit the service to the operation. The service's headquarters will have negotiated cover openings and its field stations will have spotted cover opportunities of various kinds without regard to any specific projected operations. There are also usually available some good agents for whom there is no suitable assignment at the moment. It is better that these cover openings and these agents should remain unused for the time being than be misused in the pursuit of an unworthy objective only because they are available. Experience shows that the successful operations are generally those in which the planners have arrived at a valid objective and made sure that the cover and the agent were suitable for the pursuit of that objective before going ahead with the implementation of the project.

The intelligence objective, once chosen, is of course not immutable. Constancy of purpose is of vital importance in most long-range operations, but a service should be ready to make the most of any unexpected opportunity that permits it to raise its sights. In recent experience a deep-cover agent who had been sent to the field to work through locally recruited agents suddenly found himself in the entourage of a high-priority target; another, after one uneventful tour and a transfer under the same cover to another country, gained access to the inner circle of a very important target person. These agents were able to capitalize on their opportunities because their cover had been well prepared and they had been careful to preserve it during periods when operational prospects were not bright.

4

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

Nevertheless, one cannot rely on chance to provide an operation with purpose. The untimely termination of cover ventures intended to be long-range is often charged to the unsuitability of the agent or the inadequacy of his cover, but close examination may reveal that the faulty element is itself the result of an underlying failure of the planners to derive the operation from a worthy purpose clearly understood at the start by everyone concerned.

Importance for Agent and Station

A lack of specific purpose has a very disquieting effect on agent morale. Agents sometimes express the belief that adequate thought is not given by their contact man, the field station, or headquarters to the ultimate achievement that is desired from them on their project. Their remarks are generally to the effect that there is not a consistent plan or objective, that they are given the blanket advice "to get out and see what can be developed" with regard to practically any political party or government agency, that they are seldom given the opportunity to learn how, if at all, their activities are integrated into the overall area program or objectives, and that this is not a deliberate effort on the part of the field station or their station contact to keep them compartmented but rather an indication of the nonexistence of a long-range plan. Such impressions, even if groundless, are not conducive to vigorous and purposeful activity.

The field station has an essential role to perform in determining the objective as well as the means of a deep-cover operation in its area and it must share in the early planning. Chiefs of station should keep headquarters currently informed as to which long-range intelligence objectives they and their successors will need to approach through nonofficial cover, what kinds of cover would be the most effective in reaching those objectives, and what kind of agent would be professionally and personally suited for the cover job and the operational tasks involved. Headquarters, in turn, should consult the station in the early planning of a particular long-range cover project. Although a headquarters area desk will have a greater or lesser understanding of the field situation, its information may be dated or incomplete. The field station certainly has the most intimate knowledge of the problems

SECRET

5

SECRET

Deep Cover

and in addition will have more faith in the prospects of an operation and feel more deeply committed to its success if it has helped to shape it.

A few years ago an agent was placed under commercial cover and sent to the field "to assess the area for deep-cover and operational possibilities and to develop intelligence operations." There was a station in the area and it should have been able to assess cover and operational possibilities, but apparently headquarters had not discussed with it what objectives needed to be pursued through nonofficial cover and what type of agent would have a good chance of attaining them; no attempt was made to define the kind of operations the agent was expected to develop or to specify the nature of the targets he was to work against. This agent had neither business nor operational experience; yet he was expected to start a business in a country that had inhibitory laws on trade and on currency exchange, to make a difficult assessment of operational possibilities, and to seek out his own intelligence mission. The operation failed and was terminated after two years.

Collaboration between headquarters and the field station is needed in the early planning stage in order to bring together a broad central view of intelligence needs and an intimate knowledge of the local scene. These two complementary elements are required to give an operation a precise orientation toward a priority objective, and this objective must be determined early enough to insure that the cover and the agent are suited to it.

Preparing the Means

The period of preparation is one of commitment; it comprises a series of major steps which steer the projected operation along a course that becomes increasingly difficult to change or halt, until a point is reached where the service is committed to go ahead with whatever investment of funds and manpower may be required. These major steps have to do with the selection and preparation of the agent and his cover. Hasty preparations have no place in long-range operations. Haste is justifiable and even necessary in situations of urgency where one must work at top speed towards a short-term goal; in such cases security and durability are knowingly

6

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

sacrificed to the extent required by the pressure of circumstances. But to be durable, cover must be genuine, and to be genuine it must be prepared at a pace consonant with the normal pace of the cover pursuit itself, not according to an operational timetable. This is the only way to avoid built-in causes of failure of all sorts—morale problems, administrative snarls, unsuitable agent, thin cover, and other security hazards.

Durability of Cover

The first requisite of cover is that it should convincingly explain the agent's presence in the area. This requisite becomes increasingly stringent with time, and to endure over the years a cover must be such as to appear logical in its own terms. There have been too many salesmen who did not sell, students who did not study, consultants who were not consulted, some of them living on a generous scale with large families, deluding themselves that all was well until perhaps the chief of station was queried by his cover boss, "Is so-and-so one of yours? He looks as phony to me as anyone I've ever seen!"

A few years ago an agent who had had medical training was sent to a city described in the project as "a historical mecca for graduate doctors." His cover occupation was the sale of medical supplies and his intelligence mission was to develop sources in the scientific field. One month after his arrival the station estimated that his cover would be good for at least nine years. After six months, however, the station requested his transfer because the cover was wearing thin. Now it came out that the day when the historical mecca enjoyed an excellent reputation for its medical facilities had long since gone. Something had obviously gone wrong with someone's objectivity; the tendency to overstate the merits of a project is particularly strong when it is first submitted for approval.

There had been warning indicators when this cover was being negotiated: two medical supply firms that had been approached had said they would not place their own men in that area because it would not be profitable, and one of them agreed to send the agent there only because the service wanted it that way and was willing to foot the bill. When a service

SECRET

7

SECRET

Deep Cover

chooses to ignore the counsel of old-line companies whose business it is to know what works in a certain place and what does not, it should be for compelling reasons and with an appreciation of the problems ahead.

The cover with the best chance of enduring in any area is one that does not feed off the area but contributes needed skills or knowledge or a commodity that is lacking. In countries that are trying to develop economic autarchy the authorities may scrutinize the activities of foreign businessmen with severity, ruling that any foreign-owned or foreign-operated enterprise must benefit the national economic structure. Here agents involved in businesses that are not financially sound or have no significant volume of business are sadly out of place. But local firms may need citizens of another country to help them in their dealings with firms located in that country, and such employees would probably have greater freedom of movement and better access to local targets than those of the local branch of a foreign firm, as well as protection in case of expropriation or nationalization of foreign assets. Or non-commercial cover may be more desirable in some places: in newly independent countries, for instance, teachers or technicians may be more needed and welcome than business representatives, and the desire of the new governments to get them elsewhere than from the former colonial power may provide another nation with cover opportunities for its own nationals or for third-national agents.

The plan for long-range cover must take into account any likelihood of drastic changes in the area that could affect the viability of a particular type of cover. If there is such a likelihood, an agent cannot use cover whose survival depends on an indefinite continuation of the *status quo*. Aside from the hazards to commercial cover entailed in the trend towards economic autarchy, there may be political changes which would make it more difficult for Westerners, or citizens of a particular Western country, to move about. Such prospects call for timely preparations in the establishment of third-national cover agents in advance.

Finally, the most important element of cover durability is legitimacy. There are suspect covers just as there are suspect persons, and a cover cannot confer upon the agent a legitimacy it does not itself possess. A newly founded company

8

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

once offered to cover any number of a service's agents as consultants in several underdeveloped countries, expecting that the service in return would subsidize its own early development. These consultants would have come under the scrutiny of the genuine foreign consultants who had been there for years, and the inevitable checks on the standing of the home office would have quickly exposed the masquerade.

Cover and the Objective

The function of explaining the agent's presence in the area, difficult though it is under unfavorable circumstances, is still only a part of what cover should do for an operation. Cover should always be considered in relation to the intelligence objective, and insofar as possible it should provide legitimate access to the targets being attacked. The ideal solution is achieved when the activities of the agent in doing his cover job provide the basis for the operational contacts desired. If this ideal arrangement is not possible, the cover should at least be compatible with the objective. Otherwise, there can be only competition and conflict between them.

One agent, married and with children, was recently reported to be working 30 hours a week for his cover firm and 40 to 50 hours a week for intelligence. The poor fellow was running himself ragged, neglecting his family, and even so not doing justice to either of his unrelated jobs. His cover had been chosen almost exclusively to establish him in the area, too little attention being paid to the operational opportunities it should provide. The two functions must be considered concurrently during the planning stage; if avenues to the intelligence objective are left to be improvised later, the agent's access, if he ever develops any, may be to targets already within easy reach through the official cover of the station, and his presence in the field, while adding to the station's problems, will not add to its resources.

There is also a security advantage in a close relation between cover and intelligence work. If the two occupations are unrelated, the operational comings and goings do not benefit from the protective interpretation that the known cover job should normally suggest to observers. The field station is in a position to know which specific cover pursuit can provide and explain operational contact with the target persons;

SECRET

9

SECRET

Deep Cover

in fact, the station would normally want to have an agent under cover only after finding it impossible, or unwise or inadequate, to recruit a person already in place in a similar situation.

Knowledge of the facts of the local situation will reduce the large amount of guesswork that often goes into the choice of a cover and thereby obviate the unreasonable demands that otherwise come to be placed on it. An agent was once sent to a colonial country to recruit agents within the European community, but two years later it was decided that his efforts should have been directed at the native groups. His cover did not permit him to make this about-face, and so the impasse was blamed on "rigid cover." A certain amount of latitude may be desirable in some forms of cover, and this latitude can be planned at the start to serve a known operational need, but latitude or flexibility in cover should not be used as a hedge against failure to study and interpret the pertinent facts in the first place and to select a cover in the light of those facts. The factors that enter into the establishment of cover that is both durable and operationally effective are numerous and intricate, and that is why it is risky to go ahead without the best knowledge of the field situation that the station can provide.

Cover Arrangements

Cover negotiations with a business firm afford the service a valuable preview of what kind of collaboration it can expect in the joint enterprise. If the firm wants the service to pay a disproportionate share of the business expenses, it is probable that its professed desire to contribute to government aims is specious and that intelligence interests will be pushed aside. There is no need for high cost in an agreement with a company already doing business in the area in question, particularly if the agent is already in place or is destined to go there. If the company goes out of its normal way and incurs additional financial expenses and risks, the service naturally has to bear a larger share of the burden; but if the company offers to place any number of agents in all sorts of positions without regard to the facts of business, it probably envisages a quick and generous bounty from the government rather than reasonable business profits patiently earned.

10

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

The cover negotiations can of course also give the company some idea of the seriousness of the service's intentions. If the service professes to need and want a sound and durable cover and at the same time proposes to use it to rotate a number of agents on two-year tours, the firm cannot be expected to think very highly of its long-range planning, or of its concept of cover, or of its practice of economy for that matter, and may be tempted to make the most of the opportunity for profits.

The agreements with the company should be as simple and clear as possible and understood in the same way by both parties. In addition, those arrangements that affect the agent should be clearly understood by him at the very start and be made known to the field station involved at the same time; otherwise the station case officer's meetings with the agent and his correspondence with headquarters will be taken up for a long time by the too common three-way debate on the substance and interpretation of the cover arrangements, to the detriment of the operation.

When a cover agreement is negotiated it should be decided early who in the company has to be made witting. If the matter is left for spot decisions to be made as arrangements develop, the number of people in the know will keep growing as one after another is brought into the picture to facilitate the solution of problems that arise. There is no assurance, of course, that the witting company people will observe the need-to-know principle, but the firm itself has an interest in keeping secret its connection with intelligence. The witting persons are more likely to maintain secrecy if they know that there are very few of them and if they realize the importance the service attaches to keeping that number small.

Experience shows that there are security problems both ways, from cutting in too many people and from not cutting in enough. The problem in both cases generally stems from a real or imagined urgency which prompts the service to interfere with the natural development of cover. For instance, it has an agent who is not very well qualified for the cover job and is not company-trained, perhaps not yet hired by the company; but he is ready to go! The personnel manager is cut in to hire him, a section chief is cut in to streamline his training, the field manager is cut in so that he will not expect

SECRET

11

SECRET

Deep Cover

Deep Cover

SECRET

too much from him, and so on. Or else the company president removes all obstacles by fiat without explaining anything to anyone; everyone is hostile and suspicious, and the operation is off to a bad start. Time is wasted in trying so desperately to save it: the agent often returns from an unworkable assignment without having done anything for the service.

Career Contract Agents

One of the most serious problems of many deep-cover agents has been the uncertainty about career that results from their dual status in the intelligence service and in their cover; they have felt the demands of both pursuits and the reassurance of neither. Some services have tried to protect their own interests by requiring that agents going into business firms waive at the outset, when the cover arrangements are made, any right to transfer to their cover firms for some years after resigning from the service, the firms for their part agreeing not to hire them for that period. Such a provision confines the agent to his intelligence career, in which, however, he may tend to have less and less confidence the longer he remains on the outer rim of the intelligence organization. In such circumstances it is probably wiser for the service to permit immediate transfer to the cover firm and maintain its operational relationship with the agent by means of contract.

In one such case a staff agent with three years of intelligence experience but still quite clean was placed in a cover job while yet young enough to be starting on a career without prior job experience. An intelligent, enterprising, and personable young man, he did excellent work for the cover firm for 28 months; he looked genuine to the general public, and his long-range intelligence prospects seemed good. But his intelligence performance, according to rigid standards mechanically applied, did not permit a promotion in the service. It was clear that he would be better off with the cover salary and allowances than with his service pay, and the discrepancy was likely to increase as time went on.

He was therefore transferred outright to the firm, which was happy to have him as a permanent employee, with a verbal assurance from the service that it would attempt to reintegrate him at a suitable grade if he should lose his job be-

cause of his intelligence association or for some other cause not of his own making. He became a contract agent of the service, paid according to his usefulness and reimbursed for expenses incurred on its behalf. The release of this agent does not mean that intelligence interests will be sacrificed or that intelligence work will be only incidental, because he is a high-caliber young man with a bent for intelligence, and his motivation lies in the very nature of the work. It is unlikely that the service will ever lose him.

It is more the manner than the fact of separation from the staff of a service that deprives it of the work of trained and experienced officers. Once a good agent has found career opportunity and security in his cover firm, it is sensible to complete the transition and put an end to his equivocal status if the transfer stands to serve the interests of all concerned. Similarly, agents can be allowed or even encouraged to develop professional or other types of self-employed cover to the point that their economic security rests principally on their cover activity, buttressed by a stipend from the service and underwritten by the understanding that, if they do well operationally, they can be assured of a career in the service in case unavoidable circumstances destroy their cover.

This kind of arrangement has two great advantages: first, the cover takes on real depth and solidity as the years go by; and second, the service is freed from innumerable administrative headaches that may otherwise plague its cover operations. One of these administrative headaches is that dependable irritant to relations with the agent, the recovery of cover payments that exceed his service entitlement. One terminated agent felt so strongly about kicking back a Christmas bonus that he wrote to headquarters, saying he was willing to return the money to the cover company but would not turn it over to the service under any circumstances. When advancement in the cover firm is rapid and the difference between cover salary and service pay gets progressively larger, the administrative tangle becomes so frustrating that there have been serious proposals to freeze the cover salaries of agents while their colleagues are being promoted. Such an expedient would violate security as well as decency, and it would be unrealistic to expect an agent in such circumstances to give the cover job a proper effort.

12

SECRET

SECRET

13

SECRET

Deep Cover

If in particular instances the interests of the service and the agent call for his retention on the staff although assigned to long-range cover duties, the career contract should be supplemented with special administrative provisions to assure him of service rights, benefits, and career opportunities comparable to those he would have on regular duty. The unorthodox nature of nonofficial cover requires destandardized practices and diversified personnel patterns. This diversification can be further advanced by greater use of natural cover.

Natural Cover

Many of the problems of deep cover are avoided when a service can recruit suitable agents already embarked on legitimate careers. A company president who claimed no intelligence experience once suggested out of common sense that instead of placing its man in his firm a service might better recruit one of his employees in the overseas branch in which it was interested. In another instance a government which needed information on the deployment and activity of certain air forces did not have to put a man under cover because its station in the area recruited one of its own citizens who represented a gasoline company and was in constant contact with key officials of the target air forces. This agent was able to develop the needed informants in the normal course of business.

Some companies are willing to furnish information on all the young men they recruit for their foreign branches and to make those selected as potential agents available for training with reasonable assurance that they will eventually be assigned where the service wants them. Similarly, some employers are willing to furnish biographic and evaluative information on their overseas employees for assessment and possible recruitment, and to arrange to bring back the recruits for a training period. The agents recruited in these ways would continue to pursue normal business careers and to expect from that source their salaries, allowances, bonuses, and promotions, as well as their financial security and their status in the community. They would be compensated equitably for intelligence services rendered, and there should be no termination problems or dual-status administrative difficulties.

T4

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

The recruitment of persons already employed or about to be hired by a firm would require fewer company employees made witting than the placing of a man from the service; normally it should be only one or two key officials. There would be none of the difficulties which the family of a converted staff employee has to face when it needs to adjust to a new mode of living. The greatest advantage of all, however, lies in the quality of the cover itself. Natural cover is the most convincing of all, and the best way to fool all the people all the time is to be genuine. Only on rare occasions, such as a cover reassignment, would there perhaps be a need to interfere discreetly with the normal course of events. The principal dangers, here as elsewhere, would be impatience and the real or fancied urgency of short-term goals.

Cover Qualifications

Once it has been decided what forms of cover can serve the intelligence objective, the task is to find an agent who has the qualifications for one of the possible cover jobs and who can, in addition, do the intelligence job that constitutes the sole reason for the undertaking. It is easy to hope for, but very difficult to find, the ideal agent who has dual qualifications. The problem, in fact, is often regarded as a dilemma: if the agent is already established in the cover company he never really gets the feel of intelligence; if he is an intelligence officer venturing forth into the business world, he is generally unconvincing in his cover life, and his tour of duty is of short duration despite original long-term plans; in the rare cases where the experienced intelligence officer has good cover qualifications, the service risks losing him to the cover pursuit, and sometimes does. Not quite a dilemma, this is a serious problem which can be solved only by making concessions.

If a cover operation is to endure, the agent's qualifications for his cover job must be unimpeachable. These qualifications are more exacting in some pursuits than in others and the amount of expertness required may be less for a young agent than for an older man, but no agent can be expected to succeed in his cover unless his cover preparation and performance are convincing in their own terms. For this reason, when the

SECRET

15

SECRET

Deep Cover

ideal agent with dual qualifications is not available for a particular long-term cover mission, cover and durability must take precedence over intelligence training and experience. A deficiency in these is not insuperable if the agent has the necessary aptitude for intelligence work. His training will have to be highly concentrated to suit his specific mission, and his experience will have to be gained on the job under the close direction of his case officer.

Agent Aptitude

Given a well-defined mission, a good cover, and an agent capable of living his cover effectively, an operation which is successful in terms of cover will still fail if the agent lacks the ability to perform his intelligence mission. In sacrificing intelligence experience to requirements of cover, therefore, it is vital not to sacrifice on the point of the agent's native ability to do a clandestine intelligence job. Many people are fascinated by espionage and like to talk about it, even in first person, but not so many are suited by character and temperament to engage in it. There are even loyal and patriotic businessmen who question the need for the clandestine collection of information; one company president being sounded out for a cover possibility quickly put an end to the exploration when he remarked that he did not "see the need for such devious methods." This is a rather widespread attitude among businessmen, who in their own highly competitive field nevertheless appreciate the importance of obtaining and safeguarding inside information.

On the other hand, there may be indications of an agent candidate's flair for intelligence work in the amount of shrewdness and discretion he shows in the conduct of his overt affairs. In any case he will have a lot to learn and need a lot of energy to learn it. A native ability for intelligence work entails not only the right attitude but also the necessary amount of drive; and the cover agent must possess the personal dynamism and resourcefulness needed to work effectively at the end of the line. The translation of an agent's native ability into the skills required by his mission is discussed in the next section of this article.

16

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

Conduct of the Operation

Living the Cover

Living one's cover is an around-the-clock job. It requires first of all that the agent in his cover work have as much competence and put out as much effort as his colleagues in comparable jobs. In certain instances special qualifications like language skill or area familiarity may compensate for other lacks, but he must conform to whatever pattern is established. Any departure from the norm provides factual justification for the instinctive hostility that rivals in a competitive field feel towards a newcomer; any special treatment obtained in order to get things done easily and quickly, such as a shortening of company training or protective intercession by the top management, will only intensify this hostility and arouse suspicion. And, of course, the agent himself must resist the very human tendency to surround himself with the mysterious aura of one engaged in special work.

Occupational interest is an important factor in living one's cover because competence and interest go together and each helps the other. It is only natural, moreover, that the agent should be expected to show an interest in the occupation he ostensibly has chosen as a career. A hobby can therefore be an indication of an agent's suitability for a particular cover position. One man with a passion for firearms was placed under cover as the representative of a dealer in small arms; wherever he was the conversation inevitably turned to guns, and his cover took care of itself.

There is an important corollary to the requirement for good performance on the cover job, and that is the need to live the kind of life that goes with the job. Here the demands on the agent are extended to his family, and the difficulties of living in accordance with cover status are generally greater for the family than for the agent himself. When there are young children there may be real hardships that should be anticipated. But it should be a prerequisite for any deep-cover assignment that the agent and his family be able to adapt themselves to the living conditions and social life of people in the cover situation.

The pull exerted by a privileged way of life is a constant danger among staff agents who have previously served under

SECRET

17

SECRET

Deep Cover

official cover. No amount of cover work can hide such conspicuous breaches as access to PX supplies or a closer association with the official government colony than the cover occupation would normally bring about. Staff officers are often vehement in their professed desire to go out under non-official cover but, once there, unwilling to forego any of the amenities of official cover; they are probably not so much attracted by the challenge of the lone game as repelled by the regimentation at headquarters and the larger stations. A mature and stable staff officer under nonofficial cover once satisfied an almost compulsive urge to visit a bowling alley where he knew many of his former associates would be playing in a league; when the incident was raised with him later as a probable security hazard, he ruefully admitted his imprudence but explained that he just had to see someone with whom he could identify himself.

The Right Case Officer

There is a tendency at large stations to entrust the less active operations to the less experienced case officers, and long-range cover operations are of course seldom productive immediately. Operations that have prospects of quick and valuable intelligence dividends are often run as vest-pocket affairs by a top station officer or the chief himself; those that have no prospects of quick results are often delegated far down the line. Field stations are pressed with work and pressured to produce, but a station's chief should work out a reasonable distribution of its effort between immediate needs and long-term investment.

Nonofficial-cover operations cannot be mass-produced and run by the book; each one has its own character and its own problems, and each requires the right case officer for the right agent if it is to have any real chance of success. The case officer's task is to develop and maintain the agent's effectiveness, and he cannot succeed in this task without the agent's absolute confidence in his competence and reliability. He must have the necessary experience, maturity, and personality to deal with that particular agent. He is generally the agent's sole link with the service; in fact, in the agent's mind he is the service, and his merits and failings are extended to the service as a whole. His whole manner with the agent must

18

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

suggest that he has no duty more important than that of directing and supporting the agent in his mission. The operational practices whose importance he wants to impress upon the agent he must teach by his own example and not by precept alone. Finally, he must have a well-balanced combination of imagination and judgment in order to deal with the constant novelty of deep-cover situations and problems.

It is also important to provide for the availability of the same case officer for a relatively long period of time, because nonofficial-cover operations are more vulnerable than any other kind to the disruptive effect of frequent case officer rotation. It is a frequent complaint of agents that with each change of case officer there appears to be a change in emphasis and guidance, and inasmuch as the case officer is the sole channel for the agent's direction, there is no corrective for this impression of inconsistency. When a case officer must be replaced, the transition should be planned well enough in advance not only to permit the choice of a successor well qualified professionally and personally to direct the particular agent but also to allow this successor to get the feel and tempo of the operation. The agent will not fear that the operation is apt to be swayed by the whim of his immediate handlers if the new case officer introduces any necessary changes after a smooth period of transition.

Clandestine Contact

The procedure for initial contact with the agent should be decided before he is in place, and it must be compatible with the ultimate purpose of the operation; if the agent's cover is to endure, he has to be handled as a sensitive agent from the very start. A continuous clandestine relationship is needed from the outset to condition the agent properly for his role; it will help keep his clandestine mission ever present in his mind despite the demands of cover work, and it will sustain his morale by demonstrating the importance the case officer attaches to the security of the operation. The regularity, the relative frequency, and the average duration of case-officer contacts necessary to the successful development and maintenance of a long-term mission require that most if not all of them be clandestine meetings under safe conditions.

SECRET

19

SECRET

Deep Cover

Whether or not there should be overt contact and what sort of overt contact would be advantageous are problems that involve a number of factors. The best bet is to keep the relationship entirely clandestine until both case officer and agent can analyze these factors and make an informed decision. It is necessary to restrain the tendency toward carelessness that often characterizes the period of cover establishment, when the agent more or less abstains from aggressive intelligence activity. The tendency to feel complacent is all the greater when the political atmosphere is relaxed, but the situation can change quickly and it may then be too late to tighten up.

The factors that should influence the decision to surface or not to surface the contact lie in the nature of the environment and of the intelligence mission itself. In areas where contact between the nationals in question or between them and local persons is commonplace, an occasional overt contact may serve to avert suspicion in case one of the clandestine contacts is accidentally exposed. Many successful operations are handled in this manner. In other areas, overt contact between case officer and agent may not be advisable. The agent's mission may be such as to make overt contact inadvisable in any circumstances, for instance one in which he is acting the part of a political renegade.

There is another consideration that should enter into the decision whether or not to surface, even in the most favorable operational climate. Case officers under official cover who have a large number of legitimate overt contacts may feel that one more will appear equally innocent to all onlookers. But not all onlookers will add the same figures and reach the same totals, and it may be that this one relationship will arouse the curiosity of certain persons and lead them to probe beneath the surface; it is always possible to chance upon the right conclusion from a partial set of facts. There are generally valid arguments both for and against surfacing. A wise decision requires a knowledge and appraisal of the fine points involved before the irrevocable act is committed.

Once a decision to surface has been reached, the cover situation of the two principals should determine the manner of the surfacing. It should be done in such a way as to appear

20

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

natural and to minimize any suspicion of contrivance. One agent and case officer who had children in the same school and participated in school support activities formed a nodding acquaintance susceptible of further development. Some agents find legitimate reason to consult the case officer in his official cover capacity. Others meet their case officers at the homes of mutual acquaintances. Still others may have to contrive a meeting if their overt positions do not provide a ready logical justification for their encounter.

There is also the question of frequency of overt contacts. One chief of station avoids all but the rarest social contact with his covert agent because, he soundly reasons, the counterintelligence opposition, if alerted, would probably never hear the contrived explanation but only note the fact of meetings. Another case officer reports that some close friends whom he saw several times a month were wrongly suspect to the opposition, whereas his deep-cover agent, whom he very rarely saw overtly, was apparently considered clean. If these officers should relax and slide into the habit of careless contact, they might soon reach a point of no return: once government interest in an agent is suspected the damage cannot be undone.

On-the-Job Training

It is important to maintain regular contact with the non-official-cover agent from the very start, even though he may not yet be fully embarked on his intelligence mission. The case officer must condition his agent to live according to his cover status, within his ostensible cover income, and be sure that he does not allow himself telltale benefits such as the acquisition of PX commodities to which he is not normally entitled. The period when the agent establishes his cover is the critical time when his attitude towards his twofold job takes shape. Too often an agent is allowed to occupy himself solely with cover work for a long time; afterwards it is always difficult, and in some cases it is impossible, to revive his interest in intelligence. The cover job, for lack of competition, quite naturally occupies the agent's full time and interest, and the longer one waits the more difficult it is to superimpose a second job.

SECRET

21

SECRET

Deep Cover

Furthermore, the case officer has an operational interest in the successful establishment of cover, that necessary prelude to active operations. One case of agent neglect during this early period had consequences even worse than a drift away from the intelligence objective. Two agents were placed together in the same cover office, told to build cover, and left pretty much to themselves. They developed a bitter hostility toward each other which the station was either unaware of or unconcerned about. Headquarters repeatedly heard of the flareups only through the company president. This very cooperative person must have gained a poor opinion of the kind of supervision exercised by the service, and the agents themselves could not have helped making the inevitable comparison between the commercial and the operational management.

The case officer's concern with the period of cover establishment is not only protective, that is to avoid cover pitfalls and prevent the agent from losing interest in intelligence. This period must also, and principally, serve to prepare the agent for the tasks ahead. The nature and extent of the preparation needed will vary from case to case, depending on the agent's prior experience and training and on the tradecraft and reporting demands of his intelligence mission. Formal training, valuable as it is, is only a preparation for experience, not a substitute for it, and the case officer will have to develop the results of any pertinent past training the agent may have had into practical skills.

First of all, the case officer must keep abreast of the agent's cover problems and progress in order to blend matters of operational import into his activity at the right time and in the proper gradation. At the same time he must make sure that the agent understands his mission thoroughly, for that is the entire purpose of the operation, anything else being only a means to the end. He must see to it that the agent gets sufficient practice, to the point of perfection if necessary, in the particular tasks that his mission will require, such as observation, elicitation, and assessment, practice that can be done in the normal course of cover work. The product of these exercises should be submitted in the form of reports—biographic reports, target data, general information reports, and written assessments. The agent may need technical skills, some of which, like photography, can be practiced as a

22

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

hobby, and some, like secret writing, only in seclusion. Whatever skills he needs he must master, for there should be no major deficiency in the makeup of the long-term agent. Conversely, however, his training should not be loaded with non-essentials.

The agent should regularly report his contacts, some of whom may be of interest to the station whether or not it plans for him to use them. He must be trained to transmit information accurately and completely, and he must appreciate the importance of operational data in the evaluation of his information. He must be alert to the by-products of his work toward his own objective, such as spotting information and other operational leads. He must understand the complementary purposes of cover—to protect the agent and expose the targets—and he must learn to use his own cover safely and effectively. These fundamentals will naturally have been covered in his briefing and training, but the case officer needs always to bear in mind that an agent who lives in isolation can in a surprisingly short time become oblivious of the most elementary principles of tradecraft unless they are kept constantly before him.

A long-term nonofficial-cover agent, we have noted, must have the right attitude towards clandestine work and the necessary drive to keep going without constant prodding. There is much that he can do by himself in preparing for his mission, and if he is to become conversant with all aspects of the situation related to his intelligence mission, no amount of briefing can make up for his own lack of initiative. It is up to the agent, with appropriate station support, to acquire background information and keep up with overt developments in his field of intelligence interest, so that he can recognize the significance of his requirements and of the information he collects to fulfill them. If his objective, for instance, is the penetration of a political group, he should find information easily available on its leaders present and potential, its sources of support, its stand on important issues, its allies and enemies, its relationships abroad, the divisions within its ranks, and so on; and he must of course also be familiar with the wider national background in which the group operates.

SECRET

23

SECRET

Deep Cover

All this information is indispensable for the agent's performance of his mission, but it is important even in the preparatory stage when he discusses with his case officer his intelligence objectives, his ideas with respect to attaining them, and his progress in working his way closer to his targets. The intelligence tasks and discussions of this early period will work toward the necessary correlation in the agent's mind of his cover occupation with his intelligence mission, and they will sharpen his alertness to possible intelligence significance in whatever he hears or sees. He should reach the point, as one officer expressed it, where he views his whole environment "through intelligence eyeglasses."

At the same time, the exercises and discussions will provide a running gauge of the agent's competence and enable the case officer to keep currently planned a workable progression of intelligence tasks. This progression should nourish the agent's confidence and self-reliance and help him advance smoothly to the point where he can develop and handle his own sources of information, the primary skill of an intelligence collection officer. There are instances where the progression of tasks does not quite achieve this desired result; in these, the case officer may further ease the agent's transition to active operations by turning over to him a secure going operation if there is a suitable one at hand in the general sector of his intelligence mission.

Intelligence Support

A long-range intelligence agent under nonofficial cover is not a lone operator in the sense that he can be expected to work without direction. For reasons of security he must be able to stand a considerable amount of isolation from the service, but it should be clear to him that this isolation is an operational necessity, not the result of neglect or oblivion. His morale has to be maintained over the years, and the morale of a good agent can be sustained only by the inner feeling that he is doing a valuable job as an integral part of the service. This feeling cannot be instilled by reassuring words; it can come only from the agent's own day-to-day recognition of the value of his mission and his work in furtherance of the

24

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

broader missions of the station and even of the service as a whole. An agent once pictured his uneasiness in these terms:

"The rule is followed that there is no use showing the agent any material that does not concern his project. He has little opportunity to call on someone else for advice. It is unlikely that he will ever hear what happens to the information he turns in, or whether headquarters found it useful or not. He is in the unfortunate position where his shortcomings are open to almost instant scrutiny and not hidden by the mass of work in an office."

Too narrow an interpretation of the need-to-know principle can demoralize the man at the end of the line. In the interest of his effectiveness no less than of his morale, the agent must be given a sufficiently well-rounded interpretation of his progress; and that means that the case officer himself has to be well informed on the station's general operational program and performance in order to discuss the agent's work with him in its wider context. The agent should also receive currently, beyond the usual requirements and target information, any background data and any general guidance that will help him recognize operational opportunities outside of his assigned tasks and propose new approaches to his own objectives. If he receives anything less than all-out operational support, the expensive deep-cover agent will be working at a fraction of his capacity.

Furthermore, the considerable amount of time and effort required to keep a good agent primed for his best performance is not so much an operational overhead as an investment; not only should it yield a better intelligence product, but it should also develop and maintain a sound initiative in the agent and enable him to become less dependent on his case officer for day-to-day guidance. In short, nothing is more important to the agent than timely evaluations of his performance and production, and there is no better stimulus and guide for improvement. If it is at all possible, an occasional secure contact with the station chief would contribute to the agent's sense of belonging and it would be a shot-in-the-arm for him to hear from the top man a few well-informed remarks about his work and its value. The goal of intelligence support of the long-term agent is to keep him constantly oriented and inspired towards his informational objectives.

SECRET

25

SECRET

Deep Cover

Maintenance of Purpose

We have already stressed the fact that the agent must have a clear understanding of his mission at the outset and that he and his case officer must keep it constantly in mind. Headquarters and the station must have the same understanding of the purpose of the operation, they must both agree to it, and if this purpose is a valid one they should stick to it. The temptations to redirect cover operations are many and varied; they should be examined thoroughly and, unless the change is unquestionably for the better, they should be resisted. There is no surer way to bewilder the agent than to force him repeatedly to change his course, and often there is no more certain way to doom the operation. A radical change in target, as for example from one ethnic group to another, will be wholly incompatible with the pattern of activity already established by the agent, and it may be incompatible with his basic cover.

Frequent organizational and personnel changes in a service bring a succession of officers with differing views into control of cover operations, and some new officers are prone to make changes before they fully understand the intent of their predecessors. Sometimes deep-cover operations are diverted and exposed for the sake of expediency: the chronic urgencies in some unsettled areas lead, sometimes justifiably, to the commitment of cover resources to purposes for which they were not originally intended. Much less justified are those purely administrative urgencies which prompt a service to throw a nonofficial-cover agent into a routine and perhaps insecure operation because someone is needed and he happens to be at hand. Operations in which such hasty resort is made to expediency are usually characterized by general laxity: the natural limits of the cover are overstepped, the elements of risk are glossed over, and tradecraft is ignored. One long-range agent who was well established in his cover and had obtained good access to targets was assigned to replace a departing case officer in charge of an operation that was already compromised; he had to be withdrawn from the area a few months later. The agent was lost without benefit to the operation. Long-range operations demand consistency.

26

SECRET

SECRET

Deep Cover

Progress and Production

The unorthodox nature of the deep-cover agent entails a need to judge his work by different standards from those used in evaluating the performance of persons under official cover. Even among themselves deep-cover operations differ from one another, and their value cannot be determined by any common criteria. Some operations officers, who may complain loudly when deep-cover operations are put through the budget wringer along with the rest of the wash, are still prone to measure their value with the same yardstick they use for other agent operations, that is production statistics. Some officers, on the other hand, may go to the opposite extreme, treating the agents as sleepers and demanding patience and the long-range view without giving any inkling of the time and manner of the awakening.

The right view, of course, is in the happy medium, a position easier to state than to define. The long-range agent should not be pressured to produce as soon as he is in place, but except in rare cases he is not a sleeper, exempt from all operational performance. In the preceding section we have described tasks he can perform from the very start, tasks that will contribute to his training and experience, maintain his interest and morale, and sometimes be of immediate value to the station. These tasks will also hasten the day when he becomes truly operational. If no intelligence production is expected in the early stage, there must still be progress, and the operation should be judged by the operational headway it makes toward its objective, according to an estimate of reasonable expectations outlined in advance.

A premature demand from headquarters for production may change the case officer's concern from operational progress to project justification, he may as a result direct the agent towards readily accessible targets, and the operation will have acquired a new purpose—its own survival. A long-range intelligence operation deserves headquarters' patience; but headquarters in turn is entitled to progress, and eventually to production. There is no place in a mature service for the epitaph over a terminated operation that it had been "extremely valuable as experience" although it had produced

SECRET

27

SECRET

Deep Cover

nothing or for the consolatory view of a malingering agent that he is not producing but "his cover is excellent."

The goal of clandestine intelligence operations is the collection of clandestine information. If there is a major defect in an operation, that is if it is apparent that it cannot and will not become productive, it should be terminated in order to give the case officer time to develop better operations. To the question, when should one expect production to begin? there is no single answer, because circumstances vary with the operation. But if the persons most closely concerned with an operation cannot give an approximate date it is probably not progressing towards production. There is a natural reluctance to end a going operation, even if it is not going anywhere. It was once reported in the review of an operation that "a kind of operational inertia set in, and it was easier for all concerned to let the operation run than to terminate it and sort out the pieces." But to prolong an unsuccessful venture on mere hope or through force of habit is an expensive exercise in futility.

* * *

Long-range cover operations will always be difficult to prepare and to maintain, and there is never a certainty of success. They are always vulnerable in the sense that one weak element can nullify the excellence of all the others, and even the soundest cover operation can be destroyed by pure bad luck. But although one can never be sure of success, the odds against it can certainly be reduced. They can be reduced by not persisting in doing things the hard way. The recruitment of suitable agents already under natural cover and the transfer to career contract agent status of staff agents who make good with a cover organization can limit the use of staff agents in long-range cover operations and spare much of the grief that stems from their morale problems and their tight-fitting, buttons-in-the-back administrative suit, with salary adjustments, bonus kickbacks, covert tax returns, and so on.

Chances of success can be improved in a more basic way by keeping in check the habits and the tempo that sometimes ooze over from official cover practices to nonofficial cover, with lamentable results. Nonofficial cover requires, not the mechanical efficiency of the assembly-line worker, but the pa-

28

SECRET

Deep Cover

SECRET

tient inventiveness of the artisan, and an official-cover carry-over is especially harmful to operations intended for long-term coverage of sensitive targets. A repetition of previous mistakes is generally the result of congenital haste and a fondness for short cuts: long-term cover operations allow few concessions to expediency.

This paper has laid particular stress on planning and preparation because the early period is decisive; after a certain point the die is cast and little can be done to improve or redirect an operation. And yet, though totally sterile, it may continue for years, at great expense and constituting a time-consuming treadmill for the case officer in whose lap it falls. That is why long-range cover operations require patient and painstaking effort from start to finish.

SECRET

29

SECRET

Broad reflections on the role of concealment in unconventional warfare and other clandestine operations.

COVER IN UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Harvey B. McCadden

Mr. James Thurber, reviewing a book about caterpillars, complained that "the author has told me more about the caterpillar than I wished to know." Prospective readers of this paper are promised no such exhaustive or exhausting treatment, but some remarks on cover and concealment seem appropriate at a time when studies are in progress looking toward a more effective and better polished conduct of unconventional warfare operations.

Unconventional operations, bellicose or otherwise, if they are to retain the conspiratorial and secret attributes they have had in the past, bespeak cover and concealment, at least in their organizational stages and sometimes through their entire life cycle. Cover is almost always necessary for the protection of conspiracy and conspirators as they organize for action. If surprise is to play any part in the fruition of the conspiracy, cover is a useful and sometimes a necessary ingredient in mounting the action. And if for political reasons abroad the government sponsorship or perpetration of the action is not to be revealed, then cover is a *sine qua non* throughout. Cover affords protection against counteraction either of a direct sort or through mobilization of adverse public opinion.

