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

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By special dispensation the usual $500 prize was augmented so that each winner could be given $200.

Economic intelligence's contribution to strategic warning of Soviet surprise attack.

ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS AS WAR INDICATORS

H. C. Eisenbeiss

The Soviet Union, being the only country with enough military capability to constitute a serious threat to U.S. power, is the principal focus in the intelligence effort to give warning of any deliberate all-out attack on this country. Under prevailing conditions as of the mid-1960's, economic intelligence can contribute to this effort in a number of important ways. The USSR has elaborate civil institutions whose main purpose is to facilitate the transition of the economy from peace to war: they provide for stockpiles of all kinds of goods, industrial and agricultural, and maintain the administrative apparatus needed to integrate industrial and transportation facilities into a military effort. The Soviet civil defense program is already extensive and would undoubtedly be augmented in the event of imminent hostilities. Finally, a variety of economic problems would hinder the Soviets from undertaking the kinds of massive action called for by their military doctrine except after a great deal of advance preparation; the transportation system, most notably, operates at close to capacity under normal loads.

It is true, however, that economic intelligence has a diminishing role in today's early warning process. Under conditions that prevailed immediately before World War II, or even the Korean war, logistics were frequently more important than either weapons systems or tactics, and the potential of economic intelligence for strategic warning was correspondingly great. But as such current military concepts as "zero-reaction-time" long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and "instant-ready" airborne armies approach realities, information on the slow build-up of a logistical base contributes less toward determining whether, or where and when, the technically advanced weapon systems are to be used. It is nevertheless to be expected, since the maintenance of "instant readiness" will be very expensive in this era of rapid technical advance, that economic intelligence will continue to be useful for strategic early warning.

In the USIB Watch Committee's monitoring of war indicators Communist China, though a poor second to the USSR, remains of considerable concern for a variety of reasons. These reasons include a very large army, a regime which sometimes talks as if it considers war an enjoyable pastime, an inclination toward what Mr. Kent calls the "dramatically wrong decision," [1] its proximity to the Nationalists' offshore islands and Taiwan itself, its Indian adventure in 1962, and the expectation of its eventually producing nuclear weapon systems. Today, however, it not only lacks modern weapon systems, but the ability of its economy to support a sustained effort by its massive but obsolescent ground force is, at best, in doubt. The achievement of a significant modern military capability will require a large and successful industrial program, one as much concerned with production of basic commodities (e.g. high-grade steels and technically complex chemicals) as with military equipment proper. The economic intelligence officer charged with strategic warning of hostile Chinese action against the United States will be preoccupied with the regime's progress toward such a program for some years to come.

Civil Defense [2]: the MOG

It could be argued that with present collection capabilities civil defense is the best bet as source for successful strategic warning of Soviet intention to start a big war. Furthermore, it seems probable that the potential for collecting civil defense information of the warning type will improve.

Although the Soviet civil defense program seems to have changed policy several times since the war, and although there are grounds for debate over its exact size and effectiveness, there is no question that it is large; in comparison with those in the West it is enormous, involving millions of people. Whether the current policy calls for urban blast shelters or urban evacuation plus fallout shelters makes no great difference in its value for warning. Either way, the public has to know what it is supposed to do, when to do it, and where to go. The best of security is not likely to conceal even the earliest of the massive public actions that go with the declaration of a "special period" of possible imminent hostilities. Urban evacuation, moreover, presently an integral part of Soviet policy, requires several days.

The program is as complex as it is large, and it appears to stipulate detailed procedures for every part of Soviet society. These details are one of the reasons that it offers good opportunities for the collection of strategic warning information. In Moscow they include such seeming minutiae as relocating to the suburbs fire engines stationed in the central city, removing national treasures (probably including Lenin's body) for safekeeping, preparing for window-by-window blackouts, and probably even making "final disposition" of carnivorous, poisonous, and obstreperous residents of the zoo. So long as persons friendly to the United States can move about in Moscow, we have simple, inexpensive, and reliable collection devices—such as an embassy wife airing the heir—to give us the crucial information on implementation of civil defense procedures.[3]

A *Moscow Observer's Guide,* assembled by the National Indications Center, covers the possibilities for simple physical observation at times of crisis. The MOG was used during the Cuban missile crisis, and in retrospect it can be said to have proved a useful tool. One defect in the performance was notable, however: an ominous sign—distribution of gas masks before the eyes of U.S. personnel on one of the upper floors of the Foreign Ministry building—was reported by the highest priority cable, whereas reports of negative indications—neither Lenin nor the live inhabitants of Moscow, neither fire engines nor ferocious animals ever left their normal quarters—arrived by slow boat, or not until personnel returning to Washington underwent an end-of-tour debriefing. Next time it would help to know in Washington which items in the MOG had been checked and which of these conveyed "no information," which were normal, and which ominous.

Prospects for increasing the MOG type of emergency collection appear to be improving. There is now an Indian consul stationed in Odessa; his cooperation would double (from 1 to 2) the cities covered. Then if a U.S. consular office opens in Leningrad the coverage could be tripled.

[1] Said of the Soviet decision to install strategic missiles on Cuba, *Studies* VIII 2, p. 15.

[2] Soviet civil defense has long been a concern of the economic intelligence officer because the present program began as an integral part of the postwar reconstruction of the Soviet economy. Today the Ministry of Defense and other institutions are heavily involved in the program, but the role of economic institutions also continues to grow.

[3] The simplicity, economy, and reliability of embassy wives emerges from comparison with other intelligence systems, not other wives.

Disaster Columns

Paramilitarized relief and recovery columns based in rural areas under the civil defense program offer another possible set of indicators. The task of these "disaster columns" is to move into a nuclear-devastated urban area and attempt to assist the injured, limit damage, and restore or salvage what they can. They are to get their personnel mostly from the farms, their transport and earth-moving equipment from farms and from construction projects. Similar city units to be evacuated in an emergency draw personnel and equipment from factories, utilities, and service groups. Both the Soviet press and secret intelligence suggest that the rural relief columns have not yet developed much beyond the planning and organization stage, but there has been recent public exhortation to increase efforts to equip and train them.

We have no source with a demonstrated ability to observe and report promptly an alerting of the disaster columns. Still, collection possibilities seem fairly good. The columns will directly involve large numbers of people. And if alerted they would disrupt the activities of even larger numbers by their claims for equipment on farms and construction activities. Thus the immediate task is to determine the procedures prescribed for the disaster columns as they are organized and trained, so that emergency collection requirements and means to meet them may be established.

The foregoing discussion may suggest that the prime task in day-to-day observation of the Soviet civil defense system is measurement of its alertness for near-term use. In fact, it is not. Although portions of the system have been alerted and exercised, there is no evidence of any national exercise having been staged, even one of a command-post type. The most widely held (but not necessarily the best) guess at the reason for this apparent shortcoming is that the Soviet population has a proclivity to read too much between the lines and might react in ways that would hurt, for example panic buying.

Over the years, in support of the National Indications Center and the Watch Committee, economic analysts have charted the slowly growing capabilities of the civil defense apparatus. They seek the answers to such questions as: "Does the disaster column program have a readiness date? Does it require the diversion of resources from some other user? How effective will the columns be?" In order to answer such questions as well as possible the collection and analysis of data on civil defense developments must be a day-to-day process rather than one concentrated on periods of crisis.

The overwhelming majority of the answers have, in NIC jargon, been "negative." That is, we have never (Cuban crisis included) discovered an urgent effort to achieve early readiness, peak at a given time, or otherwise meet a specific target date. It appears rather that the Soviet regime believes civil defense to be a necessary part of the balanced economic and military power base of the state which, like the other parts of that base, must more or less keep pace with general progress.

Suppression for Surprise?

What of the possibility of a surprise attack plan which omits any direct pre-action alerting of the civil defense apparatus? Summarily, such a plan is considered to be unlikely. Even if we ignore the strategic military reasons for using the civil defense system, whatever its capability (as well as the even more cogent military reasons for not meditating an attack at all under the present balance of forces), there remain a number of considerations against it.

Civil defense is an integral part of Soviet power. In some areas, when a regional military authority has conducted an air defense exercise, the regional civil defense mechanism or some part of it has also been exercised. The military authority can do this because civil defense is now a military responsibility. The regional military commander is trained to consider civil defense another of his many tools. Consequently, it appears that a decision to omit civil defense would be administratively as complex as a decision to cancel participation of aircraft in an air defense effort and leave the job entirely to missiles.

The military commander, however, does not bear sole responsibility for civil defense. The party, the economic bureaucracy, and the civil government each has its own responsibilities, chain of command, and interlocking liaison with respect to it. In order to omit civil defense from a surprise strike plan, positive instructions to prevent the execution of standing operating procedures would thus appear to be necessary at a multitude of geographic locations—would need to go to party officials, military officers, civil government bureaucrats, and managers of factories, and would need to go to many levels in each of these hierarchies. With so many people involved, the planners of the strike have a problem: would the security of the surprise be well served by an attempt to leave out civil defense?

Most important is the probability that the party leaders would not accept a military plan which excluded civil defense participation. One totally unacceptable result of such a plan might be the decimation or worse of the party while the military leadership remained relatively unimpaired. Another consideration of the Presidium ought to be the reaction of the surviving members of the populace, as well as of the party, if available civil defense facilities had not been put to use.

Above all, the party leaders remember the effects of World War II on Soviet industry and the prodigious logistic efforts required to fight the war and afterward to rebuild the economy and restore the culture. Even now the demographic effects of World War II present problems of labor force and military manpower. It is these memories and the dangers of nuclear warfare, not charity, that have caused the party leaders to expend the money, effort, and manpower to create a civil defense organization, along with strategic reserve and industrial mobilization systems.

To sum up, the Soviet civil defense program involves millions of people in a multitude of tasks. It is considered a basic component of national power, and there are strong reasons for expecting it to be activated even in connection with a planned surprise attack. Current collection systems are relatively inexpensive and reliable, and they are capable of timely reporting on the activation of at least some part of the system. Prospects for this reporting appear to be improving rather than diminishing. Let us now look at indicators in other economic fields that can be monitored with existing collection capabilities.

Transportation: Pre-attack Moves

Because the Soviet transportation system is usually operating at close to capacity, a major increase in military movements would disrupt normal traffic patterns. The operation of the system is consequently of great interest for strategic early warning. Moreover, because the bulk of transport is concentrated in rail facilities, the Soviets are concerned that the existing system might not give them the flexibility and service they would need after a war had begun, and schemes to remedy the projected shortcomings are probably also of value in pointing to possible indicators.

These propositions are not just wishful thinking on the part of U.S. intelligence officers. The July 1961 issue of the Soviet journal

Military Thought (secret edition) contained an article which discussed military transport in much this light. The author was quite concerned lest the West be tipped off to any imminent action against NATO by the total disruption of normal freight when reinforcements were moved to the western front. He proposed, in order to allay this danger, that a large proportion of normal movements be continued and the reinforcement trains mixed in as a minor part of total rail activity over several weeks.

From the Soviet viewpoint the problem of concealing this westward reinforcement of the ground armies, a necessary action under the "balanced force" concept, is complicated by the difference in gauge between Soviet and European railroad tracks. At each border crossing point, paired tracks of the two sizes parallel one another in order to facilitate train-to-train transloading. These transfer yards have grown slowly but steadily, and some now reach many miles both east and west of the Soviet border.

Surveillance of the routes, crossing points, and yards in the western USSR and abutting parts of eastern Europe should reveal by direct observation the reinforcement of the armies facing NATO. For indirect acquisition, information useful to the strategic warning process should be available to a number of railroad men, bureaucrats in economic administration, and plant officials on both sides of the border. These people would quickly be aware of an either general or partial embargo on civil freight or passenger traffic, and many of them could determine whether it resulted from military usage of the system.

Wartime Capability

Soviet military planners also appear to be much concerned about the difficulties their transportation system will face in providing the required service after the start of a war. A variety of measures intended to strengthen it have been proposed, some of which would offer opportunities to collect early warning information. Because some of the measures could also serve purely economic ends, however, both collectors and analysts must treat them with care.

A central organization for the control and direction of all forms of transportation would increase the efficiency, flexibility, and recuperability of the Soviet system. With central direction, priority freight could be more rationally shuttled among various routes and carriers

and around bottlenecks and damaged facilities; repairs could be organized in better accord with national priorities. The intelligence officer concerned with strategic warning therefore watches constantly the administration of Soviet transport. Centralization, subordination to the Ministry of Defense or a supraministerial body, and military staffing of either the operating or directing levels of transportation administration are considered possible moves that would have meaning for early warning.

A wide range of physical improvements in peacetime have also been suggested as means to strengthen the wartime capacity of Soviet transport. At one end of the range these consist simply of more facilities, especially of kinds other than railroads—more pipelines, more and better roads, improved canals, and more double tracking. Less grandiose proposals are for road and rail bypasses around cities, alternative bridging, and extension of Soviet-gauge track farther into eastern Europe. Proposed emergency measures include road trailers to move rail cars across breaks in rail lines, stocking of reconstruction materials in the vicinity of probable Western priority targets, and last-minute evacuation of transportation equipment from target areas.

We do not know which of these proposals might be implemented in preparation for an anticipated war. Economic development requires that some of them—the "Friendship" oil pipeline into eastern Europe, for example—be acted on without particular regard to their military utility. Others, particularly evacuation of transport equipment from target areas, would be either very expensive or so disruptive of normal military and civil activity that they are unlikely. But if evacuation did occur, it would be an unmistakable sign that large-scale hostilities were imminently expected.

Finally, in addition to land transportation, the intelligence officer must follow Soviet merchant shipping and civil aviation. Normality in the deployment and occupation of the merchant marine has been a comforting phenomenon during past crises. Sometimes the Soviets have moved ships out of an area of immediate danger, but they have not put them in safe havens. If they really mean business one would expect them to move at least some ships to home or friendly ports. As to aviation, almost as many high-performance air transports are operated by Aeroflot as by U.S. air carriers. These planes plus the military air transports provide a substantial airlift potential, and so any unusual activity in Aeroflot needs to be identified.

Thus transportation, like civil defense, should be featured in a list of activities that under existing collection capabilities could provide useful, perhaps conclusive, strategic warning information.

Strategic Reserves

Over the years the Soviets have quietly created a vast and expensive system for maintaining strategic stockpiles. It is administered unobtrusively and with unusual care from Moscow by the Chief Directorate of State Reserves, apparently directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. Its object is support for a war effort. It was used for the initial effort in the Korean war.

For this purpose the Directorate administers and operates stores of foodstuffs, raw materials for industry, semiprocessed materials, finished manufactures, medical supplies, fuels, spare parts, construction materials—some of almost everything. It is not the only operator of storage facilities in the Soviet Union: the Ministry of Defense has depots; factories and distributors hold limited inventories; economic and political administrative institutions keep some stocks. But State Reserve inventories are probably by far the most important. They were designed, for example, to enable the economically deficient eastern littoral of the Soviet Union to operate for extended periods without the aid of the vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Under Khrushchev the rules governing the withdrawal of materials stored in the facilities of the Directorate were relaxed to allow use in easing the effects of natural disaster and economic abnormalities—in June 1964 Tass noted that farmers lacking seed were being supplied from state reserves. But the primary purpose of the system—strategic reserve for war—remains. Withdrawals from stock are not a routine bureaucratic procedure; high officials must rule on each individual release and approve the replacement schedule. Accounting procedures, including physical inventory, are apparently stringent. The refreshing process, putting old stores into service and replacing them with newly procured goods, seems to be pursued with care.

As long as the Chief Directorate of State Reserves exists it must be presumed to have a role in any Soviet plan to start a large war, and it may have one to play in limited war. In recent years, however, the value of this knowledge to the indications process has been slight because the intelligence community lacks a source for timely and detailed information on actions of the institution. The USIB's Economic Intelligence Committee reaffirmed in 1964 that development of such

a source is one of the first-priority requirements for economic information. Prospects for filling this requirement are uncertain.

Industrial Mobilization

Another unique Soviet institution (or perhaps set of institutions) is designed to coordinate the efforts of industry and transport in filling wartime military needs. It is most easily explained in terms of the pre-1957 economic administration because there was information on its operation then. Prior to 1957 the Soviet government ran the economy through a series of ministries based in Moscow; there was an oil ministry, an aircraft production ministry, an ocean fleet ministry, etc., sometimes close to fifty of them. Each ministry was subdivided into departments, some functional, like supply or finance, some product-oriented, e.g., fighter aircraft production, and some geographical, as eastern area oil exploration.

Now each ministry had also a military affairs office called the "Military Mobilization Department," and the administration of each factory, railroad section, river fleet, or other activity had a similar subdivision under one of a variety of names—mobilization section, special department, secret department. These two, the ministry department and the factory department, had a number of different responsibilities, depending on the kind of ministry or facility it was in. For example, at plants which had been converted after the war to the production of agricultural implements instead of small arms and ammunition, the responsibility of these departments included maintenance of an ability to switch back to arms—the required equipment, limited quantities of raw materials, and personnel with the right skills. Another responsibility was to keep track of the draft status of the employees in order to assure that quotas for draftees and for skilled production personnel would both be met. It was the factory departments that handled classified documents at the plant level.

Like all Soviet institutions, these were required to submit many reports. The instructions for some of the reports, which have come into the hands of U.S. intelligence, clearly assumed that these units would be deeply involved in the Soviet actions precedent to initiation of any major military action. In some instances they were the channel through which the civil defense readiness of the plant was reported to the ministry in Moscow and would have been the channel for reporting the effect of enemy military action on the plant. The intelligence officer concerned with economic activity in the Soviet Union presumes that these units will continue to play a considerable part in any Soviet preparations for war.

Again, as reflected in the 1964 updating of EIC priorities, the intelligence community needs a source. In at least one of the few economic ministries that retain more or less their pre-1957 form, the units continue to exist and to function. Soviet attitudes and procedures being what they are, the continuity of the system would be assumed without any evidence at all, but there is some indication that units at the factory level also continue to exist. A source is now needed for much more basic information than the alerting of the system. We need to reidentify its parts and rediscover its procedures after the constant shuffle of industrial administrative bodies since 1957. Prospects for such a source do not appear very bright.

The four activities discussed above (strategic reserves, the industrial mobilization system, civil defense, and the transportation system) are the ones that the economic intelligence officers in CIA consider the most likely to be productive for indications purposes. They are the fields that are kept under constant review for the National Indications Center, subject of course to what the quantity and quality of reporting are at any given time. The list of four, however, by no means exhausts the economic phenomena from which early warning indicators may be derived. Indeed, they may not even be the most important.

General Economic Activity

At least some economists turned intelligence officers believe that their most important contribution to the warning process is the continuing analysis of the totality of Soviet economic policy; they believe that a Soviet decision as important as to go to war will be reflected in a variety of broad economic developments. These might include great changes in the share of investment resources going to support military activities, in the division of construction activities between projects offering a relatively quick return and those having a slow return over a very long period, in the proportion of total goods available assigned to people for consumption and to industry for investment opposed to that available for military forces, in the way the annual addition to the labor force is divided up, and in the assignment of priorities among the various claimants in the economy.

Other intelligence officers, including economists, arguing that data on general economic policy is too imprecise to be of great value for early warning, point out that conclusions reached in the last 10 years

or so via this route have regularly been that the Soviet Union is hell-bent for peace. The fact that there has been no global war in this period does not demolish the objection: in late October of 1962 economists involved in intelligence were not likely to be making arrangements for a winter vacation in southern Florida, even though the evidence from Soviet economic policy suggested that it would be reasonable to do so.

Strictly, it can be claimed only that the total economic picture should tell us what the potential enemy ought to be considering if he is rational, not what he will necessarily do. The Chinese Communists, for example, would be unable at present to sustain a massive military operation over an extended period, but Mao and friends might still start one. At times, nevertheless, the total economic view can be fairly conclusive. In late 1963 and up to Khrushchev's fall in 1964 a variety of sources, secret and public, have given evidence of a Soviet economic policy so clearly reflecting peaceful intent that it should prevail even in the face of fairly strong contrary evidence.

In practice, the National Indications Center and the Watch Committee have been interested in Soviet economic policy only as background for the week-to-week examination of more direct indicators. Though this practice may seem to neglect an important part of the total picture, there are valid reasons for limiting broad economic policy to a background role. The information on which judgments about this policy are based is more often than not obtained from open Soviet sources and is therefore subject to manipulation by the Soviets. It also requires interpretation, which can be a long and involved process, and frequently it is not timely enough for indications purposes. Material in open sources becomes available when the Soviet publisher is ready, not when the economic intelligence officer needs it.

Bottleneck Intelligence

Under this heading one can collect the unending flow of reports on shortages of particular kinds of equipment and materials in the Communist world. The warning watchman is traditionally interested in the bottleneck because it might reflect a diversion of the commodity in question from normal to military use ("Lucky Strike 'green' has gone to war!"). A typical example might be the periodic Soviet shortages of petroleum products, generally diesel fuel or bunker oil. The bottleneck report of a commodity specialist is generally his most frequent contact with the indications process. All such reports are carefully reviewed for indications implications.

The commodity specialist himself, however, is not likely to consider bottleneck intelligence a very useful input for strategic warning. Because the Communist economies are continually trying to get from available resources the maximum output and because these resources frequently do not stretch as far as the planners had scheduled them, shortages are a permanent part of all economic systems like the Soviet. The specialist might even find it more disturbing if all references to shortages among the commodities he watches disappeared from the Communist press; the disappearance might be a reflection of tightened security, which in turn might suggest some dark intent. Moreover, a confirmed or admitted shortage in a commodity which he had estimated to be in good supply might move the analyst rather to question his previous estimates, all too often based on inadequate sources, than to suspect a diversion to military usage.

Most investigations of bottlenecks as indications turn out like one made at the request of a congressional leader who had been told that the Soviet purchases of Canadian and U.S. grain reflected very high military consumption of alcohol (industrial) rather than a crop too small to feed the population. The gist of the intelligence reply was that even if Soviet military use of alcohol exceeded U.S. military use by 10 times it would still consume only about three percent of Soviet alcohol output, far too little to require large grain imports.

In the light of his experience the commodity analyst thus properly looks first to the economy rather than to hostile intentions for the explanation of all shortages. Even when he cannot find an economic explanation he remains reasonably sure that there must be one. That he still looks carefully for indications implications in each new shortage does credit to his integrity, for he feels like a man examining clams for pearls.

And Others

A myriad of other possible economic events might theoretically provide valuable indications information, but limits on collection capabilities and on the ability to generalize from fragmentary information (like data on one activity at one facility at one point in time) severely reduce the logical possibilities.

A large "unknown" area in the potential utility of economic intelligence for strategic warning is covered by the items in the General Indicator List which refer to relocation of plants, increased output in armament plants, and changes in the pattern of industrial output. The validity of such indicators and to some extent the prospects of

collecting information on them would depend on what assumptions were made as to the kind of war plan the USSR might settle upon. There is little precedent in the history of such activities to serve as a guide for early warning; some redirection of economic effort occurred during (but not before) the Korean war.

In practice, there are only a few additional economic areas of occasional concern, even as background, to the NIC and the Watch Committee. Economic developments in the GDR are of considerable background value for strategic warning. In particular, the level of interzonal trade has over the past several years been a good gauge of the intensity of Communist feeling on the Berlin issue. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the Group of Soviet Forces Germany could be put to extended use without the support of the GDR railroad net, which is sometimes hard pressed to handle normal loads and therefore could not move greatly increased military traffic without cutting off its civil customers.

The varying priorities accorded Communist agriculture are also of background value. For an extreme example, the periods when significant number of troops are engaged in digging potatoes or moving wheat seem unlikely to bring war. At other times the Soviet Union is involved in one of its chronic reorganizations of economic administration (such as that being prepared in the fall of 1962), with inevitable disruptive effects on command, output, and supply flows, aggravated by infighting for position in the new scheme. That such a reorganization is in progress does not preclude war, of course, but it does indicate strongly that the possibility of war is not preempting the undivided attention of party and government leaders.

Construction projects are of occasional concern in early warning. Information on important projects is sometimes available with little time lag, and analysis of the purpose, priority, and cost of the effort may then be of significance.

Finally, merchant shipping and related information provided in late July and early August of 1962 the initial indisputable evidence of a drastic modification in Soviet policy on Cuba. On 29 August the Watch Committee concluded that "at the least, recent deliveries indicate a significant Soviet effort to improve the defensive military capabilities of the Cuban regime." This conclusion was made possible primarily by the collectors and collators of information on commercial maritime shipping. Were the Soviets again to try such a build-up in an overseas location, shipping information might again provide strategic warning.

Some observations on the hazardous duty of conveying early warning in political and other "soft" areas of intelligence.

ON WARNING

Keith Clark

The capabilities of U.S. intelligence have improved markedly in the course of the last fifteen years or so, but in the same period expectations about what it ought to be able to accomplish have probably grown even faster. This is natural enough, and probably professionally salutary for those who ply the trade, since most people need demanding requirements to keep them up to the mark. In any case, the government spends a great deal of money to equip itself with good intelligence and is rightly impatient with anything less than the best. But the situation does carry irritations and hazards for the professional. It is comparable to that in modern medicine, wherein improvement in techniques and medications, by giving rise to anticipation of consistent success, makes occasional failure a doubly grievous matter.

And by some standards intelligence fails more than occasionally, since it is considered in many quarters to have fallen down on the job if there takes place anywhere in the world an important, or sometimes even mildly interesting, political event which it had not heralded in advance in a way to make the warning stick in the minds of its consumers. We are all familiar with the queries and the resulting search of the record to find out whether top officials had been warned of such and such a development prior to its occurrence, and if not why. The short answer is often that these officials had indeed been warned, sometimes repeatedly, but won't admit it. This is the one likely to jump to the tongue of the participant in the post mortem, whether intelligence collector, analyst, or estimator: he had reported a week or a month ago that coup plotting was afoot in Ruritania and the government's position was shaky, so nobody should have been surprised when it was thrown out last night.

Whether or not anyone should have been surprised, however, the fact is that they often enough were surprised, and so inclined to ask why. Except in a narrow and not very profitable way, the

On Warning
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analyst or estimator cannot meet the question by pointing out that an estimate or a current intelligence daily "covered" yesterday's big event when it noted weeks or months ago the possibility of a coup in Ruritania. Too often that report has been forgotten in the intervening stream of intelligence issuances and other papers or their equivalent in briefing sessions. Unless the consumer has been informed recently, and with sufficient emphasis and impact to make it stick, he has not in an effective sense been warned.

The following observations on this subject are intended neither as a defense of the intelligence community's record nor as definitive analysis and solution of the difficulty. The problem of crisis anticipation and early warning will continue with us, I suspect, despite the recurrent efforts of this computer age to gear up machines for effective and reliable prophecy in these soft areas of intelligence; here art, old-fashioned expertise, and a judicious amount of imagination still count for more than science. But while these reflections can offer no new secret insights or intellectual breakthrough, it may nonetheless be useful in a professional journal to record some guidelines and techniques derived from experience in asking the questions, if not always giving the right answers.

Varium et Mutabile

The obvious first consideration is that the world itself is a chancey and uncertain place, in which change, sudden or gradual, is more the rule than the exception. One need only compare the world today, or any one area of it, with what prevailed 10 years ago to get a measure of the flux we live in. Technology, altering the lives and the thinking of men everywhere, has been accelerating the pace of even the most massive historical trends, the kind that used to take decades to work themselves out. To take one conspicuous example: with some stretching of the historical imagination one can imagine a colonial revolt against imperialism getting under way a century ago and gaining wide support in various parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but one can scarcely picture such a movement winning hands down, but for a few isolated spots, in little more than a decade. Yet this is what has happened in the last 15 years, and the accompanying turbulence has generated some of the principal problems for U.S. foreign policy and intelligence during most of our official careers.

In this world and this period of history, the intelligence analyst and his customers are going to be nearer the mark if they think of change as more or less constant, and the main question as being not whether but when and how it will manifest itself. Unless proven otherwise, it should be assumed that a given society is changing daily. We face a semantic pitfall in the possibility of inferring from the overworked term "stable" or "stability" that things are remaining static; this attribute is often ascribed to a kind of mere surface calm below which change and flux are going on all the time.

If accepting the fact that change is normal and widespread predisposes us favorably, it still does not begin to solve the problems arising from what we have to work with in forecasting a particular change. In most cases the raw material of the evidence is necessarily fragmentary and inconclusive, and as it is rounded out it normally becomes not the stuff of early warning but news of current events. A number of things contribute to the poor quality of evidence on future developments.

One is the sheer impossibility of keeping track of the moves of every individual, organization, or government that may be in a position to change things in some part of the world. This difficulty is compounded when the success of the move for change depends on the ability of the promoters to keep it secret. If the coup plan that gets leaked is the one most likely to be frustrated by its enemies, it follows that a lot of such impending moves that have been reported either do not come off or go quite differently than anticipated. No one in the early-warning business can afford to overlook such reports in his own calculations, but some of them are going to prove ill founded by reason of the same lack of secrecy that led to our getting them.

There is also the intrinsic element of caprice in the affairs of men and nations. Some events cannot be predicted because the principals seize sudden opportunities to act or are reacting to sudden stimuli, unforeseen and quite often unforeseeable by those on the spot. If the participants themselves could not have predicted the turn of events, the most sensitive and pervasive of intelligence systems would not be likely to do better. It is probably a salutary sign of awareness of such limitations that the unanticipated fall of Khrushchev was not followed, at least to my knowledge, by stern admonitions to the intelligence [illegible] its procedures and sharpen its sense of urgency.

Shotgun and Pinpoint

For those charged with intelligence warning there is of course a simple and appealing solution to these dilemmas—to point the gun in all possible directions. Warning always of everything gives you a technical defense against the charge that you failed to provide warning; it is also likely to lose you most of your readers or listeners and beat the remainder into a state of permanent hysteria or hopeless apathy. It is doubtful that anyone could be got to read an estimate or current intelligence paper big and fat enough to cover all the dire possibilities, and it is certain that the inflationary effect of this course on the value of intelligence warning would be ruinous.

A cardinal principle of effective warning intelligence, then, has to be selectivity. Selectivity involves rejection, and rejection involves risk. If intelligence is to eschew the shotgun approach in the interests of being read and respected, it will have to pick from the voluminous mass of often fragmentary and sometimes contradictory data a limited number of items to pass along, and sometimes what it rejects will later prove to be important. The hope is that the error will be corrected in time by the receipt of information supplementing or shedding new light on the rejected item and so promoting it out of the rejection category. Or perhaps another, better or luckier human mind will encounter the same fragment of information and respond more sensitively and perceptively—hopefully well in advance of the event it foreshadows. In the best of circumstances, however, selection will occasionally eliminate something that subsequently proves to have been important stuff. It is the argument of this essay that an occasional miss of this type is preferable to the overprudent shotgun alternative.

Criteria: Likelihood

Now even a highly selective warning system will have to deal in possibilities more often than in probabilities or near-certainties. Reasonable prudence requires that a government be prepared, at any given moment, to cope or at least live with a number of contingent possibilities only some of which will in fact materialize. If something *could* happen, it had better be borne in mind, whether it will "probably" happen or not. This being the case, some fairly substantial proportion of the warnings delivered will in the event prove exaggerated or will otherwise not be borne out by subsequent developments. (Sometimes the fact that a warned-of development fails to come off may be due to U.S. action triggered by the warning; here intelligence has done its job to perfection even as its prophesies fail to come true.)

Errors on the side of caution are less harmful than neglect of warning, but they are not harmless. A false alarm will normally be overlooked or forgiven much more easily than a failure to call the shot on something that does happen; but both are errors and both ought to be on the consciences of those in the warning business. Most of us recall with acute pain instances in which intelligence failed to forecast something that did occur. A review of the dangers and opportunities warned of that did *not* materialize may give less pain but is still sobering.

Importance

The area between these two kinds of error thus represents one of the criteria in the process of selection—degree of likelihood. The standard is admittedly a fuzzy one. A second criterion offers somewhat solider ground, namely the importance of the matter being warned of. It is often, though not always, easier to judge how significantly some contingency would affect our interests than how likely it is to occur. Common sense and a reasonable familiarity with the scope of our government's interests and activities usually enable us to tell whether some foreseeable event would be of critical, great, moderate, little, or no importance to national or departmental interests. In any case the policy makers' judgment on this score can supplement our own.

The complexity and many responsibilities of a government like ours suggest that very few foreign developments would fail to be of concern to some department or program. As a criterion for warning selection, then, the question of importance probably refers less to whether than to whom to warn and how. Some predictions should have top billing in national intelligence publications or briefings, others more subdued treatment in departmental or specialized issuances. The criterion is thus most usefully relevant to selection for briefings and publication at the highest levels.

It is this writer's subjective and purely personal opinion that the application of more vigorous standards in this respect would have a salutary effect on the bulk and readability, and hence on the impact, of most intelligence publications, not excluding the national esti-

mates. An urge for completeness and detailed perfection is a good thing, but sometimes an inordinate amount of time and energy is spent in perfecting presentations of detail which can make no earthly difference to policy decisions but confront already overburdened readers with more information than they want or need to know. This is not an argument for either carelessness or super-finality but a plea for the classic virtues of brevity and concentration on the essential as still useful in our line of work.

Imminence

The criteria of likelihood and importance for determining whether, how, and to whom to give early warning are supplemented by a third, that of imminence, which is most relevant to the choice of *when* to warn. This timing is often of critical importance, for policy makers are as human as the rest of us and busier than most. On the higher levels they are subjected to a mentally exhausting barrage of publications and briefings on a host of subjects, and in the daily round of attending to inescapably urgent things, some of the rest are going to be remembered and some are not.

Selection in the light of imminence is a matter of avoiding unacceptable extremes, warning too early or too late. Logically it might seem the earlier the better, giving as much time as possible to do something about it, but this logic leads to presenting a catalog of all kinds of important things that may or are likely to happen eventually. Though it is unquestionably desirable to look ahead, in appropriate context, with a general prediction of developments that seem ultimately probable, our problem here is a pointed particular warning at a time when something can and should be done about it.

Even the most prudent and forward-looking administration cannot give as serious attention to a problem foreseen five years ahead as to one shaping up next week. It is not just that something postponable is crowded off the stage by real and present dangers; there is often little that can or should be done about some foreseen events until they are closer at hand. There is always the chance that the contingency will not arise when expected or not at all.

It is true that in addition to delivering specific warning at the right time, intelligence has a responsibility to keep its consumers sufficiently aware of the remoter contingencies, of what Walt W. Rostow recently described as "the relevance of the less obvious."[1] It has to do this without dulling their senses or straining their patience with frequent laundry lists of all imaginable horrors. I confess it is much easier to state this problem than to offer any but the most banal answers. One line of procedure, however, while more the result of evolution in the art of policy making than of intelligence innovation, does offer the intelligence officer some help. I refer to the increased emphasis in recent years on isolating and studying very long-range policy problems—issues of a sort which may not require U.S. counter action for several years to come. It may be debated whether the policy lines worked out in these exercises will in most cases be followed when the moment for action comes—certainly it will not be just a matter of lifting a ready-made "courses of action" formula out of the files—but the long lead-time concept is salutary for policy planning, and its acceptance makes the job of intelligence warning a few degrees easier and conceivably a bit more fruitful. In an uncertain world perhaps we can't ask for much more.

[1] In a lecture on "The Planning of Foreign Policy," given at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and published in *The Dimensions of Diplomacy* (E. A. Johnson, ed., Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1964).

Some precepts for the practical application of an esoteric art.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION

C. N. Geschwind

The general topic of interrogation is a vast one, opening into all fields of theoretical and applied psychology and leading at its distant limits in one direction to the wellsprings of human nature and in another to the roots of political power. The specialized form we call counterintelligence interrogation—that done to secure information on a hostile intelligence service and the cooperation of the subject with a view to neutralizing it—being a more subtle art than the interrogation, say, of ordinary prisoners of war or criminal suspects, has ramifications almost equally far-reaching. The ordinary intelligence officer cannot begin to master the enormous body of literature on the topic.[1]

Because of this and because a really first-class talent for interrogating—as for managing people in general—is a rarity, what is needed as a matter of practical reality is a simplified doctrine and standard procedures that officers of average ability can follow. The soaring doctrines of the theorist and the virtuoso have to be brought down to earth and confined to what will work for you and me. This kind of simplification has been performed in several guides and manuals.[2] What I want to discuss in this article are selected aspects of counterintelligence interrogation which have been slighted or in my opinion simply require highlighting.

Managerial Aspects

It is a peculiar feature of most works on interrogation that they begin with the "how to" phase; one starts out in a room face to face

[1] A good place to sample it is in *A Study for Development of Improved Interrogation Techniques: Study SR 117-D,* by Albert D. Biderman of the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., with its bibliography of hundreds of references. This is the final report, March 1959, on contract AF 18 (600) 1797, monitored by the Rome Air Development Center with technical assistance from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.

[2] See *Interrogation Guide* (Counter Intelligence Corps Supplemental Reading. U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird: SupR 38000 June 1958) and *Intelligence Interrogation* (Department/Army FM 30-15, 1960), especially Chapter 12, "CI Interrogation."

with the subject, all ready to interrogate him. In reality, many things have to be done before we reach that point. The following paragraphs cite some of them.

The need. First of all we have to decide whether the subject actually has to be interrogated. Like a marriage, a CI interrogation should not be embarked upon unless it is unavoidable. Does the subject really know enough to be worth while? Can he do something useful for us if we swing him around? Would some other subject be better worth our time?

In answering these questions, we have to keep in mind our purpose, at least latent in most CI interrogations, of getting the subject to collaborate with us, later, perhaps in an entrapment or double-agent operation, perhaps for example by surfacing hostile operations or testifying in court. We have to guard against a very natural desire to get the truth out of someone just because we want to prove something or satisfy our curiosity. It takes just as long and costs just as much to interrogate a bum as it does to lay open the secrets of an opposition case officer who has defected.

Now there will be times when we do not know enough about a subject to decide whether he is worth interrogating or not. We should get the facts—by file checks, other investigation, screening assessments, etc.—before we render a decision. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that some agent handlers have a tendency to push their disposal or discipline problems into interrogation channels. Those in charge of interrogations should be careful never to buy a pig in a poke, or act until they have reviewed whatever operational files there are.

Control. A second thing to be established is the control situation. Authorities vary on many points in interrogation doctrine, but they are all agreed on one: the better the control, the better the outlook for success. A man firmly behind bars can be put under a good deal more control than one we meet in a safe house, not to mention his own home. Though obvious, this is often overlooked.

We should therefore catalog, in writing, the factors of control which we have and those we can develop. Can we jail the man? Can we convince him that we can? Could he flee across the border, or would he face a worse fate there? Are his emotional treasures (family, etc.) where we can reach them? What hard evidence have we in documents or witnesses? Are we free to use it? These and many other questions must be studied.

Bargaining position. In every interrogation there is an overt or tacit bargaining situation, and the quid pro is the single most potent means of moving the subject to action. Are we going to pay for his information? What can we do for him if he collaborates? Will he face jail if he does not? How can we protect him from retaliation? What can we do about his special problems? Before entering upon interrogation we must be quite clear as to what offers may be made or implied and what may not.

Care and feeding. It should always be settled in advance where the subject will be housed and under what conditions, where he will be fed, how his laundry will be handled, where he can go and what he can do for amusement, what medical care will be available, who will provide transport, where he can get religious ministration, etc.

Security. We do not need to be reminded about protecting our security from the subject, but what about his security? Will he be quartered out of sight from the public? How can he be transported securely? How will he be guarded? Can he go out nights? Will he be supplied with funds and documentation to protect him? How and for how long can he remain away from his regular haunts without attracting hostile attention? What cover can be arranged for our contact with him? A CI interrogation differs from most other types in the critical respect that we may wish to keep it completely secret, not only to protect ourselves and him but to safeguard operational potentials and values that may be derived from him—potentials of which we may have no inkling until we are well along in the interrogation.

Covert aids. We should have firm plans on whether and how to introduce stool pigeons among the subject's associates, whether to read his mail, surreptitiously search his belongings and quarters, put eavesdropping devices in his vicinity, put him under surveillance, and so on.

Manpower. There is the question of what interrogators are to be reserved—one might say expended. How much time will they have? Will they have suitable facilities? What help will they have? Are they actually up to handling the subject? Will the polygraph be made available? How much control of it will the interrogator have? Are recording devices on hand?

Legalities. The basic paper work often turns out to be most important. There should be some authorization in hand spelling out

the right to interrogate this particular subject and why. It is well to secure some agreement in writing from him also, if only a security agreement. Most subjects can be talked into signing some sort of paper. There must be a clear-cut understanding of how the local law or legal officials fit into the picture. After the subject has complained to the district attorney is the wrong time to think about this aspect.

Females. Female subjects, whether young or old, require special handling not only because they are more difficult to interrogate but because they can cause scandals. If female interrogators are not available, a witness, possibly through a mirror-window, should *always* be arranged. Neglect of this point can lead to extremely painful incidents.

Interpreters. The use of interpreters poses many problems. In professional work there should be someone listening in at least from time to time to report what the interpreter is really saying. The availability and the ability of interpreters should be determined in advance.

Concurrent research. It would be nice to have an interrogator who knew all the topics of the interrogation as well as the subject did, but in most cases the interrogator's knowledge will be deficient in one or more respects. He may therefore not recognize the significance of certain information the source provides or could provide, may waste valuable time getting information that is already well known, may misinterpret information, or may not even reach a common understanding with the subject on what they are talking about. Every interrogator, however well informed, has blind spots and therefore needs to have his "take" reviewed concurrently, while the subject is available to supply further or clarifying data.

This means that concurrent research support should be arranged, if not at the site of the interrogation then near enough that the interrogator can have the drafts of his reports reviewed daily and can discuss the trend of the interrogation with one or more competent analysts. In practice, unfortunately, the U.S. services have been so organized that the consumer-analysts are far away and first see the interrogation reports long after both subject and interrogator are busy with other things.

Spot interrogation. Many times the subject is available only at intervals—a border crosser, a possible double agent, a defector who has steady employment elsewhere, a prisoner of the police to whom access is but fleeting, or some person whose contact with us must be concealed. In such cases the planning must be especially thorough and details of questions well worked out with the help of the best analysts available.

Supervision. The interrogator must of course be alone with his subject a good deal of the time, and he must have a wide latitude in dealing with him. He may spend quite a bit of time discussing trivia without necessarily being out of line. He cannot do his job with someone breathing down his neck. The simplest means of supervision, short of closed-circuit TV, is a microphone in the interrogation room, so that when the supervisor is minded and has time he can listen in to what is going on. This is a good way to keep interrogators on their toes and keep some track of the development of the interrogation. The mirror-window (if suitably camouflaged, as in a medicine cabinet) is also a big help.

Communications. A one-way telephone is most helpful, one that does not ring but can be used by the interrogator for outgoing calls. A light and buzzer system to show when the corridors are free and enable the interrogator to call for assistance or block the corridor is one of a number of refinements that can be elaborated at an interrogation center but are usually too costly for smaller setups.

Comforts. It is important to be sure the refreshment facilities are adequate. Toilets, snacks, coffee, etc., must be handy and controlled by the interrogator without his having to leave the subject alone.

Disposal. Planning should be quite concrete on what is to become of the subject after the interrogation is over. Provision for the signing of receipts, quit-claims, security and recontact agreements, etc. should be made in advance; you can't tell when an interrogation may suddenly be terminated.

Conversion. It will almost always be a major objective to win the cooperation of the subject at least to the extent of maintaining secrecy. Is your interrogator able to argue ideologies? Can he handle the man in such a way as to win his allegiance? These are matters to have in hand before the struggle begins.

The golden rule of counterintelligence interrogation is take care of the housekeeping before the how-to part, being sure that everything is as efficient, secure, dignified, and impressive as you can possibly make it.

The Interrogator Job

It is a truism to say that most men who have the ability to handle interrogation have more sense than to want to. In many ways the interrogator has become a forgotten man of intelligence and counterintelligence, looked upon as a question-machine and seldom given adequate career prospects. The work is just about the hardest there is, for it includes the two separate jobs of questioning people and writing reports. And it is of key importance: interrogation and investigation are the twin pillars of counterintelligence.

The Communist services have provided the most elaborate interrogation careers and facilities procurable. They rely very heavily upon interrogation not only to get facts but to grind people down to their specifications. Successful interrogators can look forward to positions of increased importance. One East German, a certain Gustav Szinda, who used to beat subjects up first and ask questions afterward, with the twin objectives of knocking them off balance and convincing them that he meant it when he threatened violence, eventually wound up as chief of a provincial headquarters of his service. Others have been given such positions as chief of operations and illegal *rezident* abroad. The Communists consider interrogation training to be the building of a fundamental skill, and a successful interrogator they seem to look upon as so heavily compromised to the regime as to be trusted on foreign missions.

We, on the other hand, seem to have made the job a drudge assignment which does not lead anywhere. The easiest way out of this dangerous situation would be to make a half-year or so of interrogation duty routine in the development of all officers who aspire to run secret agents. This would yield a reservoir of interrogators for any situation, train agent handlers in the skills of questioning and reporting, strongly reinforce their knowledge of counterintelligence topics, foreign languages, hostile thinking, etc., and at the same time provide manpower with motivation to handle the presently much neglected basic job of interrogation.

In any case, those upon whom the interrogation task is laid require more than routine good handling; they have to be made to feel that their work is appreciated and the greatest care taken to steer their careers away from blind alleys. Above all, one must see to it that unimportant or curiosity interrogations are not imposed upon experienced men; nothing is so demoralizing to an interrogator as to struggle with worthless subjects to get a product that will soon find its way into the classified trash. As good sources become scarce, pressure develops to fish out marginal ones and dubious individuals such as fabricators for the sake of producing some kind of report. Consistent resort to this practice risks killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.

The best protection against such misuse is to give established interrogators the responsibility for assessing and evaluating their sources. If an interrogator says a subject shows signs of mental aberrations or other deficiencies or is worthless in point of knowledge, his judgment should be accepted unless there are very important reasons for overriding it. In the latter case these should be candidly explained. If at all possible, interrogators should function in groups or as a staff led by a senior interrogator. This is a great morale-builder and stimulant to productive competition.

The How of Interrogation

> The general successfulness of interrogators in eliciting compliance makes for a difficulty in analyzing scientifically the bases of their effectiveness. A high rate of success is apparently achieved by many different kinds of personalities, employing a wide variety of methods, on the basis of assumptions and lines of reasoning which, to the extent that they are articulated at all, are frequently unfounded or mutually incompatible.[3]

It seems to me that this finding is substantially correct. That is to say there are all sorts of people and all sorts of approaches that work. There is no best way. There are not even many general rules. People are complex, variable, and vulnerable or invulnerable at the most unexpected points. More important, depending on the person doing the interrogation and the personal equation that evolves between him and the subject, the vulnerabilities may change. An elderly woman, for example, may develop a strong interest in impressing a personable young male interrogator and entirely reject another elderly woman. On the other hand, she may refuse to talk at all except to another woman in the same age bracket. Many people, of course, make adaptations, so that an interrogator not basically compatible with the subject assigned him may soon get along swimmingly.

The tricks and tactics of interrogation worked out by generations of interrogators can be found in many books; all of them have validity some of the time. There are many tomes on how to assess

[3] Biderman, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

the vulnerabilities of subjects, mostly in rather abstruse psychological language. What it all boils down to is that what works with one person may not work with another.

It seems to me that we have again to fall back heavily on what are in the main the managerial aspects. We have to arrange a suitable setting and props in accordance with the role to be given the subject in our interrogation psychodrama. Is he to play the role of a captured spy? A fellow conspirator? A terrified victim? A hero? An oracle? A being entitled to every consideration and protection? A suspect? Is he to change roles, and if so when and how? When we have a controlled situation, we have enormous power to force a role upon the subject because we can manipulate his environment.

Unless our subject is highly sophisticated, he will hardly realize he is being offered a part to play. He may, of course, seek to play a part of his own, but if we have assessed him and the situation correctly and approach him skillfully, we can fairly easily maneuver him at least to take one of two roles we prefer. Insensibly he drifts into the part and begins to respond as if he were the person represented in that role.

In counterintelligence interrogation, no matter where we start we want at the end to have our subject playing the same role—the oracle; this is the pose that makes him as productive as a gusher. We can hardly start with it if he is recalcitrant, but we can lead toward it from the beginning by getting him to pontificate on trivia and harmless matters. The best interrogators—sometimes unconsciously—all head in that direction.

The worst interrogators are those who (usually unconsciously) want to be the heroes of the drama themselves and so beat the subject (mentally) to the ground. The interrogator must firmly suppress all impulses to dramatize himself, unless for the purpose of arousing the subject to compete. He can boast of his own operational achievements, for example, and quite possibly get a recalcitrant subject to top his story.

We must decide early on whether we are going to interrogate on many topics and in detail or only on a few or superficially. When we are in for a long siege, the managerial aspects become very important indeed, and the problems of writing, accuracy, concurrent research, and keeping the subject productive become more difficult. If we confine ourselves to a few topics—relatively rare in counterintelligence interrogation—we need not expect too much trouble with the source once he has been made productive.

Some Approaches

Making the subject productive is the first goal of any interrogation, and it can be reached, as we have said, by many avenues. The problem may range from coping with open hostility to working around mental blocks. In a paper of this length we had better concentrate on ways of transforming a recalcitrant subject into an oracle, and of these on a few that are not covered in nearly every work on interrogation. The following are some that have proved profitable.

Hypnotism. In a legal and control situation where chemical or natural hypnotism can be induced by qualified practitioners, its value does *not* lie in questioning an entranced subject. You get worthless suggestion-results, fabrications, and distortions. What it can do is enable you to change the subject's attitude toward the interrogation. He can be made to see foes as friends (a good CI interrogator of course is never a foe, but only a man who wants to get the subject on his side), and post-hypnotic suggestion can often make him cooperative after he is out of his trance.

The polygraph. This machine is the stethoscope of interrogators, used in diagnosis of areas of deception. It is also a fabulous stalking horse, offering the interrogator many openings to give the subject an excuse for not holding out any longer.

The ideological argument. Every interrogator should be prepared to refute tenets of Communism such as that the end justifies the means. The ideological line vis-a-vis a subject, however, should not be to prove him wrong but to provide him with rationalizations which he can use to justify to himself his changing sides (which every person to some extent wants to do).

The quid pro quo. CI officers are sometimes in a position to make substantial offers to a recalcitrant subject—protection, a chance to "work against the Communists on our side," etc. Backstopped and approved on the proper level, such inducements can occasionally shortcut weeks of effort. Quite a few subjects who do not want to say so are actually very much interested in "what's in it for me."

Threats. Threats to turn the subject over to local authorities, to return him to the Communists, of blacklisting, public exposure, solitary confinement, deprivations, deportation, confiscation of property, physical violence, etc. are dangerous instruments, for if they fail of their effect it usually means the loss of irrecoverable ground. Under no circumstances should a threat be made overtly without

having been cleared beforehand on the highest level. The fear element can be stimulated easily and safely by manipulating the situation in such a way as to *imply* the threat.

If threats are employed, it should always be implied that the subject himself is to blame—"you leave us no choice but to . . ." He should never be ordered to comply "or else." Readers familiar with the Jaitner case will recall that he was told he left us no choice but to blacklist him everywhere. This potent threat to his swindling future brought him almost at once around to an agreement to tell us the truth now if we would keep quiet and not bar him from future deceptions. Essentially the threat is the basis for a quid pro quo. One should always be prepared to carry out an explicit threat, for the subject will generally sense a bluff.

Confrontation. There is a strong temptation, when we are in possession of hard evidence such as a witness, documents, or self-contradiction, to face the subject with it. Certainly in many cases it becomes necessary eventually to use this type of ammunition openly, but the moment should be put off until all else has failed, *always* until after our advantage has been used in polygraph tests or a decision made not to run any. There is nothing so valuable to interrogators as having a question on which the subject is known to lie, especially when he has no idea that we know it.

A woman agent of the East German MfS, for example, was observed shoplifting by our surveillants. In the general polygraph examination she was casually asked whether she stole things, and the resultant reaction became an invaluable gauge. Later interrogated on the same point, she almost immediately admitted it; if this had happened before the polygraph test the effect would have been lost. Coming as it did, the confession was the turning point in the interrogation, proving an entering wedge for other detailed admissions.

In the instructions issued by Communist services to their agents there is usually a section on what to do under interrogation. They are told to stick to their story and try to find out what evidence there is against them, and particularly to be alert for anything indicating who has betrayed them. It is well to bear this in mind in surfacing evidence in the confrontation maneuver or in the "we know everything" ploy.

Divide-and-conquer tactic. Whenever two or more persons are under interrogation on the same topic, for example two agents from the same network, the opportunity arises to play one off against the other, not only as sources of detail exposing and refuting cover stories and other lies, but also as levers. A clever interrogator can get the idea across to each subject that the other is leaking, especially if he has reliable derogatory information he can let slip into his questioning. In the still hours of the night, when the subject is free to mull over the day's exchange, he will stumble on the "slips" and their significance, with very weakening effect on his morale.

Harassment. Three things very hard on a subject are to have to go back over the same ground, to change abruptly from topic to topic, and to be interrogated at irregular intervals, say once at dawn, another time at midnight, etc. They are particularly effective if done under the pretense of "emergencies in which your help is needed" rather than as a hostile measure. But harassment which goes so far as to impair the functioning of the subject's nervous system reduces his capacity to provide accurate and complete information. All harassment and threats build up the subject's sense of moral superiority and so his resources for resistance.

Isolation. We often find that resistant subjects are kept in compounds with open-mesh fences, windows, etc. which allow them visual contact with the outside world. In some cases they have been allowed to listen to broadcasts or receive newspapers. Resisters draw great strength from this. They should be isolated visually and in every other way, so that they come to regard the prison as their world and gradually respond to the fully controlled environment.

Violence. There is little doubt that violence, correctly applied, often gets crude results quickly; but it lowers the moral caliber of the organization employing it and soon corrupts the interrogation staff, which degenerates until it cannot operate without violence. There are many more powerful persuaders, and violence should never be used.

Miscellaneous Considerations

Most of the following topics are each worth a book to themselves; here we are only hitting a few points where an interrogation can be helped or hurt.

Questionnaires. It should be a function of the concurrent research analysts to work out as thoroughgoing a biographic questionnaire as possible, so that a junior interrogator, if no one else is available, can get down the main facts on which the interrogation plan will have

to be based. The standard Personal Information Report forms in use are inadequate but far better than nothing. Special questionnaires should also be devised to cover each main topic. By using questionnaires we do risk stereotyping the questioning process, but we gain so much in the way of systematic coverage that the disadvantage is trivial. This is hard work that has to be done before the subject has even been contacted. It is a staff job.

Subject assessment. Tomes have been written on how to determine the character of individuals, their strengths, interests, weaknesses etc. It remains a fact that the best clue to the future behaviour of any man is his past performance. The more you can find out about the subject's past reactions in situations which confronted him with unpleasant choices and problems, the better you can determine who should interrogate him and can plan the interrogation tactics. It is quite beyond this paper to get into details on this enormous topic.

The plethora of aids is confusing. If you have psychiatric assistance it may prove quite valuable. The polygraph can be used as an assessment tool. So can handwriting analysis. Direct interviews, batteries of tests, etc., all have some validity. But the situation is often the determining factor.

Thus a basically dishonest millionaire would scarcely ever be a thief because he has no need to steal, while an honest man faced with necessity can perform quite spectacular larcenies. A weakling being asked to divulge information when it would mean death for a beloved child will put up a hell of a battle, while a hardnosed fighter type may be quite easily induced to cooperate in exchange for a fortune or the chance to do in a personal enemy. It is accordingly illusory to devote too much time to assessing a subject's inherent resistance potential.

Far more important is to select an interrogator whose personal equation meshes with the subject's. And that is easily done by trying out a few people in harmless personal interviews. Most of us have the gift of being able to tell whether we like and are liked by given individuals. Another very important thing is to be sure to determine whether the subject can in fact tell an accurate story about anything. Some criminals with jail experience habitually put out a screen of confusing tales on any and all topics when confronted by authorities. Such people can often be trapped by stool pigeons.

Clues on bona fides. Only detailed research and investigation can confirm bona fides. There are, however, some warning signs that

should be looked for. Subjects who use or understand jargon they could not know unless they were "hep" should be trapped with more jargon, provocation, etc. Subjects who defend one or another aspect of Communist doctrine while disavowing Communist affiliations should always be viewed with suspicion. Subjects with a fund of "guardhouse lawyer" talk, like those who do not seem to be able to tell a straight story about anything, are often found to have had extensive criminal involvement. Subjects who get off on side issues in great detail but are brief on certain central matters are worried about the latter.

Pocket litter. Never forget to turn out all pockets, cuff linings, etc. and where possible conduct a full body search. Make sure the subject gets a chance to explain each item.

The interrogation plan. This should be made by the interrogator and approved by the supervisor. It should include deadlines. Never start without one.

Story building. As far as possible, the first interrogation should be conducted as if it were the last, with detail piled on detail. It is not a good idea to have different people give the subject "once over lightly" treatments. As he tells and re-tells his story he will develop it, plug loopholes, resolve contradictions, add corroborative detail, learn how to talk under questioning, etc., making the job of the detailed interrogator and the breaking of recalcitrance harder and harder. Some subjects even begin to believe their own lies.

Commanders should politely but firmly resist the efforts of visiting firemen to "get immediate information on a few important points" while the detailed interrogation is postponed. If there is need for haste on particular matters, as in order to get evidence for making arrests, this interrogation should be done, in detail, by the assigned interrogator. The visiting firemen can if need be sit (or better just listen) in, but it is a very bad error to let them take over unless political considerations have precedence. These smash-and-grab artists not only contaminate the subject by providing him with all sorts of information in their efforts to get immediate answers but also put him in the position of being able to say much later, when cornered: "Oh that, why I told the big man with the white mustache all about that—didn't he tell you?"

Recording hints. Full tape recordings are usually useless because they include too many preliminary and clarifying verbal exchanges

and other confused matter. Cut the recorder in while you summarize out loud, paragraph by paragraph, what the subject has just said, asking him to confirm or correct you. This greatly reduces volume and error and in effect gives you the first draft of your report.

Reporting hints. All interrogation reports, unless they have been fully verified by research, should be labeled "Unevaluated Information." They should distinguish carefully between what the subject has directly observed, what he has heard, and what he deduces, e.g., "Subject infers, because of so and so, that . . . ." The interrogator's comment should always be carried in footnotes, never inserted in the body of the report. If the results of research and check-ups such as confirmatory name-traces are to be mentioned, they too should appear as footnotes. There should also be a statement informing the reader how much confirmatory research was done; otherwise a heavily annotated report will give the impression of having been fully researched although only aspects of a pivotal nature (or those interesting the interrogator) had been checked out.

Maps and plans. Beware of letting the subject have maps or building plans to work with until he has drawn what he can from memory. Nothing suits a fabricator better than to get a map thrust into his hands from which to give verisimilitude to his lies about installations, escape routes, etc. When the subject has produced his memory work the comparison with maps and plans will yield many interesting insights.

Questions on organization and functions. The rarest of birds is a man who really knows how his organization is set up and functions. It is well to be very careful in taking any subject's say-so, no matter how sincere and confident he is, on how his outfit works. The best safeguard is to do detailed biographical and job interrogations concerning all his colleagues; then do an organization and function interrogation; then examine whether the job descriptions of individuals confirm the organic picture.

Two-man teams. A prolific source is a heavy burden on a single interrogator. It is not extravagant but highly efficient to use two interrogators alternately on different topics, one questioning while the other is off writing up what he has gleaned, so that the subject is kept continuously occupied. This not only leaves no time for idling and brooding but introduces a measure of variety and competition into the interrogation process.

Operational officers as interrogators. Their use is often unavoidable, as in handling double agents. It is poor practice to use them for ordinary interrogations, both because it ties up specialized manpower and because no operational officer can be expected to buckle down to detailed interrogation work not directly affecting his own operation.

Interrogator training. Other things being equal, it is better to get people who are interrogators more or less by nature and inclination. The training really has to be done on the job. It is possible to lecture and give a dry-run, ground-school type of training, with each man interrogating a fellow student and being in turn interrogated (the latter aspect is often overlooked); but the best results and the quickest assessment of ultimate suitability are obtained by putting the man to work interrogating real but second-class subjects. Sometimes arrangements can be made to assign candidates to local security or police interrogation work for a few months.

CI background. No interrogator will be useful or productive unless he has had full CI operations training and experience and acquires an extensive and detailed knowledge of the organization, functions, personnel, tactics, methods, etc. of the Communist services against which he is to work.

Indigenous interrogators. As a rule, these will have a great deal of trouble winning the confidence of indigenous subjects, who generally distrust their countrymen's security and resent the imposition of a mere fellow countryman's will. If they have to be used, their original motivation should gradually be reinforced, as by inducing them to apply for U.S. citizenship and providing a career path that leads to attractive goals. One should make sure that they are soon moved on to other and better work, not left stuck in an interrogation rut.

The interrogator's attitude. The most important single attribute every successful interrogator appears to have is an inflexible determination to get the facts. Persons who quail at difficulties, look for fast and easy solutions, are lazy, have turned out to be misfits in other jobs, etc. should not be disposed of into the interrogation team. They will not only lower morale but be the cause of costly failures. When the recalcitrant subject meets with an interrogator who he senses is absolutely determined, his resistance is invariably weakened. And the subject soon perceives the caliber of the man who faces him.

Interrogation

Never forget that some day the subject may have an opportunity to tell his side of the story to the press or other public medium, friendly or hostile. He certainly will talk to individuals. What he should honestly be able to say about us is that we are tough but fair. If he decides to paint us in other colors falsely, he probably won't be convincing. In any case, let's not provide him with ammunition.

A program for identifying and attacking the adversary's psychologically vulnerable fringe.

MORE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIETS

Martin L. Brabourne

Andrew J. Twiddy's "Recruitment of Soviet Officials" [1] came as an invigorating breath of fresh air to at least one much interested reader, combining a realistic appraisal of one of our key intelligence tasks and an unenchanted review of past efforts with an original and optimistic approach to the future. Its community-wide dissemination in the *Studies* was also a forward move in striking the keynote, so to speak, for a renewed and broader examination of Soviet recruitments which would lift the subject out of its status as the arcane, esoteric specialty of a selected few. It is not out of disagreement with Mr. Twiddy but stimulated by his refreshing treatment that this reader has tried to organize and pull together his own parallel thoughts and experiences in the hope of continuing the conversation, the "thinking out loud" that Twiddy began. He believes he has something to say, and perhaps this may in turn stimulate others to join the discussion.

The Vulnerable Target

We have for years studied so-called "vulnerabilities," the "basis for recruitment," the "motivation of defection," and so on, and there is no question that we have learned something from these studies. That our efforts have somehow been wide of the mark, however, is indicated by the consistent failure of operational approaches based on the studies. It may be that we have lost sight of the forest, or perhaps more appropriately have failed, in our wandering among the trees, to perceive that we are in a forest at all. What we are looking for is so evident, so perfectly obvious, that in a sense it has escaped our notice.

This single, simple, self-evident observation is that the enormous act of defection, of betrayal, treason, is almost invariably the act of a warped, emotionally maladjusted personality. It is compelled by a fear, hatred, deep sense of grievance, or obsession with revenge far

[1] *Studies* VIII 1, 9-15 ff.

exceeding in intensity these emotions as experienced by normal, reasonably well-integrated and well-adjusted persons. Defection is atypical, and continued betrayal even more so: of the thousands, even tens of thousands of Soviets who have served abroad since say 1950, only a few dozen have defected, and of these only a few have worked in place for us as agents. Such acts in peacetime are clearly a manifestation of abnormal psychology; a normal, mature, emotionally healthy person, deeply embedded in his own ethnic, national, cultural, social, and family matrix, just doesn't do such things.[2]

This general principle is illustrated in our experience with Soviet defectors. All of them have been lonely people. All of those in the writer's experience have manifested some serious behavior problem—such as alcoholism, satyriasis, morbid depression, a psychopathic pattern of one type or another, an evasion of adult responsibility—which was adequate evidence for an underlying personality defect decisive in their defection.[3] It is only a mild hyperbole to say that no one can consider himself a Soviet operations officer until he has gone through the sordid experience of holding his Soviet "friend's" head while he vomits five days of drinking into the sink.[4]

What is the evident corollary of this proposition? Simply stated, it is that our operational efforts should be focussed against the emotionally weak, immature, and disturbed fringe elements of a Soviet colony. Systematic fishing in these troubled waters should have a much higher probability of yield, over a period of time, than unfocussed, indiscriminate efforts such as have been made in the past. This is the principle that has been so obvious as to escape notice.

[2] The truth of this generalization is today adequately recognized in overt academic, journalistic, and literary works. Of the many references that could be given, Rebecca West's *Meaning of Treason* comes to mind, and William L. Shirer's *The Traitor*. From a psychoanalytical standpoint there is Robert Lindner's *Prescription for Rebellion*. A sociological treatment, and the best one for our own systematic study and understanding, is Morton Grozdin's *The Loyal and the Disloyal* (University of Chicago, 1956).

[3] Our classified literature has finally recognized this fact, and articles in this journal have reflected the hard-earned lesson. See, for example, "What to Do with Defectors" by John Ankerbrand, *Studies* V 4, p. 33 ff.

[4] We shall not attempt an analysis of the degree to which this post-defection behavior may reflect guilt and remorse for the act of defection. Suffice it here to observe that psychiatric study of several of these defectors identified the alcoholic manifestations as merely one symptom of long-standing personality difficulties of which the defection itself was another.

Given the principle, a number of conditions must be satisfied before it can be translated into an operational program. First is the question whether it is possible to recognize and identify these fringe elements by means of traditional and existing sources of information. Do sources normally available to us produce the kind of clues which would at least tentatively identify such potential targets? If so, the next step is to isolate and catalog these clues, criteria, and indicators of our targets. That done, case officers and analysts have to be sensitized to recognize the indicators, have to develop the outlook and sophistication to seize on them in their observations and report them. Finally, access must be gained to the targets so identified, and officers must learn how to talk to them.

Target Characteristics

An intelligence officer once observed that the only reliable motivation for treasonable espionage is hatred and thirst for revenge. Elsewhere it has been said that most traitors have been impelled to their treason by dreams of power and glory. Who are the people that hate and seek revenge with such passion they commit treason? Who are the people that dream of power and glory and, not only frustrated in these dreams but perhaps even ridiculed in their daily lives, become so bitter as to turn their backs on family, friends, and nation?

It is necessary at this point to go into a little amateur (and vastly oversimplified) psychology. In this writer's opinion, the persons we are seeking are those with a markedly deficient or defective conscience—the psychopaths, also called sociopaths—and at the other end of the spectrum those who may have an adequate (or perhaps overdeveloped) conscience but are hampered in their life and work by intense internal conflicts—neurotic and prepsychotic personalities.

The psychopath is a person basically without scruples or one whose weak or defective conscience is eroded by the problems and frustrations of living and finally collapses under their intolerable accumulation. Sometimes a deceptively charming and seemingly well-adjusted person, he can also be an easily recognizable misfit, an intrigant, a con man, a chiseler. He is highly self-centered, even if he hides it with some degree of success. He is impulsive, with a low frustration tolerance, hypersensitive, easily angered. He has an enormous need for prestige, status, recognition. He is often highly arrogant. He characteristically seeks revenge for real or imagined slights. The revenge may be taken in coolly calculated actions to wreak the maxi-

mum damage or in indiscriminate destructive retaliation, a blind lashing out. Sgt. Dunlap, Col. Penkovskiy, Joe Valachi, Aaron Burr, Rastvorov, George Blake, and Lee Oswald almost certainly belong to this type. Eleazar Lipsky has written a highly perceptive fictional account of such a person in his story *The Scientist,* which is well worth reading. Another by the same author is *Kiss of Death,* presenting a fictional precursor of Joe Valachi.

The neurotic and prepsychotic are different from the psychopath, but equally interesting from an operations standpoint. Here we have emotional constellations characterized by inner conflicts, anxieties, and severe repressions or distortions of particular facets of the personality. It is to this category that Morton Grozdin's "alienated" personality belongs. The neurotic or prepsychotic has difficulty getting along in life; in severe cases he is immobilized in his job or perhaps in his family relations. He may be severely repressed, or over-organized and rigid (the Puritan, for example). His ability to understand and get along with other people is characteristically poor. He is preoccupied with his own problems. He loses contact with other people to varying degrees, and he acutely feels need for such contact, for communication and affection. He will be over-dependent or over-aggressive. His personality distortions cause his unsatisfied needs to be experienced with much greater intensity than in "normal" people, and it is these overwhelmingly intense feelings which can provide the driving power for defection and espionage.[5]

Whether the neurotic/prepsychotic is overly dependent (often shy, withdrawn, even isolated), or overly aggressive, obnoxious, and upstaging, he retains the opposite tendency repressed, driven out of sight, so to speak, with greater or less success. A highly dependent person thus has strongly repressed hostility and unsatisfied aggressive needs, while the highly aggressive ones have rigidly suppressed dependency needs and are often most lonely persons. The suppressed tendency, whether to dependency or aggression, often splashes over into overt behavior, giving the outside observer an impression of inconsistency, "spottiness," or instability of character.

[5] The force of these drives was well illustrated by an incident in the writer's handling of a defector. The defector was being "dried out" from one of his periodic alcoholic bouts and had been placed under sedation. The doctor administered about ten times the dosage normally sufficient to knock a person cold. This massive dosage failed to put him to sleep, however; it merely "slowed him down."

Neurotic and prepsychotic persons are characteristically unable to evaluate friend and foe objectively. They systematically misread the motives and intentions of others, projecting their own problems onto people in the outer world. In aggregate all these attributes, while making their possessors difficult to work with, render many of them peculiarly susceptible to approach and development.

Finally, even in more normal people, we should look especially at the unique vulnerabilities of middle age. The incidence of various types of emotional and mental breakdown is highest in the middle-age category. The period of life from say age 37 on shows the highest incidences of divorce, disappearance, alcoholism, infidelity, suicide, embezzlement—and probably defection, overt or in place.