Cover is therefore a consideration to be weighed in connection with any examination or re-examination of the modus of unconventional operations. It is not, of course, the only pertinent consideration; for one thing, it is never quite separable from other pervasive protective elements of the operational plan, particularly security and counterintelligence. But cover and concealment are worth singling out here as one aspect of unconventional operation sometimes obscured by the complexity of the whole.

SECRET

31

MORI/HRP PAGES
31-35

SECRET

Unconventional Operations

Unconventional Operations

SECRET

Cover as Integral to Planning

A major point to be emphasized is that cover, the assumption of some ostensible legitimate status to conceal the hand of intelligence or operations personnel and protect their activities, must be treated as an integral part of the plan for the conduct of any clandestine operation. It does not fall into the category of a support factor on the peripheral framework of the plan nor is it an element solely of its executional phase. Such views are intrinsic hazards to the basic philosophy of clandestine operation. Cover is a determining element in the plan itself, and a sound concept of its application must be worked out in advance. All persons responsible for the execution of the plan must know the "legend" beforehand, and during the execution they must accept the discipline it requires and adhere to the regimen it imposes.

Because of this burden of maintaining cover and the hazards of exposure,¹ if for no other reason, clandestine procedure should not be adopted for an action unless the national interest clearly demands it. For once it is decided that an operation is to be clandestine, there is no recourse in its execution from this burden and these hazards.

An example of operational cover consistently maintained is the Soviet deployment of a trawler fleet into international waters, including the sea lanes of the Western powers. Whatever the plan of clandestine operations for this fleet may be, the cover of commercial fishing is an integral part of it. When suspicions have been voiced that the "fishing" is of a peculiar surreptitious kind, the Russians have steadfastly maintained a position of international legality and rectitude. The fishing legend is always vigorously reasserted, and it is accepted by those who are inclined to believe the best of the Bulwark of Socialist Society. In adopting this cover the Russians apparently considered protection against adverse public opinion worth the cost—in men, money, materials, and planning effort—of creating for their clandestine activity this elaborate equipment identified with peacetime pursuits.

¹The usual agents of exposure are not only enemy counterintelligence services, but also friendly counterintelligence services, newsmen with exaggerated zeal, and fellow citizens competing in the cover capacity or just infected with one-upmanship.

32

SECRET

As corollary to the proposition that cover is integral to the concept of an operation, it follows that the conduct of the operation must be shaped to fit its cover legend. For one thing, personnel overtly connected with the operating agency, or with other government agencies and departments, can play only a limited role in the execution of a clandestine operation, one that permits them to remain in the background unidentified with the plan or its execution.² And the drive to "get things done" must frequently give way to measured, often cumbersome, sometimes inefficient, methods necessary to preserve the cover legend.

Extemporization of cover in the conduct of a clandestine operation must be closely controlled and in each instance carefully evaluated in relation to the totality of the coverture. Cover contrived empirically for an act ancillary to a planned operation may conveniently cover the act but at the same time be inimical to or inconsistent with the cover legend; coverture of the part may tend to expose the whole. For example, the purchase of expensive equipment by a "private citizen" for cash may hide the identity of the buyer but may create a whirlwind of conjecture in the business community, leading to a consensus, particularly if the purchase is one of a series of suspicious incidents, that the cover legend is an official contrivance. Even in an agency composed of civilians trained in the use of cover, it is a formidable task to enforce unremitting application of a cover legend in the face of more expeditious ways of "getting on with the job." Within a military structure, the accommodation to such an inhibiting factor poses an even graver problem to personnel trained in traditional methods of direct action.

Magnitude and Concealment

Since requirements for concealment may vary according to circumstance, cover may be considered a variable both qualitatively and quantitatively. It may vary qualitatively accord-

²Although it is almost a truism, it is perhaps worth repeating that once an individual, however well qualified for a particular assignment, is publicly identified with a government department or agency, there are no mechanics of disassociation that can assure him protection from identification by hostile intelligence services and propagandists, or for that matter by friendly enemies.

SECRET

33

SECRET

Unconventional Operations

ing to the depth of concealment required by political considerations, and also quantitatively with the size of the operation or the nature of the support available for it. Operations undertaken in a favorable political climate and with the tacit consent of the local government may require only a thin veil to conform to political niceties, whereas those mounted under a hostile regime may require the ultimate in concealment.

With respect to size and complexity, it may be said that in general the smaller the operation in terms of men, money, and materials, the better the chance for its complete coverage. Some large operations are of such a nature that they may be covered up to a given point in their unfoldment but then inevitably become apparent. For these a judgment must be made as to whether the advantages of a temporary cover legend are worth the effort entailed and any ill effects of the subsequent exposure. The sheer magnitude of a given operation sometimes limits the reliance that can be placed on cover and concealment, but even here particular aspects of the whole may be cloaked by the controlled use of physical security, surprise, and operational deception, as well as cover. When all tricks of the trade are skillfully applied, much can be accomplished, probably more than is realized by the current crop of expostulators who seek the public ear and eye. In this broad sense remarkably good coverture was attained for many aspects of the largest operation in which this nation ever participated, Overlord.

There are of course other limiting influences on cover and concealment besides the magnitude of the operation—geography, for example, if we speak of an infiltration operation. It goes without saying that a cross-border operation from a contiguous wooded area can be concealed much more easily than a penetration from across a large intervening stretch of water, sand, or exposed flatland. In addition, ethnological and ecological limitations play their part. These latter have been well debated and categorized in the past and this information is available for future guidance.

It is, however, the limitations imposed by magnitude and complexity that undoubtedly need re-examination and debate at this point. We came out of World War II with some fairly

34

SECRET

Unconventional Operations

SECRET

firm ideas on the limitations inherent in clandestine operations by their very nature, particularly those of the kind undertaken by the early Resistance, based largely on hope with little assurance of ultimate deliverance from the Nazis. The dogma of small, compartmented units and closely held knowledge, so painfully achieved at that time, seems of late to have lost its currency. We have fallen into habits of thought which permit covert operations to take on any degree of magnitude from the deployment of a solitary agent to actions involving hundreds of people.

But it is not our purpose here to prejudge the problem of scope and magnitude; it should be the subject of a careful and well-paced examination, which should at the same time consider the inhibitions imposed on unconventional operations by the necessity of maintaining a benignant world opinion. In the process of any such evaluation, however, we must especially guard against any tendency to derogate the very concept of the use of covert operations in the nation's interest.

Having begun these reflections with a quotation from a prophet of joy, we might end with comment on one from a prophet of gloom. A columnist in the *Washington Post* of 9 May 1961 was moved to say, "It is not possible for a free and open society to organize successfully a spectacular conspiracy. The United States, like every other government, must employ secret agents. But the United States cannot successfully conduct large secret conspiracies. It is impossible to keep them secret."

A free society may not be able to organize a "spectacular conspiracy," for that is an outright contradiction in terms. But as a nation we can do just about all we need to do in the way of conspiracy—if it is carefully planned with due regard to the integrality of its elements, if the plan is continuously weighed against the consequences of failure, and if it is executed with the required care and deliberation. Our freedom was gained in substantial part by conspiratorial action; in the same fashion much can be done to keep it.

SECRET

35

SECRET

*Imprecision and real hazards in
an arbitrarily prescribed divi-
sion of functions.*

THE COLLECTOR'S ROLE IN EVALUATION

Bruce L. Pechan

Ever since the establishment of a defined and ordered central intelligence program, the community has performed one of its fundamental functions on the basis of a fiction. This fiction has by now come to be accepted as fact in some circles, and there is a dangerous chance that ultimately it could be universally accepted. I refer to the notion that the collector of information is not qualified or authorized, much less obligated, to participate in the evaluation of the reports he transmits. If this idea in its full implication is ever accepted by the collector, it will do great harm not only to our evaluative and estimative performance but to our performance in clandestine collection as well.

The official fiction makes Evaluation a ritual which only analysts are ordained the high priests to perform. Clandestine collectors, with their often impressive qualifications, may subject an item to a thorough process which bears all the earmarks of evaluation, but this is not officially accepted as Evaluation and may not be designated by that term. Recipients of clandestine reports are protected against any such misconception by the solemn warning, "This is unevaluated information."

This pre-emption of the word "evaluation" to denote a particular step in what is a composite process has left us floundering for terms to apply to other steps. For the field collector's judgment as to the probability that a report is true we must use the synonym "appraisal" in order to preserve the analytic monopoly on Evaluation. The collector's judgment as to the significance of an item of information must be designated vaguely "comments" to avoid the implication that he has some evaluative responsibility.

The tortured circumlocutions that must thus be employed in referring to the collector's role in evaluation are unbecom-

SECRET

37

MORI/HRP PAGES 37-47

SECRET

Evaluation

ing in a profession in which search for objective truth and precision in the use of language are cardinal principles; but the official fiction has more serious consequences than these semantic ones. The best of our collectors, ignoring the codified absurdities, have for years been offering their own evaluations as appropriate, unconcerned by what name they are called. But some collectors have been honestly confused by the hazy language describing their evaluative functions, and some have accepted literally the dictum that the collector has no responsibility in the evaluation of an item's significance. When this happens, the quality of collection and reporting inevitably suffers and valuable judgments are lost.

There is a tendency in some quarters to regard collection as a technical process and collectors as mere technicians. But a technique that employs human agents rather than black boxes requires considerably more than technical skill. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the duties of the clandestine collector in connection with evaluation in order to clarify his natural and proper role in making the judgments of which evaluation consists. The discussion will be confined to evaluation done for the benefit of estimators and policy makers, not touching the slightly different characteristics of the same process undertaken for the purpose of guiding collectors in the pursuit of further information. Although addressed specifically to the role of the covert collector, much that follows will apply equally to that of the overt collector.

Determination of Probability

Evaluation, as the term is used in the intelligence world, consists of determinations on two matters—the truth or probability of facts reported, and their significance if true. Evidence about probability is of two kinds. One kind of evidence lies in the origin and acquisition of the report, i.e., the reliability, capability, access to information, etc., of the source, and the circumstances surrounding his acquisition of the information. The second kind has to do with the information itself—the amount of confirmatory or contradictory information already in hand, or in the absence of direct confirmation or contradiction, the internal logic of the new information in its relation to what is already known.

38

SECRET

Evaluation

SECRET

The collector is held responsible for providing the first, external kind of evidence—an evaluation (officially labeled such) of his source's reliability, and an account of the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the information. These two elements of external evidence are to be used by the analyst as factors in determining the degree of probability that the information is true. In providing them the collector has discharged his major assigned responsibility in the evaluative process, and he is not regarded as having thereby engaged in evaluation of the information itself. To see whether this is a realistic view let us look more closely at the nature of these two elements.

Source. The one accepted evaluative judgment of the collector, his source evaluation, is generally considered to be independent of the particular information reported. Source reliability is regarded as a relatively stable factor, and a C source has to prove his reliability over a considerable period to be advanced to a B rating. Once he achieves this, he is not deprived of it unless his reliability shows a decrease over another considerable period. This is a convenient practice and serves reasonably well for most of our clandestine sources, but in any given instance it may be invalid. A source who is reliable in one field may be less reliable in another, whether for lack of competence, lack of access, or lack of will to be reliable. The collector who smugly rests on his source's B rating is flirting with disaster; there is always the possibility that the B rating may not apply in the instance at hand.

This means that the collector must be constantly alert to possible shifts in his source's reliability, brought about by variations in the source's access to information or in his motivation or by lack of competence to report intelligently on a new subject. These can be detected only by regular analysis and *evaluation of the significance* of the information being received in terms of the source's capability and access and especially of his motivation. This analysis may be only a matter of form in the case of a staunch anti-Communist Japanese reporting the movements of Communist organizers, but it can be an endlessly complex job when a Japanese socialist is reporting on Japanese political undercurrents.

SECRET

39

SECRET

Evaluation

Circumstances. In the simplest of situations, that in which the source is reporting on something of which he has direct participating knowledge (such as a plot in which he is one of the leading conspirators), the source evaluation bears directly on the probable truth of the information. But when the source is reporting information he acquired second hand, the source evaluation can bear only on the credibility of his account of how he got the information; and the circumstances of its acquisition here gain importance as the only valid external evidence bearing directly on the probability of its being true.

An account of the circumstances of acquisition is expected of clandestine collectors for each individual report. Many agent operations have a standard pattern in which agents of fairly stable reliability report regularly in one or two sectors and their mode of acquisition remains unchanged in any important particular over a long period of time. But if a situation being reported on grows tense or if security conditions for the source become more stringent, this comfortable stability diminishes; the circumstances surrounding acquisition become of increasing importance and tend to vary appreciably from report to report. This is particularly true of political reporting on an area in crisis where the source may have to acquire his information in a variety of ways. In such situations the factors of acquisition pertinent to a determination of truth are often closely related to the *significance of the information*. To get at these factors the collector must analyze the information itself and work back from that point to draw out his source to best advantage.

In sum, the collector must for his own purposes evaluate the information he receives if he is to perform with discrimination his tasks of evaluating the source and reporting acquisition data. He thus has a head start toward fulfilling his third assigned function in the evaluative process, that of "appraising" factual probability. For this purpose, however, before he can make a judgment of validity, he needs additionally a respectable store of knowledge on the subject to which the new information pertains. We shall return to this point shortly.

40

SECRET

Evaluation

SECRET

Determination of Significance

In evaluating the significance of a report there are at least four elements to be determined. The first is whether it has relevance to an established requirement. The second is its meaning in terms of the requirement, in other words its place and contribution in the fulfillment of the requirement. The third is its relative weight, impact, or importance. And the fourth is the timeliness of the information, with particular reference to the timing of events predictable therefrom.

A study of the extended implications of these several elements shows some significant characteristics of the evaluation function. First, evaluation is an exercise of human judgment, under the best of circumstances subject to human limitations and human error. Any single evaluation may be wholly accurate, but the sum total of all our evaluations will fall short of perfection. Second, it is a transitory judgment, rarely if ever a fixed and stable truth. It is subject to change with changes in the facts themselves or with the acquisition of new information. Third, it is an organic process comprising a number of successive steps, and though each of these may be complete in its own terms no one of them is the whole of evaluation. Some of these steps occur very early in the official life of an item of information. Let us then look at them more closely, and determine who it is that logically takes each of them.

In denying responsibility to the collector for evaluation we have overlooked entirely that he is de facto authorized to exercise evaluative judgment regarding relevance, importance, and timeliness, and that these judgments of his are often final and irrevocable. His right to kill a report for lack of relevance is uncontested. To cut down marginal reporting he is given lively encouragement even to kill information of limited relevance or importance. And because of his front-line location in the collection process, he must judge both timeliness and importance in deciding whether to send a report by pouch or by one of several orders of cable precedence. Whether his judgments are good or bad, the actions based on them are definitive: once a report is destroyed in the field it is beyond our reach to recall and reconsider. Or once pouched

SECRET

41

SECRET

Evaluation

as having limited timeliness or importance, the delay in its transmission is an unchangeable fact.

These judgments, however, are not Evaluation with a capital E, which is apparently thought to require a study in depth of relevance, importance, and factual probability for which the collector is not qualified. Let us then examine the prerequisites for such a study.

Capabilities of the Collector

The qualifications needed to be capable of evaluation in depth may be summed up in two categories: ability as a thinking man to reach sensible conclusions, and command of a pertinent body of knowledge on which to base them. With purely personal capabilities there is no reason to suppose that the collector is less generously endowed than the analyst; there is nothing in the analytic function that increases nor in the collecting that decreases the native ability of the naked man to think. It is held in some quarters, however, that the practice of the different functions enhances the ability of the one and detracts from that of the other to apply his logical capacity to the function of evaluation in depth, that analysis contributes to and collection detracts from the conditioning of the mental equipment for evaluation.

This effect is said to be produced in two ways. First, since the analyst must evaluate regularly as part of his job, his equipment for evaluation becomes more and more highly trained, whereas the collector, who by definition does not evaluate as a necessary part of his job, lets his equipment, however naturally great and highly trained when he starts out, become rusty from disuse. I have already shown that evaluation of the significance of information is a necessary adjunct to a collector's proper performance of his assigned evaluative responsibilities. I shall deal further with this point in a moment.

The second argument is that the influence of contact with his sources and his personal interest in the success of his operations render the collector undependable as a maker of objective judgments. I will concede that bias may be introduced into his thinking by his identification with sources and operations, but I believe the danger is often overstated. First of all, the possibility of such bias is accepted by collectors them-

42

SECRET

Evaluation

SECRET

selves, and the seasoned collector builds up a healthy skepticism to minimize it. Second, since his personal interests are bound up in the success of his operations, the experienced collector realizes that overselling his product may reflect badly on himself and so cultivates a counteracting tendency to undersell.

Admitting that bias, while not inevitable, remains a possibility in the collector's evaluative judgments, we should note that it is not peculiar to the collector. The analyst too may, and sometimes does, exhibit bias toward a point of view and interpret new facts in such a way as to make them support a preconceived conclusion. Pearl Harbor and a number of more recent strategic surprises bear memorable witness to the possibility that analysts may reject or downgrade evidence not in accord with their preconceptions. And since bias is a human failing that afflicts all of us to some degree, the best way to insure objectivity in evaluation is to take into account the judgments of all those in a position to render valid opinions.

Is the collector in such a position? Theoretically, only a person with access to all related knowledge can render the definitive evaluation of a new fact. The analyst most nearly meets this condition: in addition to his own knowledge of the area or subject matter he can call on a vast organized store of related facts from all available sources. But he does not approach an allness in this store, and on some areas and subjects it is pitifully thin. So if it were true that evaluation is not Evaluation unless it is based on the entirety of data we should have no Evaluations whatever. Actually, we seldom need all the facts to make a valid evaluative judgment. Of the hundred thousand facts about a country we may have stored up in machine records, ranging from the makeup of the party of the opposition in 1897 to the number of aluminum teeth worn by the current labor minister, we may find that only sixteen are of any use in determining the significance of a new item. The work-a-day analyst quickly learns to confine his consideration of data on hand to those of substantial pertinence. Otherwise he would turn out precious few evaluations.

Given that the analyst must evaluate on the basis of incomplete data, what kind of data is he most likely to lack? On many countries and subjects his store of organized and

SECRET

43

SECRET

Evaluation

usable information grows sparse as we approach the immediate now, because of the inescapable lags in acquisition, transmission, organization, and assimilation of up-to-the-minute facts. In a rapidly changing situation he usually lacks the facts most essential for a valid evaluation of new information. That this is recognized by analysts themselves is shown in a recent review of clandestine reporting on a certain area: "... During a critical situation ... field interpretations of the significance and probability of the information reported are needed by the customers to a greatly increased extent." This plea lacks any official standing as a directive for collectors to evaluate, but it remains a direct and realistic expression of need by one set of analysts aware of the limitations placed on their own judgments by circumstances.

The field collector, and I speak here of both the overt and the covert collector, is best situated to acquire what the analyst most keenly lacks: current information on the area in which he works. He it is who can immerse himself wholly in the life of the area, have daily contact with broad segments of its people and its thought, and develop a capacity for judgment which under some circumstances is beyond the capability of the distant analyst. The 1956 uprising in Hungary was unforeseen in our national estimates not because we lacked excellent analysts working on the area or knowledge of the history of Hungary or information on the economic situation, but primarily because we had no qualified body of observers present on the scene to report the things that could be experienced and interpreted only by being there.

It is argued that the collector can fill this gap by furnishing the analyst that evidence on which he himself would base an evaluative judgment were he called on to make one. But this is impractical in many cases. There are often too many small details, some too elusive to capture in a written report, too closely bound up with the physical presence of the collector in the area. Many of the indicators simply do not speak to the analyst in his remote office with the same ring they have for the collector experiencing them in the field.

The collector is not only thus uniquely qualified under certain circumstances to evaluate new information, he *must* evaluate if he is to produce good reports. We have already discussed the importance of evaluating the significance of in-

44

SECRET

Evaluation

SECRET

formation as an adjunct to the task of evaluating the source and providing useful acquisition data. Evaluative judgments are required also in getting the maximum of information from agents and informants. The skilled collector in the field, overt or covert, far from being a mere technician, is a whole intelligence community in miniature. When he debriefs an agent he runs through the entire intelligence cycle, sometimes several times over. As an agent makes a report, the collector evaluates it as to relevance. If it is relevant, he hastily evaluates its significance as nearly as he can and uses it to formulate new requirements. These he immediately puts to the agent in the form he judges most likely to draw out additional facts and related information which the agent may have overlooked, not realized he knew, or intended not to reveal. By this means the collector often greatly increases the substantive value of his report.

The important thing here is that the collector is limited by his capacity to judge significance. When he reaches the limit of the body of particular facts and broad general knowledge at his command and therefore of his ability to analyze the new facts in relation to them, he must content himself with accepting whatever the agent offers and sending it on for others to work on. It is axiomatic that, other things being equal, a collector who is well grounded in a subject is a better collector in that subject than one who is not. He can instantly analyze, evaluate, and extemporize his own requirements, short-circuiting by days or weeks the process of getting further guidance from the analyst. The mental operations of analysis and evaluation, by whatever terms they are designated, are inextricably involved in this short-circuiting, and it is clear that the skilled collector must have an evaluative technique well polished by use.

Limitations on the Collector

Limitations there certainly are on the qualifications of the individual field collector to evaluate. Being only one person, he cannot become expert in all subjects on which he may collect information, and his judgment about the significance of many items he reports is therefore of little or no value. On geographic areas other than the one in which he is working

SECRET

45

SECRET

Evaluation

he can have at best only a limited up-to-date knowledge; hence, while he may be able to evaluate political news meaningfully in terms of its local impact, he may have little to offer with respect to its impact abroad. For these reasons, each collector should take stock of the limitations of his knowledge and not attempt to go beyond their bounds.

Although in some situations the collector may have all the data available to the analyst and more, he can never be sure that this is so. The analyst usually has, and in every instance may have, pertinent other-source information not available to the collector. Further, by virtue of the nature of his job, the collector is usually inhibited from indulging in the depth and thoroughness of deliberation expected of the analyst. Hence no evaluation by the collector, however accurate and thorough it may prove to be, can properly be regarded as more than tentative until it has been reviewed and confirmed by the analyst.

Finally, full cognizance should be taken of the fact that the primary job of the collector is to collect, and in this job analysis and evaluation are means to the end. It would be foolish for the collector to waste his time writing evaluations of every item he collects. He should make evaluative comments only when he believes he has something to offer that the analyst can probably not supply.

Recognition of these limitations should keep the collector's evaluations of the significance of information within workable limits. At the same time, to insure to the community that his judgments, which at times are irreplaceable, are not lost, as well as to enable him to enhance his own collection technique, it should be clearly acknowledged to the collector that he has a responsibility to make evaluations. It should be a part of his indoctrination to accept that responsibility and understand its limitations, of his training to learn how to carry it out, and of his performance to act his logical part in the evaluative process with skill and discrimination. Improvement in reporting will not be the least of the resulting benefits.

By the same token the analyst should be aware of the worth and of the limitations of field evaluation, as well as of his own. He should not act arbitrarily in discounting collector

46

SECRET

Evaluation

SECRET

opinion, but give it the weight it deserves; he should never simply discard it because it does not agree with his own beliefs. Differences of opinion should be carefully examined, documented, and in important cases referred back to the collector for further consideration. Such a procedure may be cumbersome, but reliable evaluations cannot be arrived at by denying the collector's responsibility to express his opinion or by ignoring it once expressed.

SECRET

47

SECRET

*Interlocking aspects of the
intelligence and psychological
warfare functions.*

PSYWAR IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

John Brockmiller

The intelligence operator, whether collector or analyst, in any Western nation engaged in a defense effort against the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement has at least four major reasons to take an active interest in psychological warfare. First, much of the information he collects or analyzes is of value primarily for psywar purposes. Second, psywar may, and does, influence his operational environment and so affects the availability of information to him. Third, intelligence operations have an intrinsic psywar significance, immediate or latent, intentional or unintentional. Fourth, psywar operations, under the specific condition of cold war with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement, require effective clandestine support, which can be provided best by intelligence personnel knowledgeable in the requirements of covert activity.

Psywar as Intelligence Customer

The intelligence officer is not inspired by the purpose of merely collecting and evaluating information or making analytic studies. His mission is not an end in itself, but a means to an end—a contribution to the defense and foreign policy objectives of his country. His work is therefore meaningful only to the extent that the information he provides is utilized through appropriate action. The individual operator's performance, to be sure, does not lose merit if significant information which he acquired in due time and reported to proper authority is not acted upon; but the intelligence organization as a whole has failed to function effectively if the information it produces does not lead to some kind of policy determination or action.

In some fields the relationship of an item of information to a course of action is simple and obvious. Data on a new

SECRET

49

MORI/HRP PAGES 49-55

SECRET

Psywar

enemy weapon, for instance, transmitted to the armed services, will enable them to develop a similar innovation, to devise a defense against it, or at least to alert combat troops to the new hazard it represents. Or intelligence about another country's plans for tactics at a diplomatic conference will enable the collecting country's diplomats to adjust their own preparations accordingly.

Less self-evident are the customer to be informed and the appropriate actions to be taken on some of the widely varied types of information which can be generally classed as "of psywar value." Traditional political and economic reporting, in addition to its importance for policy agencies, often has relevance to psywar operations; a shift in Soviet production from military hardware to consumer goods interests not only diplomats and military planners but also propagandists. Psywar needs sociological and psychological data which can be obtained by overt research, for example the relative influence of established religion and atheist indoctrination on the populations of Communist countries. Operational data may be of psywar significance, such as the covert Communist control of ostensibly non-Communist mass communications media or Communist influence on political parties and other power factors in the non-Communist world.

It is not enough that the intelligence operator should recognize the psywar value of his information and transmit it to a customer authorized to act on it. In the field of psychological warfare, as in any other segment of intelligence collection, the customer's requirements determine what is to be collected, the priority assigned it, and whether only information on the national, policy-making level or also particularized data on lower levels is to be sought. These requirements of the customer depend in turn upon his plans and capabilities for action. The relationship between intelligence collector and customer in the psywar field must therefore be a mutual one. Support and guidance must flow both ways.

The Communist intelligence officer has no problem in getting his information acted upon: the Party takes action either through its own organization, usually the Agitprop or Foreign Relations department of its Central Secretariat, or indirectly, through the government intelligence services or the front organizations it controls, on all intelligence of psywar

50

SECRET

Psywar

SECRET

value. The Western nations have no organs with functions even remotely comparable to those of a Communist party, especially one in power; they have to take action on psywar intelligence primarily through a government agency.

Psywar as Intelligence Aid

The intelligence operator's chances of success or failure depend not only upon the determination, skill, professional equipment, and other assets that he and his organization bring to bear, but also upon the environment in which he is operating. Some elements of this environment are in a sense objective: he must travel and communicate over certain distances, he must avoid certain controls, he must counter the opposition. Other elements, however, are psychological—the extent and intensity of friendliness or hostility with which his and the opposition's course are viewed by actual or potential agents, or by any persons in a position to help or hinder their activities; the apparent superiority of one side or the other in the eyes of those in between; morale and loyalty in the opposition's ranks; and so forth.

These psychological elements in the operational climate can be of decisive importance. The operations of Hitler's Gestapo against the outlawed German Communist Party were greatly assisted by the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda in mobilizing the active support of large parts of the population for this work. When the same Gestapo was later sent into France and other Nazi-occupied countries to cope with the Communist underground there, it was far less successful. It must have been largely the change in operational climate, not any deterioration in the professional skill of Hitler's security and intelligence services, which led from the effective liquidation of the German Communist underground to the Nazis' failure to suppress the Communists in the countries their armies had effectively occupied.

Five years ago the West surfaced Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress and gave the text world-wide publicity. The impact of this revelation of Stalin's crimes upon Communists and non-Communists alike benefited Western intelligence operations in many ways: it induced defections, it lowered morale in Communist ranks, it increased people's

SECRET

51

SECRET

Psywar

Psywar

SECRET

readiness to assist the West and thereby markedly improved the operational climate.

Intelligence operators need not wait for windfalls to improve the operational climate upon which so much depends in their work. They can contribute actively to psywar operations which, either as their main objective or as a by-product, will modify the operational climate in the desired direction. Intelligence collection and psywar objectives coincide in this aspect of operations.

Psywar as Intelligence Product

Some intelligence operations, especially ones of a tactical and technical nature, carry, whether incidentally or by main intent, a significant psywar impact. A psychological purpose is central to deception operations that mislead the opposition by playing false information into its hands or staging ostensible operations against a false target. The incidental psychological effect of other intelligence operations may influence not only the opposition but other groups and populations at large.

The obvious success of an intelligence operation may impress both friend and foe. At one stage in World War II, Allied aircraft attacked a new underground headquarters of the German Supreme Command within 24 hours after it had been put into service; and years after the war the inhabitants of the area were still discussing with awe the efficiency of Western espionage. It does not matter whether that air attack was really the product of espionage, the result of aerial reconnaissance, or merely a lucky accident: whatever the historic truth, the depth of the psychological impact for a long time after the event was startling.

Although most intelligence operations are carried out with the knowledge of only a very limited number of persons, a large-scale psychological effect is often produced when they are later exposed and publicized by the originating service or by the opposition. The results do not always coincide with the intentions of the side that provides the publicity. Several years ago, for instance, the Soviets in Berlin discovered that a Western service had tapped their communication lines by means of a tunnel dug under the sector border. They decided to give this perfidious trick as much publicity as they

could, and they brought busloads of correspondents, domestic and foreign, to the site. The ensuing publicity, however, was for the most part quite different from what they expected: many people in Germany and throughout Western Europe were impressed by the feat and reassured by this evidence that the West was capable of matching wits with the Soviets.

Intelligence officers ought to give careful consideration to the potential of proposed operations for psychological flap or psychological advantage in event of exposure. Further, they should examine the possibilities for intentional psywar use of operations of their own or of the opposition.

Psywar as Covert Operation

In the cold war, the United States and her allies find themselves mostly on the defensive, which means, among other things, that their antagonists have the first choice of weapons, battlefields, and timetables. The Communists have chosen primarily political weapons—agitation and propaganda, mass organizations, subversion. Although they do not eschew the use of more orthodox means in the international arena—armed forces, economic warfare, diplomacy—these are subordinated to the political bias of the controlling Communist Party.

The cold war is therefore being fought mainly with the weapons of psychological warfare, taken in its broadest meaning to denote the whole range of manifestations from propaganda and various kinds of national penetration to the political-psychological effects of the respective antagonists' achievement in orthodox activities—military power, economic strength, social stability, national morale, and so forth. There are other reasons for this hegemony of the psychological, too, among them the reluctance of governments to risk nuclear war in pursuit of their national objectives, the extraordinary new efficiency, range, and speed of mass communications, and the rapid rise of literacy rates in all parts of the world.

On the Communist side, these weapons are wielded mainly by ostensibly non-government agencies, the Communist parties and their innumerable fronts and auxiliary organizations. This setup enables a Communist government to disclaim formally the responsibility for whatever these groups may be doing in another country. It also provides a huge, specialized

SECRET

Psywar

Psywar

SECRET

apparatus devoted largely to the conduct of the cold war, endowed with enormous manpower reserves—the 85 Communist parties alone have more than 30 million card-carrying members, of whom several hundred thousand are full-time activists—and backed by the massive financial and technical resources of twelve totalitarian dictatorships.

The mass organizations of the non-Communist world—political parties, labor unions, veterans' associations, and the like—though capable of playing a significant role in the cold war, are by themselves no match for the world-wide Communist machine. Most of them exist for some strictly limited purpose such as getting their representatives elected to parliament or obtaining better working conditions for their members; they cannot compete with a movement whose central and pervasive purpose is to bring all mankind under the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus decisively to change the course of history. In countries where the Communist movement is comparatively weak, political groups, however anti-Communist in their basic attitudes, naturally spend a far greater amount of their energies in competing with each other than in fighting the cold war. But even in countries like Italy, France, India, or Japan, where the Communists are strong and well organized, the spontaneous anti-Communist efforts of political parties and other mass organizations are inadequate, being limited to opposing the local Communists at the polls and in shop steward elections and similar contests, without mounting any effective counteroffensive against world Communism beyond their borders.

These private efforts can make a successful contribution in the cold war only if they are all coordinated, supported, and supplemented by government action. But since the psywar weapon chosen by the Communists involves activities which, when not entirely clandestine, must have their government sponsorship disguised, the regular agencies of a democratic government in peace time (and the cold war, for all that its outcome will be of more decisive significance for mankind than that of a good many shooting wars in earlier phases of history, is technically considered a state of peace) would find it difficult to meet the Communist drive on the scale and with the militancy required.

54

SECRET

The conduct of the West's psywar effort is therefore inextricably bound up with the intelligence function. This phase of national defense has to be carried out by clandestine means not attributable to the sponsoring government. It has to depend on intelligence techniques such as cover, foreign agents, the penetration of hostile organizations, and third-country operations, as well as utilize information obtained by clandestine collection. Organizationally, however, responsibility for psywar may be assigned in any of three ways—to the same organization and the same personnel that collect intelligence; to the same organization which collects intelligence but to separate units and different personnel; or to an independent organization, connected only through liaison arrangements with the collecting service.

The decision as to which of these three ways should be chosen in a given country and at a given time has to be made at top level and will be governed by a variety of considerations. Regardless which organizational form is selected for psywar, however, the intimate relationships with intelligence outlined above will remain. We are faced with three alternatives in the cold war—to surrender peacefully ("better red than dead," as the pacifists say); to leave the decision to World War III; or to fight world Communism at least to a standstill, forcing it by means short of general war, i.e., by successful psychological warfare, to abandon its world drive. Taking cognizance that this is the choice, everyone in the intelligence community, whatever his specific function, ought to give psywar operations his unstinting support.

SECRET

55

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

SEVEN MEN AT DAYBREAK. By *Alan Burgess*. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1960. Pp. 233. \$3.95.)

This is an inaccurate and fictionalized account of the circumstances surrounding the assassination in 1942 of the Nazi RSHA chief Reinhard Heydrich by two agents of Czech intelligence in London, Jan Kubis and Josef Gabcik, parachuted in for that purpose. Because the author represents that his construction of the events is validated by research into records and interviews with surviving witnesses, claiming the "advantage . . . of records amassed by both friend and enemy" and "a footnote of authority" conferred by his "coming so late to this story," and because he has indeed unearthed enough facts to provide a distorted skeleton for his yarn, his failure to distinguish between fact and invention may disconcert readers familiar with my own earlier presentation of the case history of the operation.¹

Mr. Burgess' inventions range from the usual embroidery of verbatim dialogue which no still living person could have heard and relatively harmless false embellishments like seven swastikas branded on Kubis' buttocks and his decoration for fictitious exploits in France to bad guesses on points of major importance. He has the agents "knowing that they were the first parachutists to come back to Czechoslovakia" when there had been 16 others before; he has them dropped in December 1941 instead of April 1942; he has them "told they would be dropped near Pilsen" though the Pilsen area was a poor drop zone and never used; he has other agents dropped from the same plane as they, including Josef Valcik, who had gone in the preceding autumn; he has London getting radio messages from them and about them. Some of his misconstructions reflect on the soundness of the Czech operational procedure—that the agents should be told "without preamble" what their mission was to be on their "first meeting with the senior officers," rather than after specialized training and a

¹ R. C. Jagers, "The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich," *Studies* IV 1, p. 1 ff.

SECRET

65

MORI/HRP PAGES
65-67

SECRET

Recent Book: Heydrich

probing assessment; that they should be parachuted in when there was telltale snow on the ground; that they should have "decided to preserve their parachutes as souvenirs"; that they should be caught displaying English banknotes, wearing English suits, and having English laundry marks on their clothes. None of these things are true.

Most damaging in this respect is Burgess' intermingling of the strictly compartmented mission of the two lone agents with the activities of the unreliable and Nazi-penetrated Czech underground, saying that they were given three addresses where they could apply for help, that the Czech underground radioed London for reinforcements for them, and that two rescue teams were dispatched. The men he names as leaders of these teams, Arnost Miks and Adolph Opalka, had been parachuted in on other missions several months before Kubis and Gabcik were dropped. The latter were particularly instructed to eschew contacts with the underground, and the turning of their lonely ordeal into a clumsy mass enterprise sullies its high courageous dignity.²

Against this author's disservice to the cause of careful history, however, must be set one really good deed. The man who betrayed to the Germans the brave assassins' hideout in the cellar of St. Bartholomeus was given in my account, out of confusion with a similar cover name, as Alois Kral. Mr. Burgess correctly gives it as Karel Curda. There was a real Alois Kral, a member of a different operational team, whose memory is thus cleared of an unintentional calumny. Of a second, separate traitor whom the book names Gerik, I have no knowledge.

² Mr. Burgess' data on two of the underground conspirators he names can be amplified from an open source. "Uncle Hajska," whose true name he gives as Zelenek, was Jan Zelenka, a district Sokol leader. His cover name was derived from his birthplace, the village of Haj. After Heydrich's death he was arrested by the Gestapo and took poison. "Jindra," whose true name escaped Burgess, was Ladislav Vanek, a high school teacher and district underground leader in Brno. He too was arrested, much later than Zelenka; but he survived. Despite accusations of collaboration, he became a postwar official in the Czech Ministry of Education. Both of these names appeared in a book entitled *Stiny za Heydrichem* (*Shadows behind Heydrich*) published in Czechoslovakia in 1947 or 1948. The Communist authorities later took it out of circulation.

Recent Book: Heydrich

SECRET

It is conceivable also that Mr. Burgess' account of the agents' heroic last stand and death in the church cellar, which varies considerably in detail from mine, rests upon better information than I used, the reports received in London shortly after the event. But how much of this is fact and how much fiction would have to be determined by an examination of his sources, which he does not name.

R. C. JAGGERS

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

Eggers' <i>Colditz</i> and Marsden's <i>Resistance Nurse</i>	Louis Thomas
Three Civil War books	Edwin C. Fishel
Hobman's study of John Thurloe	H. H. Cooper
Berger's <i>Broadsides and Bayonets</i>	Marsha Timfield

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS PAGE

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET, 

Intelligence Articles V 3

*Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.*

SECRET, 

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

*Case of a notorious American
defector from the viewpoint
of his handler.*

JOHN ANDRÉ, CASE OFFICER

Robert Amory, Jr.

In May of 1779, two and a half years before its decisive victory at Yorktown, the Continental cause was in a precarious state. Stalemate in the north and almost uninterrupted British success in the south had brought not only despair to General Washington's forces and dissension among the revolutionary politicians, but also disenchantment to our French allies. At the same time, however, England was war-weary and Parliament was buffeted by Whig demands for a settlement on the colonists' terms. Thus all hung in balance, and it seemed one brilliant military stroke on either side could be enough to make the other give up the struggle. Raids and forages might go on endlessly, it was thought at Sir Henry Clinton's New York headquarters, but the capture of a critical position and a major corps of the rebels would bring elusive victory within grasp.

Captain John André, who a month earlier had been made Clinton's intelligence chief, certainly saw it thus, and he apparently felt the situation as a personal challenge and opportunity. His professional competence, along with his social graces and artistic talents, had made him eminently successful at 28, but he was still consumed by ambition. His new responsibilities included that of encouraging defection among the enemy, and so his spirits must have vaulted when at this juncture there came into his office a man purporting to be an emissary from Major General Benedict Arnold.

A Prize Walk-In Parlayed

Consider how Arnold must have loomed to the G-2 of His Majesty's expeditionary forces. The dossier would record: lower middle class background; vigorous entrepreneur; pre-war captain of a superior company of militia; early in the war the brains of the seizure of Ticonderoga; energetic admiral

A1

MORI/HRP PAGES
A1-A15

John André

who swept Lake Champlain; conceiver and executor of the late '75 campaign in which André himself had been taken prisoner, the epic effort to take Quebec (which ended in disaster but might have been a success of historic watershed proportions had Arnold been permitted to commence it in mid-summer as he wished). The record would also show Arnold's major if not unique contribution to the capture of Burgoyne at Saratoga and a crippling wound suffered there. It would note his rise in three short years from Captain to Major General and his current position as commandant of recaptured Philadelphia, benign to the Tories and neutrals.

Undoubtedly, however, Arnold's dossier would also record his present ill repute with the Congress for this same benignity, along with other quirks, and his demand for a general court martial to clear his reputation. And finally, if full and subtle, it would disclose acute financial embarrassment and the probable Tory leanings of his beautiful young bride Peggy Shippen (whose name had once been linked with André's own during the hedonistic winter André spent in occupied Philadelphia after a prisoner exchange had liberated him in time to take part in Charles Grey's surprise attack on Mad Anthony Wayne's corps, opening the way to the rebel capital).

Arnold, making this first approach in the pseudonym of Monk, after the roundhead whose rallying to Charles Stuart made the Restoration possible, had sent his emissary, a trusted Philadelphia Tory, through the lines to see André personally. The terms of his proposition can only be reconstructed from the response André sent back by the same intermediary; it was apparently an offer, in exchange for cold cash and the promise of a high position in the King's service, to defect immediately. André answered with a proposal that he "defect in place," supply intelligence and hold off changing sides until it would have a significant effect on the progress of the war. After all, at this time Arnold had no combat force command and his influence had suffered under the bitter hostility of the left-wing Whigs and his many enemies among the militia officers less competent than he. Let him stew a while, one reads between the lines of the reply.

André included a set of communications instructions, complete in professional detail. Correspondence was to be main-

John André

tained through intermediaries or drops, so that no telltale addresses would be disclosed. Pseudonyms would further mask the parties. A code was prescribed—numbers keyed to pages, lines, and words of a specified dictionary. Auxiliary acid and heat-type secret inks would be used as necessary. And finally, as a last line of defense should counterintelligence penetrate the coded veil, the whole contents of the correspondence were to be disguised as concerning a harmless illicit business transaction between two merchant adventurers or as "observations on the complexion of an old woman's health."

André also spelled out the intelligence requirements of the British command: "Contents of dispatches from foreign abettors—number and position of troops—concerting the means of a blow of importance . . . etc., etc." All he promised in return was that "liberal acknowledgments will infallibly attend conspicuous services."

A surprisingly large portion of the André-Arnold correspondence survives.¹ Sixty-eight separate letters or decryptions covering forty tightly leaded printed pages are available for study, containing every type of classical artifice and mistake. The scholar has endless conundrums to solve—which message crossed which, which was drafted but not sent, what meaning was conveyed by what double talk.

Arnold promptly started to produce a miscellany of intelligence information, much of it of current value to Clinton and his staff, but at the same time pressed his side of the bargain, demanding 10,000 sterling as lump sum payment. He asked to be informed of Clinton's plan of campaign so that he could conform his activities to it, a disclosure Clinton and André could of course not make to an agent. Neither would they get down to specifics on the price they were prepared to pay for mere defection. Instead, André urged that Arnold "Join the army, accept a command, be surprised, be cut off—these things may happen in the course of manoeuvre, nor you be censured or suspected. A complete service of this nature involving a corps of five or six thousand men would be rewarded with twice as many thousand guineas." This letter of his also makes the fateful suggestion that the two of them

¹ Much of it in the Clements Library of the University of Michigan.

John André

arrange the final details in a face-to-face meeting under a flag of truce.

Through the summer of '79 the case officer alternately encouraged and chided his agent. Arnold, in his volatile state of mind, was not easy to handle. His demands, said André, were too high, the information he supplied of but "very indirect influence here." "Permit me to prescribe a little exertion." Constantly he reverts to his main objective, that Arnold deliver up with himself a sufficient body of Washington's army to inflict a grievous if not mortal wound on the Continental cause. "Sir let us not lose time or contract our views . . . we cannot think you would on your side confine to general intelligence whilst so much greater things may be done . . ." But Arnold was not to be rushed; his wound still stood in the way of his taking a field command, and the court martial he had invited failed to vindicate entirely his actions as military governor of Philadelphia. The correspondence languished during the fall except for occasional spot reports from Arnold.

Firmly in back of André's subornation of Arnold was not only General Clinton but also the government in London. War Office advice to Sir Henry urged him not "to hesitate at any expense, promises, threats . . . that may tend to disarm the rebellion" and approved specifically of bribery. Romantics or moralists may decry such methods of achieving military objectives, but throughout the ages and in every civilization far-sighted commanders have employed silver bullets to obviate the expenditure of blood and greater treasure. Hamilton, adverting specifically to André's plot, later philosophized: "The authorized maxims and practices of war . . . countenance almost every species of seduction as well as violence, and the General who can make most traitors in the army of his adversary is frequently most applauded."

In October '79 André was made Acting Adjutant General to the British Army in America—in today's terms Chief of Staff and even more. Exulting, he wrote home: "You may well conceive how much I am flattered at being called in the space of three years from a Subaltern in the Fusiliers to the employment I hold and the favor in which I live with the Commander in Chief." A contemporary called him the general's

John André

"first friend . . . best adviser . . . bosom confidant." Who can blame the 28-year-old officer if he conjured up visions of a brigadier's brevet and a baronetcy as his recognition if this conspiracy succeeded? But now for several months he was far away from Arnold and New York, assisting Sir Henry in the siege and capture of Charleston.

The Treason Takes Shape

In the spring of 1780 the conspirators became active again. By May Arnold was ready to comply with André's urgings: he appears by then to have made up his mind to obtain command of West Point and, after strengthening its garrison to a remunerative size at £2 a head, to turn over the works and all to the British. Through his old patron General Schuyler he hinted to Washington that the post at West Point would enable him to play a worthy role in the summer's campaign and would be within the physical endurance limits set by his wound. At the same time he resumed his correspondence with New York and for the first time disclosed really vital strategic secrets about Washington's and Rochambeau's summer plan of operations and the feints that were to disguise them. In June a journey to Connecticut gave him the opportunity to inspect the West Point works in detail, and he sent Clinton a description of how plausibly a quick stroke abetted by treachery might capture the position.

This time it was André's turn to be cautious and dilatory. To make sure he was not being made the victim of a deception operation, he set spies on Arnold's trail in Connecticut. When Arnold returned to Philadelphia he still had no response from the British. He became feverish in his importuning, pleading for confidence and stating as fact what was yet only a hope, that he had been assigned the West Point command. The most he got out of André was general encouragement, along with insistence on a face-to-face encounter to arrange details and confirm his bona fides. Not until August 24, three weeks after he had actually taken over the hoped-for command, did he get a firm offer of £20,000 for delivering up the post, provided the bag included 3,000 men and specified quantities of ordnance and stores. He then set busily about arranging means for a meeting with André.

John André

Such a meeting presented obvious problems. The American garrison commander could have no legitimate private business with the British adjutant general. Either's absence from his post would be soon remarked. There was no safe neutral ground for the rendezvous. Conscious primarily of the dangers to himself, Arnold proposed that André enter the rebel lines as a civilian, thus risking death as a spy. André, guided by Clinton's affectionate prudence, counterproposed the relative safety of the Hudson River under the protection of British gunboats and meeting under a flag of truce.

As in previous correspondence, but even more particularly because these letters passed through the hands of a patriotic American officer in charge of Arnold's outpost, the conspirators wrote as though they were merchants arranging illicit traffic through the lines. "Mr. Anderson" wrote from New York:

I shall be happy to meet Mr. G. Should I not be allowed to go, the officer who shall command the escort between whom and myself no distinction need be made can speak on the affair . . . I trust I shall not be detained but should any old grudge be a cause for it I shall rather risk that, than neglect the business in question or assume a mysterious character to carry on an innocent affair . . . and get into your lines by stealth.

Only Arnold would know that Mr. Anderson and the escorting officer were one and the same.

This did not satisfy Arnold, for how could he avoid raised eyebrows if his ostensible "agent" in New York dealt with him through a British officer? He cautioned his correspondent not to be "so imprudent as to trust a British officer commanding a flag with our private concerns" and concluded, "I do, by all means, advise you to follow the plan I propose of getting to our lines by stealth . . . I will engage you shall be perfectly safe here."

One Colonel Beverly Robinson, a Tory attached to British HQ, had a house near West Point and had on occasion been allowed to pass the lines to look after his establishment. Clinton was inclined to make him the intermediary with Arnold, but André was bursting with eagerness to undertake the mission himself. Though he'd now been made full adjutant general, old Lord Amherst had refused to promote him

John André

appropriately in the regular establishment because he was such a junior captain. With a personal feat of derring-do he felt he might break out of the ruck. Clinton, after some importuning, gave him permission to accompany Robinson with a flag to Dobb's Ferry and there complete his clandestine business ostensibly as escort for the Tory. So on September 11 André and Robinson proceeded upstream, but an overzealous patrol boat from the British flotilla fired on Arnold's approaching barge and caused the meeting to abort.

Nearly a week passed, during which Arnold made various suggestions for another meeting and betrayed to André the highly confidential information that Washington and his staff would cross the Hudson with no escort at a given time and place on his way to confer with Rochambeau. André was busy laying the groundwork for the coup de main that was to capitalize on Arnold's treachery. His spirits must have been high. He had been recommended again to Lord George Germain for the rank befitting his position as Adjutant General, and it is said he hoped to command the corps which would effect the capture of the citadel at West Point. With the now added possibility that Washington and his staff might be taken in the trap, his vision of a blow that would gloriously end the rebellion was almost within his grasp.

For never were the fortunes of the Continental Army at lower ebb since Valley Forge. Washington was writing Congress, "Every idea you can form of our distresses will fall short of the reality. . . . The patience of the soldiery . . . begins at length to be worn out and we see in every line of the army the most serious features of mutiny and sedition. . . . All our operations are at a stand." The loss of the Colonies' most famous and expensive fort would accomplish what Burgoyne and Howe had failed to do three years before, would divide the rebellious colonies in two; and the defeat might well convince the soured French that the time had come to cut their investment in the feckless revolution. A member of Clinton's staff witting of the conspiracy wrote home to London, "Since 1777 I have not seen so fair a prospect for the return of the revolted provinces to their duty."

John André

Fated Venture Afield

Now Admiral Rodney was apprised of the plot and requested to provide the necessary transport for the dash up the Hudson. On September 20 André proceeded upstream with Robinson on HMS sloop of war *Vulture* in a second attempt to meet Arnold. When no contact was made that night, André, concerned lest Arnold doubt his presence, took advantage of a shelling of his truce-flag vessel to send a protest ashore in his own handwriting, countersigned in his pseudonym Anderson. Arnold, thus informed, sent out a boat the next night with an unwitting intermediary—a local gentleman of dubious affiliation named Joshua Smith—to bring André ashore for the long-sought rendezvous. After some hesitation, when credentials had been verified and he had examined the pass made out for him, André consented to go ashore—in his full regimentals but no longer carrying a flag of truce. As he subsequently wrote Washington: "I had fairly risked my person." Smith observed later that "Mr. Anderson, from his youthful appearance, the softness of his manners, did not seem to be qualified for the business of such moment. His nature seemed fraught with the milk of human kindness."

From one to four a.m. the case officer and his defecting agent conferred in a grove in Haverstraw on the Hudson. No record exists of the negotiation save Arnold's later self-serving memorandum citing the sum André promised him in the event of failure of the venture. Presumably the last loose ends were tied up and the assault on West Point, the simulated defense, and the surrender were all arranged. Arnold pressed on André an estimate of his ordnance and the defense forces, their battle plans, and diagrams of the works and their approaches to take back with him to convince Clinton of the merits of the scheme. When the meeting concluded Arnold said that daybreak was too close for André to be rowed the six miles back to the *Vulture*; he must hide out until the next night. So he rode with Arnold to Smith's house, and to his alarm passed a sentry post; he was within the American lines.

During the day André spent in Smith's house chance dealt ill with him. The Yankee commander on the opposite shore decided, out of pure cussedness, to wheel up a four-pounder and a howitzer and bombard the *Vulture*. The sloop, after

A8

John André

being holed six times, retired twelve miles downstream. Smith's rowers refused to go so far, and thus André's chances of returning the way he arrived disappeared. That night, although André still preferred to try rowing down river, Smith, left in charge after Arnold's departure for West Point, insisted on crossing the river and moving overland through Westchester to the British outpost near White Plains.

Arnold, to protect himself, had told Smith that André was a merchant masquerading in false pride as a British officer and that for his ride through American-held terrain he must dispense with his uniform. Irrked but not really downcast, André set out in civilian clothes with Smith, hoping to cover the entire distance in one night. But before nine o'clock, after only eight miles, an American picket detained them, warned them of Tory partisans operating to the south, and insisted that they spend the night. Obviously André couldn't evince a lack of fear for raiders of the other side, so perforce he turned in and spent a restless night.

The next morning the travelers proceeded seven miles together, breakfasted, and then parted, Smith afraid of the partisans and André happy to ride alone the last 15 miles to the British pickets. The country he had to traverse was a genuine no man's land alternately raided by Tory cowboys, so-called, and rebel skinners, both interested strictly in the profits of brigandage.

About nine o'clock André was halted by such a party, of which side he could not tell, and questioned who he was. Since he carried Arnold's pass, he had nothing to lose by claiming to be in rebel service: if his accosters were rebels they would honor the pass; if they were Tories they would treat him as a prisoner and transfer him through the chain of command until he came into hands that would recognize him. But his wits deserted him. Probably influenced by the British uniform coat on one of his captors, a recently escaped prisoner, he blurted out that he was of the loyalist part—in fact, "I am a British officer on particular business."

When his captors declared themselves Americans, he tried to satisfy them with Arnold's safe-conduct; but too late. They saw him as a simple captive whose equipment was fair booty, and they particularly cottoned to his boots and hose.

A9

John André

In stripping him of these, they stumbled onto the incriminating papers Arnold had given him to carry back, and so they took him to the nearest rebel officer. This officer had earlier been alerted by Arnold to expect a line-crosser named Anderson coming from the British side. When the man now came from the wrong direction and bore most suggestive documents, he grew vaguely suspicious. He sent him under escort toward Arnold's headquarters, but dispatched the documents by separate messenger to intercept Washington, who was en route to West Point at this time.

When André learned the next day what had been done with his papers, he for the first time dropped his disguise as Mr. Anderson and wrote Washington that "the person in your possession is Major John André, adjutant general of the British Army," who had been "... against my stipulation, my intention and without my knowledge ... conducted within one of your posts ... Thus become a prisoner, I had to concert my escape. I quitted my uniform, was passed ... to neutral ground and left to press for New York ... Thus was I betrayed ... into the vile condition of an enemy in disguise within your posts ... with no motive ... but the service of my king as I was involuntarily an imposter."

A report of the capture and its disposition meanwhile reached Arnold just barely ahead of the revealing documents' delivery to Washington at Fishkill. Alexander Hamilton, as advance aide for Washington, had actually arrived to breakfast with Arnold when the latter learned of the disaster. With a brief farewell to his swooning, co-conspiring bride, he ordered out his barge and dashed down the Hudson to the *Vulture*, to live out the remainder of his days in the service and as pensioner of the Crown. Thus the defection originally contemplated was accomplished, to the shock and consternation of the continental army and the colonies; but it was only of one man. The big prize of the Commander in Chief, 3,000 soldiers, and a key defense position escaped the snare.

Due Process, Doubts, and Death

Washington took no chances, regrouping his field forces to shield West Point against the plotted British assault. At the same time he sent André under the tightest guard to his headquarters at Tappan. There on September 29 he convened all

John André

available general officers as a board to examine André and "as speedily as possible to report a precise state of his case, together with your opinion of the light in which he ought to be considered and the punishment that ought to be inflicted." This board, headed by Nathaniel Greene, included Lafayette, Baron von Steuben, Henry Knox, and ten others. The relatively full abstract of its proceedings made by the Judge Advocate General was published by order of Congress and exists today in several editions.²

No defense counsel was provided; and André, although cautioned by the Presiding Officer and the Judge Advocate, almost blithely made damaging admissions of facts the prosecution could not have proved and described circumstances in a manner highly prejudicial to his case. For example, he admitted that the boat which brought him from the *Vulture* carried no flag and that his "surtout coat" concealed his regiments. After concluding their interrogation of André, the board considered letters from Arnold, Clinton, and the Tory colonel who had accompanied André on the *Vulture*. All insisted that he had come under a flag of truce and thereafter acted in obedience to the commands of Arnold, the lawful American military authority in the locale.

There was no real question about André's having been in disguise when captured (but the precise spot of his capture was certainly in no man's land and nearer to the British outpost in Kingsbridge than to any position of the regular American forces) nor about his having had papers with intelligence for the enemy on his person. The critical issue was the truce flag, and on this André's admission easily outbalanced the ex parte letters from Clinton and Arnold. The verdict followed inexorably that "Major André, Adjutant General to the British Army, ought to be considered as a Spy from the Enemy; and that, agreeable to the law and usage of nations ... he ought to suffer Death."

² The six editions published in America in 1780 are all of considerable rarity. The Norwich edition exists in only one recorded copy, in the possession of the Harvard Law School Library. The British press was quick to reproduce the text, stopping only to change its title to *Proceedings of a Rebel Board of General Officers*, published by the end of November. Even the Irish published it: the Dublin 1781 edition has survived in five recorded copies.

John André

Such was the judgment, but as Lafayette later wrote, "All the court . . . were filled with sentiments of admiration and compassion for him. He behaved with so much frankness, courage and delicacy that I could not help lamenting his unhappy fate. This was one of the most painful duties I ever had to perform." Summing up what was undoubtedly the unofficial opinion of the board, Baron von Steuben growled, "It is not possible to save him. He put us to no proof, but in an open, manly manner, confessed everything but a premeditated desire to deceive. Would to God the wretch who drew him to death could have suffered in his place."

To my mind the case is not as open-and-shut as most writers consider it. A prisoner of war, or today a downed airman, is entitled to disguise himself in attempting to escape without making himself thereby a spy. In view of André's clear intention to act as an intermediary—a case officer—when he entered the lines wearing his uniform, he was not a spy until he began his return journey. It was at this point, after his expectation of being rowed back to the *Vulture* under a flag was thwarted, that he concluded, as he said, with "great mortification" that he was a prisoner and "had to concert my escape." The carrying of intelligence documents substantially weakens the argument that he was in the position of an escaping prisoner with attendant rights at dissimulation, but in rebuttal it can be urged that he had these in his capacity as negotiator-intermediary between Arnold and Clinton.

Whatever might have been accomplished along this line by competent defense counsel before a completely objective court, the fact is that no real lawyer-like effort was made in his behalf. The concept under which, without articulating it, the board adjudged him a spy was the well-known principle of trespass ab initio, whereby an originally lawful entry into a place becomes criminal by the subsequent commission on the premises of a criminal act. Moreover, the atmosphere of "bloody treason flourishing" surrounding the court must have been highly prejudicial to any chance that a member of the board would undertake on his own motion to exonerate the prisoner by involute legal analogy.

Although, as Washington wrote Rochambeau, "policy required a sacrifice," I do not wish to imply that André did not have a fair trial; and it can be flatly asserted that there is no

John André

persuasive evidence to support the popular legend that he was railroaded in vindictive reprisal for the execution of Nathan Hale. What can be said is that the case involved fine points which ideally should have been argued by an aggressive defense judge advocate. On the other hand, under the usages of war, Washington would have been fully justified in summarily executing André, as the British had Hale.

During André's last weekend on earth a hectic correspondence flowed from New York to Washington's headquarters, alternately protesting, beseeching, and threatening reprisals against captive Americans if the execution were carried out. None of these had the slightest effect on the stern and embittered commander in chief. The one possibility left for André was exchange for Arnold. Hamilton proposed this in writing, whether with Washington's knowledge is obscure; but much as Clinton's heart and stomach must have urged him to such a course, his head obviously forbade, for to betray Arnold to certain death would completely doom his efforts to induce other rebels to return to allegiance to the Crown.

Meanwhile, ever since his admission of identity, André had been captivating his captors with his gentle charm and serene composure. His contemporary Tallmadge, one of Washington's most trusted espionage and partisan officers, was "entirely overwhelmed with grief that so gallant an officer and so accomplished a gentleman should come to such an ignominious end." Hamilton, who noted his "peculiar elegance of mind and manners, . . . his knowledge . . . without ostentation, embellished by a diffidence that rarely accompanies so many talents and accomplishments," wrote a few days after his death that "never, perhaps, did any man suffer death with more justice or deserve it less," that "he died universally esteemed and universally regretted."

André appeared to hope for a while that he might receive special consideration and escape capital punishment, but in the last days he apparently resigned himself to his fate and confined his hope to that of dying by a firing squad. He wrote Washington in quiet dignity, "Sympathy toward a soldier will surely induce your excellency to adapt the mode of my death to the feelings of a man of honor.—Let me hope sir—that I

John André

John André

am not to die on a gibbet."³ But the General adhered to the rules of war, fearing that any variation would cast doubt on the justice of the verdict. For if André were not a spy, he was an ordinary prisoner of war.

On Monday, October 2, André's servant brought him a fresh full-dress uniform, which he donned for a last self-portrait and then his final walk. As he came in sight of the gibbet and realized for the first time that Washington had denied his request, he recoiled momentarily and said aloud: "I am reconciled to my fate but not to the mode of it." He then composed himself, walked erect to the wagon and mounted it. With his own hands he adjusted the noose to his neck, tied his own handkerchief over his eyes, and swung off into eternity.

His outward tranquility, which indelibly affected all the multitude of soldiers who witnessed his passing, appears to have been matched by an inner peace of soul. The closing part of his farewell letter to Clinton said simply, "I am perfectly tranquil in mind and prepared for any fate to which an honest zeal for my King's service may have devoted me." And Tallmadge, who was constantly with him from his capture, wrote on the eve of the execution, "Tho' he knows his fate, he seems to be as cheerful as if he were going to an assembly. I am sure he will go to the gallows less tearful for his fate, and with less concern than I shall behold the tragedy." Washington commented, "André has met his fate, which we could not but lament, with that fortitude which was to be expected from an accomplished man and a gallant officer."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barbe-Marbois, François Marquis de, *Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry Clinton*, Paris, 1816.
 Bradford, Gamaliel, "The Wife of the Traitor," *Harper's Magazine*, July 1925.
Centennial Souvenir—Capture of André, New York, 1880.
 Flexner, James T., *The Traitor and the Spy*, New York, 1953.
 Ford, Paul Leicester, "Stray Leaves from a Traitor's Life," *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, April 1900.
 Hall, Charles S., *Benjamin Tallmadge, Revolutionary Soldier and American Businessman*, New York, 1943.

³ Original in Library of Congress; forged copy in New York Public Library.

- Hamilton, Alexander, Letter to John Laurens regarding The Fate of Major André (1780), New York, 1916. Letter from a Gentleman at Camp, Pennsylvania Packet, October 14th and 17th, 1780.
 Lengel, Cornel, I, *Benedict Arnold*, New York, 1960.
 Millis, Wade, "A Spy Under the Common Law of War," *XI American Bar Association Journal* 183 (1925).
Proceedings of a Board of General Officers Respecting Major John André, Philadelphia, 1780.
 Sargent, Winthrop, *Life and Career of Major André*, ed. by William Abbott, New York, 1902.
 Smith, Joshua Hett, *Authentic Narrative of the Causes Which Led to the Death of Major André*, London, 1808.
 Thacher, James, "The Execution of Major John André as a Spy," *New England Magazine*, May 1834.
 Van Doren, Carl, *Secret History of the American Revolution*, New York, 1941.
 Wallace, Willard M., *Traitorous Hero*, New York, 1954.

Diffident appraisal of the contribution of amateurs to the maturing of professional strategic intelligence.

A SIRA TEAM IN RETROSPECT

C. Bradford Welles

It must be stated at the beginning that my comments on the program of academic reserve units for Strategic Intelligence Research and Analysis are neither professional nor authoritative. I knew only what I could infer about the planning of the project in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, and I was a part of it for only four years. I have never seen any estimate of the value or success of the program, and I know nothing of its development since 1952.

It is my impression that our national intelligence is now very good. In 1951 it was better than it had been, certainly, but still far from perfect; and even the problem of finding out what was known in Washington itself was great. For instance, we once put through an official request for information on the income tax situation in Cyprus and Greece, and got nowhere—acknowledgments from a number of departments and agencies, but no answers. So as the situation was then, it seemed to me that our work had some value. It may be that the most valuable things academic amateurs can contribute to professional intelligence are their eager unorthodoxy, their mental appetite, and their disposition to embrace all aspects of a problem whole.

Unregulated Reserve

In the spring of 1948 I was asked to undertake the organization of the first SIRA unit planned at Yale, the 441st Affiliated Team. Since I was less than two years back from service with OSS Cairo and was interested in promoting study of the Near East at Yale, I accepted. The unit, with a T/O&E of three officers and three enlisted men, would be built from Reserve personnel among the faculty and students at Yale. I

A17

MORI/HRP PAGES
A17-A21

A SIRA Team

would be sent for a week's temporary duty in the Pentagon for orientation, and would thereafter communicate on all matters of training and administration directly with the G-2 Reserve Section officer charged with developing the program. As the commanding officer of an "A" Team, I should have a relatively free hand to develop an effective group of Near East experts according to my own ideas, with a minimum of red tape.

So the 441st was activated in October, 1948, and got under way, after the usual delays, with a complement of three officers and a sergeant. Recruiting, with the help of local Reserve headquarters, was so successful that we were soon well over strength: even then there was at Yale a considerable interest in the Near East which was not satisfied by any course being given in the academic program. I suspect now that the local Reserve headquarters did not know how much over strength we were, and there may have been rules against it. But I found it easier to maintain enthusiasm with a larger group, especially among the undergraduates, and it was necessary to be prepared for attrition through graduation and other academic hazards.

It was some time before all members received clearance for *Secret* classifications, but in a small group who knew each other well there was no real problem of security such as to justify our waiting around and doing nothing. During the first year we had 24 two-hour "drill" periods, followed by the two weeks of active duty in the Office of G-2 in the summer. In the second year the number of periods was increased to 48, and this was better. It was about the equivalent of an undergraduate course.

Not being much bound by Regulations but having a fairly clear idea of what would be useful, we started out on a broad front, too broad for much depth but good for purposes of orientation. Military subjects were generally neglected, except when our local military advisor put in an appearance. We began work on the Arabic language, on the topography, politics, and economics of the Near East, and on intelligence procedures, including interrogation and report writing. A number of old intelligence hands on the faculty were generous enough with their time to talk to us about their experience and ideas.

A18

A SIRA Team

Into its second year, with some personnel changes, training went on methodically. The Reserve instructors began to be impressed. We were not very "GI," but we were learning a good deal. We selected Egypt as our special point of attack, and drawing on the resources of the Yale Library began to prepare minor studies in the fields of politics, economics, law, religion, and society. And we began to accumulate, in a rudimentary sort of way, something of a Who's Who, or political order of battle.

In this latter effort, particularly, we supplemented our study of histories and handbooks with the reading of such Egyptian periodicals as we could lay hands on, trying in a remote but purposeful fashion to identify people of importance and to see what they thought of each other. We felt that this personal intelligence might help to dissolve the strangeness of a strange land. We knew that all sorts of factional strains existed, and if these found expression in action, the factional leaders would be key elements in the conflict. If we were informed about them we could at least *understand* what happened, and might even be able to forecast in a general way the probable course of events. Granted that this was no substitute for on-the-spot observation and research, overt and covert, by experts, it would in any case be a good preparation for such first-hand study if circumstances should give us the opportunity to do it.

Ultimately proved right in our area concentration, for the present we were wrong. Instead of going to Washington for our 1950 summer training, we were alerted for active duty following the outbreak of fighting in Korea, and at the beginning of September we found ourselves taking the General Basic Intelligence Course at Fort Riley, Kansas. The next two months, while having nothing to do with the Near East, were certainly broadening. Reserve intelligence personnel of all sorts had been scraped up from everywhere, and as a group we were of considerable interest. We learned much from each other, less from our instructors. We must have been an insufferable lot of students, many of us experienced, knowledgeable, and cantankerous. I can believe that the school saw the last of us with some relief when we went our various ways.

A19

A SIRA Team

To Duty Station

My own unit was reunited at Fort Bragg, where we resumed our Near East training. In a few months we were ordered to Washington, to train and to be helpful in the Near East section of G-2. Next to being in the Near East itself, it was the best we could have hoped for. The unit was still there a year and a half later, when I was released and returned to Yale.

I think that we were able to contribute something. We were amateurs among professionals, enthusiasts among bureaucrats. We were lively rather than ponderous, curious rather than methodical. We made up for our lack of knowledge by imagination, and if we could not answer questions, we were fertile of asking them. We distrusted the duly coordinated situation estimates which filled the files, and were eager to bombard other Washington offices and especially the field with demands for further information. We tried to get area books and, if possible, periodical literature to study. Particularly, we tried to find out about people in our area, and this was the hardest thing of all to accomplish. We quizzed everyone who would listen, but an academic appetite is hard to satisfy. We must have been very trying to our patient professional colleagues.

We were disinclined merely to paraphrase reports and telegrams for staff distribution, and wanted to create and test new theories. We wanted, certainly wrongly, to go beyond the factual role of G-2 intelligence into areas assigned to G-3, State, and other sovereign and coordinated agencies of government. We were anxious, if not to see the Big Picture, at least to see our part of it rounded and whole. We were frustrated that we couldn't be sent out on a six-month mission to see for ourselves, forgetting protocol and budgets.

We seemed alone in viewing area intelligence as a whole, almost limitless in objective. Certainly such a point of view existed in Washington, or does now if it did not then. Certainly the ambitions we had were realized in other places at a sufficiently high level. They were not realized or realizable where we were, and still I cannot think that our attitude on this level was wrong. We had not been in G-2 much more than the statutory six months when assassination, revolution, and the threat of war began to give our briefings and re-

A20

A SIRA Team

ports on the significance and probable course of events something more than a formulaic quality, something more than a routine importance. They may not always have been right; in retrospect I believe that they were more often right than wrong. The point is that it was we, the amateurs, the unabashed, who were willing to try.

It is evident that, government being what it is, the professional must rule, and it is acknowledged that on the whole the professional knows best. But even in a completely professional organization, the fresh, the impetuous, the untrammelled amateur may still play an occasional useful part if judiciously directed. We of the 441st SIRA Team were amateurs, and behaved accordingly. I do not suppose that we deserved to be loved, but I do think that we were useful.

A21

Dissection shows the ravages of inherited disease.

A SHARP LOOK AT SINOSOVIE TOLOGY

Perhaps it is a human failing for practitioners of a new science to assume that all problems within its purview become immediately solvable through proper application of its techniques. After long travail, Kremlinologists learned a measure of caution and due modesty. But now we have a new species or subspecies of inquirer into Communist factionalism—the Sinosovietologist—and the lesson must be learned again.

Both the parent science and its offspring must rely basically on the painstaking, and often tedious, study and comparison of official pronouncements representing divergent views or maneuvers of the supposed factions. Such study is often rewarding, but more often it is not, and this is the unhappy fact that the analyst must live with. Dreary hours over monotonous hortations may finally produce what seems to him a gleam of insight; but even this "seems" must be checked and rechecked, and discarded if in the process it suffers a sea-change into "seems not." Most important, theories plainly supported by documentary evidence must be clearly differentiated from theories not supported, and perhaps in part contradicted, by the documents available at the time.

The Sinosovietologist, afflicted with the youthful brashness of his new methodology and unable to acknowledge that all the answers are not yet available, tends to find answers too readily. At the same time, his science confronts him with two built-in difficulties beyond those faced by the Kremlinologist which make circumspection all the more desirable.

First, though the terminology is in both instances Marxist, Moscow and Peking by no means always convey the same sense by the same words. The terminology, as it comes down to us, has picked up special connotations in its passage through not one but two distinct closed societies, and these subtleties must be understood and taken into account by the analyst.

A23

MORI/HRP PAGES
A23-A27

Sinosovietology

Second, because the new methodology was born of an obvious rift in Sino-Soviet relations which in recent years has been largely a left-right split between the "radical" Chinese and the "conservative" Soviets, the Sinosovietologist is tempted to assume that differences will be found strictly along this line of cleavage. But in the history of Communism, and especially in regard to the "colonial question," left and right have often gone hand in hand; leftists have crossed to the right on specific issues and vice versa. Lacking proper documentary evidence, it is unwise to take it for granted that Peking-left, Moscow-right is the inevitable pattern. And it is especially unwise to assume without proof that Peking pursues its generally left strategy to the edge of idiocy in disregard of its own interests.

A good example of overzealous hunting along the left-right cleft, coupled with a less than painstaking sifting of the evidence, appears in a recent issue of the scholarly periodical *Problems of Communism*.¹ It presents, among other things—and quite effectively for those without the patience or resources to check the facts—what purports to be documentary evidence of a Sino-Soviet dispute over the handling of the 1958 crisis precipitated by the Iraqi coup on 14 July and the Anglo-American landings in Jordan and Lebanon over the following three days.² The sequence of the ensuing diplomatic moves had been as follows:

- 19 July Khrushchev's appeal for an emergency summit meeting of the USSR, the United States, Britain, France, and India, with the participation of the U.N. Secretary General.
- 22 July Macmillan's counterproposal for a summit conference within the framework of a special session of the Security Council.

¹"Sino-Soviet Friction in Underdeveloped Areas," by Donald S. Zagoria, in the March-April 1961 issue.

²A much earlier article in the same periodical (September-October 1958 issue, by Herbert Ritvo), showing in detail the close coordination between statements on the crisis from Moscow and Peking, had concluded persuasively that there was no propaganda evidence of a rift between the two.

Sinosovietology

- 23 July Khrushchev's qualified acceptance of Macmillan's proposal, and his suggestion of 28 July as the date.
- 28 July Khrushchev's rejection of the Western proposal for a meeting of the permanent Security Council representatives to prepare for the special session. From this point on, the proposal for a summit meeting was dead.
- 30 July Greece's recognition of the new Iraqi regime. Turkey and Iran followed suit the next day, Britain and the United States on 1 and 2 August.
- 31 July Khrushchev's departure for Peking.

The article's first bit of evidence that Peking disapproved of Khrushchev's soft handling of the situation is negative, and erroneous. It says that the *People's Daily* editorials of 21-22 July did not endorse his emergency appeal for a summit meeting. The fact is that a *People's Daily* editorial of 22 July declared the Soviet proposal of 19 July to be "a new, effective measure of the USSR to support the just struggle of the people in the Middle East and stop the U.S. and British acts of piracy." Still more to the point, in an editorial of 25 July, the Chinese paper welcomed as "a major step for peace" Khrushchev's subsequent acceptance of Macmillan's counterproposal for a summit meeting within the framework of the Security Council, including Nationalist China's representative. Logically (our Western logic), this acceptance should truly have infuriated the Chinese, but there is no scholarly evidence that it did.

As positive evidence that Peking favored a more vigorous military response, the article cites *People's Daily's* intimation on 21 July that it might become necessary to send "volunteer armies" to the Middle East. But the USSR had previously issued a more specific threat in a more official form: a Soviet Government statement of 18 July had warned that Moslems of the Middle East and Central Asia might go to the aid of their coreligionists. The article also backdates Khrushchev's trip to Peking ten days, to 21 July, as though to make room for the possibility that his 28 July backtracking on the Se-

Sinosovietology

curity Council plan was the result of Chinese pressures exerted in personal confrontation.

As a clincher, the article quotes the following passage from a *People's Daily* editorial of 8 August, after the crisis was past:

... Some soft-hearted advocates of peace naively believe that in order to relax tension at all costs the enemy must not be provoked. ... Some groundlessly conclude that peace can be gained only where there is no armed resistance against the attacks of the imperialists and colonialists ...

But this passage in the editorial is immediately followed by a direct reference to the Middle East crisis which cites it along with the Korean and Indochinese wars, the attack on Egypt, and the 1957 Syrian crisis as occasions when firm Soviet and Bloc reaction forestalled or defeated Western "aggression." *People's Daily* was certainly rebuking someone for something, but, even granting a probability that the someone was Khrushchev, this citation and the circumstances of the time make it unlikely that the already resolved Middle East crisis was the subject of dispute.

From any Communist standpoint, whether Moscow's or Peking's, Khrushchev's tactics in July had worked out very well indeed: there was no Western intervention in Iraq, and the U.S. and British troops soon withdrew from Jordan and Lebanon. If the Chinese had opposed Khrushchev's tactics at the time, they were shown by September to have been in error, "objectively" speaking, and what the Sinosovietologist might then look for in the polemics would be some intimation of a Khrushchev "I told you so."

Sinosovietology as represented by this article has thus failed to shed light on the question of whether there was a Sino-Soviet dispute over tactics during the 1958 crisis, but it has shown how overeagerness to prove a theory can lead to carelessness and insufficiency of examination. On another subject it makes an even more egregious mistake. Speaking of tactics vis-a-vis colonialism in general, it says:

The Moscow Declaration of December 1960 deferred to the Chinese viewpoint in calling it a Communist "duty" to render the "fullest moral and material assistance" to "peoples fighting to free themselves from imperialist and colonial tyranny." But while the Chinese explicitly interpreted this afterward as a commitment to

Sinosovietology

support not only political but also armed struggles of colonial emancipation, East German Party Secretary Ulbricht, undoubtedly speaking for Moscow, flatly reaffirmed that "we are opposed to colonial wars."

The author surely knows, when he is not carried away by the heat of argument, that a colonial war, in Communist terminology, is one instigated by the colonialists, and that it would be inconceivable for Ulbricht, or Khrushchev, or Mao, or any other Communist leader, *not* to be "opposed to colonial wars." What Ulbricht is saying is that the policy of peaceful coexistence does not preclude opposing colonial aggression.

Sinosovietology, if it is to grow to a healthy maturity, will have to exercise the caution, modesty, and painstaking regard for facts that are essential attributes in every field of scholarly endeavor. It may be unfair to hold up this particular article as an example of the prodigy's current accomplishments. But it would not take very many such productions to cast upon the new science the same discredit that its parent Kremlinology long suffered and even now has not completely outlived.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

WW II CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

THE MAN WHO STARTED THE WAR. By *Gunter Peis*.
(London: Odhams Press. 1960. Pp. 223. 18/—.)

These are the memoirs, journalistically served up by Mr. Peis, of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, a hitherto little known officer of the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst who now exposes his key role in a number of its most famous exploits. Responsible for the most part directly to security chief Reinhard Heydrich, according to his story, he supplied forged signatures for the documents that led to Stalin's execution of Marshall Tukhachevskiy and thousands of other high-ranking Soviet officers in 1937, and he personally sold them to a Russian agent; he planned and led the simulated attack from Poland on the Gleiwitz radio station that Hitler used as the pretext for invasion (whence the book's title); it was he that kidnapped British operatives Best and Stevens from their rendezvous with Walter Schellenberg at Venlo; he installed and ran for Schellenberg the audio surveillance in Salon Kitty, the luxurious brothel Heydrich devised for diplomatic espionage; he conceived and directed the development of Aktion Bernhard, the incredibly perfect forgery of British banknotes. Then, he says, he fell from Heydrich's favor, in the spring of 1941, and was cashiered on framed charges.

The best previous published source on most of these operations is Schellenberg's own memoirs,¹ which appeared in 1956, well before Peis and Naujocks started work on this book. But there is no indication that Naujocks had read Schellenberg (whom he considered an enemy and now describes contemptuously), and if Peis was aware of inconsistencies in the two versions he preserves a dead pan about them. Not that inconsistencies are ubiquitous. There are none between Schellenberg's paragraph on Aktion Bernhard and the dozen pages Naujocks/Peis devote to it,² and those in regard to the Venlo

¹ *The Labyrinth*, reviewed in Intelligence Articles I 4, p. 119 ff.

² Naujocks' account, in fact, clears up, by distinguishing between the development of the project and later routine production, a discrepancy noted by the reviewer of the Schellenberg memoirs (p. 124) between them and Murray Teigh Bloom's description in "The World's Greatest Counterfeiters" (*Harper's*, July 1957).

Recent Books: *Clandestine*

Recent Books: *Clandestine*

kidnapping are minor ones readily understandable in the reporting of a confused few minutes of frantic action. But after one of Heydrich's overnight "inspection" visits to Salon Kitty, of which Schellenberg was in overall command, Schellenberg says he was accused by Heydrich, in an attempt to get a hold over him, of having left the audio equipment turned on in the room he occupied, and it took sworn statements from the entire technical staff to refute the charge. Naujocks, on the other hand, tells how Heydrich faced him, still chuckling over the tape he had just erased, with this accusation and how his ineffective denial was the beginning of his downfall. Possibly both stories are true, with Schellenberg unaware that the charge was justified and someone had squealed.