The reasons for this phenomenon are not hard to find. There is the onset of decline from physiological peak; one's children suddenly are no longer children but young adults, bringing a sharp realization of the passage of one's life; youthful ambitions and ideals suffer disillusion and then sudden, brutal collapse; career turning-points occur at this time. The prospect of an insignificant old age looms large and immediate. Most men, according to numerous qualified sources, go through a complete reevaluation of personal philosophy, religious and moral beliefs, and so on in this period.[6] It is the time when a man takes stock of his life, and the result is frequently traumatic in the extreme. This so-called "middle-age revolt" is of exceptional importance from an intelligence operations standpoint, since men of 37 or older are usually well advanced in their professional careers and highly enough placed to make them extremely interesting targets.

Symptoms and Sources

What precisely, then, should we look for in our scrutiny of source materials during the initial search for targets? The following sketches the outline of an indicator list; it is not, of course, complete or comprehensive:

Alienation in interpersonal relationships. Lack of close friends in the Soviet colony. Evidence of coldness in personal relationships. Isolation, aloneness. Personality difficult to get along with. Arrogant, offensive, sullen, hostile. Feels discriminated against. Resentful. Hypersensitive. Enemies in the Soviet colony. Ob-

[6] See Edmund Bergler, *The Revolt of the Middle-Aged Man* (Grosset and

ject of either ridicule or contempt. Difficulties with co-workers or psychological isolation from them.

Career Situation. Evidence or reasonable inference of difficulties in job situation. Resentment of supervision, direction, interference. Evasion of job responsibilities. Lack of appropriate career progression. Resentment of others' progression.

Family Situation. Difficulties in family. Lack of warm relationship with wife, children. Resentment of wife, children. Infidelity. Avoidance or disregard of family (e.g., in off-duty diversions).

Non-Duty Outlets. Avoidance of family or other Soviets. Excessive drinking. Infidelity. Wasting away time in trivial diversions. Having no physical sports or diversions. Predominance of diversions over responsibilities and obligations.

Personality. Aggressive vs. submissive evaluation. Rigid and compulsive behavior patterns. Anxiety and self-protective maneuvers. Unusual shyness and over-dependency. Or anxious efforts to please, over-submissiveness. Preoccupied with self ("McLandress dimension"), selfish, overestimating own problems, ideas, outlook. Excessively impulsive, chronically impatient, easily angered. Hypersensitive, feelings easily hurt, unable to accept criticism. Tending to blame others, evade own responsibility. Arrogant, excessively prestige- and status-conscious, anxious to impress everyone with own brilliance and importance. Great mood swings, depressions, evidence of low self-esteem or self-estimate. Constant criticism of others, fault-finding, sarcastic manner, sarcastic or anti-social type of humor. Rigid, highly organized, inflexible personality, or its opposite.

All of the above are relative questions; they call for qualitative evaluation of the ways a given Soviet relates to other Soviets. To make valid evaluations of this type requires persons, analysts and case officers, who know and understand the Soviets as participants in their own culture and society. It requires mature, sophisticated, socially sensitive, and observant persons who mingle and converse with a broad range of Soviets reasonably frequently and over a period of time.

Telephone taps and audio sources which provide coverage of internal conversations in a Soviet colony, properly read, are an exceedingly valuable source of clues and leads bearing on the questions of interest. Wives' personal chatter and complaints, the planning of social events (picnics, hunting and fishing trips, receptions), what is said when the children become ill, when the boss insists a man leave his lunch to come to the office, when people are planning home leave—all of these situations are among the kind that provide occasion for personal commentary, for flashes of irritation, frustration, and anger, for identifying persons who are disliked or isolated, and so on.

People who have business relations with the Soviets visit their offices frequently and also attend parties and receptions. As recruited agents, they can report on pecking order, on arrogance/submissiveness, on the personal manner and personality of individual Soviets, and on warmth or coldness in interpersonal relationships, as well as more concrete observations such as disparaging remarks made by one Soviet about another, jokes and ridicule, flashes of irritation and anger, impatience in dealing with people, and so on. As a given Soviet becomes acquainted with such a contact and gains confidence in him, he may over time decide that the man is no risk, regardless of what the security officer might say, and may increasingly confide in him. All of these observations and confidences provide insight into the Soviet colony and produce the hints and leads we are seeking.

Double agent operations can also, in certain circumstances, produce similar information.

Finally, there is direct diplomatic or social contact. Numerous advantages accrue from a broad and continuing contact of this kind. Foremost is the short-circuiting of all the indirect assessment problems, problems occasioned by working through one or several intermediaries; face-to-face meetings by trained intelligence professionals should produce far more comprehensive and reliable impressions. Second, the direct American-Soviet confrontation permits individuals on each side to become acquainted with individuals on the other and so dispels the numerous halo effects and stereotype conceptions that arise when the two are isolated from each other. Third, if there is information already on hand leading to a given target or if it is obtained from another source such as a telephone tap, it is far easier, faster, and more productive to undertake direct probing and development of him and observe and evaluate at first hand his reactions. Fourth, it is extremely useful, if not indeed essential, to expose a given target to a range of diverse personality types, for purposes of both assessment and development. Finally, an intelligence officer (and to a lesser degree any U.S. government officer) can be much more fully briefed and guided than say a third-national agent.

Program Training

A third prerequisite for making an operational program of our principle, we said, was to provide an enabling point of view for case officers and analysts and sensitize them to the indicators. One aspect of the problem is that most case officers regard Soviet recruitments as a will-of-the-wisp and simply refuse, in practice if not in words, to give the required effort to the task. The other is that they do not recognize the necessity for sensitive observation, through fairly subtle indicators, of personality relationships and adjustments. If a case officer cannot himself do these things, it is of course unrealistic to expect him to give adequate guidance to his agents. The net result is that a supervisor trying to run such a program must spend an inordinate amount of time in personal debriefings and guidance of these people. Some examples follow.

Three different officers in a field station were successively charged with responsibility for screening telephone tap production. They were given the criteria for selection, and examples taken from live material were repeatedly drawn to their attention. Yet time after time they all failed to notice interesting and possibly important leads in the material. *One item missed:* a series of telephone calls indicating that a given Soviet was having serious marital problems, was drinking heavily (on one occasion throwing the embassy into a flap at 2 a.m.), and was having difficulty in his work as a result. (A year later new evidence showed the marital problems to be deep and durable ones. He was of minority ethnic origin, and his wife, a Great Russian, ridiculed him as representative of this minority nationality.) *Second item missed:* A senior officer newly assigned to the Soviet embassy conducted himself with great arrogance, constantly using offensive and abusive language over the telephone and creating numerous enemies. (It has more recently been found that this same officer may be having not one but several affairs simultaneously within the Soviet colony.) *Third item missed:* Two Soviet officers were reflected in telephone conversation as absolutely despising each other, to such an extent that they could not even be seated next to each other at an official function. *Fourth item missed:* In an operational development that was heading toward a defection approach, a key unknown was the relationship of the target with his wife. Overt observation had suggested that it was the hoped-for cold and perfunctory one; a warm feeling between them would probably vitiate the whole approach. The missed conversation, on a newly acquired tap, established beyond a shadow of doubt that husband and wife were warm and intimate.

Reports on social contacts can be equally frustrating from a supervisory standpoint. In reporting physical characteristics, intelligence officers trained in anti-Soviet operations generally produce good descriptions of Soviets they meet. But when it goes beyond the physical to observations on interpersonal relationships and psychological nuances, they rarely produce acceptable reports in the sense of what is needed for a program of this kind. One officer who had flirted with a Soviet's wife recalled gleefully some weeks after the event how the husband had bristled with antagonism from across the room, obviously watching every move she made. This incident had not been noted either in the written report of contact or in the oral debriefing after the party.

Another intelligence officer, speaking fluent Russian, gained acceptance from the Soviets and frequently attended their get-togethers and embassy receptions. But this officer treats social/diplomatic contact as just that: his eyes are blind to behavioral nuances and his ears are closed to anything except art, books, theatre, and so on. Nothing can be elicited from him concerning which Soviet talks to which and in what manner, or which habitually wanders around alone and unengaged with others. Superior in many aspects of his job performance, he seems to have a blind spot when it comes to functioning as a spotter or developer. He will note that a Soviet has a seventeen-year-old boy; but that this same Soviet is very upset because the boy's education is about to be broken off by conscription escapes him.

Another officer, reporting that a Soviet had been in London, failed to report that the London visit was a six-month familiarization assignment in the embassy, which usually means a KGB probationary tour. Met later by another officer, this Soviet turned out to be a quiet, thoughtful, and seemingly impressionable young man; there was no such description in the original contact reports. With glowing sincerity he now characterized his experience in London as "the most wonderful six months" in his life. The original case officer, apprised of this remark, said "Oh I know that, he told me that a long time ago!"

These sad stories could go on, but the point is made: officers must be trained and sensitized, and first of all they must be convinced that Soviets can be recruited and it is worth the effort. This is a long-term process, easier with young officers than with older ones.

Access and Development

If we can overcome this obstacle, the final requirement for making the program operational is gaining access to the Soviets in question and knowing what to do when it is gained—things easier said than done. Access is in a sense the key question of Soviet operations. If normal social, business, and diplomatic intercourse with the Soviets were possible, most of the problems to which this paper is addressed would not exist. Many of the operational approaches and gimmicks which have been devised over the years have been efforts to evade or surmount restrictions on getting next to the target.

Some of these restrictions are created by Soviet security practices and controls of one type or another. In addition to specific control procedures, the intense security indoctrination the Soviets get implants in them suspicion and anxiety about any foreign contact. So even when you succeed in establishing an outside relationship with one or two Soviets, you usually find that it is leading nowhere unless you get invited to their home ground, where, paradoxically, you have a chance to break out of the controlled channel by assessing individual Soviets in their own environment and observing their relationships with each other. Outside the Bloc practically the only place where this is possible is at Satellite or Soviet receptions, or to a lesser degree at some third-national receptions. Invitations to these are therefore the first objective, regardless of whether you are seeking an opportunity in person or trying to maneuver embassy officers, indigenous businessmen or other contacts, or recruited agents of any nationality into promising situations.

Of equal importance with the Soviet restrictions are our own self-limitations. These result from general American attitudes towards the cold-war enemy, the reflection of this in the official climate established by an embassy, a reluctance on the part of American diplomatic and even intelligence officers to consort with Soviets and East Europeans, and a general diplomatic ineptitude in dealing with them, often marked by the apparently irresistible urge to be one up on them, embarrass them, and score at their expense in order to look good as a loyal and clever American diplomat when the Political Counsellor reads the Memorandum of Conversation. More on this subject a little later.

Third-National and Indigenous Agents

In the face of this reluctance of the official American community abroad to indulge in social contact with Soviets, a natural course is to emphasize the alternative and complementary program of running agents into the Soviet-Satellite community. These may be American (including staff agents under deep cover), indigenous, or third-nationals. They may be persons already in business or other contact with the Soviets whom we can coopt, or they may be carefully selected "pigeons" whom we recruit, train, and then set up in positions where we hope the Soviets may be interested enough to cultivate them.

The agent approach is indeed an essential part of any comprehensive program. Third-national agents, in particular, provide a broader base for assessments and development, offer windows that may have a truer view of certain targets than an American can get, and frequently give access to Soviet groups that, like trade missions, are beyond reach through normal diplomatic channels. It does suffer, however, from certain inherent difficulties. One is that the unilateral cooption of people with established Soviet contacts is replete with security hazards, including a high probability of their being doubled by the local security service as well as by the Soviets, and the consequent limitations on the extent to which they can be safely briefed and guided. Finding them in the first place may require an extensive investigative effort, and then come operational maneuvers to screen, contact, and develop them. A year or more may thus be required to procure only a handful of such agents. And as noted, if we are doing this unilaterally we are operating in the same area and against the same targets as the local services.

The planting of agents especially recruited and trained for this purpose is an important program that takes even more time. Finding suitable persons, recruiting and training them, creating situations leading to contacts, and developing plausible relationships are a matter of long-term effort that should be undertaken in sufficient mass to make up for the likelihood of failures. After the laborious preparation the plant may fail to evoke any interest whatever from the targets. Or he may develop a relationship which the local security service then calls him in to explain. If he escapes these hazards, the time will still come in most agent-mediated operations, though not in all, that an intelligence staff officer under viable cover

must be introduced to make a face-to-face assessment and possibly take over the development.[7]

The citation of these difficulties in trying to maneuver agents against Soviet targets, along with a conclusion that the percentage over time of yield from such operations will be low, is not intended to convey a pessimistic or defeatist attitude regarding this use of agents. It *is* intended as grounds for insisting that such operations must be part of a comprehensive, long-term, focussed program; and this is not a program that can be run with the left hand, so to speak, part-time, by officers assigned also to other duties whose product may be more immediately tangible and gratifying to a chief of station.

Diplomatic Contact

Broad and regular diplomatic contact with the Soviet colony is the other main approach to the access problem. Against its undeniable limitations and dangers, it offers the advantages of direct assessment, personal acquaintance and familiarity, gradual development through conversations, rapid contact in any sudden opportunity for more direct approach, and a high degree of control over what is said to the target and how it is said.

The opportunity for this kind of contact is probably much greater than the accepted mythology allows. The Soviets are said to shy away from such contacts, to be prohibited from accepting invitations, to mouth nothing but the Party line, to walk away if an American approaches, and so on. Undoubtedly this is a true picture in many places. In this writer's experience in one country, however, such beliefs, buttressed by a few casual experiences, had effectively inhibited efforts to cultivate Soviet bloc representatives for a considerable period of time, but when a determined and prolonged effort was finally made it paid off handsomely, to everyone's surprise. The principal obstacles, it transpired, had been skepticism, indifference, and hostility within the American establishment.

A truer picture would show that Soviet intelligence officers and coopted workers are under instructions to cultivate Americans—for identification, assessment, and transmission of "disinformation"—and moreover that, as human beings in a dull and restrictive environment, they welcome such contacts, whatever their official aims may be. This truer picture would distinguish between intelligence officers and other Soviets; the latter are truly wary of friendly contacts with Westerners while under the eyes of their security shepherds and tend to avoid Westerners at receptions. Finally, willingness to engage in broad diplomatic contact, in all probability, varies considerably from one Soviet embassy to another, depending on the local situation, the personalities of the ambassador and the intelligence rezidents and so on. But we don't find out what we can do in any particular place until we really try.

There are a variety of reasons why Foreign Service, USIS, and military attaché personnel and even intelligence officers under official cover are so often reluctant to involve themselves with Soviet bloc representatives. Some don't want it on their records that they have had Eastern associations; some imagine that the Soviets are ten feet tall; many feel that it's too much work with too little to show for it; some have a visceral distaste for intelligence and just don't want to get involved in it. Many officers are therefore also indifferent to standing instructions that contacts and relationships be reported, dilatory in writing reports, and reluctant to be debriefed. And there is a certain category of persons whose chief delight is to bait, embarrass, and insult their Eastern counterparts.

For this latter there is no excuse. Yet time after time one can see officers—military, diplomatic, *and* intelligence—ruining contacts: "All that guy could do was talk about himself, I just walked away." "This jerk fastened himself to me like a leech, so I told him off." "He was so stupid I couldn't make any money with him." "When he got gushy about friendship I asked him why they didn't take the same approach to disarmament negotiation." "That fat slob is too incompetent as an Army officer for me to waste my time talking to him."

It must be recognized that some of the American inhibitions are not wholly without justification. The KGB is known to put at the top of its priorities the cultivation of American officials in order to assess them, determine who does what in their installations, attempt compromises, and hopefully recruit. But this fact merely calls for discrimination on our part in selecting those—intelligence officers or others—whom we encourage to cultivate and be cultivated by the Soviets, and for more realism in defensive briefings.

[7] This statement is based in part upon the proposition, not here to be developed, that no Soviet is going to consider seriously defection to nationals or intelligence services of small powers. When a Soviet begins to think about treason, he is going to think of either Britain (along with some Commonwealth countries) or the United States. Third-national agent assessments are in any case, in this writer's opinion, not to be considered reliable; that is why a first-hand professional assessment must be obtained.

Many of the difficulties are often traceable to a single underlying cause, an indifference pervading the individual establishment. The tone or attitude of an official representation is determined by the ambassador and his deputy. If the ambassador is indifferent, skeptical, or hostile toward this intelligence objective, then it is an uphill struggle all the time. On a personal basis one can secure the full cooperation of Foreign Service, USIS, and attaché officers, but usually only at the cost of time and developmental efforts which should be invested rather in operations against targets. The only solution visible to this writer is a continuing flow of requirements and guidances not only from intelligence headquarters but also from the State Department emphasizing the Soviet operations problem. Until the U.S. Government addresses itself integrally to this problem, the intelligence effort will tend to peter out in paper exercises.

Tactical Devices

The Soviets are a highly disciplined group, intensively indoctrinated, provocation-minded, keenly suspicious, insulated, and operating within security controls and secret observation several orders of magnitude greater than anything to which we are accustomed. They are prideful and highly sensitive to slight. At the same time, as individuals, many of them are extremely anxious for adventure and exposure beyond these narrow confines, and many are eager for acceptance and approval by Westerners and by Americans. This mixture of conflicting tendencies can produce interesting results and points to operationally useful tactics.

While Soviet relationships with the British and Americans (and some others) are under tight official control, those with other nationalities may be, for diplomatic or other reasons, much more relaxed. Thus it may be unusual (as well as operationally undesirable) for a Soviet to accept a singleton invitation from an American but not at all unusual to see singleton Soviets at parties given, for example, by the Indians, the Iraqis, or the French. And at such a third-national party the singleton Soviet can be approached, conversation can flow easily, and after a number of such meetings over a period of time a real relationship and bond may develop. The Soviet is in a position—limited, of course, by the possible presence of Soviet agents at the party—to report the contact or not, or to slant the report, as he sees fit. But the minute an attempt is made to convert this relationship to an overt Soviet-American one, it comes into the purview of the rezident and the security officer, and it will be either abruptly terminated or run as a controlled intelligence contact.

In twos or more, on the other hand, the Soviets will often accept invitations from Britishers and Americans, even during periods of international tension, especially to reasonably large parties or receptions which have a diplomatic or official rather than personal and pointed tone. It is perfectly possible, over a period of time and in a succession of large cocktail party meetings, to conduct highly useful conversations with a chosen target, even though other Soviets are charging around and perhaps watching closely from across the room. This is a device that can be used at posts where there is no mechanism to assist elements of the diplomatic community, especially newcomers, to meet their counterparts from other countries. Where there are organs like International Clubs or Diplomats' Associations they enormously simplify the problem of meeting Soviets and spotting links.

Most officers in a Soviet establishment speak the local language, usually quite well, and very few Americans speak Russian. It is often argued, therefore, that the Soviets will immediately suspect a Russian-speaking American of being an intelligence officer and shy away from him, so that in order to allay suspicion it is better for American officers to speak the local language. This argument is fallacious on three counts.

First, in order not to start out from a position of inferiority, the American should be able to speak the indigenous language as well as the Soviets do. In many places he usually is not. A man with a six-month or one-year quickie course in one of the less common languages usually cannot compare with the product of the Soviet institutes, who may, moreover, be serving his second or third tour in the area. Second, the argument presumes that the Soviets will have nothing to do with a suspected intelligence officer. This is simply not true, any more than that we will have nothing to do with a suspected Soviet intelligence officer. Finally, there is the fact that many Russians are genuinely pleased to have a foreigner speak to them in their own tongue. At a recent Soviet reception this writer had the pleasant experience of finding himself "receiving" his Soviet hosts: at one time there were seven Russians lined up to introduce themselves to their Russian-speaking guest, one third secretary even elbowing his way past the GRU deputy chief.

What to Say

Here are some observations, which apply both to direct contact and to the guidance of agents, on how to talk to Russians. The first and overriding rule: Warmth, openness, sincerity, interest. A cold, suspicious, cautious, unresponsive person is greeted with coldness, suspicion, caution, and indifference. Second rule: Avoid polemics, political evangelism, criticism, one-upmanship. Third rule: Don't probe. Fourth rule: Show respect where respect is due.[8]

Remember that the object of the exercise is not to pass the afternoon, conduct political arguments, or cement international relations; it is to recruit Soviets. The immediate purposes of the social contact are to build rapport, to elicit responses useful for assessment, to assist chosen targets in articulating grievances, to awaken resentments and anxieties, to plant ideas, to make oneself a sympathetic friend, a channel, a "connection." These objectives should be best served by questioning and conversation on topics which we know from our many studies to be likely to stimulate anti-regime responses, tailored to the extent possible to the individual Soviet in question so as to strike a responsive note without giving cause for alarm.

Example No. 1. A Soviet Army officer in assistant attaché assignment, rank commensurate with age but passed over a number of times for assignment as attaché. Hero of the Soviet Union. Difficult personality, has chronically had difficulties with his chiefs and expresses contempt for them. Blunt, outspoken. Very high self-estimate. Highly variable moods.

After rapport was solidly established, we would question him about and discuss the Soviet Army promotion system, what he would do after retirement, when he would make General, how it could be that those clowns, his several chiefs, could be put in charge of anything, what kind of pull and connections they must have, what the future is for an officer who has wasted seven career years in attaché assignments under chiefs who have given him bad fitness reports, and so on. We would make frequent allusions in various contexts to corresponding aspects of U.S. practice. These conversations were of course progressive so that the target was never offended, and we elicited a surprisingly positive response. Then after a six-month build-up we hit him with a disguised but definite approach. He backed away, but not without absorbing our point. The rapport was not broken, and we have a reasonable belief that the conversations were never reported. No defection, no recruitment; but who knows, in the future, if perhaps the system should kick him hard in the teeth.

Example No. 2. GRU colonel, civilian journalist cover. Spotted and developed by third-national agents. Difficult personality, disliked by a number of other Soviets. Cultural pretensions. Pompous and conceited, high self-estimate, but work actually marginal. Self-indulgent. Strongly dependent personality, would refuse to rebut political arguments. Drinking progressively more during his tour, toward the end approaching near-alcoholism. Under pressure would block up and become unable to express himself. Marital situation unknown, although ample evidence of frequent friction with his wife. Constantly chafing against the "bureaucracy." Frequently in trouble with the embassy.

After development by agents, warmly accepted direct American contact, which confirmed almost all aspects of previous indirect assessment. He was crude, arrogant, condescending, constantly talking (about himself), highly insecure, seeming greatly in need of a sympathetic listener (other Soviets apparently wouldn't give him the time of day). Unfortunately, just when the relationship was getting warm he and the Soviet ambassador discovered a common passion for chess, which transported him from a condition of chronic discontent, isolation, and unhappiness to a seventh heaven where all immediate opportunity for manipulation was dissolved.[9]

Our conversations with this Soviet were directed towards conveying a sense of the cultural ferment, freedom, experimentation, and opportunity to be found in the West and particularly in the United States. We especially dwelt on the immense prestige, power, and influence exercised by Western journalists and commentators. We also fed back to him his own complaints about the cultural and intellectual

[8] See *A Guide for Interviewing Soviet Escapees*, Air Research and Development Command, HRRI, Research Study No. 3, August 1953. This is the best single handling guide or training manual for contacts with Soviets that the writer has run across. See also *How the Soviet System Works*, by Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn, available in both hard cover and paperback.

[9] Our belief in the value of using the Russian language was strengthened by this case. Both this man and his wife spoke good English, and he also spoke the local language. As he drank, however, he would revert more and more to Russian. His wife also, on one occasion at a party, after several hours of effort at being pleasant, sought us out with the plea, "Come sit and talk with me in Russian, I'm tired of speaking English."

sterility of "bureaucracy," with a progressive effort to tie the terms of reference for this into his headquarters in Moscow and the local Soviet embassy.

Example No. 3. A young Soviet officer was noted in the telephone taps, soon after arriving, to be having serious difficulties with his wife and to be drinking very heavily. After raising cain on the town one night he was apparently severely reprimanded and assigned (as he still is) to minor embassy drudgery. His parents were divorced, we learned, and as a child he lived with his stepmother and mother alternately, a pointer to one possible source of his problems. A third-national agent with a logical business cover established contact with him, and a warm though unproductive relationship has resulted. (It is unproductive because the intermediary agent is an unimaginative plod, unresponsive to requirements and guidance by virtue of inability to grasp any subtleties whatever. But we keep trying.)

The Soviet did make one interesting point in a conversation with the agent, to wit: "Please don't invite me out. We are not like the Germans or British or Americans and cannot accept an invitation just like that. If I accept your invitation, I must obtain approval, and for this I must offer explanation, provide justifications, and so on. You like me and I like you, but it just isn't worth it."

Our efforts to get additional means of regular access to this man have so far been fruitless. Recently, however, upon being introduced to this writer, he was talking within minutes about the sterility and boredom of existence in the confines of the Soviet colony. He is outgoing, bored, curious, anxious to see and learn, chafing under embassy restrictions, and at least partially perceptive of the negative aspects of the Soviet system. He deserves further exploration, to assist him in the articulation of his discontents and to discover whether his personality, political, and career problems are deep and strong enough to provide fuel for a channeled explosion.

These examples illuminate to some extent the generalization that the safest, most innocuous way to surface and cultivate anti-social tendencies and personal grievances, as well as plant ideas and communicate sympathy, is by *questions* on certain crucial topics: "What is your promotion system?" "You look very tired tonight, have you been working too hard?" "You say you are bored and hate this place, but there is this and this and this to do, you have a very pleasant and beautiful Club, how can you feel that way?" "Why do you call diplomats worthless careerists?" "How can the Soviet Foreign Office

assign a man like B [whom we know the respondent hates] to such a responsible post?"

Digression: Virtues of the Interrogative

The utility of questions in stimulating conversation, in focussing thought, in causing inner turmoil (if that is what you want to do), and in communicating a sympathetic awareness is of more than mere tactical value. The mind functions four to five times as fast as oral communication, so that even under the best circumstances, when a respondent is interested in what you are saying, his attention and thoughts are continually straying, elaborating. Under less than the best circumstances, where there is a language problem and the respondent is only mildly or even negatively interested, his attention is constantly wandering and the effectiveness of your communication can go well below 10 percent. Addressing him a question, however, serves to engage almost his whole consciousness, prevents his thoughts from wandering, appeals to his ego, and communicates an interest in him and his opinions.

In addition, the responses to certain types of questions can be useful in assessment; the so-called *projective* questions, requiring expressions of preference, interest, and the like, are an essential part of assessment. For example: "Who is your favorite author [or fictional hero]?" "What do you hope to do when you retire?" "What is it you like best [or least] about living in such and such a country?" "What do you want your children to do in life?" "Why did you choose the foreign service?" "Your work involves talking to people a lot, do you like that?" "Why did you [a Satellite representative] like the movie 'Chance Meeting'?"

Suitable questions are the most effective way to probe personally and politically sensitive topics and implant ideas without running a risk of alienating the respondent or exposing your own prior knowledge. A sure way to alienate Soviets is to criticize the system, its methods and policies, etc., even if you know what you are talking about and even though the Soviet may agree with you. The better way to get him to think such thoughts is to trigger them by seemingly innocuous questions. "What do you do with your evenings?" "Have you been dancing at A?" "Have you visited B?" "Do you prefer to spend your time at your own Club here?" These questions (and many more like them), directed at a person already chafing at the restricted and highly organized Soviet embassy existence (a fact

known to you from other sources), will certainly provoke inner reactions, no matter what the overt response is.[10]

The Last Step

After all these many words we are still faced with the crucial problem of how this whole process is to be carried to the point of defection or recruitment, as the case may be. In a sense, to be sure, we can consider all we have done—identifying targets, establishing relationships with them, working on their frustrations, pressures, prides, and ambitions—as worth-while programmed work to increase the probability of walk-ins. And that it will often be. Only in a most unusual and favorable case will an outright approach be made, and then only after every aspect has been studied and restudied at headquarters and in the field and the plan specifically tailored to its opportunities, peculiarities, and risks.

But to complete a hypothetical case let us assume that we have arrived at the stage of considering an outright approach. We are working with a Soviet who is definitely "different"—an odd-ball of some type, neurotic, "alienated," possibly quite disturbed. We know a great deal about him from a number of different sources as well as through direct contact. He has shown a tendency to relax and talk about his personal problems with his American or other friend. He has shown he has the nerve to side-step Soviet security controls, and we have strong grounds for believing that he is not reporting his conversations with us. We believe that we have detected an important change in his relationship with other Soviets (which may not have passed unnoticed by them either).

[10] This digression on the interrogative was derived from the theory of sales work, a fact which provokes a further digression: It is strange that a profession so highly dependent on personal contact, personal rapport, and personal influence as clandestine operations is has paid practically no attention to such allied lines of endeavor as social case work and selling. The sales profession has intensively applied both pragmatic insight and psychological research to problems of personal effectiveness, rapport, interpersonal influence, the hard sell, and the soft, insidious sell. It has no qualms whatever about telling a salesman both how he is to talk to people and what he is to say, with highly effective results. A manual entitled *Cold Call Selling*, published by the National Sales Development Institute, is the finest piece this writer has seen on the "cold approach." (It cost him $17.00, which couldn't be written off operationally but was at least income tax deductible.) Elmer Leterman's *Creative Selling* is a fine manual on personal contact, especially on the soft sell.

What do we do now? Here we should keep in mind the very basic proposition that a man who defects is *running away* from something too big for him to cope with, and a man who changes sides in place is *fighting back* against something. Neither is being pulled to us by personal magnetism or ideological attraction, even though these motives may appear as rationalizations. Our role then is to continue to build up, in our contacts with him and perhaps by clandestine irritant actions on the side, these inner pressures that are driving him. At this stage we try to contribute to building in him the conviction that there is no hope for him within the Soviet system. Now we can do what we could not earlier, try to channel and focus his resentment onto the top Soviet leaders, the apparatchiki who surround them, or the system itself. The process is one of pinning the blame for his intense personal dissatisfactions on the regime, of directing his anti-social tendencies, if you will, against it.

This is a stage of utmost interest and delicacy. We are not trying to tell a Soviet things which he himself knows better and feels more deeply than we. But we can build on, feed back to him, and focus feelings which he has already expressed. We all know how to calm a friend down when he is upset; we also know, with a close friend, subjects to avoid talking about, not because he would get angry at us but because they would hit sensitive nerves and plunge him into depression or trigger anxieties. It is the reverse of this latter course, in moderate and appropriate doses, that we deliberately pursue with our Soviet "friend."

Once a Soviet is so far along as to question his own system and his relationship to it, we are not far from our ultimate goal. Once he begins to think of his rulers as bad or irresponsible or dangerous or corrupt, or as surrounded, misinformed, and manipulated by others who are like that, he is very close to the crossing.

In Sum

It has been our thesis here that we do have a sufficient basis of understanding to bring about recruitments and defections of Soviets. Our information sources, if they are properly used, are adequate to permit us at least an initial target selection; and if we deliberately seek out "alienated" Soviets, the neurotic or sociopathic fringe, the chronically unhappy, the misfits, we can significantly increase our probability of yield. We must, however, seek some means of solving

the overriding problem of our own attitudes, of overcoming our skepticism and indifference. If we do not, the future will be like the past, and such successes as we achieve will be simply from luck or circumstance, or perhaps from our mistakes cancelling each other out.

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Wanted: a Word

Dear Sirs:

The contribution from intelligence officers who defect from the Communist services has been one of the mainstays of our counter-intelligence effort, and we have accordingly sought in various ways to create as inviting an atmosphere as possible for further defections. One of the most difficult aspects of this effort, and one of the biggest stumbling blocks to defection, is the implication of cowardice, treason, and desertion not only in the act itself but also in the terminology applied to it. Deserter, turncoat, renegade, apostate, etc., are words of opprobrium, and even the usual term defector, though less indignant than the others, carries a connotation of dishonorable motives, a touch of the subconscious revulsion Organization Man feels for any deed that undermines his organization.

This deed is not necessarily dishonorable, however; it is usually the only effective action within the capabilities of an intelligence officer caught in the meshes of tyranny if disillusionment or his principles drive him to oppose that tyranny. Defection from a Communist service requires courage as well as adroitness. And even if a defector's motives are unworthy we don't attract him by the use of stigmatizing names.

It has long been recognized that the terminology we use is infelicitous from the point of view of encouraging defections, and there have been sporadic efforts now and then to develop a new semantic approach. These have not been successful; a new word or phrase is still being sought and is badly needed. What we are looking for is a readily understandable expression conveying the idea of a courageous act to liberate not only oneself but other victims, one that is translatable or transliterable into foreign languages and not susceptible to invidious or comical perversion. If any of your readers has a suggestion we should be happy to hear it through your good offices.

Gordon Cooperwood

Soviet doctrine on the holding of meetings with agents.

OPERATIONAL CONTACTS [1]

L. K. Bekrenev

Personal contacts with agents are conditioned by a series of mutually related factors among which the following are basic:

The situation, maturity, and importance of the agent.
What is to be accomplished by the meeting.
The professional skill and the legal status of case officer and agent.
The timing, duration, and place of the meeting.
Prevailing operational conditions.

Quality of the Agent

If an agent is sufficiently trusted and if he supplies valuable information, personal contact with him should be reduced to a minimum. For the intervals it suffices to work out a plan for either to summon the other to a meeting in case of emergency.

Even in meetings with a tested and reliable agent much attention is paid to security as well as to the fulfillment of intelligence requirements; but in working with an agent who has not been fully assessed and vetted, the prime emphasis is put on vigilance and checking—has he been planted by the local counterintelligence, are his motives in agreeing to collaborate sincere? The need for personal meetings with such an agent is increased, for they give the opportunity to assess him more completely. But the meetings must be conducted with caution. In 1959 an officer assigned to a certain residency [2] submitted a plan for a third-country meeting with an agent who had been recently and hurriedly recruited and not thoroughly assessed. Headquarters warned the resident [3] of the need for precautionary measures, and in this it proved to be correct: the agent brought along counterintelligence officers to the meeting site. The resident's application of precautionary measures and the case officer's observance of correct

[1] Adapted from a Top Secret paper issued by the Soviet Military-Diplomatic Academy in 1960. For the circumstances of its issue see *Studies* VIII 1, p. 16.

[2] Field Station.

[3] Chief of Station.

operating techniques en route to the meeting made possible the deflection of a serious provocation by adversary counterintelligence.

One should not neglect personal meetings with agents who are not sources of important information. Agents performing support roles are also essential to the service and should be appreciated. If a Soviet intelligence officer on an illegal assignment is supplied cover by an auxiliary agent, his fate depends upon that agent.

In general, whatever an agent's role in the intelligence net, personal contact should be made with him only when it is impossible to manage without it. The number of meetings should be kept as low as possible, especially with sources of valuable information. This principle holds for all residencies and agent groups [4] but particularly for residencies under legal [5] cover in countries which have severe counterintelligence practices.

Purpose of Meetings

Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his next assignment and instructions for carrying it out, to train him in tradecraft or the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulfill several of these purposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually served by a meeting. In addition to its particular objectives more general needs can be filled. A meeting held for training purposes may be a means for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study him and obtain new data on his potential and talents, thereby providing a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in him.

These various objectives require different kinds of meeting in terms of frequency, duration, and choice of time and place.

Professional Skill

Success in face-to-face handling depends to a large degree on the professional authority of the handler, his knowledge of the business, the firmness of his will, his adherence to principle, and his ability to get along with people. Above all else is dedication to the assignment and a positive resolve to achieve success and fulfill the assigned tasks.

[4] Which may be controlled by a principal agent rather than a staff officer.

[5] Official (or semiofficial, like Tass).

Vigilance in protecting one's activity and intentions not only from counterintelligence but also from the agent requires a developed intuition, the power of observation, and an ability to retain the initiative and assert one's will tactfully.

Some case officers lose the initiative during agent meetings by wasting time discussing secondary matters or problems in no way related to the purpose of the meeting and end up failing to attain the objectives for which the meeting had been set up. Recently, for example, a case officer from one of our residencies under legal cover was asked to make a quick contact with an agent in order to transmit to him Headquarters' decision that he should immediately leave the country because of impending danger. Instead of executing these instructions immediately, the case officer devoted a meeting to completely unnecessary conversation about the agent's status in the country, means of communication, legal documentation, etc. Then he ordered the agent not to travel anywhere without his approval and set another meeting for six days later! The resident had to correct the situation immediately.

There have been cases in which agents have actually refused to meet with officers who exhibited incompetence in matters concerning which they themselves, as specialists, were working in behalf of Soviet intelligence. During meetings the case officers acted timid, were not serious, let their minds wander, acted stiff and formal, attempted to order the agents about, or did not show interest in the agents' problems. Or they did not give the agents satisfactory explanations of operational or contact problems, betraying thereby lack of preparation and at times confusion, which engendered doubts in the agents as to the security of working with them. Such conduct has often lost us the services of valuable agents.

Experienced case officers are made, not born. Experience is acquired by practical work. New case officers, just beginning to work at agent operations abroad, therefore have to hold personal meetings with agents. But they learn also by example, instruction, and coaching. It is necessary to imbue them with professional skills and draw them gradually, starting with less complicated tasks, into the work of handling agents.

Legal Status

There have been instances in which agents have refused to meet with case officers whose legal position in the country was incompatible with their own situation. In particular, several agents have refused

to have meetings with officers from our military attaché apparatus because if discovered by outsiders or counterintelligence they would be incriminated. The legal status of case officers and agents is of utmost significance for clandestinity, security of communications, and ability to make personal contact and must be taken into account in planning meetings.

During the years 1951-1953 our service suffered some bitter failures. To a significant degree these were a consequence of slackened vigilance on the part of case officers in legal residencies and of their agents. The case officers would report that meetings had been carried out under favorable conditions and there had been no external surveillance. But testimony at trials would subsequently show that counterintelligence had known not only the time and place of meetings but also their duration and details such as who the participants were and what they did, how the officers were dressed, and in one case even the color of the wrapper on a package that had been passed. There had obviously been surveillance which both case officers and agents had failed to detect.

These failures occurred, not because operational conditions were terribly complicated or the adversary counterintelligence service was so skillful, but because either the case officers or the agents had forgotten to be vigilant at all times, mistaken the significance of cover and security, or done incorrect things. This was what enabled counterintelligence to arrest our agents and expel our officers from the country. At present counterintelligence practices are less severe in several of the eastern capitalist countries than in the west, but that gives no reason to weaken vigilance there. Favorable elements in any operational situation should be taken advantage of, but not by relaxing vigilance and security consciousness.

Illegal residencies[6] and agent groups, not being subject to surveillance of the kind experienced under legal cover, can depend better on having secure personal meetings. These can be held in a relaxed atmosphere and in some instances without clandestinity. In every country there live many "welcome" foreigners, tourism is a mass phenomenon, business and family ties are widely developed; thus large human streams cross international borders. No country has a counterintelligence service with the capability to follow every foreigner, not to say every local inhabitant, in its effort to identify officers and agents of foreign intelligence services.

[6] Under deep cover, which in Soviet practice involves false documentation.

This does not mean that members of illegal residencies are not subjected to any surveillance, only that its incidence on them is greatly reduced. Provided, of course, that they have not compromised themselves by mistakes or rash acts and so been placed under special observation, counterintelligence does not follow at their heels. Moreover, they have greater freedom in selecting cover stories, means of disguise, and other security measures, even in countries with the most severe counterintelligence practices.

Choice of Case Officer

The legal status factor should be taken into account in deciding what case officer is to be assigned to carry out any particular meeting with an agent. Initially, in legal residencies, meetings with agents are carried out by the officers who assessed and recruited them. Depending on the purpose of the meeting or the importance of the agent, they can also be held by the resident, his deputy, or a special case officer sent for this purpose from Headquarters.

Case officers in legal residencies, in the course of recruiting agents, cultivate new contacts among local inhabitants who seem to have agent potential. The development of such persons, on top of already recruited agents, brings an increasing number of personal meetings and concomitant danger of detection. In order to reduce this danger and also improve the management of the intelligence net, Headquarters splits off the most valuable agents of legal residencies and sets them up under illegal residencies or as agent groups reporting directly to Headquarters via illegal channels.

In illegal residencies and agent groups meetings are held by the residents, their deputies, and the group leaders. A resident can assign a trusted cut-out to hold a meeting that has limited objectives such as transmitting materials. Despite the favorable conditions in illegal residencies, meetings must be planned and held in full compliance with clandestine operational doctrine. Holding them without professional planning is not permitted. Each member of an illegal residency or agent group must check constantly for clandestinity and for the security of his illegal status and make efforts to improve that status.

In principle it is undesirable to make frequent changes in the person assigned to meet an agent. It is therefore important, before assigning an officer to make contact with any agent, to think over thoroughly all the considerations presented above in order to avoid

mistakes. From the point of view of security, it is also improper to set up personal contact between the radio operator of an illegal residency and agents in its network. Only the resident must know the identity of the radio operator.

As a parallel security measure the agents of an illegal residency must not know the basic biographic data (name, nationality, addresses) on the resident, his assistants, or the cut-outs who effect the operational contact. For this reason it is better to use pseudonyms, although in practice it is not always possible. Under no circumstances should horizontal lines of personal contact be permitted, even if adherence to this doctrine necessitates excluding an agent from operational activity for some time. This is a vitally important rule, especially among valuable and trusted agents.

Headquarters is responsible for personal contact arrangements with illegal residents, group leaders, and singleton case officers or agents reporting directly to Headquarters. It sends out its case officers for this purpose, either illegally with foreign documentation or officially with Soviet documentation and an appropriate cover story. The meetings can be held in the target country or in a third country. In some cases the agent may be summoned to Headquarters and the business taken care of there. In that case it is necessary to expunge from the agent's passport (or the resident's or group leader's) all notations concerning his stay in the Soviet Union.

Choice of Place

The choice of meeting place is of considerable importance and should be made deliberately and with foresight. It has to lend itself to the objectives of the meeting, suit the positions in society of the agent and case officer, and satisfy security considerations. Meetings can be held on city streets, in parks, restaurants, cafés, reading rooms, or museums, out of town, in the suburbs, etc. The range of possibilities depends to a large degree on the creative initiative of members of the residency, conditioned by a firm knowledge of the real operational situation, local conditions, and the structure and techniques of the counterintelligence and police forces.

Elements to be taken into account include the severity of the country's administration, the sensitivity of the police force, the extent to which police and counterintelligence check local inhabitants, foreigners, employees of Soviet installations, main highways, streets, and squares, and how well state and private buildings and transportation

facilities are guarded. Similarly it is necessary to bear in mind the degree to which counterintelligence and police agents are planted in enterprises and public buildings such as theaters, museums, libraries, and restaurants. In addition to counterintelligence activity, one should consider police measures for maintaining public order, particularly the control of criminal elements and lesser violators of law and morality. In the summer of 1959, for example, two of our illegals meeting abroad found themselves in a district where the police were conducting a roundup of such elements. When they saw what was going on they took off, but could not get away without having their documents inspected by the police. The situation would have been much worse for an officer under legal cover meeting with an agent.

For prolonged meetings it is necessary to choose places which outsiders cannot observe. Frequently the agent is picked up at some predetermined place in an automobile and taken for operational work to a place chosen earlier that the agent himself had not known about. The agent's own car can also be used for this purpose. It is best not to hold conversations on operational matters in the automobile, for it is possible that a recorder might be hidden in it.

Places for long meetings present fewer difficulties in illegal residencies. Their members can meet in their own apartments, in hotels, or in out-of-town resort areas without any special risk of suspicion. But even in illegal residencies the demands of clandestinity and security must be observed in choosing meeting places. The local operational climate and the status of the persons to take part in the meeting must be taken into account.

The problem is greater in residencies under legal cover. Here it is best either to have reliable safehouses or to deliver the agent discreetly to the official residency building. The latter is a serious operational move. If neither is feasible, it is better to have Headquarters dispatch an officer to a third country, either legally or illegally, for the meeting.

Here are some of the mistakes sometimes made by case officers of legal residencies. They hold meetings in restaurants and other public establishments located near hotels and houses where employees of Soviet installations, sometimes even the case officers themselves, reside. The service personnel in such establishments know the identities of Soviet citizens. Some of them may be counterintelligence agents, and in any case they may spot our officer holding a meeting and report to the police or the counterintelligence service. Other

meetings are held near guarded compounds and government installations where more intense surveillance is maintained than elsewhere.

Some case officers use the same site for successive meetings over an extended period of time. Others hold meetings in their own or the agent's apartment, sometimes taking along their wives in order to suggest a family friendship. These fail to realize that social intercourse implies a closer relationship than legitimate business relations and unquestionably will not escape notice in these days of intense counterintelligence activity.

Timing, Duration, Frequency

In the matter of timing it is always necessary to bear in mind the current foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government so that these will not be prejudiced by any unfavorable incident arising from the operational contact. If there is any such risk the meeting should be postponed until another time. This applies to meetings with agents that are poorly assessed or insufficiently tested, particularly if there is doubt of their bona fides. It applies also when there is a possibility that the case officer will be under surveillance as he leaves for the meeting. This consideration should be borne in mind by case officers of illegal residencies but especially by those in residencies under legal cover.

Governments of capitalist countries sometimes pursue political ends by having counterintelligence set up special provocations against Soviet officials and catch them meeting with agents or agent candidates. The object may be to compromise Soviet foreign policy, strain international relations, or strengthen the political position of the capitalist government, especially if it is currently trying to get a military or anti-democratic law through parliament. Sometimes this is done against the opposition of the counterintelligence service, for the premature detention of the Soviet officer may frustrate its effort to make a thorough study of his contacts. As a rule provocations against our officers are associated with an international or internal political development, and they are even mounted against officials who have no connection with agent operations.

Meetings should be kept as short as the transaction of the business allows. The case officer and agent must not be together without a purpose. They should not waste time discussing matters having no substantial relationship to the business at hand. This does not mean that one should talk to the agent only about business in dry bureaucratic language. Sensitivity towards the agent's interests must be developed. If the situation permits, he should be heard out even on matters which were not anticipated when the meeting was planned but which have an operational relationship and can influence his future work. But he should not be permitted to deflect the talk into a labyrinth of secondary, insignificant topics. The case officer must keep the initiative in his own hands, and he must remember that control of a meeting in a proper and businesslike manner cuts down its length.

Frequent meetings with the same agent are unwise, especially if he is a tested and reliable one producing important secret information. Meetings with such agents can be reduced to one or two a year, or even fewer, held whenever possible in third countries. Routine transactions can be taken care of through nonpersonal forms of communication. With more ordinary agents it should not be necessary to meet oftener than once every two or three months. These limitations are of special importance for residencies under legal cover.

Operational Conditions

It should be taken as axiomatic that Soviet intelligence officers under legal cover are subject to counterintelligence scrutiny in all capitalist countries, most effectively in those with severe counterintelligence practices. In some European and eastern countries the counterintelligence effort is not as intense as in the countries of the Anglo-American bloc, and the operational situation is therefore "easier." But this seeming ease never justifies reduced vigilance and security-consciousness on the part of case officers and agents. Flaps still occur in countries where the operational situation appears to be relatively favorable, and analysis shows that flaps do not depend on the complexity or simplicity of the operational situation but are traceable to deficiencies in the camouflage of operational activity, slackening of vigilance, and neglect of cover and clandestinity.

In capitalist countries of the east that have comparatively small counterintelligence apparatuses, the activities of our legal residencies still do not necessarily go without observation. The counterintelligence programs of such countries as the U.S.A., England, and France are also extended to those eastern countries and seek to undermine and compromise the favorably developing relations between them and the Soviet Union. The capitalist counterintelligence services exploit in this effort all the national peculiarities of which the east has many.

This tactic of adversary counterintelligence carries possibilities of great unpleasantness for us.

Because of the operational conditions now prevailing in capitalist countries, intelligence officers, especially those in residencies under legal cover, must seek out and apply the most reliable forms and methods of camouflage and clandestinity when meeting personally with agents. Although the holding of personal meetings has been rendered difficult for them, with proper study, good planning, and careful execution it can be successful. Counterintelligence surveillance of personnel in Soviet installations abroad is not so tight or continuous as to make operational activity impossible. As a rule it is intermittent and is shifted from one case officer to another and even to persons that have no connection with agent operations. A counterintelligence service does not possess the means for uninterrupted surveillance in all places at all times in all cities; it uses various systems, and observation teams do not work around the clock in all places. Once one understands the working patterns of a particular counterintelligence service, obstacles erected by it can be circumvented.

An agent with whom personal contact is maintained must be inculcated by his case officer with the qualities of a clandestine personality. He must be invested with the ability to camouflage himself, to exercise vigilance, to determine whether he is being observed by counterintelligence. He must have the ability to spot surveillance at his place of work or outside his place of work, especially when departing for an operational meeting.

Agents' carelessness or inexperience in matters of security has often resulted in operational flaps. Some agents have failed to attach significance to the circumstance that someone, often an acquaintance or friend, began to show intensified interest in them before the compromise. They ignored changes in their relationships with co-workers and friends. They did not wonder about the appearance of new faces in their milieu. Some agents, because of inexperience or in a deliberate violation of security rules induced by personal rashness, have failed to check for surveillance when going to an operational meeting. Some agents go to operational meetings unprepared, without thinking out their future actions in advance, and have not planned what behavior patterns to exhibit while en route to the meeting place or in its area. Some have approached our case officers at places not stipulated as meeting sites, have telephoned the case officer at his office and discussed personal contact arrangements, or have showed up in person at the Soviet installation to see the case officer.

Regardless of how skillful and vigilant a case officer may be, he can come to the attention of counterintelligence if one of his agents violates operational rules deliberately or neglects them because of inexperience. Furthermore, the agent's attitude toward cover and clandestinity when meeting with his case officer contributes to some degree to the over-all assessment of his sincerity and honesty in collaborating with Soviet intelligence. Some agents, of course, work honestly with us without adhering to the basic rules of security on the premise that no kind of surveillance is being directed at them. Nevertheless the case officer must always consider the agent's attitude toward security and train and indoctrinate him accordingly. He must seek out the reasons for every deviation by the agent from the norms of behavior he has laid down.

Planning a Meeting

The preparation of a meeting plan is done by the handling case officer with the guidance of the resident or his deputy. It begins with the meeting's objectives and tasks, including specific problems to be resolved with the agent, the ways and order of their solution, and operational or personal problems which the agent may have and which should be settled at the meeting. If the meeting place and time previously selected are not suitable for the accomplishment of these tasks or for current operational conditions, then it is proper to make changes. The agent should be informed in advance by nonpersonal contact or at the agreed time and place during a brief contact. The latter procedure is the better if the scheduled meeting is imminent; it avoids confusion and possible broken contact. If it is possible that surveillance of the handling officer may endanger the meeting, then he can be replaced by another handler.

The case officer must study the operational climate on the route of travel and in the area of the meeting place. He must be prepared to take correct stock of the situation on the spot and in case of necessity make the proper security decisions. Some case officers panic when complications arise in the operational situation in the vicinity of the meeting place. Some officers suspecting surveillance either continue according to plan, attaching no significance to their suspicions, or completely abandon the meeting without activating planned measures to get to the bottom of the situation. If the latter, they frequently head for the automobile that brought them to the meeting area instead of going home, thus giving counterintelligence the oppor-

tunity to identify another intelligence officer, the one at the wheel of the parked automobile. Another mistake is for the case officer, instead of leaving the meeting area by a route designed to avoid encountering the agent, to take a direction that results in confrontation with him. Not suspecting danger (incidentally, the need for danger signals is not always anticipated), the agent goes right up to the case officer; and counterintelligence has caught them in contact.

The plan will include reaffirmation or replacement of agreed meeting arrangements and signals, the cover story for the meeting and the sequence of actions to be taken to substantiate it, assessment of the personal qualities of the agent and observation of his behavior, the sequence of actions to be used in checking the operational climate in the meeting area beforehand and afterward, and in case of need a check on the agent's honesty. It will include the sequence of moves to be made in the event the agent does not appear or if complications arise while the case officer is en route to the meeting area, approaching the meeting site, or actually with the agent. Finally, it will include arrangements with the support elements assigned to provide security for the meeting and the danger signals agreed upon.

After he has thought over and clarified all of these elements, the officer should make a written outline of his plan and schedule of action. This will help him to resolve all problems and accomplish his mission completely and clandestinely in the briefest possible period of time.

Secure Exit

The departure of a case officer for an agent meeting is critical when he is under legal cover in a capitalist country with stringent counterintelligence practices. Preparations can be made approximately as follows.

Several days before the scheduled meeting the residency, using support means and other available assets, studies the status of the case officer with respect to the presence of counterintelligence surveillance. Also studied are the counterintelligence personnel and technical assets being used against the Soviet installations, especially the counterintelligence officers assigned to follow the given case officer. Trial exits of the case officer into the city are made in order to determine the nature and extent of surveillance. Similar exits are made simultaneously by other case officers in order to determine as completely as possible the intensity of surveillance and to see whether the counterintelligence assets assigned to the given officer are withdrawn and reassigned to follow the others.

The case officer who is to hold the meeting "trains" counterintelligence personnel to a habitual daily schedule of movements in order to take the edge off their vigilance. It may be useful to deviate from this daily pattern sometimes in order to test how the counterintelligence personnel react, but one should never "play" with the counterintelligence agents and tease them by acts ostensibly designed to shake surveillance.

On the basis of data collected by these measures steps are worked out for the officer to make a secure exit into the city to hold the meeting (or to forewarn the agent if he discovers surveillance). A system of signals is agreed upon and an appropriate distribution of security and support personnel is worked out. For the latter, other case officers and technical personnel in the residency are co-opted, ones not subject to intensive counterintelligence surveillance.

For the exit itself various techniques of camouflage are used. In one case, talks indicating the case officer was ill were held several times during the day over a telephone known to be tapped by the counterintelligence service. The state of his health was being discussed again over the telephone at the very time when he was leaving his home to meet an agent, so early that surveillance teams had not yet started to work. In another instance the officer was hidden in an automobile and driven by two other members of the residency to a place where one of the two was taking driving lessons. The counterintelligence agents, who for some time had been used to watching this car leave for the driving lessons, now trailed it for a while and then fell for the cover story and discontinued surveillance.

Once a "party" was arranged in the apartment of a case officer who was scheduled to meet with an illegal. Counterintelligence, believing the cover story and supposing that all residency personnel subject to surveillance were safely assembled in this one place, relaxed vigilance. Taking advantage of their relaxation, the "host" went out by a secret exit, held his meeting, and returned the same way. He resumed entertaining his "guests" and then conducted them down to the street before the very eyes of the counterintelligence agents, leaving the impression he had been in the apartment with his comrades all the time.

In order to weaken surveillance over a case officer who is about to leave for an agent meeting, other members of the residency are some-

times sent into town in order to disperse the strength of the surveillance teams and distract their attention. The invention of successful camouflage devices depends on the use of initiative and resourcefulness in the light of the specific concrete situation.

Surveillance en Route

Automobiles and residency members on foot can be used for signaling danger to the case officer going to a meeting. They are stationed at prearranged points, the men perhaps making calls from specified telephone booths. Everything is calculated as to time and place. The case officer may be required to go to a stipulated point at a given time or be at a given place in order to observe what kind of a signal is set up there. If our automobile, for example, were parked at a specified point, this would signify that the case officer was under surveillance and should not keep the rendezvous. In working out such safeguards they should be so calculated as to warn the case officer in time for him to call off the operation before making contact with the agent.

Secret technical devices are used to detect surveillance on case officers going to an agent meeting.[7] Carefully selected residency employees can also be sent out to test operational conditions along the handling officer's route, at particular points to be passed, and in the area of the meeting place. This must be done, however, without attracting superfluous persons into the meeting area and without drawing counterintelligence attention to it. In some cases such procedures are coordinated on the spot with residents of fellow intelligence organs.[8] Sometimes employees supporting the meeting of a case officer with an agent are subjected to more intense surveillance than the case officer himself and so pull the counterintelligence "tails" along after them to the meeting. In this fashion security support is converted into its opposite, and the operation has to be called off.

The case officer departing for a meeting is required to check carefully whether he himself is under surveillance. If he is, he must convince the surveillants by his actions that his trip into town has no intelligence connotations; that is, he must act in conformity with the approved cover story or its alternate. He must also try to shake off the surveillants. It is not proper, however, to let it be evident that

[7] Presumably the monitoring of counterintelligence radios.

[8] *I.e.*, the KGB.

he is trying to shake them off, especially if the meeting is with a valuable agent. Obvious efforts usually do not work. On the contrary, they charge the atmosphere around the case officer and bring on counterintelligence reinforcements.

The officer can go on to the meeting only after careful checking and making fully certain that there is no surveillance. When surveillance is discovered and when it is impossible to get away from it naturally, he should calmly abort the meeting.

The Meeting

Upon meeting the agent, the case officer first tells him the cover story for their being together and then establishes arrangements for future contact. After that the business specified in the meeting plan can be taken up. If the plan calls for the return of intelligence materials to the agent, these are given to him immediately. But if it calls for the case officer to get materials from the agent, it is best for him to take them at the last moment, just before the meeting ends. Then, when counterintelligence activity is severe, he must get rid of them as quickly as possible. For this purpose support automobiles or other members of the residency are sometimes stationed at predetermined points in order to take them from him.

Various techniques are used to effect the transfer of intelligence materials. They can be thrown into the open window of a parked automobile. They can be passed outside of town between two cars in motion, one overtaking the other and running side by side with it for a brief span. Heavy suitcases containing radio gear, for example, can be handed over in this way. Or the exchange can be accomplished under the pretext that one car is helping the other make repairs. Under present conditions, however, residencies under legal cover should receive and pass materials whenever possible via nonpersonal forms of communication with the aid of technical operational equipment.[9]

After the meeting has ended the case officer may, if special permission has been obtained from the resident, check on the actions of the agent by discreet, unnoticeable surveillance. This practice obtains when something in his behavior and performance gives rise to suspicion.

[9] Presumably concealment devices, including microphotography.

Upon return to the residency the case officer makes a detailed oral report to the resident, and if asked he writes a report for transmittal to Headquarters including his own comments and conclusions. The resident adds his comments before sending it.

Under Better Conditions

Meetings with an agent in a third country are planned and conducted in compliance with all the requirements of cover and clandestinity applicable to agent meetings everywhere. This applies especially when a Headquarters officer has traveled there with Soviet documentation to hold the meeting. In a third country, however, the operational climate is more favorable in that the counterintelligence and police agents do not know the identity of either the case officer or the agent. Moreover, neither the case officer nor the agent has acquaintances among the local populace, with whom an encounter during a meeting would be most undesirable. The agent feels more confident and relaxed, a circumstance which facilitates a more complete and thorough examination and resolution of the business at hand.

A third country is usually chosen that has less stringent counterintelligence practices, one where the operational situation permits holding a meeting with less risk of discovery. The case officer who arrives in a third country illegally, with foreign documentation, enjoys still more favorable conditions, not only for meetings but also for non-clandestine association with the agent. The two can even live in the same hotel. Nevertheless, a case officer meeting an agent in a third country must carefully adhere to all the rules of clandestine intelligence operations.

In illegal residencies and agent groups, meetings with agents should conform to the same requirements, even though conditions are different and security measures normally do not have to be carried to such lengths. The establishment of personal contact in illegal residencies and agent groups is under the control of Headquarters, and residents and group leaders report on meetings to Headquarters through their communications channels.

Meetings with an agent summoned from abroad to Headquarters enjoy the most favorable conditions of all, held in a safehouse and in a calm atmosphere which provide the opportunity to thrash out problems thoroughly and resolve pending operational matters. Such meetings establish conditions for definitive checking and assessment of the agent, should this be necessary. They entail, however, acute problems of security and cover, especially when the agent is quartered in a hotel with other foreigners. His contacts with Soviet officials must not become known to outsiders, especially his own countrymen. If he arrives with false documentation, he should be quartered in a safehouse only, and he should not appear in those places where citizens of his country might meet him. His exit from the USSR also requires serious attention. He cannot take an airplane or train on which acquaintances might happen to be traveling.

Conclusions

Despite its obvious vulnerability, personal contact in agent operations is unavoidable. It must be used most intensively for recruitment purposes. It has a number of advantages over other modes of agent communication. It facilitates the exchange of materials, the assessment of potential agents, and agent indoctrination and training. It is a means of direct supervision, which is extraordinarily important and necessary in intelligence operations, especially in the protection of the network from penetration by provocateurs and counterintelligence agents.

It is used primarily within residencies. It is also used by Headquarters for communication with agents, group leaders, and illegal residents, especially in peacetime. It can seldom be the means of delivering urgent intelligence reports, however, and therefore even in peacetime arrangements for radio and other forms of non-personal communication with Headquarters must be established.

Much is demanded of case officers making personal contacts—excellence in operational preparedness, personality, education, and general cultural development, knowledge of specialized matters on which the agents are working, ability to detect surveillance, ability to grasp quickly the content and significance of a discussion and make correct decisions on matters broached by agents, and skill in avoiding compromise of self and agent when danger threatens.

Because of the complexity of modern operational conditions, the possibilities for personal contact in a target country are significantly reduced and in some instances eliminated completely. Personal contact with a valuable agent should take place in a third country or at Headquarters.

Under present conditions the number of personal meetings between agents and case officers under legal cover should be reduced to a minimum. This end can be achieved by the amalgamation of agents into

agent groups or illegal residencies, by cutting off group leaders and illegal residents from contact with legal residencies, and by training illegal case officers at Headquarters to send out for meetings. The indispensable residue of meetings in residencies under legal cover are feasible if the essential measures of security and cover are taken.

Because plans for personal contacts depend on the particular participants, purposes, and local situation, much freedom is granted to residents in this respect. Yet control and supervision by Headquarters is never completely absent. It is precisely the central intelligence apparatus which can and must, by study of experience with personal contacts in all strategic intelligence operations, substantially aid residents to set up arrangements that conform with modern operational conditions. Headquarters officers, residency officers, and those who are in intelligence training establishments must develop the highest creative initiative and resourcefulness in the quest for secure agent communications, in fitting these to actual operational problems, and in the application of the latest attainments of Soviet and foreign science and technology.

Perusing the enemy bureaucracy's most secret files.

MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: BOSTON SERIES

The OSS station in Bern obtained access during the war to some of the classified communications among German government offices and between Berlin and its representatives abroad. A number of the intelligence reports paraphrasing these documents General Donovan considered worthy of the personal attention of the President, and carbons of these are included in his files of correspondence with the White House.[1] *A sampling of historically noteworthy items thus transmitted is reproduced below.*

New Source

10 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have secured through secret intelligence channels a series of what purport to be authentic reports, transmitted by various German diplomatic, consular, military and intelligence sources to their headquarters. The source and material are being checked as to probable authenticity both here and in London. We shall submit later a considered opinion on this point. It is possible that contact with this source furnishes the first important penetration into a responsible German agency.

We have labeled these reports the "Boston Series" and append hereto the first fourteen.[2]

[1] Described in the first of this series, subtitled "Sunrise," in *Studies* VII 2, p. 73 ff.

[2] The source was publicly identified as "George Wood," a subordinate official in a branch of the Reich Foreign Ministry, in Edward P. Morgan's "The Spy the Nazis Missed" in *True* magazine for July 1950. Morgan's story, based on information from "Wood," is fictionalized and inaccurate in some of its details but otherwise substantially correct. It reveals that the first of Wood's reports were cabled from Bern to Washington in late August 1943. Why "the first fourteen" were not disseminated until after more than four months is not clear.

GERMANS SECURE BRITISH REPORTS

Shortly prior to the 4th of November Ambassador Von Papen came into possession of certain documents on which he clearly places great value and which, seemingly, were secured from the British Embassy in Ankara by an important German agent.[3] Among the cables was a list of questions which the British Ambassador took to Cairo for his own guidance in consulting with Eden. Also included was a Foreign Office memorandum of October 7, apparently entitled, "A Long-Range View of Turkish-British Policy." By a special courier these and additional documents were dispatched to Berlin. Among these additional documents was a memorandum presumably dealing with the steps which the English were taking in Turkey in preparation for war and which was referred to in a list of questions.

* * *

TREATMENT OF ITALIANS LOYAL TO KING

The following order was dispatched by Keitel from General Headquarters to all involved, on the 12th of September:

> The following treatment shall be applied at the command of Hitler, to all Italian troops who permit their arms to come into the possession of rebels or who in any manner unite with rebels for mutual ends; if captured, 1) Officers are to be shot at once; 2) Soldiers and non-commissioned officers, avoiding as much as possible any passage through Germany, are to be dispatched at once to the East and put under Military Command for labor.

* * *

TREATMENT OF ITALIAN JEWS

On October 6, 1943, the following recommendation was made to high German sources by a German official in Italy:

> Orders have been received from Berlin by Obersturmbannfuehrer Kappler to seize and to take to Northern Italy the 8,000 Jews living in Rome. They are to be liquidated. General Stahel, the city commandant of Rome, will permit this action only if it is consistent with the policies of the Reich Foreign Minister. It would be better business, in my opinion, to use the Jews, as in Tunis, for work on fortifications. Together with Kappler, I shall present this view through Field Marshall General Kesselring.

* * *

SECRET NAZI RADIO IN DUBLIN[4]

A secret radio transmitter is located in the Nazi Legation in Dublin, and the Irish are aware of its existence. Regular cables from Dublin are sent, with considerable delay, by way of Bern; the Nazis are keeping the secret transmitter for emergency use only. The Irish are putting pressure on the Nazis to give up this transmitter, but the Germans are stalling. The Nazi Minister, Hempel, was of the opinion that he should be permitted to state to DeValera that such a crisis might result from the Irish insisting on the surrender of the transmitter that it might result in the recall of Hempel, thereby causing a decrease in the independence now enjoyed by Ireland in relations with England.

NOTE: With reference to the above report, OSS is now advised by its London Office that this transmitter was removed on December 24th by the Government of Eire.

* * *

INTERNMENT OF GERMAN FLIERS IN EIRE

The German Government in December proposed that, to avoid being interned, Nazi airmen landing in Ireland should claim that they are on a practice flight. Munitions and bombs are to be dropped overboard prior to landing. On the basis of such actions by Nazi fliers, the German Government is to request that DeValera release all Nazi airmen who land in Ireland from now on. Then perhaps a civilian airplane could fly to Ireland for the purpose of picking up these fliers, thereby affording the German Government a chance to send a new German official to Dublin.

NOTE: With reference to the above report, OSS had been advised from London that, whether or not German aviators were engaged in "nonoperational" flights, everyone has been interned on landing and they will continue to be interned.

[3] The famous Cicero. Documents supplied by Wood identified him sufficiently for the British to take counteraction. These were not among the first delivered, however; Morgan's story in *True* cites them as a sample of the "important news" with which "the secret circuit between Berlin and Bern," established after Wood had made two trips to Bern in person, "became heavily laden." Cicero's own memoirs (Elyesa Bazna, *I Was Cicero*) give Wood's true name as Kolbe.

[4] Morgan puts the delivery of a fancifully embroidered version of this document not with the initial take but as one of Wood's reasons for making—still in 1943, "late October"—his second trip in person to Bern.

11 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following paraphrase comes from German sources, the ultimate source allegedly being the German Foreign Office. It purports to be a report to Berlin by the German Minister to Switzerland, embodying the substance of a report from the Swiss Minister in Washington to the Swiss Foreign Office:

"1. K. O. Schweiz [Note: Kriegs Organization, the Swiss secret intelligence agency][5] has seen reports of the Swiss Minister, which were based upon talks with the Vice President.[6] According to these reports, at the start of the Moscow Conference the Americans and British tried to vindicate both the past and future actions of the Allied GHQ's; however, their Russian partner exhibited practically no sympathy or appreciation of their position. On the other hand, it seems that the foundations were laid for coming military cooperation. Not until a second front has been opened up, i.e., not until the Allies have carried out a successful invasion of France, will this plan for cooperation go into effect. Until then Russia retains the right to unrestricted action in military and political matters. The Vice President stated, however, that Russian conditions for more complete military cooperation will soon be met.

* * *

"10. The report of the Swiss Minister is a valuable supplement to the reports from friendly diplomats which I [the German Minister to Switzerland] sent earlier. The reason that the above report contains so much more concrete information than the data which came to Bern from the American and British governments is due to the fact that the Vice President was talking to the Swiss Minister, his brother-in-law, in the greatest confidence."[7]

[5] Erroneous. K. O. Schweiz would be the German Abwehr station in Switzerland.

[6] Henry Wallace.

[7] Admiral Leahy made excerpts from this memorandum public in his memoirs (*I Was There*, pp. 220-1).

The V-Weapons

10 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a message just received through OSS in Berne from our informant strategically placed in Berlin:

"1. With reference to the rocket bombs, extremely secret information from Pari (Koerperbau)[8] reveals that the 'gerade Laufapparatur'[9] is produced in Gdynia, at the Ascania works; both the V-1 and V-2 models are made in Hersograd (sic), which is located in Niederdonau[10] in the vicinity of St. Valentin; the 'Duesen'[11] are built at the Krupp works in Wuppertal; additional parts which are not named are manufactured by the Siemensplauia[12] factories at Murtenberglech (sic)[13], situated 30 kilometers north of Augsburg.

"2. Approximately 10% of the V-1 model rocket bombs will have short-wave transmitters installed in them. The purpose of this will be to direct the path and aim of the rocket bomb. The problem which arises with respect to this, however, is whether waves transmitted from England will be able to interfere with the apparatus.

"3. To the best of the informant's knowledge, Berlin has not been able to obtain any first-hand information regarding consequences of the bombing of southern England. They have secured the following indirect reports, however, through third persons:

"(A) On June 29th, von Papen wired Berlin that he was informed in confidence by the Deputy General Secretary that although England has ended the suspension of diplomatic privileges and although the Turkish government has asked its Embassy at London for a report on this topic, still no report has been received.

[8] Paris body works.

[9] The edited version of this report which was delivered to the other recipients reads "flight control mechanism."

[10] Translated in the edited version to "the lower Danube region."

[11] Translated in the edited version to "jets."

[12] Typo for Siemensplania.

[13] Noted in the edited version as probable garble for Meitingen-bei-Augsburg, but later messages have Moertingen.

Britain has requested all diplomatic representatives stationed in England not to transmit any information regarding the invasion situation and the Nazi weapon.

"(B) From Madrid, Ambassador Dieckhoff wired the following on July 2nd: In the last two days, the initial results of the rocket bombing of southern England have become a great deal graver. If this bombing is maintained, it is anticipated that there will be heavy damage and disorder, even though public services have not yet been halted. Dieckhoff's information was based on a cable from Alba which reached Madrid on July 1.

"4. In the neighborhood of Orlamuende, south of Kahla on the railroad line between Rudolfstadt and Jena, a large new airplane plant is being built. It is underground in part. It was already bombed on either June 29th or 30th, but this raid did not cause much injury and the plant will soon be in operation. Pursuit planes (Jagd maschinen) are manufactured here; in addition, perhaps new secret weapons are also produced. In comparison with the V-1 model, the V-2 travels through the stratosphere. It is radio-controlled and is therefore a more accurate weapon. In addition, it possesses a longer range. This new model will be in use by the Nazis within 60 days, at the outside."

11 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received through our representative in Bern the following report from a reliable source inside Germany, concerning the characteristics of the German V-2 bomb:

"A-4 is the designation applied to the V-2 bomb by the experts, but there are many conflicting reports concerning it. It is reported to be manufactured at Saint Gallen in Austria southeast of Steyr. The parts are assembled at MDW (Mittel-Deutschen Werke) Harz (sic) and all buildings for this work are located beneath the earth. The most effective way to cripple this production would be to smash the lines for rail shipment. The weapon is claimed to be capable of a speed of 1 kilometer per second and to sustain itself in flight for a distance of 500 to 600 kilometers. It carries anywhere from 1 to 2 tons of explosive charges and has a weight of about 20 tons. It is *not* directed by remote control, however. The fuse is manufactured in Moertingen near Augsburg. The bomb is propelled from steel plates which are mounted on a movable track. The Germans are said to be all ready to employ the weapon in Norway. On October 3, a wire was sent by General Jodal [14] to the Oberbefehlshaber in the West that this is not a propitious time, politically, to launch these bombs against Paris, and no attack should be made in that region now. It is the opinion of everyone that any talk of other so-named V weapons is mere propaganda, or, at least if there are such bombs, they will not be ready for use till March or April next year. If the V-1 or V-2 are directed by remote control they use a wave length frequency of 24 to 56 centimeters. Operations have been resumed at Peenemuende."

Field Comment [15]

15 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The enclosed dispatch from Berne and the accompanying evaluation of its source should, it is believed, be brought to your attention as early as possible.

You will recall earlier copies of a special character which were secured from original official German sources through our Agency in Switzerland. This cable is not such a message but it is the evaluation by our principal Swiss intelligence representative[16] of two hundred such enemy documents (four hundred pages) which have just come into his hands.

As is customary with material of such special character these enclosures are also being delivered personally to the Secretary of State, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Eisenhower and the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs.

Under existing arrangements on this particular contact the British will see this cable and, as in the past, will doubtless show it to their highest officials.

[14] *Sic.*

[15] Note that the memoranda in this section preceded those on the V-weapons, dating well before the invasion of Normandy.

[16] Allen Dulles.

MEMORANDUM TO ACCOMPANY 2787-92 ATTACHED

With regard to the attached message which left Bern April 12th, the following is to be said.

(1) The author of message is an American citizen, 52 years old, in charge of OSS secret intelligence in Switzerland since November 1942. His intimate knowledge of European politics dates back to 1915. During the last war he acted as an intelligence officer for the United States Government from the Legation in Switzerland. Subsequently, he represented the United States officially on several occasions in important diplomatic negotiations. During the last 30 years he has had a continuing expert and responsible interest in European affairs.

(2) All "Boston" (Kappa) material has been handled personally by him in Switzerland since it first appeared in October 1943.[17]

(3) The sender of this message has hitherto acted merely as a reporter of material received by him, transmitting it as it reached him, and only occasionally making a brief note of comment on some point of fact or on some individual named in Boston material.

(4) His last previous evaluation, a month ago (not based primarily on earlier Boston material), was conservative and by no means optimistic with regard to the possibility of an early German internal collapse.

(5) As a man experienced in affairs, he knows how significant the attached message may be and the responsibility he assumes by sending it.

(6) However, in view of the very great implications in this message, a cable has been sent to the author requesting him to review it carefully to see whether he wishes, on reflection, to modify any of its language and to report here by cable immediately.

(7) It would seem that the author, thanks to the sudden receipt of 400 pages of material all at one moment, finds himself in a position where he can see the whole picture rather than any single part. He is probably better able to see and evaluate that whole picture than the Germans are themselves, since they have neither the time nor the calm nor the undistracted minds to take an overall view of their own diplomatic situation.

(8) You will be further informed when and if any modification of this message comes from Bern.

[17] This date splits the difference between the actual first appearance in August and the first dissemination in January 1944. The volume of reporting did increase in October with Wood's second trip to Bern.

Sincerely regret that you cannot at this time see Wood's material as it stands without condensation and abridgement. In some 400 pages, dealing with the internal maneuverings of German diplomatic policy for the past two months, a picture of imminent doom and final downfall is presented. Into a tormented General Headquarters and a half-dead Foreign Office stream the lamentations of a score of diplomatic posts. It is a scene wherein haggard Secret Service and diplomatic agents are doing their best to cope with the defeatism and desertion of flatly defiant satellites and allies and recalcitrant neutrals. The period of secret service under Canaris and diplomacy under the champagne salesman is drawing to an end. Already Canaris has disappeared from the picture, and a conference was hurriedly convoked in Berlin at which efforts were made to mend the gaping holes left in the Abwehr. Unable now to fall back on his favorite means of avoiding disconcerting crises by retiring to his bed, Ribbentrop has beat a retreat to Fuschl and retains a number of his principal aides at Salzburg. The remainder of the Foreign Office is strung out all the way between Riesengebirge and the capital. Almost impossible working conditions exist in the latter, and bombing shelters are being permanently used for code work. Once messages have been deciphered, a frantic search begins to locate the particular service or minister to which each cable must be forwarded; and, when a reply is called for, another search is necessary to deliver this to the right place.

Borman or Neubacher will step forward if Ribbentrop is sacked, and one of them will carry out Gestapo diplomacy. Ample evidence of what this will mean is contained in 100-odd pages of Weesenmeyer cables describing the situation in the Hungarian capital. There, however, the drama involves that old fox, Horthy, playing the role of a 1944 Petain. Weesenmeyer's cable dated the 20th of last month ends on the following querulous note: "Within the last 24 hours, I have had three long talks with Von Horthy. As a result, I am becoming more and more convinced that on the one hand the Regent is an unmitigated liar and on the other he is physically no longer capable of performing his duties. He is constantly repeating himself, often contradicting himself within a few sentences, and sometimes does not know how to go on. Everything he says sounds like a memorized formula, and I fear that it will be difficult to convince him, let alone win him over."

In Sofia, cagy Bulgarians are playing all kinds of tricks on Beckerle and going off to Turkey on pleasure trips, while Nazi offices are accusing each other right and left of letting traitors clear out from under their noses. In Bucharest, Antonescu's harried aides try to think up excuses for the Stirbey-Chastelain incidents that will satisfy the Nazis, while the Marshall himself is getting reports that looting German troops are just ahead of the Russians.

The final death-bed contortions of a putrefied Nazi diplomacy are pictured in these telegrams. The reader is carried from one extreme of emotion to the other,

from tears to laughter, as he examines these messages and sees the cruelty exhibited by the Germans in their final swan-song of brutality toward the peoples so irrevocably and pitifully enmeshed by the Gestapo after half a decade of futile struggles, and yet at the same time sees also the absurdity of the dilemma which now confronts this diplomacy both within and outside of Festung Europa.

19 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In connection with the message from Switzerland (transmitted to you on 15 April 1944) giving an appreciation of the German political and diplomatic situation rendered by the principal OSS intelligence officer, Switzerland, he was immediately queried as to whether he wished to modify or add to that message, in view of its import. He has now replied.

He states:

(1) That he sees no reason to change or qualify his earlier message as a description of the current Nazi diplomatic and political scene.

(2) That though his evaluation is derived most immediately from the material recently received by him, and from conversations with one tried informant, he has received other similar reports recently from other well-proven informants in the same strain, and background data to him in Bern supports his view.

He adds:

That his message should not be read as indicating that the morale of the Nazi army is nearing collapse (excepting probably the so-called Gross Deutscher, Slav and other non-German elements). Nor does he think that any important Nazi military officials are ready and willing to let us come in through the West unopposed. He believes, rather, that fierce opposition may be given to any invasion attempt. A collapse of Germany might follow, however, a few months after the establishment of a firm toe-hold in the West.

He concludes:

The timing of the invasion attempt may be all important. The German people are war-weary and apathetic, and even in Nazi circles the same kind of psychological depression can be seen as appeared last August and September.

Yet if they could stabilize the Russian front once more, they might catch a second wind, and put up an even stronger defense against invasion.

From a Confederate heroine—

LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT

Walter Pforzheimer

On the following pages are reproduced two letters written in August 1863 to President Jefferson Davis by Rose O'Neal Greenhow, prewar Washington socialite who became, as the chronic North-South quarrel flamed into armed hostilities, a celebrated propagandist, intrigante, and espionage agent for the Confederacy. To her information on Union troop movements is credited the Southern victory at First Manassas. Arrested by Pinkerton in August 1861, she was imprisoned for nearly a year, then "exiled" to Richmond. Now she is on her way to Europe, commissioned by Davis to try to rekindle sympathy for the South in the cooling governments of France and England. The letter from Bermuda has not been reproduced before.[1]

It was in returning from this mission, after a year of personally triumphant effort in behalf of a cause that was too far gone to save, that the writer died in the service of her country. Running the blockade and pursued by a Union gunboat, her ship ran aground in a storm, but within the protective range of Confederate guns. Too impetuous to wait for calming waters, she insisted on putting to shore in a boat and drowned when it overturned.

[1] The originals of both are held in this writer's private collection.



Wilmington [North Carolina]
August 4th

To The President

My dear Sir

In a few hours I shall be aboard the Phantom. The tide being most favorable tonight, Capt. Porter intends to make the attempt to get out. Of course I am anxious, for Fort Warren or Delaware are looming in the distance. The Yankees are reported as being unusually vigilant, a double line of blockaders block the way. Still I am nothing daunted, and hope by the blessing of Providence to get out in safety.

I think I should brave any fate rather than remain here ten days longer. It is the hottest and most disagreeable place in the world, and the very atmosphere seems laden with disease. The better class of the inhabitants have left the city. A great many people are here for the purpose of running the Blockade, and I am surprized to see amongst the number so many men who ought to be in the Army.

Dr. Gwin & Lucy are going I think on the Ella & Annie. The Capt. of the Phantom would only take me as passenger on his ship.

I saw Gen. Whiting last evening and in the course of conversation he said he thought that he would be able to raise a brigade of Cavalry amongst persons about here whom he knew if he were allowed to promise that the officers selected would be commissioned.

I have a letter this morning from an intelligent gentleman Col. Jones who started some twenty days since for Matamoros, who has been obliged to retire to Mobile, as he represents Louisiana & Mississippi to be completely infested by the Yankees.

And now my dear Sir I must say goodbye. I can never sufficiently thank you for your goodness to me. May heaven guard you Sir and keep you in health is my most fervent prayer.

Rose O'N. Greenhow

[Minor corrections made in punctuation and spelling]



St. George Bermuda
August 19th

To The President

My dear Sir

I have been detained here for the last ten days awaiting a vessel for Europe. I had concluded by advise of Maj. Walker to go on the Harriet Pinkney, a vessel which sails with English papers and with English officers and leaves in a few days for Liverpool. But yesterday a person whose position enables him to know most things came to me confidentially and told me that a decision had been given by Crown lawyers in England that all vessels on the high seas carrying cotton were lawfully liable to capture altho the vessel and cargo should be owned by British subjects, and that Col. Monroe, the officer in command here, admitted that such instructions had been sent out, altho with the injunction of secrecy. I have no doubt at all of the accuracy of this as the intelligence and reliability of my informant is without question.

Today I am going to address a note to the Gov. asking for information on the subject & stating my object of going on a British vessel &c. The Lee has just got in, having had a hard trip and being obliged to throw 150 bales of cotton overboard. If I elicit a response to my letter I shall send it. For if this be the case the blockade is also in British waters.

Our Agent Maj. Walker has a very delicate and difficult post here. I have informed myself thoroughly as to the business &c. here, and I feel that I cannot give him too much credit for his indefatigable zeal and ready resources. One of the greatest difficulties is the procuring of funds in gold or silver, there being no Bank on the Island, and I really have felt for his difficulty this last ten days, there having been cleared fifteen vessels which each had to have their share of the sterling. I will not take up your time which I know is so valuable, but I thought it proper to communicate this information which I know can be relied upon.

With my prayers and my best wishes. Believe me most truly and respectfully.

Rose O'N. Greenhow

[Minor corrections made in punctuation and spelling]



INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE FORTRESS THAT NEVER WAS: The Myth of Hitler's Bavarian Stronghold. By *Rodney G. Minott.* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1964. 208 pp. $4.95.)

The thesis of this book, which is based on study of Allied intelligence reports and some German documents, is that General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters became so obsessed in the spring of 1945 with fear of a prospective German redoubt in the Bavarian Alps as to drop plans to take Berlin and Vienna. The author, described on the dust wrapper as a young American historian currently teaching at Stanford, does not know what he is writing about.

Perhaps Mr. Minott was influenced by Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe,*[1] which, following the British line, blames Eisenhower for not capturing Berlin, Prague, and Vienna and makes concern over the purported redoubt one of the principal reasons for not driving more aggressively to the east. William L. Shirer, in his generally authoritative *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich,* also says that Eisenhower and his staff were obsessed with the urgency of capturing the so-called National Redoubt, although it "was a phantom. It never existed except in the propaganda blasts of Dr. Goebbels and in the cautious minds at Eisenhower's headquarters . . ."

With this encouragement the young author, pontificating that "intelligence evaluations of all types from the tactical up to the national level are incredibly important for our defense in this age," tries to make something out of nothing, and fails. It is true that there was a lot of talk about a planned National Redoubt in the Bavarian Alps, talk by the Germans and by American and British intelligence. Shirer indicates the command attitude toward it in quoting Omar Bradley's statement that it was "too ominous a threat to ignore." Eisenhower writes in his *Crusade in Europe,* "The evidence was clear that the Nazi intended to make the attempt and I decided to give him no opportunity to carry it out. . . . The way to stop this project . . . was to overrun the entire national territory before its organization could be effected." And that is exactly what was done.

It is true that the German project had not got off the ground. It is absolutely untrue that the preventive action affected the rest of Allied strategy in any way. One army group, unemployed, was di-

[1] London: Collins, 1952.

verted to clean out the area of potential danger. This, the Sixth Army Group under General Devers, was unemployed because the enemy had been destroyed and because there wasn't room on the roads or supplies for further advances to the east. One division, in fact, the 13th U.S. Airborne assigned to the Army Group for this task, had acquired distinction as the only U.S. division sent to Europe that *never* had anything to do—not of its own choosing, of course.

Mr. Minott suggests that if we had had enough intelligence analysts to study the matter we wouldn't have been taken in by the stronghold myth. He is off base on three counts. First, we weren't taken in. Second, you don't stop fighting a war to await the results of a research project. And third, if we were "obsessed" or even very much worried about the danger, I who was General Bradley's G-2 briefing officer at Tactical Headquarters wasn't aware of it. Certainly we wanted to make sure that there was no problem on our right flank, but anything beyond that takes our concern out of context.

It's a commander's job to anticipate all problems, and that's what Eisenhower and Bradley did here without detriment to any other task. We had divisions and corps to spare. It would have been wrong to dismiss the redoubt as a myth on the strength of intelligence analysis. Intelligence cannot be omniscient; maybe Mr. Minott's book is about the wrong profession.

L. B. Kirkpatrick

THE GESTAPO: A History of Horror. By *Jacques Delarue.* Translated from the French *Histoire de la Gestapo* (Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1962) by Mervyn Savill. Published in England (London: Macdonald, 1964) under title *The History of the Gestapo.* (New York: William Morrow. 1964. 384 pp. $6.95.)

This purported history of the Nazi political police boils over not only into an account of the Reich intelligence and security services generally, along with the SS and other instruments of oppression, but into a wide-ranging treatment of the rise and eventual triumph of the Nazi party, the consolidation of its dictatorship in Germany and its preparations for conquest, the atrocities of the occupation, and the final cataclasm that began with the plot of 20 July. The author, who was a member of the Paris Sûreté, a resistance worker, a Nazi prisoner, and then postwar liquidator of occupation records for the Sûreté, is too unskillful a writer and too careless a historian—he says for example that Mussolini was "a refugee in Germany" in July 1944—to bring any new perspectives to the familiar material he resplashes on this broader canvas. The value of his work is thus confined to the two chapters reflecting his own experience and documentary studies, those on the SIPO-SD units in France. Even here the pickings are pretty slim, the prize exhibit being a hitherto unpublished jurisdictional agreement with the Vichy police, which in any case was not honored.

What is remarkable about the book in its English-language versions is that the British and American publishers were satisfied with such a clumsy, dictionary translation and such a sloppy job of editing. When the author begs leave to tell of his personal memories, he "hopes the reader will excuse him *from* recounting . . ." Himmler was unwilling to "participate" (for *share*) his control of the police. Stenographers are "shorthand typists." A cell is a "casemate"; prison rules are a "material regime." Cruel regulations are called "insensate." Newspapers are "presses." The Gestapo had "integrated" (for *absorbed*) units of the SD. The RSHA had "a special formation" (i.e. *course of training*) for all agents. "I could not tell *from his glance* if he was still alive." Ostmark is "the Eastern Marches." "Woe to the journalist who dared write a *misplaced allusion.*"

A few of these are edited out in the British edition. The American editors passed all of them and many more, along with some Briticisms and a lot of plain errors. The Schupo is the "urban police corresponding to *our constables.*" March is specified when it should be February; we get A.M. for P.M., 1944 for 1943, francs for marks, political forces for police forces. Czechoslovakia is to evacuate "the Sudeten Germans" rather than Sudeten Germany. Heydrich's assassin is misspelled "Gabeik" in both editions. "Hitler was dominated . . . by the conflict against the 'Reds,' in other words the Democrats and the Republicans." Stool pigeons had been "baptized 'well-wishers,'" whereas "well-wishers had been baptized V. Maenner, in other words 'men of trust.'"

In justice, one cannot have expected editors to catch some of the errors which must have been made in the original French. Schellenberg's man Hoettl is said to have made contacts in Berne with General Donovan. Beck's being passed over as replacement for von Fritsch in 1938 is attributed to a speech he made in 1934. And details for the installation of the first gas chambers—that would be 1940—are said to have been decided over lunches held in Eichmann's office after "the Allied bombing had seriously damaged all the [RSHA] buildings" in Berlin—which could not be before 1944.

The book seems to represent a lot of honest effort on Delarue's part, and it isn't quite as bad as this fault-finding makes it. But it isn't worth wading through, at least in this translation.

Art Rosenhagen

THEIR TRADE IS TREACHERY. Prepared by the British *Central Office of Information.* (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1964. 59 pp. For official use only.)

Much better than its garish title promises, this is a counterintelligence handout for British government employees. Its principal content is a score of sanitized case histories which show how the Soviet and Bloc services go about the spotting and recruitment of indigenous agents, what action some prospects they approach take to escape entrapment, and how others fail to escape. The treatment is light and the style simple, featuring the one-short-sentence paragraph of the preschool book:

> Gorski and Zaremba were interrogated.
> The dangers were explained.
> Zaremba never went to Poland. He didn't want to, now. . . .
> Lucky Zaremba.

This playful rendering of the earnest message, together with the intrinsic interest of the case histories, keeps the reader's attention and lets him enjoy being preached to. Except for the inevitable lecture on physical security at the end (you'd think they could have handed that out separately) it is skillful propaganda, and universal enough to be suitable for U.S. use if our own CI propagandists are all too heavy-handed for this kind of job.

Anthony Quibble

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STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

VOL. 9 NO. 2 SPRING 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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

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An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

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Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

Leaves from the diary of an intelligence-minded interpreter with expertise in industrial matters.

SHEPHERDING A SOVIET TOUR

John Anthony Dahms

The main job of the interpreter accompanying a Soviet delegation around this country is to facilitate communication. He should not be so loaded with other assignments that he reaches the point of exhaustion in which, as a Soviet interpreter once put it, he feels like a wise dog—he understands everything but cannot say a word. Yet if he keeps it a secondary function he can elicit, and help in the elicitation of, useful information, a good deal more these days than in the first years of the exchange program.[1] Sometimes he stumbles on it; sometimes he works for it and succeeds, sometimes fails. And exceptionally he may be deluged with more than he can absorb. How he goes about it can most easily be shown by holding up some pages from his life.

Paducah

As I near the top of the temporary ladder leading to the second floor of the new Paducah city hall, open to the sky during construction, the December fog from the Ohio river is so thick that I cannot see whether the two missing members of the Soviet delegation are there. Twisting around on the top rung, I now spot the two ghostly figures at the far end of the building—and simultaneously slip and nearly tumble. I picture the headline in the Paducah paper: "State Department Interpreter Breaks Leg in Fall: John Dahms, who accompanied the Soviet delegation of 12 construction specialists to dams and construction sites around Paducah, is said to be in satisfactory condition after . . ."

The slip is a warning that I am overanxious. The reason for my eagerness is that these two Soviets, the most communicative of the 12, for the moment are alone. All week the head of the delegation, Andrei Schepetyev, has blocked my every move to talk to them without his supervision. Here is my chance. As I approach them amid the pipes, conduits, and construction debris, I can tell

[1] *Cf.* Francis Agnor, "The Interpreter as an Agent," *Studies* IV 1, p. 21 ff.

from their stance and dramatic gestures that their conversation is of the heart-to-heart kind. Now I can hear it.

Pravilno, pravilno! Girenko is agreeing with something. The big man of magnetic personality is head of some 400,000 construction workers in the South Ural economic district, a gold-starred Hero of the Soviet Union, and a delegate to the Supreme Soviet.

"I told them, I wrote them; but it did no good," protests Denyega, an idealistic, obstinate, and bitter Ukrainian whose job is to coordinate the production of construction machinery throughout the USSR. He is thirty-seven but looks fifty. The head of the delegation appears to hate him.

From the commodious pockets of my trenchcoat, from among the neosynephrine, aspirin, cough drops, and indigestion pills there, I take a small box of chocolates which were to have been my breakfast (try ordering for a dozen hungry Russians in Paducah when they want real Central Asian *kefir* and won't settle for buttermilk or even yogurt) and hold it out to them. "Chocolates, Pavel Gavrilovich, Andrei Yermolayevich?" With an automatic *spasibo* they munch the candy and continue talking. Denyega, I learn, has written a report in which he is going to take on the entire Gosstroy chain of command and doesn't care what happens.

Drug moi, proshu vas ochen—ne goryachites. Like an old coach calming down his star player, Girenko in his velvety basso tells his friend not to get excited and act rashly because he will only hurt himself. Denyega gives a frustrated kick at an imaginary impediment, then reluctantly concedes, "You are right. But how long do we have to wait? It is not for me. It is for the good of all."

"You can be sure," answers Girenko with great power of persuasion in his voice, "that soon there will be changes. Enormous changes. Life demands it. But right now be calm and do not criticize them."

"Them," I think, the insiders, the politicos. I interrupt. "I am glad I found you. Shepetyev worries when you are missing."

"Let him. We are not children," says Denyega, just as I expected.

"May I ask you, is this building of interest to you? It is old-style custom construction, monumental type. The last delegation from Gosstroy that I had was only interested in mass production methods, prefabricated parts and all that."

"That's absolutely wrong," says Denyega, and Girenko nods. "If our responsible people were not so blinded by dogmatics, they would learn much here—they would see our weaknesses."

"What do you mean?"

"Rhythm, Ivan Antonovich. Rhythm."

I am puzzled, and both smile at me. "Better speak Russian, not construction jargon," suggests Girenko, lighting another Russian long cigarette.

"Look!" Denyega paints his dream, "The second floor is put on top of the first with all the electrical conduits and outlets, all the pipes already in place. The building emerges from the ground a logical organic whole—like a squash coming up from the earth. The carpenters, masons, electricians, assistants, truckers all work in rhythm doing the right thing at the right time—like players in a symphony, like our great Moscow orchestra under Kondrashin. Have you heard him? Now do you understand?"

I say I do but I already knew that some buildings were quickly assembled in the USSR out of prefabricated parts. What's wrong?

Again they smile at my naivete. "True we put a building together. But it is only the shell. Then come the pipefitters and poke it full of holes. Then the electricians and make more holes, then the plumbers who usually flood it for you," explains Denyega.

"And chip off all the plaster!" breaks in Girenko. "So before your customer will sign the acceptance you practically have to refinish the whole building, and then explain the delay to the bank and a myriad of supervisors. Oh, Ivan Antonovich, you have no idea what unpleasant negotiations one has to carry on! You know I have an ulcer, don't you?"

"Not only buildings; even roads. Remember the road?" asks Denyega, beginning to laugh.

"Yes, the road!" roars Girenko, and then the two of them, interrupting each other and doubling over with laughter, gasp out the story of how 500 kilometers of a highway Girenko had just built were torn up so that telegraph wires could be placed under it.

I realize that I am witnessing a rare moment of purgation—accumulated frustration suddenly expressing itself in near-hysteria. I play along. "I understand that under your system each enterprise makes its own plans and sends them to Gosplan for approval. What goes wrong?"

"Gosplan—those mother-rapers!" explodes Denyega.

"Our cross and crown of thorns," says Girenko, rolling his eyes to the foggy sky.

"We in Washington are accustomed to thinking of them as top experts surrounded with computers, etc. Are we mistaken?"

"Partly. They have good engineers, good staff. But key decisions are often made by unqualified people at the top. Overall planning devitalizes the individual building organizations. Here your contractors do what common sense tells them. We frequently can not. That is our grief. It is not your factories and engineers that impress me," continues Denyega. "Man for man, plant for plant, we are as good as you are. But in system of management—here you have something we should take lessons in."

"Ach, we know all this," Girenko says. "We didn't have to come to America to see the changes that are needed. Life demands them. Life teaches us. It is just a question of time, we will make them. And then, mark my words, we will catch up with you."

At this juncture the head of the delegation comes climbing up and slips on the same rung I did. It does not improve his humor. "Well, have you found anything useful?" he asks Denyega and Girenko.

"Not very much . . ."

"Then why waste time?"

"Well, not utter waste. Note here—they use stamped pipe clamps. We still cast them. It is cheaper their way," says Denyega.

"Aha, Aha!" Shepetyev is pleased and tells the secretary, Kazarinov, always at his elbow, to note the name and location of the factory that makes this minor item. "Now please, Ivan Antonovich, do stay at my side," he turns to me. "My colleagues need you. What were you discussing here so long?"

"The delegates very kindly explained some facts about building planning that confused me."

"Later, later, I will personally explain and answer all your questions. They are not specialists in this field and should not try to educate you. I am the specialist. I will talk to you later. But right now please work with me. Every minute is valuable. This trip is very expensive and we are not rich like you. Shall we go?"

Some Notes and Thoughts

At the airport I quickly make notes on the conversation, and then I test my recall from brief notes I took about a week ago on another incident involving Denyega.

My notes, like those of most interpreters trained by the State Department, are based on the principle of Egyptian ideographs with a few key words, letters, or symbols added. In the twinkling of an eye a whole idea or incident can thus be recorded. This method releases the interpreter's attention for listening and comprehending. Of course it takes practice. The principles of interpreting impressed on us in the instruction are the following:

Learn to listen; subordinate yourself. Listen for the ideas, to what the man is selling, not what he is saying. Interpret the man's ideas rather than his words whenever possible. Make your notes suggestive, to stimulate your memory. These personal reminders will also be secure.

Now I am pleased that I seem to recall fully the week-old incident from just a few ideographs and words and can compare it with what just happened at Paducah city hall. Here is how it goes.

The letter *L* and the symbols *3/12, yd.* tell me that on 3 December 1963 we were at the Lorain factory near Cleveland which makes cranes, and the incident took place in the yard. A crudely drawn fish skeleton and the words *Loch Ness, tubular, 250' welded* remind me that we were looking at a tower of a crane 250 feet high made of welded tubular steel instead of the usual riveted flat members. It therefore had unusual lightness and strength. And it did look to me like the skeleton of a Loch Ness Monster.

The letters *D, K, O,* and the word *Gosplan* with a line through it mean that Denyega, Kazarinov, and an engineer named Ozerov who builds cranes assured me they knew of such crane construction and wanted to build some, but Gosplan objected. Or, rather, it upheld the steel industry, which did not want to have to make a special small production run for the tubing.

Uralmash=Henry Ford "T" tells how, when I asked the engineers why they could not place an order with say the famous Uralmash, they replied that this wealthy combine, with its own sanatoria and a huge director's fund from which special bonuses can be given its employees, is slow to change models and so makes a lot of money but produces machinery they considered obsolete. I thought of Henry Ford clinging to his Model T and making quite a few millions by not changing.

The last symbol is a book with the letter *K*. This is my observation that Kazarinov, the secretary, who at home is a senior engineer at Gosstroy and tests all the foreign machinery for it (to compare it

with the Soviet, he says)—this Kazarinov, with a face like Shostakovich and as tall and lean as an Olympic track star, is a fabulous note-taker. Looking over his shoulder I see that he too uses symbols and ideographs, and he is a marvelous sketcher. When he cannot take pictures (as he does by the hundreds) or get photos or drawings from the plant, he takes notes in order to make sketches later. "The design of this connector is so interesting," he confides with a happy smile.

I bet he will have an almost 100-percent recall of every plant layout, dam site, and construction project we visited, as well as design features of new machinery. But I note that the Americans shy away from telling him everything. Usually they hold back about steel specifications. Maybe this is one reason the Soviets still have to buy U.S. technical data and know-how.

St. Louis

Six months later, in the summer of 1964, I am in St. Louis with another delegation. A high-powered one, it includes: Novikov, head of Gosstroy and deputy to Khrushchev in the Council of Ministers; Neporozhny, top man on electrification and builder of the Aswan Dam, just back from a visit to Egypt with Khrushchev; several Ministers of Construction from large republics; Petya Chernyshev, builder of the largest turbines for electric generators and a recent Hero of the Soviet Union. The last is a pudgy, nervous, pleasant young man who speaks in snatches. His hands testify that he did indeed start his career as a lathe operator at the plant where he is now the principal engineer.

I no sooner step into the hotel than I am told to call a number in Washington "no matter what the time is." I recognize the number as that of my backstop, Sean. I cannot make the call until 2:30 A.M. Reason: his most communistic majesty Ignaty Trofimovich Novikov chooses to have tantrums and summons me and the tour manager to his suite and bawls us out because no crowds, no VIP's, no press and photographers met him at the airport. He had wanted to make a speech on Soviet-USA friendship there at eleven o'clock at night in a pouring rain. We express anguish at his displeasure, promise to phone Washington, and hope to do better in the future. Thanks to Neporozhny we are dismissed with a conciliatory pat on the back and a tumbler of Ukrainian vodka aptly called *Gorilka,* the Burner.

Then I get Sean out of bed and get the news, which is good. The host company has been briefed by the local CIA office and is

cooperating fully in the effort to get answers to intelligence questions. A young engineer named Joe is the key man, and I should work with him. I have seen the questions, and they are good. They are clear, logical, and not probing sensitive matters about which a delegate cannot tactfully be asked. Enough background is given for the questioner to understand the problem. Petya (the Turbine) Chernyshev is the main target.

The next morning finds me working without a break. Since the tour began, ten days ago, I have not asked a single question; but I have bought technical books [2] and periodicals as gifts, have given Neporozhny a plastic raincoat, have made some useful suggestions from prior experience in some of the areas visited—in short, I have put the Soviets under obligation to me. I have helped them and they know it.

I spot Joe easily. He is a smart young engineer, a turbine specialist. He and Petya enjoy talking to each other through me. But there never is an opportunity for them really to get together. The next day is the same. The third day it rains, and I am getting desperate. Nonetheless a part of the group goes out to a power plant under construction, puts on rubber boots, and sloshes through the foot-deep mud at the site.

As we start back Joe and I make our move. Joe says he wants Petya to ride with us. Petya is most agreeable, for he has questions on the huge new turbine he has seen. But the other Soviets raise a cry as if Petya is being kidnapped, and the Americans not in on the game side with them. Shortly everybody is hopping in and out of cars—a Mack Sennet comedy in the mud. I am getting dirty looks from everybody. Petya ignores them and gets into the car next to Joe, who is at the wheel. I get in and shut the door and we drive off. The others follow, then overtake us as we slow down for conversation.

Petya wants to know why the compressor is located where it is on the new turbine. A tough question, but Petya sketches the turbine and Joe explains why. Petya understands, takes notes, and begins to look like the cat that swallowed the canary. Then Joe asks him questions about *his* turbine and his problems with it. I suggest that he sketch it, pleading the very real difficulty of interpreting technical descriptions. Petya does; and presto he shows its

[2] Soviets were particularly interested in the "critical path method" of programming construction.

configuration, its size, the steam flow, and many other characteristics—everything we wanted to know.

Joe takes the sketch while driving. He glances at it, points to the exhaust, and says, "Tell him, John, there's where his trouble is." Petya turns beet-colored and bursts out with something incomprehensible, showering my face with saliva. Then he chokes with laughter as he wipes my face with his hand in a friendly Soviet way—"Tell him that I have trouble here too," and he points to the last section where the blades are longest. He says Joe is real bright and pats his shoulder. Joe says Petya is real bright and pats him back. He says both Westinghouse and General Electric had trouble in exactly these same spots when they were in the design stage. Petya asks about steels, and Joe tells him something but seems unable to recall the full answer.

Suddenly Joe honks madly. The lead car has forgotten to make a turn. Joe makes the turn, and soon we are driving along the Mississippi without the other car. Joe asks if Petya would like a ride to see another plant with an interesting water intake. Would he? Why it's the river of Mark Twain. He has read "Life on the Mississippi." So another hour of talk about turbines. The two promise to write to each other; Joe will send Petya some steel specifications when he finds them.

When we arrive at the hotel Novikov's personal secretary is standing at the entrance, angry and impatient. He demands what Petya was doing for such a long time. Petya pats the pocket where his notebook is with a happy expression and says he was learning things about turbines and viewing the Mississippi. "And how was it?" asks the secretary. "Wet," says Petya, and walks away.

Joe and I compare notes. He reveals *he* was the one that made the wrong turn—on purpose. He agrees to write a report for Washington. Petya is at least three—maybe four—years behind us, he says. But he is bright. If he knew English he would recommend the Company hire him. "He's no competition now, but he will be."

Schenectady

Although the people who work and live in Schenectady call it an ugly and dull company town, I found it a cool, immaculately kept little city, set in an emerald valley and having wide boulevards, magnificent factories, and a lovely old section of colonial homes with large neat lawns and flowering shrubs that have Georgetown

in D.C. beat all hollow. Furthermore, Neporozhny, his secretary, and Petya (the Turbine) Chernyshev, who were there with me on the closing days of their tour, agreed with me wholeheartedly.

When the tour of the factories was over we walked through this colonial section, and the Soviets daydreamed like kids, picking out which house they would like to live in. They praised Schenectady and the American engineers and managers and labor and General Electric and the whole United States. Schenectady and the Hudson river valley is just like countryside in the vicinity of Kiev, they said, admitting they were getting homesick.

Maybe Schenectady looked so good because all of us were happy, the Soviets with what they had learned and I with the facts *I* had gathered. For after St. Louis, and particularly after Los Angeles, mid-way in the tour—after I had taken care of Neporozhny when he fell ill and got him gratis a miracle-working doctor who had him back on his feet in one day—the tour became for me virtually a movable feast of facts and interpretations. My main frustration was inability to absorb all of the particulars and details that were thrust upon me from all sides; it is my practice not to take notes during such conversations. Consider the following:

Item one. The Minister of Construction from Kazakhstan, shaken by the colossal irrigation and flood-control works in southern California, began to tell me all about *his* irrigation scheme. The Minister from the Ukraine said his was much bigger, and both started reeling off names and details concerning the crash program that seems to be under way in the USSR. Neporozhny, with a mischievous twinkle in his eye, said the program was drawn up personally by his friend Nikita Khrushchev, who sequestered himself a whole month at his dacha after the disastrous crop failure, helped by only one expert.

Item two. Neporozhny revealed to a host (who I could tell had been well briefed intelligence-wise) his problem with costs in electric power production, how they seem to be twice the average in the United States, and how all the turbines in the world will not lower them significantly as long as Gosplan makes the electric industry use the worst coal in the RSFSR so it can give the best to the chemical and steel industries. "Right now the chemists in the Soviet Union are Czar and God," he said. "I am having to use my cadres on building twenty factories for them."

Item three. At the amazing Enrico Fermi atomic plant in Detroit, again in Boston at an experimental plant that generates electricity

directly from burning gases, and again in Schenectady the Soviet electric power specialists made no secret of their philosophy for expansion of the industry, their troubles with a long-range transmission system which they had been boosting for sale to the United States, the high cost of atomic fuel in the Soviet Union, apparently precluding large-scale commercial use until a fast breeder reactor is perfected, and their troubles with bursting boilers, symptomatic of the general stand-still in electrical engineering until there is a breakthrough in metallurgy. The American hosts agreed they had similar troubles; electricity knows no politics. But everywhere in this area we seem to be ahead, sometimes by a nose and sometimes by several lengths.

Item four. On one long flight I opened a gambit by saying I had not yet met a delegation that liked Gosplan. The delegates laughingly agreed and told the following story:

"We understand that the mythical figure Jesus Christ once worked an utterly improbable miracle; he fed the multitudes with five loaves and two fishes. Well, it might have been possible after all. He did not have the Gosplan allocating his material resources."

Then, referring to speeches of Novikov, I asked his secretary if Novikov was satisfied that he could bring about with his existing authority and organization the programmed improvements in the construction industry. "No," was the reply, "he has asked the Council of Ministers for some added powers, which Gosplan, headed by Lomako, now has."

For the next several hours, five miles up in the sky, I was afforded insight into the workings of the minds of the top Soviet echelon as the various Ministers dropped in on this bull session. They complained that insufficient funds are allocated for planning and supervision. "The difference between us and the Americans," said the six-foot-seven Minister from the Ukraine, "is that here they think before they start construction, and we afterwards." Even Novikov joined the party to remark that Ministers should merely execute orders while others—more intelligent people—do the thinking for them.

Last Flight

Mulling all this over at the Schenectady airport, I decide I should make one more try, for the answer to a question a colleague has asked about Soviet organization. So another gambit. I give Neporozhny a handbook I have promised him—*Annual Indicators of the USSR*, published by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in February 1964. It is my personal copy and shows the use. Neporozhny is grateful. Since he can read some English he is at once so absorbed in it that I begin to regret giving it to him.

"Aha, aha," he mutters. "See how much bigger you are than we. What is all this devilishness Lomako has been telling me! Wait till I shove this at him. Oh I will shove it hard."

I ask if it is possible that a person of his rank has trouble getting original foreign statistical data. Surely the Soviet embassy in Washington would send him a copy. Looking away, he says matter-of-factly, "Shameful as it is to admit, this is one of the hangovers from the Stalinist period we have not yet eliminated. Our government organizations do not exchange information freely—lateral dissemination of economic data is frowned upon. There is a prejudice against asking for it unless it is directly related to your job; and occupying the position I do, I am supposed to set an example for others."

Boarding the airplane, I ask to be seated next to Neporozhny. He is still studying the handbook with shifting expressions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. I pull out of my briefcase a new, still uncatalogued Soviet book on organization of economic management and open it to a place my colleague had marked. Here is indicated a new organization, and one of great importance, for it stands squarely between the Council of Ministers, which runs the economic life of the Soviet Union, and the four pillars of planning and management—Gosplan (Lomako), the Councils of National Economy (Dimshyts), Gosstroy (Novikov), and the several specialized State Production Committees (headed by men like Neporozhny). This new body is headed by Ustinov and called the USSR Supreme Council of National Economy. Its function is not at all explained by the tiny paragraph devoted to it.

I ask Neporozhny what this organization does and does he know Ustinov. I tell him how hard it is for me to make intelligent translations because of a lack of clarity in some Soviet publications, of which this is a good example. His answer is simple; it is a kind of appeals board for conflicts which can be resolved on a technical basis without modification of basic directives. The Council of Ministers did not want to be bothered with questions which experts could settle.

I note that the new Council has specialists for defense on its staff and pry further—for it is suspected that it also coordinates economic

activity with defense requirements. What kind of experts does Ustinov have? Neporozhny says Utinov's staff is small but he calls in experts as needed. What kind, I ask.

The now familiar twinkle comes into Neporozhny's intense blue eyes. "Preference is given to ex-wrestlers," he says. "They grab the ministers by the scruff of the neck and seat of the pants, catch-as-catch-can fashion, and pull them off each other. For Ustinov is a small man and not very strong. Against a man like Novikov, who is a former coal miner, he wouldn't have a chance!"

Checkmate. I know when I'm licked and put the book away. I make a few notes, openly this time. Neporozhny continues to answer questions and talk freely on other problems of economic organization and management—industrial consolidation, capital formation, labor productivity, and its scarcity under the new priority for agriculture. When I ask how a central planning system can compensate for the lack of the built-in incentives to cut costs in a competitive system, he says, "Since you raise this question, you are the person best qualified to answer it. Come to Moscow and we will give you all the information needed for a comparative study."

"Do you think it would be useful?"

"I think," says Neporozhny, "the more meaningful fact is the suitability of a system to a people at their present stage of development. At one time your system gave you very rapid growth. Your mastery of technology is beyond what I imagined it to be; yet your growth has slowed down. Clearly something is wrong if, having such fine cadres of labor and engineers, such abundance of resources, and such a God-sent climate, you are not working at your highest potential. We are. Our growth is more rapid than yours. So Communism is in our blood and there can be no hint of a return to the past."

I explain that I was not thinking of that, but of the capacity of their system to evolve, as ours has also evolved. "Yes, we change," he replies. "So long as new ideas do not conflict with basic Marxism and dialectical materialism, we adapt them for our use. Notice I say adapt; we do not copy. Neither machinery nor ideas do we copy. All require adaptation before being incorporated in our system."

Neporozhny, who had been a professor of electrical engineering with many published works, says he became an industrialist when, under Khrushchev's reforms of 1957, a decision was made to have the economic life of the country run not by politicians but by top specialists. I ask if Novikov is a PhD. Again sparks fly from Neporozhny's eyes and he cannot resist a witticism. "He is a political engineer," he says, leaving me to ponder the double meaning while his colleagues turn red.

Net Evaluation

The tour is over. At the Kennedy airport, as the delegation prepares to emplane, Novikov gets off his last speech before a few Americans, including the official State Department host. Compared with his initial speech a month ago, this shows him a changed man. He is more relaxed, far more thoughtful. The strident, self-confident style of the *udarnik*, the shock worker, is mercifully gone. He speaks of the usefulness of the tour, simply, with dignity and sincerity. He asks the Americans to come and visit the USSR, where they too may learn something. His talk of peace and friendship does not sound like propaganda. The dapper Ambassador Fedorenko, delegate to the UN, trembling in the presence of Novikov, translates his speech. He falters and I have the satisfaction of prompting him.

Later I shall see that Novikov gave a favorable and fair interview to *Pravda* on his return to Moscow. The main nonintelligence objective of the tour, its one really big purpose, has been accomplished: even a tough, doctrinaire Communist like Novikov has been deeply impressed by the United States. And this is the usual pattern for every delegation I have accompanied. At first impatience, braggadocio, suspicion, and unreasonable demands. Then the big thaw and a period of good feeling. Then the thoughtful, quiet parting, the warmth of a month's comradeship dissipated as the Soviets make ready to be whisked back into their perilous, rigid world.

What impressed them? Not only, I hope, our industrial might, roads, cars, real wages. I hope it is our people and their attitude towards life: the semi-employed workman speaking without embarrassment to a Minister about his car, his mortgage, his union benefits, his sons in school or in the army; the lovely air hostess who quickly learns enough Russian to offer them *kofe ili chai;* the soft-spoken colored porter who graciously refuses their tip; the earnest college students poring over books in the library.

As for the intelligence objective, the interpreter is greatly aided if there is no break in the question chain that originates with the specialists in Washington and ends with a cooperative host. The latter is in by far the best position to ask questions at the usual

meeting winding up a plant visit. To the Soviets it seems only fair that reasonable questions should be put to them by Americans engaged in the same line of work. This then gives the interpreter an opening to follow up with more questions and develop the topic more fully. It is quite difficult—sometimes, with a hostile delegation, utterly impossible—for an interpreter to start the questions on his own.

Aside from factual information there is need for interpretive insight into what stands behind it. The integral meaning of what lies openly before us is probably one of the more important problems in Soviet studies today, and the interpreter who lives for a month with a Soviet group is in a good position to achieve some insight into deeper meanings.

A dearth of information continues to keep open the Soviet germ warfare intelligence gap.

THE ENIGMA OF SOVIET BW

Wilton E. Lexow
and
Julian Hoptman

Despite a considerable expenditure of time and resources, the pursuit of intelligence on biological warfare activities in the USSR has been unrewarding. There is no firm evidence of the existence of an offensive Soviet BW program. Some Soviet biomedical research transcends normal public health requirements, and from time to time top Soviet military officials have boasted publicly that they have the means to rebuff a U.S. attack with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. We know that the Soviet military establishment is concerned over U.S. BW research, and we have some insight into their organization and activities for medical defense against BW attack. But we still do not know their precise defense readiness posture or their specific logistical preparations.

The paucity of real evidence has forced us to resort to indirect signs. Attempts have been made to examine all military-related activity in the fields of biology and medicine, all technical publications which appeared to be censored by security considerations, and all biomedical studies which did not jibe with Soviet public health requirements as we know them. Analysts have used speculation, analogy, and parallels with other nations' BW research, development, and practice in recent times and in the historical past. They have analyzed Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese propaganda charges of U.S. germ warfare for clues as to the Communists' sophistication and familiarity with BW hardware and agents.

The Grim Presumption

The accepted premise had been that the heavy U.S. BW commitment which has been public knowledge, along with the Japanese World War II effort as known to the Soviets, would probably have engendered a comparable program in the USSR. Postwar defector

reports and German intelligence findings implicated several persons and locations in such a Soviet program. It was with this premise in mind that available sources, primarily the open literature, had been closely screened for indications such as those cited above. But it seemed that good Soviet security, censorship, and care not to mar the image of their well-advertised adherence to the Geneva Convention had eliminated from the scientific literature all trace except of defensive preparations and attitudes. The same was true of writings on military doctrine. Sensitization of expert travelers to the problem and the evaluation of such evidence as there was by the most knowledgeable sources in the United States brought no new insights. Then suddenly new photographic and other intelligence seemed for a time to confirm our worst suspicions with hard evidence of elaborate BW test range activities.

The foremost suspect as a biological warfare center had long been Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea. The finger was first put on this island in 1951 by the "Hirsch Report." Hirsch, who had been a German intelligence officer during the war, compiled his report on Soviet BW and chemical warfare activities from data in German intelligence files. The bulk of its great volume was devoted to CW, and since much of this agreed with other information available to U.S. intelligence, the entire report gained some credence.

Hirsch declared that the Soviets had been engaged in BW research in the early 1930's, carrying out experiments in a Moscow laboratory and on Gorodomlya Island in Lake Seliger northwest of Moscow. BW field trials were at first held at the CW proving ground at Shikhany near the city of Volsk. But the proximity of this proving ground to the city limits made it too hazardous for BW, and they were shifted in 1936 to Vozrozhdeniya Island and reportedly again in 1937.

The island is well suited to BW experimentation. It is located quite a distance from the nearest shore of the Aral Sea, which itself lies in an arid, barren, and sparsely settled region of the USSR. Animal ecology difficulties which would plague a mainland facility are virtually nonexistent; only a transient bird population presents a problem in containing the spread of experimental diseases. Security against observation and accidental or intentional intrusion by unauthorized persons is at a maximum. The climate is suitable for testing the influence of a variety of environmental conditions.

Trials could be carried out over water, as the British had demonstrated during their offshore BW trials at Bermuda. The site offers few of the restrictions which the U.S. mainland facility has had to overcome.

Target Analysis

With this first clue to an intelligence target, BW analysts in the community embarked upon an intensive search of Soviet literature dealing with the Aral Sea region. Requirements were levied upon all collectors, and a comprehensive survey was made of all the economic and scientific aspects of the area. In support of collection and analysis, surveys were made of fishing, transportation, geography, scientific expeditions, hydrochemistry, marine biology, geology, and climate and weather in the area. It is probably safe to say that some of the analysts came to know this region and its problems better than the inhabitants.

Despite all this area research, little was found specifically about Vozrozhdeniya Island. It had been surveyed by a scientific expedition in the early 1900's; there was a prison camp there in 1926. A small fishing village, uninhabited during the winter months, apparently existed on the island in the 1920's and 1930's. But the paucity of information about this island could not be an indicator of anything particularly sinister, for there was very little known about any of the many islands in the Sea, including the largest one, Barsa-Kelmes.

Other sources than literature yielded little information. Two clandestine reports noted physical security measures to prohibit access to the island but revealed nothing of the nature of any facility on it.

Then in 1957 high-level photography brought the first big windfall. Photographs of the island revealed the rather extensive installations shown on the model pictured on page 18. There were more than 150 buildings of various sizes grouped into two settlements about 2½ miles apart. The northern and largest group of buildings appeared to be the administration, housing, and logistics area, marked "operational headquarters" on the model. Its barrack-like buildings were large enough to accommodate about 1,400 people. The southern group was contained within a high walled area which appeared to be the work or "laboratory" site. South from the "laboratory" area tangled roads and tracks led to five centers, called "test sites" on the model. At each of these centers was a tower and one or two

small buildings. About three miles to the south, not shown, lay the small island of Konstantin, with some 35 buildings on its northern tip.

Return to Enigma

The fact that Vozrozhdeniya Island had been carried for years as a suspect BW site so oriented the thinking of PI analysts that a BW function was immediately hypothesized. Many of the parameters of a BW research and test area do fit the picture of the island, but it was soon realized that a few do not, some of them too critical to be discounted. The whole range of other possible functions was therefore examined with all the background information on the area in mind. CW research or testing, a guided missile or electronic installation, fishing and fish processing, geological exploration, a prison, a secret police training establishment, and a paramilitary training area were considered and discarded. The only certain finding was that the general layout of the buildings, parade ground, and other features distinguished it as a military rather than civilian establishment.

The island was photographed a second time in 1959. Although there were changes such as additional building, there were no new clues to its function. Three major obstacles remained before it could be classified as a BW installation. First, the apparent "grid systems," needed for measuring dispersion of test agents, were small, ill-defined as to configuration and purpose, and not comparable to those at the Soviet CW proving ground and U.S. BW-CW proving grounds. Second, there were no indications of the necessary air support for BW test activities. For example there was no evidence of a sophisticated landing strip, decontamination facilities for aircraft, or night landing facilities. Third, the buildings and presumed inhabitants of Konstantin Island just to the south were in the path of the prevailing winds, precluding tests with live BW agents.

Since 1959 renewed efforts on an all-source basis have turned up no other indications of the nature of the activity on the island. In recent years the Soviets have published a considerable amount of material on the Aral area and its economic problems, especially the fishing industry. In this connection they have occasionally mentioned some of the smaller islands. The largest island, Barsa-Kelmes has been given some publicity in the Soviet and British press as a unique game preserve. But about Vozrozhdeniya Island the enigmatic silence holds.

New Directions

Despite tight security, a highly developed Soviet BW weapons system and technology should have surfaced sometime during the years since the war, just as the nuclear and chemical warfare efforts have. Current analyses, therefore, while clearly stating our lack of positive knowledge, depart radically from the old assumptions and look at Soviet military doctrine realistically in terms of limited BW activity and the unsure potential of BW weapons.

This reappraisal has not lessened the need for an alert analytical thrust into Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to BW weaponry. Rather, it points the way for greater emphasis on the possibility of Soviet covert action with such weapons in the light of U.S. vulnerability to clandestine attack. It calls for more intensive scrutiny of available R&D benchmarks for BW activity and of medical defense applications that could also be used for offensive purposes. Intelligence on the biomedical aspects of unconventional warfare in the USSR will also continue to contribute to other related fields—biological contamination of aircraft and spacecraft, bioastronautics applications of BW-related technology, estimates of Soviet vulnerability to BW attack and the socio-economic consequences.

Retrenchment and reorientation are thus helping us make the best of our few resources. Nonetheless, the BW intelligence effort needs new overt collection methods and more emphasis on covert penetration in order to improve the low-quality information now available from reliance on collective experience and sensitivity to indicators.

Chinese art in the balance.

DEATH OF AN HYPOTHESIS

Sherman Kent

One of the obvious rules of our calling—and one not always observed—is not to do things the hard way when an easier way will suffice.

Some of us vividly remember the occasion when General Smith at the head of the IAC table referring to the National Intelligence Estimate under consideration asked how in the world it came to be there. Its subject was the UK. With something more than his usual asperity, and be it said, some disingenuousness, he fairly spat at one of his lieutenants, "If I want to know what the British are up to, I call them up and ask."

Perhaps more to the point is a story of a student who was taking Dr. Siegerist's course in the history of medicine at Hopkins. Someone had sent in a peculiar object and wanted to know what could be made of it. It was sculpted stone; its subject was clearly anatomical (some sort of organ from some sort of animal; and it was embellished with a good amount of cuneiform script). Dr. Siegerist gave it to the class as a problem in identification. One student took it to the professor of ancient oriental languages who read the inscription and said it was gibberish. He rendered a few passages out loud to prove it.

Another student looked long at the stone and decided it resembled no human organ. Thus skipping over his professor of gross anatomy he took it to a butcher. The butcher instantly and unequivocally identified it as a liver, in fact a sheep's liver. When the professor of ancient oriental languages heard this, his thinking changed gears and an unexpected kind of sense began to emerge from the cuneiform gibberish. Suddenly he recognized some of the formularies of a spell or a charm or an utterance of divination. The hero to Dr. Siegerist was, however, not the professor; it was student number two who had made the essential contribution and had done it the easy way.

What follows is another piece of the same—but something by far closer to our professional calling. It is recounted here not only

to praise the methodology of student number two, but also to make the point that the destruction of an interesting hypothesis is often as important a part of our trade as its confirmation.

Old Art for Cash

One morning while shaving, Intelligence Officer Jones had a bright thought—or so it seemed. If he could prove it out perhaps it would help explain how the Chinese Communists were getting some of the hard currency for sorely needed imports—foodstuffs, for example. Suppose, Jones thought, the Chinese, recognizing the great cash value of their national art treasures, decided to sell them. Why shouldn't they? Why should the Communist leadership sentimentally rate these relics of classical society and the rotten old empires as "treasures"? So long as rotten young Western capitalism did so rate them, why not realize the seemingly large amount of foreign exchange their cold-blooded sale would produce? Why not?

Jones speedily took his hypothesis to his professional colleagues. None of them knew much more about oriental art and its market than he. They too may have thought they recalled stories of Park-Bernet auctions where some bit of Tang or Ming sold for a very large sum. They did not, however, jump aboard Jones' hypothesis with his sort of enthusiasm. They confined themselves to a lukewarm comment that only served to spur Jones on.

Still doing it the easy way, he took the hypothesis to a higher level of expertise: to an orientalist who had engineered San Francisco's acquisition of the Brundage collection, who in turn took it to her colleagues and dealer friends. Her reports showed a lot of interest in the proposition, but produced no evidence to confirm. Indeed what did come through was strictly negative.

Jones began to feel that he had given the hypothesis all the play it deserved and was about to let it die when two things occurred to revive it. The first was when Jones was informed that *Newsweek* sometime back had published an article to the effect that a Swedish dealer had purchased some treasures in Communist China and had exported them under license of the Chinese government. The objects in question were on their way to an oriental collection in Stockholm. The second was when Jones heard from an impeccable witness that a good many old and extremely costly Chinese rugs were appearing on the Hong Kong market. Surely these could not be considered as representing national treasures but they might be the indication of something that was.

Missed Magnitude

Jones decided to revive the enquiry. This time he would go to the real experts. He drafted a letter that went like this:

> Dear ————:
>
> The other day some of us were talking about the growing tension between the Russians and the Chinese. One of my friends, who is particularly well informed in such matters, spoke of the new and dramatic turn for the worse in their relationship, and wondered in passing how the Chinese would be able to continue their very substantial purchases of foodstuffs and other raw materials in the world market if they can no longer count on the Russians and the European Satellites for financial help. Another member of the group suggested that if the Chinese Communist government finds itself really pressed for hard currency, it might turn to selling its national art treasures. It seems likely that if they should reach this point, they would probably do everything possible to conceal the matter. In that case, the only way we could find out would be through chance communications between museum personnel and others who work in the field of oriental art around the world.

With this piece of prose in hand he invited the curator of a famous oriental collection to lunch, gave him the necessary background, and made a cold pitch. What did the curator think of the idea? Would he be willing to send a letter like the above to his knowledgeable colleagues and show Jones what he got in reply?

To Jones' delight the curator was enthusiastic. Not that he gave a whoop for Jones' hypothesis, but for a totally different reason he was happy to go along. It was as the curator was explaining his own interest that he casually dropped an oblique half sentence that killed the hypothesis for Jones' purposes stone dead. The death blow was the curator's aside to the effect that the yearly sum spent world-wide for Chinese art was of the order of a million dollars. With this amount of hard currency the Chinese would have less than one per-cent of their annual outlays for imported foodstuffs.

Anti-Customs Consensus

What had caught the curator's interest was an excuse to poll the experts in his field of expertise. It seemed that the U.S. law forbidding the import of all goods of Red Chinese origin was a major headache to U.S. art collectors and U.S. and foreign dealers. Here is the reason: suppose Mayuyama and Company of Tokyo acquired a

Chinese antique from a Japanese family that had owned it for a century. Suppose the American curator wanted to buy it for his museum. Before he could get the object into the United States he and Mayuyama would have to satisfy the U.S. customs people that the transaction would in no sense profit the Chinese Communists. The Japanese dealer would have to be able to prove that the object in question had left the Chinese mainland and had been paid for prior to the Communist takeover of 1949. Jones got the idea that our customs people were pretty hard to satisfy. Their attitude was understandably irksome to American collectors, not to say foreign dealers who were not getting the full good out of the affluent American market.

If the curator could get full and expert testimony to the effect that the Chinese were not willing to sell their art treasures and had not done so, then, he reasoned, he might have less trouble with U.S. customs. Accordingly, he snatched at Jones' idea and Jones' draft letter; he added a paragraph of his own and sent it to some thirty colleagues. They were fellow curators of the world's most important museums of oriental art and the world's most important dealers.

If the hypothesis was not already dead as far as the curator was concerned, it speedily became so. All but one or two of the people queried answered. Most of them wrote after they had talked the matter over with other experts in the field. The twenty-eight replies that did come in represented the view of several score, and every single one responded with a shattering negative. A few did not confine themselves to saying they knew of no sales from the mainland, but quite gratuitously went on to indicate that they could not imagine the situation in which the Chinese regime would part with any of its treasures. Two indicated that they had had unsubstantiated reports that the Chinese were actually spending good hard cash to repatriate certain objects of art.

And what of the objects which *Newsweek* had reported on the way to Stockholm? One of the respondents had seen them and called them "rubbish"; another, "junk."

Some anti-revolutionary operations of the imperial Russian political police.

THE OKHRANA'S FEMALE AGENTS [1]

Rita T. Kronenbitter

Part I: Russian Women

In a memorandum of 31 January 1911 addressed to the Police Department in Petersburg, the imperial MVD gave a description of Anna Gregoriyeva Serebryakova, the ideal of female agents:

"She had completed 25 years of continuous and very useful service for Moscow Okhrana. As a secret [penetration] agent she had connections with the leaders of many subversive organizations but was not attached anywhere as a regular or active member. Her motivation for hard agent work came from her strong personal convictions. She hated sedition in all forms and performed her assignments against subversives as an idealist, having little interest in monetary remuneration . . .

"She kept her secrets even from her family. Accepting the job of clandestine employment against the revolutionaries, she had to reconcile herself to exposing her own children to revolutionary propaganda by holding meetings of subversives in her home . . . Despite the emotional and spiritual conflicts she had to suppress unshared with anyone, her devotion to duty never failed."

The memorandum goes on to declare that Serebryakova, now ill, blind, and deserted by her family after Burtzev, chief of the revolutionaries' counterintelligence, exposed her in 1909 as an Okhrana agent, was to receive an annual pension of 1200 rubles in gratitude for her long and devoted service.

Personnel Practices

The Okhrana depended heavily on female agents, particularly in foreign operations, and Serebryakova came to be held up and fre-

[1] Most of the information in this article is derived from the collection *Zagranichnaya Okhrana* (The Okhrana Abroad) at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, consisting principally of the complete archives of the Okhrana station in Paris. For the story of operations within Russia, however, it has been necessary to use secondary sources—Agafonov, Vassiliyev, Zavarzin, and others.

quently pointed to as a model. The best of the female operatives, the records show, did have their paramount motivation in patriotism and devotion to the anti-revolutionary cause. But as in any intelligence service some were attracted by the danger and glamor of clandestine life, some were blackmailed into intelligence work, and many, especially those that were not Russian, had strictly mercenary motives. Later we shall trace some individual agent careers of all these kinds.

The records show that a number of Russian deep-cover agents were drawn into the service by some form of conversion after conviction as revolutionaries. Kovalskaya, "Gramm" (true name not recorded), Borovskaya, and Romanova are some of the ex-revolutionary women on the agent lists. After having served part of their terms in prisons or in exile, they were persuaded to work for the Okhrana, freed on some legal pretext, and normally helped to escape abroad to begin their agent activity. Although some of these converts in time became proficient and trusted employees, they were seldom accorded the same confidence as agents without prior leftist records.

Wives, mistresses, and sisters of male Okhrana agents were often a convenient source of recruits, particularly for operations abroad. When director Lopukhin sent Lev Beitner to Paris in 1905 with the assignment of collecting the intelligence required to control arms smuggling on the part of the revolutionaries, the agent took with him his wife and sister in order to engage in simultaneous operations in the capitals and ports of France, England, and the Low Countries. The three received their pay separately, but Beitner did the planning and gave the women their assignments. The operation was successful in uncovering every major shipment of arms in the Baltic and Black Seas.

"Julietta," Beitner's sister, in addition to her immense contribution in spotting clandestine arms sales, supply dumps, and cargo craft and crews, distinguished herself later by discovering and infiltrating the shop where Robert Loewenthal, an émigré from Russia, counterfeited Russian banknotes to finance the revolutionaries. She became Loewenthal's partner in the shop by giving 1000 francs, ostensibly from her savings but supplied by the Okhrana, for the purchase of some special printing equipment. She met daily with her case officer for the operation, an Okhrana staff agent, and they worked out a detailed plan whereby the entire ring of producers and distributors could be taken red-handed.

Agent Brontman's mistress Eropkina played a similar role. Like Beitner, Brontman had served many successful years in Russia. When the Okhrana decided to send him abroad, it hired his mistress and sent her along with him. The two worked for a number of years as penetration agents, he in the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, she with the Social Democrats (Bolsheviks).

It appears that the salaries of women agents were for the most part equal to those of men, and frequently they were even higher. Their code names and pseudonyms were usually male (while male agents were at times given female first names or nicknames—Katia, Lucy, Belle, and the like).

Okhrana staff officers were always men. Staff agents abroad, who did spotting, recruiting, and liaison work, controlled operations, and handled agents, were likewise always men. The archives of the Okhrana abroad have no record of a woman in the capacity of case officer. Women could be the most valuable of agents, engaged in extremely dangerous or sensitive operations, but they never held positions entailing any kind of supervisory function. The Okhrana offices at home likewise had no females on the staff except in clerical capacities; women served otherwise as agents only.

In this respect the Okhrana's practice contrasts sharply with that in revolutionary ranks. Lenin's wife Krupskaya, as the heavy Okhrana folders of her intercepted mail indicate, could be considered the de facto intelligence director for the Social Democratic Party (Bolshevik) and, in part, the Jewish Bundists. Much of her correspondence with fellow conspirators all over Europe and the Russian Empire was in secret writing; this was of many types and often complex. For years she was busy gathering information for the party and the revolution, sending out instructions, designing codes for communications, receiving and dispatching couriers, and acting as an informal but competent intelligence center.

The Okhrana's women were different from their counterparts among the revolutionaries in various other ways. They were predominantly Christian, i.e., Greek Orthodox when of Russian origin, while the revolutionary women, like most of the men, either were Jewish or belonged to some minority group of the Empire such as the Poles,

Armenians, or Latvians.[2] The only Jewish female agents sent abroad by the Okhrana seem to be those who accompanied their male partners to form operational teams like those of Beitner and Brontman mentioned above. But the Okhrana's male deep-cover agents abroad tended to be predominantly Jewish like the revolutionaries.

The files contain no record of any special training for the women sent abroad. All the outstanding ones, however, are shown to have spent some preparatory time in close association with the very top operators in Petersburg and Moscow. That time was presumably devoted to some kind of training, at least briefing on targets and methods of operation abroad. There is no indication of any other than strictly operational relationship between the bosses in Russia and the female agents. Abroad, the propaganda of the revolutionaries accused exposed female agents of being prostitutes or mistresses of their case officers, but the records give no reason to believe that the accusations were anything but convenient propaganda.

Some of the women agents were instructed to communicate directly, upon arrival in the field, with the chiefs at headquarters in Petersburg or at Moscow Okhrana; accommodation addresses were supplied at both ends. In all cases, however, it soon became the practice to channel communications through the field office in Paris or Berlin. The field offices then ultimately assigned case officers and exercised direct control over the agents.

Following are case histories of some of the individual Okhrana women, selected as typifying the operations and methods of the time. First come the stories of three Russian agents, then those of some indigenous recruits.[3]

Francesco

Dr. Nikolai Sergeyevich Zhuchenko, a physician of excellent professional reputation and high standing in the Moscow society of 1913, made a discreet inquiry at the police department concerning the whereabouts of his wife Zinaida. She had left him full fifteen years ago to go into hiding from the police, and she had not been heard from again. The doctor, being a good and law-abiding citizen, had never approved of her revolutionary associations during their five years of married life together, and for that reason her disappearance had not unduly upset him. Now he had decided that fifteen years was long enough to wait; he wanted to know whether she was dead or alive. In fact, he wanted to remarry.

As was usual with such inquiries, this found its way to the Okhrana identity section in Moscow. Zinaida's name was there, but the card contained only a reference to another set of identity records kept at Okhrana headquarters. In Petersburg Zinaida's card and voluminous operational dossier were located under the name "Francesco."

Matters under this operational code name were of utmost importance and sensitive enough to require the personal attention of the chief. Police Director Aleksei Vassiliyev wrote to Paris, instructing Paris Okhrana chief Krassilnikov to have a talk with agent Francesco, Mme. Zhuchenko. The Okhrana chiefs were just as anxious as the parties concerned to avoid a divorce suit in the open courts. The lady turned out to be agreeable to a quiet divorce. She asked that the doctor be told she was no longer in hiding but in Paris and still active as a revolutionary. He should be given her Paris address in order to simplify negotiation on the divorce.[1]

Paris Okhrana files contain many references to Francesco, but the bulk of her operational dossier was probably removed to Petersburg after she was exposed by revolutionary intelligence and denounced as an Okhrana agent. It is possible also that a revolutionary commission which came to Paris in 1917 to search the Okhrana records removed some of the papers on her. This account of her career is therefore sketchy and drawn in part from general histories of the Okhrana. All early writers about the service devote considerable space to her position among the revolutionaries and her accomplishments against them.

Apprenticeship

Zinaida, daughter of a government official named Guerngross and graduate of the Smolny Institute in Petersburg, was still a student at Moscow University when she made three vows, all at about the same time. She took the marriage vow with young Doctor Zhuchenko;

[2] Paris Okhrana files contain about 75,000 cards on some 20,000 Russian exiles abroad. These operational records cover known and suspected revolutionaries, members of Anarchist, terrorist, Socialist, and similar groups. The names and personal descriptions reveal that over 75 percent of them were Jewish and about 10 percent were from other minority groups, leaving less than 15 percent Russian. The card file of Okhrana secret operatives abroad shows an even greater proportion of Jewish agents.

[3] These latter in Part II, to appear in a future issue.

[1] Paris Okhrana files, Incoming Dispatches, 1913, No. 1465.

she took oath with a group of university students conspiring to kill the Czar; and she swore to serve faithfully as an Okhrana agent. From the beginning, her career shows that she took only the last of these seriously. Even during her five years of married life she could not settle down to relatively prosperous ease as a housewife; to her husband's distress she associated with revolutionaries and malcontents of all brands.

Her refusal to single out any one subversive group and become a member may have been due to her husband's protest, but it was more likely in conformity with the Okhrana's doctrine that the most dependable agent is one who succeeds in developing access to all revolutionary groups without belonging to any.[2] In her later operations, as she forged the reputation of being one of the two most important of all Okhrana agents at home and abroad,[3] she adhered strictly to this doctrine. The other of the two, Evno Azev, contrastingly, forever strove to attain top positions among the revolutionaries, frequently by means of betraying his rivals to the Okhrana.

Zinaida, according to a case officer's description of her as a student at the fashionable Smolny Institute, was thoroughly opposed to revolutionary activities but had a love for adventure and challenging risks. Even at this time, before her recruitment, she expressed her conviction that the revolutionaries had a corrupting and demoralizing effect upon students and the people in general. An eager recruit, she followed instructions with enthusiasm and was perspicacious and adventurous enough to penetrate subversive groups and bands of conspirators beyond her assigned targets. Her case officers[4] first required reports on individuals, groups, activities, and plans. Much of her year or so under her Moscow case officer, Zubatov, must have been devoted to training and some to a cooling-off period. But by 1895 she had already attained the distinction, though probably known then only to Zubatov, of having saved the life of Czar Nicolas II.