A discrepancy about the Gleiwitz incident is more difficult. Naujocks says he was assigned the planning and execution of the fake attack—except for the provision of a fresh corpse, which Heinrich Mueller of the Gestapo would take care of from concentration camp resources—on 5 August 1939, and he describes his uninterrupted preparations for it through 31 August, when he, with six other SD men, carried it out. But Schellenberg says that as late as 26 August his former superior Mehlhorn was asked by Heydrich to lead a force of concentration camp inmates dressed as Poles against the radio station; on Schellenberg's advice he refused the assignment, and someone else was found. Perhaps the dates could somehow be explained, but Schellenberg's second-hand version—which is also the one generally current—of a whole force recruited from concentration camps that suffered a number of casualties is quite an embroidery on what Naujocks records, the single corpse deposited by Mueller on the steps while a squad of SD men raided the undefended station.

It is on the historically most important operation of the SD, the forging of the Tikhachevskiy papers, that the two sets of memoirs became flatly irreconcilable. They do not disagree that late in 1936 Heydrich had bought information from White Russian General Skoblin on the existence of a Soviet General Staff conspiracy against Stalin headed by Marshall Tikhachevskiy in which the German General Staff might be involved, that the Abwehr evaluated the report as absurd, that Heydrich had Schellenberg dig up background

information which made it seem plausible, that Hitler decided to convey it to Stalin, and that the SD's problem was to provide documentary proof. But Schellenberg claims that documents which were for the most part genuine were obtained by burglarizing the Abwehr and General Staff offices, adducing their being laid before Hitler within four days as proof that not much forging could have been done, while Naujocks says that typed forgeries had been prepared before the burglary, which was carried out solely to obtain specimen stamps and signatures to affix to them, and that he personally supervised the all-night session in which the forger copied these.

Schellenberg says that Stalin, informed of the availability of the file through President Benes of Czechoslovakia, sent a personal envoy bearing credentials from NKVD chief Yezhov to Heydrich to pick it up. Naujocks, however, says the Benes channel was considered and discarded; a double agent in Prague was told that Naujocks himself was hard up and willing to sell a copy of this material that was passing through his hands as an SD officer, and within two days Naujocks was approached by a Soviet agent, a German national who called himself Hans. Schellenberg has it that Hitler and Heydrich had not planned to charge Stalin for the documents, but that when his envoy inquired about price they accepted three million gold rubles to preserve appearances. Naujocks says that he was instructed to insist on marks, 50,000 of them that Hans balked at the price but checked by radio with Moscow, that German monitors picked up Moscow's reply, the single word "Proceed." He describes in detail his meeting with Hans the next day to hand over the photographs he himself had made of the file. Schellenberg says that he personally had to destroy most of the three million rubles because the bills had obviously been marked; Naujocks says the SD cashier entered the 50,000 marks under "miscellaneous receipts."

Unless Naujocks' highly circumstantial account is pure fabrication or Schellenberg's memory is much fuzzier than it should be about such a history-making operation, it can only be concluded that the SD, with clean compartmentation at all levels below Heydrich, prepared two different sets of Tikhachevskiy documents and got them to Moscow by two different channels, to insure against one getting sidetracked on

Recent Books: Clandestine

to provide confirmatory evidence. The SD might look pretty silly for having put all this effort into elaborating the undocumented tip from the White Russian Skoblin, who shortly turned out to have been a Soviet agent and therefore had doubtless come to Heydrich on NKVD orders in the first place, except that the operation did evidently trigger the decimation of the Soviet officer corps two years before the war began.³

COLDITZ: The German Story. By Reinhold Eggers. (London: Robert Hale. 1961. Pp. 190. 18/—.)

During World War II Colditz castle was made a *Sonderlager* or special camp for Allied POW's with unusual political or escaping records. The heavy guard arrangements were supposed to put a stop to escape once and for all. The POW's, however, took these arrangements as a special challenge and by pooling their talents and considerable experience made Colditz the theatre of some of the war's most ingenious escapes. These exploits have been the subject of a film and a number of books, all from the prisoner's point of view.⁴ Reinhold Eggers, a German guard officer at Colditz from 1940 to 1945, now retells the story from the German point of view. His account brings out some sidelights and perspectives that add significantly to the open history of escape and evasion.

Noteworthy from the intelligence viewpoint are the book's revelations regarding "Operation Ekkehard," a feeble and tardy German effort to match the British in contacting and aiding their prisoners behind enemy lines. Oddly, the idea of communicating covertly with their prisoners in Allied camps does not seem to have occurred to the Germans until

³ For the Soviet side of the Tukhachevskiy story as reconstructed from open and White Russian sources, see Geoffrey Bailey's *The Conspirators* (New York, 1960), reviewed in Intelligence Articles V 2, p. A67 ff.

⁴ Notably by Patrick R. Reid, *The Colditz Story* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1953) and *The Latter Days* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1953), also published under the title *Men of Colditz* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1954); by Lt. J. E. R. Wood, *Detour* (London: Falcon Press, 1946); and by General Le Brigant, the senior French officer imprisoned there, *Les Indomptables* (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1957).

Recent Books: Clandestine

they learned at Colditz, to their surprise, that the British were enjoying at least a modest success in doing it.

During the author's four years at Colditz escape attempts were made on the average of once every ten days. Details of some of the escapes did not become known to him until long after the war, and there are some that he is still unaware of. He claims that somewhat more than 300 would-be escapers were caught in the act, often the same ones who had tried before. On about 130 occasions escapers got out of the castle or got away while in transit locally. The number that got clear away and over the frontier without being retaken was 30—six Dutch, 14 French, nine British, and one Pole. Percentage-wise, considering the number in the camp from each nationality group, the Dutch had the best escape record. The book includes some exceptionally good photographs of POW-made escape disguises and equipment.

Eggers and other Germans came to realize too late that Colditz castle, with its nooks and crannies and irregularly shaped rooms, was the worst possible site for a strict surveillance camp. A spread of wire-enclosed huts in an open field would have given equal or greater security while requiring much less guard manpower. The author also learned belatedly that nearly all security measures are two-sided, i.e., that the device which plugs one hole usually opens another. Nothing in this interesting book sums up the German experience at Colditz better than Eggers' comment that "our locks were no damn good."

RESISTANCE NURSE. By Alexandrina Marsden. (London: Odhams Press. 1961. Pp. 208. 18/—.)

This is the autobiography of an Englishwoman who served as a nurse in France during both world wars, her most strenuous adventures coming during the second conflict, when, although over 60 years of age, she combined her nursing with an active role in the French resistance. Mrs. Marsden's main clandestine work was in connection with an escape line for downed Allied airmen, but she also collected and transmitted military data. No particularly new techniques are highlighted, but it must be granted that she used old ones, espe-

Recent Books: Clandestine

cially the cover provided by her nursing career, to good effect. Although, as a British subject, she was automatically suspect, she was never detained by the Germans for any indiscretion she could not talk her way out of. Her excellent qualifications for clandestine work show up clearly: courage, inventiveness, command of languages, a knack for worming out of tight spots, intuition, luck, and a good security sense. Her security-mindedness is attested to by the fact that the husband with whom she lived for three years while in resistance work did not learn of her activities until the war ended.

CAVEAT LECTOR

FROGMAN EXTRAORDINARY and **DANGER FROM MOSCOW**. By *J. Bernard Hutton* (pseudonym for Joseph Heisler). (London: Spearman, Neville; and Toronto: Burns & MacEachern. 1960.)

These two recent accessions to the literature respectively of counterespionage and international Communism warrant careful marking. The pieces have a common taint that makes them suspect at a time when the East's hot war of words against the West appears to be putting more and more reliance on forgery and prevarication. "Hutton's" efforts may be merely a pecuniary speculation by an exile fabrication mill, or they may be something more sophisticated, a product of Moscow's cold warriors; a case can be made for either view. It is necessary in any event to call attention to the fraud and its perils.

Frogman Extraordinary, dubbed by its publishers "The Counter-Espionage Book of the Year," purports to be the inside story of the fatal underwater mission carried out by Commander Lionel Crabb on 18 May 1956 against the Soviet cruiser *Ordzhonikidze* in Portsmouth Harbor. According to "Hutton," the Soviet internal security service called its acolyte services together in Moscow early in August 1959 and passed them a dossier on the Crabb case (and several others) for use in training their operatives. The core of the book is the alleged dossier, translated from a German original of which the usual facsimiles are shown. "Hutton" attributes Western acquisition of these materials to "those men and women who, in the Soviet rear, daily risk their lives to obtain information for the Western world."

The story, like most such fabrications, contains no provable facts not made public in the news coverage during and since the Crabb affair. Whether or not the dossier was fed to "Hutton" by Soviet agents, with or without his knowledge, the Soviets clearly stand to gain from its publication. Soviet intelligence is shown as omniscient. It is alleged to have known the details of the Crabb operation before it was carried out. At one point there is a serious reference to the "brilliant brains of the Soviet security officers." It is also depicted as humane: after immobilizing, capturing, and conveying Crabb

Recent Books: *Caveat*

to the USSR, it "rehabilitated" the frogman instead of shooting him.

Finally, there are 31 assertions in the text that the Crabb operation was sponsored by U.S. Naval Intelligence. The sequence of the references is an interesting example of conditioning technique. Most British and Canadian readers, by the time they finish the book, will have the Crabb affair firmly associated with U.S. intelligence. Because U.S. intelligence in the past year has become a primary Soviet propaganda target everywhere, this linking of it to the Crabb case and placing it in the sponsor's role serves the overall Soviet purpose. On the one hand, British public opinion may be nudged toward anti-Americanism; on the other, American confidence in British security and operational skill would be weakened if U.S. readers were persuaded that Soviet intelligence had the Crabb operation so thoroughly penetrated that it knew everything in advance.

Danger from Moscow is based on the device of "secret instructions," a standard fabrication come-on throughout the existence of the Cominform which still appears in intelligence frauds. It is the classic mixture of fabrication and previously published fact. Without taking into account "Hutton's" own murky Communist past—Heisler belonged to the Czech Party—the possibility persists that his writing may reflect deeper origins in some paper mill group such as those that operated most successfully in the late forties and early fifties.¹

Except for a chapter on developments in the Middle East, the piece consists entirely of retold news stories superimposed on "secret Cominform instructions" by which overt developments in the U.K., the United States, West Germany, and the rest of the world are attributed to "hidden Communist activists." In a final chapter, "On the Home Front," Hutton develops the provocative thesis that Russia is constantly on the verge of a popular revolt against the Communist regime. The Middle East treatment was quite apparently written by another pen: here, though the material is overt, it is assembled in a professional manner and is not saturated, like the remainder of the book, with émigré self-interest. The book

¹ See Intelligence Articles II 1, p. 95 ff.

Recent Books: *Caveat*

contains no real or reliable knowledge of the workings of the Communist conspiracy in the U.K., the United States, or West Germany which would be beyond the resources of the periodical room of a good library.²

² A third book from the same author and publishers, and presumably of the same ilk, is being advertised, as this caveat goes to press, under the title *School for Spies*.

Recent Books: Civil War

CIVIL WAR BOOKS

DEATH TO TRAITORS: The Story of General Lafayette C. Baker, Lincoln's Forgotten Secret Service Chief. By *Jacob Mogelever*. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday. 1960. Pp. 429. \$4.95.)

SHE RODE WITH THE GENERALS: The True and Incredible Story of Sarah Emma Seelye, Alias Franklin Thompson. By *Sylvia G. L. Dannett*. New York, Edinburgh and Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 1960. Pp. 326. \$5.00.)

SPY FOR THE CONFEDERACY: Rose O'Neal Greenhow. By *Jeanette Covert Nolan*. (New York: Julian Messner. 1960. Pp. 192. \$2.95.)

Here are three exercises in gullibility, all dealing with secret service in the American Civil War. Almost the only intelligence operatives of that war who have been publicly identified are the few who published accounts of their experiences. It was customary to load these accounts (which were usually ghost-written) with embellishments such as long stretches of dialogue (taken down without the aid of tape recorders, presumably); and the fabrication of entire exploits was common. Secondary writers have been gleefully mining these books ever since, and it was too much to hope that we could pass through a four-year Centennial without the appearance of a rash of such rewrites. Meanwhile the hundreds of unrecognized spies and spymasters turn over in their graves, wondering how it can be that books such as these pass for the inside story of secret intelligence in an otherwise well-documented war.

All three of the present books are beneath the notice of anyone with a professional interest in intelligence, and only the curious need read farther in these paragraphs, which will be confined to supporting the allegation just made.

Lafayette C. Baker was a detective of decided strong-arm tendencies whose official capacity was that of Provost Marshal of the War Department. His activities and methods are by no means unknown to the thousands of Civil War cognoscenti, but this is the first biography he has received. Baker headed a small group of detectives whose operations, predominantly in and near Washington, embraced such ordinary po-

lice functions as tracking down counterfeiters and speculators, weeding out disloyal postmasters, keeping the capital's dens of vice under some semblance of control, and jailing military and political prisoners. He was detested by fellow army officers, who considered him a hatchet man; his treatment by his superiors was not such as to reflect any higher regard for him. His chief claims to fame were two—the tracking down of John Wilkes Booth (accomplished by subordinate officers while Baker remained in Washington), and the unparalleled effrontery of spying on President Johnson, an act which even the President's bitter enemies in Congress could not stomach.

Clearly there is material here for a biography. Author Mogelever produces instead an uncritical and unskillful rehash of Baker's memoirs, glorifying the villain well above his own fond self-portrayal. He is depicted as an intimate of Lincoln, Seward, and Stanton, whereas in fact Baker, a colonel until the end of the war, got most of his orders from a judge advocate who held the rank of major. His little organization is represented to have achieved the status of a national "Secret Service"; the assumed existence of such an organization is another example of a fable which through repetition is well on its way to being accepted as history.

It happens that Allan Pinkerton, the Chicago detective, was in Washington for a good part of the war directing a bureau that operated alongside Baker's, though not in cooperation with it. Pinkerton wrote a postwar book in which, like Baker, he represented himself as having been the chief of the "United States Secret Service." Later writers have preserved the illusion that there was such an organization without resolving the question of who headed it; those who write about Pinkerton give him the honor, and those who write about Baker blandly name their man for it. Mogelever enjoys something of a distinction in that he runs this pretense out to a considerably greater length than any of his predecessors.

In *Death to Traitors* Baker is pictured on the one hand as a man who casually shot Secessionists when he was not throwing them into jail without warrant or evidence, and on the other as a man of strong character who fought for the establishment of a politically independent national police system. (The FBI can take comfort in the fact that this impu-

Recent Books: Civil War

tation of its origin is entirely unconvincing.) The contradiction is evidently intended to be an impartial view of two sides of a complex man, but its effect is merely that of talking out of both sides of the mouth.

Presented here also are such clichés as the theory that the Confederate government was behind the assassination of Lincoln; that the Confederates engaged in an attempt at germ warfare; that most Union generals "had no heart" for a war to free the slaves; that in the early months of the war betrayal and confusion were so widespread as to paralyze the North. Some historians classify these as fantasies, others admit them to skeptical consideration; Moglever swallows them whole, and without showing his reasons. But he does not confine himself to the time-worn fantastic; he introduces the preposterous notion that Baker's organization, in addition to all its other services, provided decisive *military* intelligence.

Moglever's contacts with the descendants of Baker and his subordinates included one with a man who claimed that his grandfather, John Odell, was Lincoln's personal spy assigned to investigate the loyalty of his generals. This, the only interesting new material in the book, rests entirely on an old man's war stories as remembered by his grandchildren. Moreover, it entails such improbable situations as the frequent covert rendezvous of Lincoln, Baker, and Odell—nighttime walks by an unaccompanied President to parts of the city distant from the White House.

The chief value in a serious study of Lafayette Baker would center on his role in the political arrests: assuming that he was the Gestapo type that he appears to have been, was he really given enough rein to do serious damage? He made many arrests, but a real study of them might show that they were generally well justified. And the punishment meted out to such prisoners was light, often trifling; the title "Death to Traitors," although based on a slogan of Baker's, is nonsense when considered against this record. Despite Baker's tremendous appeal as a villain, the hard evidence now in print grants him few substantial accomplishments in villainy. Materials exist that would go far to answer the question; in fact, some of them probably came under the view of Mr. Moglever.

** ** *

Recent Books: Civil War

In *She Rode with the Generals*, a Union division commander shouts in the heat of battle, "We are whipping them like hell! Like hell we are whipping them!" This remarkable quotation is but a suggestion of the many puzzles and contradictions set out for the reader by Miss Dannett. The story is of a young Canadian woman, Sarah Emma Edmonds, who served two years in the Union army under the guise of a man without being officially discovered and who claimed to have performed espionage for three different Federal armies. The less believable half of the story—that concerning her protracted masquerade—is well authenticated; but the other half, which concerns her service as a spy, though essentially reasonable, cannot be accepted on the strength of Miss Dannett's account.

The author, despite a sob-sisterly approach, takes a properly critical view of the problems of the transvestite, four hundred of whom got into the Union army (and usually got right out again). She considers all the factors from the probable Lesbian origins of Miss Edmonds' enlistment to the difficulties of performing a covert toilette while living with a male soldier under a pair of shelter-halves. And the author concludes convincingly enough that the ridin', shootin' Emma Edmonds was not only a soldier for two years but a good one. So full a study of a military transvestite may not have appeared before.

An honorable discharge, a G.A.R. membership, and lengthy statements of numerous fellow soldiers, still on record, support Miss Edmonds' claims to having served in the army. But the story of her supposed espionage services rests on the book *Nurse and Spy*, which she wrote in 1865 and later admitted to contain experiences that were not her own but had merely passed under her observation. None of them, however, are rejected by Miss Dannett. Thus we are presented with such a comic-opera figure as Edmonds in blackface, performing the sweaty task of wielding a pick and shovel on Confederate fortifications without damage to her make-up, and meanwhile tabulating—it could only have been through the aid of some miraculous agency—detailed data on all Southern artillery along an entire front. The most titillating of these caricatures is that of the transvestite entering the enemy lines with a "Hi-

Recent Books: Civil War

bernian accent" and a supply of cakes for the starving rebels, this time *masquerading as a woman*.

So skilled was Emma Edmonds at leading a double life that it is entirely possible she led a triple one for a time. But her own book determinedly avoids any details which could be used to substantiate or disprove her claims to service as a spy. (It also withholds the fact that she was in the army as a soldier rather than as a field nurse.) It is not the kind of stuff of which history can be made, and Miss Dannett in fact sizes up her heroine as a congenital liar (though some pages farther on she says that "an innate honesty [was] characteristic of all her actions"). Emma Edmonds herself, in supplying voluminous information to support her application for a veteran's pension, did not (so far as Miss Dannett shows) even refer to her espionage service. In the course of the considerable attention Miss Edmonds has received from Civil War historians, the possibility that she actually was a spy has remained open. That possibility may now be discounted.

In Rose Greenhow, subject of *Spy for the Confederacy*, we have an undoubtedly authentic top-drawer spy, and one who has received so much publicity that further documentation of her career is redundant. Widow of a prominent State Department officer, close friend of President Buchanan, relative of Dolly Madison and Stephen A. Douglas, she was so highly placed in Washington society that high-echelon gossip found its way easily to her, and she knew well how to make use of it. The warning she sent to Manassas when the Federal army set out to attack that place in July 1861 probably had a great deal to do with the summoning of reinforcements which turned the First Battle of Bull Run into a Confederate victory. Although engaged on such business Mrs. Greenhow made loud Secessionist noises around Washington, probably hoping that open dissidence would allay suspicion of covert activity. But at the same time she allowed her house to become an obvious meeting-place for Southern sympathizers. She was arrested by Pinkerton a month after the battle, and although she never denied this service to the South, the punishment she received—it is an example of the aforementioned

Recent Books: Civil War

leniency of the Federal Government toward such offenders—was merely deportation to Richmond.

This book about her, which abounds in trumped-up dialogue and doctored situations, adds nothing to the story contained in a longer biography, *Rebel Rose*, by Ishbel Ross, published in 1954. It is time, however, that public recognition be given to the fact that most of the impressive bibliography of widely scattered Greenhow material owes its discovery to the labors of a University of Alabama graduate student, Lamar William Smith, whose 1948 study of the famous spy remains unpublished. Smith's treatment is also more sophisticated than Miss Ross' and Miss Nolan's. It may be said in extenuation of the latter's shortcomings that she is evidently writing for the juvenile trade. But this reviewer will guarantee to produce half a dozen preadolescent Civil War buffs who would reject her offerings as palpable non-history.

WHY THE NORTH WON THE CIVIL WAR. Edited by David Donald, with a foreword by U. S. Grant III. (Louisiana State University Press. 1960. Pp. 129. \$2.95.)

Whether an automobile crash on a street corner or a clash of states at an international crossroads, any spectacular accident evokes a never-ending variety of views as to why it happened, whose fault it was, and what should have been done differently. The greater the intensity of emotions involved, the more extreme the interpretations of the event. The American Civil War is a case in point. As the first of the modern wars, it has been the object of intense scrutiny by military students of every major power; as the military episode in our continuous effort to solve national problems, it is the favorite subject of American historians.

This book presents five essays analyzing the South's defeat. In "God and the Strongest Battalions," Richard N. Current emphasizes that the North had a five-to-two advantage in manpower and greater economic strength. But he points out that the Confederacy failed to utilize properly its own economic advantages—the transportation system giving it interior lines of communication, its cotton as a basis for foreign credit and firm alliances with Britain and France, and its potential resources in taxation.

Recent Books: Civil War

"The Military Leadership of North and South," by T. Harry Williams, points out that the War presents an unusual case history for the study of generalship, in that the adversaries came from the same educational system and military background. "Of the sixty biggest battles, West Point graduates commanded both armies in fifty-five, and in the remaining five a West Pointer commanded one of the opposing armies." Most of these generals, having been schooled in the military science of Jomini, were inclined to fight his chivalric kind of war and did not recognize that they had entered the era of "organized assassination." They were preoccupied with the seizure of "decisive strategic points" and tended to ignore intelligence that could have led to the crushing of the opposing army. The Southern generals, however, because Confederate policy did not look to the acquisition of enemy territory, were fortunate in being able to make armies the object of their offensives. The generals on both sides, except for Grant, failed for the most part to relate war to politics. The role of intelligence in Grant's thinking is tellingly characterized in Sherman's comment about him, "He don't care a damn for what the enemy does out of his sight, but it scares me like hell," and in Grant's own theory of strategy, "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on."

In "Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality," Norman A. Graebner observes that since even limited assistance from Europe could have carried the South to victory, the nation's future lay as much in diplomatic as in military hands. Russia was the only European state to stand for the preservation of the Union. Britain would have been pleased to see disunion. France favored the Confederacy. Seward, as Lincoln's Secretary of State, had to devote all his effort to keeping European power out of the war. His pressure on the Europeans undoubtedly played a large role in depriving the South of any official help from them, particularly at the time when the early Confederate victories made it appear the Union would most certainly fall. Graebner does not, however, provide any analysis of how well Seward was kept informed by his posts abroad.

Recent Books: Civil War

"Died of Democracy," by David Donald, has some lessons pertinent today. Its thesis is that the South failed, in high degree, because it tried to preserve its democratic traditions in wartime at the expense of achieving victory. He cites the lack of discipline in the Confederate army: "Regarding themselves the equals of any men in the world, the Southerners never took kindly to regimented life." In civil rights too, Jefferson Davis preserved the traditional freedoms—speech, press, and protection against arbitrary arrest—giving disloyal elements almost unrestricted activity. Political democracy was also unimpaired, in direct contrast to the situation in the North.

In the final essay of the compilation, "Jefferson Davis and the Political Factors in the Confederate Defeat," David M. Potter puts considerable blame for the defeat on the Confederate government's failure to resort to taxation in order to raise public revenue and control inflation. To this he adds its restrictive policy on cotton trade, which resulted in extensive smuggling and the loss of a major economic weapon, and its failure to assert control over the labor force, particularly in making greater use of the slaves. All of these errors he lays at Davis' doorstep, who failed in his relations with other Confederate leaders, in his concept of the job of President, and in his duties as commander in chief. In a masterful summation the author characterizes Davis as "a conservative leader, not a revolutionary leader; a man with a strong sense of protocol and convention, but with a weak sense of innovation; a man who was much happier with details than he was with overviews; a man who loved order and logical organization better than he loved results which are achieved by unorthodox methods; above all, a man who thought in terms of principles rather than of possibilities and who cared more about proving he was right than about gaining success."

In sum, from the estimative viewpoint, these five essays show that the South lost because it failed to make a net evaluation of its assets as against those of the North and to conduct itself accordingly.

Recent Books: Miscellany

MISCELLANY: CROMWELL TO CONTEMPORARY

CROMWELL'S MASTER SPY: A Study of John Thurloe. By D. L. Hobman. (London: Chapman & Hall. 1961. Pp. 186, 21/—.)

John Thurloe, a lawyer and minor government official, rose under Oliver Cromwell to become, at the age of 37, Secretary of State; he was also charged with foreign and domestic intelligence and given control of the post office. (He had John Milton on his table of organization as a Latinist.) He was an industrious, not to say obsessional, worker. He accumulated a fortune during his seven years in office, and he preserved his fame by saving his correspondence. This considerable collection of papers was found years after his death in a false ceiling of his law office in Lincoln's Inn. Published in 1742, the seven volumes remain a useful source on the history of the Interregnum.

Hobman's book is not, as first glance would indicate, worthless; it has a modest but real use as a sort of digest of those items in the Thurloe Papers touching intelligence activities. Some attempt is made to set the scene and weave a narrative, but little comes of it, perhaps because of the tid-bit nature of the variegated items. The style is journalistic. The publisher is presumably responsible for the misleading title; could Spy Master have been meant? The publisher must also be held responsible for the lack of an index in a book of many barely related subjects and names.

Had the author been seriously concerned to give us a study of Thurloe as head of intelligence, he could hardly have omitted reprinting the short paper by Thurloe's assistant, John Wildman, which describes how Thurloe built his organization.¹ Wildman recommended that the government recruit agents in the inner circle of each faction in the city, screen the mail at the central post office,² and maintain covert reporters at home and abroad. Thurloe's reports from abroad

¹ A brief discourse concerning the business of intelligence and how it may be managed to the best advantage. English Historical Review, 1898, vol. 13, pp. 529-533.

² Thurloe's opener of the mails, Isaac Dorislaus, was retained even after the Restoration in his cover job at the post office and lived to be accused of using his position to tamper with the mail.

gave him a virtual monopoly on foreign news; he published a semi-official newspaper to give the public information that could do no harm and would turn opinion in the interest of policy.

English royalist émigrés in Europe constantly plotted to murder Cromwell and to restore the monarchy by means of uprisings in England. Thurloe's hands were full. He was MI-5, MI-6, the Foreign Office, the Post Office, and military intelligence. He used money liberally; he kept his secrets; Cromwell made him an intimate. He had an agent who was in the confidence of the exiled Charles. And Charles, of course, had an agent in Thurloe's private office. The Royalists spotted Thurloe's man and executed him in a park in Paris. Thurloe never realized that his trusted assistant, Samuel Morland, had been won over to the King's cause, unless indeed he smelled a rat when Morland was knighted after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660.

Thurloe was allowed to live in quiet after the kingship was reestablished, partly, it was said, because he had in his black book evidence of disloyalty involving many of those close to Charles. He tried to take the position that he was a non-partisan servant of the state and offered his services to the King; Charles, however, paid him the compliment of refusing, thinking perhaps that his devotion to Cromwell had had some roots in principle. But a member of Parliament cried out in the Commons that the King was now not so well protected as Cromwell had been. Secretary Thurloe, he said, had enabled Cromwell to carry the secrets of the Princes of Europe in his pocket.

BROADSIDES AND BAYONETS: The Propaganda War of the American Revolution. By Carl Berger. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1961. Pp. 224. \$5.00.)

This engrossing history of propaganda and subversion in the American Revolutionary War is a timely one. The events belong to the period 1775-1783, but the struggle of antagonists to make men fight for their respective principles and to convert the uncommitted into allies or friendly neutrals is not dated. In the Revolution, as in the world today, there were not just two clearly defined or early aligned antagonists.

Recent Books: Miscellany

The Colonists were divided, and in Britain the Patriots found support among the Whigs; sympathetic France, still smarting from defeat at the hands of the British, was eventually drawn into the military struggle, and other nations were encouraged to bring pressure upon England; both sides sought the support of Canadian citizens, recently come under British rule with Wolfe's defeat of Montcalm; the use of mercenaries gave the Colonists particularly likely targets for subversion; and Indian and Negro minority groups moved in and out of the battle. Arguments, rewards, threats, and coercion were all used by both sides to bring various groups into the war, to win them over, or to keep them out of the battles. Both sides were aware of the importance of carefully prepared persuasion and organized propaganda operations in the field and abroad.

In the organization of his story Mr. Berger subordinates chronology to subject matter and describes military movements only as they provide the setting for propaganda actions. His first four chapters are devoted to the efforts to neutralize, attract, threaten or otherwise influence groups outside the country, especially the French Canadians, and minority groups active in the colonies—Indians, Negroes, and Hessians. Interwoven among these efforts is the struggle for the not-so-fully committed Americans, particularly the Southerners, whom the British referred to as the "weak end of the chain." It is in these chapters that the full force of the eight-year struggle to win and maintain the support of the fringe groups is borne in upon the reader.

Mr. Berger's carefully documented and indexed account, particularly full concerning the American side, makes the reader aware of the extent to which psychological intelligence, a knowledge of groups, issues, and sentiments, played a part in the outcome of war; it leads him to ponder "what would have happened if" intelligence had been more precise or better assessed in relation to certain policy decisions or in the wording of certain appeals. Sometimes the record details the arguments considered in making operational decisions, but at other times the record is incomplete. For example, when the British made the decision to use German mercenaries, did they consider that many rebels were German-Americans well

Recent Books: Miscellany

equipped for subversion operations? Did the Continental Congress not know that there were channels of communication between Britain and Canada which would quickly reveal to the Catholic French Canadians the gross contradiction between the declaration of religious toleration it made to them and its broadside sectarian appeal to Protestant England? Why did the British not realize that the use of Indian fighters would catapult the Colonists into strong unified action and turn the sentiments of the civilized world against them? Was the argument for calling on the slaves to rise against their masters weighed by the British against the inevitable unified resistance this measure would call forth among the Southerners in support of the Patriots' cause?

Two chapters, one on propaganda and one on kidnappings, rumors, and bribes deal with psychological themes, tactics, and techniques in relation to military operations. The accent is on efforts by each side to destroy the will of the enemy to fight and to sustain the morale of its own troops. As the stories of encounters unfold the reader wonders what the outcome might have been, for example, if General Howe, who possessed military superiority, had better anticipated Washington's ability to lift the morale of his oft-beaten troops and, by spreading propaganda about the "bubble of British invincibility," to turn a single victory after a series of crushing defeats into a surge of strength; if, in the contest between the rifle and the bayonet, the Americans had recognized sooner the critical psychological as well as tactical importance of the latter instead of waiting two long years to provide their troops with them; if the British had known sooner or assessed better the effect of French recognition of the independent States and had moved earlier to counteract it.

The author devotes a few pages to sorting out the respective roles of the Continental Congress, Washington, and others. The Continental Congress "was the [psywar] movement's essential director." Ad hoc committees were "appointed to prepare the necessary supporting documents as well as to consider, investigate, and recommend policies." It was by these ad hoc committees that major appeals, orations, and broadsides were prepared, but State Committees of Safety

Recent Books: Miscellany

also disseminated propaganda and carried out other operations. General Washington was an indispensable figure not only in military strategy but also in propaganda and political action. Many of the broadsides of the Continental Congress, as well as its policy decisions, were the fruit of his astute advice. He himself made unique use of general orders to his troops to sustain their morale and provide officers and men with argumentation against the enemy.

The burden of propaganda and political operations overseas was long carried almost alone by Benjamin Franklin, later with the assistance of a few men such as John Adams, who arrived in Europe in 1778 but did not become a full-fledged publicist until his second trip in 1780. Franklin appears to have made use of every advantage offered and to have created many others himself. French mass media under covert attribution were at his disposal; articles, letters, and pamphlets from America were fed to German, French, and Dutch papers; pro-American articles by a British friend found their way into the enemy's publications and were disseminated on the continent; and Franklin's own essays, including black propaganda unattributed at the time, were placed in overt and covert journals. Franklin did not stop with winning friends for America and countering the heavy British propaganda in Europe; he set his political propaganda talents to fanning the disputes of other nations with England, encouraging them to bring pressure upon the British, and identifying their causes with those of the colonies.

Only one propaganda error of serious proportions is reported, one that can be laid to the slow transatlantic communication of intelligence. It struck hard at the colonies' and Franklin's reputation for honesty. A fabricated letter set in motion in America—rather than by Franklin's own not otherwise innocent pen—which anticipated a British defeat at Charleston was reissued by Franklin without waiting the long period necessary for confirmation, because "I have no doubt of the facts stated, and think the piece valuable, as giving a true account of British and American affairs in that quarter." Franklin lost the support of several publishers when the news of Clinton's victory followed close on their use of the spurious item.

A50

Recent Books: Miscellany

THE HUNTER. By Tuviah Friedman. Edited and translated by David C. Gross. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday. 1961. Pp. 286. \$3.95.)

Regardless of what one may think about the moral and legal aspects of abducting Adolf Eichmann from Argentina and taking him to Israel for public trial and spectacle, the intelligence job of locating and capturing him after fifteen years was a feat that should be worthy of study. The dogged persistence of one man, Tuviah Friedman, seems generally recognized to have been the most important factor in this exploit. Yet Friedman's own account of his efforts, now available in this translation, is disappointing from the intelligence viewpoint, however compelling as the autobiography of a man who survived the murder of three million of his fellow Jews in Poland, including his mother and a sister.

Only 17 at the outbreak of the war, Friedman was taken from his family in Radom and sent to a forced labor camp. He escaped and made his way back home. When the family was moved into a ghetto, he found jobs and with the help of his older sister, a nurse, kept the others from starving. This employment saved the two of them from the extermination transports that took their mother and younger sister; they were sent to another camp. Tuviah escaped again and took refuge in the forest with partisans, but he found that his new associates were as anti-Jewish as they were anti-German. When the area was overrun with Russians, he joined the local militia and was assigned to Danzig to round up Nazis. This started his intelligence career.

Friedman soon left the Polish Security Service and joined a commune formed to emigrate to Palestine. When he reached Vienna he was recruited by the Haganah to help ferret out Nazi war criminals, and here his obsession with Eichmann began. He organized a Documentation Center which built up extensive dossiers of material on war criminals. By 1952, however, the number of Jewish survivors who had testimony to offer against the Nazis was exhausted and Eichmann's trail was cold. Friedman closed the Vienna Documentation Center and went to Haifa.

A51

Recent Books: Miscellany

The next eight years were obviously ones of intense frustration for him. He held a variety of jobs, but one gathers he was largely supported by his wife, who is a doctor. Without government backing, he finally set up a new Documentation Center of his own, persistently following the trail of Eichmann. One gets the impression that he used publicity to force the government of Israel to take an interest in the pursuit. When an informant in Argentina wrote to Friedman, Israeli intelligence at last followed up and got Eichmann. But Friedman himself was not involved in the intelligence operation and obviously knew nothing about it. The intelligence interest in his book is therefore confined to the circumstances of his two escapes and the description of his work for Polish Security and the Haganah.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET ☐

25X1

STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



VOL. 5 NO. 4

FALL 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING

SECRET ☐

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

25X1

SECRET

All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence community.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

EDITOR

EDITORIAL BOARD

SHERMAN KENT, Chairman

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components.

SECRET

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CONTENTS

CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION

Contributions to the *Studies* or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building [] and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through *Secret*.

For inclusion on the regular *Studies* distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, [] For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor, []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

CLASSIFIED ARTICLES

	Page
Intelligence for the Space Race Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal <i>Seconding the giants' Olympian duel.</i> SECRET	1
The Problem of Scientific Surprise . James G. Ostensoe <i>A methodological progress report.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	15
Production at Small Posts C. R. Drave <i>Problems of a one-man clandestine base.</i> SECRET	21
What To Do with Defectors John Ankerbrand <i>Reception and handling of walk-ins.</i> SECRET	33
Combat Intelligence: A Comparative Evaluation Lyman B. Kirkpatrick <i>G-2 sources in the WW II European campaign.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	45
Communications to the Editors <i>Magazine in a mirror.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	53
<i>Reservations on the polygraph.</i> SECRET	58

UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES

In Memoriam Assembled by Walter Pforzheimer <i>General Walter Bedell Smith.</i>	A1
Number One from Moscow David Kahn <i>The finest of spy ciphers unraveled.</i>	A15
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	
<i>Psychological Techniques</i>	A29
<i>Unconventional Warfare</i>	A37
<i>Clandestine Operations</i>	A41
<i>Cryptology</i>	A45
<i>The Wartime Resistance</i>	A47

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

*Prospects and methodology for
supporting a symbolic Olympian
technological duel.*

INTELLIGENCE FOR THE SPACE RACE

Albert D. Wheelon
and
Sidney N. Graybeal

THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the *Studies* purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.

Awards will normally be announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

A college football coach, spurred by a vigilant body of alumni to maintain a winning team, is expected to devote a great deal of energy to what in a more deadly competition would be called intelligence activity. He must scout the opposition before game time and plan his own defense and offense in the light of what he learns. During a game he must diagnose plays as they occur in order to adjust his team's tactics and give it flexible direction in action. After the game he should be prepared with an appropriate analysis of what happened, both in order that his team may benefit from seeing its experience in clear focus and in order to placate or moderate the Monday-morning quarterbacks. Although both alumni and coach recognize that football has little to do with the true purpose of a college, the coach is under relentless pressure to win games because his team, in some intangible sense, stands for the entire college.

It is much the same in the space race, a game which is similarly characterized by lively competition on the playing field and intense partisan interest among the spectators. In a way which is neither rational nor desirable, our stature as a nation, our culture, our way of life and government are tending to be gauged by our skill in playing this game. Because we should expect to lose as well as win matches in the series, our government must be provided by its intelligence services with reliable foreknowledge of the possibilities for Soviet space attempts and forecasts of probable attempts, with concurrent evaluations of all attempts as they are made, and with detailed reconstructions thereafter.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

1

SECRET

*The Space Race**Foreknowledge and Anticipation*

The first intelligence problem is to anticipate Soviet space launches with respect to timing, performance, and effect on world opinion. If such forecasting is reliably done, our own program can be so focused or rescheduled as to be most effective. Suppose, for instance, that one had anticipated the determined Soviet drive to impact the moon which was finally accomplished with Lunik II in September 1959 and had accurately gauged the effect of this success on world opinion. Our planners' negative attitude toward the scientific value of such a mission might well have been softened or alloyed with other considerations in time to make the United States the first to accomplish this elementary feat, which was within our reach also in 1958 and 1959.

More broadly, a reliable foreknowledge of Soviet capabilities and schedules should provide a basis for determining the planned performance levels we should achieve by pushing the development of particular booster and upper stage combinations. A familiar example of frustration in this respect is the discrepancy in performance, as measured by space payload, between the Atlas booster and the Soviet ICBM. This discrepancy is probably correctly attributed to a less advanced Soviet nuclear technology in 1953-55, which required the development of a larger ballistic missile to carry a heavier warhead. But we should make quite sure that in the next generation of space boosters we have no unfavorable balance in mission capability, and one key to settling on the appropriate performance level for this next round is clearly good intelligence.

A third assignment for intelligence in advance of Soviet space shots is essentially a self-serving one—collection planning. This is particularly important for the benefit of ELINT efforts to intercept telemetry data and beacon signals from spacecraft which are through the sky on unannounced and usually unknown trajectories. Because these vehicles travel around or away from the earth at great speeds, the collecting antennae not only must be large but must be focused precisely on the vehicle's trajectory. The trajectories from the Soviet launch site, however, are remarkably predictable for a given mission, and skillfully programmed digital

SECRET

The Space Race

SECRET

computers can readily compute the corresponding antenna steering data or look angles with an accuracy adequate to ensure early pickup of the signals.

Concurrent Flight Analysis

Once a Soviet space launch has occurred, intelligence must be prepared to move quickly and confidently into a concurrent tracking, collection, and analysis operation. Prior trajectory computations for a variety of missions and early identification of a particular shot's intended mission can make it possible for most collection sites to pick up the signals on the first pass. This early pickup is critical because only then is the spacecraft sure to be close enough to the earth to be heard by antenna-receiver combinations of standard design; later a capability possessed only by the Jodrell Bank 250-foot dish for long-range listening may be required. A lost opportunity on first-pass tracking can easily preclude subsequent pickup and so nullify the whole collection operation. But when tracking or position data is acquired during the initial phase, it can then be used to refine the prior trajectory estimates and generate more reliable antenna steering data for the next pass, and so on. This bootstrap process is precisely what we have to go through on our own space shots in spite of the fact that we have far more prior knowledge about their intended trajectories and telemetry frequencies. The disparity in prior information means that intelligence, in monitoring Soviet shots, must be even more responsive and skillful than the tracking and trajectory professionals in our own programs.

There is another important aspect to current space events intelligence. Our national leaders are expected to make correct and appropriate comments on each new Soviet space accomplishment. It is unsatisfactory to defer to Soviet claims in framing such comments, and it is therefore the job of intelligence to provide accurate technical facts with great promptitude. Technical information on unsuccessful Soviet space attempts would also be required if it should be decided to comment publicly on this aspect of the competition. If such statements by our national leaders are as authoritative and complete as possible, Congress and the public will be less likely to give undue weight to the rash of scientific but often

SECRET

SECRET

The Space Race

ill-informed opinion which bursts upon us with conflicting and confusing effect in the wake of Soviet space achievements. A determined leadership well supported by intelligence can assure our national bearing and self-confidence during the times of lost matches which are bound to come.

Post-Flight Study and Reconstruction

Even when the dust stirred up by a Soviet shot has settled, intelligence services still have before them an important set of assignments. Detailed reconstruction of each space mission is essential to a penetrating understanding of the Soviet program, and it provides the only sure basis for technical forecasting. It is also hard work.

A great deal of technical data becomes available to the analyst over a period of several months after a launching from the Tyura Tam complex, but much of it is low-grade ore which can only be compared on a phenomenological basis with similar material from previous shots. Another source is telemetry data, which includes a great deal of valuable intelligence information. In point of fact, the telemetry contains most of the information the Soviet engineers themselves get from a shot. Our exploitation of this unique source, however, is less efficient than the Soviet because, first, we do not know which measurement is assigned to which channel, second, we do not have the calibration or absolute values of readings on the several channels, and third, we do not intercept transmissions covering the entire flight because of radio horizon limitations. Painstaking technical analysis has gradually solved many facets of the channel identification problem and is making encouraging progress on calibration. The problem of early intercepts, to which analysts attach great importance for speeding the solution of the other two puzzles, is one for intelligence collection components.

The technical characteristics of a given shot can be efficiently extracted from telemetry by professional missile engineers who have reviewed all prior shots in detail, and the gross features of a Soviet space shot can usually be thus established within the first few hours by an experienced technical man. The variations and nuances of a given flight, however, which can be equally important, may require weeks of concentrated effort by a team of subsystem specialists working together.

4

SECRET

The Space Race

SECRET

This kind of analysis can eventually give a rather clear picture of mission performance and the technical features of the missile hardware used to achieve it. One striking achievement of such detailed post-flight analysis, the reconstruction of Soviet payload capability, is described in an appendix to this paper as a good illustration of the techniques used.

An important facet of the post-flight reconstruction is trajectory analysis. If one can establish launch time to the nearest minute by identifying fixed events reflected in the telemetry, one can tell a great deal about the mission objective and the techniques being used for lunar and interplanetary missions. For example, the launch time of Lunik I (Mechta) on 2 January 1959 indicates that this "solar satellite" was very probably an unsuccessful lunar hard impact attempt which through a guidance fault went into its fail-safe orbit about the sun. One can also tell from launch date and time whether a minimum-energy trajectory was used in order to maximize the payload or one favoring better guidance was selected at a sacrifice of payload.¹

It is also important to analyze data from the space payloads themselves. Usually this means telemetry data, which must be correlated with announced Soviet scientific experiments and our own impressions of how particular experiments ought to be reflected on one of the many unidentified telemetry channels. On the flights of Major Gagarin and Major Titov, by exception, we had a source of data in television pictures, which left little doubt about the success of their missions; but it would have been good to know also just how the recoveries from orbit were managed.

The broadest continuing objective in post-flight analysis, however, is to understand the Soviet space program as a whole—past, present, and future. The program in this larger sense is seen as a complete schedule for achievement and acclaim, covering the selection of objectives, the development of techniques, and the exploitation of successes. Because a vigorous Soviet logic almost certainly interrelates these dif-

¹ These deductions really require knowledge of the launching azimuth as well as the launch time, but the azimuth is almost invariably supplied by radar returns, beacon tracking data from radio astronomy installations, or Soviet announcements.

SECRET

5

SECRET

The Space Race

ferent aspects of the program, there is a chance of using the logical relationship to understand and anticipate it.

The Soviet program is characterized, for example, by a sequential attack on prominent space "firsts" in order of increasing difficulty. All resources are poured into a given space objective until it is accomplished; but, except for the biomedical development shots required before putting a man into space, missions are not repeated. Another consistent feature of the program is the remarkably small number of distinct rocket vehicles employed. Every space shot to date has used the ICBM as the basic booster, and the Lunik upper stage has been used versatilely in a number of different roles. The extent of Soviet preplanning and design integration is further illustrated in the adoption of very narrow limits for the firing azimuth for all space and ICBM shots, which makes a heavy investment in tracking and instrumentation facilities along the single range economically possible. This consistency and simplicity, however, gives U.S. intelligence a stable frame of reference for analyzing the Soviet program.

The Outlook

It is well that the formidable task ahead of space intelligence is tempered by a number of simplifications like that introduced by the inherent logic of the Soviet program. There are two other simplifying factors—the undeviating predictability of possible launch times and dates for interplanetary missions, and the costliness of developing a space capability.

The laws of physics and celestial mechanics, invariant in Soviet Bloc and Western applications, impose severe constraints on trajectories that can be flown to the moon and planets. These, in turn, determine the allowable launch times from our spinning launch platform, the earth. The times thus predicted have been found to agree very closely with actual flight data, indicating that tables of possible launch times can serve as useful guides in anticipating and diagnosing Soviet space attempts. These tables cannot tell, of course, on which possible date the Soviets will actually elect to fly a given mission, but they do narrow the range tremendously. They are prepared annually for both direct ascent and coasting orbit trajectories to the moon, and they have been made

The Space Race

SECRET

up for Mars and Venus shots as these missions become possible every 2.0 and 1.5 years, respectively.

The current space race is a duel only, and it will remain so for some time. The small nations may fire sounding rockets in considerable quantity and even launch earth satellites on a cooperative basis, but they are under a strict economic limitation; the capital investment and development costs for a reliable booster vehicle with significant space performance capability are staggering. Only the Soviet Union and United States have thus far undertaken this burden, and they are likely to remain the principal competitors for the next decade. It is an evident advantage for space intelligence that all its collection and analysis resources can be focused on a single target.

The space intelligence problem is nevertheless not only formidable but, unlike most other technical intelligence questions, expanding. A new ballistic missile being developed is of concern and commands considerable attention until its characteristics and the magnitude of its operational deployment have been determined. Once these are established with confidence, succeeding R and D firings assume less significance. Each new Soviet space mission, however, is a fresh flare in the sky requiring a new, imaginative analytical effort. The variety of space missions will expand rapidly as basic capability in space technology grows in both nations. This mission proliferation will probably be accelerated when the Soviets develop new upper-stage vehicles and eventually even larger boosters.

So far we have seen but the first game in a series which promises to be a long and taxing competition. The pace will quicken, and it will increase the popular and executive pressure on intelligence. The prospective consumer demand for successful intelligence efforts suggests that long-term investment of collection and analysis resources is amply warranted.

APPENDIX: DETERMINATION OF PAYLOAD CAPABILITY

The verification of claimed Soviet space mission payloads is important not only because of the competitive nature of space achievements but also because of the possibility of turning payload capability to decisive military applications. We are

SECRET

The Space Race

now in a position, for as long as the Soviets continue to use their basic ICBM as booster on all space attempts, to establish readily whether the payload weight claimed for a particular mission is within their capability. As a matter of fact, one can state in advance the payload capability for a variety of missions they might undertake. This is possible because we now have a rather good model for the performance of the ICBM and the upper-stage vehicles that have been flown with it.

The reconstruction of this capability, a nearly classical solution of an intelligence problem, is of interest from a methodological standpoint. It was characterized by the correlation of unrelated reports from truly independent sources, data computation and cross-checking, several lucky breaks, and remarkable clarity once the puzzle was solved. Unlike many familiar intelligence problems, this had a precision about it in that the reports were generally measurements, the laws of physics provided the correlator, and the solution of a particular case, once it had snapped into focus, was usually applicable to other cases.

Burnout Speed and Lunik Weight

The Soviets had been firing ballistic missiles and space vehicles from the Tyura Tam area for more than a year before we obtained a single measurement that could start the solution process. Soviet payload claims for the first three Sputniks constituted our only sources, and these had to be rated F-6 in the absence of either internal consistency or supporting evidence.

Early in 1959, however, our ELINT sites began to record telemetry signals from both ICBM's and space shots during powered flight. The telemetry format or code was a relatively simple one, and analog records of all channels were readily produced for the portions of the flights that lay above the radio horizon. Several of the channels recorded had evidently conveyed missile velocity and acceleration, data of immediate purport to the performance problem. Ordinarily, however, these intercepts covered only the last 20 per cent of the flight and provided no means to determine the absolute values of the measurements. But during the summer of 1959 abnormal

The Space Race

SECRET

propagation conditions made possible a weak intercept which, with extraordinary effort, yielded telemetry records running from before launch to well after burnout. This intercept, since the total number of digital clicks on the "speedometer," each representing one unit of acceleration, could be equated with the burnout speed required for the free-flight trajectory to the Kamchatka peninsula, established the all-important velocity meter calibration. That was the first lucky break, but it was still not enough, for one had no reliable idea of the weight of any of the vehicles or their payloads.

An absolute measure of weight was soon obtained by a second lucky break. Covertly, we were able to acquire detailed data about the upper-stage rocket vehicle shown in Figure 1, the Lunik stage which mates directly to the Soviet ICBM. Although these data were incomplete, especially with respect to the motor, one could make a good estimate of the vehicle's performance capability by calculating its dry weight against the quantity of normal propellants its tanks could hold. The result checked rather well with the Soviet payload announcements for Lunik I. The stage weighed about 2,600 pounds dry, and it looked as though it would weigh 18,000 pounds with the propellant tanks filled and the payload on board.

Performance Reconstructed

In September and again in October of 1959 the Soviets launched successful lunar probes. Telemetry was received from the powered flight phase of the upper stage, and it was possible to identify this vehicle with the one reconstructed from covert data. More importantly, new long-range radar sets tracked the ICBM tanks which had been used to boost it. These traveled some 3,800 nautical miles on both occasions and hit the water not far from the radar itself.

Here was the missing piece to the puzzle. Had the Lunik stage not ignited, it too would have gone 3,800 miles with the empty ICBM. Since the Lunik weight had been fixed at some 18,000 pounds fully loaded, one could state with high confidence that the ICBM had a capability of throwing 18,000 pounds a distance of 3,800 miles. From these figures we could compute thrust and weight schedules for the basic booster. Having previously determined the calibration of the velocity meter, we could reliably convert this performance demonstra-

SECRET

The Space Race

The Space Race

SECRET




FIGURE 1. INTERNAL LAYOUT OF THE LUNIK STAGE VEHICLE

tion to other ranges and draw range-payload curves for the ICBM, a result not without significance in another context. Of special importance was the discovery that the ICBM thus reconstructed could place approximately 3,000 pounds into a low-altitude satellite orbit such as that of Sputnik III. This calculated weight agreed with what the Soviets claimed for Sputnik III and tended to increase our confidence in such statements.

For purposes of solving the space payload problem the performance contribution of the Lunik stage had also to be determined—a relatively easy task, for a number of sources bore on it. A velocity meter measurement identical with that noted in the ICBM telemetry was found in telemetry from the Lunik stage, indicating that a common instrument had been employed on the pair of vehicles.² Because this instrument had previously been calibrated through our lucky complete intercept from the ICBM, the performance of the Lunik stage could be estimated with high confidence using the empty and dry weights we had established. This checked exactly with the velocity change required to reach lunar escape speed after ICBM burnout as reconstructed from the radar data. The performance of the Lunik stage was thus established with confidence from a number of independent sources. More particularly, the calculation reproduced the announced payloads of each of the three Lunik shots with good accuracy, suggesting both an internal consistency and inherent veracity in Soviet payload claims.

It was no surprise, therefore, when in 1960 the Soviets announced that they had placed an over-10,000-pound space cabin into satellite orbit as Sputnik IV and subsequent recoverable satellites leading up to Major Gagarin's flight around the earth. When telemetry confirmed that an ICBM-Lunik combination had in fact been used to power the cabin into orbit, one could corroborate the Soviet claim with precision: ten thousand pounds was just the payload-in-orbit capability that had been calculated for the combination.

²The same pendulous gyro integrating accelerometer is also noted in telemetry from the 1,000-nautical-mile ballistic missile flown out of Kapustin Yar, suggesting a remarkable standardization.

SECRET

The Space Race

A comparable analysis was done for Soviet attempts to reach Mars in late 1960 and Venus in early 1961. Although an entirely new heavy upper-stage vehicle was used in these four shots, an analytic effort very similar to that described above led rapidly to the technical reconstruction of this vehicle and of the performance it could achieve in combination with the ICBM. The solution was again accelerated because we had already calibrated the basic ICBM through powered flight telemetry. The resulting weight schedules were consistent with Soviet claims for the (unsuccessful) injector stage in orbit (14,300 pounds) on 4 February 1961 and the payload toward Venus (1,420 pounds) on 12 February 1961.

Missions of the Future

With the results of this technical analysis one can establish reasonable limits for the payload capability of the Soviet ICBM in combination with Lunik upper-stage vehicles for space missions not yet performed. With the vehicle used for the Gagarin-Titov flights, the following missions could be accomplished on direct ascent trajectories with the maximum payloads indicated.

500-mile Earth Satellite	9,000 pounds
Lunar Soft Landing	270 pounds
Lunar Satellite, 300-mile	520 pounds
24-hour ("stationary") Earth Satellite	2,000 pounds

A combination of the ICBM and heavy injector stage with injection rockets firing from a coasting orbit, as in the Venus probe of last February, could perform the following missions:

Mars Probe	1,300 pounds
Mars or Venus Satellite	1,000 pounds
Lunar Soft Landing	800 pounds
Lunar Satellite, 300-mile	1,600 pounds
Lunar Circumvolution and Aerodynamic Re-entry	2,100 pounds

If the Soviets were to develop an additional upper stage of high energy, say a specific impulse of 450 seconds, their payload capability for the space missions listed above would be about doubled. If such a vehicle were used as an orbiting in-

12

SECRET

The Space Race

SECRET

jector stage in combination with the ICBM and present heavy stage, the following missions would be possible:

Lunar Soft Landing and Return with Aerodynamic Reentry	500 pounds
Mercury Probe	2,000 pounds
Jupiter Probe	1,500 pounds
Neptune Probe	320 pounds
Solar System Escape	120 pounds

One should note that the communications equipment for probes beyond Saturn would probably weigh more than the indicated payload capability. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a great deal of mission capability left in the existing Soviet ICBM as basic booster for various upper-stage combinations.

SECRET

13

CONFIDENTIAL

Progress report on efforts to pin down an elusive estimative problem.

THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC SURPRISE

James G. Ostensoe

Unforeseen Soviet achievements in science and technology have shown in recent years that means should be found whereby intelligence estimates can better anticipate the results of Soviet research and development, forestalling scientific and technological surprise and providing lead time for our own research and development programs. Precision or certainty in the prediction of Soviet advances can of course not be expected, but it may be possible to develop methods of using the information we do obtain on current Soviet scientific activity to gain some insight into the likelihood of future achievements. In 1957 a series of studies aimed at developing such methods, essentially a search for indicators, trends, and patterns that might make it possible to foresee at least certain kinds of scientific and technological innovations with some measure of accuracy and reliability, was begun.

Three approaches to the problem have been made—one through identification of promising frontier areas and prominent trends in worldwide scientific research; one through the analysis of environmental and sociological factors in past major achievements first of Western science and then of Soviet science; and one through analysis of projected Soviet research programs. The results of these studies to date point to a practical methodology for improving upon estimates of what will and what will not be achieved within the next two decades in many fields of science and technology; but the attempt to find methods for predicting where and by whom discoveries will be made has been much less successful.

The findings of the studies made along these three approaches are given individually below.

Frontier Areas and Trends Worldwide

The best source for identifying promising frontier areas, important objectives, and prominent trends in the world of sci-

CONFIDENTIAL

15

CONFIDENTIAL

Scientific Surprise

ence is the judgment and speculation of leading scientists themselves. For this study, therefore, authoritative and detailed projections and forecasts by scientists as to trends and future possibilities were collected from world scientific literature in all basic fields. Annual reports and general survey or review articles were found to be richest in such material. The published judgments thus assembled were supplemented with a survey by interview of the views of some 50 scientific leaders in the United States.

The resulting composite of opinion served to identify not only a number of general trends—such as that toward mathematization and theoretical explanation of phenomena in all sciences and that toward interdisciplinary studies—but also the major problems, goals, and speculations in many subfields of the basic physical and biological sciences, subjects such as gravitation, anti-matter, plasmas, computers, non-linear mechanics, chemical theory, fast reactions, climate control, molecular biology, control over heredity and growth, brain function, and environmental research. Many of the ideas that were speculative in 1957 are being realized in research today. It is one thing, however, to state research goals in a field and anticipate advances, quite another to specify when the goals will be reached or by whom the advances made. Although, for example, scientists of all countries are seeking a satisfactory theory of elementary particles and believe a solution not far away, it may be in the United States, in the USSR, or in some other nation that it is first achieved.

Sometimes it may be possible to establish a link between the likelihood of future scientific achievement in general and the prospects for Soviet science in particular when specific Soviet research objectives are known or can be surmised. Plans to build certain kinds of scientific facilities or experimental installations or instruments may both indicate objectives and help define capabilities for reaching them: U.S. scientists can estimate, for example, what can and what cannot be achieved by such-and-such Soviet accelerators. The Soviets anticipated in 1955 that their accelerator research might result in the discovery of the anti-neutron, a discovery which they indeed, as well as the West, were able to announce in 1956. These considerations, however, bring us to our third ap-

Scientific Surprise

CONFIDENTIAL

proach, the study of projected Soviet research programs, which will be discussed later.

A negative outlook for scientific advance, the unlikelihood of achievement, can also, when identified, at least narrow the field for the prognosticator. The development of an "anti-gravity machine," for example, is pretty well ruled out on theoretical grounds. As mathematically put by a physicist, "Gravity change has only one sign. This immediately negates the possibility of a shield for gravitation forces." On the other hand, stubborn adherence to questionable theory may itself create a negative outlook for achievement: the long persistence and strong influence of the Lysenko-Michurin theory of genetics has been considered by many Western scientists a sufficient basis for expecting few important results from Soviet genetics. A negative influence is also exerted by the lack of adequate research equipment or personnel—say optical and radio telescopes, electron microscopes, specialized computers, space vehicles, oceanographic ships, theoreticians—and if we have reliable information about these we have a basis for estimating what cannot be achieved by a country. The Soviet lack of digital computers may have retarded work in some secondary fields of research.

Another indicator of the likelihood of important scientific advance is a major data collection effort in a particular field; observational discoveries, new theories, and practical exploitation are likely to follow. For example, the intensive IGY collection program for space data led to our discovery of the Van Allen radiation belt and that for oceanographic data to the Soviet discovery of the Lomonosov range under the Arctic. The extensive Soviet efforts to collect climatological data could bring important advances in the understanding of climate change and its control.

Environmental Factors

The environmental or sociological approach to a methodology for predicting scientific advances began as an academic study of the recent history and sociology of science.¹ Case histories of major advances in four areas of Western science

¹ Summarized in R. R. Seidmore's "The Symptoms of Scientific Break-through," *Studies* IV 1, p. 73 ff.

CONFIDENTIAL

Scientific Surprise

were analyzed in an attempt to identify influences within the research environment that might have been decisive in promoting them. It was concluded that many scientific discoveries have certain characteristics in common: they are likely to result, among other things, from new techniques, instruments, and methods of research, from the interaction and stimulation of other fields of knowledge, and from the concentrated efforts of a group of young but experienced scientists. The sociological circumstances conducive to scientific advance, however, seem to defy complete systematic analysis. Scientific creativity is affected by a number of elusive factors, including the ill-definable "state of the art," social and scientific prejudices and fads, the practical needs of the times, and other motivations, quirks, and intuitions within the mind of the scientist.

A similar study of environmental factors was attempted for Soviet scientific advances; but so little data was available on the circumstances of specific Soviet discoveries and even on the general Soviet research environment that it was abandoned. The group making this study concluded, on the basis of the existing literature about creativity, that "that which is common among creative men does not appear in personality pattern, media used, products produced or environment provided. . . . There is nothing which lends support to the view that inventions can be predicted." They saw no prospect of foreseeing Soviet scientific discoveries even if information on Soviet research were abundantly available.

Projected Soviet Programs

The environmental approach to a study of Soviet science having thus been abandoned, the empirical relationship between published Soviet directives for research or projected programs otherwise revealed and corresponding announced achievements was explored. In many instances, for example in the development of certain nuclear reactors, accelerators, computers, and satellites, the Soviet intention to score an achievement had been made known in advance; but no systematic correlation between this rather obvious basis for prediction and ensuing successes had ever been attempted. Statements in the Soviet literature about projected research, whether official directives or indirect references, were there-

18

CONFIDENTIAL

Scientific Surprise

CONFIDENTIAL

fore collected for ten years back in four important fields—polymer chemistry, nuclear physics, semiconductor physics, and automation—and claimed achievements were checked against the planned program as thus pieced together.

As expected, the main difficulty in this study arose from the fragmentary picture of Soviet research formed by scattered official and semi-official statements about research interests and activities; in many fields these statements are insufficiently precise or complete to permit analysis for predictive purposes. It was not possible to arrive at statistical conclusions, much less validated rules for prediction, but some generalizations could be made. The data strongly suggested that Soviet directives and statements of research intentions and interests are a useful basis for anticipating specific research activities and resulting achievements. In fields in which the Soviets are behind the West and where the trends and objectives of research are clearly evident, the results can be foreseen with some confidence. In frontier areas that are undergoing very rapid and revolutionary change, however, it would be difficult to say much more than that the Soviets are likely to make original discoveries of some kind or other in directions in which they have a capability and have shown a strong interest. There seems to be no reason, at any rate, not to credit or even to discount stated Soviet intentions, at least in the fields covered by this study: Soviet scientific achievements appear to follow closely their research plans.

Furthermore, there were no significant instances of announced accomplishments which were not preceded by the disclosure of research programs. Because the data for this study cannot be assumed to have been complete, it cannot be asserted that Soviet accomplishments are invariably preceded by the disclosure of projected research; but the weight of evidence in the case studies indicated that it would not be the usual Soviet practice to embark upon a research program without published announcement. The prediction of Soviet advances in science seems therefore to rest most heavily on detailed study of Soviet research programs and statements of intent.

CONFIDENTIAL

19

CONFIDENTIAL

Scientific Surprise

Course for the Future

The development of a predictive capability with respect to Soviet science and technology can best proceed, it then appears, along the following lines:

Continued identification of the most challenging and promising scientific problem areas according to the judgment of leading scientists.

Detailed and systematic reconstruction and evaluation of the Soviet research program, with special attention to changes in direction and effort.

Study of Soviet capabilities and limitations for experimental and theoretical research.

Identification of the most promising Soviet creative scientists, especially young men, and their research interests and special capabilities.

20

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Impediments to the collection of intelligence at the one-man clandestine field installation.

PRODUCTION AT SMALL POSTS

C. R. Drave

This study of factors bearing on the productivity of the small intelligence field post is based on a review of experience over the past decade with clandestine bases and stations that comprised only one or two intelligence officers, with or without an administrative and communications assistant. A one-man post was found to produce, other things being equal, only about a third as many reports as a two-man post. And although numbers of reports is only a crude quantitative measure of productivity and completely ignores quality, it will appear that the over-all value of the one-man post was on the average even lower than this 2:3 ratio would indicate. Some of the conditions that produced this result were unavoidable; others could have been obviated or mitigated.

The factors critical for productivity that emerge from the study are generally applicable to the field of covert collection, and many of them apply equally well to the lone overt collector. They fall into five categories—the validity of the post's mission, the quality of its staffing, its administrative workload, the guidance it receives, and its cover problems.

Validity of Purpose

A post's chances for high productivity were evidently prejudiced at the start if no fairly specific job that needed doing gave rise to its establishment. Of the several dozen posts here studied a large portion were independent stations, each covering one small country and responsible directly to a Washington headquarters. These, we can assume, had valid missions in the coverage of their respective countries. But an even larger number were bases in countries each already covered by a station. Some of these auxiliary bases or outposts had apparently been opened on general principles, the intelligence purpose being only dimly anticipated and the base itself

SECRET

21

SECRET

Small Posts

expected to seek out a specific mission. The city to be covered was usually large and industrial; or it was thought to be a Communist stronghold; or the general area was characterized as critical or strategic.

Such generalities may seem sufficient cause for the establishment of a base. But the inescapable corollary to lack of particular purpose is an absence of specific direction. If a base chief is simply told to go out and operate, without the guidance and stimulus of defined requirements, his output is more than likely to be poor.

Instances of good planning before the opening of small bases can be cited to illustrate procedures that might profitably be imitated. A one-man base was established in 1956 on [] only after the prospects for its operation had been personally explored by its future chief, []. A base near the 17th parallel in South Vietnam was opened in 1958 to debrief refugees from the north, run cross-border operations, and collect information on the Annamese area only after three years of shuttling station officers up from Saigon had failed to attain these objectives. The station in [] opened a one-man outpost after actually developing a worthwhile operation in a coastal town some distance away.

A base established in 1954 near [] provides an example of clear purpose and the constant measurement of cost and performance against this purpose. It was to cover [] to obtain information on the activities of [] troops in [] and finally to infiltrate [] with an early-warning network. It was successful in the first two of these purposes, and it also established []. But the development of an effective early-warning net was found infeasible, and the post was closed because accomplishment of all three objectives was considered necessary to justify the cost.

The validity of concrete purpose in a proposal for a new base was in general manifested by sufficient examination of the operational potential and conditions on the spot and, where distance did not prevent it, by an attempt to develop the required coverage working out of the station. The importance

22

SECRET

Small Posts

SECRET

of the purpose was reflected also in the choice of operations officers to man the base.

Staffing

The qualifications required to run a small station or base are those generally desirable in any intelligence officer anywhere; but in a large establishment the strengths and weaknesses of the different members of the staff tend to offset each other, while in a one-man post there is no remedy for a major weakness or lack of experience in the single officer. Officers on their first tours of duty overseas, who have had no experience in recruiting and directing covert sources, should not be required to mount and run their first clandestine operations in the isolation of a one-man post.

Stations were sometimes able to staff their small bases out of their own experienced staffs, as those in [] did. This practice provided the bases with persons who had some knowledge of the country and the operational climate, a certain language competence, and an acquaintance with the operational outlook and the inner workings of the station. Other small bases were staffed by men who had prior knowledge of the area. The man who opened a post in [] in 1950 was a geologist who had lived there many years before. The chief of a one-man station in [] had spent seven years there before the war; he and his wife knew how to handle the problems of daily living, including the difficult one of safeguarding the health of their children.

Area preparation by planned effort was illustrated in the case of a chief of base sent to [] having spent 20 months in [] he was not ignorant about [] and knowing two years in advance that he would be assigned to [] he spent one year in language and area study at Yale and Cornell and the other on [] affairs at headquarters. When he arrived he already knew much about the place and its personalities, and his preparation proved invaluable when the rebellion broke out and he could not get much direction from the station [].

On the other hand, valuable specialists in the language and background knowledge of a hostile or target country other than the place of station were shown to be wasted at small

SECRET

23

SECRET

Small Posts

bases; they could generally have been used more profitably at headquarters or at the station. The smaller a post is, the greater is the necessity that such specialists, if they are sent there, do their share of all the work, and this fact of life had not always been understood by the specialist himself and by the headquarters division or desk primarily concerned with that target country.

The most frequent complaint made by returnees from one-man posts concerned the isolation to which they felt relegated there. Some had felt alone and forgotten in spite of the fact that they visited the main station at least once a month and someone from the station occasionally came to see them. The solitary post is no place for the organization man who needs the daily presence of colleagues to give him assurance.¹

The essential qualities for such an assignment emerged as the self-reliance and resourcefulness to reach decisions alone, with deliberation but without hesitation or anxiety. One out-post chief found that the best way to get direction from his station was to present his intentions and say that unless he heard to the contrary by a certain date he would assume approval. Another, even though he was on his first tour, showed the same self-reliance: in presenting problems to the station or to headquarters he made up his own mind first and submitted recommendations instead of questions. Another, who lost contact with his station after a political coup and from then on was under the immediate direction of headquarters, says he received little guidance from headquarters because no one there had any solid knowledge of his area, but he did not miss it; he preferred to be left to work alone.

Another important requisite was evidently an equable temperament and faculty for adjusting not only to the physical and operational circumstances of the post but also to the character and attitude of the cover chief; in a small post the intelligence officer is constantly exposed to the limelight of his cover chief's attention. Agreeability in interpersonal relations must be complemented by firmness, but tact and

¹For a full discussion of this psychological hazard, see Martin L. Schatz' "Psychological Problems in Singleton Cover Assignments," *Studies* II 3, p. 31 ff.

Small Posts

SECRET

equanimity are important ingredients in avoiding difficulties with a mission chief.

A few chiefs of small bases demonstrated that a good supply of self-reliance and ingenuity could make up for a lack of operational experience and area knowledge. But when inexperienced officers did not possess these compensating qualities, the odds against success were prohibitive. The practice of staffing small bases out of the sponsoring station had clear advantages in this as in other respects.

Administrative Workload

Most of the small stations and bases under study had an administrative assistant, but about one-sixth were dependent on working wives for secretarial and administrative support, and at another sixth the single operations officer was all alone. It was clear that the productivity of a post in one of the first two categories depended in large part on the caliber of the administrative assistant or the ability of the officer's wife to step into the breach. The large amount of administrative work required of all stations and bases, regardless of size, tended to be given de facto priority over operations because, as one base chief put it, "It takes some courage to omit administrative requirements in order to carry out operations; you can let operations slide without headquarters' knowledge, but omitting an efficiency or property report will invariably bring a rap on the knuckles."

At some bases the administrative load did not interfere with the chief's intelligence work because his administrative assistant, as one of them reports, "was outstanding; she took over all the administrative work except for the accounting; she was a good secretary, a good reports officer, a top-notch communications clerk, and she had no personal problems; she was really too good for a mere base!" Others had to neglect operations because they did not have a good administrative assistant. Most frustrated were the base chiefs who had had and then lost one, as when a male administrative assistant proved so valuable to a one-man base during its first year that he was pulled back to the station "because he was so good."

There were a few men among the administrative assistants at the small stations, most of them in [] where the operating division encouraged those who showed aptitude

SECRET

Small Posts

for becoming junior case officers to attempt the transition at its small posts. One of these who showed promise in minor operational tasks later became a case officer in his own right. But there were not many male administrative assistants available. There was only one in all Asia, where they were most needed because, as a chief of base there remarked, "of the position of women in society in this part of the world; a man can walk alone down the street without attracting undue attention and he can call at a house alone without jarring local mores." Another described his location as "very trying for a single woman; the hostile populace restricts her activities greatly, there are no social outlets, not even stores or eating places. The one eligible social contact in town for her is a British bachelor, and a close relationship with him creates a security concern. It is difficult to find a girl who will come here and stick out a full tour."

25X1

One solution in areas difficult for women was illustrated at a two-man post in [] where the second officer was a junior trainee who did administrative as well as intelligence work. At the same time that he was thus learning the basic clerical functions of the station—accounting, cryptography, the preparation of pouches, and so on—he progressed operationally to the point of handling an outside penetration and doing much of the liaison work. Elsewhere, small stations that lacked an administrative assistant but had a communications man let him double in the administrative work.

25X1

Few of the posts studied had regular communicators, however, and this was another job that fell to the administrative assistant or to the operations officer himself. It was apparent that the officer should, in view of the uncertainty of his always having an assistant, have communications training in any case; a man sent without such training to reopen a base in [] in 1958 was unable to get away afterwards to take the six-weeks communications course.

Wives working as administrative assistants offered the advantage of not needing cover positions. This solution, of course, was not always available; frequently the officer's wife, for one reason or another, could not help out. But all the wives who did assist at the posts under study apparently did very well, and some were former staff employees who could

SECRET

Small Posts

SECRET

help even in cryptographic work. They seem all to have been, as they had to be, stable, self-sufficient, and willing to endure the hardships of a small post in one of the less desirable areas, for the posts that depended solely on wives for administrative support were almost all in out-of-the-way places.

The officers at one-man bases that had no administrative help at all generally fared better than those with mediocre assistance because they were supported administratively by their sponsoring stations; even the intelligence reports of the outposts were prepared in final form by the stations. Such an arrangement worked well when frequent visits to and from the station were possible. It was suggested that if the station itself is a small post without clerical help, its reports might even be sent to headquarters in rough draft.

On whether the administrative workload itself could and should be reduced, opinion among the base chiefs was divided. Those that had good administrative assistants or their administrative work done by their station had no complaints, one of them concluding that "the administrative requirements of a base as a drain on a case officer's time are exaggerated as a problem." But the less fortunate, particularly where operational demands were heavy, complained vehemently about the administrative burden and urged that it be reduced. Logistic matters were especially singled out, and one base chief said he spent half his day answering dispatches on vehicles, schools, property, and so on.

Toward the end of the period under review, however, there was some reduction in the administrative demands placed on small posts, and a thorough streamlining of their administrative procedures was reported to be in prospect.

Direction and Guidance

The study disclosed a wide variety of experience with the direction and guidance provided by headquarters to small stations and by headquarters and stations to small bases. Headquarters direction, since the "go-out-and-operate" days of the early fifties, was shown on the whole to have improved "with the improvement in its education," as one chief of station said. Some of the best teachers were the very officers who served at small posts and knew what was needed; some

SECRET

SECRET

Small Posts

branches adopted the excellent practice of having selected returnees serve one year on the desk supporting their former post before being released for assignment elsewhere.

One form of guidance particularly appreciated at small posts was the timely evaluation of their work and production, and a number of base chiefs felt that headquarters was delinquent in this respect. They remarked that "an occasional pat on the back would have been overwhelmingly welcomed," and recalled that "there were times when evaluations of our intelligence reports were far behind, with a backlog of 100 reports still unevaluated, and the base was in the dark concerning the usefulness of its reporting."

The lack of specific guidance from some stations regarding the current plans and operations of their subordinate bases was a serious problem. The base chief who "preferred to be left to work alone" was a rare exception; most of the officers who had little guidance said they needed it badly. Distance was sometimes a factor; yet a base in [] more than a thousand miles from its station "received good month-to-month guidance despite infrequent visits," and some bases located relatively close to their stations received so little guidance they felt that "the station did not give a damn about the base from the start."

The bases that did receive the necessary guidance were generally in frequent contact with the station through a pattern of visits arranged in advance. The base chief visited the station every month or two for a period of two or three days, the frequency being determined in each case by operational need as modified by cover and travel conditions; in one case it was as often as every two weeks. Sometimes the travel burden was divided by meeting in alternate months at the base and at the station.

Visits to the station offered base chiefs the chance to get full and current political briefings to obviate the collection deficiencies which can be caused by an isolated base's lack of sensitivity as to what is timely and new. Copies of intelligence reports produced by a station were also regarded as a source of inspiration and guidance when transmitted regularly to its base. Some stations designated one officer to look after all matters pertaining to a base and to visit it periodically.

28

SECRET

Small Posts

SECRET

Cover Problems

The old adage about safety in numbers applied to cover; in a small mission where relationships among the staff are close and the work each member does is apparent to observers, the intelligence officer must spend more time on cover duties if he is to maintain any semblance of cover. Moreover, lack of privacy can make such activities as enciphering messages or preparing pouches difficult and time-consuming, and lack of anonymity demands greater care in blending one's comings and goings with the general pattern of the installation. One base chief was a [] officer; his cover work took only about one-fourth of his time and it made his position look genuine. But even in this favorable setup he found it awkward to have to clear his desk of intelligence materials every time a [] came in and get them out again after taking care of him.

In some places the intelligence officers were easily spotted because of departures from the norm. In one [] one of the two secretaries worked exclusively for the intelligence officer, though he was junior in rank to several others on the staff. In a number of instances when a cover mission had to curtail travel because of a shortage of funds the intelligence officer was still required to make long trips. In one case the intelligence officer was quickly exposed among the genuine members of the cover organization because he was not familiar with its administrative and operating procedures and its peculiar jargon.

Cover positions varied widely in their demands on time and in the extent to which they furthered intelligence operations. One base chief had across-the-board [] duties which generally took between 40% and 50% of his time, and some days he had to devote entirely to cover work. Another was the [] in a [] and when the principal [] was traveling, about three months a year, this man had to spend over 50% of his time on work of no intelligence value. But the rest of the time the two jobs meshed very well; he had to spend only about 10% of his time on strictly cover duties, and because there was a close parallel between his intelligence and cover interests he often obtained from a single source both overt and covert informa-

SECRET

29

SECRET

Small Posts

25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1

tion and used it for two different reports. Another base chief remarked that his load of work was heavy but his cover job of [] reporting helped him operationally and permitted him to travel. Another's cover position as [] and status as [] gained him invitations to many functions of the [] and a chance to make contacts; but his assistant, whose cover was that of an [] did not share in these.

Cover problems were accentuated when the chief of the cover installation was hostile or uneasy about clandestine operations. In one instance the antagonism was so great that the [] of the mission deliberately exposed a going intelligence operation. In less extreme cases the cover chief would frown on clandestine agent contacts or forbid contact with high government officials except by prior approval. Others levied requirements that seemed inappropriate and of doubtful value. At most posts, however, relationships with the cover chief were reported good to excellent. There was a consensus that the quality of this relationship was of paramount importance to the conduct of operations.

Conclusions

A one-man post is best suited for an intelligence purpose that is circumscribed in advance; the intelligence targets in the area may be few, or the post may be intended to do its collection job primarily or exclusively through liaison with a local service. If the targets are many and varied and have to be reached through independent operations, two intelligence officers will on the average be three times as productive as a single one.

There are three main reasons why the addition of a second man should generally more than double the productivity of a post's operations. First, the daily exchange of operational views is a valuable catalyst for both officers in the development of operational approaches. Second, the number of equally important targets in one place may be too much for one man to handle effectively, and if these targets are in widely diversified environments secure contact by the same officer can be difficult. Third, certain bases expected to provide effective, not merely nominal, coverage of targets located at a considerable distance need one officer to man the base

30

SECRET

Small Posts

SECRET

while the other undertakes the travel necessary to develop contacts, recruit agents, and maintain regular contact with them in the outlying places. The man at a base in northern [] for example, was frustrated at being unable "to spend two or three weeks at a time in the frontier area, giving continuous attention to spotting and developing there."

The addition of a second intelligence officer doubles the case-officer potential, generally with a decrease in the per capita administrative burden. In some cases it may mean the difference between a productive post and one that could just as well be closed. But it must be justified by operational opportunity and need. And even when operations justify a second man it is sometimes impossible to add a cover position for him; here operations must be expanded through the use of nonofficial cover agents.

The productivity of a base is conditioned not only by the number of operators, but by their competence and experience, their relative freedom from administrative work and from incompatible cover duties, the direction they receive, and the validity of the base's purpose. The officer at a one-man post or the chief of a two-man post should have prior intelligence experience and some area preparation, but his indispensable qualifications are resourcefulness and self-reliance; they can even make up for lack of experience. He should also be selected, if the post's cover chief is known to be difficult, for his ability to deal with such a man.

Cover problems are too variegated to admit of integral solution, but more imaginative thought should be put into improving the cover arrangements in individual instances. Sometimes the addition of a nonofficial cover man would give more operational flexibility than another officer under official cover.

Any practices which lead a small base to feel ignored by headquarters and its station should be eliminated. Regular visits between base and station and the practice of designating a station officer to look after matters affecting a base should be encouraged.