In the spring of that year Moscow students worked out a plan to kill the Czar. One of them was assigned to throw a bomb from a steeple of the Church of Ivan the Terrible down on the imperial

[2] Pavel P. Zavarzine, *Souvenirs d'un Chef de l'Okhrana,* p. 21.

[3] Boris Nikolaevsky, *Aseff: the Russian Judas,* p. 158.

[4] Her case officer in Petersburg in 1893 was Colonel Semyakin, who introduced her in 1894 to the chief organizer of the Okhrana's penetration service, Zubatov. The latter, as chief of operations in Moscow, remained her case officer until her removal in 1895.

cortege as it passed below. The chemists in the conspiracy fashioned the device and it was delivered to a nearby monastery. Zinaida waited until the preparations were finished and the conspirators were all in place, and then gave the word. All were arrested, including Zinaida, and deported to Siberia. There it was arranged that she, along with several others as a screen, could make good an escape.

Trial by Terror

Zinaida thus went abroad as an escaped Siberian exile and began operations under Arkadi Harting, chief of the Okhrana's Berlin outpost, who assigned her tasks in Berlin and Leipzig. She was soon called to other European countries, but her principal target became the Socialist Revolutionaries and their Fighting Unit (*Boyevaya druzhina*) which carried out assassinations and other kinds of terror in Russia.

Paralleling Zubatov in Moscow, Harting was the counter-intelligence planner *par excellence* abroad. His successes as a provocation agent in Paris in 1890 had launched him on an intelligence career that took him to the very top of the Okhrana ladder. In Berlin he relied heavily upon Zinaida's work, not only as her case officer but as chief of operations in Germany. The two worked together as the most successful team of the period. When Harting left Berlin to take charge of the integrated Okhrana station in Paris, Francesco, to use her code name, remained in Heidelberg with instructions to concentrate on the Socialist Revolutionaries through active participation in their Fighting Unit for purposes of control.

Active participation soon meant trouble for Francesco. The revolutionaries had reason to suspect treachery in their ranks: too many conspirators sent to Russia to commit atrocities were being apprehended. Francesco was among those who had knowledge of all of these, and the central committee of the party may have had other grounds for suspecting her in particular. Now the customary means of testing the loyalty of a member under suspicion was to assign acts of terror to him. Francesco was accordingly, in 1905, made leader of one of three assassination teams to be dispatched simultaneously to Russia. She personally was to carry out her team's assignment, the assassination of General Kurlov, governor of Minsk.

This assignment posed a veritable dilemma before the Okhrana. If it wanted Francesco to remain in the Fighting Unit and continue her good work, she would have to carry out the assassination. A

solution was worked out by Colonel Klimovich of Moscow Okhrana. Francesco consented to carry out the assassination as instructed. She met with her team of assistants and planned the details of the action—how, when, and where she would throw the bomb. But from her lodgings she took the bomb to an Okhrana safe house, where an expert disarmed the detonator and made it a dud. When it was thrown at General Kurlov nothing happened.

In the meantime the other two teams had been successful in their assassinations. Mme. Zhuchenko, Francesco, had given ample warnings of them, but there had been a slip-up somewhere in Colonel Klimovich's plans to prevent them. In the course of investigating these acts of terror, Kurlov turned up the name Zhuchenko, and his pursuit of this lead was eventually to cause the exposure of her agent work. Not knowing that she had actually saved his life, the governor made so much fuss about her that her true status had to be made known to certain Okhrana personnel that did not otherwise need to know. Among these was a Leonid Menshchikov, who in 1910 defected to the revolutionary intelligence service and betrayed her.

Successful and Sought After

Before that eventuality, however, Francesco had five more years of continuous, prolific service. Now the conspirators fully trusted her, after she had personally participated in the triple assassination, two-thirds successful; they could not hold her responsible that her bomb turned out to be a dud. Terrorist groups were liquidated by the authorities one after another, thanks in considerable measure to her reports and forewarnings. Large-scale bank and other robberies, euphemistically called "expropriations" by the revolutionaries, failed after her alert.

These extraordinary achievements gained Francesco a name as Okhrana's ace agent at home and abroad. The top leaders at headquarters, in Moscow, and in Paris, the only ones supposed to know her identity, vied for her services. A set of cables and letters in a folder labeled Mikheyev—this was her pseudonym for interoffice correspondence—shows a tug-of-war for her between Harting in Paris and Colonel Klimovich in Moscow. Klimovich's demands for her transfer finally ceased after Harting sent the following cable. (The French words were carried in clear text among the encoded Russian, here translated to English.)

"*Veuillez* stop asking for Mikheyev. *Semblables procédés impossibles.* I shall never approve transfer . . . I consider such attitudes among colleagues in the same service unpardonable . . . Stealing agents from each other only makes more difficulties for our intelligence efforts . . ."

By 1906 Mme. Zhuchenko's monthly pay had been raised to 500 rubles, ample to let her move about as a fairly well-to-do lady. In addition there were liberal presents for Christmas and Easter, bonuses for major exposures of assassination and burglary projects, and allowances for travel and other operational expense. She had a son, her only personal responsibility, whom she kept in Berlin even when on prolonged assignments in Moscow. Her home was in Berlin's western suburb of Charlottenburg.

The End

That is where she was when exposed by the defector Menshchikov. Burtzev, chief of counterintelligence for the revolutionaries, solemnly called on her. He explained in his methodical and unexcited way that his intelligence penetration of the Okhrana made it completely clear to him that she was an Okhrana agent, that the central committee had already sentenced her to death, and that he would personally guarantee her life if she would come clean, confess, and thenceforth help him in the fight against the Okhrana. She refused, and reported promptly to her case officer, Colonel von Kotten.

Soon all the revolutionary press published her name as one of the most vicious agents-provocateurs ever exposed. The Berlin police provided the necessary protection for her, but she had to be pensioned off—at pay higher than her active wages had been. Resigned to her retirement, she said to Von Kotten, "In this profession no one can be safe from traitors and betrayals. The fall of my life has come after rich and active labors in the spring and summer." But Zavarzin, Vassiliyev, and other authors have written that she still continued to make useful reports on the revolutionaries. None of them knew what finally became of her.

In 1910 she was about 45 years old but looked younger. Zavarzin described her then as a tall, slender blonde, wearing glasses with round gold frames on a small nose under her large forehead, in short not particularly attractive and far from beautiful. But her speech, he said, was most pleasant, firm, and precise, usually serious and giving an impression of extraordinary character and intelligence.

Reminiscing about the long line of conspiracies broken up by her reporting, her eyes were animated as she described subterfuges she had used to escape from difficult situations.

She knew that reforms were needed in Russia but was convinced that a better life could not be achieved through the Communists' proletarian revolution or the Socialist Revolutionaries' terror and agrarian revolt. For herself she had only one real aim in life, to bring up her son properly. Music was her main recreation, and she attended the opera frequently. Knowing society well and feeling at home among all classes of people, from monarchists and aristocrats to underground subversives of all colors and morals, she was well equipped for her dedicated work.

Ulyanova

The Okhrana had recruited Roman Vatslavovich Malinovski, a Communist and personal friend of Lenin, in March 1910. Within a few months it selected him for all-out clandestine support as candidate for the Imperial Duma. He was active in the Metal Workers Union and a good orator. Some behind-the-scenes campaigning, the obedient good will of the gendarmes, and a supply of money from the Okhrana overcame all handicaps, even his prohibitive court record of having been jailed for common thievery. The Okhrana just had to have a penetration among the dozen or so Socialist and Communist deputies. That little fraction was numerically insignificant in the unwieldy Duma, but it was the only body of deputies who knew what they wanted and how to plan their action. And Okhrana agent "Ulyanova," who had been reporting on them profusely and religiously, had been terminated on 14 June.

Letter from a Lady

Ulyanova's true name was Julia Orestova Serova. In signing her reports she used another alias—Pravdivy, Truthful. She was an educated and rather literary woman, a member of the Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolshevik) who had never taken a very active part in its affairs. She had probably joined it to please her husband, who was a militant Bolshevik, committee member, archivist of the party, and its first deputy in the Duma.

The Okhrana's record of Ulyanova's life and work is replete with contradictions. She was described as a weak character, yet her steady and painstaking contributions to the service reveal a hard and conscientious worker. She loved her husband and was a faithful wife, but she betrayed him daily with reports on his political activities. She was described as frugal and a good housewife, yet it was need for money that recruited her and she was hungry for bonuses and awards on top of her regular monthly pay. Among the party affiliates she was spoken of as a saint and a quiet devotee, she who probably had no equal in betraying their trust and causing their arrest in groups.

She first made contact with the Okhrana in 1905, a write-in. In a letter dated 1 March she offered, for 1000 rubles, to give the underground locations where the committee of the Social Democratic Workers Party could be found. She was invited to come to the Fontanka, Okhrana headquarters in Petersburg, under secure arrangements. She did not obtain 1000 rubles, but half that sum was also considerable in the days when an average bourgeois family could live on it for six months. Soon thereafter the entire committee of the party was under arrest.

Ulyanova appears not to have expected this single betrayal to lead to any regular connections with the Okhrana. She needed the money at the moment but was not interested in continued employment thereafter. But Okhrana headquarters, quite pleased with the first transaction, was inclined otherwise. A case officer saw her. He knew about the clerical work she did for the party; how simple it would be for her to bring him information from the underground office. By collaborating she would be freed of fear of being watched herself. No one would suspect her. And it would give her a regular income. She refused.

But the case officer had her signature on a receipt for 500 rubles. Resorting to simple blackmail, he pointed out that what she had already done might easily become known, and she would lose her husband and family. Or she might land in the Fortress of Peter and Paul where those whom she had betrayed were prisoners, and they might find out that the new prisoner was the one who had reported on them. Faced with these consequences of refusal, Ulyanova agreed to continue. She submitted irregular reports until September 1907, when, having by now become a willing and even enthusiastic agent, she signed a regular contract providing compensation at 25 rubles a month, which eventually grew to 150 a month.

In the Spirit of Service

Although her assignment required her to report only on the Petersburg Bolsheviks' internal affairs, she soon extended her purview to

several other subversive groups. Her husband had many connections. Serov felt completely safe in his own home. He had a good, taciturn wife with political views identical to his own, and it would not have occurred to him not to introduce her to visiting fellow conspirators.

Numerous arrests were made in Petersburg and other cities as a result of Ulyanova's disclosures. In May 1907 her reports made possible the capture of an entire revolutionary band which, operating out of Vilna, was about to perform a set of "expropriations" from banks and the state treasury. In the same city they led to the discovery of a load of forbidden literature, including brochures and leaflets calling for an armed uprising. For this she got a 300-ruble special award. In September her information provided legal grounds for the arrest of Sergei Saltykov, a Duma deputy. Her reward of 500 rubles for this was paid on the day she signed on as a regular contract agent.

Through 1908 Ulyanova kept the Okhrana informed on all meetings of the Bolshevik central committee, the composition and structure of the organization, and the personnel of many local committees. In April of that year her information led to the arrest of four militants, among them Trotzky's brother-in-law Kamenev, in May to the capture of an entire underground gathering, and in September to the apprehension of Dubrovski, another member of the central committee. In February 1909 she brought about the exposure and liquidation of a revolutionary printshop in Petersburg and one for counterfeiting passports. Later that year the Bolsheviks sent her abroad to attend a conference, and in this connection she made a report on Aleksei Rykov.

These are just the recorded highlights of Ulyanova's work of disruption among the Bolsheviks. Her sources were always authentic, derived from her attendance at underground meetings, where she frequently served as recorder and general administrative assistant, and from activities in her own home, where her husband handled party matters and received fellow conspirators. She was an avid correspondent, and among the many letters she wrote to friends there were interspersed, sometimes daily, reports for delivery to the Okhrana.

Her sizable salary and awards would probably have led her to disaster sooner or later, for she began to spend far beyond her legitimate means. Some gossip about this had reached her husband, but he remained trustful and never doubted her explanation that she got money from her family, who were not poor. Her undoing came from her own carelessness. As her zeal and practice in the work increased, she became slack in her precautions, often copying from her husband's papers right at his desk. One spring day in 1910, coming home unexpectedly, he caught her copying his confidential record of a meeting held with his Bolshevik deputy colleagues the preceding night.

Outcast

Serova tried to make a confused explanation, but he grabbed all the papers and saw that she had done the copying in the form of a letter to a friend. "Who is the friend?" Persistently evasive answers to his questions brought him to the point of violence. After giving her a thorough beating on the spot, he chased her out of the house, forbidding her ever to return. She took their two small children with her, and she never did return. On 10 June Serov ran a notice in the Petersburg newspaper to the effect that he no longer considered Julia Orestova his wife.

Okhrana director Beletzky fully understood what this announcement meant. Four days after it was published a memorandum was added to Ulyanova's dossier recording that her name had been deleted from the roster of secret agents. A copy of this memorandum came to the attention of the Minister of Interior, who was acquainted with Ulyanova's record. He demanded an explanation from Beletzky. Why should such an extraordinarily productive and frequently rewarded agent be subject to sudden termination? The explanation, of course, was convincing.

From then on hounded by her husband, without friends, and without income, Ulyanova from time to time contacted her Okhrana bosses. In August 1912 she pleaded urgently for help: "My two children, one only five years old, are without clothes, and we have no food. I have sold everything, even furniture; I have no work, and if you do not help me I will end as a suicide." She was given 150 rubles. Other letters followed, sometimes pressing and desperate, not seldom threatening suicide. All of them elicited some amount or other, 50, 100, 200 rubles, until they totaled 1800 rubles at the end of 1912. One last letter after that brought her 300 rubles and an order to leave Petersburg for good. She was given transportation for herself and children to any place she wanted to go.

Serova found another husband during the war. Just before the first revolution of 1917, she addressed a final letter to headquarters in Petersburg:

"I would like you to recall my good and loyal services. On the eve of great events that we all feel are coming, it hurts me to stay inactive and unable to be useful. My second husband is an excellent man and worthy of your confidence. It would not be difficult for me to have him join the Bolsheviks and guide him in the procurement of intelligence. You must realize that that party has to be watched very closely now in the interest of all—our Czar, our Empire, and our armies."

The letter was never answered. She and her husband both perished in the revolution.

Sharzh, Sharni, Sharli, Charlie, Shalnoi

The Okhrana used these code names for Mme. Zagorskaya, who had a remarkably long record of continuous service as an agent and was the highest paid of them all. Her targets were the top leaders among the Socialist Revolutionaries, the terrorists, and the Anarchists. She worked under the direct supervision of three successive chiefs of Paris Okhrana, beginning with Ratayev in 1903, then Harting, and finally Krassilnikov until February 1917.

Because she was handled by the chief rather than staff agents who would have to report in detail to the chief, Paris Okhrana files are rather meager concerning her activities and stages of growth as an agent. Her full name was Maria Alekseyevna Zagorskaya, *née* Andreyevna. She was married to Peter Frantsevich Zagorski, another Okhrana agent, who was a Catholic and originally came from Croatia in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At times the couple worked as a team, but she scored her major achievements in her singleton operations.

Socialite Couple

Zagorski had begun his agent work in 1901, having been hired by the Okhrana's staff agent Manusevich-Manuilov in Rome and given the task of reporting on Polish and Catholic émigrés from Russia. His wife-to-be was recruited not long after by Ratayev, as head of the Okhrana personnel section in Petersburg just before his departure to become chief of the Paris station. The two new agents met at Petersburg when Manuilov brought the young Croat to headquarters for training.

The Okhrana files contain no record of the married life of the couple. They were assigned abroad in early 1903 to work with Ratayev, but there the record of Zagorski himself stops for several years. He is described as unusually well qualified, having encyclopedic knowledge of geography, economics, arts, people, etc. He was therefore not used for ordinary anti-revolutionary operations but frequently assigned to missions involving travel as an Austrian subject, on which he would report directly to the police directorate. At one time he associated with Pilsudski and other Polish and Russian rebels and top Anarchists.

Later Zagorski changed his Austrian citizenship to French, and the couple established a home in Paris. When the revolutionaries, after Azev's exposure, started a vigorous campaign to uncover all the Okhrana's penetrations, the Zagorskis came under considerable suspicion. Both of them were apparently without employment of any kind, yet they lived in lordly luxury and gave sumptuous parties. Zagorskaya, however, casually let slip food for gossip about their family wealth, and her parents were soon spoken of as rich merchants while he became known as a great landowner in Croatia. This tactic was successful and suspicion subsided, especially since it was widely understood that they distributed a good deal of their wealth in donations to various subversive causes.

Zagorskaya's chief task in all her fifteen years of service was to penetrate the leading groups of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and its Fighting Unit at home and abroad. To this end she had joined the party in Petersburg and won the confidence of the underground as a capable member who could do much for the cause abroad. She had no difficulty making herself useful not only in the central committee of the party headquarters in Paris but among the leaders of the terrorist Fighting Unit. For years she was a close friend and associate of the mistress of Boris Savinkov, leader of the Fighting Unit, and she maintained a steady correspondence with Russian terrorists in France, Italy, and England.

Belittled by New Boss

Her pay was high enough to let her live in grand style. Her income from her agent work was 3500 French francs a month, about that

of cabinet ministers of the period. It was higher than Krassilnikov's salary when he became chief of Paris Okhrana in 1910. He did not particularly relish this situation, and he wrote headquarters that her accomplishments were not worth the amounts paid her in salary and operational expenses. He not only wanted her salary lowered but recommended that he stop handling her directly and turn her over to his principal staff agent, Lt. Col. Erhardt.

It was generally agreed that her services were now less valuable than under Ratayev and Harting, from 1903 to 1909, and so her salary and expense allowance was cut to 2500 francs a month. But Krassilnikov did not succeed in transferring her to the staff agent. She enjoyed considerable protection at headquarters, and Okhrana director Vissarionov himself saw to it that her wishes about who should direct her work were honored.

But Krassilnikov persisted. In 1912 he decided to transfer Zagorskaya to staff agent Erhardt regardless of what attitude headquarters might take about it. Then she wrote, in her own typescript, directly to Vissarionov:

> Esteemed Sergei Evlampiyevich:
>
> A. A. [Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Krassilnikov] told me he received orders to discontinue contact with me and transfer me to a different person. He has been proposing this transfer for some time, but I have always refused to be transferred and I still insist on refusing. The reasons A. A. gives for this transfer are not valid, and the transfer would cause an unnecessary change in my life. A. A. is known by name and address to many as an official representative, but he maintains no open contact with the person to whom he wants to assign me. I find that dealing with this new man would be inconvenient and even dangerous. (I do not need to go into particulars, you can see for yourself why it would be dangerous for me.) Dealing with A. A. directly would assure me that our contact will remain strictly clandestine and dependable. A. A. is well known and I can maintain contact with him, like so many others, without fear for my security.
>
> Please consider this aspect—the psychological effect of transferring an agent from one case officer to another. One does not have to be subtle to comprehend the feelings of an agent transferred to a new case officer. You recall our work together, and you can understand that my work is bound to suffer severely from the change . . .

The lengthy letter begged that Krassilnikov be ordered to continue handling her. Headquarters, after some vacillation, complied, and there was no change in case officer.

To the End

Zagorskaya remained in Okhrana employ until the revolution of February 1917. Her husband, however, after joining the French army in 1914, was released to fight with the Yugoslav volunteer army on the Salonica front. Agafonov, writing about the Okhrana and its agents from the revolutionary point of view, claims that Zagorski was exposed as an Austrian agent by the Serbs at Salonica. Considering, however, that it was normal Serbian practice to hang all suspects, one may suppose that this allegation was only added coloring to paint the agent still more despicable in the eyes of the Russian revolutionaries.

After the war the Zagorski couple lived quietly in retirement on the French Riviera.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

Some New Words for Defection

Dear Sirs:

In response to Gordon Cooperwood's appeal in your last issue for a new term for defection,[1] it strikes me that a case can be made for the neologism "transcreder" as a noun, or in infinitive form "to transcrede," to shift beliefs or basic values to another creed or credo that demands another allegiance. Of course many defections are not really transcreditions, being prompted by less august motives, but I gather that Mr. Cooperwood is seeking terminology that may assist a potential transcreder to commit the act.

The simple pairing of Latin roots seems to meet the requirement for easy translation or transliteration and avoid susceptibility to undesirable interpretations. While emotionally neutral in a literal sense, the combination may nevertheless be capable of virtuous associations in the minds of our adversaries experiencing qualms or disillusionment. The shift from falsehood to truth, from a lesser level of belief to a higher one in a process of conversion to another value system suggests honor and courage. At the same time the expression appears to be accurate enough to describe some of the more notable successes of our opponents.

By focusing on the central core of a man's beliefs the terminology seeks to surmount in his own eyes the personal, selfish motivations that may underlie his decision to come over. As with conversion, the aura of this term carries an implication that the community of fellow believers will welcome a soul tardily emerging from the darkness. To this extent our transcreders of the future may be of continuing service after the information they bring has been exhausted; they can appeal to similar emotions in former compatriots who may be susceptible to transcredition.

William A. Kugler

[1] *Studies* IX 1, p. 61.

Dear Sirs:

In answer to Gordon Cooperwood's inquiry, I suggest a freedom-seeking and -promoting defector be called a libertarian.

Robert Ausdenmore

Dear Sirs:

I suggest Gordon Cooperwood try variations on the old concept of seeking and taking sanctuary. Unfortunately there is no noun for one who has taken sanctuary; he is *in sanctuary*. This lack could be gotten around by use of longer forms: "In taking sanctuary, you . . ."; "Those who have taken sanctuary from oppression . . ." and so on.

This device associates the ancient right of sanctuary in the Church with the sanctity of a freedom which offers sanctuary to the oppressed.

John Littlewood

Oriental prototype of the cloak-and-dagger man.

THE NINJA

W. M. Trengrouse

What cowboys have been to U.S. entertainment, the Ninja—the stealers-in—are in contemporary Japan. But a Ninja is less like a cowboy than a dirty-dealing Superman. Originally a medieval cult of unconventional warrior-spies, as presented in the vogue now sweeping Japan from toddlers to grandparents they have the power to turn themselves into stones or toads, are as invisibly ubiquitous as gremlins, and can do things like jumping ten-foot walls and walking on water.

Television carries Ninja dramas from morning until night, kabuki and the serious stage put on Ninja plays, eighteen Ninja movies were made in 1963 and 1964, bookstores carry two hundred fiction and non-fiction titles on the occult art, children's comic books and the adult pulps are loaded with their adventures, toy stores sell Ninja masks and weapons, and even Kellogg's corn flakes has a Ninja mask on the box. It has got to the point that kindergarten classes have been asked to pledge they will not play Ninja, the police are plagued by moppet bands of Ninja, and hardly a castle wall in Japan has not been attacked by amateur Ninja scalers.

The legend of the stealers-in—as much a part of Japanese culture as Robin Hood and King Arthur are of the English—has a reasonably firm if little researched basis in history, and its artifacts can be seen even today. The supernatural powers of the popular Ninja character are only an exaggeration of some remarkable accomplishments of his prototype, some of them strangely similar to things we regard as peculiarly modern. The Ninja did practice the art of invisibility—ninjutsu—through choice of clothes and other quite natural means. The inventions they used in their profession anticipated the skin-diver's snorkel and fins, the collapsible boat, K-rations, the four-pronged scatter spike for traffic sabotage, tactical rockets, and water skis.

Origins

The Ninja most probably began with a group of "mountain ascetics" who lived in the hills around Kyoto and Nara when those towns were

the capitals of Japan and Buddhism was being established. The Ninja beliefs and practices show the influence of Buddhism (with a mixture of Shinto), of the Chinese way of hand fighting, and of the ancient writings of the Chinese Sun Tzu, with his emphasis on spies and on stratagems, deception operations.[1] By the end of the Nara period (710-784) this cult of mountaineers (Yama-bushi, those who sleep among the mountains), who were "men of lower caste representing the crude side of religion, . . . exercised a great influence upon the people by appealing directly to vulgar ideas and superstitions."[2] Occult and dreaded, they lived and taught their blend of Buddhism (mainly of the Tendai and Shingon sects, the latter dealing in mystic hymns and secret formulas) and Shinto on such mountains as Koya and Hiei. They inducted young men into their secret orders, and they came down to the villages to get contributions in return for doing magical cures through formulas and medicines.

But their miracles were not enough to protect them in the face of government hostility to the cult, and the priests turned to guerrilla warfare, versing themselves in what was to become bujutsu, the martial art of eighteen methods—karate, bojutsu, kenjutsu, and so on—to protect their shrines and temples. These had been established twenty miles to the east of Nara at Iga-Ueno, then a farming village situated on a broad tableland rimmed by mountains. The area was so poor and isolated that it was not deemed worth fighting for by the warring landlords of Nara and Kyoto, and so it went by default to the mountaineer cult. Here ninjutsu became an independent art.

Before the end of the Heian period (794-1185), the first book treating ninjutsu appeared, written by the great Genji warrior Yoshitsune Minamoto (1159-1189), the "Book of Eight Styles of Kurama." Mt. Kurama, a training station of the mountain ascetics, was where Yoshitsune mastered his arts as a child. This book emphasizes the art of flying—Yoshitsune is believed to have been a great jumper—and the use of shock troops. It first distinguished among the three arts of strategy, bujutsu, and ninjutsu. Although ninjutsu was still

[1] For example: "In the whole army none should be more favorably regarded than the spies; none should be more liberally rewarded than the spies . . ." And elsewhere, "A stratagem is a military trick. You should win the enemy to your side . . . throw him into confusion . . . break his unity by provocation . . . make him overconfident and relax his guard . . ."

[2] Masaharu Anesaki, *History of Japanese Religion.*

embryonic, it was established as an art by Yoshitsune's "book of ninjutsu," so referred to and extant today.

The Iga area was so impoverished that families often killed their children, particularly girls, and they could not get their whole livelihood from farming. On the other hand adults, or any who could perform adult labor, were valuable. Warfare in the plains of Iga therefore tended to be carried on by stealth rather than by bloodshed. The mountain priests would teach the head of a strong family their secret arts, and these would be passed from a father to his sons, who might also visit the wilderness temples for indoctrination. Even today, says playwright-novelist Tomoyoshi Murayama, the people of Iga are known as sly, tricky, and crafty.

Three grades of Ninja sprang up—the jonin (leader), who was head of a strong family, the chunin (middle class), a skilled Ninja, and the genin (lowest), a day laborer in ninjutsu. As the people of Iga became known for Ninja, fighting landlords in the period of the civil wars from the middle of the fourteenth to the end of the sixteenth century called upon the town for spies and warriors. There were two major families there, each having about three hundred Ninja. In addition, another settlement at Koga, some twelve miles away, had fifty-three families of roughly equal rank with a smaller number of Ninja. The heads of the Iga forces were jonin, those in Koga only chunin.

Masashige Kusunoki, the warrior genius of the latter part of the 14th century, is regarded as the father of advanced ninjutsu. Like Yoshitsune Minamoto, he had learned the basics of the science from mountain ascetics as a child, but unlike him used Ninja not only for attack but also for defense and peacetime purposes. According to Iga historian Heishichiro Okuse, he had forty-eight Ninja under him who spied in Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. One of his exploits, reducing an impregnable fortress, was accomplished by locating the enemy's supply route, killing the bearers, dressing his Ninja in their armor, and sending them on, bearing bags of arms. When the gates swung open the Ninja struck and set fire to the castle. On another occasion, after vainly trying to defend his castle from attack, he was found dead in his armor by the attackers, his personal Ninja crying over the body. But while the enemy were celebrating their triumph, Kusunoki, who of course had only been feigning death, arose and crushed them.

"Two Hundred Techniques" [3]

The Ninja's garb was all black. He wore a black cloth wrapped in turban style about his head and covering his mouth and jaw. His cloak was full-sleeved, and the arms ended in gauntlets. Chain mesh armor was often worn beneath it. The pants were baggy, tied above the ankle. Even the socks (tabi) and sandals (zori) were black, with cotton padding on the bottom of the zori for stealthy walking. The clothes were filled with hidden pockets.

The traditional samurai sword was often shortened to leave room in the bottom of the scabbard for poisonous dust or blinding-powder which could be hurled into an enemy's face. The hilt was likely to be square across, with a long light cord attached, so that the sword could be leaned against a wall as a first step in scaling and then pulled up afterwards.

In travelling, the Ninja usually carried the following equipment: a straw hood for covering his face except for small holes to see through; a rope and hook for climbing; a stone pen for writing on walls; medical and food pills (including hyorogan pellets a half inch in diameter made of carrot extract, soba powder, wheat flour, mountain potatoes, herbs, and rice powder—two or three a day would sustain the Ninja for ten days); thirst-allaying tablets made of palm fruit, sugar, and barley; medicine to prevent frozen fingers; a lighter flint; and a black three-foot towel which could be used in climbing, to hide the face, or to carry water purifiers or poison absorbed from secret mixtures into which its ends had been dipped.

One type of weapon was shuriken, missiles which he could hurl with pinpoint accuracy for thirty feet. Usually he had nine of these, either metal knives six or so inches long or disks in the shape of stars, comets, swastikas, or crosses. Another was the bamboo pole fitted with a hook for climbing or with a balled chain for attack. More subtle were hollowed eggs containing dried jellyfish, toads' eggs, powdered snake grass, and powdered leaves from a "sneeze tree"; these were thrown to blind or unnerve his opponent. Water guns, to be shot from up wind only, were loaded with a deadly three-second poison.

[3] Most of the information in this section is taken from the 22-volume *Bansen Shukai* (Thousands of Rivers Gather in the Sea), written in 1674 by Natsutake Fujibayashi. Extant in seven manuscript copies, it is now being edited for publication. Notable among the score or more of other 17th- and 18th-century accounts of ninjutsu is the volume *Shonin-ki* (The True Ninjutsu).

There were poison rings utilizing the all-powerful tiger's nail, and leather gloves (shuko) were tipped with iron cat's claws for climbing, raking a face, or fending off a sword.

The Ninja had the secret of gunpowder before it was generally known in Japan. They developed wooden cannons, designed grenades and time bombs, mounted incendiaries on arrows, and tipped arrows with leaf-like ends to scatter the fire. As anti-personnel weapons against their soft-shod enemies they scattered sharp-pointed nuts, iron tripods with needle points, and solid pyramids of metal which would fall upright.

There were two types of water shoes. One was a wooden circle three feet in diameter with a center of solid board, the other simply two buckets, with a wooden fan on a bamboo pole used as a paddle. For invisible swimming the Ninja used bamboo tubes as snorkels, wooden fins for speed and silence. The snorkel sometimes had one enlarged end and could double as a horn or a blowgun. Their collapsible boat folded on its hinges to the size of a filing drawer. In use it would be caulked with sap. They also used rabbit skin to make floats of the Mae West type.

The Ninja are credited with developing a secret walk which would take them along at twelve miles an hour with less effort than ordinary mortals make for four; but this secret, if they had it, has been lost. They did use a crab-like walk, crossing one foot over the other and moving sideways, for walls and narrow passages.

They were well versed in nature lore. To get his direction in the dark a Ninja would pull up a radish; the side with more root fibers points south. To find the depth of water in a moat he would pull a reed toward him (they can't be pulled up by the roots) and calculate by a sort of empirical Pythagorean geometry from the submerged increment per displacement from the vertical. From a cat's eyes he could read time with the help of a song into which the formula was woven. He watched the tides, currents, constellations, the moon and sun, the winds, and the colors of the sky to forecast the weather and the best moment to strike (there was another song on the dates of currents). A thin sheet of iron heated and then cooled at rest could be floated in water to form a crude compass.

A study of snores observed with a bamboo listening pipe told the Ninja the sleep status of their victims. They learned to boil rice without a pot (wrapping it in a wet straw sack, burying it in the

ground, and building a fire on top) and freshen salt water (by packing red earth on the bottom of the boat to absorb the salt). A wooden fan was used as a protractor to measure angles and thereby determine distances. They had their own secret ideographs and coded call signs. They were adept at "Gojo no Ri," the ability to read their opponent's mind and mood from facial indications, voice, gesture, etc.

The Ninja used many disguises, but it is said there were seven basic covers—the priest, perhaps offering prayers for the enemy dead while making a head count of the quick and a general survey of their battlefields, the mountain ascetic who could spy from above and signal by conch shell from mountain top to mountain top, the itinerant merchant who could be admitted to castles, the wandering bard and the entertainer with their songs and tricks, and the commoner.

The mystical elements of ninjutsu, largely from the Shingon sect, took the form of secret hand signs and murmured formulas. The art of invisibility and transformation is also put in mystical terms. Shugendo, the mountain ascetic creed, says, "Conceive that you are a stone." If you believe you are a stone, then you are. It is much like becoming one with Buddha. When the Ninja is surrounded by enemies and has no place to escape, he shortens his breath, shrinks himself as small as a stone and conceives he is a stone. The enemy cannot find him.

This particular camouflage is called *Doton no jutsu,* invisibility by means of the earth. But four other elements can be used. In *Katon no jutsu* a man is turned into smoke (helped by liberal use of gunpowder in the Ninja practice of blowing one's face off to preserve secrecy when cornered). But this probably refers primarily to the use of smoke screens, setting fire to infiltrated castles, etc. *Suiton no jutsu* is making use of water to disappear, likely with a snorkel. *Mokuton no jutsu* is to hide in trees. And *Kinton no jutsu* is the use of metal; Ninja would crawl into rice boilers, hanging bells, and temple statuary to spy. A combination of metal and water was to steal a large temple bell and jump into deep water with it, making use both of its weight and of its trapped air supply.

Mass Action and Decline

The last burst of Ninja activity came under Ieyasu Tokugawa (1541-1616), who was to become the first shogun of a unified Japan. On February 6th, 1562, the general wrote a letter of gratitude to a Koga Ninja, Yoshichiro Ban, for services rendered two years before. Ieyasu had had to attack an impregnable castle (we gather all castles were impregnable until the Ninja were called in) and had asked Ban to lead 280 Ninja in an infiltration movement. This band slipped in at night and fired the castle towers. The defenders thought their own men had betrayed them and fell into confusion. The Ninja totally disrupted them without use of staff or sword except to behead the enemy leader.

Two other generals, however, who helped in the unification of the country, Nobunaga Oda (1534-1582) and Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-1598), were trying to stamp out Buddhism and therefore not only rebuffed but held and tortured any Ninja who fell into their hands. In 1581, 9000 of Oda's men attacked a force of 4000 men from Iga, including many Ninja, laid waste the town, and slaughtered its warriors. Ninja leader Hanzo Hattori, lamenting the death of his townsmen, asked Ieyasu to employ the survivors, and the great general did. Then in the battle of Sekigahara (1600), 100 Ninja of the 200 in the Ieyasu forces were killed.

In the first years of the 17th century, when Ieyasu as shogun moved the political capital of the country to Edo (Tokyo), he took 200 Ninja with him. He made Hanzo and his successors the equivalent of U.S. Secret Service chiefs. The Ninja had complete and unquestioned access to the shogun to protect and inform him. (The main west entrance to the Imperial Palace, then the shogun's residence, is still called Hanzo's gate, and parts of Tokyo where the Ninja lived are now named Koga-cho, Iga-cho, and Kogai-cho.) Their cover was gardener employment, and they lived it. But they were always ready to be stopped among the poppies with the order, "Go to Kyoto," and they would drop their spades and set out at once at Ninja speed.

In 1638, when farmers and Christians in Shimabara, Kyushu, rebelled against the shogunate, Ninja were called in again, this time strictly to gather information. The fight had lasted ten months, and 40,000 rebels were holding the Shimabara castle (impregnable) against 130,000 of Ieyasu's troops. Finally the commanding general, Nobutsuna Matsudaira, ordered ten Ninja to reconnoiter the castle. "We have no idea of the layout inside the enemy camp," he said. "Determine the depth and width of the moat, the height of the wall and fence, and the distance from our camp to theirs; and draw a map."

Five Ninja fired guns as a diversion. After the consequent enemy stir had subsided, at midnight, the Ninja moved in from the opposite

side, scaling the castle wall with rope ladders. Two of them fell into traps in the floor, and this aroused the guards. Nevertheless the Ninja, with their black garb and ability to work in the dark, accomplished their mission, and they carried off the enemy's cross-bearing flag as well.

With the coming of peace, however, the Ninjas, like old generals, now faded into the administrative spy and other dull professions. The era of the true Ninja was over.

A history of intelligence reporting from high, if ineffectual, political levels.

MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: FROM PETER TO TITO

Because of President Roosevelt's interest in Balkan affairs, one of the most extensive and detailed series of memoranda contained in the OSS Reports to the White House [1] *is formed by those that trace the evolution from monarchist Yugoslavia to the Tito dictatorship, a course of events in which Roosevelt and particularly Winston Churchill played a hand. In Yugoslavia OSS had representatives with both of the feuding resistance leaders Mihailovich and Tito, and it once proposed to include among the latter the man whom Churchill later forced upon King Peter as prime minister and who still later became Tito's first foreign minister, the Croatian leader Ivan Subasic. In London it had a representative who enjoyed the intimate confidence both of Subasic and of Peter and whose reports reflect minutely the political developments. The most important of the documents are excerpted below.*

21 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

During my last conversation with you, you showed a great deal of interest in the Balkan Theater of Operations. Since that time I had a very interesting talk with the Ban [2] of Croatia, whose letter to you I am enclosing herewith.

The Ban is willing to go for OSS first to Italy and later to make an appearance in Yugoslavia proper in order to establish direct contact with the political and military leaders of Croatia. He understands

[1] Described in the first of these articles, subtitled "Sunrise," in *Studies* VII 2, p. 73 ff.

[2] Ban is an old title equivalent to Governor, notably under the Austro-Hungarian empire.

that he will go merely as a soldier and patriot to assist us in our fight against the enemy. . . .

The Ban told me that it would aid him tremendously in carrying out his duties, and would greatly facilitate his future tasks, if he could have an interview with you, not in his diplomatic capacity,[3] but merely as a patriot who is working for the common cause. . . .

The Ban, who fought in the last war as a Serbian officer, is very popular among the 5,000,000 Croats. They regard him as their champion and leader.

I believe that the Ban can be of great value to us in paving the way for our forces. . . .

28 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . here is additional information on the Balkan situation:

"1. All political leaders, with the exception of the fighting forces, are regarded apathetically by the people. The fighting forces are composed of two parts—the Cetniks, lead [4] by Mihailovitch, and the Partisans, led by Tito. Nearly all the Cetnik units are east of the Tara and Drina Rivers in old Serbia. Their strength is customarily exaggerated. . . . These men are nearly all Serbians. Disturbances among the population are created by Mihailovich's title as Jugoslav commander-in-chief and Minister of War, which is obviously opposed to fact.

"2. The Partisans are led by Tito, whose true name is Josip Broz. Their official designation is the National Army of Liberation. They are made up of men from every region of the country and they are engaged in hostilities in every part of the country, even including old Serbia. This is in favorable contrast to Mihailovich's relative lack of activity and narrow field. Each day, Tito's forces are growing. . . .

"3. Included in the political goals of the Partisans is the establishment of federated Jugoslavia with a government selected by democratic elections. This aim is extremely popular. There is no factual foundation for the allegation of communism made against the Partisans. Such inclinations are found only among a small part of the rank and file or the leaders.

"4. The Government-in-Exile anticipates that Mihailovitch, with assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. . . . The Government is not representative of the population, and causes controversy between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-Exile.

. . .

"7. Outside of old Serbia and with the exception of some of the Slovene clericals, who are a tiny part of the Slovenes, the monarchy is quite unpopular today. King Peter is popularly believed to be a youth under the control of political and officer cliques possessing Pan-Serbian inclinations. The population is irritated by the sizeable allowance made to Peter and particularly by his becoming engaged, during the war, to Alexandra.

"8. There is no genuine understanding between the Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union. The principal barrier to such an understanding is Mihailovitch. Although it is frequently stated in rumors, there is no definite evidence which can be obtained of an accord between the Partisans and the Soviet Union. . . ."

2 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a copy of memorandum which I am submitting today to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has to do with the British request for concurrent withdrawal of British and American officers now with Mihailovich.

Attached to the memorandum is an intelligence report by an OSS officer who has been with Mihailovich during the past six months. I believe that it will be of much interest to you.

[3] In 1942 he had been named by the government in exile to a mission for organizing the Yugoslavs in the United States.

[4] Misspellings retained as a matter of documentary interest throughout.

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a digest of discussions had by a representative of ours with King Peter:

King Peter's sojourn in Cairo was both futile and difficult for the following reasons:

(a) General Zivkovic was engaged in plots directed toward deposing Peter and placing Prince Tomislav, the brother of Peter, on the throne. Supposedly, Prince Tomislav is the bastard son of General Zivkovic and Queen Marie.

(b) Yugoslav army officers have been going over to Marshal Tito.

(c) Cabinet underlings have issued inflammatory decrees favoring General Mihailovic and have been affixing King Peter's signature to these decrees without his consent. This has made it hard to work for an understanding with Tito.

(d) The British have followed a policy of keeping King Peter practically a prisoner. King Peter verified newspaper accounts reporting this fact, although he was forced to refute them publicly at the time.

The foregoing factors, as well as his desire to affect American and British policy in favor of General Mihailovic and to expedite his marriage were responsible for his wishing to go back to London.

The agreed policy of the Purich cabinet and King Peter is the backing of General Mihailovic not only as a force opposed to the Nazis but also as a guarantee of Peter's ultimate return to the Yugoslav throne. They are also agreed on the policy of securing material assistance for Mihailovic. King Peter . . . intimated that if the British did not order him to do otherwise, he would keep Purich in his present position. . . .

25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From our London office, we learn the following:

"1. Effort is being made to construct the basis of a new government which will stand for the potential middle element between Tito and Purich. . . . No Croats have been asked to participate in the discussions to date, on the theory that agreement must first be reached among the Serbian factions. . . .

3. Neither the King nor the British Foreign Office has been contacted by this group as yet; . . ."

10 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Here is a report sent to me by one of our representatives on statements made by the Ban of Croatia on his departure for England:

". . . The Yugoslav crisis is due primarily in his opinion to the utter weakness of the present government. His advice, if sought by the King, will be to suggest the formation of a strong government under the King. . . .

"The great mistake in the past has been that the Allied governments, because of the weakness of the Yugoslav governments-in-exile, dealt directly with General Mihailovic and Marshal Tito. . . .

"The Shepherd [5] believes that if a strong government is set up the first task would be to relegate General Mihailovic and Marshal Tito to their legitimate tasks, namely, military commanders of the resistance forces within the respective areas controlled by each one of them separately. The only effective way to bring about such a situation would be for the Allies to give all military assistance and supplies through the government only. . . .

"Finally, the Shepherd stated that if a strong government is now formed, it must seek, as stated above, by exercising its authority, to consolidate all resistance forces throughout Yugoslavia in order to achieve the maximum effort to conquer the enemy. . . ."

22 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following report of the meeting on 21 May between the Ban of Croatia and Mr. Churchill was prepared for me by my special assistant, Mr. Bernard Yarrow. . . .

[5] Apparently not an additional or alternative title but a code designation. The plan to make use of him was called the Shepard project.

In view of the secrecy maintained by the British on this conference, apart from this report to you, I am having only the Secretary of State advised. . . .

"The Ban informed me yesterday that he had received a telephone call from Churchill's secretary, requesting him to have dinner with Churchill at the latter's country place . . . on Sunday, 21 May . . . The Ban, . . . accompanied by Mr. Stevenson, British Minister to Yugoslavia, . . . arrived there about noon. . . .

"At one o'clock, Mr. Churchill joined them and during the dinner he had the Prime Minister of Holland seated at his right and the Ban at his left. Addressing his guests and pointing to the Ban, Mr. Churchill said: 'I want you to meet the next Prime Minister of Yugoslavia.' Noticing the expression of surprise on the Ban's face, Mr. Churchill said to him: 'Why don't you know that you are going to be the Prime Minister of the new Yugoslav Government?' The Ban replied: 'The King consulted with me regarding the formation of a new government but has not as yet informed me of the fact that I am to be the Prime Minister of that Government and that I will be entrusted with its formation.' Mr. Churchill then said: 'Why of course. That is the reason I asked you to come here.'

. . .

"Thereafter . . . Mr. Churchill stated . . . that he consulted, of course, with the President of the United States about the formation of this new government under the premiership of the Ban and was assured of his complete approval.

"Turning to the Ban, Churchill then said: 'You will form this government and I assure you that Great Britain and the United States will regard yours as the only government of the Yugoslav people, and within four or five weeks you will get all the support and assistance we can possibly render to your country to increase its resistance to the enemy.' . . .

"Churchill further added: 'We shall continue to have friendly relations with Tito because he is conducting a vigorous campaign in Yugoslavia, but we shall look to you and your cabinet as the only legitimate government of Yugoslavia.'

"Churchill informed the Ban that he had informed Tito that, if he is in favor of the new government, his support will be very welcome, but at any rate he must refrain from attacking it and thereby disrupting the earnest attempt which will be made by the new government to unify Yugoslavia. . . . He frankly did not know what the attitude of Stalin would be. He expressed the hope that the USSR will join with England and America in giving whole-hearted support to the new government but had no information on that point up to the present.

". . . On the way home Mr. Stevenson spoke to the Ban about the conference with Churchill. The Ban pointed out to him that whereas the Prime Minister took it for granted that he is the future Premier, the King has not advised him as yet that he is entrusted to form the government. The Ban then said that he is contemplating calling King Peter tomorrow, Monday, May 22nd, and informing him of the conference with Churchill so as to bring the matter to a head. . . ."

27 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a paraphrase of a cable from General Donovan which he asked be delivered to you:

"I had lunch with General Sir Maitland Wilson today. General Wilson stated that the conversations between Tito and Subasich went better than anticipated. The following was agreed upon:

"1. The Subasich Government would have a Tito representative.

"2. As part of his Army, Tito would accept Mihailovich troops who would be allowed to wear the Royal insignia as distinguished from Tito's red star. This would also apply to Naval forces.

"3. That ultimate determination of the King's position would be put off until after the war was over.

Wilson remarked that the chasing around the mountains which the Nazis gave Tito had had a healthful effect. Both Peter and Subasich are going back to London."

25 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Donovan (who is presently in London) has asked that the following report of a conversation he had on 21 August with Prime Minister Subasich be sent to you from him:

"I talked with Subasich on Monday and he told me the following:

"'On August 20 I had a conversation with Adam Pribicevich, Vice President of Draga Mihailovich's Committee. When Pribicevich asked for my help to stop the Partisans' fight against the Chetniks, which is now raging with full intensity and when he asked me whether we could bring about a reconciliation between the Partisans and the Chetniks, I answered:

"'. . . If you wish to fight the Partisans as Communists—conscious of the fact that they are sons of our nation—and to this end, accept the help and collaboration of the Germans, you cannot expect anything from the King, the Royal Government or the Allies. . . .'"

There has also been received from our representative in Bern the following Boston Series report[6] which is of direct relevance to the matters discussed in General Donovan's talk with Subasic. . . .

"During the second week of August, 1944, Hermann Neubacher, German special plenipotentiary for the Balkan area, is reported to have made the following comments on Mihailovich and the political situation in Yugoslavia:

"'. . . The position of those Chetniks who advocate cooperation with the Germans is strengthened by the fact that the latter may soon be forced to evacuate Serbia. This would be the signal for a show-down engagement between the Communists and the Nationalists. Mihailovich therefore probably intends to cooperate with the German Army while it is still in Serbia, in order to lessen the effectiveness of Tito's Partisans. By emphasizing the common fight against Communism, Mihailovich would obtain as many weapons as possible from the Germans. He feels that he will then be able to take over the German positions easily when the German army leaves. Informal negotiations between Mihailovich and the Germans are said to have been initiated, and may possibly be followed by an official conference at a later date.' . . ."

[6] See *Studies* IX 1, p. 81 ff.

22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence has just been relayed to us from Caserta:

"2 C-47's, with stars on the rudders, landed on Vis Monday evening with Russian Yak fighter escort. Tito left in one of them near midnight for parts unknown, according to information we have received here. Source of information is U.S. Air Command Vis. Major Alston and Colonel Maxwell, British Army, have checked and verified Tito's departure."

24 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am sending to you the following paraphrase of message sent by General Wilson to Marshal Tito on 16 September, and a report from our Bari office concerning an order issued by Marshal Tito's headquarters on 20 September restricting intelligence operations both of ourselves and the British. . . .

General Wilson's message to Marshal Tito:

"1. A communication was addressed by you on the 5 of September to the British and American missions at your Headquarters, in which you made a statement to the effect that the Chetniks were being sent supplies and afforded other aid by the Allies, and that the Allied command in Italy is maintaining relations with Draga Mihailovich.

"2. It is not my plan to send these to either the British or the United States governments as a strong exception to these allegations is taken by me personally. I am perfectly competent to take care of the situation as the Allied officer personnel to which you made reference in your communication of the 5 of September are under my direct orders.

"3. In any event, you have apparently been misinformed. The statement that we are sending Mihailovich any supplies or maintaining relationship with him is absolutely false. At the time, you were made aware of the special reasons for which the two American missions have been in the region that Mihailovich controls. The evacuation of Allied air personnel in Yugoslavia was

the specific reason of the first mission, the air crew rescue unit. A small unit under direction of Col. McDowell, the second mission, is in no way accredited to General Draga Mihailovich; its sole object is to collect intelligence in Serbia.

. . .

"6. The fact that on a few occasions rescued American airmen were brought out garbed in Chetnik clothing because of the loss of their own, may have caused some misunderstanding. A few supplies, which may have been dropped in the wrong area, may have fallen into the hands of the Chetniks. The complaints made by you must be wholly based on erroneous reports which resulted from distortion of the facts stated above."

Report concerning order issued by Marshal Tito's Headquarters on 20 September:

"Tito's headquarters issued orders on September 20 to all Partisan corps commanders to the effect that no Allied missions may operate henceforth with units smaller than a corps and further that no Allied military personnel are to travel inside the country unless Tito has given them written permission to do so. The Partisan Istrian Corps Headquarters has ordered one of our officers stationed in Slovenia to report to the headquarters without delay. This order was in fulfillment to Tito's order.

"According to the British military mission, similar communications have been received by its representatives in other areas. All supply drops were immediately cancelled by the British and also all flights to remove Partisan wounded. Nothing further will be done along either line until the situation is clarified. . . .

"Probably the motive behind Tito's move is his desire to curtail and control American and British military representation in the country now that he believes the civil war is all but in the bag and now that British and American supplies are no longer needed. He evidently does not wish American and British representatives to observe and report developments of his plans to consolidate his military victory in the political and economic field. The order, significantly enough, was issued at a moment when Tito was almost certainly with the Russian leaders in Bulgaria or Rumania. He has not come back to Vis since he left for an undisclosed destination in Russian planes. There is no way of knowing if the Russians come under the phrase "allied" personnel.

"The Russians have for a long time had the closest possible liaison with Tito and his staff and have probably taken part in his political and military councils.

30 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received word from Colonel Huntington, Chief of our group with Tito, that the Partisan Headquarters have been moved to Serbia.

The British and Russian groups, as well as our own, are in the process of transferring their personnel to the new headquarters.

2 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that you will find of interest the following report of conversations which our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, had with the King of Yugoslavia and with Subasic:

"On Wednesday September 27, I saw the King. He gave me a warm welcome and spent an hour with me chatting about the present situation. He told me . . . that Winston Churchill sent a sizzling telegram to Tito telling him in effect that the British Government has sent supplies and arms to Tito to fight the enemy and not to fight his own people. The King also said that this cable which was of a challenging tone and the sharpest yet delivered to Tito was provoked by a certain note sent by Tito to Churchill. Two days later this . . . was confirmed by Subasic independently and without any questioning on my part. Subasic told me that Tito sent a cable to Churchill protesting vehemently against assistance rendered by the British to certain Chetniks in Switzerland and to other acts of assistance to Mihailovich. Subasic further informed me that Churchill sent to Tito a reply in which he rebuked him sharply for using arms and ammunition supplied by the British Government to fight the Yugoslav people instead of fighting the enemy.

5 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received the following dispatch from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, concerning a cable which Subasic has received from Stalin:

"Tonight Subasic informed me that he received a cable directly from Stalin in which Stalin stated that the National Committee of Liberation agreed to the Red Army's entrance into Yugoslavia.

"Stalin stated that the Red Army will liberate the Yugoslav people from the yoke imposed by the enemy. Stalin extended his best wishes to Subasic personally as the Prime Minister of Royal Yugoslav Government to carry out successfully the policies inaugurated by his government.

"Subasic asked that contents of cable from Stalin to him not be wired to Washington because he has not informed the British about it."

In view of the nature of this communication and the fact that the value of our informant might be seriously jeopardized, Mr. Yarrow has requested that contents of the message not be revealed.

6 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following report from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:

". . . Subasic lunched with Churchill on August 3 and asked him to provide two divisions to invade Yugoslavia, promising to capture Belgrade with assistance of Yugoslav troops within short time. Churchill stated cannot spare two divisions but assured Subasic of whole-hearted support. Before leaving for Quebec, Anthony Eden spoke to Subasic about moving government to Italy in anticipation of liberation of Yugoslavia. Subasic heard no more about it and is mystified by British verbal promises of support and lack of any real backing. Subasic believes that British in concert with Soviets working with Tito only, disregarding royal Government."

10 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following dispatch which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:

"Saturday October 7 Churchill conferred with King Peter. The King telephoned Subasic from 10 Downing Street asking him to prepare a speech to be broadcast by the King upon liberation of Belgrade. Churchill wanted to see the speech by 5 P.M. The speech was prepared on time. Briefly, the King will congratulate people of Yugoslavia for bringing about their own liberation. He will thank Tito, Red Army, and American and British Allies for assistance rendered, and will appeal for unity.

"Subasic believes Tito still in Serbia with troops, not in Moscow as rumored."

14 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the following report which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow:

"Saw King today, October 10. He related to me his conversation with Churchill on October 7, before latter's departure for Moscow. Churchill said that he is dissatisfied with Tito's continuous non-cooperation, and will find new ways to bring pressure to bear upon him. He assured the King that he will discuss with Marshal Stalin the whole situation and will seek Stalin's assistance to exert his influence over Tito with thought of forming a single government upon liberation of Belgrade."

26 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the attached memorandum which the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia gave to one of our representatives in London for transmission to the State Department.

MEMORANDUM FROM PRIME MINISTER SUBASIC

. . . The Royal Yugoslav Government have decided to adopt the following measures:

1) Instructions will be sent immediately to the Army personnel in the Middle East and elsewhere ordering them to join up with the National Army of Liberation in one single front. . . .

3) Officers and men who . . . fail to join up with the National Army of Liberation . . . will be demobilised and will assume the status of refugees. . . . It is to be expected that those who assume the status of refugees . . . will not be allowed to return to Yugoslavia at the end of the war. . . .

6) . . . The Royal Yugoslav Government have already issued the strictest instructions to their Ambassador in Ankara for . . . dealing with the group in Turkey (Istanbul) who have operated a secret wireless station and . . . engaged in propaganda . . . in opposition to . . . the National Army of Liberation. . . .

7) . . . The Red Cross personnel in Cairo will be changed and an inquiry concerning their activities will be instituted. . . .

10) The intention of the Royal Yugoslav Government in resorting to these measures is to carry out the terms of the agreement which was signed with Marshal Tito on behalf of the National Committee of Liberation on June 16 at Vis . . .

28 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . King Peter saw Churchill this afternoon. Herewith report as given me [Yarrow] by King. Stalin and Churchill discussed general Balkan situation. . . . Yugoslavia military operations and administration upon liberation will be under joint British-Russian control.

. . . Stalin was not in principle against re-establishment of Monarchies in Balkans. He said, 'If a King can be more useful in waging war against enemy and maintaining stability after victory, he would prefer him to a makeshift Republic.' Specifically as to Peter Stalin said, 'He seems to be a young man who is close to his people.' But insisted that question of King's return be postponed until people express will by plebescite. Churchill added, 'When time comes I shall see to it that plebescite is conducted under British, Russian and American supervision.' Churchill smilingly said, 'I shall manage your campaign when time comes.'

King informed Churchill that he learned . . . that Subasic before departure harbored plan to create Regency commission and appointing himself as member of same. King expressed anxiety that Subasic will attempt to perpetuate own political power and is not person upon whom King can rely to fight for his return. Churchill said that this regency idea was news to him and that it is despicable that Subasic promoted it. He assured King that if regency is suggested to him by Subasic or anyone, he will rudely reject it. He said, 'You are neither minor nor at your death bed or mentally deficient, therefore there can be no question of appointing regent.' Churchill amplified that if regent were appointed his acts of malfeasance would be charged against King hence unacceptable. Churchill made a note to send word immediately to British representative participating Tito-Subasic conferences and warn him of Subasic's regency scheme. . . . Churchill said that when he met with Tito and Subasic in Italy it was he who fought the battle of the Monarchy with Tito and not Subasic. Churchill said that Tito is only a Communist and will try to put one of his followers as Prime Minister who will exercise very little power, Tito retaining same.

King asked Churchill to arrange conference between him and Tito in Churchill's presence. Churchill said, 'It is premature now but I will seek the [U.S.] President's opinion as to the advisability of such a meeting.'

Churchill expressed view that King should not under any circumstances be on Yugoslav soil at present. First because he does not wish by King's presence to legalize some of the misdeeds perpetrated by Tito against some of Yugoslav people. Second that it would be easy to assassinate him and then claim that he was murdered by German agent or Mihailovich henchmen. Churchill expressed annoyance at . . . Minister of Defence placing Royal Yugoslav Air Force and Navy under Tito's command. He said that he received word from his Admiral commanding Mediterranean that he will not tolerate same.

Finally Churchill reassured King that he need not worry about Subasic-Tito conference for any agreement will have to get his sanction. He said that Stalin was not unreasonable about general Balkan situation but that of course Stalin is a very shrewd man and situation will have to be watched.

King requests you to keep this report confidential. He is concerned that Churchill may be annoyed if he suspects that King is talking.

3 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From Mr. Yarrow:

"The King received a telephone message from Sir Alexander Cadogan requesting an audience at 2:30 P.M. on 2 November. Cadogan stated he had a message from Mr. Churchill and handed a written memorandum the text of which is as follows:

'Memorandum on agreement reached between Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, King Peter would appoint a council of 3 regents to represent his Majesty in Yugoslavia, pending the decision of the country on the ultimate form of government. . . . The regents would form a government of 18 ministers from the members of Dr. Subasic's government and of the National Committee. It would be the task of the united government to conduct the plebiscite which would eventually decide upon the form of government of the country. . . . The Prime Minister would be Marshal Tito, who would also be Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief. . . . Dr. Subasic is proceeding to Moscow . . . to ascertain for himself the attitude of the Soviet Government towards Yugoslavia. . . .'

"Cadogan then asked the King whether he had any message for Mr. Churchill. The King stated, 'Please tell Mr. Churchill that . . . I was shocked by this agreement and I shall not accept it.' Cadogan then informed the King that Mr. Churchill expressed consternation at sudden departure of Subasic for Moscow without first reporting to Churchill and to King Peter. He further stated that he was not consulted by Subasic as to details of the agreement. Churchill accordingly, said Cadogan, sent a cable to the British Ambassador in Moscow instructing him to ask Subasic to proceed immediately to London to report to King Peter and Churchill. Churchill also sent cable to Stalin informing him that neither Churchill nor King Peter were consulted by Subasic during his conference with Tito with respect to agreement and specifically asked him not to make any decisions until Churchill had opportunity to get a complete report of the agreement and until King Peter had opportunity to study same. . . ."

We have also received from our representative in Belgrade a concurrent report concerning the Tito-Subasic agreement . . . :

". . . Subasic said that Tito was very reasonable although urged by followers who are anxious to set up a federated republic immediately. Subasic indicated the regency compromise agreement by Tito was only to obtain immediate recognition of United States and England. If this recognition is withheld I feel that the agreement might weaken.

"Subasic plans to go to Moscow tomorrow for three or four days and will sign agreement when he returns provided presumably Peter agrees."

21 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in London has forwarded the following account of an interview between Prime Minister Churchill and King Peter. The information was received from King Peter immediately following the interview on 17 November:

Churchill, holding in his hand a copy of the proposed agreement between Tito and Subasich, commented to King Peter that the draft could have been worse and that it represented at least a partial victory because it recognized, for the time being, the constitutional Monarchy. "As you know," Churchill added, "I am against a Regency. . . . I thought Subasich was statesman enough to see the inadvisability of such a step. But I believe this clause may be eliminated; the agreement is not yet final."

King Peter told Churchill that he regarded the agreement as a polite way to oust the King quietly, that . . . he wished to disavow Subasich immediately for transgressing his powers and for proceeding to Moscow without first reporting to him. This comment, however, is said to have infuriated Churchill, who warned the King under no circumstances to take any action before Subasich has returned to London. . . .

Churchill reportedly added: "You know I do not trust Tito. He surreptitiously flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin before my arrival in London. He is nothing but a Communist thug, but he is in power and we must reckon with that fact. President Roosevelt, Stalin, and I have agreed that there will be a plebiscite by which the people of Yugoslavia will decide on the question of the Monarchy. Your re-

turn, therefore, will have to be postponed until the plebiscite takes place." The King replied, "What chance have I in a plebiscite when Tito is in Yugoslavia? It will be nothing but a farce." Churchill then stated that he would insure that the plebiscite would be supervised by "impartial umpires" including "British, Americans and Russians."

During the conversation, the King said, "I have followed your advice, Mr. Prime Minister, since I escaped from Yugoslavia, and look where I am today." To which Churchill replied, "Would you have been better off if you had followed Mihailovich?"

9 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . In a lengthy conversation with the OSS representative in Belgrade on 5 December, Subasich indicated that his visit to Moscow had been a difficult ordeal. Much time was spent discussing questions of government procedure pending a plebiscite, which Subasich feels will take place six months after the complete liberation of Yugoslavia. According to Subasich, Stalin insisted on the free expression of popular opinion in Yugoslavia and expressed abhorrence of any Yugoslav "experiments" in Communism or Bolshevism. Stalin appeared shocked to learn that some delegates to the Serb congress (the Supreme Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Serbia, held in mid-November 1944) were elected by acclaim, which he characterized as an undemocratic procedure.

Subasich reportedly admitted to British authorities in Belgrade that the return of King Peter was out of the question at present. To the OSS representative Subasich admitted surprise at the attitude of the Serbs, whom he had considered monarchists, and added that if King Peter were to return it would cause riots and disorders. . . .

11 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . MacLean has shown the OSS representative in Belgrade a lengthy, strongly-worded, and slightly menacing message from Churchill to Tito, protesting against the non-cooperative and discourteous attitude of Tito and his subordinates toward the British. The message mentioned a number of incidents involving British naval and military

operations on the Dalmatian coast. MacLean states that Tito appeared much disturbed by the communication and offered profuse apologies. At the same time, however, Tito complained that the British had failed to keep him informed of their operations, and stated that the incidents were due largely to the unexpected appearance of strong British forces in various areas.

Churchill's message also emphasized the necessity for genuinely democratic elections in implementing the Tito-Subasich agreement, and expressed the hope that all democratic groups will be free to put forward their candidates and support them in election campaigns. Churchill added that he expects the question of the monarchy will be put directly to the electorate and that the vote will be by free and secret ballot. (Subasich had informed the OSS representative in Belgrade that present plans call for a constitutional assembly and not the electorate to decide this issue.)

14 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow . . . :

"King saw Churchill at 3:00 P.M. on 13 December. The conference lasted 1 hour. . . .

"In discussing Tito-Subasic agreement Churchill said, 'I advise you to sign this agreement for with it the constitutional monarchy is helped to some extent and it is not as bad as it looks. If you sign it there is still a chance for you. If you refuse to sign Tito may form his own government and banish you forever from Yugoslavia. I cannot make up your mind for you. It will have to be your own decision. You are your own master. Think about it and don't rush. You can take your time and we shall discuss it further.' Churchill suggested that King and Subasic meet with him on Friday at 5:00 P.M. King agreed. . . ."

Subsequent to the receipt of the report set forth above we have just received another dispatch dated 14 December 1944 from Mr. Yarrow, which reads as follows:

"King Peter decided to seek advice and assistance of godfather, King George of England. Peter telephoned him today and will see King George this afternoon or tomorrow morning."

23 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have just received by pouch a report of a conference which our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow had with Subasic on 15 December 1944. . . .

"Yesterday, December 15, I had a long discussion with Prime Minister Subasic. Knowing him as I do for the last two years, I should like to say that I am pretty certain that he spoke his mind to me and was utterly frank in those matters which he related. . . .

"When Subasic got to Bari on his last trip, he was met by an official of the British Foreign Office, Mr. Philip Broad. Mr. Broad suggested that he accompany the Prime Minister on his trip to Yugoslavia, to which the Prime Minister replied that he appreciated very much the kindness of Mr. Broad to be of assistance to him but he preferred to conduct his negotiations with Tito alone. He amplified his statement by saying that he did not wish it to be said among the National Committee of Liberation that he was traveling around with a British representative of the Foreign Office. . . .

"The Prime Minister related to me that when he first got to Belgrade after its liberation he knew by that time that he was condemned on an alleged indictment that he was responsible for the death of many communists, whom he interned before the Germans advanced into Yugoslavia, because he did not release them in time. Instead of evading the issue, said the Prime Minister, he delivered a two hour talk before the National Committee of Liberation in the presence of Tito, who brought him into the Assembly. He told me how, after the two hour talk, he convinced them that he was not responsible in any manner for the deaths at the hands of the Germans.

"He told them of his impressions of America and I could gather that he tried to give them the impression that he was very well acquainted with the policy of the American Government, has contacts with officials of that Government and would be in a position to handle Yugoslav affairs more successfully because of his presence in America for two years and the contacts established by him there.

"The attitude of the members of the National Committee of Liberation towards him was, according to Subasic, most cautious and distant. He heard rumors that they were regarding him as a spy and agent for King Peter II and were most uncommunicative with him.

"The Russians, during his stay in Belgrade, were exceedingly cordial to him and showed every sign of consideration and attention. He struck up a friendship with General Kornieff, who was the head of the Russian military mission in Yugoslavia. It was Kornieff who had a large comfortable chair built in the Douglas plane which took him eventually from Belgrade to Rumania. Later on Subasic got to know and became very friendly with Colonel Melnikoff, who, although a colonel in rank, has more authority and power, according to Subasic, than General Kornieff. It was Melnikoff who accompanied the Prime Minister to Russia when he undertook his trip to see Stalin.

"The Prime Minister related to me the following incident: before his departure from Yugoslavia to Ploesti, General Kornieff asked him whether he would prefer to fly in a Russian or Yugoslav plane, that they were both of the Douglas model built in Russia. Kornieff said he was asking the question because on the Yugoslav plane there was the Red Star emblem. The Prime Minister replied to Kornieff that he did not mind the star as long as the plane was a Yugoslav plane.

"The Prime Minister spoke to me at length about Tito. He told me he found Tito to be exceedingly reasonable, that although he is a devoted communist by 'religion' he found no traces of his ideology as far as Yugoslavia is concerned. He regards him primarily as a Croat and a good Yugoslav. Tito became exceedingly friendly to Subasic, according to his report.

"Tito told Subasic that he is surrounded by a bunch of incompetent persons who, although good communists at heart, know very little about how to handle affairs of state. He complained to him time and again of the troubles they cause him by their ignorance and incompetence. Said Tito, 'You, Subasic, can be of the greatest assistance to me and Yugoslavia. You can handle delicately and tactfully our relations with the western democracies and America. It is too bad that we are both Croats but we shall manage and make Yugoslavia in the future a happy democratic state.'

"The Prime Minister related to me that when he was brought by Major General Velebit to Yugoslavia, it was to Vrsac where Tito's headquarters were located that he was escorted. The General left him in the hall where he waited for fifteen minutes and when Tito

came out he turned to Velebit in great rage and said, 'My instructions were not to bring the Prime Minister to me. You always mix things up. You know that I wanted to come and greet the Prime Minister at his villa instead of him coming to me.' The Prime Minister cited to me that incident as an example of the respect with which Tito is treating him. He said that it was at Tito's request that he saw Stalin. He stated that it was exceedingly important for him to meet with Stalin and discuss with him in detail the state of affairs of Yugoslavia and therefore he took the trip at Tito's request.

"Another incident related to me by Subasic as proof of Tito's trust in him was that the Prime Minister suggested to appoint Dr. Ante Pavelic, formerly his secretary in New York, as Counsel General and perhaps Minister in South Africa. Subasic told Tito that of course it was a bit embarrassing to appoint Dr. Pavelic to that post because he bears the very same name as the Croatian quisling. Tito, however, dismissed that obstacle saying, 'What difference does it make what his name is. If you find him reliable I shall appoint him as Minister to South Africa when I become Prime Minister.'

". . . Tito begged the Prime Minister to accept the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the Prime Minister, Tito assured him that he will give him complete freedom of action and will be guided entirely in the field of foreign policy by Subasic's suggestions and ideas. Tito told the Prime Minister that he is contemplating to cultivate the close cooperation of the western democracies and America.

. . .

"Prime Minister related to me further that Tito, although he will never pursue a policy against the interest of Russia, will nevertheless attempt his utmost to build up a closer economic and diplomatic relationship between Yugoslavia and Great Britain and the United States.

"The Prime Minister told me that Tito was distressed a couple of weeks ago when he received a letter from Churchill, couched in the sharpest language he has ever received from Churchill. Subasic told me that he personally saw that letter and gave me the following account of same:

"It seems that Churchill recently sent a request to Tito for permission to land several divisions of Anglo-American troops in western

Croatia along the Dalmatia coast. Tito refused categorically to permit Anglo-American troops to land in Croatia. Thereafter Churchill sent his famous letter to Tito in which he upbraided Tito in no uncertain terms and told him that Allied troops can land wherever they wish if the military operations require it.

"Tito, according to Subasic, was terribly shaken up and distraught over the message and took the point of view that he would not give in to Churchill because he was fearful, as he stated to Subasic, that the Croatian separatists and all elements in Croatia who are against Tito, would seize upon the opportunity to separate from Yugoslavia. Tito was very nervous that the presence of Allied troops in Croatia and Dalmatia would jeopardize his position and would afford the Croatian nationalistic elements an opportunity to rally against the National Committee of Liberation.