An officer at a one-man base who has to do his own administrative work and some cover work in addition has little time for intelligence operations and is therefore of little use to his organization. If he cannot be given a competent ad-

SECRET

31

SECRET

Small Posts

ministrative assistant and his wife cannot fill the gap, his paper work should be done by the sponsoring station. The administrative workload of small bases should in any case be reduced to the indispensable minimum.

The factors which inhibit the productivity of small posts appear sometimes singly, sometimes in combination. Combinations are most frequent at posts opened in undesirable areas for no cogent intelligence purpose. When the need for a post has not been thoroughly investigated and only generalities are adduced to justify an expansion, the inevitable corollaries are poor staffing and lack of direction. Productivity can hardly be expected.

32

SECRET

SECRET

Guidelines for the reception and initial handling of important deserters from the Soviet Bloc.

WHAT TO DO WITH DEFECTORS¹

John Ankerbrand

Among the several modes of intelligence collection, the exploitation of defectors, by definition sources of especial interest to intelligence for either operational or analytic purposes, is unique in its peculiarities. Although the handling of a defector is simplified by the fact that he, unlike an operating agent, cannot regain access to his former sources of information, it is greatly complicated by our acceptance of responsibility for his creature comforts, his welfare, and his ultimate disposal. Some of the problems intrinsic in defector handling and the prevailing characteristics of defector personality call for continuous, attentive, and understanding but cautious treatment.

From the defector's point of view, he has taken a desperate plunge in giving up a familiar world in exchange for one of which he knows little or nothing. He has lost all that heretofore comprised his life, gave him a sense of values, and constituted his standards of judgment. If he was a Communist (and former Communists are usually the most valuable defectors), he has also lost his ideals, his "religion," his life purpose. He is often stunned, and the officers handling him may have difficulty getting through to him or understanding what he tries to tell them.

From the operational point of view, handling problems are increased by the fact that overt as well as covert segments of the intelligence community are inevitably involved. The defector, to be sure, is not truly a clandestine source. Even

¹ An earlier article, Stanley B. Farndon's "The Interrogation of Defectors," *Studies* IV 3, p. 9 ff., described their handling at a center such as the one in Germany established exclusively for that purpose. This paper treats parallel problems and procedures in the setting of an ordinary field station, to which the early phases of defector exploitation often fall.

SECRET

33

MORI/HRP PAGES 33-43

SECRET

Defectors

if his defection has not been publicized (as it often is not if he was an intelligence or security service officer), opposition services can inventory their intelligence losses by the mere fact of his absence. They can usually determine fairly quickly if the vanished person is alive or dead, and they are often in a position to estimate reasonably well his whereabouts. Nevertheless it is usually desirable to employ clandestine tradecraft in the reception, exploitation, and protection of a defector.

Reception of the Defector

There are some clearly established requirements for procedure in the reception of a defector who declares himself at an official installation; they are found in the Inter-Agency Defector Committee Operating Instructions under IDCOP 58/1. A CIA officer is to interview or direct the interviewing of the defector and take custody of his passport. The defector's basic biographic information should be taken down on the first visit, and a complete description of him made, with photographs if possible. His local address and telephone number should be recorded, and security precautions arranged.

He is to be debriefed about his defection, a most important step, particularly as an aid in later establishing his bona fides. Any promises or seeming commitments to remove his family or other dependents from a denied area should be carefully avoided. His apparent fields and depth of knowledge and his "general level of intelligence and potential operational value" are to be appraised. Most urgently in this respect it must be ascertained whether he may possess perishable or critical intelligence information, especially in the early-warning category, or operational leads to other potential defectors or recruits. Last, but of much importance, he must sign a handwritten statement in his own language that he freely and voluntarily seeks asylum in our country.

On the basis of its initial assessment the field station must decide whether to recommend that the host country be notified of the defection. It must also, if it is to handle the defector itself, set up its plans for probing his bona fides and for exploring his knowledge or operational potential. In arriving at this assessment, one of the first questions facing intelligence

34

SECRET

Defectors

SECRET

personnel who find themselves suddenly in a defector's receiving line is that of his motivation in defecting.

*Motives of Defection*²

Was his act induced by an intelligence service, was it promoted by foreign friends without intelligence connections, or is he a "walk-in" who made his decision for reasons of his own; and what were these reasons? The motives for defection are subjective, to a certain extent evanescent, and liable to re-interpretation, modification, and even reversal; but they are not therefore the less important. They are determinants of the defector's attitude and the degree to which he will cooperate with us, as well as of his potential for redefection.

If his defection has been induced (very few of these), and for truly ideological reasons (fewer yet), the reception problems are minimal. If he is a walk-in (as most likely), the ordinary routine of the field station can be utterly disrupted, sometimes for protracted periods. These walk-in defectors that take us by surprise and divert and tie down our manpower often turn out to be individuals previously regarded as hard-core opponents, Party wheelhorses, or other diehard anti-Westerners. The assessment of their motives, or perhaps it would be clearer to say assessment of the plausibility of their ostensible motives, therefore becomes one of our first tasks. It is seldom an easy one, because the defector often tells only a part of the truth.

Most defectors start out by saying that they bolted for political, *i.e.*, ideological reasons, but the rare defector with true ideological motivation is likely to be less vocal about it than those who use it to veil their real reasons. One of the least vocal was a young Polish army officer-interpreter who defected at Panmunjon toward the close of the Korean hostilities. He presented from the outset no handling problems, and the handling officers were never able to discern any personal troubles that might have caused or precipitated his defection. He had simply not liked the governmental system in Poland, and this was his first opportunity abroad to slip out from under it.

² See also on this subject John Debevoise "Soviet Defector Motivation" and Delmege Trimble's "Defector Disposal (US)" in *Studies* II 4, p. 33 ff.

SECRET

35

SECRET

Defectors

Transported overtly to the United States and used briefly for intelligence and propaganda purposes, he was soon settled in a midland community, of which he has now become a respected citizen.

Thus, with all its regimentation, the Communist system is not without individualists, independent thinkers, and rebels who if they get the chance may turn their backs on Communism and walk out. But most defections occur for other reasons—those of the subordinate who has a fight with his boss, of the man in trouble for breaking rules and regulations, of the incurable malcontent, of the psychotically disturbed. These are not lacking in any society, and the Communists have their fair share. In many defectors the motivation is dual—ideological in background but personal in precipitation.

Our intelligence officers abroad are thus faced with the need to make prompt but well-considered judgments when a walk-in appears, declares that he is seeking political asylum, and plops himself down in a chancery reception room until something is done about his situation. Field stations encountering their first walk-in tend to be incautious in their hasty appraisal of the authenticity of the defector's story. One field station, in its eagerness to deliver its first achievement of this kind, was unfortunate enough to accept a Soviet diplomatic deserter whom experienced officers could have pegged in a few hours' interviewing as mentally unbalanced.

A less extreme and more typical psychiatric case was that of a Soviet journalist who walked in with the usual ideological story. His physical act in deserting his post had been accompanied, however, by sweeping mental reservations and evasions. He would not, for example, divulge "Soviet classified information" to us. The real reasons for his apostasy proved to be a disagreement with his superior, a characteristic disputatiousness, his marital problems, and the strong attraction of the material advantages of the West. He later reversed himself and, in accordance with our policies, was returned to the custody of Soviet officials.

On the psychiatric borderline stands the case of a medium-ranking officer of the Soviet State Security service, the civilian KGB, who defected "for political reasons." Although cooperative from the moment of our first contact with him, he was

36

SECRET

Defectors

SECRET

eventually found to be in reality a refugee from himself. He could not tolerate incompetence in superiors or personality differences with them; he had resented the authority assumed by the Soviet diplomatic mission chief's wife; he had not been informed by his government that his mother had died; he had made a bad first marriage years before in Moscow. He was, in effect, an unhappy man who had come to believe that his only chance for happiness lay in a complete change of scene. By defecting he got the change of scene; whether he found happiness remains an open question.

A clinical psychologist and trained intelligence officer, after working closely with this man and another much like him, came to the conclusion that the usual defector is a perennial malcontent, one who had rebelled at most constrictions of the environment he had known and would have done the same in other environments, and that the man who defects once may well defect a second time, may redefect. The experience of fifteen years supports this conclusion. A substantial percentage of defectors from the USSR since 1945 have eventually returned to their homeland. It is important that this redefection potential and its attendant counterintelligence risk be kept in mind during the handling of a defector.

Organizing the Handlers

If the field station concludes from its initial assessment that its walk-in should be accepted as a defector, its next problem is to set up handlers to take care of him, to probe his story, and to explore his store of useful information. There should always be at least two interviewers; the more the better. It has been empirically demonstrated that handling personnel should be selected not only for their experience and linguistic ability, but also for their knowledge of Communism, of politics, and especially of what makes a Communist tick. This latter requirement is overriding; yet sometimes it cannot be satisfied, and some redefections are traceable to bad handling.

The handling arrangements can sometimes be elaborate. When a station with considerable experience in defector handling once found itself unexpectedly confronted with the possibility that a female army officer might soon be in its hands, it organized a team consisting of two men—one the team chief and senior interrogator, the other a counterintelligence ana-

SECRET

37

SECRET

Defectors

lyst—and three women, one to act as reports officer and part-time companion, one who spoke the prospective defector's native tongue to act solely as companion and friend, and one to do the secretarial work for the team. It was calculated that if the men confronting the defector were outnumbered by the women, she would adjust herself more quickly to the situation and the exploitation of her information would be speeded. The validity of this theory was not to be tested, however: fearing the fate of her parents at home, the woman decided in the end against defection.

A frequent practice, when the defector is not wholly cooperative, is to choose two intelligence officers and use them to stage a little drama around him. One of them, an experienced, businesslike, purposeful, and tough-minded inquisitor, is the villain. He is forceful, unbending, and if necessary thoroughly incredulous. The defector needs, therefore, a friend, a benefactor to protect him from the villain. The benefactor should be chosen for his resemblance to the defector in age, in physical size, and if possible in ethnic origin. He acts the role of an understanding, easy-going, comforting companion. His intelligence questions, once a full biography has been obtained, are impersonal, concerned with non-sensitive aspects of the defector's knowledge and experience.

A vigorous ostensible tug-of-war is soon flourishing between benefactor and inquisitor. The defector is likely to confide to the benefactor things which he has obstinately or perversely withheld from the inquisitor. The inquisitor can use the information thus obtained by the benefactor along with the statements he himself gets from the defector as the basis for a close scrutiny of the defector's story.

Ideally, the inquisitor should be represented by several trained interrogators, specializing respectively in area knowledge, counterintelligence, and perhaps propaganda; and the benefactor should be a group of off-duty escorts and companions. (If security officers act as guards or companions they should be under the managerial direction of the operations officer in charge.) It is better not to have to eat, sleep, and play with a person whom you are trying to squeeze dry of every bit of information he has; the two functions are incongruous. At headquarters there is usually no excuse for

38

SECRET

Defectors

SECRET

combining them, but few field stations have the resources to achieve the ideal separation.

The handling of the handlers themselves is another aspect of the management problem. It is usually necessary to take these intelligence officers suddenly away from their regular duties and often physically move them to another place to devote their full attention to the defector. They need time to study their debriefing guides in advance, to compare them with questions already put and answers received, to compare notes with one another, to transcribe or dictate raw reports, to compile personality and security evaluations, to eat, sleep, and rest. The pressures on them are great, and otherwise promising apprentice intelligence officers have more than once found their undoing in the handling of a defector. Even as the defector must be treated with purposeful pressure and consistent discipline on the one hand and with understanding and tolerance on the other, his handlers must be pushed, but with consideration. They must get out the reports, but they must also have time to study and discuss their problems with colleagues and supervisors, and they need days off completely away from the defector.

Probing the Story

By the time the handling is well organized, information from headquarters concerning the defector's background begins flowing into the field post. This may indicate that the man is not so important a source as he was initially assessed to be or as he himself believes. Or he is more important. Or he is withholding information concerning past intelligence or security service connections. Or he has not told us about his marriage-gone-sour, a well-known biographical item in his home country, which possibly has a bearing on his defection. There may be traces of past embezzlement, larceny, murder or other criminal acts. And so on. The field intelligence officers should expect the appearance of discrepancies, should look for them, and do their best to get to the bottom of each element of mystery.

On the other hand, any unnecessary duplicate questioning may impair the genuine defector's morale and attitude. Often the bulk of the information available on a defector has come from other defectors; birds of a feather flee together. Many

SECRET

39

SECRET

Defectors

defectors survive in their new worlds by becoming, plainly, career informants, dispensing over many years their stores of information. A good proportion of such persons become attached more or less permanently to established intelligence services, with a vested personal interest in retaining this employment. Some of them will therefore, consciously or not, submit information intended to disparage, disprove, or discredit a competitive new defector. The intelligence service sometimes thus finds itself in the position of having to choose between two incompatible sets of purported facts advanced by two rival defector sources.

Every moment of interview, every question and answer, should be recorded—openly, unless the defector is hostile. For this purpose the magnetic tape recorder has a number of advantages over cylindrical or belt-type office voice transcribers; and mere notes, longhand or shorthand, are quite inadequate. The tape can be replayed to the defector if details in his story later turn out to be contradictory, confusing, or misleading. His awareness that every word he utters is being taped, that a small archives is being built up on everything he admits, denies, volunteers, and withholds, will have a salutary influence. The persistence necessary to clear up discrepancies can sometimes spoil the relationship between the defector and his handlers, perhaps rendering him useless for further exploitation under clandestine conditions. If this happens, the field station is best relieved of him, and the sooner the better.

Intelligence Debriefing

A more rewarding aspect of the defector processing is his systematic topic-by-topic intelligence debriefing. We have noted that the initial assessment of the defector included an areas-of-knowledge list or chart. This can usually be prepared by an experienced intelligence officer after 12 or 15 hours of interview. For example, in the case of a Polish military intelligence officer who had been attached to the International Control Commission in Viet Nam, ten major areas of knowledge were charted—(1) organization and operation of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, (2) organization and operation of the Polish Ministry of Defense, (3) Polish military commitments outside Poland, (4) military and political

40

SECRET

Defectors

SECRET

build-up in the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, (5) belligerent intentions of the USSR and Communist China, (6) organization and operations of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (7) organization and operation of the Military Intelligence Service, (8) organization and operation of other Polish ministries and commissions, (9) applied Marxism-Leninism in Poland, and (10) Western propaganda weaknesses in Poland.

The areas of information on which intelligence and security service defectors, especially deep-cover agents, can speak with competence are apt to be unclear. Some of these operatives are remarkably ill informed, sometimes even misinformed, on the organization and personnel of their former services. Intelligence and security personnel can most often provide valuable background information on government and Party leaders, past coups, trials, and purges, and other politico-historical events.

If practicable, a clerk-analyst should card each question to be asked the defector and later cross-reference his answer. In one debriefing conducted in Washington, where it was possible to keep good records, 44,000 distinct questions asked two Soviet defectors were tallied during the first 12 months.

During the debriefings the intelligence officers need to exercise their imaginations to the full to keep the defector (and themselves as well) keen and productive. A normal day's questioning sessions run about six hours; but when the defector has been led into information areas of great personal interest there may be days when he begins talking right after breakfast and does not finish until the wee hours of the following morning. At other times he may be sullen, confused, dazed ("God, what have I done?"), or plainly recalcitrant. During his periods of depression he should be afforded all the amenities and a degree of privacy consistent with what precautions seem advisable against the possibility of suicide or self-mutilation. Happily, this latter problem is a rare one, but we have had defectors who became morose to the point of will for self-destruction. We have also had raving maniacs (one in particular from a satellite intelligence service) who have had to be kept under sedation or in straitjackets, or both.

SECRET

41

SECRET

Defectors

Yet another problem may be piled on the field station's heavy burden of tasks in systematic exploration of the defector's areas of knowledge, determination of his bona fides, and ministrations to his needs, moods and conflicts—that of suppressing publicity concerning the defection. The discreet and expeditious handling of information obtained from and about a defector is difficult enough within the bounds of our own country; in the field, it can pose some monumental problems.

Termination of Initial Phase

The first phase of defector handling ends with the official determination of the defector's bona fides. This determination is made at headquarters with the participation of the Inter-Agency Defector Committee on the basis of the following items submitted by the field: (a) a detailed biography of the defector (which is then checked against all available records and extant sources); (b) a complete record of his security and intelligence functions and connections; (c) the record of a medical examination, including interviews by a cleared psychiatrist; and (d) the results of a polygraph test. In some cases the determination can be made within two to three weeks of the time of defection, but generally it is more like two to three months.

Now agreements are made with the defector concerning country of resettlement, immigration, assistance in obtaining employment, interim financial aid, transportation for his family, and so on. One or more of his handling officers escort him to the next point on his itinerary and remain with him long enough to obviate any confusion or panic and ensure a smooth transfer to the new handlers. The field station's part of the job is then done, and the defector is ready for a long series of exhaustive interviews to develop minute detail on subjects that emerged prominent in the field station's explorations of his areas of knowledge.

Do's and Don't's in Defector Reception

Do:

- Have the defector write and sign a statement of his desire for asylum.
- Cable headquarters for guidance at the earliest moment.
- House the defector in a place not previously used operationally and to be discarded after he leaves.

42

SECRET

Defectors

SECRET

If you have a choice, prepare legitimate travel documentation for defectors and case officers rather than move them "black."

Make the defector prove his own bona fides; take the position that he must do something for us before we can do things for him.

Assume that he is a test or provocation or that he will redefect until headquarters has concurred in the acceptance of his bona fides.

After establishment of his bona fides keep your security discipline at the same level as in your regular agent operations.

Press for critical positive intelligence and operational leads.

Provide the amenities, including means for amusement and diversion—games, reading material, phonograph, radio and TV if security permits, 16 mm. sound movies, sports facilities, short trips, company of the other sex, etc.

Do Not:

Make any commitments of any kind to the defector, beyond a general promise to help him, without prior approval from headquarters.

Give the impression that our interest is only in milking him dry before disposing of him like an empty container.

Show any sign of disagreement or rivalry among the handling personnel except in the context of the inquisitor-benefactor tactic.

Let him master a situation by displays of temper, irritability, or other emotion.

Let him assume a position of superiority or make a show of ego to advantage.

Blame headquarters, the organization, or the government for delays and difficulties which the defector construes as showing disinterest in his case. His questions or criticisms can be met with the reminder that a great deal of organizing, coordinating, and planning is required to make the right decisions and take the actions dictated by his own best interests.

SECRET

43

CONFIDENTIAL

*A former G-2 officer at Army
Group level analyzes sources of
battlefield intelligence.*

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE: A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

The "final after action" report of the G-2 section of the 12th Army Group, General Omar Bradley's command in the World War II European campaign, contains one chapter of particular pertinence to the work of the military intelligence officer. Chapter Three is an analysis of G-2 operations at army, corps and division level throughout the 12th Army Group command.

As one of the group preparing this now 16-year-old report, I visited the G-2 sections of each of the four armies, twelve corps, and 48 divisions that had served with the 12th Army Group, the largest ground combat command ever assembled by the United States. The purpose of the exercise was to obtain first-hand judgments from intelligence officers at all levels about what methods of intelligence collection had proved most valuable in combat. Organization and procedures were examined with only secondary interest. A questionnaire had been sent earlier to each of the commands, but we guessed that visits in person would evoke fuller and franker opinions; and this proved to be the case.

With the ever-looming possibility of a new clash of arms before us, a summary review of this digest of fairly recent experience may be of value.

Prisoners of War

By far the most profitable source of intelligence for all levels of the command—division, corps, and army—was prisoners of war. Some units estimated that as high as 90 per cent of their useful information came from prisoner interrogation. The corps calculated that from 33 to 50 per cent of all the information they received was provided by the interrogators in the prisoner-of-war cages.

CONFIDENTIAL

45

MORI/HRP PAGES 45-51

CONFIDENTIAL

Combat Intelligence

report says, "showed that often all planning failed to be optimistic enough and that rapid breakthrough of armor overran maps and terrain appreciations." Here photography deep behind enemy lines was needed.

Sigint

Generally considered the third most important source of information on the enemy in combat was signals intelligence, something not much more complicated or sophisticated than listening in on a party line, the line here being the nearby ether. The listening units on both sides could easily pick up chatter between tanks, aircraft, and even different units when the situation was fluid and land lines either not yet laid or too frequently cut. Even the most security-conscious often dropped their guard in the heat of battle, and it didn't require terribly brainy cryptographers to read through double-talk or crack simple pseudonyms. With the aid of information from prisoners, documents, and other sources, it was easy to translate such a message as "This is Eagle Tac calling Lucky Forward" into "This is 12th Army Group Tactical Headquarters calling 3rd Army Advance." The report commented: "Through its radio intelligence activities the [Sigint] unit repeatedly produced enemy information at critical periods that was not obtainable from other sources, and often of decisive moment tactically."

Efforts to maintain signal security provided some moments of humor. During the Battle of the Bulge the Germans overran all of the ground lines connecting 12th Army Group headquarters with the forces to the north. It was possible to get a call through on land lines by routing through Rheims or Paris, but this was generally about as effective as trying to communicate with the North Pole through a megaphone, and even so not necessarily secure; the far-ranging German patrols could be happily listening in at some tap. Consequently most calls were put on VHF radio, and the operator would admonish the caller "Remember, the enemy is listening." One colonel, highly frustrated in trying to get his message through, snapped: "Well I hope to hell he can hear better than I can!" Another story, perhaps apocryphal, features an officer who used to answer his field phone by saying, "This is the enemy, who are you?"

48

CONFIDENTIAL

Combat Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

Documents

The fourth most prolific source of combat intelligence was captured enemy documents. In the words of the report, however, "Combat troops must be indoctrinated with the importance of enemy documents as a source of enemy intelligence, and this must be stressed during operations. It is highly probable that much intelligence, possibly of great value, was lost due to failure on the part of troops effecting the capture to recognize the importance of what probably appeared to be documents of little or no value."

To a large degree documents served only to confirm other information, as on order of battle, T/O and E of enemy units, etc. But there were instances when they had a broader, independent value, particularly those in such categories as enemy after-action reports. For example, the German 3rd Parachute Division's report of its fight against the 29th U.S. Infantry Division at St. Lo in the Normandy battle proved exceedingly valuable in showing us our mistakes and as material for training in enemy tactics.

Agents

Agent's reports ranked an over-all fifth in value for information on the enemy. The assessments by different units ranged all the way from zero to very great, but there was universal agreement that the field armies should have working with them personnel trained in the handling of espionage agents. The armies varied widely in the amount of experience they had had with the use of special units for getting agents behind enemy lines: the Third Army kept an OSS unit all the way through the European campaign, while the First Army got rid of its OSS detachment shortly after landing in Normandy.

The use of agents was unquestionably the intelligence collection technique least well understood by the military personnel. There was also inadequate forward planning for placing agents in key spots. These two elements undoubtedly reduced the value of espionage in the battle for western Europe below what it could have been.

The best use of agents was made in the battle for France, in two carefully planned long-term operations, one from Eng-

49

CONFIDENTIAL

Combat Intelligence

land and one from North Africa, mounted well before D-Day in Normandy. It had to be assumed that German counter-espionage might cripple the effectiveness of the French resistance at the time of the Allied landings, and it was decided that alternate sources of intelligence should therefore be in place. For months before the invasion, accordingly, the British, French, and Americans in a tripartite effort infiltrated radio-equipped intelligence teams by air and sea into all of the key areas of France. The teams were told to get in place and establish agent networks, but not to come on the air until ordered. These operations proved highly successful, with amazingly low casualties, and provided a considerable amount of valuable combat intelligence. The French resistance, however, was fortunately not crippled by the Gestapo, and it too provided intelligence until all France was liberated.

After the fighting moved eastward out of France there were no longer any agent networks to provide combat intelligence. Advance planning had not foreseen that the Germans would fight on their own soil, and so no preparations had been made. Here, in an area where the population was hostile, when whatever resistance to Hitler existed was either cowed or in concentration camps, the need for agents carefully placed in the path of the advance was theoretically at its greatest. The efforts of the OSS to recruit and drop or infiltrate Germans behind the lines proved, with few exceptions, pitifully inadequate to the difficult task of getting good agents in the proper places. Most of the Germans dropped either got themselves picked up promptly and executed, or else headed for home to hide out. Fortunately, the enemy front was collapsing, prisoners were plentiful and talkative, aerial observation was uninhibited, and the need for agent reports was actually not great.

In Wars to Come

What these experiences of World War II offer in the way of guidance for the future depends, obviously, on when, where, and how the new battle is fought. Some contingent generalizations can be made.

In any war of the future fought with conventional weapons, much of the past experience will still be valid. Prisoners will be captured, and prisoners will talk in direct proportion

50

CONFIDENTIAL

Combat Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

to the skill of the interrogators. Aerial reconnaissance will be more sophisticated, using unmanned drones, television, and photographic missiles. It will also face a better defense, one equipped with gun-laying radar and other new devices. As long as fighting units communicate there will be signals. Documents will continue to be carried and be left behind. And finally, espionage will be of value if there is advance planning, if networks can be established behind enemy lines, and if the population is not too hostile.

In a limited nuclear war the relative value of some of these sources will probably change. Prisoners will be fewer because of the remoteness of contact and they will be less knowledgeable, although they will probably surrender in larger numbers when there is contact. Documents will also decline in importance for similar reasons. Aerial observation and signals intelligence will become of paramount importance. Agents in place in advance of the conflict will help—provided they are in the right place at the right time.

In an all-out nuclear conflict, previous experience in combat intelligence may count for very little, and those forms of collection, such as prisoners and documents, that depend on direct contact with enemy forces may be eliminated altogether. The rapid mobilization and recovery of intelligence resources in the recuperative phase following the first blow may well prove to be the key to such victory as is possible. In this war there will be vast areas of destruction mutually inflicted in the opening minutes. The side that can most quickly discover the extent of damage to the enemy, ascertain the retaliatory force and strength remaining to him, and strike and destroy that in the second, probably decisive blow, will emerge victor. Only the rapid collection and effective use of intelligence can make this blow effective, whether the intelligence comes from signals, aerial observation manned or unmanned, or agents well established in advance in key areas of the enemy country. On this survival may depend.

CONFIDENTIAL

51

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

Magazine in a Mirror

Dear Sirs:

The nineteenth issue of *Studies in Intelligence* has just appeared and the magazine is now in its fifth or sixth year, depending on whether one counts an early lapse in publication. In any case, it has passed the experimental stage and now issues a staple product which can suitably be subject to criticism and review.

The magazine is handsome in an austere sort of way, and very capably edited. Its prose is unimpeachable; but it is not exciting. Its contents, save for some lively antiquarian writings, are dull. It has tended more and more to become a kind of house organ for discussing covert or clandestine arts and skills. It seems to have come but a very small way toward achieving the objectives set forth by Dr. Kent in its first issues: the establishment of basic principles, the definition of terms to convey an exact meaning, and elevated debate leading to synthesis of doctrine on controversial topics.

What Dr. Kent's lead article called, with greater optimism than propriety, the "profession" of intelligence has shown very few signs of developing the characteristics of a profession. And now the chosen vehicle that was to support the new profession, or rather lead it into the promised land, has dropped its torch. It may be, indeed, that a professional journal cannot flourish until there are established principles, definitions, and syntheses upon which it can rely. Until that time a proposed definition remains a personal opinion, and the examination of a first principle only a biased review. Multiplication of opinions or biased reviews can hardly lead to any synthesis unless they are referred to some sort of Arcane Academy of Intelligence where a decision can be reached. I believe that in general most of the professions have developed in this way; it has been synods, or royal academies, or representative associations that have made the great decisions in other professions.

Intelligence has no such authority and is now suffering from its lack. A recent report of the CIA Inspector General on training programs, for example, refers almost jestingly to "what is called the profession of intelligence," stops for a mo-

CONFIDENTIAL

53

MORI/HRP PAGES 53-57

CONFIDENTIAL

To the Editors: A Mirror

ment in bemused contemplation of the phrase *intelligence officer* before it shies away, and only very briefly discusses whether there is a body of common knowledge with which all intelligence officers should be acquainted. If the Olympians are in doubt on these fundamental matters, the people are in confusion. Ask half a dozen intelligence officers for a definition of intelligence and you will get at least three different answers. Ask two clandestine service officers for definitions of *clandestine* and *covert*; from one of them you are likely to get two distinct definitions and from the other a statement that the two terms are synonyms.

In the field of combat intelligence, the Armed Services have laid down basic principles and established doctrine; but in national intelligence there is even confusion on such a primary matter as its central mission. Is the duty of the work-a-day analyst one of compiling information or that of learning ultimately how to interpret information in terms of national security? Is the true mission of intelligence to learn to understand people as fully as possible or to collect statistics about them? Many such questions either go unanswered or produce a bewildering maze of answers.

Many of our intelligence specialists were recruited from the economic or scientific professions after having obtained some reputation in their chosen fields. What happens to them when they begin to work as intelligence officers? Are they still economists or scientists? What are the professional satisfactions offered to compensate a brilliant young scientist for giving up his laboratory and his research to become a scientific intelligence officer? A skeptical older man once said that the only scientists who would give up their life work for intelligence would be those who hadn't yet made science a life work and those who already had—the novice and the professor emeritus.

In the absence of answers to their fundamental questions people are turning to routine to save them. There are jobs to be done, and the hard stone bench of routine has a comforting stability about it. Sitting on it discourages speculation, however, and removes the desire for change, because change might be upsetting. On the organizational level, the counterpart of routine is bureaucracy, and centralized intel-

To the Editors: A Mirror

CONFIDENTIAL

ligence has been hardening into bureaucracy at a rather dreadful speed. Nothing is more encouraging to bureaucracy than uncertainty about its ultimate goal; it is a great deal easier to expend energy tidying up procedures than to set the whole cumbrous machinery progressing in a different direction.

It is not an accident that the residual energy of the centralized community now makes itself most manifest in collection, processing, and support activities: where the goal is clear, the drive of the earlier days still persists. We soon will be able to have the daily flood of documents scanned electronically for coding, punched onto IBM cards, and conveyed to the files without being read by human eye. We have performed and are performing miracles in technical devices, communication, printing, and logistics. But we are not continually building toward a profession. We have around too many sad young men.

The objectives that Dr. Kent nailed to the masthead of the first issue are still sound, but they cannot under present conditions be attained through multiplication of articles in the *Studies*; and for lack of other clearly stated objectives the magazine is slowly dying of anemia. During the past five years it has produced about a dozen articles of some permanent value. Most of these have spread abroad sober and necessary information on how things work. Here the authors had solid facts to use that were classified but not sensitive, conditions of relative rarity. The possibility of articles discussing, for example, new techniques, current operations, or radical changes in organization is eliminated by a warm touch of common sense or the cold hand of security. Technical services cannot proudly describe a new device; communications cannot mention improvements in the instruments of communication; nor can an operating component tentatively put forward a new method of securing information. Even on the overt side, the discussion of new methods of distilling intelligence from information must be warily conducted. I remember an excellent article on the principles of electronic intercept; it would be impossible, however, to print one showing how we used these principles to learn about the characteristics of ballistic missiles.

CONFIDENTIAL

To the Editors: A Mirror

In a field closely allied to intelligence, that of guerrilla warfare, theory has been established and there is now a growing and orderly body of information. After World War I, T. S. Lawrence wrote one of the first philosophical tracts on the subject, setting forth certain basic principles; his article is still carried in the 14th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Mao Tze-tung in 1937 wrote his treatise called *Guerrilla Warfare*, which was first translated in 1941 by Colonel Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC. These two texts supplement and underwrite each other. They provide the foundation for further speculation.

After a certain period of experimenting, operating, or just doing, action becomes helplessly empirical unless the expert or a body of experts has the power and the opportunity for synthesis, that is, the insight to establish basic principles. The medieval herbalists struggled vainly with descriptions of plants until Linnaeus came along with his analysis of the flower. Medicine could hardly get off the ground until Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood. Or, to take an extreme example, the orderly development of a light engine was impossible until someone conceived the idea of burning fuel inside the chamber containing the moving parts.

Expert authority is evidently needed to do this work of synthesis. The democratic process will multiply opinions or record endless examples, but its end product will usually be a cumbersome body of empirical knowledge or simply a mass of opinions that cancel out one another. Moses, or his Great Sponsor, produced the four-word synthesis "Thou shalt not kill." This commandment in the past few thousand years has provoked an extraordinary body of exegesis and comment. I am sure, however, that if Moses had asked the children of Israel to brush out a few thoughts on papyrus for his guidance he would have got something like this:

It is probably inadvisable to kill one's parents; there seems to be almost universal disapproval of this act. On the other hand, there are certainly limits within the bonds of kinship beyond which killing is permissible. Some would make killing permissive beginning with second cousins while others claim that only ties of blood should be respected and that all in-laws are *ipso facto* to be killed upon proper provocation. The definition of proper provocation is still a subject of debate in one or two of the tribes and will be the subject of a later report.

To the Editors: A Mirror

CONFIDENTIAL

In order to establish the required expert authority to synthesize intelligence doctrine I would suggest specifically that we create a permanent Synod of National Intelligence. I would advocate that such a synod be composed of a couple of benignant Olympians, a few young men from the bowels of the community who know the inner and lower verities, a small group of middle-aged men who have lost the pragmatic illusion that "whatever is, is right," and an Angry Old Man or two to keep things stirred up. This synod, after deliberation on first principles, should be able to produce or have produced under its direction a series of doctrinal papers that could well appear in the magazine. Once these were published one could let the hundred flowers bloom. The elevated debate envisioned by Dr. Kent could get under way, with the synod acting from time to time as moderator, changing doctrine or modifying it as in its wisdom it saw fit. Case problems could be fitted into categories or criticized from the standpoint of first principles. *Studies in Intelligence* could then develop an expanding body of sound knowledge.

A professional magazine, as someone has said of an Army, is a spiritual phenomenon. The magazine, like an Army, reflects the health of the organization it represents. National intelligence has been, and is, faced in a changing world with a formidable new task. In the past ten years it has met this challenge, but in the rush of events has had time to meet it only empirically. We now need to ponder on our past efforts and distill from them a body of precepts. When we have done that, when we have established those first principles of Dr. Kent, a professional magazine could flourish.

PHILLIPS D. CARLETON

SECRET

To the Editors: The Polygraph

Reservations on the Polygraph

Dear Sirs:

The comments that follow are those of an operations officer who has had a good deal of experience with the polygraph in agent interrogation and with the interpretation of polygraphic results.

Among case officers there have been a wide variety of attitudes toward the machine. There have been disbelievers, skeptics, objective appraisers, wholehearted enthusiasts, and, at an unhealthy extreme, some who embrace the comforting faith that the polygraph is a panacea for their problems. These latter tend to rely on it as a litmus paper, a short cut to secure operations, a short cut to the determination of bona fides. All too often the lazy or careless use it as an excuse to neglect their own most elementary and basic duty—to know everything possible about their agents—and shift from their own shoulders the responsibility for operational security.

A recent article in your *Studies*,¹ I am sorry to say, by citing impressive statistics and by enlarging upon the role of the polygraph operator in agent control, tends to reinforce this attitude and engender a belief that the case officer's problems can be solved by something outside himself. Or at least 95 to 98 percent solved: two to five percent of polygraph analyses were statistically tabbed inconclusive.

The statistics, taken from three studies of polygraph results, show that it produced "previously unknown information" in several critical categories in a substantial percentage of cases analyzed. No one doubts that interrogation, with or without the aid of a polygraph, will turn up new facts; but it is decidedly disturbing to learn that a polygraph operator can obtain previously unknown information on this scale in such categories as employment by other intelligence services. The fact that the information was obtained is good. But the way it was obtained is bad, because it indicates that the case officers in question were not doing their job, either with their agents or with respect to the security of their operations.

¹ "The Polygraph in Agent Interrogation," by Chester C. Crawford, *Studies* IV 3, p. 31 ff.

To the Editors: The Polygraph

SECRET

It does not follow, if a case officer is not doing his job properly, that the basic task of operational security can be or should be taken over by the polygraph operator. The article, although it notes that the results obtained from the polygraph must not be credited to the machine *in vacuo*, that the interrogator using the machine is also a determinant, does not make clear the more basic fact that both polygraph and operator/interrogator constitute only one of several aids available to the case officer. Whether the machine is to be used at all and whether subsequent operational decisions or actions are to be based on its graphs are matters decided exclusively by the case officer and his supervisors in the operational chain of command.

At least the first of these sets of statistics, covering Far Eastern tests conducted under the wartime conditions of 1952-53, may not be as impressive—or depressing—as it seems. Many of the "agents and potential agents" tested may have been merely members of a large pool constituted at that time of persons recommended by indigenous principal agents and not yet subjected to any detailed case officer interview and assessment. The only information available on them, in this short-cut approach, was frequently what they themselves had supplied on a routine questionnaire. To the extent that such unknowns as these were introduced into the agent statistics, both the figures and the conclusions drawn from them are of diluted validity.

Most of what the article says about the thorough preparation of the polygraph operator to conduct a particular examination represents correctly what should be done, though all too often, through the fault of the case officer, there is no such preparation. But it is wrong to say that the polygraph operator is "prepared to probe for detail regarding the modus operandi, personnel, and tradecraft" of foreign intelligence services. Such probing requires an expert's knowledge of the sensitive practices and procedures of foreign services, internal and external, hostile and liaison. The polygraph operator's usual questioning is on the broad level of "Are you now or have you ever been employed by a Communist security or intelligence service or the intelligence service of any other country?" To suggest that he is capable of conducting an operationally sophisticated interrogation, functioning as a highly

SECRET

To the Editors: The Polygraph

specialized counterintelligence officer, depreciates the complexities of the continuing effort to acquire knowledge about foreign intelligence services.

I question also the "more general dividend" claimed near the article's conclusion, that the agent "is usually a better clandestine operator after being polygraphed." Agents are human; they do not necessarily "appreciate our attitude and look with greater respect on the American service after their 'ordeal.'" And the agent who refuses to undergo the ordeal may still be needed and in fact may prove very effective in clandestine operations.

The polygraph has a place in clandestine operations as an aid controlled by the case officer and used with discretion; but if he does his job properly he will often not have to use it, and he should always ask himself whether its use is the best way to enhance a particular operation. Most important, he cannot pass to the machine or its operator the buck of his own responsibility for acquiring a sure knowledge of his agent.

CLARK R. DIANGSON

60

SECRET

SECRET

25X

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

<i>The Manipulation of Human Behavior</i>	ALFRED FAUMIER
<i>Thought Reform and Coercive Persuasion</i>	JOSEPH A. FAUSSNER
<i>Spy Ring (the Lonsdale case)</i>	MARTIN T. DAPRATO
<i>Craciunas' The Lost Footsteps</i>	LOUIS THOMAS
<i>Barker's Cryptanalysis</i>	L. D. CALLIMACHOS
<i>Conferences on Resistance History</i>	WALTER PFORZHEIMER

The bibliography of General Smith's writings was prepared by the CIA Library.

SECRET

25X1

MORI/HRP THIS
PAGE

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET/

Intelligence Articles V 4

*Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.*

SECRET/

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

In Memoriam
General Walter Bedell Smith
5 October 1895 ~ 9 August 1961

A1

MORI/HRP PAGES A1-A13

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9



In Memoriam

The President of the United States takes pride in presenting the National Security Medal to

General WALTER BEDELL SMITH

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

As Director of Central Intelligence, he made an outstanding contribution to the national security of the United States. Through his firmness and tact, perceptiveness and judgment, and withal, through his brilliant leadership in a position of highest responsibility, he assured the realization of that ideal of a coordinated intelligence effort which was set forth by the Congress in 1947, and brought to a new height of effectiveness the intelligence machinery of the United States Government. Through his well-grounded and clearly-defined concept of intelligence, reinforced by his recognized integrity and high personal prestige, he won acceptance of the principle that policy decisions must be based upon sound intelligence.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

February 21, 1953

In Memoriam

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1953

Dear Bedell:

As you know, I consider the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency one of the most important steps which I have taken, as President, in the interests of our national security. An effective intelligence service, which this country now possesses, is a vital element in our efforts for a just and lasting peace.

As Director of Central Intelligence since 1950, following your superior service as Ambassador to Moscow, you have successfully and faithfully accomplished your mission of developing the Central Intelligence Agency into an efficient and permanent arm of the Government's national security structure. During this critical period the far-reaching improvements and strengthening which you have introduced in the intelligence field have been of immeasurable value to me and the other members of the National Security Council in dealing with the difficult problems facing us.

I am firmly convinced that no President ever had such a wealth of vital information made available to him in such a useful manner as I have received through CIA. I want you to know how deeply I appreciate and admire the conscientious and loyal way in which you have accomplished your mission. I am equally sure that future Presidents will benefit substantially from the outstanding work which you have done in developing the Central Intelligence Agency.

As I prepare to leave the Presidency, I want to say thank you to a true friend, a real patriot, and a public administrator of the highest calibre.

Very sincerely yours,



General Walter Bedell Smith, U.S.A.,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, D. C.

In Memoriam

GENERAL SMITH'S DECORATIONS AND SERVICE MEDALS

Decorations

Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal (Navy)
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star Medal

Service Medals

World War I Victory Medal with three battle clasps
American Defense Service Medal
American Campaign Medal
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal with seven bronze service stars for participation in the Algeria-French Morocco, Tunisia, Sicily, Northern France, Ardennes-Alsace, Rhineland, and Central Europe campaigns
World War II Victory Medal
Army of Occupation Medal with Germany clasp

Foreign Decorations

Belgium : Grand Croix de l'Ordre de la Couronne, with Palm; Croix de Guerre 1940, with Palm
Brazil : Order of Military Merit, degree of Grand Officer
Chile : Medal of Military Merit of the Army, First Class
Czechoslovakia: Order of the White Lion for Victory, Star II Class; War Cross, 1939
France : Cross of the Legion of Honor (Grand Officer); Croix de Guerre, with Star (WW I); Croix de Guerre, with Palm (WW II)
Great Britain : Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire
Luxembourg : Ordre National de la Couronne de Chêne, Grade de la Grand Croix

In Memoriam

Morocco	:	Grand Officer, Order of Ouissane Alaouite
Netherlands	:	Lion of the Netherlands Grand Cross
Poland	:	Commanders Cross with Star of the Order of Polonia Restituta (II Class); Silver Cross of the Order of Virtuti Militari; Grunwald Cross, 2d Class
Tunis	:	Order of Nishan Iftikhar
USSR	:	Cavalier of the Order of Kutuzov, 1st Class

A6

In Memoriam



Members of the SHAF, 7 May 1945. General Smith as SHAF Chief of Staff presiding at the formal German surrender which ended the war in Europe. Opposite General Smith is the German Chief of Staff, General Jodl, with Admiral von Friedeburg on his left and Major Oerter on his right. Seated at General Smith's right are Admiral Burrough, Commander of the Allied Naval Forces; General Seves, representing the French Chief of Staff, General Juin; and General Smith's deputy, General Morgan. At the table on his left are Soviet General Suslov, General Spatz, commanding the 1st German Army, General Koss, SHAF's Chief of Air Staff, and the SHAF G-3, General Bull.

A7

In Memoriam

on the pantry and five or six
of us sat around the kitchen
table making sandwiches
drinking beer and talking
about politics till almost
daylight. And even though
they were to lead the N.F.Z.M.
to gether they were fully
under an illusion regarding
the aggressive designs of the
Communists in their attempts
to convert the federation into
an instrument of Soviet
policy abroad. This design
they were determined to
dash within the framework
of the N.F.Z.M. and its
communist and socialist
through them I met
— Kuznetsov, the head of
the Soviet Trade Union,
whom we entertained at

Page from original manuscript of *My Three Years in Moscow* done
by General Smith in pencil.

WRITINGS OF WALTER BEDELL SMITH

Books

My Three Years in Moscow. (*New York Times* in 27 install-
ments 6 November to 2 December 1949; *Saturday Evening*
Post in 8 installments 12 November to 31 December 1949;
Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1950, 346p.)

Foreign Editions:

- In de schaduw van het Kremlin, tr. by Rufus. Amsterdam,
Moussault, 1952. 334p.
- Masko men tin varsha. New Delhi, Adhunik Sahitya Praka-
shan, n. d. 280p. Text in Hindi.
- Maskoman trana varsha. Bombay, Nutan Sahitya Praka-
shan, n. d. 292p. A condensed translation into Gujarati.
- Maskontil tin varshen. New Delhi, Rajakamal, 1952. 301p.
Text in Marathi.
- Meine drei Jahre in Moskau, [dt.] aus d. Amerik. v. Wern
G[erh.] Krug. Hamburg, Hoffmann u. Campe, 1950. 486p.
- Mina tre år i Moskva, tr. by Einar Thermanius and Nils
Holmberg. Stockholm, A. Bonnier, 1950. 290p.
- Mis tres años en Moscú. Barcelona, Editorial Mateu, 1950.
287p.
- Mis tres años en Moscú. Mexico, Editorial Matheu Mexicana,
1952. 311p.
- Mo Szü k'o Ti Shih Ming; tr. by Wang Yun-wu. Taipei,
Hwa Kuo Publishing Service, 1950. 353p.
- Moscow mission, 1946-1949. London, Heineman, 1950. 337p.
- Moskavada üç yıl, tr. by Vahdet Gültekin. Istanbul, Nebioğlu
Yayınevi, 1951. 228p.
- Mosuko no san nen . . . Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1950.
284p.
- The mystery of the Kremlin. Winnipeg Free Press, 13-19
September 1950. Abridged.
- Rusia contra Estados Unidos. Buenos Aires, Editorial Pe-
gaso, 1953. 306p.
- Stalin or hans rike. Mine tre år i Moskva, tr. by Trygve
Width. Oslo, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1950. 385p.
- Thalāth Sanawāt fi Mūsū, tr. by Muhammad al-Mu'allim.
al-Qāhirah, 'Isa al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1954. 472p.
- Tre anni a Mosca (1946-1949), tr. by Andrea Zanchi. Milano,
Garzanti, 1951. 378p.
- Trois années à Moscou, 1946-1949. Paris, Plon, 1950. 348p.

Smith Bibliography

Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe 1944-1945. (New York, Longmans, Green, 1956, 237p.; *Saturday Evening Post* in 6 installments 8 June to 13 July 1956.)

Foreign Editions:

Eisenhower's zes grote beslissingen. Europa 1944-1945. Voor Nederland bew. door H. J. Kruls. Amsterdam, Van Holkema & Warendorf, 1956.

General Eisenhower's sechs grosse Entscheidungen (Europa 1944-1945). Übertr. aus dem Amerikan von Curt Meyer-Chason. Bern, Scherz, 1956. 292p.

Forewords

Foreword for Louis B. Ely's *The Red Army Today*. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Military Service Publishing Co., 1949.)

Foreword for Henry Bertram Mayo's *Democracy and Marxism*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1955.)

Introduction to John Moors Cabot's *Toward Our Common American Destiny*. (Medford, Mass., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1955.)

Introduction to Astolphe Marquis de Dustine's *Journey for Our Time*, as edited and translated by Phyllis Penn Kohler. (New York, Pellegrini, 1951; Chicago, Regnery, 1959.)

Introduction to Edmund Stevens' *This Is Russia—Uncensored*. (New York, Didier, 1950.)

Preface to George Francis Robert Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War*. (London, New York, Longmans, 1961.)

Articles and Statements

Address at the opening of the colonial magazine and guard-house, Williamsburg, Va., 4 July 1949. (*Congressional Record* 95, pt. 15: A4430-A4431, 11 July 1949.)

Address on maritime training, at the Merchant Marine Academy, 16 July 1949. (*Congressional Record* 95, pt. 15: A4671, 20 July 1949.)

America and Foreign Affairs. (*State Government* 22:191-193+, August 1949.)

America's Primary Interests in Asia: interview. (Department of State *Bulletin* 31:191-195, 9 August 1954.)

Anniversary of the Death of a Bulgarian Patriot. (Department of State *Bulletin* 31:490, 4 October 1954.)

Smith Bibliography

The Base Rights Agreement with Libya. (Department of State *Bulletin* 31:396-397, 20 September 1954.)

Building a Community of Free Nations: address October 20, 1953. (Department of State *Bulletin* 29:630-632, 9 November 1953.)

Building a Cooperative Peace. (Department of State *Bulletin* 29:463-467, 5 October 1953.)

The Cold War, an Audit: interview. (*New York Times Magazine*, p. 9+, 10 October 1954.)

The Davies Record: as told by Patrick J. Hurley, Walter Bedell Smith, Mr. Davies himself, Lyle H. Munson and others. (*U. S. News & World Report* 35:26-32+, 11 December 1953.)

The Day the Germans Gave Up. (*Parade*, 8 May 1955, p. 17.)

Europe as a Bulwark of Peace: address at conference of governors, Colorado Springs, Colo., June 20, 1949. (Department of State *Bulletin* 21:872-875, 4 July 1949; *Congressional Record* 95, pt. 15: A4485-A4487, 13 July 1949; revised under title *Russia Won't Risk War at Present Time* in *Vital Speeches* 15:696-698, 1 September 1949.)

Foreign Policy for the Long Haul: address February 9, 1954. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:263-265, 22 February 1954.)

General W. B. Smith Meets the Press. (*American Mercury* 68:697-703, June 1949.)

Geneva Conference Begins Discussions on Indochina: texts of statements made in plenary sessions. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:783-784, 24 May 1954.)

Geneva Conference on Indochina Concluded: statement July 21, 1954. (Department of State *Bulletin* 31:162, 2 August 1954.)

If Geneva Fails: statement May 9, 1954. (*U. S. News & World Report* 36:85, 21 May 1954.)

Has Russian Despotism Changed Much Since the Czars? Extracts from a book suppressed by the Soviets. (*U. S. News & World Report*, v.47, no. 11:60-64, 104-109, 14 September 1959.)

The Importance of Indochina: remarks made April 11, 1954. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:589, 19 April 1954.)

International Development of Atomic Energy. (Department of State *Bulletin* 29:330-332, 7 September 1953.)

Smith Bibliography

A Man Who Would Be Great in Any Language: interview. (*U. S. News & World Report* 38:52-54, 4 March 1955.)

Negotiating Solutions to Today's Problems: address October 2, 1953. (Department of State *Bulletin* 29:475-479, 12 October 1953; under title *Soviet Good Intentions in Vital Speeches* 20:80-83, 15 November 1953.)

A New Look at Our Foreign Policy: address May 8, 1953. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:703-706, 18 May 1953.)

No Threats of Force from the U. S.: statement July 21, 1954. (*U. S. News & World Report* 37:93-94, 30 July 1954; Department of State *Bulletin* 30:940-944, 20 June 1954.)

The Pivotal Conflict Dominating the World: address June 8, 1953. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:874-877, 22 June 1953.)

Practicalities of Power. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:675-678, 11 May 1953.)

Praise for the Foreign Service. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:821-822, 8 June 1953.)

The President's Proposal for Admission of European Migrants. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:857-859, 15 June 1953.)

Progress toward Solving Current International Problems: address February 23, 1954. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:358-360, 8 March 1954.)

A Realistic Review of Foreign Policy Problems: address September 5, 1953. (Department of State *Bulletin* 29:371-375, 21 September 1953.)

The Red Army's No Restraint: interview. *Newsweek* 45:35, 21 February 1955.)

Remarks on behalf of H. R. 2967, the national reserve plan. (*Congressional Digest* 34:122+, April 1955.)

Report to the President March 1, 1957. (U. S. President's Citizens Advisers on the Mutual Security Program. Washington, USGPO, 1957. 36p.)

Request for Extension of UNRWA Program for Palestine Refugees. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:822-824, 8 June 1953.)

Role of the International Red Cross in War and Peace. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:787, 24 May 1954.)

Statement on NATO treaties April 7. (Department of State *Bulletin* 28:628-631, 27 April 1953.)

Smith Bibliography

Testimony in support of Voice of America legislation. (*Congressional Digest* 27:58+, February 1948.)

They Knew Zhukov When: interviews with U. S. generals and top military men. (*U. S. News & World Report* 38:53-57, 4 March 1955.)

Thirty-sixth Anniversary of Lithuanian Independence. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:320, 1 March 1954.)

Understanding U. S. Foreign Policy. (Department of State *Bulletin* 31:530, 11 October 1954.)

U. S. Denounces Planned Destruction of U. N.: statement May 28, 1954. (*U. S. News & World Report* 36:67-69, 4 June 1954; under title *Korean People's Right to Unity and Independence* in Department of State *Bulletin* 30:915-918, 14 June 1954.)

U. S. Goals at the Geneva Conference: statement May 9, 1954. (Department of State *Bulletin* 30:744-745, 17 May 1954.)

Nomination of Walter Bedell Smith. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the nomination of Walter Bedell Smith to be Under Secretary of State. February 4, 1953. (Washington, USGPO, 1953. 39p.)

Testimony of Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith at hearings before a special subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning H. R. 3342, the United States information and educational exchange act of 1947. May 14, 1947. (Washington, USGPO, 1947. p. 45-71.)

Testimony of General Walter Bedell Smith at a hearing before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. October 13, 1952. (Washington, USGPO, 1952. p. 4283-4298.)

Testimony of General Walter Bedell Smith at a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Study of air power. April 16-June 1, 1956. (p. 5-20.)

Testimony of General Walter Bedell Smith before the special subcommittee on investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Special Senate investigation of charges and countercharges involving Secretary of the Army Robert R. Stevens, John G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel, Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn and Francis P. Carr. April 22, 1954. (Washington, USGPO, 1954, Pt. 2: 83-89; *New York Times* p. 16, 23 April 1954.)

*Intricacies of a remarkable
Soviet spy cipher.*

NUMBER ONE FROM MOSCOW¹

David Kahn

At the trial in 1957 of Colonel Rudolf Abel for espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union, one of the exhibits in evidence was a bit of microfilm carrying ten columns, 21 rows, of five-figure groups. This cipher message, found inside a hollow nickel in 1953 and turned over to the FBI, had proved impregnable to solution until its key was made available four years later by the defection of Reino Hayhanen, Abel's erstwhile assistant, to whom the message had been addressed.² The inability of government cryptanalysts to read it was no reflection upon their competence, for the cryptographic system used in the message was the finest and most advanced mnemonic cipher ever made public. Although not theoretically insoluble, it is effectually unbreakable without prior knowledge of the system and on the basis of a single message.

At the trial, although prosecuting attorney Kevin Maroney did a masterful job of leading Hayhanen, as state's witness, through the intricacies of the system, the cipher was so complicated that its description bored the jurors and the process could not be followed even by a cryptographer without the written program furnished the jury. A better look at it at leisure will be rewarding to anyone with an interest in cryptography.

The Message

If the cipher were to be given a technical name, it would be known as a "straddling bipartite monoalphabetic substitution superenciphered by modified double transposition." Four mnemonic keys—the Russian word for "snowfall," a snatch of popular song, the date of the Soviet V-J Day, and the agent's personal number—were used to derive the arrangement of the

¹ This article is based on the author's booklet *Two Soviet Spy Ciphers* (Great Neck, N. Y.: David Kahn. 1960. L/C Card No. 60-16799.)

² For the full dramatic story of the Hayhanen/Abel case see W. W. Rocafort's "Colonel Abel's Assistant," *Intelligence Articles* III 4, p. 1 ff.

Number One From Moscow

alphabet for the substitution and the order for the two transpositions. The system can most easily be illustrated by following through the encipherment of the exhibited message, Moscow's first to Hayhanen after his arrival in New York, much as some Soviet cipher clerk did it in a well-guarded office of the KGB on a wintry third of December, 1952. Translated, the message read:

1. We congratulate you on [your] safe arrival. We confirm the receipt of your letter to the address "V" and the reading of [your] letter No. 1.
2. For organization of cover we have given instructions to transmit to you three thousand in local [currency]. Consult with us prior to investing it in any kind of business, advising the character of the business.
3. According to your request, we will transmit the formula for the preparation of soft film and the news separately, together with [your] mother's letter.
4. [It is too] early to send you the gammas.* Encipher short letters, but do the longer ones with insertions. All the data about yourself, place of work, address, etc., must not be transmitted in one cipher message. Transmit insertions separately.
5. The package was delivered to [your] wife personally. Everything is all right with [your] family. We wish [you] success. Greetings from the comrades.

No. 1, 3 December.

The Russian text was as follows:

1. Поздравляем с благополучным прибытием. Подтверждаем получение вашего письма в адрес "В" и прочтение письма №1.
2. Для организации прикрытия мы дали указание передать вам три тысячи местных. Перед тем как их вложить в какое либо дело посоветуйтесь с нами, сообщив характеристику этого дела.
3. По вашей просьбе рецептуру изготовления мягкой пленки и новостей* передадим отдельно вместе с письмом матери.
4. Гаммы высылать вам рано. Короткие письма шифруйте, а побольше—делайте со вставками. Все данные о себе, место работы, адрес и т.д. в одной шифровке передавать нельзя. Вставки передавайте отдельно.
5. Псылку жене передали лично. С семьей все благополучно. Желаем успеха. Привет от товарищей.

№1/03 Декабря.

*Probably one-time pad cipher keys.

*The genitive case is apparently an error.

A16

Number One From Moscow

The Substitution

The first major step in the encipherment of this text is substitution of one- and two-digit numbers for the Russian plaintext letters. For this purpose a table or "checkerboard" of 40 cells—ten across and four down—is set up as illustrated below.

	5	0	7	3	8	9	4	6	1	2
	С	Н	Е	Г	О	П	А			
6	Б	Ж	.	К	№	Р	Ф	Ч	Ы	Ю
1	В	З	,	Л	Н/П	Т	Х	Ш	Ь	Я
2	Д	И	П/Л	М	Н/Т	У	Ц	Щ	Э	ПВТ

The first seven letters, СНЕГОПА, of the Russian word for "snowfall" are inscribed in the first row, leaving the last three cells blank. The remaining 23 letters of the modern Russian alphabet, omitting diacritical marks, are inscribed in sequence vertically in the other three rows, skipping the third and fifth columns, which, with the last cell remaining in the last column, are then filled by seven symbols. These are a period, a comma, the symbol П/Л, whose meaning is undetermined, the abbreviation №, the letter-number switch sign Н/П, the "message starts" sign Н/Т, and the abbreviation ПВТ for "repeat." Along the top of the checkerboard are written the ten digits in a mixed sequence determined by a process to be described later. The last three digits in the sequence, which stand over the blank cells at the end of the first row, are repeated at the left of the second, third and fourth rows. These digits are known as coordinates.

Each plaintext letter in the first row of the checkerboard is enciphered by substituting the single coordinate above it. Each letter and symbol in the other rows is enciphered by substituting the coordinate at the end of its row followed by the coordinate at the top of its column. Numbers are enciphered by placing them within a pair of the letter-number switch signs and repeating them three times.

Before these substitutions are made, however, the plaintext is bisected—chopped at random into two parts—and the true start of the message is tacked onto the true end. This true start is indicated by the "message starts" sign Н/Т. In this encipherment, as illustrated below, the sign stands seventh in the fourth line from the bottom of page A19.

A17

Number One From Moscow

9 69 20 63 69 61 19 20 12 23 61 25 4 13
 П Р И К Р Б Т И Я М Ы Д А Л
 20 29 63 4 10 4 0 20 7 9 7 69 7 25
 И У К А 3 А Н И Е П Е Р Е Д
 4 19 11 15 4 23 19 69 20 19 61 5 12 66
 А Т Б В А М Т Р И Т Б С Я Ч
 20 23 7 5 19 0 61 14 67 9 7 69 7 25
 И М Е С Т Н Ы Х П Е Р Е Д
 19 7 23 63 4 63 20 14 15 13 8 60 20 19
 Т Е М К А К И Х В Л О Ж И Т
 11 15 63 4 63 8 7 13 20 65 8 25 7 13
 Б В К А К О Е Л И Б О Д Е Л
 8 9 8 5 8 15 7 19 29 20 19 7 5 11
 О П О С О Б Е Т У И Т Е С Б
 5 0 4 23 20 17 5 8 8 65 26 20 15 14
 С Н А М И С О О Б Щ И В Х
 4 69 4 63 19 7 69 20 5 19 20 63 29 21
 А Р А К Т Е Р И С Т И К У 9
 19 8 3 8 25 7 13 4 67 18 333 18 67 9
 Т О Г О Д Е Л А Н/Ц 333 Н/Ц П
 8 15 4 16 7 20 9 69 8 5 11 65 7 69
 О В А Ш Е И П Р О С Б В Е Р
 7 24 7 9 19 29 69 29 20 10 3 8 19 8
 Е Ц Е П Т У Р У И 3 Г О Т О
 15 13 7 0 20 12 23 12 3 63 8 20 9 13
 В Л Е Н И Я М Я Г К О И П Л
 7 0 63 20 20 0 8 15 8 5 19 7 20 9
 Е Н К И И Н О В О С Т Е И П
 7 69 7 25 4 25 20 23 8 19 25 7 13 11
 Е Р Е Д И М О Т Д Е Л Б
 0 8 15 23 7 5 19 7 5 9 20 5 11 23
 Н О В М Е С Т Е С П И С Б М
 8 23 23 4 19 7 69 20 67 18 444 18 67 3
 О М М А Т Е Р И Н/Ц 444 Н/Ц Г
 4 23 23 61 15 61 5 61 13 4 19 11 15 4
 А М М Ы В Ы С Ы Л А Т Б В А
 23 69 4 0 8 67 63 8 19 8 19 63 20 7
 М Р А Н О К О Р О Т К И Е
 9 20 5 11 23 4 16 20 64 69 29 20 19 7
 П И С Б М А Ш И Ф Р У И Т Е

Number One From Moscow

17 4 9 8 65 8 13 11 16 7 19 20 69 7
 А П О Б О Л Ш Е Т И Р Е
 25 7 13 4 20 19 7 5 8 15 5 19 4 15
 Д Е Л А И Т Е С О В С Т А Б
 63 4 23 20 67 15 5 7 25 4 0 0 61 7
 К А М И Б С Е Д А Н Н Ы Е
 8 5 7 65 7 17 23 7 5 19 8 69 4 65
 О С Е Б Е , М Е С Т О Р А Б
 8 19 61 17 4 25 69 7 5 20 19 67 25 67
 О Т Ы Д Р Е С И Т Д
 15 8 25 0 8 20 16 20 64 69 8 15 63 7
 В О Д Н О И Ш И Ф Р О В К Е
 9 7 69 7 25 4 15 4 19 11 0 7 13 11
 П Е Р Е Д А В А Т Ь Н Е Л Б
 10 12 67 15 5 19 4 15 63 20 9 7 69 7
 3 Я В С Т А Б К И П Е Р Е
 25 4 15 4 20 19 7 8 19 25 7 13 11 0
 Д А В А И Т Е О Т Д Е Л Б Н
 8 67 18 555 18 67 9 8 5 61 13 63 29 60
 О Н/Ц 555 Н/Ц П О С Ы Л К У Ж
 7 0 7 9 7 69 7 25 4 13 20 13 20 66
 Е Н Е П Е Р Е Д А Л И И Л И Ч
 0 8 67 5 5 7 23 11 7 20 15 5 7 65
 Н О С С Е М Ь Е И В С Е Б
 13 4 3 8 9 8 13 29 66 0 8 67 60 7
 Л А Г О П О Л У Ч Н О 67 9 69 20
 13 4 7 23 29 5 9 7 14 4 69 20 26 7 20
 Л А Е М У С П Е Х А Р И Ц Е И
 15 7 19 8 19 19 8 15 4 69 20 26 7 20
 В Е Т О Т О В А Р И Ц Е И
 68 18 111 18 25 69 8 65 11 8 18 333 18 25
 N2 Н/Ц 111 Н/Ц Д Р О Б 0* Н/Ц 333 Н/Ц Д
 7 63 4 65 69 12 28 18 111 18 67 9 8 10
 Е К А Б Р Я Н/Т Н/Ц Н/Ц П О 3
 25 69 4 15 13 12 7 23 5 65 13 4 3 8
 Д Р А В Л Я Е М С Б Л А Г О
 9 8 13 29 66 0 61 23 9 69 20 65 61 19
 П О Л У Ч Н Ы М П Р И Б Ы Т
 20 7 23 67 9 8 25 19 15 7 69 60 25 4
 И Е М П О Д Т В Е Р Ж Д А

* Apparently enciphered as a letter by error.

Number One From Moscow

7	23	9	8	13	29	66	7	0	20	7	15	4	16
E	M	И	O	И	У	Ч	E	H	И	E	B	A	И
7	3	8	9	20	5	11	23	4	15	4	25	69	7
E	Г	O	И	И	C	Б	M	A	B	A	Д	P	E
5	17	17	15	22	15	17	17	20	9	69	8	66	19
C	,	,	B	И	BT	B	,	,	И	И	P	O	Ч
7	0	20	7	9	20	5	11	23	4	68	18	111	18
E	H	И	E	И	И	C	Б	M	A	NQ	H/И	111	H/И
67	18	222	18	67	25	13	12	8	69	3	4	0	20
.	H/И	222	H/И	.	Д	И	Я	O	P	Г	A	H	И
10	4	24	20	20	2	1	4						
3	A	И	И	И	N	U	L	S					

Transpositions

The sequence of coordinates resulting from the substitution—which by itself affords virtually no security—is then thoroughly jumbled by passing it through two transposition tableaux. The first tableau (Fig. 1) is a standard columnar transposition. The substituted coordinates are written in horizontally under a set of keynumbers (the second of the two rows heading Figure 1) whose derivation will be given presently. They are taken out vertically, the column under keynumber 1 first and the others following in key order.

This new sequence of digits is then inscribed into the second tableau (Fig. 2) which, however, has a complication. This consists of a series of step-like disruption (D) areas determined as follows. The first D area begins in the top row under keynumber 1 and runs to the right side of that row. In each of the following rows, it begins one column to the right. When the columns are exhausted, one row is skipped and another D area is started in the following row with the column under keynumber 2, and so forth for as many rows as are needed to accommodate all the cipher digits.

The cipher digits taken vertically from the first tableau are inscribed horizontally from left to right into the rows of the second tableau, but leaving the D areas blank. When the non-D portions of all rows have been filled, the remaining digits are written in from left to right in the D areas, starting with the top row. From the completed tableau the digits are then taken out vertically in the order indicated by the

Number One From Moscow

9	6	0	3	3	1	8	3	6	6	4	6	9	0	4	7	5
14	8	16	2	3	1	13	4	9	10	5	11	15	17	6	12	7
9	6	9	2	0	6	3	6	9	6	1	1	9	2	0	1	2
2	3	6	1	2	5	4	1	3	2	0	2	9	6	3	4	1
0	4	0	2	0	7	9	7	6	9	7	2	5	4	1	9	1
1	1	5	4	2	3	1	9	6	9	2	0	1	9	6	1	5
1	2	6	6	2	0	2	3	7	5	1	9	0	4	1	1	4
6	7	9	7	6	9	7	2	5	1	9	7	2	3	6	3	4
6	3	2	0	1	4	1	5	1	3	8	6	0	2	0	1	9
1	1	1	5	6	3	4	6	3	8	7	1	3	2	0	6	5
7	5	8	6	5	2	6	2	0	1	5	1	5	7	1	9	2
8	2	5	7	1	3	8	9	5	8	1	5	7	1	9	2	0
9	2	0	1	9	7	5	1	1	5	0	4	2	3	2	0	1
4	6	3	1	9	7	6	9	2	0	1	5	1	4	4	6	9
2	9	2	1	1	9	8	3	8	2	5	7	1	3	4	6	7
1	8	3	3	3	1	8	6	7	9	8	1	5	4	1	6	7
2	0	9	6	9	8	5	1	8	5	7	6	9	7	2	4	1
7	9	1	9	2	9	6	9	2	9	2	0	1	0	3	8	1
9	8	1	5	1	3	7	0	2	0	1	2	2	3	1	2	3
6	3	8	2	0	9	1	3	7	0	6	3	2	0	2	0	0
8	1	5	8	5	1	9	7	2	0	9	7	6	9	7	2	5
4	2	5	2	0	2	3	8	1	9	5	7	1	3	1	1	1
1	2	3	8	2	3	3	4	1	9	7	6	9	2	0	6	6
7	1	8	4	4	1	8	6	7	3	4	2	3	2	3	6	6
1	1	5	6	1	5	6	1	1	3	4	1	9	1	1	1	5
4	2	3	6	9	4	0	8	6	7	6	6	8	6	9	8	1
9	6	3	2	0	7	9	2	0	5	1	1	2	3	4	1	6
2	0	5	4	6	9	2	9	2	0	1	9	7	1	7	4	9
8	6	5	8	1	3	1	1	1	6	7	1	9	2	0	6	9
7	2	5	7	1	3	4	2	0	1	9	7	5	8	1	5	5
1	9	4	1	5	6	3	4	2	3	2	0	6	7	1	5	5
7	2	5	4	0	0	6	1	7	8	5	7	6	5	7	1	7
2	3	7	5	1	9	8	6	9	4	6	5	8	1	9	6	1
1	7	4	2	5	6	9	7	5	2	0	1	9	6	7	2	5
6	7	1	5	8	2	5	0	8	2	0	1	6	2	0	6	4
6	9	8	1	5	6	3	7	9	7	6	9	7	2	5	4	1
5	4	1	9	1	0	7	1	3	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	6
7	1	5	1	9	4	1	5	6	3	2	0	9	7	6	9	7
7	2	5	4	1	5	4	2	0	1	9	7	8	1	9	2	5
7	1	3	1	1	0	8	6	7	1	8	5	5	5	1	8	6
7	9	8	5	6	1	1	3	6	3	2	9	6	0	7	0	7
9	7	6	9	7	2	5	4	1	3	2	0	1	3	2	0	6
6	0	8	6	7	5	2	7	2	3	1	7	2	0	1	5	5
5	7	6	5	1	3	4	3	8	9	8	1	3	2	9	6	6
0	8	6	7	6	0	7	1	3	4	7	2	3	2	9	5	9
7	1	4	4	6	7	9	6	9	2	0	1	5	7	1	9	8
1	9	1	9	8	1	5	4	6	9	2	0	2	6	7	2	0
6	8	1	8	1	1	1	1	8	2	5	6	9	8	6	5	1
1	8	1	8	3	3	3	1	8	2	5	7	6	3	4	6	5
6	9	1	2	2	8	1	8	1	1	1	1	8	6	7	9	8
1	0	2	5	6	9	4	1	5	1	3	1	2	7	2	3	5
6	5	1	3	4	3	8	9	8	1	3	2	9	6	6	0	6
1	2	3	9	6	9	2	0	6	5	6	1	1	9	2	0	7
2	3	6	7	9	8	2	5	1	5	7	6	9	6	0	6	0
2	5	4	7	2	3	9	8	1	3	2	9	6	6	7	0	2
0	7	1	5	4	1	6	7	3	8	9	2	0	5	1	1	2
3	4	1	5	4	2	5	6	9	7	5	1	7	1	7	1	5
2	2	1	5	1	7	1	7	2	0	9	6	9	8	6	6	1
9	7	0	2	0	7	9	2	0	5	1	1	2	3	4	6	8
1	8	1	1	1	1	8	6	7	1	8	2	2	2	1	8	6
7	2	5	1	3	1	2	8	6	9	3	4	0	2	0	1	0
4	2	4	2	0	2	0	2	1	4							

FIGURE 1. FIRST TRANSPOSITION TABLEAU.

Number One From Moscow

column keynumbers without any regard to D areas. This final sequence of digits, in the standard groups of five, comprises the cipher text. A keygroup is inserted at a predetermined point before the message is sent. The result is shown in Figure 3.

Key Derivation

We have seen that one of the four mnemonic keys—CHETONIA—develops the alphabetic arrangement in the checkerboard. The other three—a phrase from a popular song, the V-J date, and Hayhanen's personal number, 13—interact to generate a series of virtually random numbers that in turn yield the keynumbers across the top of the checkerboard and the two transposition tableaux.

In the derivation of these keys two devices are used repeatedly—chain addition and conversion to sequential numbers. Chain addition produces a series of numbers of any length from a few priming digits: the first two digits of the priming series are added together modulo 10 (without tens digits) and the result placed at the end of the series; then the second and third digits are added and the sum placed at the end; and so forth, using also the newly generated digits when the priming series is exhausted, until the desired length is obtained. To illustrate: with the priming series 3 9 6 4, 3 and 9 are added to get 2 (the 1 of the 12 being dropped), 9 and 6 yield 5, 6 and 4 add to 0. The series so far is 3 9 6 4 2 5 0; extended, it would run 3 9 6 4 2 5 0 6 7 5 6 3 2 1....

Conversion to sequential numbers, or the generation of a sequential key, is an adaptation from the standard practice of deriving a numerical key from a literal one by assigning consecutive numbers to the letters of the key in their alphabetical order, numbering identical letters from left to right. The literal key BABY, for example, would generate the sequential numerical key 2 1 3 4. In the Hayhanen system a series of digits is used as the breeder key, and consecutive numbers are assigned to them in their numerical order (0 is last), numbering identical digits from left to right. For example, if the breeder key is 3 9 6 4 6, the sequential key would be 1 5 3 2 4.

The derivation of the checkerboard and transposition keys for this message begins with the date—September 3, 1945—

Number One From Moscow

3	0	2	7	4	3	0	4	2	8	7	7	1	2
5	1	2	9	7	6	0	8	3	1	0	0	1	4
6	5	7	3	0	9	4	3	1	7	5	7	1	1
9	1	8	9	1	1	2	3	4	5	1	1	1	1
7	1	3	3	6	0	9	6	2	6	1	9	5	0
1	1	5	9	2	1	6	1	2	4	1	5	9	1
5	1	0	1	1	1	1	6	9	0	6	4	6	4
7	1	1	2	2	0	2	1	5	0	3	1	1	1
8	9	3	9	0	1	1	4	6	5	5	1	6	2
3	1	2	7	7	1	6	4	2	6	2	8	0	0
1	2	1	2	4	1	6	5	9	2	5	6	1	1
7	0	5	7	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	6	6	6
3	6	9	5	2	8	2	5	0	1	1	6	6	6
4	6	6	2	4	8	7	1	4	5	1	3	4	9
2	5	1	9	5	4	5	9	5	7	1	2	7	1
7	4	5	8	2	5	3	9	7	7	1	1	4	1
5	5	2	1	1	2	0	2	2	6	1	1	1	1
6	1	9	6	1	3	9	2	0	2	0	7	1	1
2	4	1	9	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
5	0	1	5	8	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	6	7	1	4	6	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	6	4	6	9	2	4	4	1	0	1	1	1	1
3	0	6	1	7	9	3	2	5	6	9	1	1	1
6	9	3	4	1	0	3	7	4	5	1	1	1	1
1	8	9	1	2	4	1	6	7	0	7	1	1	1
2	6	3	4	7	3	1	6	4	1	1	1	1	1
9	0	5	8	7	4	7	6	8	1	1	1	1	1
8	9	3	0	4	8	1	5	5	4	7	1	1	1
2	5	1	3	1	4	8	2	2	9	5	1	1	1
1	7	1	2	0	9	0	1	1	6	6	1	1	1
8	7	1	2	7	4	2	1	7	5	6	8	1	1
0	1	5	5	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
9	2	7	9	3	1	7	9	6	5	0	7	1	1
6	1	1	7	9	2	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
6	0	0	6	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	7	0	2	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	3	5	1	2	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	3	0	1	6	1	6	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
2	4	0	1	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	1	9	4	7	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
5	1	7	9	1	7	2	0	9	9	1	1	1	1
7	2	6	2	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
7	1	7	4	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
0	2	1	1	5	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
9	5	2	1	9	3	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	3	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
5	1	6	9	9	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	6	9	5	6	7	5	6	1	1	1	1	1
8	0	1	5	8	5	6	7	0	2	2	1	1	1
1	8	6	0	6	3	4	1	2	3	1	1	1	1
7	5	6	9	0	9	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	6	0	1	5	6	5	6	3	1	1	1	1	1
6	2	9	2	1	0	8	2	3	9	1	1	1	1
7	7	9	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	9	7	0	7	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	8	9	9	5	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
7	4	2	7	8	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	6	7	5	1	3	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	8	7	1	2	7	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	6	0	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
9	1	5	0	7	6	1	2	3	9	6	1	1	1
8	1	5	8	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	2	9	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	5	0	0	2	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
9	0	0	9	9	1	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
7	5	0	6	1	3	8	4	1	1	1	1	1	1
7	3	6	1	1	3	3	9	4	1	1	1	1	1
9	2	2	1	1	1	5	9	8	1	1	1	1	1
6	1	9	4	1	2	0	9	7	6	1	1	1	1
4	5	1	7	1	2	0	2	7	5	5	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	1	7	1	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	1	7	1	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
7	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	2	7	5	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	2	1	0	4	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

FIGURE 2. SECOND TRANSPOSITION TABLEAU, WITH DISRUPTIONS

Number One From Moscow

Number One From Moscow




FIGURE 3. THE CIPHER TEXT AS FOUND IN THE NICKEL.

that Russia achieved victory over Japan in World War II. It is written numerically in the Continental style: 3/9/1945. Its last digit, 5, indicates the position from the end of the message of an inserted arbitrary keygroup, presumably a different one for each message. In this message it is 2 0 8 1 8. The first five digits of the date, in Line B following, are subtracted from this keygroup (Line A) by modular arithmetic (without borrowing the tens digit). The result is Line C.

Line A	2 0 8 1 8
Line B	3 9 1 9 4
Line C	9 1 7 2 4

Then the first 20 letters of a line from the Russian popular song "The Lone Accordion" are divided, in Line D, into two sections of ten letters, and sequential keys are derived for each part in Line E. Under the key for the first part is written, in Line F, the subtraction result of Line C, chain-added out to ten digits. Under the key for the second part is written a standard numerical sequence, 1, 2, 3, . . . 0. The first parts of Lines E and F are added modulo 10 to yield Line G.

Line D	Т О Л Ь К О С Ы Ш	Н О Н А У Л И Ц Е Г
Line E	7 4 2 0 1 5 6 3 9 8	6 8 7 1 9 5 4 0 3 2
Line F	9 1 7 2 4 0 8 9 6 4	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
Line G	6 5 9 2 5 5 4 2 5 2	

Then each digit of line G is located in the standard sequence of Line F and replaced by the number in Line E directly over it. The result of this substitution is Line H, which becomes the priming series for a chain addition that begins in Line K and proceeds—in rows of ten digits each—through lines L, M, N, and P.

Line H	5 9 3 8 9 9 1 8 9 8	
Line J	3 7 2 4 8 9 1 5 0 6	
Line K	4 2 1 7 8 0 9 7 7 2	
Line L	6 3 8 5 8 9 6 4 9 8	13+4=17 (tableau 1)
Line M	9 1 3 3 7 5 0 3 7 7	13+1=14 (tableau 2)
Line N	0 4 6 0 2 5 3 0 4 7	
Line P	4 0 6 2 7 8 3 4 1 1	

The widths of the two transposition tableaux are found by adding respectively the eighth and ninth numbers—or perhaps the last two dissimilar numbers—in Line P to the agent's personal number, in this case 13. The first tableau will therefore have 17 columns and the second 14.

*The full phrase is the following:
Только слышно на улице где-то
Одинокая бродит гармонь.

Number One From Moscow

The sequential key derived in Line J from Line H indicates the column sequence for a vertical transcription from the block formed by Lines K through P. The digits that result from this transcription, in Lines Q and R, become the breeder keys for the two transposition tableaux. They are repeated at the top of Figures 1 and 2 respectively, followed by the sequential keynumbers derived from them.

Line Q 9 6 0 3 3 1 8 3 6 6 4 6 9 0 4 7 5
Line R 3 0 2 7 4 3 0 4 2 8 7 7 1 2

Finally, a sequential key is derived in Line S from Line P.

Line P 4 0 6 2 7 8 3 4 1 1
Line S 5 0 7 3 8 9 4 6 1 2

This becomes the sequence of digits used as the coordinates for the checkerboard.

In 1956 Hayhanen's personal number was changed from 13 to 20, so that the width of the transposition tableaux was increased and their reconstruction thereby made slightly more difficult. In addition, the chain-added block was deepened by one row to increase the randomness of the digits that become the breeder keys for the transposition tableaux.

Evaluation

What can be said of the cryptographic merits of this cipher? That it is eminently secure was demonstrated by the FBI's inability to solve the nickel message. The system derives its great strength from complications introduced into a combination of two basically simple methods, monoalphabetic substitution and columnar transposition.