"Subasic told me confidentially that he shared entirely Tito's point of view. He told me that he knows only too well that the Vatican is trying to organize a federation of Catholic states into which Croatia should be included and that he favors Tito's feeling that Croatian separatists would avail themselves of the opportunity when the Allied troops landed in Yugoslavia to march against the Partisans.

"Subasic told me that Churchill was exceedingly nervous and jittery when he left for Moscow but that he, Subasic, could see no other way and hopes to pacify Churchill when he sees him. He will try to explain to him that he did it for one reason only: to come to an agreement with Tito and that he needed Stalin's backing in dealing with the members of the National Committee of Liberation.

"In relating his story yesterday, Dr. Subasic told me that at the very beginning Stalin opened the conversation saying, 'You understand, Ivan Oissipovic, (addressing him in Slavic style, calling him by his first name and the first name of his father) that Churchill and I have agreed to work out our arrangement on Yugoslavia on a fifty-fifty basis.' He said Stalin was very cautious with him when they spoke about diplomatic matters, but again, the Prime Minister reiterated, Stalin warned him not to try to emulate Soviet Russia. Stalin allegedly said, 'You have not the territory of Russia nor the people of Russia. You are a small country of small landowners in the heart of Europe. You will have to build your state upon democratic principles with equal representation for all the national groups of Yugo-

slavia. You will have to seek economic assistance from America the way we here in Russia are planning to do after the war is over.' Stalin, according to Subasic, spoke in 'very warm terms about the United States.'

"Discussing the monarchy, Stalin wanted to know from Subasic what the people's feelings are about King Peter, II. Subasic confided in me for the first time that the King is not popular in Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia but that he has some following, of course, in Serbia, and that he told this to Stalin. Stalin replied that he does not care whether there is a monarchy or a republican form of government but no one should force the people to accept a monarchy if they do not wish it.

"Upon returning to Yugoslavia from Moscow, Subasic told me that his prestige went up tremendously in Yugoslavia. The members of the National Committee of Liberation who condemned him first and treated him like a spy and agent for the monarchy made every effort to cultivate his friendship. He told me that he found an entirely different attitude when he returned to Yugoslavia. That was one reason why he is glad that he took the trip to see Stalin. . . .

"Talking further to me about King Peter, Subasic confided in me in no uncertain terms that he regards King Peter's chances to return to Yugoslavia as absolutely nil. He said that he is convinced that King Peter will never return but added, 'Why should I destroy his hopes.'

". . . Subasic told me as a deep secret that there are several Partisan divisions at the Dalmatian coastline and that if the British troops should land in Yugoslavia along the Dalmatian coast they will meet with a formidable resistance on the part of the Partisans. He said that he hopes Churchill will not repeat the mistake in Yugoslavia that he made in Athens. . . ."

29 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From . . . Yarrow:

"Saw Subasic yesterday December 27th. He expressed great annoyance at the King's failure to see him during last week. Subasic stated that if King refuses to sign agreement he will forever forfeit his chances to be King. Signing of agreement will in Subasic's opinion

arouse sympathy for King and enhance his prestige. Subasic added that in event of King's refusal to sign, a new government will be formed nevertheless. Subasic has not seen Churchill.

"Saw King this afternoon December 28th. King contemplating to prepare extensive memorandum explaining unconstitutionality of present agreements. Told me he will forward copies of same when ready to Churchill, British Foreign Office, Ambassador Patterson and may even send copy to Moscow. King determined to insist upon naming regency. Princess Aspasia and Queen Alexandra exerting utmost pressure on King not to yield."

8 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . . From . . . Yarrow:

"Dined with Subasic last night, very perturbed over present situation. Has appointment with Churchill Monday afternoon, 8 January, prior to British cabinet meeting dealing with Yugoslavia problem.

"King George of Greece saw King Peter and told latter that he was given the '3rd degree'. He spent with Churchill from 1000 p.m. to 0500 a.m. when he finally weakened and gave consent to Regent's appointment. Peter is full of determination not to follow same path.'

11 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

On the night of 10 January, at 2300 hours, King Peter completed deliberations with his advisors concerning his final reply to Churchill on the proposed agreement between the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile and Marshall Tito's Partisan administration. The letter to Churchill [rejecting the proposals concerning a regency and the delegation of legislative powers to the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council] was to be delivered on the morning of 11 January. At 1200 noon on 11 January it was planned to release the King's decision in a communique.

At 1100 on the morning of 11 January, British Ambassador Stevenson learned from King Peter's adjutant the contents of the proposed communique . . . Stevenson telephoned to King Peter and Princess Aspasia Eden's instructions and warning not under any circumstances to release the communique to the press. Eden himself telephoned King Peter at his country residence requesting an immediate interview. 42 press representatives who had gathered at the Royal Yugoslav Court to receive the promised communique were informed, much to their annoyance, that last-minute developments had prevented its publication. . . .

11 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following information:

In a recent conference with the OSS representative, Premier Subasich summarized his conference of 8 January with Prime Minister Churchill. . . .

According to Subasich, Churchill declared: "I do not like this agreement. It appears to set up a dictatorship by Tito, who has the army under his control. But I do not see any other way to solve the problem and I shall advise the King to sign the agreement." Churchill further pointed out that the agreement does not provide for the free functioning of other political parties [than those included in the Partisan movement] and emphasized that the members of the Avnoj [the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation] are not elected representatives of the people. Subasich replied that he is contemplating the possibility of broadening the Avnoj by inclusion of former parliamentarians now in Yugoslavia.

In conversation with the OSS representative, Subasich complained of not having seen King Peter for three weeks. He expressed concern over the "unfounded fears" of Britain and the United States that a Communist dictatorship will be installed in Yugoslavia, adding that the people of Yugoslavia want only a democracy and will insist on this form of government. Even Stalin himself, said Subasich, does not wish a Communist regime in Yugoslavia. Finally, Subasich expressed his hope that "the King will himself grant concessions rather than have them taken by the masses themselves."

29 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

On 27 January, Ambassador Stevenson handed Subasich a written communication from the British Foreign Office, stating that the Foreign Office had received a telegram from Stalin with reference to Churchill's speech of 16 January. The telegram expressed Stalin's opinion that the Yugoslav Government should depart at once for Belgrade and fuse with the Tito government, which would then name a Regency. Churchill replied to this telegram that he wanted United States consent, which had not yet been received.

In spite of this information, the Yugoslav Cabinet again expressed itself as unanimously opposed to leaving London until a settlement had been reached with King Peter. Peter is still holding firmly to his position, but desires help "in defense of the people's liberties." Partisan General Velebit is conferring with leaders of the progressive democratic parties. Subasich is in a state of physical collapse and has begged the King for two days rest.

14 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following information:

Premier Subasich has stated that the entire Yugoslav Cabinet will leave on Thursday, 15 February, for Belgrade with the consent of King Peter. The King's nominations for the Regency, Milan Grol, Yuray Shutay (Sutej), and Dushan Sernets (Sernec), will be submitted by Subasich for Tito's approval.

26 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Belgrade:

Premier Subasich, who is currently negotiating with Partisan leaders in Belgrade, states that he continues to find Marshal Tito most reason-

able, but that Tito's subordinates are more difficult. Many of the latter, Subasich explains, have had little opportunity to learn about the United States or Britain, and hence underrate their importance. Subasich said he would endeavor to carry out King Peter's instructions concerning the regency council, but if this should be impossible and the King should refuse to ratify the counterproposals of Tito and Subasich, the result would be "very bad." Subasich would not say whether, in such case, he would proceed without the King's approval, but stated that he definitely would not return to London.

Edvard Kardely, Vice President of the National Liberation Committee (the Partisan provisional cabinet) and one of the leading negotiators, asserted on 22 February that the basic conflict between the King and Tito is due to the fact that the King insists on nominating politically prominent men to the regency, while Tito feels the regents should exercise only the royal prerogatives and should be non-political figures. "Otherwise," added Kardely, "we would have a regency following one political line while we would be following another." This, said Kardely, was Tito's reason for rejecting Milan Grol and Yuray Shutey (Sutej), the latter of whom is unacceptable to the Partisans for other reasons as well. . . .

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Belgrade:

In Serbia there is reported to be considerable dissatisfaction with the lack of a genuine Serb in the newly appointed Yugoslav regency council. [Srdjan Budisavlyevich is a Serb from Croatia, who is believed to have little or no following in Serbia.] The disappointment of anti-Partisan Serbs has contributed to a general feeling of despair among those Yugoslavs who had hoped that Subasich would exercise a restraining influence on the Partisans. General Alexander's visit to Belgrade also contributed to this feeling. At first the opposition interpreted Alexander's arrival as a sign of Allied pressure on Tito. When the General's convoy of fifty jeeps entered Belgrade, rumors quickly spread that this was the vanguard of an Allied armored corps, and Alexander himself was greeted by spontaneous demonstrations. The opposition's hopes were soon dashed, however, by the realization

that the Western Allies were not prepared to rescue them from their predicament. In this atmosphere the announcement of the regency, while relieving the uncertainty of past weeks, has produced little evidence of the general rejoicing reported in Belgrade by the BBC.

30 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach summary and conclusions of a report from Lt. Col. Charles Thayer, who is in charge of our mission in Yugoslavia.

15 April 1945

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

. . . . Aside from the restoration of essential services, Tito has made little progress in solving his economic problems. What steps he has taken are toward a centralized state-directed economy which under an inexperienced bureaucracy have not improved a bad situation. . . .

Although Tito has continued to assert that democracy and freedom are his ultimate aims, his methods have in reality been completely dictatorial, and the system of control he has imposed on the country has been in effect no less thorough and rigorous than those of the German dominated puppet regimes that preceded him.

Under the guise of military necessity, a censorship has been enforced that permits of no criticism either in the press or in public utterances. Active non-conformists are arrested and imprisoned until they can satisfy Tito's followers that they are no longer dangerous.

The Yalta recommendation to broaden the base of the supreme legislative organ by including uncompromised members of the last parliament is being carried out by a committee composed exclusively of veteran Partisans and dominated by the Communists who may be expected to apply strict standards, peculiarly their own in determining the eligibility of former Yugoslav politicians to participate in the future political life of the country.

Similarly, if past performance is any guide, future elections will be dominated by the National Liberation Front which heretofore has in practice had the exclusive right of nominating candidates in local elections. The Front, together with its affiliated organizations among

the youth and the women has already managed to penetrate every city ward, every block, and practically every house. Similarly, every office and factory has its political organizers who are establishing a disciplined control over the workers.

In addition he has organized a political police force and an espionage system recruited from his most loyal followers, who, with fanatical zeal seek out their internal enemies and dispose of them with little regard for those legal rights which form the basis of a genuine democratic government. . . .

In foreign affairs, as in internal affairs, Russia is the lodestone governing Tito's policies. In every international issue, whether it is the direct concern of Yugoslavia or not, Tito and his press assiduously follow Moscow's lead. In fact, Tito and his followers exhibit a servility toward the Kremlin which contrasts strangely with their otherwise dynamic individuality. It is enough for Moscow to express a view and the Belgrade press reprints it in toto, adding a few biting words of its own. Under these circumstances it is no small wonder that in Belgrade one finds no evidence of a corps of Russian agents directing the activities of individual ministries or agencies. Should the necessity arise for specific guidance, no doubt a brief message from Stalin to Tito would suffice. . . .

13 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message came in yesterday from our representative in Belgrade:

"Yesterday morning Air Vice Marshall Lee and myself were summoned to the office of Arso Jovanovic, Chief of Staff for Tito. He advised us curtly that Tito had ordered our missions to leave, including both the Belgrade mission and those in the field. He stated that our work should be taken over by the Military Attaches. Obviously this is in retaliation for our strong stand on Trieste and Corinthia. I made no commitment to him on time of withdrawal, and I do not intend to hurry. Lee stated that he presumed the Yugoslav missions in Cairo, Rome and Bari would be withdrawn. Arso obviously had not thought of this but was forced to say yes.

As he had no word of appreciation for the missions, I reviewed for him what the missions had done for Yugoslavia in bringing recognition to the Partisans and in providing material aid. He replied that the Partisans would have won with or without our support and that the materials we provided were their right to receive. He then launched into a tirade about who occupied Trieste and Venezia Giulia first."

16 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the following dispatch which we have received from our representative at Caserta:

"1. Following memorandum reported to have been distributed to all Jugoslav Army Officers: 'It has been seen in the past that Jugoslavian officers do not mix with the officers of the USSR and we wish to have greater brotherhood between the officers of these two countries. Do not be afraid to talk of military information and army movements to the Russian officers are to be considered as instructors and brothers and our only allies.[7] (Signed Tito).' . . ."

5 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

OSS representatives in Rome, Madrid and Kunming have transmitted the following information, as of 1 September, concerning underground movements and secret intelligence activities continuing at the present time in the following areas:

YUGOSLAVIA: Royal Yugoslav missions and Chetnik groups (Yugoslav nationalists, some of whose leaders cooperated with the Germans) are operating in Italy under cover of a Yugoslav welfare society which recently established a new branch in Milan. Under the leadership of Zhivko Topalovich (President of Mihailovich's anti-Partisan "National Committee") energetic steps are being taken to unite numerous Serb, Croat and Slovene anti-Tito groups into one so-called "democratic bloc." Detention and refugee camps for Yugoslavs in Italy are being combed for recruits to this new organization. Late in August the organization dispatched a Chetnik agent to renew contact with clandestine anti-Partisan groups in Yugoslavia. . . .

[7] *Sic.*

14 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, bearing on the Yugoslav elections scheduled for 11 November, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Belgrade and is dated 10, 11 and 12 September:

Partisan Attitude. The official Partisan attitude toward the elections was outlined by Lieutenant General Milovan Djilas, Minister of State for Montenegro in the Tito cabinet and an influential member of the Partisan Liberation Front, in a recent speech to a plenary assembly of the (Partisan) Anti-Fascist Youth Organization. Djilas stated: "Our enemies at home and the foreign reactionaries who are helping them regard these elections as if they were to decide the destiny of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia. The leaders of the National Liberation struggle, however, do not consider the elections to involve any question of the survival of the National Liberation Front. . . . We consider the question of our national government actually to have been decided by our armed struggle. These elections by the peoples of Yugoslavia should only endow the results of our struggle with legality and constitutionality. We consider the question of monarchy versus republic to have been settled by our struggle. It has not been formally settled, as far as the final legalization of the form of government in Yugoslavia is concerned, but in actual practice it is already decided. What then is the purpose of these elections? Their purpose is to enable us to continue along the lines of the national liberation struggle." . . .

Precept from Poor Richard.

NOTHING TO HIDE

J. J. Charlevois

One of the most egregious penetrations in the history of espionage was the British agent Edward Bancroft, who made himself invaluable to Benjamin Franklin as private secretary when Franklin was the American envoy in Paris working to get French aid for the revolution.[1] Franklin has been called a dupe and stubborn fool for ignoring repeated warnings about this man, who was not conclusively exposed until a collection of British secret service papers was published more than a century later. On the following pages, however, is reproduced a letter from Franklin acknowledging a similar warning,[2] which shows the attitude he took toward the security of his secretariat. It is also a classic contribution to doctrine for general application.

[1] The full story is told in *Studies* V 1, p. A53 ff.

[2] Transcription of warning letter on p. 88.



Paris, Jan. 19. 1777

Madam,

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I am much oblig'd to you for your kind Attention to my Welfare, in the Information you give me. I have no doubt of its being well founded. But as it is impossible to discover in every case the Falsity of pretended Friends who would know our Affairs; and more so to prevent being watch'd by Spies, when interested People may think proper to place them for that purpose; I have long observ'd one Rule which prevents any Inconvenience from such Practices. It is simply this, to be concern'd in no Affairs that I should blush to have made publick; and to do nothing but what Spies may see & welcome. When a Man's Actions are just & honourable, the more they are known the more his Reputation is increas'd & establish'd. If I was sure therefore that my Valet de Place was a Spy, as probably he is, I think I should not discharge him for that, if in other Respects I liked him. The various Conjectures you mention concerning my Business here, must have their Course. They amuse those that make them, & some of those that hear them; they do me no harm, and therefore it is not necessary that I should take the least Pains to rectify them.

I am glad to learn that you are in a Situation that is agreeable to you, and that Mr. Richie was lately well. My Daughter and her Children were so when I left them, but I have lost my dear Mrs. Franklin now two Years since. I have the Honour to be very respectfully

Madam,
Your most obedient &
humble Servant
BF

Cambray 12th Jan^{ry} 1777

Sir

The agreeable manner in which I lived for several years in the once happy citty of Philadelphia—made too deep an impression upon my mind—for either time—distance or the vicissitudes of fortune to erase; you will not be surprised Sir—after this declaration—when I inform you—that the unhappy situation of the affairs of America—has caused me to pass many days in painful anxiety—& sleepless nights since the commencement of the present warr with England, hoping & fearing alternatively—for the safety of the country in general but more perticulerly for the fate of those—whom repeated acts of friendship and kindness—rendered truly dear to my heart—it is from these sentiments—that I take the liberty of addressing you Sir—being fully persuaded from the knowledge I have of your amiable charactor, that you will not only pardon the freedom I am now takeing—but will allso—keep the purport of this letter—from the knowledge of any other Person—or otherwise—I shall be involved in *great trouble*—but I am quite easy upon that head—knowing that that it is to a gentleman of integrity—I am writeing and therefore without further preface—I proceed to the purpose of this letter—which is to inform you Sir—that you are surrounded *with spies*—who watch your every movement who you visit—& by whom you are visited—of the latter there are who pretend to be friends to the cause of your Country but *that* is a mere pretense—your own good sense will easilly infer—the *motive* of *their conduct*. one *Party* assures— that you are seeking aid & support from *this Kingdom* the other *party*—insinuate that you have given up *that Cause* & are making the *best terms* you can for the private advantage of your own family connections & friends I dare not be more explicit—for weighty reasons to my self—but on the truth of what I inform you—you may strictly rely. as I am ignorant of your address—I send this to Mess^{rs} Le Normond & Co. Rue St Honory—to deliver to your own hand—& shall rejoice to know that you have received it safe—if at your leisure you favor me with a few lines—please to address me at Cambrai—that address will be sufficient—as I have resided here for two years with five young ladies of fortune—Doughters to my perticuler friends in England, who are all under my care—we return to England in the spring season—where if I can render you any acceptable service—to know your Commands will give me real pleasure. I make no doubt but you have many abler friends—but I am sure none more willing then my self. I hope you left M^{rs} Franklin & your Doughter well—an account whereof will give me pleasure I had a letter from my husband a few days since—but He does not mention the affairs of America.

I have the honor to be with great esteem
Sir Your humble serv^{t}
Juliann Ritchie

Benj^{n} Franklin Esq^{r}.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

Traitors

THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON. By *Rebecca West.* (New York: Viking. 1964. 374 pp. $6.95.)

TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By *Margaret Boveri* Translated from the German (Hamburg, 1956) by Jonathan Steinberg.* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1963. 370 pp. $5.95.)

These two books cover roughly the same subject matter—treason and espionage in World War II and the postwar period. Both are thoughtful and scholarly and obviously required a great deal of research, which on the whole appears to have been most carefully done. Both try through detailed and extensive analyses of episodes they class as treachery to evolve a thesis of philosophical concepts which have general application, and here I believe both fail.

In her earlier book on *The Meaning of Treason* (1947) Miss West presented a good deal of the same material but came to a quite different conclusion. In effect, she said that the high development of modern civilization impairs the relationship between the citizen and the state and that loyalty to country is no longer the simple and clear-cut bond it once was. Now she has expanded and updated her discussion of William Joyce, the wartime Lord Haw-Haw of Radio Berlin, and added more recent cases, notably those involving Burgess and Maclean, Vassall, Abel, the Rosenbergs, and Profumo, laying particular emphasis on the security aspects; and she concludes that in today's world there is a pervasive and expanding espionage effort met by an equally widespread and expanding counterespionage effort. While recognizing the national need for security, she dwells at some length on the dangers that security and countersecurity activity pose to our societies and warns us to balance security requirements with determination to preserve our liberties.

The German author, Miss Boveri, argues a change in the nature of loyalties since the days of feudalism, pointing out that with the French Revolution the simple allegiance of vassal to lord began to break down and be replaced by the more complicated obligations of a citizen in the developing democratic states. As an example of

* See bibliographical note p. 98.

the feudal practice she notes the soldier's oath required by the King of Prussia as late as 1831. Clearly inconsistent with this thesis is her own observation that the oath of personal loyalty which Hitler required of all German officers was one of the main inhibitions to their active participation in the 20 July 1944 plot against him.

In developing her thesis Miss Boveri uses a remarkable collection of examples. One of the first is Vidkun Quisling, who incidentally bears a strong resemblance to William Joyce. He is followed by such figures as King Leopold of Belgium, Marshal Petain, Admiral Darlan, and Laval. She then mixes in Joyce, Ezra Pound, Tokyo Rose, and Knut Hamsun. Next she treats at length the opposition to Hitler by the various German groups from the old conservatives like General Beck through the curious combination of people involved in "Rote Kapelle" and on to Stauffenberg. Finally she mentions rather briefly such cases as those of Rudolf Rössler (the "Lucy" of Alexander Foote's net) and Otto John.

She claims to be able to see a common thread running through all these diverse types, but I find the argument unconvincing. It is difficult to see the tie between a despicable William Joyce and Stauffenberg, or between the patriot Rössler and Ezra Pound. More generally, espionage cases like that of Colonel Abel cannot be classed as treason. The detailed studies of all these people in both books seem to me to be not susceptible of the authors' interpretations but rather to lead to the conclusion that

> The wrong is mixed. In tragic life, God wot,
> No villain need be! Passions spin the plot:
> We are betrayed by what is false within.[1]

Another book on Lord Haw-Haw appeared in 1964, written by J. A. Cole.[2] It covers the same ground Miss West did and expands particularly on Joyce's activities in Germany and his personal life. (Curiously, it does not credit or even refer to her work, although some of its passages are so like hers as to suggest familiarity with it.) Is William Joyce worth all this effort? Perhaps the British, on whom his broadcasts had such an impact during the war, find the subject fascinating; but for me, well written as these books are, they do not make a major figure out of him. Both authors show a surprising

[1] George Meredith, *Modern Love, XLIII.*

[2] *Lord Haw-Haw and William Joyce: The Full Story* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. $4.95.)

sympathy for their anti-hero, whose behavior manifested few redeeming features except a certain amount of rough courage and a perverse sentimentality about England.

Lawrence R. Houston

RED PAWN: The Story of Noel Field. By *Flora Lewis.* (New York: Doubleday. 1965. 283 pp. $4.95.)

In 1949 three American citizens disappeared behind the iron curtain—Noel Field, his wife Herta, and his brother Hermann. A year later his foster daughter Erika Wallach bravely went to Communist headquarters in East Berlin looking for him; she was arrested and disappeared too. In 1954 Noel and Herta were released in Budapest and chose to remain there. Hermann was released in Warsaw and hurried back to the United States. Erika Wallach was released in Moscow and, not having U.S. citizenship, was finally permitted to join her American husband and children here only after Congressman Francis Walters had intervened on her behalf.

Noel, Herta, and Erika were all avowed Communists. Hermann was not. Their arrests, tortured interrogations, and lengthy stays in prison played a part—perhaps a key part—in the extensive purges of the late Stalin period. The incredibly complex story of their case, and of the era, is told in *Red Pawn.*

Pawn, dupe, or something more sinister, Noel Field became a touchstone in most of the East European purge trials in the early fifties—those of Rajk and his associates in Hungary, of Gomulka in Poland, of Slansky in Czechoslovakia, others in East Germany. Flora Lewis—Mrs. Sydney Gruson in private life—estimates that the number of people involved in these purges who had some association, direct or indirect, with Noel Field may run into the tens or even hundreds of thousands. Many were executed, committed suicide, died in prison, or just disappeared. All spent long periods in prison, under torture, or in work camps in the Soviet Union; the whole thing was a Soviet show. After Stalin and Beria died, and particularly after Khrushchev's revelations at the Twentieth Congress concerning Stalinist excesses, a great number of the victims were released and rehabilitated. Some got a posthumous rehabilitation, undoubtedly significant in the Red Valhalla.

An unhappy central figure in this web, Noel Field was born in London of American parents in 1904, raised in Switzerland, and edu-

cated at Harvard. He was a U.S. Foreign Service employee until the mid-thirties, when he resigned and went to work for the League of Nations Secretariat in Geneva: although a Communist, he is supposed to have had scruples about spying on his own country from his State Department job. This itself is a tip-off as to how good a Communist he was, and the Communists in fact never accepted him. All of his many and persistent approaches to leaders to obtain some important assignment were rejected.

Field was unquestionably of service to the Communists in the period that began during the Spanish Civil War and continued until after the end of World War II. Working with the Unitarian Service Committee, his humanitarian efforts were directed toward getting preferred treatment for the Communists. During this period he also made the contact with Allen Dulles in Switzerland that was later used as evidence of his being an American intelligence agent to justify the liquidation of many of his Communist contacts. (Dulles made cautious use of him, considering him neither trustworthy nor a real intelligence operator.)

Flora Lewis has unearthed an impressive amount of information for this book, considering her difficulties with sources. Noel and Herta Field refused to talk to her. The OSS and CIA files were not available to her. (Assuming that the data in these would be exclusively historical, she expresses concern over this secrecy.) Erika Glaser Wallach and Hermann Field undoubtedly told her all they knew. But she must be given credit for having tracked down thousands of leads to persons living and dead.

Perhaps because of this lack of access to some files, the author has left one or two erroneous impressions. She overstresses the assistance OSS gave to the Communists during the war, neglecting the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally of the United States in the common effort against Nazi Germany. She also seems to place Noel Field on an undeserved pedestal—possibly because material on his activities remained thin despite her arduous research—when basically he was a rather stupid idealist who never held an important post in his life.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

World War II

DIEPPE: The Shame and the Glory. By *Terence Robertson.* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1962. 432 pp. $6.50.)

As the fogs of time settle more and more on World War II, obscuring many actions that seemed important at the time, one that stands clear in historical perspective as of particular intelligence significance is the raid that was made on the French channel port of Dieppe on August 19, 1942.

Dieppe has been described as a reconnaissance in force. It was actually a test battle staged to learn the strength of the German defenses around a typical channel port. The British General Staff felt that a landing in near-division strength should be undertaken in preparation for the invasion of Europe. The Canadians, because they had been training in England since 1939, were selected to provide the bulk of the ground forces.

The action developed into five separate ground fights, an air battle, and a sea skirmish. Three of the landings were disasters, those on the main beaches at Dieppe and the two flanking ports at Puits and Pourville. The two successful assaults were on the extreme flanks: the 4th Commando destroyed a German battery at Varengeville and the remnants of the 3rd Commando neutralized the guns at Berneval. But the slaughter on the beaches made Dieppe one of the most costly actions of the war.

The reporting on the battle at the time was distorted in nearly the entire Allied press. British papers called it a Commando raid and touted the RAF action as a major air victory (RAF losses 113, Luftwaffe 40). The American press played up American participation out of all proportion (50 Rangers among more than 6,000 ground troops). The Canadian reports, coming closest to the truth, saw it as a bloody catastrophe (3,369 Canadian casualties).

This is the first book-length description of the action at Dieppe for the Canadian audience. Of the three previous book-length treatments one was published in France and two in England. The official Canadian history of the war by Stacey devoted only about a hundred pages to the battle which Canada has more reasons to remember than any other single action; more Canadians were taken prisoner at Dieppe than in the entire balance of the European campaign.

Robertson has done an excellent research job, though obviously swayed heavily by the emotions which the battle still arouses in Canada. His book is full of personal anecdotes; he has probably interviewed just about every survivor in Canada. He pays great attention to the validity of prior intelligence, both British and German, but he neglects some very important items. If he had treated the whole action more as an intelligence exercise, stressing the great value that what was learned at Dieppe assumed nearly two years later on D Day in Normandy, his book would have been not only more perceptive history but perhaps of more solace to the Canadians.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

A TASTE OF FREEDOM. By *Robert Jackson.* (London: Arthur Barker. 1964. 207 pp. 21/—.)

No German or Italian prisoner of war who escaped from custody in England succeeded in making the home run to the continent while World War II was still in progress. *A Taste of Freedom* is a roundup of the frustrations of several men who tried. Some of their tales have been told in books and articles (for example that of von Werra), but a few are published here for the first time. Noteworthy among these is that of Luftwaffe pilots Wappler and Schnabel, who escaped from a prison near Carlisle, stole a training aircraft from Kingstown airfield, and flew eastward. Short of fuel and uncertain of their location, the Germans put down at a RAF field, where, incredibly, they were able to refuel and take to the air again without causing alarm. The end came when they again ran short of fuel and were forced to land in a meadow in southeastern England, some 120 miles from German-held France. With slightly better flying weather this daring attempt might well have succeeded.

Although not intended as a survey of life in prisoner-of-war camps in Britain, the book includes considerable background on the schemes and aberrations of unrepentant Nazis who carried on in the prison camps from where they had left off in Germany.

Louis Thomas

Miscellaneous

I CAN TELL IT NOW. Edited by *David Brown* and *W. Richard Bruner.* (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1964. 362 pp. $5.95.)

This is a collection of almost two score past news stories, some hitherto untold, which stood out in the recollections of the contributors, members of the Overseas Press Club. Several of them touch, not sensationally, on intelligence interests.

Drew Middleton recalls how widely the Nazi invasion of the USSR, 21 June 1941, was foreknown not only in intelligence circles but to the public, to "everyone but Stalin." Middleton first heard in March from a British intelligence officer in Lisbon that the German plan called for the attack that spring. In May the word in Lisbon was that it had been delayed by the unexpected Balkan campaign (as indeed it had) but would take place about 20 June. In the first week of June Anthony Eden told correspondents that 120 divisions were deployed along the Soviet frontier and would move in sometime during the last half of the month. Middleton, paying tribute to British intelligence for getting this information, says, "Soviet intelligence must have known of Hitler's build-up"; he apparently hasn't heard of Sorge's warning to Moscow.

Sigrid Schultz reports, not very credibly, end-of-war conversations with Germans which revealed the Germans' intent to play the Russians and the Western capitalists off against each other as they had after World War I. One "carefully planned move" to this end was to preserve the Reich intelligence files on the United States and turn them over to the Russians, while on the other hand "Gehlen and his friends managed to put over a deal with the Americans by using his ample files [on the USSR] as bait. Germans boast . . . that we allowed him to set up his own 'Gehlen outfit' that retained its files, sent out its own agents, and handed over to the Americans only what Gehlen himself considered suitable while we were footing the bill for all these operations."

Bob Considine tells the story of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg's espionage activity and trial and ends with a gruesomely detailed eye-witness account of their electrocution, hers bungled and prolonged.

Four of the selections are centered on Communist leaders. Harrison Salisbury relives the mysterious apprehension in the Moscow atmosphere culminating in the announcement on 13 January 1953 about the

Doctors' Plot and then the "frozen terror" that reigned until Stalin's death two months later. William L. Ryan, taking off from his recollections of Soviet leaders' indiscretions at an October Revolution banquet in 1953 which Khrushchev did not attend, reviews the former Premier's career. Jules Dubois writes about Castro's coming to power; he begins by quoting "Dick" Rubottom on the question whether Fidel was a Communist: "Every week we had a high-level meeting with all intelligence agencies in Washington and I always asked for such information and always received a negative reply." And Martin A. Bursten, with dubious authority, portrays Janos Kadar as a eunuch whose sole aim in life has been to survive.

Jules Bergman tells "The Unfinished Saga of the U-2," emphasizing not the political embarrassment of the Powers shoot-down but the compelling need there was for reconnaissance, the answer in "one of the most astounding demonstrations of intelligence work in modern history," the "colossal" value of the photographic take, and the role of the U-2 as forerunner of the A-11 and spy-in-the-sky satellites. Edward Hymoff reviews his own past coverage of the U.S. and Soviet space-flight programs. Although he complains that "the United States has been just as . . . secretive as the Soviets," he has managed to get hold of a number of secrets, including the fact that U.S. radar stations in Turkey monitoring Soviet missile launchings are huge installations with some "screens"—he must mean antennas—"as long as football fields."

Daniel G. Van Acken writes about the Cuban missile crisis, less from the intelligence angle than from the viewpoint of the UN and with gratitude that "enough men . . . took time out to think." And Jess Gorkin, *Parade* editor, tells how he spent almost two years promoting a hot line to Moscow, winning approval from Eisenhower, Nixon, Kennedy, and Khrushchev but no action, before that crisis lent sufficient impetus to the idea.

Sandra Richcreek

THE STRATEGY OF SUBVERSION. By *Paul W. Blackstock.* (Chicago: Quadrangle. 1964. 351 pp. $7.50.)

This is a political scientist's study of covert political (including paramilitary) operations as an instrument of state policy. It inquires into their effectiveness and liabilities and dwells on some persistent problems in managing and controlling them. As empirical base for his analysis and conclusions the author uses three chief examples—some Tsarist operations in the nineteenth century, Nazi German prewar and wartime efforts, and at greatest length CIA's publicized activities, centering on the failure at the Bay of Pigs.

Although he promises the reader that he will keep his attention on political principles and avoid both U.S. policy recommendations and scapegoating of U.S. agencies, this choice of evidential base inevitably leaves CIA the villain of his book, especially since he discounts the most authoritative accounts of the Bay of Pigs crisis as CIA-inspired special pleading, quotes approvingly the arguments for a congressional watchdog committee, and reverts again and again to Truman's astonishing repudiation of CIA's operational responsibilities. He also steps down from the plane of principle in suggesting that the FBI rather than CIA should help small nations develop their security organs, in declaring that the Pentagon has a "far more sophisticated" counterinsurgency doctrine, and in blaming CIA for not being a silent service like the British.

The reader comes to suspect, in fact, that the professor is less interested in producing a work of scholarship than in cashing in on the public interest which made best sellers of two recent journalistic books on CIA operations. Although his foreword deprecates such "well-meaning but only partially informed criticism" as "alarmist literature," his text proper immediately reverses field and begins to quote these books respectfully as his authority. This impression of duplicity, of a façade of objective scholarship over a pandering to sensationalism, is reinforced by his remarkable act of false coyness during an interview reported in the *Philadelphia Bulletin* of 17 January last. Asked whether he had ever served with CIA—he hadn't, but in an Army Special Warfare office—"'It is not in my record,' he replied cautiously—and grinned. That was all I could get from him on the subject."

On the political science level Blackstock generalizes in conclusion that among the major world powers covert operations have been oversold, are undermined by bureaucratic rivalry over control of them, introduce distortions into intelligence, interfere in policy making, and embarrass international relations. Large-scale operations risk sparking a thermonuclear conflagration, and the techniques taught to undeveloped nations foment strife and disorder. Nevertheless he does not urge that they be altogether abandoned but only insists that "the

veil of secrecy must be lifted"—he doesn't explain how this fits in with his admiration for the "silent service" of the British—so that they can be employed, presumably under the guidance of the political scientists, "with an understanding of the principles involved."

David D. Hawkswell

* The Boveri book (p. 89) was originally published in four paperback volumes under title *Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956-1960). The British edition (London: Macdonald, 1961) and the American edition reviewed here represent only the first two volumes of the original, and the American omits two chapters (31 and 32) contained in the British. (Although both are based on the same translation, there are also other editorial differences between them.) The original third volume dealt with Communist agents, including the Sorge ring, Burgess and Maclean, and Whittaker Chambers, the fourth with problems of treason and security in the United States.

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

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

Shortcomings and net usefulness of a sharply policy-pointed class of estimative exercise.

ON ESTIMATING REACTIONS

John Whitman

The most fascinating and frustrating of the National Intelligence Estimates which an estimates officer writes begin as follows:

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist reactions to a U.S. course of action involving . . .

These estimates form a quite distinct category. They originate in a unique way; they pose special problems of organization; their coordination with the representatives of the USIB member agencies is exceptionally difficult; and final USIB approval almost always requires more than one meeting, often more than two. Herein reside the frustrations, to which I shall devote the greater part of what follows. The fascination lies in the assurance that the drafter is involved in major and immediate decisions of U.S. policy. No other estimates can generate in his breast quite such a sharp sense of relevance to action.

These papers are often miscalled "contingency estimates." Contingencies figure in almost all NIEs. Sometimes they concern what one foreign country may do if a neighbor takes certain steps, e.g., what Pakistan will do if India embarks on a nuclear weapons program. Sometimes a contingency lying in possible U.S. action is examined as part of a wider study, e.g., in the course of a general estimate on South Korea, ROK reactions to a reduction of U.S. military aid may be explored. To avoid confusion with these, it will be useful to reserve the term "reaction estimates" for those NIEs which are addressed exclusively to the question of other countries'—usually Communist powers'—responses to a postulated U.S. course of action in a crisis situation.

Origination

Reaction estimates are never self-initiated. They are commissioned by policy-making departments which are considering taking some

specific course of action and want an appraisal of how the enemy will probably respond. They are invariably written against short deadlines and deal with immediately critical problems. Those of the last few years have dealt principally with three situations—Berlin, Laos, and Vietnam. The first were requested by the Berlin Task Force in the State Department; the father of the other two sets is an alumnus of the Office of National Estimates who migrated to policy-making posts and established a practice—now sustained by the White House, the Joint Chiefs, and others—of subjecting a great variety of Indochina policy proposals to the estimative test.

After writing quite a number of reaction estimates, I'm still not entirely sure why requesters keep on asking for them. The results, as we shall see, are often of dubious value. Sometimes I suspect that the commissions come from opponents of the policy proposal who hope that the estimators will help them kill it. But the process does reflect a fundamental principle of intelligence: that when early enemy reactions are the critical test of a policy proposal, these reactions should be estimated in advance, not by proponents or opponents, but by someone uninvolved in the heat of policy contention. Full objectivity is of course a counsel of perfection, but I think it correct, not merely charitable, to say that the policy makers should and do feel better—feel protected against the full force of bias—when they have an outside opinion. And since these matters are too sensitive to be submitted to public opinion, they turn to intelligence as an inside outsider.

Terms of Reference

And intelligence always bucks. We are never satisfied with the way the questions are put. They are far too general; we need a clearer idea of what the United States proposes to do; in particular we need sharper distinctions among the various steps to be taken in a sequence. Very well, responds the policy maker, and lists for us four major steps and a dozen specific actions within each, including *inter alia,* say, the exact inventory of implements to be used in each of three probes on the Berlin autobahn. Now we are really outraged. Perhaps, we say, we can provide some general guidance, but how do you expect us to distinguish between reactions on the one hand to ten air sorties against troop concentrations in Laos with high explosives and on the other to fifteen sorties against lines of communication with napalm?

It would be nice to think that we eventually sort out with the requester the proper level of detail and can proceed to answer questions which are governed by the limits of professional intelligence and human judgment. Unfortunately, this is often not the case; the question of proper terms of reference dogs us to the very end of the process. The reason, I am sorry to say, is that we are not "outside" after all. Each of the intelligence agencies works for a particular policy maker. Even the Director of Central Intelligence is, under one of his hats, a senior policy advisor to the President. And it is uncanny how the choice of a level of detail will influence the estimated enemy reaction, and therefore the seeming wisdom of the proposed policy. A proposal may appear to bloom with fair prospects when viewed in a general way, yet prove to be studded with thorns when examined in detail. Surely everyone can understand this; how many bright ideas have we all had which might survive one or at most two levels of detailed criticism but fell apart at the third? And when that third level is reached, do we not insist that it's a good idea "in principle" and plead for a reconsideration at the higher, more favorable level of generalization?

Other Kinds of Bias

That was a fairly subtle point. A more obvious one is that the participating agencies may already, at their policy-making summits, have decided what they think about the proposed U.S. course. Their intelligence arms are then under pressure, of course, to bend the estimate toward these conclusions. There are two barriers against this: the fortitude of the drafter and the chairman, and the collective conscience—a sense of mutual responsibility, really—which has grown up over the years in the estimative community. The latter works surprisingly well most of the time.

Another source of bias, again on the subtle side, lies in the fact that the estimators are American citizens, rooting for their country. If the policy proposal is not outrageously unreasonable, it is well-nigh impossible for us to bring ourselves to a firm estimate that the United States is bound to lose. We can make differential judgments in which some parts of the policy look more likely than others to produce the desired results. But at some point the course of action will

Reaction Estimates

usually culminate in a sheer test of will, and how can we bring ourselves to estimate that we will be the first to falter? [1]

But having bared all these misgivings, I remain persuaded that the policy maker is better off for having solicited an estimate of enemy reactions from intelligence agencies which, bureaucratically tied though they are to policy departments, are by training and inclination and conscience freer from commitments to policy than he and his colleagues are. And so we proceed with the drafting, knowing that we will have to continue solving and re-solving the terms-of-reference question as honestly as we can.

The Drafting

(Though the precepts which follow may all be golden truths, they are not likely to be of much help to the next estimator who has to draft a reaction estimate. This poor fellow will have to read the request, negotiate its unclarities with some ill-informed representative of the requester, exchange confusions with the newly appointed chairman of the estimate, and produce a first draft—all within 24 or ten or even six hours. Theory is gray, Lenin remarked, but the tree of life is ever green. Or, as Stalin put it, cadres decide everything.)

Through the bitter experience of many redrafts I have learned that it is absolutely indispensable to begin a reaction estimate with an analysis of the situation preceding the U.S. action proposed. Usually, in fact, it is necessary to back up two steps: In many cases the U.S. policy presupposes an enemy initiative which then sets us into motion along the hypothesized line. What, then, did he mean by this action? Did he expect our reaction, in which case he presumably has a preplanned counter-reaction? Or would he be taken aback by what we did and discover himself in the midst of some major miscalculation, unready with a next move and wholly uncertain about further U.S. intentions? These questions make a great deal of difference. Often no single answer can be given, and instead there emerge alternative analyses which must then be run out in parallel through the remainder of the estimate. Well why not, you say, but I promise you that this plays hell with drafting a paper simple and intelligible enough to be useful.

An ordinary NIE—on Soviet military policy, say, or the outlook for Brazil—has a theme, a tone. A competent drafter will marshal his facts and his ideas and construct an argument which leads to a single or a few major conclusions. If he does not, there's no use writing the estimate. If he does, and if he constructs well, then his betters [2] may tug and pull at his paragraphs, alter his adjectives, and qualify his estimative passages, but his message still comes through.

It is fatal to approach a reaction estimate in this fashion. The drafter will encounter a long succession of close judgments as he works his way through the paper. Most of them will be near the 50-50 mark; if they were not, the estimate would not have been requested. He will make some of them in one direction, others in the opposite. He will estimate "desirable" reactions to some U.S. moves, "undesirable" ones to others. Out of the sum total of these, some general theme may in the end emerge, but he had better let this happen rather than aim at it. For his paper consists essentially of nothing but this succession of judgments, and many of them will be changed before the USIB finally signs off. If his draft is built around a theme, he will have to restructure, probably sooner rather than later.

But he can make his contribution. In thinking through the questions, he can try to find the turning points, the stage or stages which constitute, in Alsopian language, the "crunch." This, I think, is a real service. It tells the policy maker, not what will happen, but what to worry most or pray hardest about. It tells him about the moment of truth—what its content will be and where, as he gropes along an uncertain path, he may expect to encounter it. To do this well is a triumph.

If he is lucky enough to find a turning point, the wise drafter will stop and point in both directions. He will give a scrupulously complete list of arguments why the enemy might do what we want him to do. Then he will give an exhaustive set of reasons why the enemy might do just the opposite. This is another service. It gets the policy maker to think about all the factors, the unpleasant as well as the pleasant ones. And it insures that he cannot dismiss

[1] This irreducible element of bias probably saved us (the estimators, not the United States) in a series of Berlin estimates. The USSR's local advantages seemed overwhelming, and it was very hard to see how various U.S. courses of action could surmount the crisis. Gritting our teeth, we estimated some even chances. More important, the President gritted his teeth and made us right.

[2] First the Board of National Estimates, then the representatives of the USIB agencies, finally the USIB itself.

the conclusion which follows on the grounds that the intelligence people forgot something important.

The Result

Once this is done, the drafter can be rather casual about which direction he chooses. It doesn't much matter; the Director will make up his mind, some USIB members will join him in the text, and others will take footnotes of dissent. But if the text has not laid the proper groundwork for these decisions, the drafter will have to endure an hour of confused argument at the USIB table and then start over again.

Nor, I would maintain, should it make very much difference what the USIB decides. The President surely would be silly to let his decision be determined by whether intelligence said the chances were "slightly better than even" or "slightly worse than even." In the first place, the policy proposal has probably been changed in two or three minor ways, just enough to render the estimate slightly inapplicable, when he gets it. In the second place, the policy would assuredly be modified in the course of its implementation, enough to render the estimate more than slightly inapplicable. In the third and resounding place, everyone from drafter to President knows that the future is plain unknowable.

Well then, why write a reaction estimate? Because it is always a help to have the issues defined. Because the estimate may serve to highlight a forgotten or glossed-over problem. Because it may dispose of some wild, far-out ideas which heretofore had not been adequately confronted. Because a sober and at least partially disinterested accounting of risks and chances may not be available from any other source. Because subsequent policy argument can perhaps be more realistic.

You will notice that I have been very sparing of examples. This is because all reaction estimates are classified Top Secret and distributed to a small readership. In fact, they are not even accorded a permanent printing. Garden-variety NIEs get their conclusions distributed as rapidly as possible, after USIB approval, in an informal offset version. Subsequently the reader receives a handsome printed version of the full text. Reaction estimates get the first treatment but not the second. Thus their covers bear two of the finest, most lucid sentences ever written in the U.S. Government:

"NOTE: This is the estimate. No further versions will be published."

Problem of ranging technical possibilities in due policy perspective.

SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATING

Wayne G. Jackson

Those of us in the estimating business have a troublesome time with the problem of incorporating scientific or technical contributions into a finished estimate. To make the point, a hypothetical case relating to missiles and nuclear warheads is discussed below, but the example might as well be any complicated piece of military hardware or other technical subject.

Technical Possibility

An estimate on the advanced weapons program of Upper Volta is started. In the normal routine a contribution is asked from the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee. In due course, the estimators receive a contribution which concludes that, on the basis of an examination of the evidence, "Upper Volta could have an IRBM system ready for production in 1967-68 and carry out deployment in 1968-69." The economists submit a contribution saying that, given a high enough priority, the economy of Upper Volta could support such a program. The political analysts find that Upper Volta thinks it has an urgent requirement for such a weapons system. So the estimate comes out saying that "Upper Volta could start deploying an IRBM system in 1968-69."

The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee also submits a contribution, one on nuclear developments. Upper Volta has conducted a few atmospheric tests of nuclear devices, something is known of its general level of technical competence and production facilities; and so JAEIC states that warheads compatible with the IRBM's could be produced by the time GMAIC says the missiles could be ready for deployment. So the estimate adds to its sentence on deployment of the missiles the words "with compatible fission warheads." In the course of this exercise, what started out to be very special statements of raw capabilities get transformed into USIB-approved estimates that have an aura of probability. While the word "could," in the estimating business, is understood to be purely a statement of possibility, the mere fact that the possibility is stated with no further qualification gives

it something more of substance. The reader is apt to think, "If there is not a good chance that the possibility will be realized, why mention it?"

Hypotheses on Thin Ice

It is possible that the estimate could be handled with so much emphasis on its being a mere statement of potentialities that the reader would not be confused into taking it as having any significant element of probability. But it is doubtful if drafting could convey the tenuousness of the many technical components of the estimate. For instance, the estimate that Upper Volta could have compatible nuclear warheads involves in itself at least two estimates, each based on a number of subsidiary estimates. What is the maximum weight of the warhead—including guidance, firing mechanism, etc.—which the Upper Volta missile can carry? What is the likely actual weight of each of these components? What are the warhead's dimensions? It is highly unlikely that anyone can make more than crude guesses on these questions, even if we had seen a missile in the Army Day parade in Ougadougou.

Similarly, we probably know little about the probable size, weight, and shape of the nuclear component of the postulated warhead, how much fissionable material would be in it, its yield, or even its general design. Yet some hypotheses on all these questions underlay the estimate that a warhead compatible with the missile could be available. The estimators ask the technicians for opinions, and they oblige. Indeed, the estimators often ask for even more speculative data, as for the CEP and reliability of missiles. Comparable estimative problems arise in all technical subjects, e.g., capabilities for CW and BW, specifications for most kinds of complicated hardware such as aircraft, naval vessels, etc.

The intellectual philosophy of a scientist leads him to consider his scientific statements, however couched in language, as hypotheses—the most satisfactory synthesis that he can make of the available data at hand. If and as evidence changes, he will adjust the hypothesis accordingly, or even abandon it, without any feeling that he is changing previously established truth. Estimative intelligence judgments are of a different kind, even though they are based in large part on analysis of the known facts. The intelligence estimator feels instinctively that he should state what he believes true, qualifying the estimate to indicate his qualms about its validity. When it turns out to have been wrong, even though it was the most reasonable one he could make on the basis of available evidence (as on the missiles in Cuba), he feels that he failed. The biological researcher is not much upset when his hypothesis doesn't work out in laboratory tests, but the doctor is when the treatment he prescribes for his patient doesn't work and the patient dies. This analysis or analogy cannot be pressed too far, but it is part of the difference between scientific and intelligence estimating.

Worst-Casing

The scientist, in making an intelligence estimate, must have in mind the purpose for which he is making it—as do all estimators. The temptation to estimate the "worst case" is just as strong with him as with anyone else. If U.S. security plans are to be made on the basis of his estimate, it seems better that they be based on the worst that is reasonably possible, not on hopes which may turn out to be false. This is not necessarily the phenomenon of "Pearl Harbor insurance," wherein one estimates the worst, secure in the knowledge that if his dire predictions do not turn out, no one will blame him for an unexpectedly favorable course of events. It is rather a judgment that when all hypotheses are shaky, the reader had best be prepared for the worst. In respect of other nations' weapons, this worst is often arrived at by taking the best skills, experience, and technology known to the estimator, discounting them by a relatively small factor, and coming out with an estimate of raw capability.

The non-technical estimator is at a great disadvantage in dealing with such technical contributions. He can be nowhere nearly as familiar with the evidence as the technician or as well equipped to deal with it. If he questions the hypothesis, he can often be silenced when his ignorance is pointed out. (This pointing out of his lack of competence to deal with technical subjects is most often done by people who serve on technical bodies but are at best amateur scientists. The vigor with which hypotheses are defended as truth often seems inversely proportional to the technical competence of the defender.) The non-technical inquirer can unearth, without too much prodding, the vast areas of uncertainty in our evidence on advanced weapons systems. But he is hard put to it to offer a more defensible judgment.

Taking into account what we know (which is little enough) about Upper Volta's experiments, technical and economic resources, and what we believe to be its national objectives, attributing to it a fair amount of the best technology we know (usually U.S. technology),

and considering that it is better to over-warn the U.S. policy maker than to engender any degree of complacency by a judgment which cannot be documented, we thus come up with the estimate that "it is possible that Upper Volta could deploy IRBM's with nuclear warheads in three years."

Yet the estimator, technical or non-technical, feels in his bones that this worst case is highly unlikely. Does he estimate as above and add "but it might just as well be three or four years later, or even longer?" This hardly looks as if he's earning his living. He is also affected by a conscious or unconscious desire to avoid the bias that if it took the United States ten years to develop an IRBM it will take those foreigners longer.

Ways Out

Does the calling in of a consulting panel help? In most cases it is doubtful. The two- or three-day panel has not kept up with the evidence, could not possibly have done so. Just the classification of much of the evidence precludes this. The panel is briefed by the technicians, who under the best of circumstances feed into the mechanism the same data which formed their own views. The panel has many of the same compulsions as the original technical group and is apt to produce some variation of the "worst case." The consultant does not have to act or budget on the basis of the judgments he makes, and while the government estimator doesn't either, he does feel a longer-term responsibility for his advice to the budgeter.

A formal intelligence estimate should whenever possible give a judgment as to the most likely contingency. The scientist often says that there is no basis for determining the most likely. The estimator is therefore in a dilemma for which there may be no solution. Perhaps such estimates can only be so clothed with caveats and qualifications as to make them seem ethereal, and certainly annoying to the reader who craves certainty. (Incidentally, the use of footnotes to call attention to uncertainties is of limited value. Especially when numerical tables are given, the footnote, usually in microscopic type, is easily overlooked or forgotten.)

Perhaps it should be the rule that the non-technical estimator ingest the scientific contribution, append it as an annex to his estimate, and present his layman's best judgment with all the deprecating language he can think of as to the difficulty of making confident estimates. This is what sometimes happens. But in most cases, those participating in the coordination meetings on an estimate include the technicians, professional and amateur alike, and the pressure they exert on the chairman of the coordinating group to accept the scientific contribution's language is great. The chairman can, and often does, retreat to a strict interpretation of "could," "possible," "might" and not try to fight the experts. In this process the reader is likely to be given an impression of probability and firmness which is not warranted.

Proposed approach to pinning down some free-floating terms often used in intelligence.

FOR A BOARD OF DEFINITIONS

George Berkeley

If a nuclear physicist were to write that "A few whatchamacallits created a new thingamajig when they bounced off a slew of whoosies," we might suggest that his terminology needed honing. Yet day in and day out we let reporters of political events (me included) get away with talking about "democracy," "nationalism," "insurgency," "dictatorship," "totalitarianism," "the right," "the left," "the slightly left of center," "probability," "possibility," and many other concepts that lack any universally accepted definitions.

Why?

My guess is that it's because the poets don't care—they like to keep words nice and loose—and the mathematicians [1] haven't united to do something about it. This article is one mathematician's brief for doing something. Unless those of us concerned with the flow of information up through the pipeline to the policy makers understand clearly what our terms mean we will continue to waste time straightening each other out or, worse, let ourselves in for some serious misunderstandings.

Some Kind of Measles

As an example of a word that is open to all sorts of interpretations, let's look at a real dandy—"nationalist." On one day in early 1964, I read two accounts of a crisis in Brazil's state petroleum agency, Petrobras. The first was a newspaper editorial. It said, "The nationalists in Petrobras denounce the Communists and vice versa." Among those that the newspaper called "nationalists" was the Petrobras president. The other account was an intelligence report. It quoted a Communist leader as saying that the Petrobras president was trying "to demoralize the nationalists and the Communists." The context made it clear that the Communist leader considered the two groups to be allied with one another, with the president their mutual enemy.

[1] For this usage of "poets" and "mathematicians" see Sherman Kent, "Words of Estimative Probability," *Studies* VIII 4, pp. 49-64.

I once threw out to an English class in Brazil the question, "What is a nationalist?" The answers that came back ranged all the way from "a patriot" to "a Communist." (And the fellow who said "patriot" was no Communist, if you're wondering.)

What kind of word is this that means so many things to so many people? It's only one member of the whole class of compound abstractions that this article is concerned with. As a matter of fact, there's no dearth of definitions for these words. Every scholar in the behavioral sciences setting out to write a book apparently feels obliged to come up with a new set of definitions uniquely his. For "nationalism" our literature is rich in definitions. Some samples:

> "Nationalism: loyalty and devotion to a nation; esp: a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups."
>
> —Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary

> "Nationalism is the preference for the competitive interest of a nation and its members over those of all outsiders in a world of social mobility and economic competition, dominated by the values of wealth, power, and prestige, so that the goals of personal security and group identification appear bound up with the group's attainment of these values."
>
> —Karl W. Deutsch in *Nationalism and Social Communication*

> "It is a state of mind in which we give our paramount political loyalty to one fraction of the human race—to the particular tribe of which we happen to be tribesmen. In so far as we are captured by this ideology, we hold that the highest political good for us is our own nation's sovereign independence; that our nation has a moral right to exercise its sovereignty according to what it believes to be its own national interests, whatever consequences this may entail for the foreign majority of the human race; and that our duty, as citizens of our country, is to support our country, right or wrong."
>
> —Arnold J. Toynbee in *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, 3 November 1963

> "Nationalism, a product of political, economic, social, and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history, is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, having a common religion."
>
> —Louis L. Snyder in *The Meaning of Nationalism*

> ". . . the measles of mankind."
>
> —Albert Einstein (quoted in a letter to *Time*, issue of 12 March 1965)

The differences among these range from fine intellectual distinctions to the moral connotations strongly felt by Toynbee, whom you can almost see shaking his head in dismay, and Einstein, who minces no words at all.

Some scholars feel a need for breaking down the concept into more than one category. Hans Kohn distinguishes between (1) nationalism in the Western world and (2) nationalism outside the Western world. Snyder has suggested a chronological classification using these labels: integrative nationalism (1815-1871), disruptive nationalism (1871-1890), aggressive nationalism (1900-1945), contemporary nationalism (since 1945). Other writers have used many modifiers to show the variety of forms that nationalism can take: "humanitarian," "Jacobin," "traditional," "liberal," "integral," "medieval," "monarchical," "revolutionary," "totalitarian," "cultural."

The label is thus subject to more interpretations than the elephant was to the seven blind men. But "nationalism" is unequivocally clear in comparison with those warped old standards "right" and "left." At your next party, try a parlor game. Have each guest write his definition of these political labels. Promise a prize to any two of them that agree. But don't bother to have a real prize on hand; you won't need it.

So much for the problem.

The Recommendation

Now is the time, in my opinion, to set up a board to define abstract concepts relevant to the intelligence business. Because the need for precise verbal standards reaches its apogee in the intelligence community, the initiative in organizing such a board should be taken by that community. The coordinating role, the job of running the semantic clearing-house, should rest with an official group.

This group should by no means work behind high walls. On the contrary, it should be in close touch with the unofficial intelligence community, and by this I mean university faculties, book publishers, newspaper editors, and other private citizens who contribute to the flow of information that is intelligence in its broadest sense. At the outset of the program and perhaps periodically thereafter the board might invite members of this unofficial intelligence community to participate.

Let's say that the board has been organized and that a hundred or so private entities have also agreed to take part. Here is one possible modus operandi: The board chooses an abstract concept like

one of those in the first paragraph. A researcher compiles a selection of definitions already in use in some part of the world. The board might meet to concoct one or more new definitions. The board then sends to all participants, official and unofficial, a copy of these definitions of the term under consideration.

At this point the board relaxes for a spell. It gives the participants a good, long stretch to mull the matter over and submit comments and recommendations. Six months or more would be quite reasonable for this phase. This is one program that is uncrash. The ball is now with the participating entities (*parents*, to coin an acronym). Their task is to recommend a single definition which employs a minimum of abstractions and relies as much as possible on *quantifiable* criteria.

What we're asking of the parents is their help in substituting concrete or otherwise measurable elements for abstract terms like the "competitive interest," "social mobility," and "values" in Deutsch's definition above. Too wild a dream, you say? Not at all. One school of behavioral scientists has been gaining ground on the quantification problem for at least twenty years.[2]

My job does not place me in contact with them, so I can't draw any current examples of their work from first-hand knowledge. But let's suppose that one of them has been studying the correlations between the ethnic breakdowns of entire populations and the ethnic breakdowns of their national legislative bodies. He might propose that one of the criteria for defining "democracy" should be just this correlation. If it's better than a certain figure, the government under study meets one of the criteria for a democracy. Another measurable phenomenon relevant to this definition: the number of political parties that ran candidates in the last national election.

Getting back to the modus operandi, after the six-month incubation period the board considers all entries, chooses the best—very likely a composite of several—and publishes the results for distribution to members of the intelligence community and to the parents. The finished product is apt to be long. It may run to the length of a National Intelligence Estimate or a long magazine article. Excessive? Probably not; abstractions are like that. When a dozen French mathematicians started out to make a definitive study of their subject they found they needed 200 pages to deal with the ins and outs of the number "one" alone.

Side Benefits

Two by-products of all this activity are worth noting. First, with so much talent focussed on abstract concepts, one by one, we are surely going to discover newer and better ways of dividing up and classifying some of them. We may invent a new term now and then for a newly isolated concept. Through the board and the parents we will have an unprecedented test market for tentative terminology.

Second, if well organized and managed, the board's activities will win the respect of influential entities outside the intelligence community. It will be performing a public service. In its modest way it should earn some favorable press comment, and this, I submit, is something that the community could use.

Our Greek forebears believed that the universe consisted of only four elements—fire, water, air, and earth. Today we know of ten varieties, or isotopes, of a single element called tin. A lot of people along the way have done a lot of classifying—and quantifying. Somebody had to, of course. Our rising level of sophistication in the physical sciences is both a cause and a result of their work. In tackling behavioral science problems in similar fashion we will be making use of a lesson already learned by the operations researchers: "Some of the intangibles that one generation treats by experience are converted to measurable factors by the next generation." [3]

But to avoid the charge that I consider all abstract words completely reducible to quantifiable terms, let me hastily second the rest of the above quotation: "This process is a never-ending one because reality is too complex to be completely circumscribed by a finite set of measurements."

[2] And at least two kindred spirits have made a beginning within our immediate community. Both the Kent article cited earlier and "The Definition of Some Estimative Expressions," by David L. Wark in the same issue of the *Studies*, sought to establish a consensus on the arithmetic implications of such words as "possible" and "probable."

[3] David W. Miller & Martin K. Starr, *Executive Decisions and Operations Research* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960).

Suggests more systematic coping with the simultaneously diverse states of activity and quiescence around the world.

GEO-TIME AND INTELLIGENCE

Chronomaniac

". . . It often seems that in today's conditions both government and public are too often the captives of the spot-news report, the daily headline, the minute-to-minute news bulletin . . ." [1]

The concept of geo-time, briefly sketched below together with some of its possible repercussions on intelligence, was stimulated partially by the writer's recent browsing in the literature of geo-politics. (That subject, after being discredited by pseudo-scientific treatment at the hands of the Nazis and others, may be in for some rethinking and rehabilitation: a recent article in the Department of State *Bulletin* by the Department's Geographer appears to take a much saner approach to it.) Other stimuli have been the writer's experience as a former analyst and part-time night duty officer and the increasingly manifest desire on the part of intelligence consumers for what amounts to "instant analysis"—in quantity and depth.

Time Zones and Timing

Geo-time is simply the notion that there exist, superimposed on the geo-political relationships of land and water masses to each other and of both to problems of national strategy, two equally obvious world physical relationships of which little account seems to have been taken: (1) roughly half the earth's surface being in darkness and the other half in daylight at any given moment; and (2) the phenomena of the seasons and of the polar "long day" and "long night" produced by the tilt of the earth's axis. Although many individuals and organizations in intelligence, as well as in the defense establishment generally and to some extent in other agencies dealing with foreign affairs, habitually take these relationships into their daily calculations for technical if for no other reasons, I have the impression that no consciously coordinated effort has yet been made

[1] Robert J. Manning, former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1962.

to think through the many implications and possible applications of this concept in various fields. Hoping that such a comprehensive effort may be undertaken by those competent to do so, I shall confine myself here to an introductory consideration of the impact of geo-time on an activity with which I am familiar, intelligence analysis, merely noting a few other possible implications.

First a word on the real and practical importance of geo-time. Historically, men have long been familiar with the "night watch" concept, which in much more sophisticated form has necessarily been adopted by intelligence as well as military organizations. In some fields, particularly military, the day-night and seasonal factors are crucial in questions relating to attack and defense. It is superfluous to point out that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could not have been better timed to catch our forces off balance. Making use of complications arising from the overlayering of the day-night and seasonal factors by varying social customs around the globe, the concept has been successfully employed in such limited time zones as western Europe for timing critical communiqués or ultimata so as to take greatest advantage of another power's press deadlines or long weekends and holiday slackness. Even within the comparatively small time region covered by the continental United States, there has been recent debate whether televising election results from the east coast affects the late vote in the far west. All these observations suggest reasons for systematically applying geo-time in intelligence, now that a "collapse of space" has been produced by modern communications.

Analysis and Reporting

So far as intelligence analysis is concerned—and to some extent the reporting of raw intelligence and the operations which produce such reports—I submit that our system of virtually instantaneous transmission and rapid dissemination of information from all quarters of the globe and from all sources including the press deserves re-examination in the light of geo-time both in Washington and in the field. The hour of day or night at which a given message arrives, and the season of its arrival in this north temperate zone, almost inevitably affect the quality as well as the timeliness of the analysis, particularly of the "instant" variety. The main reason is the customary disparity between analytical resources available during the normal working day and those readily available after office hours, while the intelligence material now flows in as steadily by night as by day. I am aware of recent efforts to tighten the night watch and increase round-the-clock analysis and production capability throughout the community, but I am inclined to doubt that these efforts are nearly as far-reaching as what a detailed study of the impact of geo-time might lead to.

Simply to illustrate the problem in its crudest form, the day-night factor without reference to seasons or social customs, the two tables on page 22 juxtapose Washington and field times, highlighting (1) the most disadvantageous hours for analysis and production capabilities in Washington, and (2) the most disadvantageous times, depending on locality, for collection and reporting in the field. The calculations are based only on the schematic division of the globe into 24 equal time zones; to be truly useful they would have to take account of latitude, season, arbitrary local time, and local customs. The nature of the activities generating the information reports would also be a factor, since some are obviously best conducted by night and others by day. The crudeness of these tables should not, however, obscure their implications; it simply reflects the writer's lack of specific area knowledge covering all points of intelligence interest and his not having the skill and leisure to pursue this matter as far as it seems to warrant.

Aside from the implications of each table separately, a comparison of the two suggests that Washington is particularly at a disadvantage in terms of its own staffing during the optimum field reporting times in most of the areas which are currently most troublesome and are likely to be so in the foreseeable future. A case could also be made for the existence of doubly critical periods when the bracketed areas of Table II heavily overlap Table I regional times, showing Washington and field capabilities to be in balance because both are poor.

A review of the implications of geo-time might suggest further changes not only in staffing for after-hours intelligence analysis and production but in the two-way flow of communications between Washington and the field. This might improve coordination and direction of the field in administrative as well as operational matters. The conscious and complete adaptation of the geo-time concept to a variety of political as well as military tactics might also be considered; *e.g.*, major pronouncements affecting foreign governments might be timed less with an eye to the convenience of the domestic press than, say, to precipitating an atmosphere of crisis, if that is

TABLE I

ASSUMED CRITICAL PERIOD IN WASHINGTON

(Underlined hours are p.m.)

Time in selected regions	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Washington	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
West Europe & W. Africa	10–12	11–1	12–2	1–3	2–4	3–5	4–6	5–7	6–8	7–9	8–10	9–11	10–12	11–1	12–2
Middle East, & E. Africa	12–3	1–4	2–5	3–6	4–7	5–8	6–9	7–10	8–11	9–12	10–1	11–2	12–3	1–4	2–5
Moscow region	1–2	2–3	3–4	4–5	5–6	6–7	7–8	8–9	9–10	10–11	11–12	12–1	1–2	2–3	3–4
South Asia	3–5	4–6	5–7	6–8	7–9	8–10	9–11	10–12	11–1	12–2	1–3	2–4	3–5	4–6	5–7
Peking & Western S.E. Asia	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Eastern S.E. Asia & Japan	7–9	8–10	9–11	10–12	11–1	12–2	1–3	2–4	3–5	4–6	5–7	6–8	7–9	8–10	9–11

Latin America ..... (Presents no great problem; Western half has same range as continental U.S. and Eastern half is at most 2 hours earlier.)

The regional times are those during which field reporting would most disadvantage analysis and dissemination in Washington.

TABLE II

ASSUMED CRITICAL PERIODS IN FIELD DURING NORMAL PERIOD IN WASHINGTON

(Underlined hours are p.m.)

Time in selected regions	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6
Washington	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6
West Europe & W. Africa	12–2	1–3	2–4	3–5	4–6	5–7	6–8	7–9	8–10	9–11	10–12
Middle East, & E. Africa	2–5	3–6	4–7	5–8	6–9	7–10	8–11	9–12	10–1	11–2	12–3
Moscow region	3–4	4–5	5–6	[6–7]	7–8	8–9	9–10	10–11	11–12	12–1	1–2
South Asia	5–7	[6–8]	7–9	8–10	9–11	10–12	11–1	12–2	1–3	2–4	3–5
Peking & Western S.E. Asia	[8]	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eastern S.E. Asia & Japan	[9–11]	10–12	11–1	12–2	1–3	2–4	3–5	4–6	5–7	[6–8]	7–9

Latin America ..... (Again presents no great problem; see Table I.)

The bracketed times are those during which the field is at most disadvantage in meeting Washington demands.

Geo-Time

desirable, at an hour which would most disadvantage analysis and reaction in a particular foreign capital.

If nothing else, as a friend of the writer has pointed out, some alteration in our present staffing pattern might at least relieve the parking situation.

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CONFIDENTIAL

A theory and some practice in strategic air targeting against Japan.

B-29s AGAINST COKE OVENS

A. R. Northridge

The operations of an air intelligence section may often, even in an active theater of war, be too routine and colorless to offer much amusement or instruction to another generation. I recount below, however, one episode from my experience as intelligence officer for Major General Claire Chennault which is not without color and not uninstructive. If the story seems biased against the Washington apparatus, that is the bias of the man on the spot in contact with the job.

Big Order

In 1943 Chennault's 14th USAAF in Western China was ordered to proceed with the construction of a new complex of airfields at designated locations. The specifications for the thickness of the runways and their length made it plain that these bases were intended for a new type of aircraft, much larger and having much longer range than any in our inventory or any we had ever heard of. Since the fields had to be built by hand labor, locally recruited, several hundred thousands of Chinese shared in this information. But we knew only thus by inference that we were to be so reinforced. We were told nothing of the new plane. We in the intelligence section were not tasked with finding targets for it (though we did so anyway). Indeed, and this was the crowning indignity, we were not even ordered to refrain from speculating about it. Some of us worked up estimates of its specifications which turned out not to be far off.[1]

Airfield construction in the China section of the CBI Theater was a slow proposition. Powered construction equipment was scarce, and in all remaining China not in Japanese hands, there was not a single

[1] New arrivals from over the Hump told of the construction of similar new fields in eastern India, but no visitors from the States could confirm the existence of an aircraft having the specifications we envisaged. I suspect General Chennault had been told that a new, larger bomber was in the works, but I very much doubt that he knew its actual size and range. He certainly appeared surprised at the eventual briefing when these figures were given, probably more surprised than some members of his staff.

powered rock crusher. The rock for paving the runways, aprons, and taxi strips was all crushed by hand, small children working with light hammers on the smaller stones alongside their elders hammering on the larger ones. But eventually the fields were completed; the Air Force Engineer was rewarded by a promotion and a decoration; and at long last a team of senior officers arrived from Washington, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to explain what this was all about.