The complication in the substitution is the straddling device in the checkerboard. Ordinary checkerboards, having no unkeyed rows, produce two-digit equivalents for all plaintext letters. Here the irregular alternation of single and double coordinates makes it hard for a cryptanalyst to divide the running list of numbers into the proper pairs and singletons, a division which is of course prerequisite to the reduction to plaintext. A division entirely into pairs would straddle the correct equivalents (whence the term "straddling" in the cipher's technical description). Furthermore, this irregu-

Number One From Moscow

larity undoubtedly increases the difficulty of reconstructing the transposition tableaux.

The complication in the transposition is the disruptions in the inscription of the second tableau. Their purpose is to block any attempt at reconstructing the first tableau. In the solution of ordinary double transposition, once the difficult job of reconstructing the second tableau is completed, the cryptanalyst can immediately proceed to the first with the premise that its columns will be found in the rows of the second. But the D areas forestall this direct attack here by mixing a part of one such column with a part of another. The cryptanalyst must sort out the columns before he can reconstruct the first tableau, and this sorting is a formidable task.

The keying method of this cipher adds to its cryptanalytic resistance. The long series of calculations performed in the key derivation results in a series of virtually random numbers whose lack of pattern makes it difficult for the cryptanalyst to reconstruct the original keys and thus get clues for the solution of subsequent messages. Even more important is the arbitrary five-digit group introduced at the start of the key derivation. It affects the derivation so strongly that keys with different groups would bear no apparent relation to one another. Since this group was apparently different for each message, and since each agent presumably had a different set of mnemonic keys, no two messages of all those sent out from Moscow by this system to secret agents all over the world would ever be keyed the same. Cryptanalysts, whose work becomes harder as they have less traffic in a single key, would have to attack each message separately.

Finally, the bisection of the message makes it harder for the cryptanalyst to find and exploit stereotyped beginnings and endings.

The system also has a number of operational advantages. First, the individual operations are easy and rapid, minimizing the chance of garbled messages. Second, the cipher text runs only about half again as long as the plain, not twice as long, as it often does in high-security pencil-and-paper systems. This reduction from the usual doubling is effected by the use of single coordinates in the checkerboard for high-frequency letters, for which the keyword is specially chosen.

Number One From Moscow

The keyword ЧЕРТОНА includes the most frequent letter in Russian (О, with 11 percent), four other high-frequency letters (С, Н, Е, А) and two low-frequency letters. The seven account for 40 percent of normal Russian text, so that the cipher text should average 60 percent longer than the plain. (The nickel message is 62 percent longer.) The relative reduction means briefer communications, with consequent lowered risk of detection.

Third, the most important and unusual operational advantage of the cipher is the way an entire encipherment can be developed from four easily memorized items. The agent must also know, of course, the procedure for deriving from these the final keys, but this does not appear very hard to remember. Each step seems to lead to the next in much the same way that one portion of a piano piece leads to another. No spy cipher of comparable security that achieves this feat of mnemonics is known. To a spy, who lives in fear of sudden raids and searches, a cipher system that requires no betraying memoranda is a boon. Ironically, however, Hayhanen—or his superiors—did not trust his memory: when he arrived in the United States he carried microfilm notes on his cipher in case he forgot what was so easy to remember!

For all the impressive security of this cipher, it is not theoretically impossible to reconstruct the second transposition tableau in correct form for deriving a first tableau whose rows would yield the required monoalphabetic frequency distribution, and when this were done the monoalphabetic substitution could be solved with relative ease. Once the system were known and with a large volume of traffic in it, an electronic computer might be able to run through the billions of trials needed for a solution. But that a single message could have been solved while the system itself remained unknown is highly unlikely. The weakening of frequency characteristics caused by the way it uses the numbers and the obliteration of repetitions by the thorough transpositions leave virtually no clues for the cryptanalyst.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES

THE MANIPULATION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR. Edited by Albert D. Biderman and Herbert Zimmer. (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons. 1961. Pp. 323. \$7.95.)

For all its sweeping title, this collection of seven scientific essays is specifically concerned, according to its editors, with "the application of scientific knowledge to . . . the interrogation of an unwilling subject," and it should therefore be like manna to the intelligence interrogator starving for scientific aid. Instead, it is a cruel mirage, for two chief reasons. The first of these is that the several authors, each having in mind some different and undefined concept of what interrogation is, rarely approach what the intelligence interrogator means by the interrogation of a resistant subject. The editors admit that some of "the contributors to this book were not themselves highly conversant with interrogation practises"; the lamentable fact is that they display a range from unrelieved illiteracy to mitigated ignorance about interrogation. The second reason is the lack, which they complacently acknowledge, of virtually any experimental evidence to substantiate their vague extrapolated conclusions.

Writing about "The Physiological State of the Interrogation Subject as it Affects Brain Function," Lawrence E. Hinkle Jr. implicitly holds up the interrogation of prisoners of war as typical of all interrogation of resistant subjects. He concludes that "a man is best able to give accurate information when he is in an optimal state of health, rest, comfort, and alertness, and when he is under no threat. This would seem to be the optimal situation for interrogation." Whatever the validity of this statement with respect to a positive interrogation seeking, say, scientific or technical information, it has no application to a counterintelligence interrogation in which the sole initial purpose is to make the interrogatee tell truthfully whether he is or is not a KGB spy. Whatever his state of health, he is not likely to be unable to communicate this simple fact correctly, if he will.

Recent Books: Psychological

Philip E. Kubansky's paper on "The Effects of Reduced Environmental Stimulation on Human Behavior" describes several experiments in which sensory stimuli were reduced by placing subjects in water tanks, iron lungs, etc. Samples were frequently small (one experiment used only two subjects); the period of sensory deprivation was almost always brief (sometimes a total of three to ten minutes); and the subjects knew that they were in the hands of reputable scientists and could end the confinement or isolation whenever they wished. The resemblance of such experiments to the treatment imposed by a Communist security service is that of a lap dog to a gorilla. Recognizing this gulf, the writer says, "There are no experimental data . . . on the relationship of isolation and deprivation to the amount and accuracy of information which can be obtained when under interrogation. . . . [The experiments conducted to date] have remained within the limitations posed by ethical considerations and have not pushed subjects to their ultimate limits." Science cannot add to knowledge about the interrogation of resistant subjects by such a delicate, humane, and tentative probing of its harsh aspects.

Louis A. Gottschalk, writing on "The Use of Drugs in Interrogation," tells us much about drugs but little about interrogation under narcosis. His chapter is one of the three best because he makes a consistent effort to relate his data to his stated subject. But he too is plagued by a lack of immediately relevant experimentation: "When one examines the literature for experimental and clinical studies that bear directly on the use of drugs in interrogation procedures, one finds relatively few studies." Therefore he has to rely on unscientific reports about the interrogation of criminal suspects and scientific findings which may be interpreted as meaning this or that about interrogation but lead to no firm conclusions.¹

R. C. Davis' essay on "Physiological Responses as a Means of Evaluating Information" deals with the polygraph. Its primary evidential basis is an experiment conducted at the University of Indiana nine years ago. It advances three possible explanations of the measurable physiological changes which

¹Dr. Gottschalk's findings are reviewed in greater detail in Intelligence Articles V2, "Truth' Drugs in Interrogation," p. A1ff., especially pp. A7-A10.

Recent Books: Psychological

sometimes accompany lying but concludes that "present knowledge is not sufficient to lead to a decision on which, if any, of these three theories is correct." Dr. Davis seems to know what he is talking about when he says:

The intelligence interrogation, however, has certain peculiarities. Studies directed specifically to these distinctive problems would be required for more reliable conclusions regarding the applicability of findings from previous experimentation to practical employments in intelligence interrogations.

But soon he gives us a glimpse of what he thinks an interrogation is:

One may suppose that the person questioned, typically, will have little personal involvement in information sought. The questions frequently will not be about something he has done or for which he feels responsible or guilty. He may or may not know what information is important to his interrogator. Perhaps he is not very deeply motivated to conceal the specific items of information. . . .

It would be a pleasure to hear Colonel Rudolf Abel's opinion of this passage—or the opinion of his U.S. interrogators.

"The Potential Uses of Hypnosis in Interrogation," by Martin T. Orne, is an honest and thoughtful attempt to discuss scientific understanding of hypnosis in relationship to interrogation.² But this chapter shares with its predecessors a lamentable lack of directly relevant observation and experimentation. Dr. Orne says, "There is an utter dearth of literature concerning the actual use of hypnosis in interrogation. Either this technique has never been used, or if it has, no one has chosen to discuss it in print." The reader wonders why Dr. Orne, himself a hypnotist, has not conducted some research on this subject, for his suggestions are sometimes intriguing. It occurs to him that an interrogator armed with some facts about the subject, facts that the subject does not know him to possess, might turn them to good advantage:

The informant could be given a hypnotic drug with appropriate verbal suggestions to talk about a given topic. Eventually enough of the drug would be given to cause a short period of unconsciousness. When the subject awakens, the interrogator could then read

²See Intelligence Articles IV 1, p. 37, ff., for other discussion of this subject.

Recent Books: Psychological

from his 'notes' of the hypnotic interview the information presumably told him.

He also suggests that an interrogatee who is consciously resistant could be placed in circumstances conducive to hypnosis, without being hypnotized. His submerged desire to divulge what the interrogator wants to know, in order to escape stress, could persuade him that he is or was hypnotized and thus provide him with a rationalization for capitulating. But, after a cogent discussion of other possibilities, Orne concludes that "there is no direct evidence that such techniques have been or will be employed by interrogators nor any evaluation of their effectiveness."

Why isn't there?

In the sixth chapter, written by Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton and entitled "The Experimental Investigation of Interpersonal Influence," we encounter first the drear familiar fact that the evidence to be reviewed is not really related to interrogation: "The relevance of this review for the problem of the volume rests on the validity of the assumption that the dynamics of influence operate beyond the range of intensity of conflict which has been studied experimentally." We are further disheartened upon learning that the experiments discussed are unrelated not only to interrogation but also to reality: "Many of the experiments reviewed . . . have employed . . . conditions that are extremely artificial. As a result, conformity or resistance may develop under conditions that bear little resemblance to actual situations." A typical experiment:

Jenness used initial individual judgments of the number of beans in a jar to assign students with initially divergent estimates and those with initially similar estimates to groups of three members and four members respectively. After discussion to arrive at a group estimate, the variation among individual judgments was reduced more in the three-member than in the four-member group.

The relevance to interrogation is indeed a little obscure.

The last chapter, "Countermanipulation through Malingering," by Dr. Malcolm L. Metzger, shares with those by Dr. Orne and Dr. Gottschalk two characteristics rarely found in the others—a sensible use of English and an interest, however inept, in interrogation. Dr. Metzger discusses the possible

Recent Books: Psychological

feigning of mental illness to avoid, delay, or obfuscate interrogation. But he too has found that his topic lacks experimental underpinnings:

There is as yet little empirical work which would aid in the prediction of the persons and the circumstances which might combine to produce a simulation of psychosis. . . . The more specific question of the type of person who will attempt to simulate the role of the psychotic has not been investigated experimentally.

Explaining that *The Manipulation of Human Behavior* was intended to communicate scientific information to scientists, its editors presumptuously remark, "If the present study also receives the attention of interrogators, it may offset their tendency to adopt the sensational stereotypes of interrogation on which many of them appear to have modeled their practice in the past." The book has received the disappointed attention of intelligence interrogators, who conclude that they had a right to expect more substantial support from the scientists. Perhaps the failure of this prolonged exploration of a scientific void will be obvious enough to stimulate experimental efforts to fill the void. And if this review, addressed primarily to intelligence specialists, should (to paraphrase the editors) also receive the attention of psychologists and psychiatrists, it may offset their tendency to rely on the unexamined stereotypes of interrogation which many of them appear to have used as the basis for their theories in the past.

THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM. By Robert Jay Lifton. (New York: W. W. Norton. 1961. Pp. 510. \$6.95.)

COERCIVE PERSUASION. By Edgar H. Schein with Inge Schneider and Curtis H. Barker. (New York: W. W. Norton. 1961. Pp. 320. \$6.75.)

Several years ago a group of American scientists—psychologists, psychiatrists and neurophysiologists—who were trying to develop an understanding of the Russian and Chinese methods of obtaining false confessions, compliant behavior, and the apparent conversion of beliefs interviewed a veteran member of the State Security apparatus of an Eastern European nation. They asked him what, in his opinion, had been the

Recent Books: Psychological

greatest contribution of the Russians to the techniques for handling political prisoners. "The ideological approach," he replied without hesitation. The Americans had assumed that the effectiveness of these methods was due to skillful scientific design; the Communist had no doubt that ideology was the important factor. Both views were fundamentally incorrect, but the difference between them was illuminating. Crucial to the understanding of the whole phenomenon of so-called brainwashing is an understanding of the frames of reference of those who carry it out and of those who are subjected to it.

The techniques which in the West have acquired the misnomer brainwashing and in China are more aptly called "thought reform" are now known to have evolved out of Communist beliefs and practices, out of Russian and Chinese cultural institutions, and out of police and legal procedures. There is no evidence that psychologists, psychiatrists, neurophysiologists, or scientists of any sort played any significant role in their planning, development, or execution. Nor is there, on the other hand, any convincing evidence that these methods were deliberately created by party functionaries according to a theoretical design derived from Communist ideology, although there is an extensive Communist rationale behind their use and a set of reasonable theoretical explanations have been put forward to justify all that is done. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that they evolved pragmatically, empirically, and to some extent *sui generis* in response to the military and political needs of the Russian and Chinese Communist parties over the past half-century.

A person confronted with imprisonment in a Communist country on the charge of crimes against the state or with a period of indoctrination as a prisoner of war may approach the experience with a set of expectations utterly different from those of his captors. This unpreparedness, which makes him more vulnerable than he need be, to a certain extent explains some of the unexpected performances of Westerners in the hands of the Russians and Chinese. The Westerner may find himself enmeshed in institutions, laws, and regulations which look familiar but do not operate according to his expectations. It is not simply that he is not prepared for the definitions of "crime," "evidence," and "leniency" which he will

Recent Books: Psychological

encounter; he is not prepared to understand the functions of his interrogator, his guards, his teachers, and his judges. Most of all, he is not prepared to be assailed on moral grounds for his past acts and present points of view, and to be assailed, in apparently logical and sometimes devastating terms, by earnest and dedicated men who profess many of the high ideals to which he himself subscribes. Indeed, much of his experience, whether in prison or in indoctrination, is concentrated on learning the point of view of the other side; and this is presented to him so incessantly and with so little opportunity to get independent information that it is very difficult for him not to come away with some appreciation of it, whether he accepts it or not.

The current areas of argument about "brainwashing" center on the extent to which prisoners, civil or military, accept the point of view thus pressed upon them and the extent to which they do so regardless of their intentions. The procedures of thought reform are carried out in a setting which makes it very difficult for the prisoner not to produce some sort of confession and also, if the situation demands, some evidence of conversion, but the extent to which he must accommodate against his will is still debated. The two books here considered are major contributions to our understanding of these and similar questions. Both of them are concerned with the Chinese thought reform program. Both focus upon the procedures used in civilian prisons but give some attention to those applied to the Chinese population in general. Both provide extensive documentation for the origin of thought reform practices out of the needs of the People's Liberation Army in the two decades before the Communist accession to power, along with liberal evidence of the peculiarly Chinese contributions to these practices and of their ideological background. Every intelligence officer who is concerned with the Communist management of people or engaged in the study of present-day China should read these books.

He will find that the case histories in Dr. Lifton's book provide peculiarly vivid pictures of the experiences of Western missionaries and business men and of Chinese intellectuals in the course of thought reform. He should be stimulated to serious thought by the chapters which describe the complex social and political processes that seem to have made

Recent Books: Psychological

greatest contribution of the Russians to the techniques for handling political prisoners. "The ideological approach," he replied without hesitation. The Americans had assumed that the effectiveness of these methods was due to skillful scientific design; the Communist had no doubt that ideology was the important factor. Both views were fundamentally incorrect, but the difference between them was illuminating. Crucial to the understanding of the whole phenomenon of so-called brainwashing is an understanding of the frames of reference of those who carry it out and of those who are subjected to it.

The techniques which in the West have acquired the misnomer brainwashing and in China are more aptly called "thought reform" are now known to have evolved out of Communist beliefs and practices, out of Russian and Chinese cultural institutions, and out of police and legal procedures. There is no evidence that psychologists, psychiatrists, neurophysiologists, or scientists of any sort played any significant role in their planning, development, or execution. Nor is there, on the other hand, any convincing evidence that these methods were deliberately created by party functionaries according to a theoretical design derived from Communist ideology, although there is an extensive Communist rationale behind their use and a set of reasonable theoretical explanations have been put forward to justify all that is done. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that they evolved pragmatically, empirically, and to some extent *sui generis* in response to the military and political needs of the Russian and Chinese Communist parties over the past half-century.

A person confronted with imprisonment in a Communist country on the charge of crimes against the state or with a period of indoctrination as a prisoner of war may approach the experience with a set of expectations utterly different from those of his captors. This unpreparedness, which makes him more vulnerable than he need be, to a certain extent explains some of the unexpected performances of Westerners in the hands of the Russians and Chinese. The Westerner may find himself enmeshed in institutions, laws, and regulations which look familiar but do not operate according to his expectations. It is not simply that he is not prepared for the definitions of "crime," "evidence," and "leniency" which he will

Recent Books: Psychological

encounter; he is not prepared to understand the functions of his interrogator, his guards, his teachers, and his judges. Most of all, he is not prepared to be assailed on moral grounds for his past acts and present points of view, and to be assailed, in apparently logical and sometimes devastating terms, by earnest and dedicated men who profess many of the high ideals to which he himself subscribes. Indeed, much of his experience, whether in prison or in indoctrination, is concentrated on learning the point of view of the other side; and this is presented to him so incessantly and with so little opportunity to get independent information that it is very difficult for him not to come away with some appreciation of it, whether he accepts it or not.

The current areas of argument about "brainwashing" center on the extent to which prisoners, civil or military, accept the point of view thus pressed upon them and the extent to which they do so regardless of their intentions. The procedures of thought reform are carried out in a setting which makes it very difficult for the prisoner not to produce some sort of confession and also, if the situation demands, some evidence of conversion, but the extent to which he must accommodate against his will is still debated. The two books here considered are major contributions to our understanding of these and similar questions. Both of them are concerned with the Chinese thought reform program. Both focus upon the procedures used in civilian prisons but give some attention to those applied to the Chinese population in general. Both provide extensive documentation for the origin of thought reform practices out of the needs of the People's Liberation Army in the two decades before the Communist accession to power, along with liberal evidence of the peculiarly Chinese contributions to these practices and of their ideological background. Every intelligence officer who is concerned with the Communist management of people or engaged in the study of present-day China should read these books.

He will find that the case histories in Dr. Lifton's book provide peculiarly vivid pictures of the experiences of Western missionaries and business men and of Chinese intellectuals in the course of thought reform. He should be stimulated to serious thought by the chapters which describe the complex social and political processes that seem to have made

Recent Books: Psychological

the phenomenon possible in China. More than that, he may be disquieted by what Dr. Lifton refers to as the "psychology of totalism" in non-Communist manifestations and the psychological attractiveness of closed systems of thought in the world at large. It should be clear to the reader, although the author does not press the point explicitly, that an open society makes very serious psychological demands upon its citizens in valuing a variety of modes of thought and not only accepting but even encouraging a diversity of political, social, and moral judgments. Although some citizens of a totalitarian society are vulnerable to skepticism, some members of an open society are vulnerable to their own need for certainty, especially if certainty is presented to them in attractive terms.

Dr. Schein's careful documentation of the background of thought reform will also be useful to intelligence officers. His painstaking analysis of the possible psychological mechanisms involved, however, will illustrate the degree of perplexity which still besets the scientific world when it is called upon to explain "brainwashing" in scientific terms. One trusts that after the reader has studied these books, he will not accept too glibly any statement by any author which proposes to explain the phenomenon through simple physiological or psychological concepts. The unresolved questions of the mechanisms of confession, compliance, and indoctrination are not technical or military secrets of the cold war, but scientific problems unsolved within our limited understanding of the bases of human behavior. The evidence is that the Russians and Chinese understand them no better than we, and the reader will do well to be skeptical of any man who professes to have a simple answer to them.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

THE ROAD PAST MANDALAY. By John Masters. (New York: Harper. 1961. Pp. 341. \$5.00.)

One of a series that will constitute an autobiography, this volume covers the author's life as staff officer and field commander in the Indian Army during World War II. It is a sensitive and authentic narrative of love and work and play and battle. Militarily, its main theme is, as the title indicates, the Burma campaign, and the crucial point of this is the action behind Japanese lines of the Chindit 111 Brigade during the first half of 1944 in the area south and across the Mogaung from the synchronous operation of the U.S. Galahad force, popularly known as Merrill's Marauders, which culminated in the siege of Myitkyina.¹

The story's interest for the intelligence officer is therefore that of unconventional warfare. It parallels and is comparable with Charlton Ogburn's account of *The Marauders*² in highlighting the peculiarities of this kind of operation and in vivid recollection of humanly impossible endurements, ill appreciated by rear echelon staffs. It acknowledges that the Marauders got more value for their spilled blood than the Chindits did. Speaking from a higher command level than Ogburn, John Masters permits himself a more critical appraisal of top commanders. In Orde Wingate, founder of the Chindits (and by extension of the Marauders), he sees both virtues (sense of mission, original ideas, excellent planner) and failings (narrow vision, poor tensile strength, uneven as field commander). Most of the British commanders he admires, sometimes with reservations; but he views the American Stilwell with unreserved dismay, first for his anglophobia and second for his insistence on using the unconventional long range penetration groups, both the Chindits and Gala-

¹For a Galahad commander's account of this campaign see Charles N. Hunter's "Galahad: Intelligence Aspects," *Intelligence Articles* V 1, p. A1 ff.

²New York, Harper. 1959.

Recent Books: Unconventional Warfare

had, too much like regular forces. He even imputes to Stilwell a malevolence toward the unconventional units:

Stilwell and his stuffed baboons (a Marauder's phrase), having disposed of their American infantry, their best fighting force, turned their attention to us. "*Galahad is shot*," Stilwell had noted in his diary, with understandable triumph. His next target was not hard to guess.

Stilwell aside, the moral pressed by Masters, in chorus with Hunter, Ogburn, and others who have written with authority on the unconventional campaigns in Burma, is a double one. A force trained and equipped for mobile hit-and-run tactics behind enemy lines should not be diverted to regular positioned warfare, whether in siege or in defense; perhaps you can cut rope with a razor blade, but at best you ruin the blade for shaving. And the unconventional operation, at least as practiced in Burma in 1944, requires from the fighting men a supreme effort that cannot be maintained for long stretches; after three or four months under its enormous strains they are indeed "shot" and need to be relieved.

BEEFSTEAK RAID. By *Edward Boykin*. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1960. Pp. 305. \$4.95.)

In September 1864 Grant was at City Point in front of Petersburg, Virginia, after he had been deprived in June of a quick capture of the then relatively undefended city by an incredible series of blunders on the part of inept subordinates. As Commanding General of the Army of the United States he had located his headquarters near that of George Meade's Army of the Potomac. Opposing them in the Petersburg trenches was Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.

The two forces were experiencing some of the miseries of the trench warfare which was to become so extensive in World War II. But on the one side the Union force was well equipped and amply supplied, while on the other the Confederates were beginning to suffer shortages and even hunger. To keep the Yankees supplied with fresh meat, some 2,500 beeves were held in a giant corral at Coggins Point on the James River. And therein lies the story of the "beefsteak raid," in which Confederate cavalry leader Wade Hampton led a strike force on

Recent Books: Unconventional Warfare

a ride that covered 125 miles behind Union lines to capture the herd and drive it into Confederate territory.

The raid was made possible by a Confederate group known as the "Iron Scouts" who holed up in Blackwater Swamp and carried out guerrilla and espionage operations behind the Union lines. It was George Shadburne of the Iron Scouts who spotted the herd, saw how carelessly it was defended, and persuaded Wade Hampton to make the try. Meantime an agent of Lee's, protected by Reid's Rangers of Surry County, tapped the Union telegraph line down the James and kept the southern forces apprised of all Union activities.

Fascinating as such subject matter should be to intelligence officers, this book is disappointing. Mr. Boykin gets so involved in setting the stage that he devotes most of the book to it. The effort against the Union telegraph lines is given only a chapter. George Shadburne and the Iron Scouts fare somewhat better. The story is rather spotlily written and gives the impression of superficial research.

DANIEL MORGAN: Ranger of the Revolution. By *North Callahan*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1961. Pp. 342. \$5.)

Military intelligence officers debate at length these days whether a commanding officer needs to have included in his background a tour of duty in intelligence work in order to have a sufficient appreciation of intelligence. Major General Daniel Morgan, of the Virginia militia, Continental Army, and Army of the United States, was one commanding officer who, as he went up the ladder from a wagoner for the British to a corps commander, had a great variety of intelligence experiences, ranging from scouting and spying and handling agents to making genuine (and brilliant) intelligence estimates.

Morgan, whose role in a war dominated by the Olympian figure of George Washington has never been properly appreciated, had an amazing life. Born in New Jersey in 1736, he migrated to the Shenandoah Valley, drove a wagon for the British Army in Braddock's ill-conceived expedition against the French and Indians in 1755 (and incidentally received 500 lashes for striking a British lieutenant the next year), fought the Indians around Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1774, organ-

Recent Books: Unconventional Warfare

ized the Frederick County Company of Virginia riflemen for the Continental Congress in 1775, and then marched them to Cambridge, Massachusetts, and on to Quebec, where he was captured in Benedict Arnold's desperate Christmas storming of the city. After parole and exchange, he was given command of the 11th Virginia Regiment—known later as Morgan's Rangers—which harassed Cornwallis in New Jersey and then performed brilliantly in the battles of Saratoga in 1777. Morgan reached his greatest heights when his corps routed Banastre Tarleton at the battle of Cowpens on January 17, 1781. His participation in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1793 and membership in the 5th Congress from 1797 to 1799 were anticlimactic.

This book does not do real justice to Morgan's work in intelligence and in guerrilla operations. It does acknowledge, on page 123, that he was Washington's eyes and ears:

At this point, Morgan was evidently engaged in some spying activity as well as his regular duties, for he wrote Washington that he had taken a man whom he believed "to be a great villain, but I believe some intelligence may be had from him, as he has free access to New York City. . . . If he will be faithful, he may be of good use to us, as the enemy has entire confidence in him, and if he should play the double game, he can't hurt us much."

He also used deception through false documents on this occasion. And author Callahan notes that it was Morgan's Rangers that closely followed the movements of Sir Henry Clinton as he moved his forces from Philadelphia to New York in 1777. But we will have to await a later biographer to do full justice to one of the great American exponents of guerrilla warfare.

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

SPY RING. By John Bulloch and Henry Miller. (London: Secker and Warburg. 1961. Pp. 224. \$3.00.)

Although uneven in point of accuracy, this book is recommended as a readable and imaginative account of the espionage operation, publicized early this year in England, in which Gordon Lonsdale and the Krogers obtained and sent to Moscow important information on underwater detection techniques being developed for the British and for NATO at the Admiralty Underwater Weapons Establishment in Portland.

After an introductory chapter recounting the final surveillance and arrest of Lonsdale and his agents Harry Houghton and Ethel Gee in the vicinity of London's famed Old Vic Theater on 7 January 1961 and describing the arrest of Peter and Helen Kroger at their home later that same day, the book launches into a series of biographic sketches of the principals in the case; and an interesting lot they are—Lonsdale, the Soviet intelligence officer masquerading as a Canadian-born businessman; the Krogers, who as Morris and Lona Cohen had earlier been linked with Soviet agents Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Rudolf Ivanovich Abel in the United States; Houghton and Gee, the mercenary procurers for the net. The authors delve into the background, motivation, and activities of each in turn. Combining fact with speculation, they have produced character studies which, although sometimes perhaps a bit overdrawn, offer real insights into the minds and actions of the conspirators. This technique holds the reader's attention right through the denouement of their behavior at the hearing and trial.

Interwoven with the biographic sketches of the spies are descriptions and photographs of the paraphernalia of espionage found in their lodgings. Talcum powder cans with secret compartments, hollowed-out cigarette lighters, flashlights with fake batteries, high-powered radio receivers and transmitters—these and many other devices make their appearance as the story unfolds. Although details about such accouterments are often slighted, the descriptions are complete enough to give the lay reader an authentic picture of the nuts and bolts of a Soviet espionage operation. In combination

Recent Books: Clandestine

with the elaborate provision of false documentation and backgrounds for Lonsdale and the Krogers, these devices illustrate the ingenuity and professionalism of Soviet intelligence and the deadly earnestness with which it pursues its tasks.

If the authors of *Spy Ring* had confined themselves to biographic character sketch and operational case history, this book could have taken a place on the top shelf of the fast-growing public library of intelligence literature. They also attempt, however, to provide background information on Soviet intelligence as a whole and to relate the Lonsdale case to this background. In so doing they reveal their own inexperience in this field and seriously impair the value of their book. They err badly, for example, in saying that "the Russian intelligence services all come under the direction of one department, the Soviet State Security Service." They say that Lonsdale was working for Soviet Naval Intelligence, whereas in fact he was a staff agent of the civilian KGB. They say he headed the main Soviet spy organization in the south of England, but the theories they advance concerning his other supposed nets, while interesting, have no facts to support them. They inaccurately—and dangerously—suggest that the Soviets have shifted away from use of official installations for espionage cover purposes. There are many other errors and distortions, especially in chapters 17, 18, and 19.

The detailed information and sophisticated comment on the Lonsdale case included in *Spy Ring* suggest that the authors had in addition to newspapers and other public sources some measure of assistance or guidance from officials concerned with the case. In view of the British decision to give the affair maximum publicity, one may even suspect that the book was officially inspired. If so, however, it is odd that such errors as it makes concerning the overall structure and practices of Soviet intelligence were permitted to stand.

THE LOST FOOTSTEPS. By *Silviu Craciunas*. (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy. 1961. Pp. 318. \$4.75.)

Few political prisoners have escaped in recent years from Communist jails deep within Iron Curtain country and made their way to freedom in the West. Ironically, but not surprisingly, those who have find themselves greeted with is-this-

Recent Books: Clandestine

a-double-agent? incredulity, especially if, like the author of this autobiographical account, they were previously engaged in clandestine work. As far as can be determined from open sources, Silviu Craciunas has won official acceptance for his story in the United Kingdom, where he now resides. Thus there seems to be justification for accepting the main outline of his adventures, and his narrative may become more convincing when the parts of it left blank or fictionalized to protect his contacts can be filled in.

Trained in law and economics, Craciunas was a promising young industrial executive, active in the Rumanian resistance to Communism, until nationalization deprived him of his positions in 1948. He then went underground and continued to participate in resistance activities, especially the organization of escape routes; but increasingly close calls with the police soon forced him to arrange his own escape from the country. In 1949 he made his way through Hungary and Austria to Vienna and eventually to Paris, where he took up work with Rumanian émigré groups. In the fall of 1950, however, at the urging of émigré leaders, he smuggled himself back into Rumania to organize an integrated resistance and to establish new escape routes. He was about to return to the West via a reopened route when he was captured by the security forces in Bucharest. Interrogated and tortured for four years without, he claims, divulging his main secrets, he finally managed to slip his guards at a hospital, elude his pursuers, and, with phenomenal luck and the help of many whom he had earlier befriended, make good a second escape to the West in 1957.

Craciunas' over-all picture of active but increasingly cowed resistance in Rumania is of intelligence interest. Also significant is his account of the background and final days of the Vladimiresti convent, a unique institution which became a focal point for Rumanian nationalist feelings, holding out against the Communist regime until 1956. Craciunas himself was then using it as a hideout, and he narrowly escaped capture during the Communist takeover.

The book is written in a dramatic style that may make some incidents seem more consequential than they were in fact. The interrogation methods it describes seem surprisingly primitive for the 1950's; and nevertheless one suspects

Recent Books: Clandestine

that the author may not have been so successful in resisting interrogation as he himself believes. Definite statements on certain aspects of the story, such as what contacts there were between official agencies of the West and the émigré groups which sponsored Craciunas' return to Rumania, would bolster its authenticity, but such statements are not likely to be possible until the dust of several more years has covered *The Lost Footsteps*.

A44

CRYPTOLOGY

CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE SINGLE COLUMNAR TRANSPOSITION CIPHER. By Wayne G. Barker. (Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle. 1961. Pp. 140. \$7.50.)

This book is a reading "must" for all men of good humor. It can honestly be said that we perused it with ever-increasing delight. We take up our pen, more in sorrow than in anger, mindful that no review of such a work can be adequate. The book must be seen to be believed.

The treatment in many cryptologic writings is too laconic, assuming too much background on the part of the average reader; Mr. Barker's, on the contrary, is remarkable for its painful elaboration of the perfectly obvious. His preface introduces the volume as a textbook presenting "a comprehensive course of study covering the single columnar transposition cipher system," but it neglects to warn that the exposition is tailored to the level of a not-too-bright seventh-grader with a language handicap. The equivalent of this 140-page treatment of the narrow subject has been covered by established authors in one-tenth the space or less: Lange and Soudart devote 6 pages, Baudouin 10, Eyraud 11, Sacco 11, Gaines 14, and Givierge all of 15 pages to it. Even a ponderous work by two government experts covers the same ground in 7 pages.

The technical content of the book may be characterized as one big lacuna riddled with many gaps, but its most striking attribute is its incredible English; if we hadn't known better, we could have believed that it was written by a Japanese graduate of a correspondence course in the language. It abounds in tautologies, circumbendibusses, periphrases, grammatical errors, and just plain syntactical ignorance. The probing of the mysteries of the division of 96 by 13 on pp. 12 and 13, followed by the remark, "Let's take another look at this division, since it is so fundamental"; the comparison on p. 18 between alphabets written horizontally and those written vertically, together with a philosophical question on this point on p. 23; the meticulous demonstration given on pp. 24 and 25 of the manner of placing the first letter in a frequency distribu-

A45

MORI/HRP PAGES A45-A46

Recent Books: Cryptology

tion—this sort of thing raises stupidity from mere talent to a fine art.

The high point of the book is the "Index." Here we may correlate "Art, column matching is an, 59, 114" with "Science, column matching is not a, 59, 114"; and we may sip the nectar on each page, discovering for ourselves unbelievable entries such as the following:

Adjacent letter, definition of, 110.
Blindness of cryptanalyst, 69.
Cryptanalyst, "good" fortune of, 106.
Difficulty of reading plain-text without word divisions, 14-15.
"Don't give up!" advice to the student, 59.
G, letter occurs in only one of the 100 most frequent trigrams, 108.
"Good fortune" as a factor in solution, 106.
Least resistance, cryptanalyst's desire for path of, 117.
Letter occurring most frequently in English, 17, 23.
Literal key, recovery not within scope of text, 34.
Mechanical, column matching is not, 59.
Quotient, 120.
Vowels, which letters constitute, 21.

The last entry, pencilled lightly in the reviewer's copy, reads "Wretched, writing of text, 1-140."

What makes the whole performance particularly depressing is that the author is not an amateur; he was a member of the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service in Washington and in India during World War II. The book, printed in Japan, costs \$7.50 per copy, and it is labelled sanguinely, "First edition." It is without question the worst work in any language on a cryptologic subject this reviewer has had the good fortune to examine. It is available in your office library.

A46

THE WARTIME RESISTANCE

EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS 1939-1945. Presentations at the *First International Conference on the History of the Resistance Movements*. (London: Pergamon Press. 1960. Pp. 410. 40/—.)

The First International Conference of which this is the record was held in Belgium in September 1958. The papers presented include a keynote address reviewing the broad course of the Resistance (and quite cutting in its resentful depreciation of American help) and several studies exploring each of five of its particular aspects—resistance in Germany and Italy, the psychological war, Jewish resistance, the maquis and other guerrillas, and the role of the Allies.

Of more current interest than the content of these papers is the East-West political battle that has developed over the interpretation of the history of the Resistance. To the First Conference historians from Russia, Poland, and Yugoslavia as well as from appropriate countries of the West had been invited, and they had originally agreed to attend. At the last minute, however, the delegations from the three Communist countries decided not to come, the Poles and Russians because invitations had also been extended to General Bor-Komorowski, leader of the Polish underground army at the time of the Warsaw uprising, and to some of his colleagues associated with the wartime government-in-exile in London. The Yugoslavs did submit a paper on their partisans' struggle, and it is included in the volume.

The First International Conference has now been followed by a second, held in Milan, Italy, on 26-29 March 1961. This time the USSR and all its European Satellites, including East Germany, sent delegations. The "London Poles" were apparently not invited. No formal invitation went to any historical or official group in the United States, but five U.S. scholars were in attendance. At the Second Conference the Bloc presentations showed a well-planned and concerted effort to rewrite the history of World War II and its resistance movements in terms of Communist dogma, claiming for the USSR and the Communist parties the largest share of credit for the liberation of Europe and support of the Resistance.

A47

Recent Books: Resistance

Through all the Bloc texts and speeches ran a major theme—namely, that the main purpose of the Resistance was not primarily to aid in the military defeat of the Axis forces and to liberate the occupied territories (as the Bloc charged the British and Americans viewed it), for this was being accomplished in any event by the military might of the advancing Red armies. The “anti-popular” European governments which had been in power at the beginning of the war had, according to the Bloc thesis, abandoned their people and the fight against fascism, and this abandonment made necessary the creation of resistance movements in which the “progressive” masses of the people, led in large measure (although admittedly not completely) by the Communists and the workers, could participate. And the overriding purpose of these movements, in the Communist view, was to make certain that the “anti-popular and reactionary” regimes did not return after the liberation to oppress and exploit the workers and the masses. In short, the Bloc aim at the conference was to downgrade the military aspects of the Resistance and its Anglo-American and other non-Communist elements, picturing it as a social mass movement which the USSR well understood and fostered and in which the Communists proudly played the dominant role.

In their corollary effort to discredit the part played by the West, and particularly by Great Britain and the United States, in the Resistance, the prepared Bloc texts and speakers made the following salient points:

That the “phoney war” of 1939-40 was a direct Anglo-French continuation of the spirit of Munich, in an attempt to direct the German aggression against the USSR and thus consolidate the Anglo-French postwar position (As a rebuttal to the Western charge that the Communists had not participated in the war or the Resistance during the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact, the Bloc asserted that the war was then not a “just” war; only after the German attack in June 1941, when the USSR could participate in a true anti-Hitlerian coalition, did it become a “just” war, a “peoples’” war against fascism.); That the United States and Great Britain supported only the reactionary political regimes of the European govern-

Recent Books: Resistance

ments-in-exile and the reactionary elements of the resistance movements, with the ultimate aim of preserving the Anglo-American political and economic position in Europe after the victory was won; and that they failed to support, and thus alienated, the true aspirations of the anti-fascist and progressive masses of the people;

That the British and the Americans utilized the Resistance almost exclusively for military and intelligence purposes, without regard for its true purposes and the real interests of the people;

That the West gave little material support to the resistance movements; and

That the West opposed the organization of Resistance forces.

The Western delegates met this challenge head on and did not give an inch. Although their argumentation probably did not convince a single Communist, no Communist argumentation gained any ground either. Each Communist charge was countered by a Western speaker. When the Bloc threw Munich at the West, the Hitler-Stalin pact was thrown back in reply. When they charged failure to help the Resistance, the failure of the Soviet armies to move at the time of the Warsaw uprising was thrown back at them and the Katyn massacre heaped on for good measure. Attacks on the British were effectively rebutted. A blanket invitation from the Communist-dominated Fédération Internationale des Résistants to attend an identically named “International Conference on the History of the Resistance” now scheduled for April 1962 in Warsaw will find no takers among responsible Western historians, who seem to have no disposition to support another joint conference of this kind.

The Bloc’s fantastic claims regarding the Communist role in the Resistance, its depreciation of the non-Communist resistance and Anglo-American aid, its arrogation of the supreme role to the Soviet Union—all this one tends to dismiss as “doublethink” written in “Newspeak.” But one must remember that what the Communists were saying in Milan was just a sample of what they are spewing out in their official histories and papers and books. These are being translated into many languages and are being sent all over the world. They need to be countered. The West cannot leave the his-

Recent Books: Resistance

tory of the war and the Resistance to the Communists. A true historical picture must be drawn, and it must get circulation behind the Iron Curtain and in the uncommitted nations of the world. From the standpoint of the Milan Conference, this is the unfinished business of the West.

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100050001-9