New Program

The briefing took place in General Chennault's office. The B-29 was described and we were told how many would come to China. They were to be organized as the XXth Bomber Command, which was, and would remain, under the control of the Joint Chiefs. The CBI Theater and its China component in particular had certain support responsibilities toward the Command, but no authority over it. This displeased General Chennault, of course, and he made no secret of it.

Next we were told that the employment of the Command, its program, had already been determined. If General Chennault disapproved of this program, he could, as the senior American Air Force commander in China and on behalf of the senior American commander in the Theater, Lieutenant General Stilwell, make known to the Joint Chiefs his disagreement. They would not necessarily heed him, but he could comment if he chose. It was clear that this provision likewise held no particular charm for the General, especially since he would have to divert the better part of a composite wing from its offensive operations to the defense of the XXth Command's bases.

The program, we were told, provided first of all for a mission from the Indian fields against Bangkok to tune up the Command. It would then move to its China fields. The General nodded. Next, the briefers continued, now somewhat diffident, would be a mission undertaken by the entire Command against the Japanese islands, the particular target being Tokyo.

General Chennault demurred, loudly. From the figures they had just given, he said, the bomb payload at that distance would have to be calculated at mere hundreds of pounds per plane. He enlarged on this theme with such vigor that the briefers, who were by no means unsophisticated officers, could see that although he might reconcile himself to JCS direct control over the XXth Bomber Command, if they attempted a large-scale mission against Tokyo from the China bases, he might tell them to find a new commanding general for the 14th USAAF. The subject of the Tokyo raid was thereupon dropped, and it was not revived.[2]

When General Chennault had concluded his remarks, a junior member of the briefing team, hitherto silent, opened an enormous briefcase, took out an armful of handsomely bound books each the size of a copy of *Fortune,* and passed them around. Calling attention to their Top Secret classification, he said the brochures described the balance of the program and its rationale, the target system U.S. intelligence had selected for the China-based B-29s to attack. If he might presume, the briefer went on, he would suggest that we rapidly run through them, the material being quite complicated, and he would answer any queries that immediately occurred to us. Then we could review them in detail overnight—it was now nearly midnight—and if we had further questions, he would be available between nine and ten the next morning before he and his colleagues emplaned for Washington. He left the impression that they were anxious to get this pro forma ceremony out of the way; the die had been cast and there was no thought of allowing a fresh throw.

To follow the printed plan in detail was, as the briefer had suggested, more than ordinarily difficult. Charts, graphs, and text done up with Byzantine opulence were combined in an explication, or better justification, that we all found obscure. What was being justified, however, was clear enough. The target system was the Japanese coke industry. The JCS had apparently been persuaded by a bevy of intelligence analysts that no better use could be found for the XXth Bomber Command, a new instrument designed for the destruction of Japan's military might, than to launch it against Japan's coke ovens wherever they might be. Within four years, said the briefer, if the attacks were successful and so sustained that repairs were impossible, and if no new coke manufacturing capacity were constructed by the Japanese undetected by us, within four years—that is by 1947—the Japanese steel industry would begin to feel the pinch of coke shortage, and soon thereafter the Japanese armament industry would begin to feel the pinch of a steel shortage.

Recalcitrance

The realization on the part of the 14th USAAF staff that this magnificent new weapon with its enormous supporting base was being deployed a good two-thirds of the way around the globe to bomb

[2] I have often wondered if this far-out proposal was not a ploy to soften us up for those that immediately followed. It was, of course, a highly impractical idea and I feel sure the briefers knew it.

coke ovens gave rise to wonderment—and argument. Each of us could think of targets by the score that were vulnerable to the B-29s and if attacked with vigor would save countless Chinese and American lives. To cite but one example, despite the slight pressure that the 14th Air Force could exert, slight because of our logistic transport difficulties, the Japanese had accumulated large stocks of materiel at Hankow. With this they had launched a drive that cost the 14th its eastern airfields and gave the Japanese an overland route between their Hong Kong-Canton enclave and their holdings on the middle Yangtze and the North China plain. Unequipped to offer serious resistance, the Chinese suffered personnel losses, military and civilian, numbering in the tens of thousands. The XXth Bomber Command could have destroyed the Hankow supply dumps in a single strike.

Or, again within easy range under a full bomb load, there was on Taiwan an operational air depot where new aircraft, fresh from the Japanese factories, were readied for combat and ferried off to the Philippines and the southwest Pacific to do battle with General Kenney's air forces and Admiral Nimitz' ships and the planes from his carriers. The destruction of this depot could well have shortened our approach to the Philippines and saved considerable losses in men, ships, and aircraft.[3]

As the debate began to get acrimonious, the briefers left us. We spent the rest of the night studying their brochure and preparing an alternative plan for them to carry back to the JCS. We had not worked very long, plowing through the impressive presentation, before we could see that the conclusions reached were derived from elaborately contrived projections of equally elaborate hypotheses which were based, in the end, on meager data of dubious authenticity. This is an important point. The program was a scholarly piece of work, honestly researched and presented without gloss. The argument was logically flawless, but the authors simply lacked the basic data necessary to determine the proper use of the China-based B-29s. It became eminently plain that someone in Washington who had a fixation about the role of coke in Japan's war economy had enlisted followers and somehow taken the JCS by storm. He must have been a very persuasive man.

It scarcely needs saying that the alternative program we prepared for the XXth Bomber Command was found wanting in Washington, and it was not long before the B-29s reached China under the original plan.[4]

[3] Eventually, as mentioned below, the China-based B-29s mounted strikes against both of these targets, but late and with low priority. In the meantime they had been of much service to the enemy.

The Yawata Strike

Even though the planes could not cover the distance with anything like a full bomb load, the target selected for their initial mission was the Yawata steel plant, on Kyushu near the Straits of Shimonoseki, because it was here that Washington said Japan's largest collection of coke ovens was to be found. I do not recall any very convincing reasons for this estimate, but the ovens were brightly printed in colored ink on the target charts and Washington was convinced that the B-29s would find them there.

We learned of the decision to hit Yawata only a few days before the strike was scheduled, when the XXth Bomber Command sent us a message asking would we kindly provide pre-strike and post-strike aerial photography of the target. This presented some difficulties for us. The Yawata area lay beyond the range of a photo plane flying from any of our fields. There was, however, a field in guerrilla-held territory near the coast. If the weather conditions were just right (and this was predictable only within the narrowest of limits) and if the Japanese stayed where they were—they could take the field in a day's operation, and had done so in the past whenever they chose—the flight could be accomplished.

This scarcely practicable procedure had actually been carried out once some time earlier. The pilot had not made it quite as far as Yawata, and during his time over the target an unanticipated layer of clouds lay between his cameras and the ground; but there was no denying that he had overflown a part of Kyushu and returned safely, though with no considerable reserves of fuel. It also happened that this pilot, having completed the required number of missions, was still in China, about to embark at any moment on his

[4] Their passage to their new bases was attended by a curious incident. Coming over the Hump, one squadron was intercepted by a Japanese fighter evidently flown by a very wise pilot. He flew on all sides of the formation, estimating the planes' size and cruising speed. Then he moved in close enough to draw fire and so learned most of what there was to know about their defensive armament and fire control. Then he pulled away, wagged his wings, and took off for his home field in northern Burma to report what he had seen. A week earlier the very presence of the B-29 in China had officially been classified Secret. In spite of the fact that the Japanese now knew more about the plane than any Americans except a handful of General Chennault's staff and the XXth Bomber Command personnel, this classification remained in force for months, until the press could report its first offensive mission.

return flight to the States. He was apprised of the XXth Bomber Command request. After the briefest cogitation, and on learning that there was still available for consultation a certain weather officer whom he believed to be in some kind of direct communication with the elements, he volunteered to fly to Yawata once, not twice, if the weather officer found the omens favorable. His offer was accepted, and the weather was found good enough, barely, for a post-strike mission.

The photo mission was flown a few days after the strike and the pilot returned safely, though his fuel ran out before he could taxi his plane off the runway. A duplicate negative and a set of prints, made at an East China field, were delivered to the 14th Air Force Headquarters in Kunming only minutes before the arrival of a plane carrying General Wolfe, who commanded the XXth Bomber Command, and a large part of his staff. When we had had a hasty look at the prints and had told General Chennault what they showed, it was his decision that they be given to General Wolfe without comment. General Chennault suggested to him that he would doubtless prefer to have his own photo interpreters make the post-strike assessment. General Wolfe, thus having been made aware, indirectly and most courteously, that his interpreters would see nothing to delight him, motioned to his aide to pick up the package and left for his plane and his headquarters.

We had, of course, our own set of prints. A more leisurely perusal confirmed our original impression, that the Yawata plant was undamaged. Furthermore, the area that on the target charts had been so liberally sprinkled with coke oven symbols was in reality a sandspit in a shallow bay, with no buildings other than a shack or two within three-quarters of a mile. The coke ovens, less than half as many as predicted, were even farther distant and also unscathed. Indeed, no bomb craters were visible in the assigned target area at all.

As we continued to study the magnificent photography, which covered in detail a large area of strategic importance, we found, some twelve miles from the target, the fresh ruins of an industrial establishment the existence of which had previously been unknown. A complete rebuilding job would now obviously be necessary to put it back in production. We later learned that this had been Japan's second largest tank factory, smashed by mistake.

Coke Phased Out

For a time the war on the coke ovens continued. The next mission had as its target an industrial complex in Manchuria; I don't remember its name. Here, it was said, the intelligence depicted on the target charts was reliable because it came directly from the plans of the plant, which had been drawn by an American firm engaged to design the entire installation. Since this objective was nearer than Kyushu, we were able to promise and deliver photo coverage both before and after the strike. The pre-strike photography showed the target charts were wrong again. There were coke ovens about where the chart showed them to be, but there were only a small fraction of the number it showed. The owners had evidently decided to build a plant of smaller capacity than the one designed. Since this was a daylight mission instead of a night strike—at Yawata most of the bombing was done by radar—quite a few of the coke ovens were destroyed or damaged.

After this mission the B-29s still took an occasional crack at coke ovens—though never any as distant as Yawata's—but more and more they took their targets from the 14th Air Force list of strategic priorities. Even when they did go out to attack coke facilities, more and more of them aborted part way to the assigned targets and attacked instead a nearer alternative picked from the 14th Air Force list. By and by the Marianas were taken, and fields built there became the new home of the XXth Bomber Command, reconstituted as the 20th USAAF and charged with battering Japan's home islands. In China, except for a handful of B-29s equipped with cameras for mapping photography,[5] we saw them no more and turned our attention from coke ovens to other things.

[5] A slightly different employment of these photo planes, one that might quite logically have been made, might well have changed the course of history in East Asia. What they did was plod back and forth photographing untold thousands of square miles of territory of no conceivable strategic interest, though doubtless holding a certain fascination for the cartographer. Properly equipped and targeted, they would have detected the Asiatic ports nearest Japan to be all but barren of maritime traffic, permitting the conclusion that our extensive mining of the Korean Straits and our destruction of Japanese shipping had in effect cut Japan off from the mainland of Asia. With this link broken, and the home islands deprived of all the external support required for their economy and the very lives of their people, Japan's capacity to continue fighting was negligible. A mere continuation of the blockade and the aerial offensive then being carried on must soon force a surrender, quite possibly without the use of exotic weapons or the Soviet Union's late participation. As it was, the first photo coverage of Manchurian and Korean ports was accomplished by the 14th Air Force. It is my recollection that these flights were made less than a month before the war ended.

Documents tracing some fervent but fruitless Japanese efforts to end the war in the Pacific.

MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: JAPANESE FEELERS

The last two volumes of the OSS Reports to the White House preserved among General Donovan's papers [1] *include records of several different Japanese approaches in 1945 to the Vatican and to OSS Lisbon, Bern, and Wiesbaden seeking a way to end the war. These peace feelers were generally the product of local initiative and had at most only a tacit approval from official Tokyo, where government quarreling over the question of capitulation was growing more and more desperate as the year advanced. They did not lead in any way to the eventual Japanese notes sent through standard diplomatic channels on 10 and 14 August, but they may have helped define for both sides the conditions therein drawn which made "unconditional" surrender a practical possibility.*

The intelligence reports provide interesting and sometimes puzzling footnotes for Robert J. C. Butow's fastidious—and fascinating—reconstruction of the intricate political maneuverings that ended in Japan's Decision to Surrender.[2] *The documents are reproduced below.*

Through the Vatican

17 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On 10 January the Japanese Emperor attended a secret council meeting during which someone dared to speak about peace feelers.[3]

[1] Described in the first of this series, subtitled "Sunrise," in *Studies* VII 2, p. 73 ff.

[2] Stanford University Press, 1954.

[3] Butow, who had examined the Japanese records most thoroughly, does not mention such a 10 January meeting. It was at this time, however, with the American return to the Philippines, that the Emperor and the government began to be seriously worried about the outcome of the war. On 6 January the Emperor proposed consulting the senior statesmen (former premiers) about the war situation, and individual audiences were set up for them during February. The imperial favorite among them, Prince Konoye, declaring that "Japan has already lost the war," suggested purging the military of its extremists in order to clear the air for negotiations.

The Emperor was informed that certain Japanese individuals have been attempting to interest the highest authority at source [4] in mediating the Pacific War. The Emperor did not express any disapproval of these efforts.

Someone at the meeting declared that such activities might be a useful preparation for a time more opportune than the present. The Council was skeptical of mediation possibilities, evidently believing that only force of arms would settle the conflict.

24 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On 17 January a conference, the substance of which is reported below, took place with the following people present:

Masahide Kanayama, Japanese representative at the Holy See
Giovani Montini, acting Secretary of State
Mgr. Domenico Tardini, President of the Pontifical Commission for Russia
Pio Rossignani, Private Secretary of the Pope

KANAYAMA: The pacifists in Japan have great faith in the Holy See. An attempt by the Holy See to initiate mediation would greatly encourage our pacifists, even if there should be no immediate concrete results.

MONTINI: It is clear to us that the gap between the viewpoints of the two belligerents is too wide to permit Papal mediation.

TARDINI: Japanese adherence to the tripartite pact seriously hurts the Japanese case in Allied countries. World opinion stigmatizes Japan as an aggressor, and even Soviet Russia concurs.

. . .

KANAYAMA: Our Ambassador in Moscow has informed our Government that the Far East will be discussed when the Big Three meet. The United States, supported by Churchill, will ask for Russian help to crush us completely. The Anglo-Americans will ask that Russia denounce the pact of non-aggression with Japan and that Russia passively participate in the Pacific War and permit Anglo-American use of Russian air bases. Our Government also understands that, before Stalin will agree to this, he will request a wholehearted attempt on the part of the Anglo-Americans to mediate, and that he will even offer to act as mediator. Our Government also understands that the Big Three will discuss European problems first, and that if they are not settled to Russia's satisfaction, especially the Polish question, then Stalin will not discuss the Far East.

TARDINI: The United States and England have already made a declaration on Poland. American public opinion is behind Roosevelt.

KANAYAMA: It is a diplomatic maneuver to draw concessions from Russia. Moreover, Roosevelt and Churchill have another move to make against Russia. Turkey and the countries of the Middle East are ready to enter the war against us. Stalin is opposed to these countries entering either the Pacific or the European War.

ROSSIGNANI: In view of all this, would it not be better for the Pope to synchronize his mediation with that of Stalin?

KANAYAMA: On the contrary, it is urgent that His Holiness come to our assistance before the Big Three meet to discuss Japan, and that this mediation be in full swing at the time. Stalin is interested in close collaboration with the Anglo-Americans, but he wishes to gain the maximum benefits from this collaboration. Stalin knows that the Japanese reaction will be swift when it becomes evident that Russian denunciation of the non-aggression pact is imminent. There may be a stiffening of Japanese resistance, or the pacifists may prevail. In this latter case, Stalin would cut a big figure, and he would be able to gain satisfying terms for the Anglo-Americans. And even to the Japanese he might appear as the savior of Japan from destruction. Stalin desires to have De Gaulle at the coming conference, but Roosevelt and Churchill are opposed. However, should De Gaulle be admitted to the conference, then Chiang Kai-shek will be present also.

MONTINI: Would it not be possible for the Japanese Government to offer terms that would be closer to those of the Anglo-Americans so that the Holy See could begin mediation on more concrete bases?

KANAYAMA: We will communicate your request to our government at once, together with an account of this conference. Meanwhile, it would be useful if the Holy See would begin mediation attempts.

ROSSIGNANI: Very well. This evening I will present Mr. Kanayama's memorandum and the minutes of this conference to His Holiness.

[4] The Pope.

27 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is source's account [5] of the conference held on 19 January between the Pope and Mr. Myron Taylor:

When asked whether he considered Papal mediation in the Pacific war possible, Taylor was skeptical. He stated that recent developments had evidently not brought the Japanese point of view any closer to that of the Anglo-Americans. The Pope asked if he would discuss the situation with the Japanese Ambassador to the Holy See, and Taylor replied that he was neither an official nor semi-official representative of the United States, and accordingly could speak only as a private individual. Taylor promised to communicate with the President, for which the Pope thanked him, and asked him to explain the sentiments which animated this inquiry.

2 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On 25 January, Harada Ken, Japanese Ambassador to the Holy See, made the following assertions to the Pope:

The Japanese Government would be willing to interpret the Vatican's wishes to the Kremlin.

The Kremlin has assured the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow that Russia will ask the Anglo-Americans to attempt to reach a negotiated peace in the Pacific, provided the Japanese Government accepts the Soviet proposal that the Far East peace conference include Russia, China, Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan.[6] . . .

[5] Reports from this source in the Vatican were code-named Vessel. By March some of them were proved false, and it was soon suspected that many of them had been fabricated or planted. This may explain the discrepancies between them and Butow's account.

[6] Butow touches on these feelers through the Vatican only in one footnote reference to an AP dispatch of the preceding 17 July, shortly after the fall of Saipan, reporting Harada to have told the Pope that Japan was ready for any peace that would leave its national life and economy intact. The report was categorically denied by a government spokesman in Tokyo.

2 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Source [7] has been informed by connections in Japan that the Japanese Government is confident that Stalin will categorically refuse to abrogate the non-aggression pact with Japan. The Japanese hope for new Soviet-Japanese pacts strengthening the non-aggression pact.

The Japanese Government feels that Japan can continue the Pacific war indefinitely in view of Russia's certain refusal to enter the war. Japan therefore cannot reduce its minimum terms for a peace settlement.

16 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a resume of the first talk between Myron Taylor and Harada Ken, Japanese Ambassador to the Holy See, as reported by Vessel:

Harada declared that Japanese elements desirous of peace are not responsible for the Pacific war, and that those elements might be able to make their will felt if the Anglo-Americans would offer acceptable terms.

Taylor reminded Harada that American public opinion still remembers the unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor. He promised, however, to initiate a friendly investigation of the possibilities for negotiation.

Taylor and Harada agreed that the terms of the two belligerent groups, as they knew them, were too far apart to permit negotiations.

Harada stated that the United States' chief war aim apparently was a victory that would give Japanese pacifist elements ascendancy over the military and prevent any future militarist aggression. He added that Japan was exhausted by the war she has been fighting since 1937, and that she needs a long period of peace.

[7] Of the Vessel reports.

11 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

An OSS representative has transmitted the following information, reportedly sent to the Vatican on 6 April [8] by Lorenzo Tatewaki Toda, the Apostolic Delegate in Yokohama:

Tatewaki Toda, who is a member of a Japanese princely family and related to the Emperor, proposes to call on the Emperor in order to "comfort him with the certain hope that the Holy See will not abandon its attempt at mediation" of the war in the Pacific. Tatewaki Toda believes that the present is the most favorable moment to conquer the intransigence of the extreme militarists in the interests of a peaceful solution to the war. He promises as soon as possible to send the Holy See a set of conditions which it may judge acceptable to the Anglo-Americans, and he beseeches the Pope to pray that Japan's rulers may become convinced of the necessity of an honorable peace.

In Lisbon

31 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Lisbon:

On 7 May 1945 the OSS representative reported that during a contact with a regular source of varying reliability, source stated that he had been asked by Masutaro Inoue, Counsellor of the Japanese Legation in Portugal, to contact United States representatives. Source quoted Inoue as saying that the Japanese are ready to cease hostilities, provided they are allowed to retain possession of their home islands. Inoue stressed American and Japanese "common interests" against the USSR. He said, however, that unconditional surrender would not be acceptable to Japan.

(The OSS representative believes that Inoue selected this particular source to carry his message to American representatives, because of source's long experience in Portugal and Japan.)

[8] That is, just after the assault on Okinawa, the collapse of the Koiso cabinet, and the USSR's announcement that its neutrality pact with Japan would not be renewed.

On 19 May, the OSS representative reported that Inoue again had repeated to source his desire to talk with an American representative. On this occasion Inoue declared that actual peace terms were unimportant so long as the term "unconditional surrender" was not employed. The Japanese, he asserted, are convinced that within a few weeks all of their wood and paper houses will be destroyed. Inoue insisted, however, that such destruction would not lead to unconditional surrender and that the war would still be prosecuted in China. The destruction of the Meiji Jinja shrine, Inoue added, had strengthened Japanese will to resist.

[The information contained in the above messages was given the United States Ambassador by the OSS representative.]

The OSS representative on 23 May reported that the United States Ambassador, after consultation with the British and Chinese, instructed that Inoue be told he must show proof that he is authorized to speak for the Japanese Government and that he is prepared to discuss unconditional surrender—the only basis acceptable to the United States.

In Bern

12 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern,[9] originates with a German source, an authority on the Far East who is considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese: [10]

The source, on 11 May, talked with Shunichi Kase, the Japanese Minister to Switzerland. He reports that Kase expressed a wish to help arrange for a cessation of hostilities between the Japanese and the Allies. Kase reportedly considers direct talks with the Americans and the British preferable to negotiations through the USSR,[11] because the latter eventually would increase Soviet prestige so much that the whole Far East would become Communist.

[9] Allen Dulles.

[10] Butow identifies this man as a Dr. Friedrich Hack (apparently in retransliteration from the Japanese "Hakku") and connects him with incidental references in Willoughby's *Shanghai Conspiracy* to a man named Haak or Haag.

[11] The official Japanese efforts to bring an end to the war were all mistakenly directed at securing Soviet mediation. These efforts continued right up to the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August.

Kase allegedly believes that one of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor as the only safeguard against Japan's conversion to Communism. Kase feels that Under Secretary of State Grew, whom he considers the best US authority on Japan, shares this opinion.

Added by hand: Should we pursue this? Donovan

4 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 2 June, is a sequel to memorandum dated 12 May 1945 concerning an alleged Japanese peace feeler. The source of the information is the same German authority on the Far East who is considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese:

Source is in touch with Fujimura, who is understood to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe and a former Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Fujimura is reported to be in direct and secret contact by cable with the Japanese Minister of Marine [Navy?] and is believed to enjoy the confidence of the Japanese Government.

Fujimura indicated to source that the Navy circles who now control [?] the Japanese Government would be willing to surrender but wish, if possible, to save some face from the present wreckage. These Navy circles, he declares, particularly stress the necessity of preserving the Emperor in order to avoid Communism and chaos. Fujimura emphasizes that Japan can not supply itself with basically essential foodstuffs and is dependent upon Korea for sugar and rice. He also insists that Japan needs to retain some of its merchant marine for necessary food imports.[12]

[12] Butow carries a detailed account of this approach from Yoshiro Fujimura's own testimony, but there are gross discrepancies especially with respect to dates. It has Hack meeting as intermediary for Fujimura with Cero von Gaevernitz and others of Mr. Dulles' staff from 23 April on and Mr. Dulles receiving authorization "from the State Department" to continue the meetings on 3 May. According to this account Minister Shunichi Kase, whose 11 May approach is reported above, did not enter the picture until 20 June, when Tokyo finally instructed Fujimura to work with him. Fujimura is said to have cabled urgent operational dispatches to the Navy chiefs in Tokyo on 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, and four later dates in May, presenting the contact as effected on American initiative and urging that he be authorized to negotiate. But in Tokyo there was too much opposition even in Navy circles, most notably from Naval Chief of Staff Toyoda.

22 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 12 May and 4 June concerning peace feelers emanating reportedly from the Japanese Legation in Bern. The source of the information is the same German authority referred to in previous memoranda, a description of whom is appended below:

According to source, Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained. Fujimura has read accounts in the Bern press of Mr. Allen Dulles' part in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy. Fujimura is obviously interested in knowing what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans.[13]

. . .

[Source is a German national who was taken prisoner by the Japanese in World War I. Upon his release he remained in Japan and established important commercial relations there. He placed Japanese purchases in Germany, made a substantial fortune, and gained the confidence of high Japanese circles, particularly in the Navy. Some years ago he returned to Europe and, as he was *persona non grata* with the Hitler Government, took up residence in Zurich. He maintained contacts, however, with Japanese circles in Berlin, particularly with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attache. He is understood to have advised the Japanese two years ago that Germany would be decisively defeated, while Ambassador Oshima at that time officially predicted a German victory.]

In Wiesbaden

13 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden, dated 12 and 13 July, concerns a new Japanese attempt

[13] At about this time Admiral Leahy, according to his account in *I Was There*, asked Mr. Dulles about "rumors that some OSS agents were trying to arrange for conversations with high Japanese officials regarding peace terms" and Mr. Dulles said "he had no knowledge of any such activity and did not believe the OSS was involved."

to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland:

Per Jacobson,[14] a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, has been approached by Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the Bank, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank and former financial attache in Berlin. Kitamura indicated to Jacobson that he was anxious to establish immediate contact with American representatives and implied that the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family. Kitamura showed that he was completely familiar with OSS operations which led to the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, and declared that he wished to establish a contact similar to that made by General Karl Wolff.

According to Jacobson, Kitamura is acting with the consent of the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and is working with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, a former Japanese Military Attache in Bern. [Okamoto is probably the chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe.] Kitamura claims that the Japanese group in Switzerland has direct communications with Tokyo and is in a position to make definite commitments.

(Responsible OSS cut-out sources who talked with Jacobson at Basel believe that the Kitamura approach was initiated locally rather than on the basis of instructions from Tokyo. Hence it is difficult to assess the seriousness of the approach.

(The OSS representative in Bern reports that Jacobson has urgently requested him to come to Basel to see him this coming week-end. The OSS representative has declined the invitation but has told Jacobson that he could see him in Bern [15] on Sunday, 15 July. The OSS representative in Bern will see Jacobson only to obtain such intelligence as Jacobson is able to give, and expects to treat the entire matter with the greatest caution and reserve.)

[14] The surname should be spelled with a double *s*. Butow, apparently not finding a given name in his sources, calls him "a certain Mr. Jacobsson."

[15] All three anachronistic references to Bern in this paragraph should read Wiesbaden.

16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, a sequel to a memorandum dated 13 July . . . has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden. . . .

Jacobsson reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of conferences with Yoshimura, a Japanese official attached to the Bank for International Settlements, and Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the Bank, representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and former financial attache in Berlin. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim to be acting in consultation with the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, former Japanese military attache in Bern, who now is believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim further that Kase and Okamoto have direct and secret means of communicating with the Japanese Chief of Staff. Yoshimura also claims that the peace group which he represents includes General Ushijiro Umezu, Army Chief of Staff; [16] Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Minister of Navy; and Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister.

Yoshimura and Kitamura appeared to Jacobsson no longer to question the principle of unconditional surrender, though at one point they asked whether unconditional military and naval surrender might not be sufficient. On his own initiative Jacobsson replied that such a proposal would not be acceptable to the Allies but would be considered merely a quibble.[17] Both Japanese officials raised the question of maintaining Japanese territorial integrity, but they apparently did not mean to include Manchukuo, Korea or Formosa.

Throughout discussions with Jacobsson, the Japanese officials stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and (b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in 1889. Kitamura prepared and presented to Jacobsson a memorandum asking him to sound out Mr. Dulles' opinion on the two points.

(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japanese are insisting on the retention of the Emperor because they feel that he alone can take

[16] Umezu was actually one of the bitter-enders wanting to the last to give battle to the invaders on home soil. He, with War Minister Anami and Naval Chief of Staff Toyoda, were brought into line with the "peace group" only by the intervention of the Emperor on 10 and again on 14 August.

[17] But this quibble, incorporated on 26 July into the Potsdam proclamation, became an important argument for accepting the surrender terms.

effective action with respect to surrender and that some hope of survival must be held out to him in order to gain his support for unconditional surrender.)

Later Yoshimura and Kitamura prepared a second memorandum in which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to proceed, conversations could be arranged with Allied representatives and what form of authorization would be required.

Jacobsson is personally convinced that these approaches are serious and that the Japanese group in Switzerland is in constant cable contact with Tokyo.[18] This conviction appears to be based on impressions only, since his two Japanese contacts never stated precisely that they had received instructions from any authorized agency in Tokyo.

(Mr. Dulles, in carefully guarded statements, pointed out to Jacobsson that:

(1. Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July covered the situation. As yet these approaches which Jacobsson described, in the absence of conclusive evidence that they emanated from a fully-empowered official, fall squarely into the category of "peace feelers" described by Mr. Grew.[19]

(2. If competent Japanese authorities accepted unconditional surrender, appropriate Allied authorities would determine how such a surrender should be effected.

(3. He (Mr. Dulles) had no comments to make with regard to dynastic and constitutional questions.[20]

(4. Prompt unconditional surrender appears to be the only way to save anything out of the wreckage.

[18] Okamoto and Kase sent many cables (in which they, like Fujimura, apparently implied that the initiative for the contact had come from Mr. Dulles), but the only encouragement they got from Tokyo was the lack of any rebuke.

[19] "Conversations relating to peace have been reported to the Department from various parts of the world, but in no case has an approach been made . . . by a person who could establish his authority to speak for the Japanese Government. . . . The purported 'peace feelers' . . . are the usual moves in the conduct of psychological warfare by a defeated enemy."

[20] But according to Butow's information from the postwar testimony of Kase, Yoshimura, and Kitamura, Mr. Dulles' reply as relayed by Jacobsson had been that the United States was not opposed to preserving the imperial institution but had to take its allies' views into account and so could not make any firm commitment. It could state its "understanding" that the imperial system would be retained. The constitution, however, would have to be changed.

(Mr. Dulles agrees with Jacobsson that the Japanese have taken t heart the consequences which Germany has suffered, including ex tensive physical destruction and the collapse of all German authority because it prolonged a futile struggle many months after its hope lessness was wholly apparent. Jacobsson feels therefore that a tendency is growing in certain Japanese circles to try to terminate the war at any cost, provided that non-militaristic Japanese govern mental institutions can be preserved in the Japanese home islands.

(Mr. Dulles expects within a few days to obtain some evidence as to whether these approaches by Yoshimura and Kitamura have any serious backing or represent merely an effort by the Japanese group in Switzerland to start something on their own initiative.)

18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . .

Mr. Dulles has been informed by OSS representatives in Switzerland that Yoshimura and Kojiro Kitamura, Japanese officials in the Bank for International Settlements, were scheduled to confer at once with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto at Zurich, and immediately thereafter to cable Tokyo. . . .

(Mr. Dulles believes that for the next few days important developments in this matter are not likely, but that a line is being opened which the Japanese may use when the situation in Tokyo permits Japan to accept unconditional surrender.)

2 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . .

Immediately following is a summary of a report by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, transmitted to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

The Japanese Chief of Staff has acknowledged without comment a long cable which Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto sent from Switzerland on 19 July. Okamoto's telegram reportedly stated that Japan has lost the war and must promptly accept the consequences. . . .

The Japanese Foreign Minister has also acknowledged a detailed report from Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern. Kase's report, sent on or about 21 July, included (a) Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July, (b) a memorandum from Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache in Berlin, who has been active in the current Japanese approaches to Mr. Dulles, and (c) a statement of Kase's own position. The Foreign Minister's reply to Kase's message contained the following query: "Is that all you have to say?" Kase interprets this query as an invitation to continue peace approaches.

The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan [21] has been the chief topic of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first reaction, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japanese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on a basis of "take it or leave it," (c) the inclusion of China as a signatory represented an "added element of humiliation," and (d) the document should have been sent through private channels rather than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobsson, and after further study, the attitude of the group changed, and the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a possible way out." The group was particularly impressed by "unconditional surrender" in connection with the "Japanese armed forces" and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stressing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson transmitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.

The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision within a week unless "resistance is too great." The Allies should not take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tripartite proclamation.[22] This radio comment was merely "propaganda to maintain morale in Japan." The real reply will be given through some "official channel," possibly by Minister Kase or General Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the Far East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts, that Yosikazu [23] Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Bern, has sent seven long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past two months urging immediate cessation of hostilities. His superiors cabled in reply that the Japanese Navy no longer is able to "act alone," and instructed Fujimura not to take the initiative without orders from Tokyo, but to maintain his "most valuable contacts." [24]

. . .

The German source reports and Jacobsson confirms that Fujimura and Kitamura have established close contact with each other. The two men, Jacobsson confirms, are agreed that joint action by all Japanese services in Switzerland might make some impression on the Japanese Government, since Bern now "is probably next to Moscow the most important Japanese foreign post."

9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

. . .

Per Jacobsson . . . has transmitted the following information to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

Kojiro Kitamura . . . has held a number of conversations on the significance of the tripartite ultimatum to Japan issued at Potsdam with the Japanese Minister in Bern, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, believed to be the head of Japanese intelligence in Europe.

According to indications from the Tokyo Radio, the three men all feel that the declaration initially was badly received. They emphasize, however, the "brief and perfunctory" nature of the formal reply

[21] The Potsdam proclamation.

[22] It had been formally decided at cabinet level to withhold public comment on the proclamation while seeking clarification through Soviet good offices. But this decision was somehow twisted in the next day's press and radio into one to show "silent contempt" for the tripartite terms, and then Premier Suzuki, under pressure from the military, confirmed this interpretation.

[23] Error for Yoshiro.

[24] Butow has him receiving only two replies from Tokyo, one in mid-May enjoining caution against an enemy trap and the one on 20 June telling him to work with Kase. See note 12 above.

as given over the Tokyo Radio by Premier Suzuki. They attribute the terseness of the reply as evidence of the influence of a "peace party."

This group in Switzerland has been sending daily cables to Tokyo stating that the Potsdam declaration to Japan was merely a simple statement of Allied war aims and not a "take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum which Japan could not honorably accept, as was first believed." The group feels that these daily messages to Tokyo have served to bolster the efforts of the "peace Party" in Tokyo. The group finds encouraging the fact that it has not been rebuked for such frank statements, and attaches considerable importance to a report in the Swiss press on 5 August that Foreign Minister Togo was received in private audience by the Emperor.[25] The group considers that Togo belongs to "a new peace party."

The group requested Jacobsson to ask Mr. Dulles whether he would be willing to see an authorized representative of the Japanese Government. If so, one of the following would be selected as the representative: (1) Minister Kase, acting as Japanese Government delegate to the conversations, not as Minister to Switzerland; (2) Ambassador Sato in Moscow; or preferably (3) some Swiss civilian now in Tokyo who could be sent under the cover of a representative of the International Red Cross. The group prefers the third alternative because it feels that such a person would know the situation in Tokyo and "would evaluate the situation as envisaged in Europe."

Mr. Dulles comments that there is no direct evidence that these suggestions from the Japanese group in Switzerland are based on instructions from Tokyo. Mr. Dulles has again cautioned Jacobsson on this point and has emphasized to Jacobsson that the only question is whether the Japanese are ready to accept unconditional surrender as set forth in the Potsdam and other previous official declarations. Realizing the extreme delicacy of this matter, Mr. Dulles continues to handle it with the greatest caution.

13 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following, prepared to complete your records, is the substance of a final report, dated 27 August, from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of

[25] Butow does not record this audience. Togo was received on 8 August to report what enemy broadcasts were saying about the bomb that had destroyed Hiroshima and to emphasize the urgency of accepting the Potsdam proclamation.

the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden, concerning the Japanese pre-surrender attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives. . . .

On 17 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted the following information to Mr. Dulles:

Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, believed to be head of Japanese intelligence in Europe until his suicide 15 August, received a telegram just before his death from the Japanese Chief of Staff, thanking him and his associates in Bern for their work in communicating with "the Americans" in Switzerland. The wire stated that their work in Switzerland had been most useful in enabling Tokyo to reach a decision.

(Mr. Dulles comments that the Navy and civilian groups were prepared to seek peace before the Army had come to such a decision. The initiation of formal peace offers therefore was blocked until someone in the Army group came out in favor of surrender.)[26]

After receiving the message, General Okamoto wrote Fujimura asking him to express thanks to Jacobsson and Mr. Dulles. In recognition of his work, Jacobsson is to be entertained by both Fujimura and Kitamura. Jacobsson feels that the Japanese in Bern must have been praised by Tokyo for their work.

In his messages to Tokyo prior to the Japanese surrender, General Okamoto had insisted that his government should deal solely with the United States. Jacobsson believes it is likely that the suggestions of the Japanese in Bern "persuaded the Emperor finally to turn to the United States alone." The Swiss group, inspired by Jacobsson, suggested the face-saving formula that avoided the use of the word "surrender" in Japanese official communications.[27]

Before he died, General Okamoto collected all of Fujimura's letters and other pertinent papers and directed that they be saved for historians' use. Jacobsson learned from Fujimura that immediately after General Okamoto's death, the Japanese Chief of Staff sent Okamoto's "military office" in Bern a message of condolence. The message apparently was not a mere formality, since it was much longer than customary and included the following sentence: "I appreciate his patriotic service rendered at our country's most critical moment."

[26] But Okamoto's coming out in favor of surrender had had no evident effect on Army circles in Tokyo. See note 16 above.

[27] To judge from Butow's study, the cables from Switzerland commanded little attention in Tokyo.

Fujimura and Kitamura regard this action as expressing approval and appreciation of the General's last telegrams advocating surrender.

Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern, decided in July that he had been wrong in favoring the USSR as the intermediary for peace negotiations. He radioed Tokyo that the Soviet Union was not a satisfactory channel and that the wisest course would be to deal directly with the United States through Swiss contacts.

Jacobsson believes that, because of the above, the Japanese Government elected to send the final surrender communication through Bern. Stockholm, he points out, would have served as well and would have been the normal transmittal point since the USSR, by then at war, had diplomatic representatives in the Swedish capital.[28]

[28] The surrender notes were communicated to Britain and the USSR through the Swedish government, to the United States and China through the Swiss.

A new contract agent wins his spurs and reports with conviction that—

TRAINING PAYS

James A. Savacool

The following are excerpts from a contract agent's report on his successful operations in a denied area. He had been arrested, to be sure, but only in the course of a mass roundup of potentially subversive elements, and his security had been so good that after about eight weeks he was released for lack of evidence. His report shows the possibility as well as the difficulty of operating under severe counterintelligence controls and above all the value of thorough training. Experienced intelligence operatives may find the lessons herein illustrated a bit elementary, but this agent is understandably sold on the value of those elementary lessons and proud of having learned them well and followed them.

I am altogether convinced that I managed to evade detection because of the thorough teaching in tradecraft I was given by my instructors, particularly Al, with his insistence on careful planning and close attention to every detail regardless of how small or inconsequential it might appear.

Meetings

Because of the close surveillance to which all persons living under the block system of neighborhood control are subject, meetings and meeting places were the problem of primary concern. Meetings just to transfer material or funds were comparatively simple; the main essential was coordinated timing. There was no telephone number that could be called for the exact time, but a local radio station gave the hour on the minute. We used this to synchronize our watches. Our unalterable rule was, "Never before the hour and never more than three minutes after the hour." If contact was not made in that interval it was deferred to an alternative time and place. In a full year of such meetings we had to resort to the alternative only two or three times.

We soon discovered that Al's advice about woo cover for status and for action was right, that it was much easier to devise a reason

for being who and where we were and doing what we were doing if members of the opposite sex were involved. So wherever possible we arranged to have a woman as cutout, and the cover for a meeting with her would be simply a lovers' tryst. We met in bars and restaurants and, seemingly by chance, in areas normally frequented by both parties. Meetings without a cutout were held only when absolutely unavoidable, as when planning the details of a sabotage project.

When such direct contact had to be made, we generally followed this basic outline: The time and place, plus the alternate plan, were passed by the cutout. We used code words for the meeting places and a plus or minus number of hours. At the appointed hour one of the two parties would be, let's say, at a bus stop in a fairly busy section of town, with an appropriate cover for "status." The cover for action was almost invariably the other's offer to give him a ride home. Cover for their acquaintance was generally a former pupil-teacher relationship. Neither person carried documents to these meetings. Information was given orally and no notes were taken. The writing up was done immediately after the meeting when safely at home.

Staying Inconspicuous

Every effort was made to avoid both deserted sections and excessively busy areas. Al's maxim "Know the area" became a way of life. In my area, which was quite large, I knew the location of security forces, where government officials lived, and where foreigners of consequence were to be found. How important this knowledge is was impressed on me one time when I parked my car in an unfortunate spot to go to a meeting. It happened like this:

Returning to my car after the meeting, I recalled Al's reiterated "*Always* have a cover story." I truthfully did not believe there was any need for a cover story at this point, but just to follow the rules I prepared one. It was not a well-planned cover; certainly it could not compare with those I prepared after that. But it was a story. I knew a teacher who lived about a block from where I had parked my car. I went by his house and spent a few minutes there before going back to the parking place. As soon as I got to the car and opened the door about five spotlights went on and I was surrounded by militiamen. They searched me and the car, made me identify myself, and asked what I was doing there. Since I was prepared, I could tell my story readily and convincingly, and it had enough truth in it to get by.

I learned later that a high government official had moved that very day into the house in front of which I had parked. Closel A good object lesson, and an extremely convincing one. Al was right: "Have a cover story at all times, for if you don't you may panic and trap yourself."

Regular Sessions

Tutoring sessions were used as a cover for regular meetings. The "pupil" was supposed to be taking English lessons from me at my house. I supplied him with books, gave him a list of things we would have covered in the last session, had him do under my supervision a paper to be handed in as homework, and gave him another list of items to be covered in the current session. He always arrived carrying several books to use in the lesson, and he would enclose in them any papers necessary for the meeting. We drew up a class schedule for twice a week and had a reason why he had not been able to attend his last class if we had not met then. If he was there off schedule he was making up a session he had missed. While our meetings were in progress I played a tape recording of English readings to give more realism to the cover and also to preclude any eavesdropping on our conversation.

This attention to detail made it possible for me to meet with one of my contacts countless times, though the block warden might be standing in front of the house watching us. Thoroughness in detail had been one of the fundamentals drilled into me by all my instructors, and in practice it paid off.

Caution with New Contact

One afternoon I received a call from my case officer asking me to come immediately to a restaurant. When I arrived he told me we were meeting a student who he believed had good potential as a political agent. The case officer was leaving the country, and I would have to handle this man on my own. He was energetic, apparently well acquainted, and anxious to do something against the government; but he needed some financial aid to continue in the university. I was to give him $200 and explore the possibility of his working for us.

The student arrived and I was introduced to him, by a first name only. I invited him to take a walk with me and talk about his activities. He was very enthusiastic. He told me he had organized about 300 students but they needed arms. He wanted me to get him weapons, gelatin, etc. I pleaded ignorance in all such matters. Then he began asking questions. He asked me where I lived. I gave him the name of a suburb favored by Americans. He asked if I had a car. I told him no, that was one of my problems; living in the suburbs and working down town I lost quite a bit of time. He wanted to know how long I had been in the country, etc.

Then he turned to describing the "active" groups at the university. He seemed thoroughly conversant with the membership of these groups. When I inquired which one he belonged to he said he was an independent. He cooperated with several groups in sabotage undertakings, but he preferred to remain unattached; it gave him more chance to act. I just listened, carefully. I asked him where he could meet me so that I could give him the tuition money. He was very grateful for our helping him continue his studies; he would always cherish the memory of our friendship for the "little" people, the real people of his country. Could I meet him at such-and-such a corner tomorrow at 2:00 p.m.? "Of course; would you like the money in big bills or small?" "Twenties would be perfect," he said.

All the information he had elicited from me was of course false. I really don't know why I went to such pains to lie so plausibly, even adding little anecdotes about my troubles with public transportation during the rush hour. I presume it was the oft-repeated admonition of my instructors to let my contacts know as little of me as possible. The added trimmings to induce belief were probably just instinct, quickened by the knowledge that two Americans had recently been seized in the area of our rendezvous.

Provocation Deflected

The immediate problem was this prospective meeting with a person who had been handed to me as a promising contact but whom I had not checked. My solution was this: I called one of my contacts of university age and gave him an envelope containing the money. I told him that at exactly 2:00 p.m., when my new contact would be standing on a corner five miles away, he was to enter a kiosque this man's parents owned and hand them the envelope with the son's name on it. He was then to leave immediately, taking precautions against being followed. The courier did exactly as directed and reported back that no one except the mother had been in the store.

In the meantime I had started a check on my new would-be friend, asking the head of one of the activist groups at the university to look into him. He returned mystified; my friend was unknown to anyone in his group. Was I sure of the name and school? I verified these and asked him to try again. At the same time I started another investigation through a second group. The results were the same: subject unknown; their security suspected counterintelligence.

I now alerted both groups and gave them the names of the people the man had mentioned as members. They were appalled that counterintelligence was onto these, their top echelon at the university. One of them muttered it might be a good idea if the man got in the way of a bus. I heard later that he died under mysterious circumstances; I don't know what happened to him.

A regretful postscript is that at the time of the mass arrests they picked up an American citizen, fluent in the local language, who lived in the suburb I had named, had no car, and worked down town. They interrogated him frequently and at odd hours—at lunch or supper time so he wouldn't get anything to eat, in the middle of the night, etc. My story held up all too well in the absence of identification by the dead man.

Security Behind Bars

A big headache was caching materials. My house had a tile floor, and any attempt to loosen a tile would be fatal. There is no way to conceal its looseness. At the time of the mass roundup the house was searched tile by tile; light fixtures were taken down from the ceiling; the hi-fi cabinet was taken apart and examined minutely; every piece of clothing was processed; the bathroom was torn up; even the little tank on the roof for maintaining water pressure was examined and measured. The only item they missed was a breakfast table.

This was a standard formica-top table with tubular aluminum legs. During the first search my data was hidden in one of the legs. Immediately afterward I destroyed it, but they overlooked the table again in the second search. I don't know whether they thought of

it in later searches, for I was taken to jail immediately after the second one.

When he trained me, Al insisted that I use a safety signal rather than a danger signal. I put that system into effect with my contacts, instructing them never to approach me but just make this safe sign. One day shortly after I was sent to prison I saw one of my contacts in the yard. I suspected I was under observation and was afraid he might involve both of us by recognizing me. He followed the rule, however, and when he gave the safety signal I walked away.

I waited my chance and one day managed to sit next to him at lunch. Then I could tell him that as far as I knew I was in the clear, merely having been picked up in the mass arrests. He said his case was the same. That made it much easier to sleep at night. I cautioned him against making friends in prison and urged him to sit tight and confine his conversation, even with those he believed to be friends, to generalities. From then on we saw each other regularly in the prison yard but did not so much as exchange a wink.

Seeds of Success

The prisoners were all curious about the reasons why their fellows were in jail. In concocting an answer for them I recalled the advice I had been given, to think in case of capture about taking a lesser rap. So I began laying the groundwork for a lesser charge. I figured that if I was known to believe I had been jailed for a particular reason, the police just might tend to investigate that reason rather than another. So when asked why I was arrested I would say, "I think they are accusing me of hoarding," and explain how when they searched my house the police had found quite a bit of soap and probably thought I was black-marketing that scarce item. I took good care not to mention any specific amount of soap; I didn't want to make the case against me too good. I do not know how effective this story was as a red herring, but the fact remains that I was never questioned and was eventually released.

Thus I believe it was the training I received that permitted me to operate without detection and provided me, when picked up in the mass arrests, with the resources to weather the danger and elude any traps the secret police had set. I was glad my instructors had insisted on a cover story; had I not had one the first time I was stopped and questioned, I would have had no need for any subsequently. Their drilling me in attention to detail made it possible

for me to meet contacts regularly and safely despite close surveillance. The rules for checking a new contact, no matter who has introduced him, saved me from an evident disaster. The value of a safety signal was brought home when I was able to warn off my contact in the prison without any telltale gesture. And being well schooled in what to do under arrest, I did not panic but was able to form a plan under which I could have maintained my innocence of everything except having amassed eight or ten bars of soap at home.

Some foreign operations of the Tzar's political police.

THE OKHRANA'S FEMALE AGENTS

PART II: Indigenous Recruits [1]

Rita T. Kronenbitter

From the early stages of its existence the Okhrana adhered to a firm policy of strictly segregating its truly clandestine services. It divided agents into two categories, "external" and "internal," meaning roughly overt and covert respectively. The external agents were investigators. They did open and clandestine surveillance and a variety of detective work, including cooperation with other government security agencies at home and abroad. Whether known to the public as Okhrana employees or not, they were officially recognized within the government and paid overtly by it. The internal service, in contrast, was essentially a system of penetrations and thus by necessity completely secret. Its personnel were unknown not only to the public and other government agencies but for the most part to Okhrana officers themselves. The identity of its agents was masked even in the operational files recording their activities. Each was known personally only to his case officer and, usually, the chief of the unit he worked for; agents did not know of one another's existence.

Similarly no external agent was ever supposed to know an internal one, who would normally be operating under some revolutionary cover. So strictly was this rule enforced that an external agent who learned the identity of an internal agent would be dismissed. Thus it often happened that it was the duty of an external agent to mount surveillance on an internal agent ostensibly working for a subversive group. One obvious advantage of this circumstance was to provide a multiple check on the veracity and dependability of the penetration

[1] For Part I, *Russian Women*, see *Studies* IX 2, p. 25 ff. These articles are based primarily on the Hoover Institution's collection *Zagranichnaya Okhrana*, consisting chiefly of the Okhrana files from Paris, the main center of Russian revolutionary and anti-revolutionary activity abroad before World War I. These files, presented after the revolution to Herbert Hoover by the Kerenski government, have only recently been opened to the public.

agents, a number of whom turned out to be playing a double role; but this was just a side benefit from the compartmentation practiced for the sake of the internal agents' security.

The principle of two separate categories of agents lent itself remarkably well to the operating problems of the Okhrana stations abroad. The first chief in Paris, Pëtr Ivanovich Rachkovsky (he held the post from 1884 to 1902), soon realized that external agents of Russian nationality were totally unsuitable for work in western Europe. Not just their language but their very appearance and behavior gave them away immediately. Gradually, therefore, all the Russian investigators were returned home and replaced by French, Italian, German, and British agents. The Okhrana abroad thus reinforced the functional dichotomy of the two agent categories with an ethnic one: foreigners, recruited largely from among host government and private detectives, became the investigators, while agents from Russia were devoted to penetration operations against the revolutionaries.

In the fall of 1913, however, most of Paris Okhrana's external, investigation agents were exposed by the revolutionaries' counterintelligence. In the ensuing upheaval former investigator Jollivet was suddenly transformed into a penetration agent inside the revolutionary service. Paris Okhrana found it expedient also to be flexible in the use of an array of mistresses of Monsieur Henri Bint.

The Women of Henri Bint

This Alsatian gentleman, hired by Rachkovsky in 1885 after ten years of service with the French *Sûreté*, remained one of the Paris station's principal investigators until the first world war. (During the war the Okhrana took him off routine investigation work and supplied him with funds to establish a residence in Switzerland, from where he could get agents into Germany and Austria. The Swiss imprisoned him in January 1917.) Apparently he never married, but he was never without mistresses, one at a time after he had learned quite early that it was neither healthy nor economical to have two or more together.

Life on the Riviera

Another thing Bint learned was to avail himself of the help his mistresses could render in connection with his job. In 1912, as leader of a surveillance network on the Riviera, he took along a mistress and loaned her free of charge both to a younger agent of his network named Fontana and to officers of the French and Italian police departments cooperating with him. This generosity led on one occasion to a serious contretemps. The mistress, staying with Fontana at a hotel in La Spezia, stole from his suitcase a batch of photographs and letters and gave them to a cooperating Italian agent, and there ensued a fist fight in one of the city's public squares. The police interfered, the press got interested, and there were provocative stories in French and Italian newspapers. Bint, although it was not entirely his fault, received a stern reprimand from the chief.

Bint had been dismissed from the Okhrana on two occasions, primarily on account of indecorous relations with the fair sex, but both times he was promptly rehired. The chiefs valued his professional skill and realized that he occasionally got results from his mistresses' peeping into the activities of unreliable Russian aristocrats in Paris. Although a French demoiselle could not understand what the Russians were saying among themselves, she could keep company with individual conspirators, who could all speak some French. By using his girls Bint thus became more than a mere detective; the information they procured was almost in the category of that from internal agents.

Understandably enough, however, the system gradually wore out: the revolutionaries became wary of Parisian female companions. Then in 1911, when Bint's colleague Leroi defected from the Okhrana to join Burtzev's revolutionary counterintelligence, Bint had to cut off all *espiéglerie* with the females, as the practice was called. Bint and Leroi had worked together for years against the same targets, using the same techniques and often sharing mistresses for whatever job was on hand. No one cursed Leroi so much as Bint for his defection; he knew he would tell Burtzev all about it. He even anticipated that on Leroi's advice Burtzev would sooner or later try the trick on him, hiring some female to work on him. And so he did.

Tables Turned

Liubov Julia was a Parisian whose first name suggested Russian origin. The use of Julia as a surname was most likely her own invention. When Bint first saw her, in a public café, she was with a group of revolutionaries, but she seemed much too frivolous and gay to be concerned with politics or conspiracies. She acted like any ordinary Parisian *demimondaine* of the period. He made her acquaintance and found that she was just as jolly in his company as she had seemed among the Russian intellectuals. At the moment

he was not particularly tied to any mistress, so he took her home with him, and there she stayed.

This was early 1913. He reported in full to his Okhrana superiors. His case officer thought that Julia might prove useful in work among the revolutionaries, cables and dispatches were exchanged with Petersburg headquarters, and Julia was hired under the code name "Jourdain." She was to receive 100 francs a month for reporting to Bint on several groups of conspirators in Paris.

Thus there happened to Bint what he was afraid would happen: he had a mistress spy on him just as he had used mistresses to spy on others. Julia was Burtzev's plant. She would regularly bring Bint quantities of attractive information, all written in her own hand, which always turned out to be of little or no value to the Okhrana. Bint's case officer, who had reports about Julia's activities from other sources, soon decided that she ought to be able to produce much better intelligence. Gradually it was possible to check the sources of the information she delivered, and it was discovered that all of it was prepared by Burtzev's counterintelligence people.

Just about this time Julia suddenly came forth with a demand for 500 francs in cash, threatening to sue Bint and expose him in the French press. She was dismissed at once. In the lengthy explanations dispatched to headquarters toward the end of 1913, the Paris station maintained that Julia could not possibly have gained access to any information about the Okhrana and could not even have supplied Burtzev with any knowledge about Bint except the fact of his physical association with her.

A Woman Scorned

Burtzev and Leroi had had even less success in an earlier, somewhat dissimilar attempt. In 1908 Henri Bint made the acquaintance of Lea Chauvin, and she stayed in his apartment, on and off, collaborating in his professional work, for some three years until in 1911, shortly after Leroi's defection, Bint was called to Petersburg. It was not customary to bring non-Russian external agents to headquarters, but he, as the most important sleuth of three decades and chief manager of the network of detectives, was made an exception. The consultation with him was to include some training, which would entail his absence from Paris for many weeks, possibly two or three months.

By age, Bint could have been Lea's grandfather. Although he always preferred young girls, this affair had lasted much longer than usual and his leaving for Petersburg seemed a good occasion to close it off. He told the girl that it would be sensible for her to find someone more suitable to her age. But she did not want to be sensible. She refused to leave; she would stay in the apartment and wait for his return. Bint would not have it. There were several rough scenes, and when she still refused to go he had to call the police to make her get out.

Lea was in a fighting, vengeful mood. She would never have obeyed Bint's order to leave; the ingrate had to call the police to throw her out. That was what she told Leroi, who somehow learned of her distress and promptly called on her to offer consolation. Leroi of course knew all about Lea's life with Bint. He himself had always had a soft spot for her, but now she might have information about Bint's recent activities and the purpose of his trip to Petersburg. In this emotional state she even seemed a good prospect for agent work—well motivated and familiar with Bint's contacts and operations.

After much talk about his friendship and understanding for her feelings, Leroi persuaded Lea to visit Burtzev's office. She was ready for anything as long as it meant hurting Bint, and Burtzev and Leroi found it easy to recruit her for intelligence work against Bint and against the Okhrana that had taken him away from her. Leroi's enthusiasm for the prospective operation was probably enhanced by his fondness for Lea, but Burtzev trusted his judgment. He had made him chief investigator in all operations against the Okhrana's non-Russian networks.

For a short time Lea became as much devoted to Leroi as she had been to Bint, but soon she seemed to have developed some second thoughts. Who can tell what was really in her mind? Maybe she thought she could reawaken the affections of her dear old Bint when he returned, or perhaps she developed an aversion to the rather uncouth and frequently drunk Leroi. Whatever the reason, after everything was agreed and she was to become an agent of the revolutionary counterintelligence, she secretly went to see the chief of Paris Okhrana, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Krassilnikov. Yet this was just a probing action; all she did was complain about how Bint had thrown her out on the street. In relaying her story to headquarters, Krassilnikov wrote that he had given her 500 francs to keep her quiet and recover from her a packet of Bint's personal letters which she had appropriated to use just in case.

Lea was astonished by the 500 francs. She had never had that much money in her hand before. She became bemused with the possibilities of earning more; she had already observed that the revolutionary intelligence office was short of funds. So she made a second visit to Krassilnikov, and this time she told him all about how Burtzev and Leroi had recruited her to work for them and assured her of a steady income. She said she did not trust Leroi, he had deserted his friend Bint, and he would desert her the same way. Finally she offered her services to Krassilnikov, saying that she knew from living with Bint and helping him just what she would have to do to be useful.

Redoubled Hero

A case officer was assigned, and soon thereafter Lea's reports were being dispatched to headquarters under the code name "L'héros." The Okhrana instructed her to stay on the job in Burtzev's office and report on every assignment she received. At first it was just debriefings: one lengthy report on a luncheon with Burtzev and Leroi told of pressing questions on the current whereabouts of Harting, former Paris Okhrana chief, and hundreds of questions on the orders received by Bint, the times and places he would meet with Okhrana officers, his non-Russian affiliates, and his methods for receiving pay and instructions and submitting reports. As a double agent working in Burtzev's office with the position of assistant to Leroi, she was paid 200 francs a month by the Okhrana.

Mme. Chauvin, as she was introduced to visiting revolutionaries in Burtzev's office, delighted her chiefs there by her willingness to be of use, though she was disappointingly ill acquainted with the operational information they wanted. Burtzev decided to use her in other operations. Once Leroi took her to Place Bouveau, in front of the Ministry of the Interior and the *Sûreté Générale*, gave her a camera, and told her to take pictures of a man he would point out leaving the building. This project of Leroi's was soon brought to the attention of the Okhrana liaison officer in the *Sûreté*, M. Moreau, chief of the political police who, it happened, was the man whose picture Leroi wanted.

Another time Leroi took her to a lawyer named Tomasini, who she found out later was a naturalized Frenchman of Russian origin. The two wanted a statement from her to the effect that Bint had been receiving from the Monyjeux District post office a number of letters addressed to Russian revolutionaries. (Burtzev repeatedly tried to prove that Paris postal officials were selling revolutionary correspondence to the Okhrana.) Lea replied that she knew nothing of any such mail being given to Bint. They pleaded with her for a long time to write and sign such a deposition. Though they offered her 1,000 francs cash and the assurance of 200 francs a month for the rest of her life, according to her report forwarded in a dispatch to Petersburg, she answered only that she could not affirm what she did not know.

Dispatches to Petersburg in the Paris Okhrana files show that L'héros continued as a double agent until the outbreak of the war. Her pay was increased to 275 francs a month, delivered to her regularly by Bint, who on his return became her case officer, nothing more this time.

Jane

Marcel Bittard-Monin, supervisor of most of Paris Okhrana's non-Russian agents, made Mme. G. Richard Le Davadie sign five papers relating to the termination of her service. She was furious. The smooth talk with which the goaty Lothario tried to cheer her in her misery only enraged her more; he was taking the side of the Russian bosses. She didn't give a damn, she said, what new twists they were taking in their policy. She could not care less whether they conformed to the attitude of the French government. What she wanted and needed was the job they were taking away.

She felt cheated by this sudden deprivation not only of income but of everything she had enjoyed for a half dozen interesting years of spying—first for Bittard personally and then for the Okhrana behind him. She had had tours at the best times of year to the Côte d'Azur and the Italian Riviera, all expenses paid. In the endless variety of tasks that she performed she had earned much praise, which always made her feel happy, useful, and young again. The job had become part of her; she truly believed that the Russian service could never find anyone more willing to work and to sacrifice herself when necessary. She knew, and the Okhrana bosses must know, that no male detective could replace her. They could tail the conspirators to the gates of their residences; she could follow them, if need be, into their bedrooms.

Paris Okhrana "Dissolved"

When these arguments proved of no avail, Mme. Le Davadie turned to Bittard-Monin with personal reproaches. No other agent he was dismissing had ever meant anything to him, while she had been his favorite before either of them had ever heard of the Okhrana. She recalled how she had shared with him her apartment and all in those young and idealistic years when he was struggling along as a poorly paid sub-inspector for the *Sûreté*. The ingrate would hear none of it; his heart had turned to stone. Aside from the change of policy, he reminded her coldly, the agents had to be dismissed for the obvious reason that they had all been blown by Burtzev and their names published in all the press of Europe, so they would be entirely useless.

"Why aren't you fired, then?" she came back. "Your name was not only in the newspapers, but proclaimed in parliament."

He said he would be, reiterating that the Okhrana was discontinuing operations and making a public announcement to that effect. He declared that part of the reason for this was to insure the safety of the agents whose names and addresses were now known to the terrorists. But he did not convince her. The argument degenerated into repetition and name-calling.

Finally Mme. Le Davadie saw that it was no use and signed the five papers. First was a receipt for 200 francs, her salary for the last month, and one for expense money and a termination bonus. Then there was the notarized resignation:

> The undersigned Madame Richard Le Davadie, residing at 52 rue Jacob, employed by the intelligence service organized and directed by Monsieur Marcel Bittard-Monin, am hereby resigning from said service as a result of its complete dissolution as of 31 October 1913.
>
> I have received as indemnity the sum of 200 francs, the equivalent of one month's salary.
>
> I declare that I am entirely satisfied with the payment of said sum as my final compensation.
>
> Paris, 31 October 1913
> Le Davadie G. Richard

Another paper acknowledged that she had been returned her birth certificate and a court document concerning herself. By her fifth subscription Mme. Le Davadie declared that she no longer had in her possession any notes, letters, ciphers, or photographs belonging to the service.

With the termination money in her purse and all the anger in her heart, Mme. Le Davadie went to the nearest bistro. She was a temperate woman and despised excessive drinking, but this time she had to have an outlet. Not from worry about her future but for her wrath toward Monin. She couldn't take her anger out on the faceless Okhrana. If she knew any of its officers, it would be different; but going to the Russian embassy without knowing anyone, as ex-agent Fontana once had done, would be futile and ridiculous. They would say they'd never heard of her or of Bittard-Monin or anyone like that.

Two other agents Monin had dismissed that day were in the bistro—Mme. Drouchot, whom Mme. Le Davadie knew well but disliked, and Auguste Pouchot, with whom she had once served on a surveillance team in Montreux. As an agent she would have never approached them publicly, but now, savoring her new freedom, she joined them at the table. No explanations were necessary; she saw at once that they both had been canned too. The three joined in cursing Bittard-Monin.

"The bastard should not have thrown *you* out," said Mme. Drouchot, meaningfully. Le Davadie felt like grabbing her hair for twisting this one in; then she realized that Mme. Drouchot had already taken more cognac than was needed to drown her bitterness. Pouchot too was nearly drunk. She determined at once not to follow their example. She had only one absinthe and sipped it slowly, thinking. Not really listening to the other two, she heard them naming Burtzev again and again, just as Monin had, it seemed a hundred times. Burtzev's revolutionary intelligence had busted Paris Okhrana. He was powerful, the Sherlock Holmes of the revolution. All the press of Paris was praising him, and the leading politicians were fighting his battles in parliament.

On the Victor's Bandwagon

Mme. Le Davadie made up her mind. Without even finishing her drink, she left her companions and went straight to the rue de La Glacière. She knew Burtzev's office well from having done surveillance on it. She would get even with Monin. She would join the revolutionary service; and Burtzev, now so strong and successful, would pay her just as he was paying Leroi, who had defected as Okhrana agent at about the time she had formally signed on in 1911. She would even be paid for her revenge.

The office at 53 rue de la Glacière was a noisier place than Monin's bureau. It was not large, but some half dozen people were engaged in heated discussions. Burtzev was not there; his assistant Leroi received her. This was well. She knew how much influence he had with Burtzev, and she thought he would help her. Back in 1908 he had been one of her more persistent admirers among the investigation agents. True that his awkwardly long figure, frequently unstable because of too much alcohol, had not attracted her even to the point of the camaraderie usual among fellow agents; but when he was sober and alone with her, he used to flatter her with attentions. Now he showed his surprise and joy at seeing her. He moved as though to kiss her in front of everyone but settled for kissing her hand. He took her to Burtzev's private office.

When the pleasantries were over, she described how she had quit Monin and the Okhrana, and much of what she said was quite untrue. They wanted her to stay, she said, but she was fed up with them all and wanted to get even, particularly with Monin and his net. She finally recognized, she said, that Burtzev was doing the right thing, and she would be glad to join him even at a small salary, just enough to keep her alive. She would help to the best of her ability to fight and expose the entire Russian service. Leroi was pleased, and they worked out a preliminary plan of employment that he thought would be acceptable to Burtzev. She also was pleased, and she forgot all her past antipathy for Leroi. He took her to dinner and she took him to her apartment.

The following day, on 1 November 1913, Mme. Richard Le Davadie was hired as agent of the revolutionary intelligence service. Leroi spoke enthusiastically to Burtzev about her exceptional qualities and vast knowledge of the personnel and activities of the Okhrana's non-Russian networks in France, Switzerland, and Italy, as well as her excellent current motivation. Burtzev was not opposed; but, seasoned as he was in the game and not sharing Leroi's personal reasons for enthusiasm, he wanted first to determine how much she knew and to make sure she was not a plant of some kind. She had to be interrogated in detail, be kept under surveillance for several days, and in the meantime be given no chance to learn anything about his service.

The first interrogation satisfied Burtzev about her knowledge, and the many questions about Okhrana targets, methods of surveillance, timing and location of operations, reporting procedures in clear and in code, and cooperation with local security organs convinced Le Davadie that she was dealing with just as professional a service as the one she had left. She knew enough to fill a book, and since it would take forever to get this in debriefings, Burtzev told her to put in writing a full account of every surveillance job she had done since February 1911, when she formally became a salaried Okhrana agent. She could write this in the quiet of her own apartment.

Burtzev gave her 40 francs and the promise of a better monthly salary than that. All she had to do for the time being was write this report and keep in daily touch with Leroi or with Burtzev if Leroi was away. Leroi accompanied her home. Pleased as Punch, he wanted to celebrate right away, and on her 40 francs. But she was not in the mood. She was disturbed by his assurances of how they would have a secure job together and he would look after her, and especially by his remark that he personally would take care of the surveillance Burtzev wanted her kept under. She talked him out of coming up to her apartment this time.

Second Thoughts

Alone, it took her but little thinking to decide that she could never serve Leroi; that was about what this job would mean. And although Burtzev made a pleasant impression on her—the kindly, soft-spoken, bearded, scholarly gentleman knew how to treat a lady—those 40 francs of salary advance perturbed her. The appearance of the people in Burtzev's office, too, like Leroi's shabbiness, gave her shivers. They looked intellectual all right, but all haggard and undernourished. She understood no Russian, and their speaking it made her feel strange. No, she couldn't bring herself to associate with Leroi and those sallow-faced conspirators, even if the prospects of remuneration had been brighter than they were.

Late the same evening, after she had made up her mind not to go through with it, she had a visitor. Thinking it might be Leroi, she was not going to answer the door, but the knocking persisted and the caller spoke her last name. She opened to find Henri Bint there. She had met Bint on two occasions, but he had never been in her apartment. She liked the old reprobate. "Henri!" she called him by his first name as in the days when he organized her surveillance team. "I'm so pleased to see you. What a surprise!"

The call was not a social one. Bint said he was sorry about her dismissal from the Okhrana service but it was unavoidable for everyone, even for him after 35 years of service. She started talking about

the ingrates and was going to indulge in some more scolding, but Bint stopped her:

"You shouldn't feel bad. You got yourself another job."
"What job?" She looked puzzled.
"With Burtzev's service. I know it all."

How could Bint, a mortal enemy of Leroi, know? He knew just when she had made the two visits to Burtzev's office, what she had said to Leroi and Burtzev, what they said to her, and what was decided. He even knew about the 40 francs and her assignment to write about the Okhrana. He did not tell her that Jollivet, another "dismissed" Okhrana agent whom Mme. Le Davadie had never known, had recently been employed by Burtzev and had been in the office both times.

Mme. Le Davadie was not at all embarrassed. She told Bint she had just decided not to work for Burtzev after all. But Bint had a different idea, and that was the reason for his visit. He had a simple plan: she should not only go ahead with Burtzev but perform so well as to make herself indispensable in the office on the rue de la Glacière. She needed persuading. They talked until after midnight. She warned him that Leroi might come around, for she was to be under his surveillance for some time. Bint knew all that; he had disposed of Leroi by seeing to it that he had a drinking partner at a cabaret.

Le Davadie insisted that under no circumstances would she ever work again with Bittard-Monin.

"Of course not," Bint said. "Your position will be completely changed. You will no longer be a detective conducting surveillance and investigating through local security offices. That is a thing of the past for you. You will no longer be an overt agent for anyone. Your position will be that of a secret agent reporting to the Okhrana the inside story of revolutionary espionage and propaganda." She liked the secrecy and the adventurousness of the proposal. "But it would be dangerous! To whom would I be reporting? You?"

"Maybe to me at times, but the Russians prefer to handle the secret agents themselves. All important dealings would be with them."

"How much will they pay?"

Bint did not know exactly, but he was sure that as secret agent she would be getting much higher pay than ever before, depending partly upon herself. As for the dangers, he said that the Okhrana people knew how to play it safe; she would only have to follow their instructions. He told her he would visit her once more and then arrange a meeting with a Russian for further instructions. He promised to help her write the long story of her agent career that Burtzev required.

Leroi, showing the signs of his night of drinking, called in the middle of the afternoon. He found her at the table, in cheerful spirits, writing her report. He went on to the office to tell Burtzev that he had had the new recruit under surveillance and that she was now at home doing the required writing.

On 4 November Le Davadie went to Burtzev's office again. She brought a sheaf of papers in her own handwriting, done hastily and without much concern for tidiness. They listed in simple chronological order, from 15 February 1911 to 29 October 1913, her singleton and team assignments—dates, locations, targets, where and how picked up, whom with, where followed. In several instances the assistance of local security organs was noted. The story was impressive in the quantity of data recalled but not so elaborate as to suggest reference to contemporary records. It had of course been prepared by Bint, from the records in Bittard-Monin's office. Before giving it to Le Davadie to copy he had also consulted Sushkov, assistant to Krassilnikov.

New Jane at Work

It is not known what code name Burtzev gave Le Davadie, who now became an operative in the revolutionary service. Krassilnikov and all the Okhrana office thenceforth referred to her as Jane. A great pile of reports from December 1913 to late summer 1914, when Burtzev folded up his office and returned to Russia, attests that she knew and reported every move made by the revolutionaries. The records indicate that all her reports were in writing, urgent ones in the convenient *enveloppes pneumatiques* which were handled like telegrams, others in ordinary registered mail, often addressed to Bint's cover firm. At no time, it appears, did she arouse suspicion in Burtzev or his staff.

She reported first on several French and Italian agents Monin had dismissed who came to Burtzev in search of employment. In an effort to ingratiate themselves, these would all disparage Le Davadie's reputation as a person or an agent. A Mme. Tiercelin, in particular, made vitriolic attacks on her as Monin's and other agents' mistress; but Burtzev and Leroi did not care. Le Davadie did not hide any-

thing—like that—from them, and she proved to be a good agent. They never suspected that all her reporting to them actually came from 79 rue de la Grenelle or was at least approved there.

Thanks to Jane, the Okhrana was able to forstall a number of terrorist attempts during this period. It was she who led Krassilnikov onto the trail of a certain Bessel as he left Brindisi for Macedonia to pick up a load of bombs for assassins in Russia. He was arrested in Belgrade and his shipment confiscated on a train in Serbia. By a curious coincidence, Jane was also assigned to help Burtzev prepare evidence of Bessel's innocence for the revolutionary press to use in showing that the charges for the arrest in Belgrade had been trumped up by the Okhrana.

Jane reported on the speeches Burtzev prepared for Jaurez to deliver in the French parliament attacking the Okhrana. In some instances the Okhrana thus had Jaurez's speeches before he himself had seen them. During the first half of 1914, when Burtzev exposed a considerable bag of Okhrana agents, both Russian and non-Russian, Jane could at least warn when and how they would be exposed. She became so important to Burtzev that he wanted to take her with him early in 1914 on a campaign to expose the activities of the Russian secret service in the Italian parliament. She consulted Krassilnikov, who actually approved the trip, but she preferred to develop an acute migrane: she was afraid that it might bring to light discrepancies in her first report to Burtzev with respect to cooperation with Italian security personnel.

It is evident from Okhrana records that Jane ceased to be an agent after Burtzev's departure and the closing of his service. She apparently located some war-related employment; in August and September 1914 at least half the personnel of the Okhrana abroad were drafted into military services.

Soon after the outbreak of the revolution a number of writers began competing in their efforts to expose all Okhrana secret agents. Jane's role was somehow never exposed, even by writer Agafonov, who as a member of the commission investigating the Okhrana had full access to her papers. It is possible that he was unable to detect her identity behind the cover name. Several writers named Le Davadie among the non-Russian investigation agents belonging to the Bittard-Monin network, but all ignore not only her services for Burtzev but her double role for the Okhrana.

La Petite

Three intelligence services used "the little one"—the revolutionaries when she was a child, the Austrians against Russia, and the Russians against Austria. The files of Paris Okhrana contained only 3 x 5 cards on the activities of her parents, but Pavel Zavarzin, Warsaw Okhrana chief at the time of the childhood episode, has told her story.

Living Doll

The Warsaw Okhrana office was located in the Hôtel de Ville, a large building which also provided living quarters for Zavarzin and his subordinates with their families. Beginning in 1904, milk was delivered in a large can to the Zavarzin apartment by an eleven-year-old girl. It came from a dairy where her mother was also employed. The girl was diminutive and charming. She had light, fluffy blond hair and brilliant blue eyes, like a doll. Everybody called her La Petite. Pleased by her promptness and friendliness, the occupants of the Hôtel de Ville spoiled her with gifts of all sorts. A particular attachment was formed between her and the children of Yan, Zavarzin's coachman.

This pleasant association flourished for two years. Then one day a surveillance team was tailing a female terrorist named Rotte. She was accompanied by a young girl carrying a milk can, apparently full. They both went into a house in the Warsaw suburb Praga; within five minutes the girl came out alone and without the can. The detectives now recognized her as La Petite. One of them followed to see where she would go next. Surveilling a child proved to be a difficult game: she often stopped and played at corners or wandered down side streets looking in the windows. After two hours she was back at home.

A penetration of a terrorist group reported at about this time that groups preparing assassinations and robberies were using children to deliver arms, one piece at a time, to the perpetrators. A child carrying a package or container with a small gun or bomb inside would be followed by a terrorist at some distance, then overtaken at the place of action. The investigation of a number of terrorist acts confirmed that this was indeed the practice. Penetrations reported also that the conspirators maintained surveillance of the Okhrana premises in a way that would never be detected. The conspirators knew the tag numbers of Okhrana carriages and the names of officers

Okhrana Women II CONFIDENTIAL

and surveillance agents. Still another report said that the subversives had possession of some important documents stolen from the Okhrana office.

Elaborate security precautions had always been taken to keep unauthorized personnel off the Okhrana premises. La Petite was the only outsider ever admitted to the official quarters, and now she had been seen with the terrorist Rotte. A few forgotten incidents of the past two years were now recalled. One morning, Zavarzin himself remembered, he had found Yan's wife and daughter Handzhia cleaning his office, and La Petite was with them. When he asked what she was doing there, "After I delivered the milk I came to see Handzhia," she had said.

She spoke perfect Russian. Her explanation was that her father, although a Pole from Austria, spoke only Russian at home, having learned it during years of employment in a Moscow brewery. After his death three years earlier her mother had come to work in Warsaw.

Zavarzin recalled also that one morning his administrative assistant was unable to find a batch of papers which he thought he had—carelessly—left on a table the night before. A thorough search was made without success. Moreover, La Petite was often seen in the carriage shed and the dressing room where agents changed into coachman's uniform for surveillance assignments.

La Petite and her mother were both placed under surveillance. It was soon learned that the woman lived with Mishas, an influential member of the Polish Socialist Party, and that this man had been accompanied by La Petite on walks through the city. It was decided that the mother, being an Austrian subject, should be expelled from Warsaw and should be induced to take La Petite with her.

Zavarzin had them both brought to his office. The mother, named Kusitska, was cooperative but evasive when it came to giving information. When she realized he knew about her daughter's activity, she admitted through tears that she had been unable to counteract the corrupting pressure of the revolutionaries upon her child. She would therefore be glad to leave Warsaw for any place where she could get the girl away from their vicious influence and enroll her in some school.

"One would not give her ten years," she said, "and she's already thirteen. She did spy on your office at first, but after being treated so kindly by you all she was ashamed and stopped. Didn't you?"

The girl was all red in the face, too embarrassed to answer, or more likely unwilling to confirm a patent lie.

Reunion

Nine years later, when Russia and Austria were at war and Zavarzin was in charge of the Okhrana office in Odessa, he received a telephone call late in the evening. A woman's voice: "Hello, Colonel Zavarzin, Chief of Section." No one ever addressed him thus by title. Whose was this strange, attractive voice?

"I must see you urgently, but not in your office. I'm calling from the railroad station. Tell me a good hotel where we can meet."

"But who are you?"

"La Petite from Warsaw. Do you remember me?"

She stayed in the Hotel London, but the meeting took place in a safe house. Zavarzin instructed Budakov, his chief of surveillance, to arrange for complete coverage after the meeting. He did not share Budakov's fears for the meeting itself—that La Petite might come with a pistol in her muff.

She came in, still small for a grown woman, scintillating with pleasure: "You remember me! That's so wonderful! But I'm no longer the subversive La Petite of Warsaw. I have become your ally. Before coming in I asked this man [Budakov] to inspect my bag. One could of course expect anything from La Petite of the past." Zavarzin soon realized that she had become a professional intelligence agent. But whose?

"You have no doubt taken measures to keep me under surveillance," she plunged in. "That's important, because at one after midnight tonight I am to meet at the Variété a man I don't know. I'm to be introduced to him by a woman who is appearing in the show as a famous sharpshooter. The man is in touch with the Austrian general staff, and it will be important for you to keep him under close watch. He is one of the top Austrian agents here. Then tomorrow I am going to Petersburg to see Okhrana chief Bieletzky, who will probably take me to the imperial general staff. It may be that on the road to Petersburg I shall be met by persons in whom you may be interested, so you will probably want to have me covered all the way through."

Having disposed of this urgent matter on her mind, the attractive visitor proposed dinner. She was tired and hungry; the wartime trip from Vienna to Odessa was by no means without hardships. After the meal she was ready to talk about her past. But first she wanted to thank Zavarzin as the great benefactor who had played an important role in her life. Instead of putting her mother and her in prison

he had given them good advice and sent them to safety. Her mother, La Petite said, had been a weak woman; for a little love she had become a slave to Mishas. His every word came to be an order for both mother and child. La Petite delivered dynamite and bombs for the Rotte woman and other terrorists. It was Mishas' plan to blow up the Warsaw Okhrana office and kill Zavarzin. As a child she had been fascinated by the plan, and Mishas became a hero in her eyes. Three years after leaving Warsaw, when she read in the newspapers about the apprehension of the Warsaw terrorists, including Mishas, and their trial and execution, she realized how criminal her activities had been.

Zavarzin probably did not swallow whole the story of her remorse, for he changed the conversation with a question about the color of her hair. As a child it was light blond, now nearly jet black. How come? She said she dyed it in order to look older. Then she went back to what had happened since she last saw him at thirteen.

Tale of Two Services

Upon arrival in Lvov her mother sent her to a convent for schooling and to learn dressmaking. It was a harsh life, with constant work or kneeling in prayer and frequent cruel punishment as she grew rebellious. More often than not she was hungry, and after her mother's death she had no affection from anyone. One day the mother superior found her crying in the cold chapel, took pity on her, and promised thereafter to be a mother to her. Life remained hard, but under the old abbess' protection Seraphine, as she was named in the convent, became an obedient pupil.

After six years of convent life she was employed in the household of a wealthy Galician merchant. A romance soon developed with the merchant's nephew and they were married. He was a panslavist employed by the Russian services, and thus both newly-weds were soon working for the Russians in Austrian Galicia.

When the war broke out the Austrians drafted her husband, and soon thereafter he was taken prisoner by the Russians. La Petite, after giving birth to a child, made up her mind to get to Russia at all costs. She thought of the possibility of being taken into the Austrian espionage service and sent there. Leaving the baby with her mother-in-law, she set up as a dressmaker catering to various families of army officers. In time she found an officer of the general staff who was interested in more than her dressmaking.

Her frequent night meetings with this man gave her a chance to let him see her, incidentally, as an Austrian patriot who knew Warsaw extremely well, spoke Russian perfectly, and was intelligent and resourceful. She did not need to prompt him to the proposal that she would do well in Austrian intelligence. With all the modesty Seraphine had learned in the convent, she replied that she had no experience to fit her for such work, but he insisted that she should at least give it a try. After a few days of thinking it over, she decided that there would be nothing wrong in tentative acceptance.

They tried all sorts of tests on her. Questions were shot at her in the least expected forms. She would be left alone in an office with documents marked secret scattered on the desks and watched through a peephole to see whether she showed undue interest in the papers. She was followed on city streets to determine whether she had assimilated the psychological training they had given her in operational conduct and patriotism. After two months' training the Austrians set up an interview with a German officer. He interrogated her in German and Russian and found her Russian more fluent than her German. When he learned that the convent had given her considerable training in caring for the sick, he named her on the spot chief nurse in a hospital for seriously wounded Russian prisoners. It was he who insisted that she dye her hair black so as to look old enough to be a chief nurse. Her job was to attend the wounded and report anything they might say, perhaps in delirium, of interest to the German forces.

After three months of this service, she was summoned before a captain and told she had been assigned an important mission on which much would be expected of her.

"From now on your name shall be Anna Yakovlevna Lyubova, with Tyumen in Siberia as your place of origin. Here is your passport. It is a genuine document: the real Lyubova is here in Austria. She is married and has no desire to return to Russia. You will take her place among a large group of Russians who are being repatriated in exchange for Austrians from Russia. In this assignment you will have to exercise much prudence, and if there are difficulties you will have to be guided by your patriotism. We all put our country first . . ."

The entire operational program, with many alternative courses of action, was outlined for "Lyubova." She was to contact Austrian agents and deliver them instructions all along the way, as far as

Vladivostok. From there she was to go on to Harbin and then proceed to Shanghai, where she should report to the German consulate.

L'Autrichienne

From Odessa Zavarzin promptly wired to Petersburg headquarters the whole long story. Surveilling La Petite and her German contacts the same night, Budakov found that the introduction and meeting took place as she had told. The sharpshooter woman and the German man, named Gross, were both exiled to Siberia for the duration; there was not enough proof to hang them.

La Petite revealed also that the German dreadnoughts "Goeben" and "Breslau" were heading for the Black Sea to bombard Russian ports. This information was confirmed within a few days. Although Zavarzin had reported the intelligence promptly, the defense command was in no position to take counter action, and the attack caused havoc in several harbors.

"Lyubova" was carefully watched on her way to Petersburg, where she went directly to the Okhrana chief as scheduled. He had her case transferred to military intelligence, and there was no trace in Okhrana files of her subsequent whereabouts and activities. Years after his exile, Zavarzin speculated that a dashing young lady of her description who lived in Monte Carlo and was known as "l'Autrichienne," speaking perfect Russian and Polish, of angelic beauty, and wildly spending her Brazilian husband's wealth, could be La Petite.

Volunteers for intelligence—the fringe and farther-out.

CRANKS, NUTS, AND SCREWBALLS

David R. McLean

"I have always had adequate sex that no one appreciated. I need a better grade of iron to eat, and so do the astronauts." (Excerpt from a July 1964 letter to the Director of Central Intelligence.)

"A defenseless woman having husband trouble sincerely requests your help." (June 1964 letter to the DCI, enclosing picture of a convertible and address of a suburban motel.)

"O.K.! Keep me off the payroll. I'll try and sell my abilities to the Soviet Union." (1965 postcard peevishly addressed to the U.S. Lower Intelligence Agency.)

"Please be informed, old pal, I have entered my name with the 87th Congress as a candidate for the Presidency of the United States in the next elections. If I make it, I am going to reinstate you in CIA." (1962 letter to Allen W. Dulles.)

"You can tell John A. McCone to go to hell if you think I'm going to be treated this way after all I've done for you people." (Early morning telephone call from "Agent 44" on his release from the drunk cell of a Washington police precinct.)

"ORNISCOPYTHEOBI BLIOPSYCHOCRYSI ARROSCIOAEROGEN ETHLIOMETEOR OAU STRAHIEROANTHRO VICHTHYOPYROSI DEROCH PNOMYOALE . . ." (Excerpt from a 1963 telegram to CIA.)

Something about a secret intelligence agency attracts an endless stream of letters, cards, telegrams, phone calls, and personal visits from deranged, possibly dangerous, or merely daffy citizens who want to horn in on the cloak-and-dagger act. Mixed into the CIA morning mail, these unsolicited testimonials to the Agency's drawing power create some delicate screening problems, waste a lot of time, and justify elaborate security precautions to protect its top officials.

The Agency's Office of Security keeps a watch list of nearly four thousand persons or organizations who have tried to visit, write, or phone its officials and who have been, at a minimum, a source of annoyance. Every suspected crank contact is checked against this list. The signatures include "The Green Russian" in Charlotte, N.C., and "Your Aunt Minnie" in San Francisco. Nearly all crank letters are domestic, but alongside addresses in Pewee Valley, Ky., and Big Bear City, Cal., are foreign listings from Quito to Warsaw and from Edinburgh to Australia.

Steadies and One-Timers

The flow of oddball letters and phone calls increases perceptibly when CIA is in the news. Less than 48 hours after President Johnson announced he would nominate Admiral Raborn to be the DCI, a Detroit man had sent the Director-designate 8,000 words of complaint about the high cost of prescription medicines and a New Yorker had asked his help in controlling a whistling brain. The file of letters to him was mounting even before his appointment had been confirmed. On 17 April a Massachusetts man sent him some well-intentioned advice. "Dear Admiral," he wrote, "as you may be aware, L.B.J. ain't got much Brains or he wouldn't be President. I dealt with his type for 37 years. The best way to get along with him is humor him."

But a faithful nucleus of loyal intelligence fans always contributes about 25 percent of the total. Probably most of the cranks are as harmless as the childish codes they sometimes use. The trouble is, they're unpredictable. A few might have complaints worth hearing; others might pose a real threat to an unsuspecting officer who received them.

Nut-and-dolt visits to headquarters offices have practically disappeared since CIA moved out to Langley; an occasional walk-in still calls at its personnel office downtown. Its overt or semi-overt domestic offices, which are more approachable, have now compiled an impressive record of coping with off-beat visitors.

Clairvoyance and Contrivances

A fairly common complaint of the walk-ins is getting messages from the Communists by thought-transference or through the fillings in their teeth. One disturbed gentleman from Buffalo claimed the Communists had kidnapped him, cut open his head, removed his brains, and substituted a radio. After warning his interviewer to say nothing the opposition should not hear, he asked CIA to remove the radio and replace the brains. For sheer imagination in fielding such a complaint, the prize probably goes to the CIA man who assured a woman she might indeed be getting radio messages by static electricity. Reminding her of the chains that drag under gasoline trucks, he linked a series of paper clips, hooked one end in her skirt, let the other end trail on the floor, and sent her happily on her way with the static safely grounded.

Then there was the man who came in to volunteer as a spy in the Czechoslovakian uranium mines. He confided that he had been stalling because he feared the radiation might make him sterile. Now, however, he had solved this problem: he planned to carry along a carton of Chesterfields and wrap the tinfoil around his private parts. The Agency secretary who transcribed a memorandum on his visit never could understand why he insisted on Chesterfields.

Some fairly far-out ideas have been seriously proposed by sensible citizens. One responsible businessman developed a mechanical chess-playing machine which countered any move according to prepunched IBM cards. He proposed to take his machine to Moscow, consolidate his position there, and then suggest that the machine could be used as a training aid for any move-and-countermove situation, such as military tactics. Instead of chessmen he would use symbols for tanks, infantry, hills, forests, planes, and fields of fire. Since he knew nothing about military tactics, the Soviet general staff would have to tell him the prescribed response to every move. As soon as he had all the responses punched on IBM cards he would deliver duplicates to the American Embassy. Then if we ever faced the USSR in battle we could always run the IBM cards and tell what the Soviets would do next.

The most intriguing case investigated by a domestic office involved a school superintendent of unassailable reliability who dabbled in hypnotism as a hobby and reported that he could induce clairvoyance in his subject, an engineering student. In 1957, while in a hypnotic trance, the subject described in minute technical detail a Soviet ballistic missile of a type unknown in the United States but consistent with expert private assessments of Soviet capabilities. The research chief of a respected American aircraft plant was present at the demonstration, framed many questions, and made a tape recording of the answers. The subject used technical and scientific terminology

which neither he nor the hypnotist could be expected to know. Washington experts who studied the tape found "just enough substantive data to stimulate the imagination" but decided that clairvoyance would be "a very risky approach to the collection of Soviet guided missile data." The mystery remains unsolved.

Other Field Office Walk-ins

Some unlikely sources have produced usable information. In 1959 a soldier of fortune fresh from Cuba wearing yellow canvas shoes, red denim slacks, and a gaudy sport shirt contacted a domestic office. His debriefing was worth while but abbreviated by his arrest for having a bag of dynamite in his hotel room. In October 1964 a Miami man brought to CIA a box which he had bought sight-unseen at an auction of shipments abandoned in U.S. customs. The box contained more than 2,000 negatives of Cuban propaganda. And on 8 July 1960 an admitted swindler and diamond smuggler volunteered the information that five Soviet missile experts had just travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico. This report was taken with a grain of salt at the time.

One probable James Bond fan seems obsessed with finding unusual ways of eliminating the opposition. Besides the usual poisons and trick guns, he has suggested a lethally exploding cigar disguised with a band reading "It's a boy!" He has also offered to dispose of bodies for us in his home meat grinder. An attractive divorcee leads a sober life in this country as an airline secretary but regularly flies to another country and cuts loose there among the political leaders. For all her Mata Hari complex she has brought useful information.

Ever since 1948 a Slovak economist has been trying to peddle information he claims to obtain through a private underground net. He is presentable and persuasive and has impressed countless high officials, including a senator who brought him to lunch with the upper echelons of CIA. Fortunately these official contacts quickly lead back to a burn notice identifying him as a fabricator. As late as 1963, however, he was still trying with some success to interest leading American industries in technical data from anti-Communist researchers behind the iron curtain. Having abandoned the atomic cannon he offered the government, he was tempting industry with everything from synthetic fibers to jet engine designs, high-temperature ceramics, and flexible concrete. Meanwhile he had hired a lawyer and sued a Washington shoe store for $25,000 because his shoes were too tight; in the brief he filed with the court he claimed that as a spy he needed to run fast.

Letters to Langley

By far the greatest number of crank contacts are by mail. In the first eight months of Fiscal Year 1965, 1,143 letters addressed simply to CIA were identified as from cranks. This does not count those addressed otherwise—to the DCI by name or to specific field offices.

Neither does it include some unsolicited letters which may be helpful, pathetic, or merely misguided but are not from cranks. The following examples are all from March 1965: An ex-Marine sent a possibly practical suggestion for guerrilla warfare. A 17-year-old Thai girl asked how to get training in police investigation. A German student asked for help in locating his father, who had been captured by the Soviets in World War II. A 14-year-old boy asked if there were really such organizations as SMERSH and U.N.C.L.E. All such writers receive courteous replies.

But in the same month there arrived elaborate greetings to the DCI from a Maryland woman who thinks she is Catherine III, Empress of all the Russias, and who had previously sent a 5,000-word report on how she insured the successful invasion of Europe by entertaining Hitler privately for 12 hours on D-Day. Also in March 1965 came the advice that "now is the time—at last—to train 100 of the top CIA men to penetrate every possible beauty parlor and Chinese restaurant . . . the results will amaze and constantly astound your organization." On 13 March a New York correspondent informed us that Rudolph Hess, from his cell in Spandau, was controlling ten leading Southern segregationists by long-distance hypnotism. And on 25 March a woman wrote to the Director from Massachusetts: "As near as I can make out there normally is a grey cloud at the base of the psyche. When the cloud backs up you go out of focus. But after taking Alka Seltzer and sodium bicarbonate I can sing Hokus Pokus you're in focus."

A 1964 letter was addressed to "Snuffy McDuffy, Top Floor, Closed Door, CIA, Washington, D.C." Perceptive mail clerks sent it to the Director's office, where it was found to contain a fairly reasonable suggestion for propaganda. The letter ended: "P.S. If you don't take appropriate action I'll write to the President and tell him you're chicken."

Screwballs
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The Fox

Probably the most imaginative and persistent correspondent is a gaunt long-faced man with sunken eyes and prominent ears who first wrote to CIA on 27 January 1952 asking for a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights and terrain maps of Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea. Since then he has sent thousands of letters, postcards, and telegrams and used more than 50 aliases ranging from "Alexis Alexandrovich" to "Old Woody, The Fox." Usually he signs his true name followed by "U.S. Code 143," CIA's government tie-line code. Here we shall call him Old Woody.

Even though his handwriting and literary style are well known around the DCI's office, age cannot wither nor custom stale Old Woody's infinite variety. One letter told the Director: "I have allotted you a maximum life span of 94 years, not to exceed the year 1987." Another complained that "someone has wired my head for sight and sound." A third urged the Director to "tell Hoffa to require seat belts in all trucks." A fourth began: "Allen, I regret to inform you Kennedy won the election fair and square." Then came a telegram (collect) from Florida: "REQUEST FEDERAL TROOPS, MARTIAL LAW. MIAMI SITUATION OUT OF CONTROL."

Old Woody travels widely, usually first class. He has written from Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nassau, Honolulu, and Hong Kong, as well as from most major cities in the United States. On domestic airlines and in American hotels he has often registered as "A.W. Dulles, Jr." and mailed cancelled tickets and receipted bills to CIA. He likes luxury hotels; his suite at a Washington hotel in 1960 was billed at $52 a day. On many of his trips he listed CIA's street address as his residence and the DCI as his next-of-kin, often reinforcing the latter claim by taking out $62,500 in flight insurance with the Director as beneficiary.

In October 1964 Old Woody was arrested for vagrancy in Richmond. Allowed only one phone call, he used it to notify CIA of his plight. A couple of weeks later he phoned to report his new motorcycle license, and still later he wrote that he was working on a boat in Miami. Back in the money early in 1965, he wrote from Bermuda that he had been appointed King of the British Empire.

The risk of arrest does not dampen Old Woody's enthusiasm for the service. In August 1960 he made a telephone appointment with the commanding officer of an Air Force base in Nevada, conducted a "CIA security inspection," used the base commander's telephone to call CIA headquarters in Washington, and on departure warned the commander that some officers were out of uniform at Harold's Club. After sending MP's on a wild goose chase to the gambling club, the base commander somewhat grumpily reported the incident in an official letter to CIA. A few months later Old Woody was not so lucky. In Ponce, Puerto Rico, he represented himself as an FBI agent, borrowed a jeep from the National Guard, and drove it across the island to San Juan, where he was arrested. "Dear Allen," he wrote from jail, "I am in trouble again." A few days later he grew petulant. "You are wasting your time and the Armed Forces' time," he wrote, "I do not intend a reconciliation."

Generous to a fault, Old Woody rented a Cadillac limousine and chauffeur at $100 a day just before Christmas 1960 and drove to the Soviet embassy, where he left $100 for Francis Gary Powers. Then he drove to the Cuban embassy with $100 for prisoners on the Isle of Pines, and then to the American Red Cross, where he contributed $70 to help unmarried mothers. Finally he came to CIA headquarters and handed the receptionist an envelope addressed to Mr. Dulles containing $50 as a Christmas present. These activities landed him in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, from which he escaped a few days later after getting back the $50 from CIA. But he was pleased with the episode; nearly two years later he wrote Mr. Dulles that "some day I'll give you another $50 bill as a token of my affection."

In November 1961 he wrote from El Paso: "When the new Director takes over, I guess I'll wash my hands of CIA." But Old Woody didn't, and the flow of letters continues. In December 1961 he put down CIA as his home address when he opened a bank account in Wilmington, Delaware. In October 1962 he telegraphed from Chicago: "FIDEL CASTRO MINUS HIS BEARD ARRIVED CHICAGO THIS P.M. HAVE DETAIL COVERING HIM." In September 1963 a Washington-Miami airliner turned back and off-loaded him; he had alarmed fellow-passengers by claiming to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro and trying to communicate with CIA by radio.

Is Old Woody just a harmless screwball? In 1960 he wrote: "Allen, I am going to start carrying a regulation FBI revolver and if someone forces me into a situation I intend on using it." In 1961 he warned Mr. Dulles: "The bomb attached to my radio in Room 313 has not availed you anything so far." Who knows what Old Woody will interpret as "a situation"? At a minimum, he has cost the Govern-

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ment a great many dollars in wasted time, filing space, analyses, and precautions. As he himself put it in a 1960 letter from West Palm Beach: "Allen, you should deduct me from your income tax."

Fish and a Record

Some crank correspondents are remarkably well educated and successful in business or the arts. Take the 50-year-old daughter of a high-ranking Army officer who now owns a prosperous small-town shop. Educated in Europe and widely travelled, she served abroad with the Red Cross in World War II and has written many successful books—including one which was made into a major motion picture. She writes beautifully and, at first glance, convincingly.

It was the fish that gave her away. Her early letters just asked for information about an inner circle of Government officials who used a drawing of a fish as the symbol of "a confidentially shared community of patriotic attitude." Then she started sending CIA officials postcards with crude drawings of fish. Later she adopted the fish as a signature to her own letters.

In 1962 the fish-woman asked the vice president of a Washington bank to help finance a small private counterespionage organization working to expose "the mammoth traitorous operation at present flourishing within our Government." Meanwhile she wrote threatening anonymous letters, mailed them to herself, and then forwarded them to CIA to prove the existence of a conspiracy. Ignored for years, she continues writing long and quite articulate letters. The most recent one, mailed in March 1965, contains roughly 11,000 words.

One might think that if no one answered their letters the crank correspondents would eventually get discouraged and quit writing. This is not always true. CIA's most faithful correspondent has been plugging a single theme steadily since 1951, when he decided a "CIA agent" had welshed on a job offer. Almost every day he mails a postcard with the same message: "Take Action on CIA Agent Joe Blank!" He has been arrested and released on his promise to stop writing; within a few days the postcards arrive again. He has written from Miami, Las Vegas, San Francisco, Phoenix, Denver, Rochester, Colorado Springs, and Hampton, Va.—hitting his peak in 1962 with a total of 332 postcards to CIA. He has also carried his complaint to the Secretary of Defense, but a special assistant at the Pentagon politely suggested in reply that he deal directly with CIA.

Violence

Are such cranks actually dangerous? Read on.

On 13 March 1963 a "consulting nuclear engineer" called at CIA's downtown personnel office and tried to see the DCI. File checks showed that four years earlier he had sent the Director a letter marked "DEATH" and signed "Lord God, God of Israel." On 28 October 1958 he had hired a taxi in Richmond, picked up two hitchhikers and a 9-year-old boy, and tried to invade the Quantico Marine Corps School brandishing the boy's toy pistols.

The night of 21 February 1962 a man who thought he was a CIA agent telephoned four times trying to report to the Director. On 11 November 1962 the same man was arrested in Rapid City, S.D., after terrorizing residential areas of that city, firing dozens of shots through windows, and wounding one resident. When arrested he was carrying a high-powered rifle, a .22-caliber rifle, and a large quantity of ammunition.

One crank has been bombarding more than 50 top Government officials with details of alleged Communist electronic thought-control by "a coherent light process of inducing a state of controlled hypnosis by radiation of radio frequency energy on a wavelength of approximately 4 x 10^{-5} centimeters." The writer is officially diagnosed as a paranoiac schizophrenic, potentially dangerous.

On 12 December 1964 a 53-year-old Florida real estate salesman mailed the DCI a crude threat note ending "Your card is the ACE OF SPADES." This man had tried to see the Director in the past—once to discuss a proposed trip to Russia, again to report his invention of the hardest metal in the world. He is diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic paranoiac with "delusions of grandeur, seclusiveness, and hostility" who should be kept in a "structured and supervised setting." He was arrested three times in 1964, once for carrying a concealed weapon. Earlier he had been arrested for armed robbery and in 1960 in Arlington, Va., for attempted murder.

In 1962, with the arrival of a new DCI, CIA informally reviewed protective measures with Secret Service and Metropolitan Police Department officers. It was reaffirmed that, while the threat of an attack on top Agency officials was unpredictable and might never

Dec 12, 1964

To McCone

Were you ever a marine?

You lied ~~my~~ MY country of

Forty Four Million Dollars -

In War Time.

YOU ARE A TRAITOR.

Remember the ~~a~~ Famous words -

I am a Berliner.

WHAT ARE YOU ???

The Marine Corps Builds Men - Body - Mind - Spirit

My name is Joe - not Oswald.

Your card is the ACE of SPADES.

materialize, it was nevertheless real enough to require professional protection. Events since then have underlined this view, although there has been no (knock on wood) actual injury. Probably the closest call was when a woman wrestler traced one top official to the home of relatives and lunged at him with a bouquet of roses which was afterwards found to hide a jagged broken beer bottle.

In any intelligence agency it is important to keep track of crank contacts, not only to improve protection but also to assure continuity of control and analysis. Centralization of records in CIA's Office of Security permits quick identification of phonies and time-wasters. Professional security officers know how to handle the off-beat approach, and others would do well to rely on the professionals when they receive an irrational letter or find themselves face to face with an apparently unbalanced stranger.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

More Words for Defector

Dear Sirs:

In response to Gordon Cooperwood's appeal for a more palatable word to replace "defector," [1] I would like to suggest the terms *migrant* or *convert.*

William J. Brantley

. . . *Volunteer* might do, though there should be some better word.

Louis Thomas

. . . In discussing this problem together we hit upon the contraction *freelector.*

Gerald Van Doren

[1] *Studies* IX 1, p. 61.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

Festung Europa in Two Great Wars

BLOOD ON THE MIDNIGHT SUN. By *Hans Christian Adamson* and *Per Klem.* (New York: W. W. Norton. 1964. 282 pp. $4.95.)

MUSKETOON: COMMANDO RAID, GLOMFJORD, 1942. By *Stephen Schofield.* (London: Jonathan Cape. 1964. 156 pp. 18/—.)

Two books on intelligence operations in Norway during World War II take their place on the growing bookshelf of Allied intelligence activities in Europe.

Musketoon describes a September 1942 Commando raid on the power plant for an aluminum works at Glomfjord. Ten British and two Norwegian Commandos, put ashore by the French submarine *Junon,* blew up the power generators and the pipeline that carried water from the mountain lakes, effectively shutting down the aluminum plant for the rest of the war. Eight of the raiders were captured, taken first to Colditz prison, and then to the RSHA building on Albrechtstrasse in Berlin for interrogation. On October 23, under Hitler's order of the 18th to kill all Commandos, they were executed at Sachsenhausen.

The remarkable thing about the Musketoon raid, and what lay behind its success, was the excellent intelligence on which it was based. The attacking party had every detail required for a precise sabotage operation in an area teeming with German troops. Even three small slips didn't affect the outcome: a fishing boat spotted the submarine's periscope; an old lady at the window of her house by the fjord saw the Commandos land in their dinghy; and a German patrol discovered an empty Players cigarette package at a camp site they used. Schofield has done a fine job of research in reconstructing the raid and the fate of the eight captives.

Blood on the Midnight Sun consists of three stories of the Norwegian resistance. The first describes how the Norwegians were able to get the country's gold reserves of $55,000,000 out of Oslo, north across the country to Andalsnes, and then by ship to England and

across the Atlantic. The story of smuggling out 1,542 heavy boxes by road, rail, and sea, just one jump ahead of German troops and under air attack, outdoes Hollywood at its best.

The second episode concerns the heavy water plant at Vemork. Intelligence on the activities of this installation was reaching London almost as quickly as it reached Berlin, so when the Germans began to dismantle it on 31 January 1944 and were preparing to ship the stock of heavy water to Germany, word was passed that the shipment be stopped at all costs. The Norwegians had intelligence indicating that it was to go by train from Vemork to Mael on Lake Tinn, by train-ferry across the Lake, and thence to Skien for shipping out. They determined to sink the train-ferry, the *Hydro,* at the deepest part of Lake Tinn, in about 1,200 feet of water, despite any cost in lives among the Norwegian crew and passengers. The ship was sunk as planned, carrying 53 of the 57 heavy water tanks out of German reach.

The third part, entitled "Friends and Foes in the Underground," deals with an "Export Group" which established rat lines for escape. Among its accomplishments was assisting about half of Norway's 1,500 Jews to sanctuary in Sweden. This is a detailed report on its work in the Trondheim area, its penetration by Quisling agents and the Gestapo, and the constant undercover war for survival.

Adamson and Klem have produced a book that is both readable and historically quite accurate. They were a bit carried away by their determination to clear Norway's name of the "Quisling" stigma—no one has ever doubted the valor of the Norwegian home forces—but their contribution to intelligence literature is a valuable one.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

SPIONE IN HAMBURG UND AUF HELGOLAND. By *Frank Lynder.* (Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe. 1964. 120 pp. DM 9.80.)

In the fall of 1807 the British Navy, in connection with the attack it launched on thitherto neutral Denmark when Napoleon's designs on the Danish fleet became known, occupied the then Danish island of Helgoland which commands the approaches to the Elbe and Weser estuaries. This small rock mountain-top in the North Sea rapidly became the chief illegal port of entry into Napoleon's Festung Europa. Big-time smugglers crowded onto the island and loaded it with thousands of tons of contraband. The few hundred Helgolanders, fishermen and pilots, grew rich sneaking their boats in to the mainland and handling cargo. And less conspicuously, British intelligence established regular courier channels which brought out information and personnel from all over the continent and took back agents, propaganda pamphlets, and funds for dissident movements.

A good deal of the smuggling and some of the intelligence story has been told before, in connection with individual episodes—how the Scotch priest Father James G. Robertson, under commission of the Duke-to-be of Wellington, was infiltrated to arrange the defection from Napoleon of the elite Spanish troops under the Marquis de Romana and their evacuation from the mainland, how the British encouraged and financed too-little-and-too-early uprisings that ended tragically, like those of Schill and Dornberg (in which latter, two of the participants, Witzleben and Trott zu Solz, had descendants that repeated history 135 years later), how the Duke of Braunschweig-Oels fought all the way across Germany from Bohemia to evacuate his men through Helgoland, how the deposed and mentally unsound Gustav Adolf IV of Sweden had a sojourn on the island.

But now Herr Lynder makes public here for the first time the pertinent documents from the full correspondence between the so-to-speak Chief of Station Helgoland, Edward Nicholas, and the Foreign Minister in London, first George Canning and then Lord Henry Bathurst. These Foreign Office papers, supplemented by some from the War Ministry and Admiralty and material from German archives and contemporary newspapers, add much realistic detail about previously known events and describe new facets of the intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The image of the self-sacrificing Scotch priest Robertson, for example, is somewhat smudged by two post facto letters from him in the Foreign Office files. He had been paid about a thousand pounds for his mission, but after getting back to London he wrote stressing the dangers he had been through and asking for a job. He listed his preferences and then requested financial support in the meantime, adding the Latin proverb, "He gives doubly who gives fast." Then a month later he tried again: "I've been much urged to publish something about my mission, but I refuse; this is another financial hardship!" [1] Canning noted on the margin, "He has been amply rewarded."

[1] English reconstructed, here and elsewhere, from Lynder's translation into German.

When Bathurst took over the Foreign Office from Canning he asked Nicholas just how his communications into the continent worked. Nicholas answered (28 March 1810):

> My packet of letters goes from here in a boat to the island Nework in the mouth of the Elbe. At low tide you can wade ashore there and immediately hide the packet underground. It stays there until someone comes and replaces it with a bundle of dispatches from the continent. This person takes the Helgoland packet and passes it to a second agent, who carries it to Hamburg via little-used roads. As soon as it reaches there I count the greatest danger past. In Hamburg a contact man distributes the letters among our various "personal friends," who in turn carry them securely on to their recipients in different countries of the continent. Although from Nework to the distribution in Hamburg all of ten persons are working for me and so are witting, I can still say that in these two years past no single pouch of dispatches has been lost . . .

Lynder tells the whole story chronologically, from the mid-Memel meeting of Napoleon and Alexander I on 25 June 1807, where British secret agent Colin Mackenzie—who later acted as case officer for Father Robertson—somehow learned that Napoleon intended to seize the Danish fleet, to the devastating letdown for the Helgolanders when Napoleon's defeat in 1813 put an end to their high living. Although something like half his slim text is quotation from documents, these are selected and interwoven so skillfully, and loose ends so carefully researched and tied up, that they bring Station Helgoland and its operations vividly to life.

Anthony Quibble

Fair Exchange in the Cold War

STRANGERS ON A BRIDGE. By *James B. Donovan.* (New York: Atheneum. 1964. 432 pp. $6.95. In paperback: Popular Library. 1965. $.95.)

In reading *Strangers on a Bridge* my thoughts go back to the drama which was played out in U.S. government offices preceding and during the exchange of Rudolf Abel for Francis Powers. All of this that went on behind the scenes of Jim Donovan's own drama unknown to him held a particular excitement for the participants.

Donovan did know more than he put into the book. But he was prudent enough to draw the line between what is of interest to the public and what is in the public interest, and he had help in drawing it. About six months after he had accomplished the exchange he mentioned to me, too casually I thought, that he was having trouble finding time to write his book. Guardedly, I asked the question he wanted me to ask, "What book?" He said he had been wanting to write about some of his experiences; he thought the Abel case—he had been Abel's defense counsel, you recall—would be of particular interest. He then concluded, much too casually now, that he probably would end the book by "just mentioning the exchange." He didn't want an answer right then, but he was fishing for some kind of carte blanche approval. Later it was agreed that he should submit galley proofs for review. There wasn't much that needed security revision after all, and the story of the exchange made the book a best seller.

Strangers on a Bridge is a well-knit book. The eventual exchange comes as no surprise; Donovan carefully weaves in the possibility of one from the beginning and thus supplies the chief element of real suspense. But this is not just a device to make a good story. With Donovan's experience in OSS and a natural bent toward deviousness, I am sure he expected that his client would neither be executed nor rot in an American jail. He was in fact troubled by the problem of how, if he won the case, the freed Abel could be used to the benefit of the United States.

Donovan is a careful legal craftsman, and he also knows the ingredients of a good story. (He points out his early desire to be a newspaperman, and he often proudly reminisces about his newspaper experience before he entered Harvard Law School.) He made espionage the dominant theme of the book, and as a result the legal intricacies of the search-and-seizure constitutional issue are bound

into the spy story as an absorbing sub-plot. The picture of Colonel Abel that arises from Donovan's faithfully reported conversations with him is one of a dedicated, intelligent Soviet agent with a rare ability to adjust patiently to circumstance, a much realer person than the usual fictional spy.

The first three-quarters of the book tells the story of Abel's espionage activity in the United States, as Donovan pieced it together after he was asked by the Brooklyn Bar Association to defend the Russian, and follows the legal case through to the final Supreme Court decision upholding his conviction. Donovan's version makes the Court's decision seem even closer than the 5-4 split on it would indicate. But even before the case was concluded, letters from "Mrs. Abel" to Donovan raised the possibility of an exchange, and Donovan's plea to the trial court included the argument that a death sentence should not be imposed because it could be useful to have a live Soviet spy in U.S. custody.

That possibility was kept alive after the Supreme Court decision, and it became more real in May of 1960 when Francis Powers' U-2 was shot down. This was when that intense behind-the-scenes activity in CIA and other government offices began.

Fundamentally, the objective was to free an American citizen who had been captured while carrying out his assigned duties. But it wasn't that simple. For a while there was not even any indication that he was alive, and then it was not known what he had told his captors. And an answer was needed to the important operational question of what caused the U-2 to go down. For months we could only ask ourselves how long the Russians would go on making propaganda hay with their prize captive and what they would do with him then.

A legal position was devised under which Powers, being an agent of the United States, was not responsible as an individual for his acts. We knew the USSR would not accept a legalism to its own disadvantage, but we needed some kind of base from which to work. Through the Powers family and through Frank Rogers, Alex Parker, and William Dickson—American lawyers who sacrificed time and effort (and at times it seemed their reputations)—we laid the groundwork for the only defense suitable for shifting the Soviet case from Powers to the U.S. government itself. We thought that, while this defense of Powers as an employee of the government, along with the claim that the USSR could not exercise criminal jurisdiction beyond certain upward limits, would not be entertained by the Soviet government, it still could provide a basis for later negotiation.

When the gigantic Soviet propaganda drive had been climaxed by Powers' trial, the decision to sentence him to prison for a term of years suggested that he might be ransomed for the right price. We knew that historically the USSR had shown keen interest in getting the prompt release of Soviet citizens held in foreign countries on espionage charges; but Abel they had not admitted to be a Soviet citizen. We turned to Donovan as a channel through which Moscow might be willing to work.

As Donovan writes, we waited until the trade winds shifted. His letters to Helen Abel were composed in CIA, and we often thought of the parallel procedures that must have been going on in Moscow. When we finally got Helen Abel's letter describing her "visits" to the Soviet embassy in Berlin, we knew the Russians were ready to negotiate a trade of Powers for Abel.

It then became necessary to negotiate within the U.S. government a position to present to the President concerning the release of Abel by pardon. The President would act here on the recommendation of the Attorney General, who in such a case as this would make his recommendation only after consultation with the Department of State. To start the process, General Cabell, then Acting Director of Central Intelligence, sent a letter to the Secretary of State recommending that the government initiate efforts to have Powers released. He cited Powers' employment by the government, his imprisonment as a result of his employment, and the fact that he had information which would be of use to the government. He pointed out that according to every indication Powers' conduct had been consistent with his instructions. The release of Abel, on the other hand, would in CIA's view not harm the interests of the United States; more could be gained from Powers' release than continuing to hold Abel. This position was in fact agreed upon and approved by the President, with the proviso that Abel was not to be released until it was determined that Powers actually had been.

A small task force was established in CIA to plan the execution of the hoped-for exchange, and Donovan willingly agreed to be the executor. A strict need-to-know regimen was imposed; we did not want our hands tipped by any leaks. Thousands of details had to be

faced, along with major decisions such as a location for the physical hand-over. And all of this without any facts from the USSR to go on. But we knew what we wanted and made some shrewd estimates on Soviet thinking. As Donovan excitingly shows, our plan worked; but I doubt if anyone except him could have carried it off so handsomely.

Donovan could not know what efforts the government had put into the project. The necessary planning and coordination alone among State, Defense, Justice, CIA, and the White House were truly staggering. From the perspective of this part of the accomplishment, *Strangers on a Bridge* becomes an even more impressive story of devotion to justice and the national interest.

M. C. Miskovsky

STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

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ice.

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

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Rudimentary methodology for studying the effects of military programs on the Soviet economy.

GUNS OR BUTTER PROBLEMS OF THE COLD WAR

George Ecklund

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

When a Roman commander in 50 B.C. took the men and materials to throw up a fortress wall or build a new catapult, no one balanced this against civilian use of the resources. Defense was paramount. But no organization man in Washington or Moscow today would think of ordering a strategic weapon system without inquiring, among other things, into its impact on the economy. In this nuclear age both weapons and organization have become so complex, even in peacetime, that men must now study carefully the economic result of every major armaments decision. The questions asked may range from the industrial implications, here and in the USSR, of *dis*armament proposals on the one hand to the effects for the Russian consumer if Moscow matches a Washington decision to install an expensive anti-missile system on the other. This article will explore the contribution of economic analysis in studying the impact of alternative military programs and will point out some of the intelligence problems involved in doing it on the USSR.

Economists recognize that in a global context the major considerations relative to disarmament or increased armament are not economic. Maintaining a counterpoise to the adversary in military strength and political initiatives will continue to be the overriding objective over the next decade. The economic problems will increase in importance only if the political and military problems come nearer to solution. But analysis of the economic impact of alternative defense budgets may help us understand the implications of military and political developments as they occur.

It is the cost of modern armaments and the stretch-out in development of new military hardware that make it necessary to consider the economic impact of defense. The world now spends about $135 billion annually on the war industry, roughly as much as the entire income of the poorer half of mankind. The United States spends a little more than a third of the total, the USSR about a third, and the

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rest of the world a little less than a third. There are many competing demands for the resources represented by this money, for example increases in personal consumption, more investment to accelerate economic growth, war on poverty, expansion of higher education, more aid to developing countries. Moreover, decisions on arms spending made today cannot easily be changed tomorrow by beating the swords into plowshares. The Pentagon's shopping list has few items in common with the housewife's, and military hardware ordered two or three years ahead cannot be converted to patios or cabin cruisers. That is why a new military order, usually expensive and highly specialized, will affect other claimants to the nation's output for several years to come.

What is needed for studying the economic impact of defense is a technique that will translate military spending into civilian spending and vice-versa, so as to forecast the effect on the structure and growth of all civilian sectors as the resources available to them are increased or decreased. One must take into account: (1) the quality as well as the quantity of resources left for the civilian economy (a GI mustered back to an Iowa farm will not contribute as much to technological progress as an engineer released from the Redstone arsenal to AT&T); (2) the regional impact of defense spending, particularly with respect to small cities where the phasing out of a weapons system may close an assembly plant, for example; (3) the speed of military-civilian conversions, which may aggravate the frictions developed in switching resources from production of household appliances, say, to marine turbines; (4) the differences in national abilities to adjust, recognizing that a taut and muscle-bound economy like the USSR's will not as readily absorb increased defense outlays as one with some unused resources and the tremendous flexibility of the American. Economists have not yet developed standard techniques with which to attack this many-faceted task, indeed have done very little pioneering work on it.

A Hypothetical Case: The Problems

Military planning today requires some notion of the possible size and structure of the enemy's forces ten years from now and of its economic capability to support them. Suppose one were speculating about the size of Soviet defense outlays through 1975, necessarily making assumptions about many things such as technological breakthroughs and the shifting winds of coexistence. With the USSR's current defense spending at about $45 billion, a plausible range of alternative budgets over the next decade might be from a low of $35 billion to a high of $75 billion (reflecting, perhaps, a great difference in the magnitude and sophistication of strategic forces). With this frame of reference established, the economic impact problems begin.

First, would the $40 billion difference between the high and the low, if Moscow chose the latter, buy $40 billion worth of Russian consumption, or foreign aid, or investment in economic growth? Not necessarily. It might yield more (or less) than $40 billion in additional consumption, less (or more) than $40 billion in new investment, or some indeterminate addition to foreign aid. One of the riddles that research on the Soviet economy has not yet solved and must devote more attention to is the "exchange rate" between military and other spending.

This problem illustrates a fundamental difference between the U.S. and Soviet economies. In the United States a dollar is a dollar whether spent on military R&D or new housing, and our price system reflects the spending of economic resources in a way that accords with our national and individual desires. Through the price system people vote for the goods they want, and investors plan their output in line with these price votes—a very efficient arrangement. But in the USSR a ruble is not a ruble, because prices are set by Moscow without reference to consumer votes. If more resources are needed for military R&D, the Soviet price system does not determine which sector of the civilian economy will give up these resources. The decision is part of the economic plan, and the resulting shift in resources may be quite inefficient. Thus it is difficult to determine whether a ruble taken from housing will buy a ruble of military R&D.

Second, would Soviet GNP grow at the same rate under the high and the low military budgets? That depends on the quantity and quality of men and materials left for the civilian sector and on how Moscow divides them between investment and consumption. The quantity problem by itself is easily interpreted—sum up all the men and the metal and the electronics gear ticketed for defense, and those resources are lost to the civilian economy. The quality problem is more difficult—the *kinds* of men and metal preempted by defense will affect the rate of technological development and hence the rate of growth in the civilian economy.

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A high defense budget that concentrated specialized resources on military research, development, production, and space activities would interfere seriously with the introduction of new techniques in civilian industry. For example, if a disproportionate share of high-grade scientists and engineers are shunted to defense for several years, progress in developing new chemical processes and automation may be greatly retarded. Economists would say that growth in "factor productivity"—the productivity of labor and capital, measured by the ratio of GNP to the input of the two combined—has slowed down because of pressing military needs.

A question quite apart from the character of the military bite on resources is how Moscow will use those that are left, whether to increase (or decrease) the rate of growth of GNP by raising (or lowering) investment. But adding a ruble to investment will subtract a ruble, more or less, from consumption.

A Quantitative Method

The concept of factor productivity is useful in expressing more specifically the impact on the Soviet economy of the $75 billion and $35 billion defense budgets. Historically, during the long period 1928-63, factor productivity in the USSR increased at a rate of 1.5% annually; but during 1950-58, when defense expenditures grew slowly, this rate was accelerated to a little more than 3.0%, and then during 1958-63, when defense expenditures were stepped up, it fell to about 1.0%. This is the empirical basis for the following hypothesis: high defense expenditures preempt critical resources such as R&D and cause a slowdown in the growth of factor productivity. In our hypothetical example the growth in factor productivity might be about 1.0% with the high defense budget and about 2.0% with the low.

The higher rate, of course, permits a faster growth of GNP. But several other factors enter into the projections of GNP under the two defense budgets:

(1) Moscow's decision whether to put primary emphasis in the civilian economy on investment or on personal consumption; if investment is planned to increase 10% annually, the capital stock (plant and equipment) will grow faster than if it increases only 7%, and the faster capital stock grows the faster GNP will grow;

(2) The annual growth in the labor force; this is related to the growth in adult population and is estimated at 1.7%;

(3) The relative shares of labor and capital in GNP; it is estimated that the return to labor in the form of wages and other payments amounts to about 75% of GNP, and the return to capital about 25%.

We are now ready to summarize in a table the possible impact of a high and a low defense budget on Soviet consumption and economic growth over a decade.

Table 1

HYPOTHETICAL ANNUAL INCREASES IN GNP AND COMPONENTS, USSR, 1965-75

	Average Annual Rate of Growth (%)	
	Priority on Economic Growth	Priority on Consumption
Case I—High Military Budget:		
GNP	5.0	4.0
Consumption	−1.0	3.5
New Fixed Investment	10.0	7.0
Military Expenditures	5.5	5.5
Case II—Low Military Budget:		
GNP	6.0	5.0
Consumption	3.5	5.0
New Fixed Investment	10.0	7.0
Military Expenditures	−2.5	−2.5

The general formula is:

GNP growth rate = (factor productivity growth rate) + (labor growth rate) × (labor's share of GNP) + (capital growth rate) × (capital's share of GNP)

Substituting figures for the high military budget and priority on economic growth:

GNP growth = 1.0% + (1.7%) (.75) + (10%) (.25)
= 1.0% + 1.275% + 2.5%
= 4.775%, rounded to 5.0%

When the GNP growth rates have been determined, aggregate GNP can be projected to 1975 for each of the four cases. Military expenditures and investment, as given, can then be subtracted from GNP to derive the only residual—consumption.

From this quantification of economic impact it can be seen that the high defense budget is not compatible with a premium on economic growth; it would result in an annual *decline* of 1.0% in personal consumption (about 2% in per capita terms), which would be anathema

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to the Soviet leaders and their constituents. If Moscow chose the high military budget for a decade, it would probably have to be content with a rather low rate (4%) of growth in GNP, and even then personal consumption would increase more slowly—3.5% annually in aggregate, or about 2.5% per capita—than it has during the past 10 years. If, on the other hand, Moscow considered the low military budget adequate through 1975, it could maintain a substantial growth in GNP (5%) and the large increase of 5% in personal consumption (about 4% per capita), or alternatively it could opt for a higher rate of growth in GNP (6%) and a more modest increase in consumption (3.5%).[1]

A puzzling question still remains. Would the high military budget put too much strain on the Soviet economy? The new leadership is already stretching resources to the limit in its grandiose plans for expanding agriculture, boosting consumer welfare, keeping abreast of the United States in space, and maintaining the image of a dynamic economy. If Moscow spent $75 billion annually for defense by 1975 it is certain that something else in the economy would have to give. Could the USSR really afford such a high level of military spending? This question economic analysis cannot answer; it can say how much must be sacrificed for a given level of defense, but not whether the sacrifice will be made. What a nation can be persuaded to give up for defense depends on a host of sociological factors, including the nature and seriousness of the threat, the charisma of the leadership, and the cohesiveness of the people. It is a problem for the combined talents of political scientists, sociologists, economists, and other kinds of experts.

The Disarmament Problem

Although disarmament talks have made no dramatic progress, it is wise to think of economic impact along with the disarmament itself. Some of the many forms that an agreement might take are general and complete disarmament, halting the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, a ban on research, development, and testing of new weapons, reduction in conventional forces, and annual percentage reduction in over-all defense spending. All of these programs would release men and resources to the civilian economy, but some would be more useful to a particular economy than others. For example, a country with a labor shortage might be attracted by the prospect of a reduction in conventional forces that would release manpower, whereas a technology-poor one might prefer a ban on new weapons development in order to free scientists and engineers for industrial research. It would be useful for disarmament negotiators to know which possible proposals would be most attractive to the USSR, or Communist China, because of economic impact.

The impact of disarmament might be likened to that of a shift in popularity from vacations at the beach to private swimming pools in the back yard. Demand for services at Ocean City would go down, whereas demand for cement, excavating equipment, and local labor would go up. There would be a similar shift of men and resources if the Pentagon were to slash its orders for aircraft and the Interior Department let contracts for large new dams. In a modern, developed economy there are dozens of industries that would be involved in the switch from planes to dams. While some industries push the finished planes off their assembly lines, others produce only the engines or the tires or the radar systems, and still others make only the metal or only the sulphuric acid that helps make the metal. Some sell primarily to other industries; some sell most of their output to final consumers. How will each of these interrelated industries be affected if military aircraft production is banned by a disarmament agreement? Would the subsequent shifts in resources affect economic growth and personal consumption? These are the key impact questions.

One way of getting at the answers is through input-output analysis, a technique for tracing the complex adjustments that occur throughout a nation's industrial machine as demand for final products is cut back or increased at one point or another. A large "flow table" is prepared, in which each major industry is listed once as a row and once as a column. The row shows how industry A sells its products to all the industries listed in the columns, and to final consumers in an extra column. The column shows how industry A buys from all the industries listed in the rows, and from the labor market in an extra row. The table thus shows, for example, the total sales of aluminum to the aircraft industry and as pots and pans to households.

[1] It is emphasized that these figures are purely hypothetical, serving only to illustrate the methodology.

Using the Table

Table 2 is a highly simplified example of the basic flow table in input-output analysis. A usable one would have at least 30 columns and rows; in practice it would be likely to have several hundred.

Table 2

HYPOTHETICAL INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE

millions of dollars

	Purchases by Steel	Purchases by Coal	Total Inter-Industry* Purchases	Purchases by Consumers	Total Output
Sales of Steel	20	20	40	25	65
Sales of Coal	30	10	40	10	50
Sales of Labor	10	15	25		25

It is apparent from the table that in producing $25 million of steel for use by final consumers the steel and coal industry used up $40 million of steel. In other words, it takes steel to make steel and coal, and it takes coal and steel to produce coal. If consumer demand for steel and coal should increase by $5 million each, the input-output technique will tell us how much additional steel, coal, and labor will be needed to satisfy both the increase in consumer purchases ($5 million each) and the additional inter-industry purchases ($? million). The procedure is approximately as follows: The flow table is used to derive a coefficient matrix, a table which shows the inputs of steel, coal, and labor required *per dollar* of steel and coal output. We now ask a computer to invert the coefficient matrix and multiply it by the column showing the increases in consumer demand. The resulting product is the total increase of steel, coal, and labor needed. If a flow table has 200 industries rather than 2, and if we define a calculation as either a multiplication or a division, inversion of the corresponding coefficient matrix requires about 2,500,000 calculations.

If the Pentagon were to cancel its contracts for the F-111, an economist with a set of input-output tables and a digital computer could estimate the resulting changes in every industry affected. There would be a decrease in demand for steel, which in turn would require less sulphuric acid, less iron, less limestone, and less coal. There would be a reduced demand for synthetic fibres and plastics from the chemical industry. The tire industry would demand less rubber and less nylon and rayon. Employment would be cut at General Dynamics and at some of its subcontractors and suppliers. These are only a few of the ramifications from such a single cut in production of military aircraft. The input-output tables are a tool for tracing the highly intricate chain reaction through the industrial structure and measuring the resulting demands, direct and indirect, on each of the industries.

Aircraft production is a comparatively trivial example. General and complete disarmament would have a substantial impact, releasing perhaps $40 billion in resources annually to both the Soviet and the U.S. economy. Input-output tables would show the kinds and amounts of material and the quantity of labor that would be freed for use in civilian industry. This information, together with regional economic data, would form the basis for planning the alternative uses. In the USSR the government would make *all* the decisions as to what resources go where and when. But in the United States planners in private industry would bid for the released materials and labor, basing their bids on their estimates of consumer demand; the government would step in only if a geographic region or an industry needed outside help to adjust to the new conditions.

Another use for the input-output tables would be to evaluate the impact of a large increase in military expenditures. They would show the additional effort required by each industry, would point to the kinds of civilian activities that might be cut back, and would help identify bottlenecks.

To construct an input-output table for the USSR would require a great deal more data than is presently available to Western economists, but fortunately the USSR has become interested enough in this technique to develop some large-scale tables of its own. Parts of the tables for the year 1959 were published in 1962. Russian books and journals have referred to nine national and nineteen regional input-output tables that have been constructed or are in preparation. Soviet writers use input-output data widely in their unclassified papers, implying that the tables are circulated in the USSR and that economists are free to use their statistics in detail. Moscow may in time release some of the more extensive tables for other years.

It is clear that Soviet input-output tables would be more useful to economic planners in Moscow than to intelligence analysts in Washington. The planners have to solve the problems, whereas analysts only identify them. Nevertheless, the wealth of information that emanates from an input-output table would help the analyst measure the strains in the Soviet economy caused by increased defense spending or evaluate the impact of resources released through disarmament.

Other Economic Impact Questions

The ready transferability of men and factories from the military to the civilian sector has received relatively little attention. In the event of general disarmament, what amounts and kinds of the material and human inputs to defense could be used in the civilian economy (1) immediately? (2) after modification or retraining? (3) not at all? A number of excellent studies of this problem have been made in the West,[2] but the few Soviet economists who have written on problems of disarmament substantially understate the difficulties that would likely be encountered in the USSR.[3] The costs of transfer would be less in the United States than in the USSR, because our market mechanism will more quickly and efficiently switch resources to products the consumers want. Conversion probably would cause more problems for the Soviet economy and require greater effort than is now recognized in Moscow, and some of our economic intelligence efforts should be directed to the specifics of the consequent dislocations and effects on the development of the economy.

Educational progress has been an important factor, though difficult to quantify, in the rapid economic growth of the USSR. With the increasing complexity of modern weapons, a greater share of the highly trained scientists and engineers in the USSR are now used in defense, and the implications of this for the future development and growth of civilian industry are uncertain. In order to refine his impact studies, the economist needs more information on educational achievement in the USSR, including projections a decade ahead, and a better understanding of the contribution that education makes to economic growth.

Economists often say that defense is a quite separate sector of the economy that drains resources away from other uses. Although prima facie true, this assertion may ignore a possible feedback from defense to the civilian economy. To what extent, if any, does technological know-how developed specifically for defense benefit the civilian economy? In the United States, military-space technology is often diffused into the civilian sector: e.g., the ½-thousandth-inch aluminum-coated plastic film developed for the ECHO satellite is now used as a reflective insulator for very low temperature vessels; superior printing rolls have been made from the polysulfide rubber developed for cast solid propellants; sintered aluminum oxide ceramic, developed for rocket nozzles, is now used in industry for special check valves and resistor cores. Little is known about interchange of technology in the Soviet economy between the military and civilian sectors; it is probably not as widespread as here. It is an important matter to the economist, however, because the extent to which military R&D filters into the civilian sector will affect his estimate of factor productivity and future growth of Soviet industry.

[2] Benoit and Boulding, *Disarmament and the Economy*, 1963. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *The Economic Effects of Disarmament*, 1963.

[3] I. S. Glagolev, *Vliyaniye razoruzheniya na ekonomiku* (The Economic Impact of Disarmament), 1964. I. S. Glagolev, ed., *Ekonomicheskiye problemy razoruzheniya* (Economic Problems of Disarmament), 1961.

The importance of anachronistic intelligence to supplement that on advanced weapon systems.

YESTERDAY'S WEAPONS TOMORROW

Dwayne Anderson

The great emphasis that U.S. intelligence publications place on advanced weapons, in accordance with their strategic significance, may leave the casual reader with the impression that the Soviet military machine is made up of ICBM and ABM forces backed by a ponderous but ineffective mishmash of traditional components armed with elderly weapons. His familiarity with Soviet military sites may include Tyuratam and Sary Shagan but probably little else. He knows the Soviets still have some tube artillery, bombs, and torpedoes but believes these will soon be in museums alongside crossbow exhibits.

Such impressions can result from rigid application of the reporting priority accorded developments involving missiles and from a general assumption that the importance of a weapon is in direct ratio to its complexity. Thus superficial indications that some missile may be propelled by solid fuels would make the intelligence front pages, while good evidence that the Soviets were reequipping ground forces with a new and better rifle would be lucky to get in at all.

Certainly Soviet silo digging must be carefully watched so that we can adjust our own strategic stance accordingly, and the Soviets' success or lack of success with antimissiles could have as great an impact on our defense budget as on theirs. But preoccupation with these unquestionably important matters may have become so great as to skew our appreciation of over-all Soviet capabilities. Factors operating to degrade the theoretical capabilities of modern weapons have been ignored, and important capabilities of older weapon systems have been overlooked or forgotten.

Weaknesses in Complication

The very complexity of advanced weapons is their major drawback. They depend on highly trained personnel for maintenance and operation. They must have back-up stocks of precisely manufactured and inspected parts. They are almost useless if countermeasures

interfere with the functioning of any of their many components. In many instances they can operate only under carefully controlled temperature and humidity conditions, and they must have exactly regulated power supplies available at all times.

Often the refire function of sophisticated systems is limited, complicated, and slow, rendering them vulnerable to saturation tactics. Equally often sensor capabilities lag far behind the capabilities of other elements and so lower the effectiveness of the entire system. These can also be adversely affected by physical phenomena: an auroral display can blank out a radar, and a school of fish can blind a sonar.

Elaborate check-out systems to check out the check-out equipment, all of which must function perfectly, have added to the bulkiness of many of the newer weapons. This may be of no great importance with ICBMs, but in mobile combat units it can be critical. A costly antiaircraft missile had to be abandoned recently when the system was found to be so bulky it could be carried only by ships of cruiser size.

Bombers have frequently been relegated to the strategic intelligence boneyard on the assumption that modern air defense has done them in despite the development of stand-off missiles, electronic countermeasures, and low-altitude flight profiles. Even if this assumption were correct with respect to conditions in non-nuclear general war, it has no validity for nuclear war. The electromagnetic effects of thermonuclear and fission weapons, the clouds of radioactive debris, and the resultant ionization of the atmosphere would hamper the air defense's command and control communications and greatly reduce radar effectiveness. The defensive forces might have to rely heavily on the human eye for warning and fire control. The bomber, then, should have a reasonable life span.

Need for Versatility

Complexity is not the only drawback of newer weapons. In some instances the weaponry they replace is better suited for certain types of missions. The high speeds and limited loiter time of jet aircraft have led to a new appreciation of propeller planes in a variety of attack and reconnaissance roles. The elderly bolt-action Springfield, long after it had been phased out of production, continued to perform as a sharpshooter's rifle because it was superior to its successors for this purpose.

History is replete with examples of weapons abandoned too soon or with too little consideration. The bow, phased out by the Greeks in Homeric times, was winning battles centuries after the city-states had been destroyed as political entities. Spanish commanders of the early 16th century armed their tercios with the long-abandoned armor and short swords of the Roman legions and did quite well against their progressive arquebus- and pike-armed opponents. In the Korean war carefully organized and coordinated U.N. amphibious operations were hamstrung by the North Korean expedient of dropping obsolete contact mines in coastal waters from junks and sampans. The carrier-oriented U.S. Navy had to activate World War II minesweepers and crews to cope with this obstacle. Most recently a whole array of obsolescent weapons have been dusted off and adapted to the needs of the unconventional fighting in Vietnam.

During Taiwan Strait air operations in 1958, Nationalist F-86 aircraft battled Communist MIGs with overwhelming success despite the fact that the MIGs were faster and could climb more briskly. A few of the Nationalist aircraft were armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and the actions were studied to determine the effectiveness of this missile. But the post mortems showed that all but a few of the Communist losses resulted from the Nationalist pilots' gunfire. Subsequently some USAF officers, noting the difficulty of maintaining the missile in ready condition and the limited refire capabilities of aircraft fitted with it, recommended that missile-carrying fighter aircraft be reequipped with automatic cannon for at least part of their armament.

Defensive systems are particularly vulnerable to saturation effects. In antisubmarine warfare teams of aircraft, surface ships, and submarines, backed with shore-based sound surveillance systems, can present formidable opposition to one or two conventional submarines; but a large number of submarines scattered along a few hundred miles of coastline would currently pose an extremely difficult problem. Field and shipboard air defense missile systems can in general attack very few targets at a time. Their major limitation lies in the guidance radars which direct the missiles during their flights. An installation with two guidance radars can attack only two targets over a period of several minutes. During this time other enemy aircraft or cruise missiles can carry out their missions without hindrance.

The inflexibility of many advanced weapons, particularly those of mass destruction, is clear. Essentially, they can apply force on one scale only, and as a rule only to certain pre-selected targets. A 105-mm howitzer can fire one round near a target to draw attention or to press compliance with a demand. If necessary, a second round can be fired into the target to indicate that the demand will be enforced; and this can be followed, again if necessary, by twenty rounds to put enemy personnel in the face-saving position of having offered token resistance. Finally the target can be reduced by using 100 rounds, or whatever number is needed.

Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, offer only one option, obliteration of the target. U.S. preparations for action during the Cuban crisis were slowed by having to weld conventional bomb racks on aircraft which could otherwise have delivered only nuclear weapons. The presence of Minuteman and Polaris missiles of course greatly affects the basic rules under which engagements such as that in South Vietnam are carried out. Nevertheless they cannot play any active role in them.

A Range of Wars

Present mutual deterrent policies of the United States and the Soviet Union are unlikely to be affected by less than extreme changes in the relative numbers or capabilities of ICBMs or other major weapons. This being the case, it may be more important to learn how quickly and in what numbers the Soviets can send heavy infantry weapons to the Congo than to know the vernier characteristics of the SS-8 propulsion system. It may even be more important to know Soviet capabilities for low-altitude conventional bombing than the precise yield of certain Soviet fission weapons.

Finally, it may be more useful to know the quantities and types of equipment that have been stockpiled or mothballed than to know every detail about the first-line hardware. The scrapping of the battleship fleet and near elimination of eight-inch guns on cruisers had led to a serious decline in U.S. capabilities for giving fire support to amphibious operations. Recently, however, the Navy pulled rocket-equipped LST's of World War II vintage out of moth balls to rectify this deficiency. Knowing whether the Soviets could similarly remedy certain weaknesses on short notice may prove critical in our assessments of Bloc courses of action in Africa and Asia.

In sum, the whole gamut of wars that may occur, from a jungle insurrection to a prolonged broken-back nuclear struggle, demands a variety of military hardware, much of which may be primitive in design. National military capabilities can therefore not be measured just by counting mass destruction weapons or assessing the complexity of weapon systems. Weaponry must be evaluated according to its probable performance under fire, in the face of countermeasures, under conditions of limited logistic and maintenance support. It must be evaluated in terms of the environment and kind of war in which it may be used, and the attention it is to get in intelligence reporting should be determined accordingly. At the present time intelligence should be devoting more effort to the evaluation of Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities with respect to support for the kind of fighting being done, for example, in Vietnam.

Some case histories of disaffection among Chinese Communists trusted abroad and some common factors therein.

CHINESE DEFECTIONS OVERSEAS

Henry Flooks

As the number of Chinese Communists stationed abroad or sent out on tours with delegations increases, the possibility of walk-ins and the opportunities to stimulate defections increase accordingly. In an effort to give some definition to the characteristics of such possibilities, the score or so of defections that were attempted or effected by Chinese personnel in the foreign environment up through mid-1964 have been studied. It has been possible to draw a few generalizations about motivation, deterrents, and procedure, centering on the Chinese sense of mutual obligation between protecting authority and protected vassal.

A half dozen of the most instructive cases are presented in capsule below. Names have been changed where necessary to protect sensitive information.

Frustrated Penetration Agent

In Japanese-occupied Manchuria Lao Keng-nung was a college student. His father was a secret Kuomintang agent working against the occupier. Lao came of age and graduated about the time of the Japanese surrender, and the ruthless arrogance of the conquering Russian troops disgusted him; it was the Kuomintang, the Chinese government, that really deserved the credit for driving the Japanese out. But when Mao Tse-tung's troops followed not long after, he was much impressed by their considerate treatment of the people, even helpfulness. He was also pleased with the Communist land reform measures and Mao's program in general, and so, without objection from his father, he went to work for the Party.

In 1949, when all mainland China became the Chinese People's Republic in alliance with the Soviet Union, and anti-Russian elements were being suppressed, Lao indiscreetly spoke up in defense of a Russian-hater who was being purged from the Party. He pointed out how the Russians had dismantled Manchurian industrial plants and carted them off. The upshot was that he had to engage in self-

criticism and write a confession. Yet his misconduct was handled with such seeming earnestness and logic that the incident left no bad taste in his mouth. Nor in the Party's: his confession was accepted and his status cleared of any cloud. He married a Party member at about this time.

Lao's particular Party organ was the United Front Work Department. In 1951 the UFWD asked him to undertake a deep-cover mission to Taiwan. He balked. It would not be safe; a lot of people on Taiwan knew him by sight and knew he was a Party man, and sooner or later someone would recognize him. It took strong and lengthy argument, but he finally convinced his superiors that he should be sent to Hong Kong instead. He took his wife along.

In Hong Kong he had a case officer named Wei, who transmitted UFWD instructions and his reports and passed him a small salary to supplement what he could earn in a cover job; but operationally he was left pretty much to his own devices. His mission was to penetrate the Chinese Third Force group there which opposed both the Communists and the Nationalists. After much difficulty he landed a job as reporter for a Third Force newspaper. He was to write exposés unmasking Communist double-dealing and showing how ruthless the Party was. The trouble was, Wei refused him permission to write about Party secrets, even when they were well known outside, and wouldn't approve articles that put the Party in a too unfavorable light. His colorless copy was therefore rarely accepted, and he made no progress toward getting inside the Third Force. This lack of accomplishment in his mission, in turn, made the UFWD more and more dissatisfied with him.

Early in 1953 Wei told him bluntly that if his work didn't improve he would be recalled to China to explain his failures. Alternatively he could go to Taiwan as originally scheduled. Frustrated and resentful, Lao now began to question privately the decency of a Party that would insist on the dangerous mission to Taiwan, impose impossible conditions and then punish for failure, encourage mutual distrust among people, and throw a man out when it had got all the use it could out of him. Undoubtedly Mao was the greatest leader China had had in modern times; but the apparatus, especially in its international aspect, was too rigid, dogmatic, and intolerant, too much afraid of criticism. More particularly, it disregarded its obligations to those who served it loyally.

In June and July Lao had several stiff arguments with Wei. Taiwan, he was told, was still open to him, but his usefulness here in Hong Kong was zero, and his Party salary would accordingly be that from now on. This was the crunch. For the first time he discussed the situation with his wife. They could go on to Taiwan and turn themselves in as soon as they got there. But they really had no sympathy with the Kuomintang, did not trust it, and further were not confident Taiwan would hold out against the Communists. They could ask asylum of the Crown Colony authorities; but the British were friendly enough with the People's Republic that that might not be safe. Moreover, the long arm of violent Communist justice might reach them if they deserted and stayed in Hong Kong.

The third course lay to the U.S. consulate, and they took it. The United States was strong enough to protect them from any enemy. On 18 July Lao wrote a careful letter to the consulate—in Chinese, his only foreign language being a bit of Japanese—saying that he had been doing clandestine work for the Party but no longer believed in it and wanted to work against it; he had important information for the Americans. He particularly stressed his wanting to work against the Communists and the importance of the information he had. He assumed that he would be valuable enough in U.S. eyes to be offered sanctuary; and he was right.

Premeditated Abduction

Chung Jen-lung was a member of the Youth League and a student at Peking's Institute of International Relations. He wasn't particularly fond of political science; he'd have preferred medicine, and he rather resented the arbitrary way the Communists had made the choice for him. In fact, although he wasn't foolish enough to let on to anybody, he resented Communist authoritarianism generally, and he had fallen into the habit of tending to believe the opposite of what they told people to believe.

Take America, which they painted so black. A cousin of his had learned a lot about it when he worked for an American aid mission, and he had talked of it as a prosperous, generous land where anyone with ability could find fulfillment. He himself had seen something of American generosity in the rehabilitation of Manchuria, after the Russian plundering. That was before the Communists came in and swallowed up his family's money in the new China's universal egalitarian poverty. And now at the Institute he was able to read trans-

lations from the American and European press; the bad capitalists, he observed, told you what was so, while the righteous Communists told you what they thought was good for you to think.

At the end of 1958, when he was graduating from the Institute and preparing for a study tour in Southeast Asia—to polish up his language skills—he came across a London *Times* story about the young pianist Fu Tsung, just escaped to England. Fu, it seemed, in Warsaw on a scholarship, had made some critical remarks about the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Later someone had tattled on him and he was ordered home. What "labor reform" might do to a pianist's hands! His escape seemed so simple. That's for me, thought Chung, but America, not England.

The first chance was at the Hong Kong stop en route to his Southeast Asian post. But Chung had the impression that only embassies, not consulates, could grant political asylum, and he didn't want to make any false breaks. Even when he reached his post he spent a week getting the lay of the land and writing up a bitter denunciation of the Communists with which to sell himself to the Americans. Then one day when everyone else was leaving the Chinese hostel to go to work at the embassy, he begged off, saying he had to finish up some homework first. As soon as they were out of sight he walked a few blocks away and took a pedicab to a corner near the U.S. embassy.

Chung had no doubt that the Americans would be happy to receive him, but he was conscious of violating his obligation to his family. They would surely be made to suffer in one way or another if they had nurtured a defector. He had therefore taken care to leave his papers and personal effects spread out as though he had been kidnapped while in the midst of work. At the U.S. embassy he begged that his whereabouts be concealed, and he steadfastly refused to be used in any propaganda play. He even denied knowing how to reach a brother of his in the Chinese air force.

Cultured Misfit

Tung Chi-p'ing's family, in Shanghai, though mentally well endowed, was an unhappy one. The father was a niggardly and callous man who got what he could out of his wife and children and subordinates without doing anything for them in return. He suffered financially when the Communists took over, but as the children grew up they fared quite well, though they had no interest in the new ideology. Two brothers got good jobs in factories in the area. One sister became a college teacher and married a physicist. The other married a Foreign Trade officer; she was the only one to join the Youth League. Tung's ideal for himself was the cultivated intellectual, and he pointed his schooling to this end.

In 1957, in the course of a rectification campaign, several of Tung's middle school teachers were sentenced to labor reform, and he felt keenly the injustice and the degradation of it. Then came the futility and mismanagement of the Great Leap Forward; he himself was put to work at a backyard steel furnace. The Communists were like his father, driving you and then not taking care of you. But he did like school. He had a particular interest in the ways of the outside world; he was fascinated to learn that the French National Assembly could reject the EDC treaty after the French government had signed it, and he stood at the top of his class in Russian studies.

He was therefore given a chance at the entrance examinations for the Shanghai Foreign Language Institute, passed with flying colors, and put to studying French. Here he had a teacher, born in England of a French mother and Chinese father, whom he greatly admired for her competence and knowledge of life abroad (life in such contrast to the grinding poverty all around him here, especially starting with the bleak winter of 1960-61). She had once been put in jail for associating with a foreign missionary—another bit of crude oppression by those that represented the unfeeling masses. Then there were those endless indoctrination sessions of the Party's that took time away from higher learning. He got himself branded a "backward element" for disdaining political study and Youth League membership.

He emerged from the Institute in September 1963 as a French expert and was put on the staff of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. More disillusionment. He did once get to interpret for Guinean President Sékou Touré, but that was the one bright spot in day after day of menial drudgery, making travel arrangements for visiting delegations and submitting routine reports, and moreover getting criticized for being late with these. Was it for this he had sharpened his wit and enriched his mind in the bright world of French literature?

He decided to make an escape when he could. There were some jobs in China that would offer a satisfying life and work, but these were all held by old Party hands; no chance for a young man, especially without Party pull. Nor was he interested in Chiang Kai-shek's

regime, with its corruption and nepotism. No, he would go West, where his ability would be rewarded. He didn't let his family in on this decision; he no longer felt close to them. But he wanted to show the people he most respected that he was not going to succumb to frustration here, and he told his old French teacher and several of his classmates. They kept his secret.

His chance came the following spring, May 1964, when he was sent as assistant cultural attaché to Burundi with the flattering explanation that the need for French-speaking representatives was so acute that they just had to use him in spite of his being only 24 years old, inexperienced, and politically backward. He would have left the plane the first time it stopped at a city that had an American embassy if he had known any English; he'd better wait until he got to the former Belgian trust territory. In Bujumbura he spent one night at the Chinese embassy, then next morning after breakfast disappeared.

Back to America

When Wu Nai-chi was four years old his father, an army officer, was killed, and he was brought up by a rather too indulgent mother. The family was now quite poor, but it enjoyed the protection of the father's former commanding officer, a warlord in Yunnan. A year or so after the Japanese were defeated, when Wu was in his early twenties and ambitious to become a doctor, this patron sent him to the United States for schooling.

He enrolled in pre-med courses but didn't buckle down to them. His fellow Chinese students were rather ashamed of him. He gambled a great deal, was forever in debt and trying to borrow more money. He had girl trouble more serious than normal; once the Chinese embassy had to arrange an out-of-court settlement for him. No medical school would accept him. A friend introduced him to Communism; he began to read Communist literature and grew progressively more leftist. Finally, in 1951, another friend persuaded him to go back to China and "devote himself to the socialist revolution."

In China he was given a six-month indoctrination course and then assigned an English instructorship in the Institute of Foreign Languages. He became a probationary member of the Party and married a Party girl. Faced with the realities of Communism in practice, he never wavered in his belief in it. He remained convinced that socialism was the best system for a backward country like China; the Chinese needed a paternalistic, authoritarian regime. An overwhelming majority of them supported this one. It was doing wonders in health and education; it had liberated Tibet. He only regretted its anti-Americanism, because otherwise China might qualify for American aid, as some other Communist countries had.

In the summer of 1958 his turn came for the intellectuals' tour of duty at manual labor. He had to work for a year on a collective farm, then three months at a backyard steel furnace. This he approved too, and he took pleasure in being commended publicly for his performance on the labor tour. When it was over, in October 1959, he was sent to the Middle East to hold Chinese language classes for Arab students. He had to leave his wife behind with the children, but this did not bother him much. A rift had grown between them. She was such a militant Communist that she had told the Party her husband had an unprogressive attitude.

And it was true. Although Wu retained his firm faith in the Party's program for China, he personally had by now had about all he could take of it. He was fed up with having absolutely no freedom of ideas, expression, or action. Even the Arabs were better off. He couldn't stand the thought of another session of self-criticism at which everyone was passed around "the same old piece of gum to chew and each in turn praised it as absolutely delicious." (At one session he had picked up the wrong piece of gum: praising Khrushchev's program of peaceful coexistence and disarmament, he was jumped on for his backward thinking and thereby learned that all was not well with the Sino-Soviet alliance.) He recalled the laissez-faire intellectual atmosphere in America. He spent more and more time listening to the Voice of America and BBC (which the Party approved for the sake of keeping up his English) and reading English news magazines (which it did not). He especially liked a BBC program that compared what Communists said with what they did.

After much debate with himself, particularly on the point of deserting his family, Wu decided in the spring of 1960 to give up and have another try at life in America. He was sure he could hold up his end of the deal this time. At 37 he was still young enough to start anew, and he had the advantages of knowing English and of his previous experience. He decided to wait until the end of the school term. That would neatly round out his responsibilities to his Arab

students; moreover, the lump-sum check for his services he would get then might come in handy.

Like most Chinese would-be defectors abroad overtly or under official cover, Wu had some purely tactical obstacles to overcome in order to carry the act off. For one thing, it required some surreptitious research just to find out where the U.S. embassy was, though this was not a serious problem if you had plenty of time, as he had. More difficult was the Party practice of seeing to it that no one was ever left by himself in this dangerous foreign world; Wu was always accompanied to and from school by another instructor named Hsieh. He did get away long enough to telephone the U.S. embassy that he had information to offer and would like to set up a rendezvous with an American in a car; he was told he would have to come to the embassy. This he managed by asynchronizing haircuts.

On the last day of school he took there with him, packed in his briefcase, his toothbrush and shaving kit and a change of underwear. On the way home, after picking up their checks, he and Hsieh stopped at the bank and cashed them. Then he said he had to have a haircut and suggested that Hsieh, who had just had one, could while away the time in the bookstore here while he went around the corner to the barber shop. When Hsieh agreed and went into the bookstore, Wu took a taxi to the U.S. embassy. The Arab guard stopped him at the door, but he lied that he was Japanese and was let through. He explained his situation to an embassy officer and asked if he could stay in the building overnight and be flown to the United States the next day "on a Pan-American flight."

Then the blow. They could not possibly give him asylum on the spur of the moment like this; such a decision would have to be made in Washington, and even if favorable it would take several days at best. Stunned, he raced back to the bookstore. Hsieh was gone; it had been almost two hours. So back to the Chinese embassy, devising on the way a story of how he had gone from one barber shop to another trying to find one without a crowd of people waiting for haircuts. He was desperate enough to be convincing, and it worked.

Realizing now that defecting was more complicated than he had thought, Wu resolved to lay some preliminary groundwork next time. The following spring he learned he was being sent home that summer for leave and reindoctrination. Supposing that he would travel via Hong Kong, he tried to make contact with the British, first talking to an Englishman in charge of a local library that was not off limits for him and Hsieh. This man didn't want to get involved in political intrigue; he suggested the British embassy. Wu was still trying to get away long enough to follow this up when he learned that he was routed through Athens on a northerly flight instead of Hong Kong after all.

Wu and the steadfast Hsieh emplaned, June 1961, under an injunction to stay aboard during the Athens stop. But the day was hot, even on the Aegean, and it seemed sensible to go into the terminal building for a cool drink. Once inside, Wu used the pretext of a visit to the rest room to get out of sight, and then he just kept on going. As the plane's departure was announced, Hsieh made a frantic search for him, but at the last minute he gave up and boarded the flight taking him home to face the music.

Persistent Juggler

Yang Shao-heng was born, in 1937, into an acrobatic troupe where everyone was a relative or an in-law. In the old China acrobats were a free-wheeling lot living hand to mouth, and they didn't change much when the Communists took over. They were poor enough to be good proletarians, but they were too gypsyish and wild. Yang's troupe was given some indoctrination, and a brother-in-law of his who took it more seriously than most of them was made security officer on their travels. But by Communist standards discipline was pretty loose.

Yang became a juggler. The juggler section was headed by another brother-in-law, and Yang found himself more and more irked by these two, the boss who threw his weight around on the job and the security officer who poked his nose into what you were doing off of it. He caught some glimpses of a freer life; in Hong Kong the movies were for fun, not about how to "build socialism," and people really lived. In 1959 they had a tour around Latin America, and this was an eye-opener. He began to think about jumping the traces. The trouble would be earning a living, knowing only Chinese and how to juggle. Well, the Chinese would like juggling on Taiwan.

In the spring of 1963 the cultural exchange program gave the troupe a trip to the Sudan. On the first day in Khartoum they had a guided tour of the city, and among the places pointed out was a Sudanese "Refugee Aid Headquarters." That did it. In the wee hours of the next morning Yang sneaked out of the hotel and walked to the Headquarters. He managed to get across to a guard on duty there that

he wanted asylum, and the guard made him understand that he would have to come during office hours. Disappointed, he tried to sneak back into the hotel just before daybreak, but the security brother-in-law was awake.

He was bawled out: he had been expressly warned not to get involved with women here, and the first thing he did was stay out all night! He would have to have a watch set on him. And watched he was; no chance for a daytime search for refuge. But by the next evening they had relaxed enough so he could get away shortly after midnight. By chance or deliberately, people were working at the Headquarters, but the only Chinese interpreter available knew nothing but Fukienese and no characters. He didn't do any better than the guard had on the first trip, but he did know a proper Chinese linguist who could be there the following evening. It was conveyed to Yang that he should come again at 10 p.m. the next day.

Back at the hotel things really popped this time. Within 48 hours Yang was to have ready a full confession about his insubordination and a program for disciplining himself in the future; in the meantime he would be under continuous surveillance, even while in the bathroom. Yet that very evening, while the whole troupe was getting ready to go on stage for an 8:30 performance, he succeeded in slipping out a back door and keeping his appointment. The third time was a charm.

Security Officer

Chao Fu was born in Manchuria to a family that for generations had been poor peasants. He was only about ten when the Russians drove out the Japanese and brought in the Communists; Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists meant nothing to him. At seventeen, with his peasant background and having shown in two years of middle school that he was quite bright, he was selected for special training. He was sent to military school, made a full member of the Party, and rotated through various positions in the public security administration. He married the girl his mother had selected for him in the traditional way; he found her an adequate wife. In 1960, twenty-five years old, he was put through a one-semester course at the Advanced Civil Police Cadre School in Peking and then sent to Stockholm as security officer for the embassy. He had to leave his wife and baby at home.

It was something of a shock for him to find that Sweden was not really a country of poor slaves mercilessly driven to support the dissolute idleness of rich capitalists. And in addition to the workers' prosperity, he also observed with envy the freedom which the Swedes, as well as the foreigners in other embassies, had to come and go as they pleased, make friends outside their own circle, and generally choose their own way of life. If life had been regimented back home, it was much worse here in the embassy: no social mingling outside, no female companionship, and nothing to do in your spare time but play ping-pong, watch a movie once a week, or go on a rare picnic when the weather was right.

And back home things seemed to be getting worse all the time. Just before he left, a cousin who worked in an auto factory had told him it hadn't produced any trucks for a year except a few thrown together for Cuba which he doubted would run; now he heard that the cousin had been laid off for lack of work and sent back to farming. In 1961 the embassy cashier had a few months' leave in China. When he came back he had lost 20 pounds, and when someone complained about the portions of meat served at dinner he bitterly pointed out that in China anything containing a piece of meat the size of your fingertip is called a meat dish. In 1962 the embassy cook got a letter from home with such a distressing description of hunger and want that he cried as he read it aloud to the others.

Chao frequently lay awake at night comparing life as he knew it in China with what he could see around him in Sweden. The Communists had let China down; they had failed. The grass didn't just look greener on this side of the fence; it was incomparably greener. He had heard that not long before he got to Stockholm the embassy administrative officer had simply disappeared. They suspected a defection, but since no news of him came from the West or anywhere, they didn't even have to acknowledge he was missing, just took his name off the diplomatic list the next year. That way he didn't disgrace his family back home and cause them to suffer, either.

Chao had been thinking secretly along these lines for several months when, in July 1962, he heard that the embassy was getting a personnel cut in the course of an economy drive. His own security officer position was vulnerable; it wasn't a full-time job, and he was assigned all sorts of leg work and errand-running to round it out. The prospect of being dumped and sent back home decided him. But he couldn't really just disappear: he would need legal status, concealment, some way to earn a living. There wasn't any reason why the neutral Swedes

should give him these. He would seek the protection of the Communists' arch-enemies, the Americans.

He had long since discovered, in the course of outside errands, where the American embassy was, and one day he had a chance to go by it. He went in. Alas, no one there could speak Chinese. Casting about, he thought of an American Chinese he had known. A few days later, when he was supposed to be running an errand on the other side of town, he met him at the railroad station. This man advised him to get out of Sweden.

As luck would have it, a party from the Chinese embassy was meeting a train at the time and saw this encounter, and reported it. Chao tried to explain it away but was not convincing. He was confined to his room. After everyone was asleep that night, he managed to slip out, taking a pistol and the keys to an embassy car. He drove out into the countryside. He stopped at farmhouses, trying to establish that he was suffering from amnesia after a car accident. A woman gave him a cup of coffee.

Finally he took a train to Denmark, and from there he walked and hitchhiked until he reached the Americans in Germany. The Chinese embassy had meanwhile notified the Swedish police he was missing, saying he'd hurt his head in an accident and disappeared. So he wrote a letter to his wife back home in China, telling her that he had run over a man and killed him and had therefore gone into hiding to escape punishment. Now he was confident the family would not suffer.

Those Left Behind

Although the Chinese never admit such defections to the outside world, keeping them quiet if they can and otherwise usually charging abduction, within the delegations and installations where they have occurred they earnestly discuss them in meeting after meeting, trying to explain how they could happen and seeking ways to guard against them in the future. The case histories, moreover, are posed at indoctrination sessions in other installations as object lessons from which to take warning. The kinds of explanations and remedies offered at these meetings and in less formal discussions among the comrades are also instructive.

Recently a member of a Chinese delegation abroad, a man we shall call Chen, tried to break away from the delegation and get to the U.S. embassy, failed, and was immediately sent back to China. The rest of the delegation were then moved from their hotel into the Chinese embassy, and there they held several group meetings. A later defector has reported what went on at some of these meetings. The delegates were anxious lest Chen's action be held against the rest of them and prevent them from going abroad again. They took comfort in the ambassador's report on the incident, which tried to absolve them of serious blame.

Speaking in turn, nevertheless, they admitted that if Chen had been properly watched, his disaffection could have revealed itself and the attempted defection been prevented. They stressed the need to tighten the bond between the delegation leaders and other members; proper leadership would have prevented Chen from straying about and being contaminated by outside influences. Yet everyone, not just the leadership, was at fault to some extent. Chen was not basically bad; he had been entrapped by evil influences. No one had stopped him when he visited prostitutes in several countries, and these women had been agents of the dirty and unscrupulous U.S. imperialists, who will do anything to achieve their aims. One of the delegation leaders, it was reported, summed up the sentiments of the group something like this:

"In order to get us, the enemy uses all means. If someone, particularly a young comrade, has a weakness or unhealthy thoughts, he can fall into the enemy's trap. Chen's conduct was not generated in one day, and backward thinking is not spontaneous or accidental. He had this dangerous frame of mind some time before it came into the open and must have revealed somehow to intimate friends some sign of his intended action. We were lacking in political knowledge and alertness not to have seen such signs. Everybody is responsible in part for what happened."

The members of the diplomatic installation, according to our defector, also analyzed among themselves this case and others of potential, abortive, or successful defection—among them Chao Fu's and the earlier one from the embassy in Sweden, a "high-level cadre" in Cuba, one Chang Chien-yu who in 1959 had defected in Bombay and redefected the next morning, our juggler Yang Shao-heng, pianist Fu Tsung who had fled to England, a chauffeur in England who visited houses of prostitution on the way back from the airport but was caught at it in time. Speakers pointed out by hindsight the signs of potential defection which closer watching would have revealed.

The ill consequences for the defector were also stressed, on the re-defector Chang Chien-yu along these lines:

"Chang wouldn't have come back if they had promised to let him settle down in America. Instead, they told him he would first be sent to America to have some training and get married to a beautiful American woman, and then sent back to Asia to do intelligence work. The poor fellow was scared to death to learn that he would have to face the Chinese again. He pondered over his predicament and his future and made up his mind."

In a similar vein of Chao Fu: "He will regret doing that. Of course he will. After they have pumped all the information out of him, he will be kicked out and his sorrow will begin. I imagine he was told that he will get some training in America and then be sent back to Asia to work for them." Of juggler Yang Shao-heng it was said that the imperialists had exploited him for propaganda purposes and then pawned him off on the Kuomintang on Taiwan and forgotten about him.

Much discussion was devoted to the danger of Kuomintang or imperialist agents, especially women. Chen had been seen in unauthorized conversation with a "tall foreigner" before his attempt. The U.S. embassy had Chinese-speaking officials who were especially engaged in this sort of thing. Chao Fu's predecessor in defection in Sweden had been contacted by a "beautiful woman." A member of this embassy had recently been approached by an English woman on the street and asked about his job. Another told about an Italian woman who had invited a colleague of his to her room; she wanted money. In Switzerland women followed you around wherever you went, said another. An American woman in a very scanty bathing suit had flirted with another at a swimming pool. For that reason yet another never went to the swimming pool with fewer than two companions.

A defector from another Chinese diplomatic mission has reported how the principal officers discussed the defection of one Chu Heng-pan, secretary of a mission in West Europe, to the USSR. The chief was deeply concerned in particular over the question of the responsibility of a chief of mission for defections, considered as a failure in leadership. After speculating about what might have gone wrong and comparing the case with six or eight previous defections in various countries, he turned to the question of prevention and began to go through the list of his own staff:

"Counselor A doesn't like to go out by himself. Comrade B has acquired a very pretty wife, which should eliminate the possibility for him. But about Comrade C there is something that nobody knows. As for D, if she goes back to China she should not be allowed to travel by herself; nobody questions her loyalty, but we have to take precautions for her safety. Then there are three blue-collar workers we will have to watch, along with E. And F and G have to go out on official business, and very often they do not have anyone with them.

"Another bad thing is that when a chauffeur takes someone someplace, very often he comes back by himself and is completely out of control. In a country like this there are many material attractions, and we at the head will just have to set a good example. It is my responsibility, of course, to check on people's thoughts and political consciousness, but how are you going to do it. The man who has wrong thoughts will be the very one to hide them and cover up."

In regard to Chu, the responsibility was similarly laid largely upon the leadership of his mission. Chu had probably had correct ideological views at the time of his assignment abroad, it was said, because his political reliability would have been thoroughly investigated before he was allowed to leave China. His deviation then began abroad and grew gradually over the years until he finally became a traitor. The mission leaders must have known that he had been indulging in personal and material amenities, and it had been wrong not to take corrective measures.

But the foreign ministry's personnel management was also at fault for allowing him to remain abroad for six or seven years. Being away so long, he had not undergone a full-scale thought reform since the 3-Anti and 5-Anti rectification campaigns of the mid-fifties, and so he lacked the ideological strength to counteract the insidious influence of the bourgeois world. Diplomats had a special problem in that they associated primarily with the upper classes in the host country and so did not get a true picture of the decadence of bourgeois society.

In discussing this mission's own preventive measures it was remarked that it would be impossible to watch everyone 24 hours a day, but they should try to keep as close track of each other as possible. The most important preventive measures were to strengthen thought reform and completely eradicate individualism, and as a check to require detailed reports of all social and business contacts

with foreigners. Throughout this discussion little distinction was made between "bourgeois" and "revisionist." Chu was corrupted by the bourgeois environment in West Europe so that he defected to the Russian revisionists. Speakers used the two terms almost interchangeably in referring to alien influences by which they might be entrapped.

Some Generalizations

The defectors have invariably claimed to be ideologically motivated, particularly when they first walked in. They doubtless feel this explanation to be the most eye-catching for convincing Western officials that they are worthy of political asylum, but the initial emphasis on ideological disaffection is by no means a ruse. Until the moment of defection they have been immersed—if unwillingly—in an ideological world. In rejecting this environment so thoroughly imbued with ideological pressures, the totality of the rejection emphasizes, conversely, the same pressures. Deeper probing during the course of debriefing has revealed that almost all have indeed been dissatisfied with some aspects of the Chinese Communist political system, but in most cases what has bothered them has been practical consequences of the regime's program—its failure to take due care of its subjects or the restrictions it imposes on personal freedom—rather than the ideology proper. In addition, there has usually been some pressing personal problem to trigger the defection—failure on the job, dread of an assignment to manual labor, imminent recall, etc.

More than half the defectors were less than 30 years old, and with two or three exceptions all were under 40. None had achieved such high positions that they defected at great sacrifice of status. It would be of importance to be young enough to have reasonable hope for a successful new start in life. One-quarter of the score, curiously, came originally from Manchuria, and three had got an unfavorable impression of the Russian occupation there. The rest lived all over China.

Only one defector, Chao Fu, came from a real peasant family. Several others were very poor, but they were from urban areas and so had more exposure to modern life than the average poor peasant. One obvious consideration in examining backgrounds as a clue to vulnerabilities is that anyone whose personal history would make him look like a non-conformist or troublemaker would not be sent abroad. The nearest case to an exception here was French linguist Tung.

The defectors' average educational level was fairly high. None was illiterate; even juggler Yang had been taught to read and write by members of his family. Most had some kind of status in the Party. The high percentage of Party members, like the educational level, probably reflects only criteria for selecting Chinese to be sent abroad. Knowledge of foreign languages also seems surprisingly irrelevant to the defections. Only one spoke English, and about half spoke only Chinese.

Family ties are probably the strongest deterrent to defection, as the Chinese Communists themselves recognize. The number of official Chinese abroad accompanied by their entire families, always small, has decreased even further in recent years. Though the main reason for this is probably the one given officially—economy—deterrence from defection is also a consideration. Of these defectors, two intelligence officers working under deep cover and a few others were able to bring their wives and children out with them. Others, though not close to their families, felt the traditional obligation toward them and tried to protect them by their manner of defection, as by staging amnesia or kidnapping. Others were completely alienated from their families.

Most of the defectors had had some contact with non-Chinese influences before their final assignment abroad, and most had considerable opportunity to observe life outside China. Western publications and radio broadcasts were of secondary significance in one or two cases. All those who walked into U.S. installations felt that the United States was the strongest and most determined antagonist of Communist China and could provide them the greatest security. The economic opportunities in America were not ignored, but at least superficially they were less important than the security of a sanctuary.

A characteristic of most Chinese seems to be a particular need for sanctuary, for the protection of a strong authority to which in turn they give obedience, deference, and loyalty. This need is filled in their society by the traditional family system, and it may help explain both their allegiance to the authoritarian Communist Party and their disaffection when it fails in its reciprocal obligation. They tend to be docile before superiors, dictatorial with inferiors, and uncomfortable when treated as equals. When the defector breaks away

from the system that has been his life, his most pressing need is for another sanctuary, a new authority that will give him protection as well as exact obedience from him. He needs and wants a clear understanding of what his obligations to this new protector are. This is our best lever for getting him to undertake intelligence missions like working for us in place.

Knowledge of previous successful defections provided encouragement in several of these cases, though it seems not to have been a decisive factor. None had any substantial knowledge about how previous defectors had been received. We have no information as to whether knowledge of unsuccessful attempts or difficulties previous defectors have faced has ever deterred a Chinese from defecting, as the Communists seek to make it do.

Only one defection was the direct result of a relationship with a woman in the host country. But it seems clear that the enforced celibacy of most of the Chinese abroad is perturbing to them as a vulnerability of which they are aware.

Three of the defectors at one time or other threatened suicide, and three others seemed emotionally disturbed or in the midst of some sort of psychological crisis. Although the very fact of defecting suggests a failure to adjust, however, the majority were moved by quite rational considerations. Most weighed the alternatives carefully before defecting.

Only four of the defectors had some realistic idea about how they might be received and made their first approach to U.S. authorities in such manner, time, and place that they could immediately be accommodated. Three others seem to have had no great problem once they got in touch with other Western authorities. But all the rest had difficulty finding a way to defect, and some failed altogether. Mere knowledge of a place where they could defect was a critical factor in many cases. Language was often a barrier. The tactical difficulties are aggravated by security measures consciously taken by the Communists.

There is a standing rule in all Chinese Communist installations that no one may go outside alone except on official business. This rule is strictly enforced. The efficacy of the rule is illustrated by the difficulty many of the defectors found in breaking away and even in getting the address of a Western installation. Another security measure is to lock up passports in safes. At least four of these defectors had had their passports locked up.

Wherever possible, traveling Chinese are routed through cities where official Chinese installations are located, and these installations are notified to meet the travelers at the airport. This is done "to avoid kidnapping."

When there is any reason for suspicion, a preventive measure is confinement within the installation, and the ultimate one is return to China.

A Few Inferences

These security practices have several implications for us. When a defector walks in, the chances are strong that he will have made a considerable effort and taken considerable risks in breaking away; he may not always be able to do so again. There is a strong chance that walk-ins will have inadequate or no identification. If a defector agrees to go back and remain in place, it is highly possible that at a later time he may be confined to the installation or even taken out of the country under guard.

No attempted defection has been demonstrated to be a provocation. To set up a Chinese official in such a way that he would look attractive to a Western intelligence service and then willingly place him in its hands would require both a realistic estimate of the reception he would receive and complete trust in the individual. The Chinese Communists have yet to show they can meet these requirements.

Although the Chinese criteria for selecting personnel for foreign duty are heavily "political," in the Communist sense of the word, the process of screening, being an inexact science, will occasionally permit a wrong-thinking, individualistic, or potentially unreliable person to go abroad. The process is also compromised by practical necessities; a person's technical qualifications may counterbalance a less than perfect security assessment.

Political theory per se appears to play little part in defection. More important is whether the system based on the theory is compatible with the Chinese social tradition, conforms to the individual's sense of what is right, or seems effective in practice. The regime's preventive measures against defection, ranging from ideological to physical, seem sometimes themselves to help create doubts about the system.

As would be expected, self-interest, both individual and family, can make or break a defection. Lack of strong family ties, assessment of future possibilities for a reasonably good life, and personal and political problems—present or potential—all appear as basic motivations.

COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

Station Helgoland

Dear Sirs:

Thanks are due Anthony Quibble for drawing attention to Frank Lynder's *Spione in Hamburg und auf Helgoland: Neuentdeckte Geheimdokumente aus der Napoleonischen Zeit.*[1] Not only is it of historical interest, but its day-by-day record of the Helgoland operation strikes a responsive chord in any reader engaged in the intelligence business today.

For instance, note the early use of a ploy now favored by the Soviet intelligence services for documenting illegals in the authentic identities of innocent citizens living or dead. Father Robertson's memoirs relate how, after his black entry onto the continent by smuggling boat, he betook himself to the Bremen City Hall to obtain a travel pass. "I had long since thought up a false name," his account continues. "In London I had known a German, who had since died. He had left his homeland as a child and had never gone back. I remembered the name of his birthplace and the fact that all of his relatives were now dead, and so I adopted his name in order to make my transformation complete. I had also written to the pastor of his village some time before, requesting written confirmation of 'my' birth there. The pastor complied without further ado. I thus identified myself as 'Adam Rorauer, language teacher' and laid the evidence before the Bremen City Hall official. As I went to sign my name, I began, from habit, with the J of my first name, James.

" 'What's this?' cried the official. 'You've just said your name is Adam!'

"Whereupon I told him that in my homeland Bavaria almost all of us have the extra first name Johannes; and he gave me my passport and the visa."

Julia Ibbs

[1] *Studies* IX 3, p. 94 ff.

Poor Richard

Dear Sirs:

In Ben Franklin's letter, which you carried under the caption "Nothing to Hide,"[2] there appears to be a difference between the script version and your transcription, if I read the former correctly. The transcription includes the phrase "as probably he is"—his own valet a spy—which does not appear in the photographic reproduction.

Walter E. Bass

This sly phrase of Franklin's, inserted at the bottom of his first page under the crossed-out "and I like," was accidentally eliminated when the second page was juxtaposed for reproduction. Thanks and apologies.—Ed.

More Words for Defection

Dear Sirs:

The question of finding new terminology for defection recently posed by Gordon Cooperwood[3] certainly is a knotty one. The initiatives so boldly attempted by contributors to subsequent issues only serve to dramatize the difficulty; for me, at least, their well-reasoned suggestions do not quite bridge the gap between idea and ideography.

But one might possibly build on their efforts and advance the search a bit farther. I wanted to take from them the solid thought of pairing Latin roots as in "transcreder" and the sound advice about avoiding the implication of "personal, selfish motivations." At least one root, it seemed, should have associations almost universally favorable in any culture, as "libertarian" was meant to do. Then I tried to start from such concepts as seeking and taking sanctuary.

From this circuitous contemplation a word did spring to mind. May I respectfully suggest *superpatriate*? Its possible perversion into "super-patriot" does not escape me, but I believe any word would contain the seeds of its own "invidious or comical perversion." I hope at least to have helped keep this important word-hunt going until we bring one back alive.

Mike Jaderquist

[2] *Studies* IX 2, p. 85 ff.

[3] *Studies* IX 1, p. 61.

Dear Sirs:

I would like to suggest the verb *depatriate*, connoting self-expatriation. The depatriator might be called a *depatrier* (accented on the final syllable).

Robert T. Karp

Operational Approach to Soviets

Dear Sirs:

The Winter issue of the *Studies* reached me out here in the field only the other day, and I hope it is not too late to tell you how much I admire your journal and author Martin L. Brabourne for the straightforwardness with which you presented his thesis.[4] As a past contributor and one of the sources cited by Brabourne (page 40, footnote 3), I would like to make a general observation on a related point that I believe important for our future ability to manipulate Soviet personalities.

Brabourne's thesis, quite correct, is that we are most likely to reap a good intelligence harvest from among the well-placed neurotics of Soviet society. To date, at any rate, it is these human misfits who have constituted our major successes; and they may continue to do so for years to come. At the same time, I would like to suggest a case for the "normal" Soviet citizen as an object of our operational interest.

I believe I have met and observed as many individual Soviets as anyone in the intelligence community, and under a great variety of circumstances. Very few of these have been from the diplomatic or military services, but all have had one unvarying characteristic: they have been educated people. Quite aside from the interests of the Soviet intelligence services, these Soviets have subjected me and others like me to their own curious personal observation: So this is an American. What kind of person is he? How does he act, speak, behave socially, think? What kind of an impression does he make? Does his behavior confirm or refute what we hear officially about Americans? And so on.

Without gainsaying Brabourne's contention that the best intelligence target is the Soviet nervous-breakdown-going-somewhere-to-happen, I suggest that it is equally important to make a good impression on these average, often well-placed Soviets. This is really the key

[4] In "More on the Recruitment of Soviets," *Studies* IX 1, p. 39 ff.

element in our so-called covert action, capable of being taken by any one of us in a most overt way. The trick is simple: we put forward, at all times, the best foot of the intelligent American.

One of the personality details that impressed me about Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy was that for some years his very model of the modern American was Colonel X, a U.S. Army officer who had served a tour in Turkey concurrently with his own service there. He told one of our operations officers that Colonel X was the man he most respected and most wished to emulate. (It was an unexpected irony when we later learned that Colonel X could remember neither Penkovskiy's name nor his face.)

If we can't recruit these Soviets, why bother with them? Well, it could be this approach *will* recruit some Soviets some day; who can say it won't? But short of that, good impressions made on thoughtful Soviets by thoughtful Americans may well influence them toward a less intransigent policy line in their work in the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, on *Pravda* or Radio Moscow, perhaps even within the diabolical schemings of Party subcommittees. Such indirect effects can but be salutary.

Brabourne cautioned against disregard for courtesy and the amenities in our relations with Soviets. I take this one step further, urging a positive effort to make the best impression that correct and intelligent deportment can. No one has to go out of his way in order to gain respect, and approaching the Soviets in this manner doesn't take one cent of operational funds.

And this suggestion need not be limited to Soviets. Colleagues involved with the Cubans, the Congo, or Cambodia may find therein some comparable application.

John Ankerbrand

Catalog of opportunities and hazards in standardized institutional routine.

THE HOTEL IN OPERATIONS

James J. Lagrone

Hotels have been used for years by case officers for meetings and other purposes, but the recent world-wide proliferation of larger and more modern hotels, often used by the local governments for official meetings and state visitors, has increased operational interest in them. If a case officer knows the basic systems and operating procedures of a hotel he is working in or against, he is more likely to be able to do the job without attracting attention. Although a hotel staff is rarely looking for intelligence activities as such, it is constantly on the lookout for bad credit risks, thieves, sexual deviates, organized prostitution, and any activities that may disturb the guests or damage the hotel physically. In watching for such things, an alert employee can easily trip up a case officer who through carelessness or ignorance attracts undue attention.

The following describes the systems used by large hotels to check and control their guests and then examines the staff positions from the viewpoint of the desirability of different employees as agents for operational tasks. Any hotel of more than 100 rooms will necessarily have procedures which more or less parallel those discussed here. A given hotel may be more strictly or more laxly run, but it would be wise always to assume full application of the control procedures. In a smaller hotel, with fewer guests and a tighter staff, it can be assumed that little passes unnoticed. (An exception is the U.S.-style motel, whose layout complicates control and observation.) It is safe to say, then, that any hazard pointed out in the following paragraphs will be even more difficult for a case officer in a smaller establishment.

Routine on Arrival

On arrival the guest fills in a registration form giving his name, address, passport number, etc. (In some countries he must still turn over the passport for a short time for registration with the local police.) This information the front office staff transfers to an ac-

counting card, called a folio, used to record charges made to the guest during his stay. The ribbon copy of the folio goes to the cashier or credit department, but a carbon is retained by the front desk in a card-index file usually called a room rack.

If any problem concerning a room comes to the Assistant Manager's attention, the room rack is immediately checked to see who is in the room and what he represents. The information on the folio can thus be of critical importance in reassuring the management so that it lets the matter drop there or causing it to investigate further. For no single slight irregularity is likely to create a hazard for the case officer, but mysterious noises or comings and goings from his room might, in combination with poor credit implications on his card, lead to a thorough investigation. Some of the credit indications and other features of the folio's content are the following:

Name and address. Many hotels keep in their credit offices phone directories of every large city in Europe, Canada, and the United States. If a guest's name does not show up in the appropriate phone book it is not seriously damaging, but it does not help his credit rating. A fictitious company name or business address would naturally be worse.

Reservations. The folio records whether a reservation had been made before arrival. If the case officer can plan ahead the time he is to spend in a hotel, it is well worth his effort to make a reservation some time in advance, preferably through a travel agency as backing for his credit status. Next best is to make the reservation personally by mail or telephone a week or so ahead. But even one made a day or two before arrival gives status better than a walk-in's.

Room choice and price. It is an axiom in the hotel business that occupants of the higher-priced rooms (particularly the corner suites, which are often used for entertainment) can get away with more noise and strange activity than ordinary guests. One should be careful, however, not to take an expensive room without proper attention to the establishment of a good credit impression, for high charges against an undetermined credit rating will arouse the concern of any credit manager.

Credit cards. The room clerk will often tactfully ask for these on registration. If not, the case officer would do well to show them casually, if the situation allows, as a good way of establishing his credit and avoiding the prying eyes of the credit manager. He does not have to charge on a credit card, just let the front desk record the data. He could even flash a false credit card on arrival and then settle his bill by cash when leaving.

Luggage. The old jokes about one-night stands with a hat-box for the girl and a toothbrush for the man are really quite true; the notation "light luggage" is a warning signal in all hotels. Usually the room clerk or the bellman reports this condition to the Assistant Manager on duty or the Night Manager, and an entry is made on the room rack folio. The case officer could devise a story of a missed plane or some other explanation; but a suitcase, even filled with nothing but dirty clothes, would avoid the whole issue.

Special arrangements. In large hotels it is more common than may be recognized that "special arrangements" are made for a guest. These may concern diet, laundry service, or a wide range of conveniences. One of operational interest provides for holding incoming telephone calls and informing the guest who is calling. Another is a "no information" arrangement: it is noted on the room rack and at the telephone switchboard that if anyone inquires for the guest he is to be told there is no record of him. A request for this service would not strike the hotel staff as anything out of the ordinary.

Mr. and Mrs. If a woman is involved in the operation and must come to the hotel, it is best either to have her take a separate room or to register her as the case officer's wife. No matter how improbable the couple, the Mr.-and-Mrs. registration is better than none. Hotel managers, acutely aware that lawsuits and other troubles can result from harassment of couples who may turn out to be really married, normally accept such a registration without prying. But an unregistered woman's comings and goings will be noted by the hotel staff, particularly after early evening (or later if there is an upstairs or roof-top night club or restaurant patronized by outsiders).

Day use. Room occupancy, at a reduced rate, for one day and up to 6 p.m. only is generally encouraged by hotels for the extra revenue it brings in. It is practiced almost exclusively by businessmen for meetings and other such purposes. As for any registration, a normal reservation, naturally with a business address, is desirable. Out-of-town women sometimes take day-use rooms when shopping in the city; but the unaccompanied female in a hotel is always scrutinized more closely than a man. In most hotels tape recorders and typewriters can be rented in conjunction with day-use rooms. It is a good idea to take advantage of this service, whether to use the

machines in debriefings, say, or just to increase the business atmosphere of the occupancy.

Procedures During Occupancy

In a large hotel, especially if it is full to capacity, one can get away with almost anything for about 24 hours, short of continuous loud noises. A hotel staff is usually stretched very thin when all rooms are occupied, when ceremonial affairs bring in many dignitaries, or when they are serving large banquets. Moreover, the management will generally not take any action against a guest until it has monitored his behavior for a reasonable time.

In going about his business in his room, the case officer should keep in mind two chief hazards. First, the only way to prevent physical entry by members of the hotel staff is the chain latch, the ordinary lock being no bar to them. Maids, bellmen, and assistant managers, particularly in Europe, make a common practice of entering without knocking. Second, whatever the soundproofing of walls, ceiling, and floor, the room door is a weak point in the insulation and the place where a staff member's ear will promptly be cocked if suspicion or interest is aroused.

Moreover, the staff has legitimate need to enter from time to time, the maids daily. There is no surer way to draw attention to a room than to hang a "Do Not Disturb" notice permanently on the doorknob. After about eight hours it will be brought to the attention of the Head Housekeeper, who may ask the Assistant Manager to make sure no accident has befallen the guest. Complete isolation can be arranged for a period by calling the front desk and giving some pretext for requesting freedom from all disturbances including phone calls. Such a request, recorded at the front desk and passed on to the Housekeeping Department, will give perhaps 24 hours without interruptions from the hotel staff.

When the maid enters a room she wants to make it up quickly and get out; she usually has more work than she can handle. As long as nothing arouses her special interest, therefore, she will do her job and leave. (Beware the maid who stops and talks. She disobeys a strict rule in saying more than "Good day" to a guest—and probably has a purpose in it, to solicit "business," perhaps, or get information.) She is responsible, while straightening up the room, for checking evidence (beds, toothbrushes, etc.) that two or more people are using one registered as a single. If she sees anything suspicious she will tell her Floor Housekeeper, who will report it to the front office. The front office will then usually telephone the occupant or stop him the next time he is at the desk and ask whether anyone is staying with him. The penalty would usually be only an extra charge for double occupancy, but the staff's attention has thus been attracted. It would be better either to register the double or to be careful to remove any evidence before the maid enters.

Because of the theft problem, maids are constantly under close supervision by the management and security staffs. Unless a maid is a thief she will therefore rarely try to open any luggage or even drawers, and a room is fairly secure if all telltale equipment and papers are locked up in luggage while she is there. If someone must be in the room continuously, he should give the maid some excuse such as a headache. The grapevine in a hotel is extremely fast and effective, and anything unusual will be passed on by word of mouth until it arouses the management's suspicion. Although a guest who remains constantly in his room violates no hotel rule, he thus invites investigation.

Room service, laundry boys, and other service personnel will enter a room only if called. But they are notoriously observant, and the room should be cleared of anything unusual before they are called.

In the matter of services it is also hazardous to charge too much on a hotel bill. If a credit card has been presented on registering, it may be all right to charge a reasonable amount to the room; but if credit standing has not been firmly established, any sizable charges—say more than $25 in one day—would come to the attention of the Credit Manager. It is his job to review daily any bills that seem to be getting unduly large. Even with credit established, excesses in the use of room service and charging to the room are bound to attract attention.

If a case officer or his agent is to stay a long time in the hotel so that his bill will be large, it is imperative that he establish a good credit impression at the outset. (This may be a particular problem when an agent's hotel bill is to be paid not by him but by mail. A business letter making the arrangement in advance is the ideal solution, but short of that a personal visit to the Credit Manager before a large bill piles up is advisable.) During a long stay, an interim bill may appear in one's room or front desk letterbox. This is ordinarily intended as a reminder of the size of the account, not as a hard demand for payment. But it is an excellent idea, if you get such a

notice, to inform the front desk how much longer you will be staying and ask if they would like you to pay the bill up to date. This will make a good impression on the Credit Manager, who gets some of his ulcers from guests that are never seen while their bills run up into the hundreds of dollars.

No telephone in a hotel can be trusted. During the day, when the operators are busy, calls are only occasionally monitored; but at night, when phone traffic is light, it is common for the operators to monitor *all* conversations, even internal ones between rooms. Long-distance calls they usually monitor at all hours of the day, particularly when the charges are reversed. These practices, the result of police requirements and hotel efforts to control organized prostitution, together with operators' curiosity and boredom, are world-wide. The rule about increased snooping at night applies, incidentally, to other employees than the operators: the staff tends to be busy during the day with its regular work, but its inquisitiveness and capacity for observation go up sharply after six p.m. and practically double after ten.

Should a guest fall under suspicion for any reason, the usual procedure is as follows: The Assistant Manager is alerted during the day, or the Night Manager at night. Before taking any action, he usually tries to verify whatever was reported by sending hotel security officers to check the room involved. If the room is occupied they will listen outside and mount a surveillance in the hall (usually standing near the elevators as if waiting for a car). If they think that something may be wrong, the Assistant Manager will then come to inquire or investigate what is going on inside.

The case officer's best defense against such an investigation is of course to avoid creating any suspicion in the first place. But if the Assistant Manager or Night Manager presents himself at the door, reasonable answers to any questions will usually end the inquiry. The importance of the often-forgotten cover story is clearly evident here. If nothing else works, a last resort is to show pure outrage. A demand for the Manager will at least win some time, for even at this stage the hotel staff will be nervous about pushing too hard. A mistake would be very hard for them to explain, and people staying in large hotels often have money and connections. Thus a bold front can stop the Assistant or Night Manager at the door and force him to get the Manager or the police, or both, in order to gain entry.

If a room is unoccupied when the investigation is first mounted, it may be entered and searched. Then if suspicions appear to be confirmed it might be double-locked with a special key that turns the night latch from the outside and prevents the guest from reentering on his own. So if a case officer returns to his room and finds that his key will no longer open the door, it may mean that it has been purposely double-locked. He then has the choice of going down to the front desk, where a problem could be waiting, or skipping out and abandoning whatever effects he has in the room.

Keys and Security

Hotel keys are usually controlled by the Manager's office or the Security Department. There are the following types:

Grand Master. This key will open all the rooms in the hotel. It is controlled as strictly as possible; only the Manager and Department Heads have copies of their own. The Night and Assistant Managers share one, passing it from one to another as they come on duty.

Floor Master. This is the key the maids carry; it opens all guest rooms on one floor. Each maid takes a key from the Housekeeping Department office when she starts work, carries it fastened around her waist, and turns it in at the end of her shift.

Section Master. Usually intended for maintenance workers, this key opens all maintenance doors in one area. Copies are controlled by the Engineering Department.

Room Keys. These are controlled by the front desk; there are usually at least four for each room.

Individual hotel locks can usually be changed a maximum of four times before the grand master has to be changed, a prohibitively expensive job. In practice the individual locks are infrequently changed even when copies of the keys are lost. It is an excellent idea to build up a collection of keys from a hotel which is of special operational interest. By billeting staff personnel, transients, and agent contacts in it you can collect a good assortment over a period of time. Each key means at least entry to one room, and enough keys from one floor may give an expert locksmith the clues he needs to reproduce the floor master. If enough floors are represented in the collection, even the grand master can be fabricated.

Although the regulations of most large hotels clearly provide for strict control of keys, the strictness varies widely in different hotels

according to enforcement measures taken by the Manager and the Chief Security Officer. Since keys become status symbols among the hotel staff they tend to show up in the possession of some personnel not entitled to them, but just what irregularities one might find in an individual hotel cannot be predicted.

The hotel security forces almost always have close links with the local police; the Chief Security Officer and most of his staff are usually ex-policemen. The two groups exchange information regularly, and the local authorities seldom take any action in the hotel without the knowledge and cooperation of the Chief Security Officer. The Security Department has a twofold mission, to protect the hotel and to protect the guests; and its staff is divided into two corresponding sections. Those guarding the hotel usually have uniforms, while those concerned with guest relations more often wear plain clothes or inconspicuous jackets supplied by the hotel. The plain-clothes types, nevertheless, are as a rule easily recognizable, for they stay in the lobby near the Assistant Manager's desk when not sent off on some special duty, and they stand out prominently when the lobby is not crowded. The uniformed guards, on the other hand, move about the hotel according to a regular pattern; they are more concerned with checking entrances and fire exits and other physical security matters than with monitoring guests' activities.

In general, the more intelligent officers of the security staff are assigned to the section concerned with guest relations. It is worth remembering that the status of all the security officers except the Chief is rather low. Although they may pretend to some authority in dealing with guests, there is actually very little that they are empowered to do. They are only aides to the management and rarely allowed to act independently. Although they are often not armed, it is best to assume they are.

The position of "house detective" is more or less peculiar to the United States. It is often filled by a licensed private investigator. He may be granted a considerable independence of action compared with ordinary security officers, and he is generally armed.

Agent Potential

It would of course be highly desirable to have a recruitment on the staff of any hotel regarded as a target in audio or other operations. (This fact is so evident that we must assume other intelligence services in the area will also be trying to acquire assets on the staff.)

The following paragraphs describe in some detail the attributes of the various positions, their work functions, their status in the administrative setup, and their potential for intelligence purposes. It will be noted that none of the positions from the "back of the house" are included, such as those in the kitchen, restaurants, or steward department. These, which usually have little or no access to upper floors of the hotel, are not worth examining.

Before we proceed to look at the individual positions, we should note a few characteristics of hotel staffs in general. The pay for hotel employees is fairly low at practically all levels. By giving free meals and supplying uniforms hotels are often able to offer lower salaries than they would otherwise have to. This situation increases the importance of the practice of tipping. Throughout the entire spectrum of hotel transactions, various kinds of tips, kickbacks, and commissions are customary. Some are more overt than others, but personnel from the Manager down to the restaurant bus boy are accustomed to getting a monetary reward for any extra service. This being the case, the typical hotel employee exhibits two interesting characteristics: he is usually short of money, and he expects to make extra income by performing various services for superiors or guests. He therefore might tend to be more susceptible to approaches by intelligence officers and perhaps easier to recruit and control than many other employee types of comparable operational interest.

Front Desk and Office

Room Clerk. This is the man behind the front desk who registers new guests. He must be presentable and fairly fluent in languages spoken by the hotel's usual clientele. Often he is a young man, just starting out in the business, and receives very little pay. His status in the hotel is rather low—a little higher than a secretary—and he has no authorized access to keys or rooms. He can be useful, however, in that he knows who is in the hotel, when VIP's will arrive, and which rooms they probably will occupy. He also has enough latitude in room assignments to place an ordinary guest in a room of his choice. He is usually well plugged into the hotel grapevine and knows many details about the activities of guests and staff alike.

Senior Night Clerk. Usually the most competent room clerk, he has command of the front desk during the night, a position in which he works closely with the Night Manager. His duties are more

extensive than those of an ordinary room clerk; he may even look into minor troubles in upstairs rooms if the Night Manager wishes. He has no official access to keys but can get any key he desires for a short period. He has the operational potential of a room clerk plus a degree of mobility at night that would make him more useful than the latter.

Front Office Manager. This is the head man behind the front desk. He usually works a normal day and is not in the hotel at night. As a department head, he has his own grand master key and may move through the hotel at his discretion without question. Usually, however, his job keeps him tied to the front office. Besides having somewhat better access in the hotel than his subordinates, he attends the top management's monthly or weekly meetings where the hotel's activities are reviewed and discussed.

Hotel Services

Bellman. Although traditionally the eyes and ears of a hotel, the bellman is not ordinarily an attractive agent prospect. He spends much of his time in the lobby, leaving it only on specific errands such as carrying luggage for the guests. Any long absence would come to the attention of his fellow bellmen and his Captain or Head Bellman. He has no direct access to keys, receiving room keys only in connection with check-ins and occasionally a floor master from the Captain for delivering or getting something from a room. His pay is very small, but tips still make the job attractive. His greatest potential for operations lies in the fact that he is somehow always tuned to the grapevine and knows a vast amount about the hotel, staff, and guests. One drawback to using him is that management watches him constantly for signs of theft, graft, or pimping.

Head Bellman or Bell Captain. This is an operationally interesting position whose incumbent ordinarily has contacts for getting anything the hotel's guests may want—show tickets, plane reservations, special restaurant tables, rented cars, guides, women. These activities of his are usually known to the management; he operates with their blessing. Thus he has both extensive connections on the outside and a good deal of authority within the hotel, particularly at lower levels. He receives many kinds of favors and kickbacks and makes in all good money. Moreover, he keeps a close eye on the activities of the service staff, bellmen, elevator operators, and doormen, using an iron hand to prevent their engaging in any of *his* sidelines with the guests. He does not ordinarily have access to a grand master key but has the next best thing; copies of the floor masters are kept at his station for bell service to all guest rooms. Although he himself seldom has reason to leave the lobby or go to a guest's room, his authority over the other bellmen might make him an ideal primary agent. With the right operational flair, he could get his subordinates to carry out intelligence tasks without difficulty, for he alone controls their activities.

Room Service. Room service personnel do not have the high potential as recruits they might seem to at first glance. These waiters are under the strict control of the kitchen; a special Room Service Manager, the Chief Steward, or a *sous-chef* always keeps an eye on their activities, especially the amount of time they spend away from the kitchen. None of the waiters has access to keys, and all are watched closely by hotel security for signs of thieving. Their only real operational potential lies in being tuned to the hotel grapevine and being able to enter guests' rooms upon routine request.

Housekeeping Department

Maid. Like the room service waiters, hotel maids would seem promising as agents; they spend most of every day inside guests' rooms. There are several cracks, however, in this initial picture. In any hotel the maid is one of the most carefully watched employees because of her unusually good opportunities to engage in petty theft, spotting for real burglary, and prostitution. She rarely controls which floor she will work on any given day, being assigned where she is most needed. She usually has a floor master for the area, as many as 15 to 18 rooms on one or two floors. The Floor Housekeepers are responsible for keeping each maid under close supervision while she works and for checking her work carefully. A maid is likely to be not overly intelligent and is relatively expendable; she can be fired without much ceremony if her immediate superiors are at all dissatisfied with her work. In summary, both her low status on the staff and the closeness with which she is watched limit her utility.

Floor Housekeeper. This is a senior maid who controls several floors during the day, overseeing the ordinary maids there. She makes out various daily reports for the housekeeping and front offices, recording rooms occupied, the number of people in each room, and other data. She is a cut or two above her maids in natural ability and is usually experienced in the hotel as well. Unlike the maids, she always supervises the same floor. Her access to keys is on a par with other

maids'—floor masters for her area. Her salary is rather low. She has an operational potential similar to that of a Bell Captain in controlling the activities of several maids. But she has more mobility herself and can enter guests' rooms on her floors with comparative ease. Within the limits of her floor assignment, her access is surpassed only by the Head Housekeeper's.

Night Maid, Night Floor Housekeeper. These perform the same general duties as their daytime counterparts, but there are usually fewer of them. This means that they will ordinarily have larger areas of access and be freer from direct supervision.

Head Housekeeper. This seems to be one of the best positions in the hotel for operational exploitation. The position is always filled by a woman, usually one between 30 and 50. Often she will have got her experience in other hotels, and she may even be entirely foreign to the country, having been brought in especially to fill this job, considered quite an important one by hotel management. Thus she may belong to the small segment of the staff which is professional, not just recruited from local labor sources. She may be widowed, divorced, or single; she usually lives in the hotel. She is probably more a woman of the world than other women on the staff and more susceptible to approach and cultivation than a maid.

As a department head, the Head Housekeeper has her own grand master key. She is very knowledgeable of hotel activities and planning. Above all, she has unlimited access to the guest floors and need never explain her doings there, for she must keep constant check on the Floor Housekeepers' and maids' performance. Anything the maids or Floor Housekeepers report concerning the guests comes to her before anyone else, and at her discretion she may deal with it herself or pass it to the Assistant Manager. Another noteworthy fact is that she controls all room furnishings, lamps, and appliances, which are replaced by her department as necessary. Her position is of such importance in the hotel and her cooperation with Security so close in controlling the maids that she herself is almost immune from security observation. Her 100% access to the guest rooms is, however, pretty much limited to daytime; she rarely works at night.

Management

Assistant Managers. This position is somewhat ambiguous, ranging from a glorified floorwalker's in some cases to one ranking above the Front Office Manager in others; it all depends on the Manager's desires. But even when he has no power to make any real decisions, the Assistant Manager remains one of the more attractive operational targets. During the day he will always be in nominal control of the security officers on duty and will be the man to whom the Head Housekeeper reports any problems that need investigation upstairs. In addition, he usually makes at least one room inspection daily to check on the Housekeeping Department. His access to keys is not as good as that of a department head, in that the on-duty grand master which he uses is passed to his relief, who must see and sign for it. But during his time on duty each Assistant Manager has complete control of the key. His position in the top echelon of management—even though at the bottom of it—also gives him quite a bit of freedom from direct supervision. His superior may be either the Executive Assistant Manager or the Front Office Manager, depending on the hotel's policy, but he has more or less a free hand in dealing with daily problems, calling in his superiors only if something quite serious occurs. His pay is usually the lowest at management level. Although he is normally on duty in the front lobby, he is free to visit and investigate the upper floors as the situation requires.

Night Manager. During the day there are usually three or four Assistant Managers who follow one another on duty somewhat like changes of a military guard. But at 11 p.m. the Night Manager takes on the combined duties of Manager, Assistant Manager, Front Office Manager, and Chief Security Officer until 8 a.m. He thus rolls more functions into one person than any of the other managerial officers. Working at hours when most of the remaining staff are off, he has complete control while on duty. It is evident that he is one of the most promising recruitment targets in any hotel. His access with the rotating grand master key is limited only by the fact that he must not be away from the lobby too long at a time. Any serious action the hotel takes against a guest at night is initiated and controlled by the Night Manager. The security officers on duty, like the rest of the night staff, answer to him for all their activities. He is usually a professional of some years' experience in the hotel business. He almost invariably likes this position for the freedom of action and decision it gives, and the challenge of handling the many varied problems that develop in a big hotel at night.

Executive Assistant Manager. Usually the number two man in the hotel, this is another attractive target. He has unquestioned access to all parts of the hotel with his own grand master key, and

he takes part in all hotel planning. There is operational potential in the fact that he—along with only the Manager and the Front Office Manager—can arrange special accommodations for VIP's, particular friends of the hotel, and other special guests. His operational limitations lie in his very authority, for he is almost too senior to appear upstairs on the guest floors and is tied almost constantly to executive tasks at his desk.

Manager. Little need be said about the Manager, who, being the top man, is clearly of great interest as a possible recruit. His power is akin to that of a ship captain, almost absolute. He is personally responsible to the owners for the profitable and orderly functioning of the hotel and within that framework is more or less at liberty to run it as he sees fit. Like anyone in such a top management position, however, he is somewhat removed from the hotel's day-to-day routines, and much of his activity will lie outside the hotel proper.

Proposed planning guide in four phases of "national liberation" wars.

THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

Walter Steinmeyer

Experience during the past decade in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Indochina, the Congo, and other such hot spots has been variegated enough to provide some ground for generalizing about the role an intelligence agency should play in the U.S. effort to combat "wars of national liberation." This is the field in which U.S. security is for some time to come, under conditions of nuclear stalemate, most likely to be challenged, as the Soviet Union, Red China, and Cuba exploit for their own purposes dissension, turmoil, and impatience for reform in Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. No set of rules can be universally applicable to all the diverse situations that now exist and will arise, but an outline of the part a civilian clandestine service should take in helping meet these challenges can at least serve as point of departure in preparing to confront a particular one of them. To suggest such an outline is the purpose of this article.

Cadre Phase

The Communist-instigated "war of liberation" begins with a period in which the local Communist party or the local residenturas of the KGB or Chinese or Cuban intelligence service are spotting, assessing, and recruiting candidates for guerrilla training and political indoctrination. When such an agent has been recruited he is sent for his training to the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, usually via a devious clandestine route. A Peruvian traveling to the guerrilla warfare schools in Cuba, for example, may fly, using his Peruvian passport, first to Paris, where his contacts from the Cuban intelligence service meet him and give him a Cuban passport with which to travel Paris-Prague-Havana. The record in the bona fide Peruvian passport thus shows no travel to Communist countries. After three to six months' training in Cuba he reverses these steps and returns to Peru as one of the hard-core cadres charged with preparing the insurgency.

In this phase six aspects of the clandestine service mission can be specified:

- To find out what persons and procedures are used in selecting candidates for training and then to penetrate this spotting, assessment, and recruitment machinery in order to identify the cadres. This effort will include penetration of the local Communist party.
- To identify and counter, using counterintelligence techniques, cadre-phase operations of the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban intelligence residenturas.
- To expose publicly what the Communists are doing and how, and to show how the people of the country can contribute to resisting them.
- To seek by political-action measures to orient and motivate the host government to cooperate in clandestine operations against the cadre buildup and in preparations for combatting later phases of the insurgency. This means that the government must have or develop an effective security agency with arrest powers and counterintelligence competence, sufficiently secure for liaison with the U.S. service. Ideally this agency should maintain travel controls over all citizens going abroad.
- To conduct, if necessary, political-action programs to put teeth into the country's anti-subversive laws. The government must be able to neutralize subversives not by sending them into exile but by putting them in jail.
- To help the country's military or police forces establish and train a crack guerrilla-killer unit to be deployed tactically in later phases. The unit should not exceed battalion size, about 200 men; its strength should lie in the quality of its personnel, their training and leadership, and in its mobility, fire power, communications, and tactics.

Incipient Phase

When the guerrilla trainee returns to his homeland he is usually tied into the local Communist party or the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban intelligence residentura to get funds and guidance in developing the support structure for an active guerrilla campaign. (Sometimes his support and guidance come from an adjacent country.) In this incipient phase the returned agent begins his procurement of weapons, ammunition, and safehouses and settles on a rural area for his initial operations. Within this area he picks a location for his base camp and begins to cultivate the sympathies of the peasantry around it within radius of a six-hour march. He will need these peasants for logistical support and tactical intelligence.

When the groundwork is completed, the agent moves in with five to ten companions. After orienting itself in its surroundings, this incipient guerrilla band begins its political indoctrination of the peasants and the terrorizing with raids and burnings of all who remain hostile. Gradually it gains new recruits, trains and equips them, and puts them into the field. When it has grown to more than 20 men and survived what initial measures the conventional military or police forces could take against it, it has matured as a guerrilla unit and completed the incipient phase.

In this phase, the U.S. service, if feasible jointly with the government's security agency, should undertake the following kinds of operations:

- Identify the guerrilla agent as he returns from training or as soon thereafter as possible. Sources may be travel-control data or penetrations of the Communist party or recruitment machinery.
- Identify rural and urban safehouses established in support of the guerrilla program. This can be done through surveillance of the returning agent, through penetrations, or through informant nets set up in likely rural areas (see below).
- Identify and block the guerrilla's channels for arms and ammunition procurement. This can generally be done by the government's customs and border patrol forces. Intelligence penetrations will help.
- Survey rural areas suitable for guerrilla bands and gather terrain intelligence, with emphasis on such things as water sources, potential ambush sites, and possible drop zones for the guerrilla-killer unit. Bear in mind that the guerrilla usually cannot operate farther than a six hours' march from his base.
- Establish highly selective informant networks in potential guerrilla areas as a source of tactical intelligence for the guerrilla-killer unit if guerrillas do begin operations there. Such a network can be handled by the police units in the area in question, or some other apparatus can be set up for this essential job.
- Mount organized, professional civic-action programs to promote loyalty to the government among the populace of potential

guerrilla areas. Convince the people that steps are being taken to right social, economic, and political wrongs.

Begin guerrilla-killer operations as soon as intelligence indicates the presence of an incipient guerrilla band. Tactics are sustained pursuit, ambushes, destruction of the base camp, denial of water and supplies, and finally direct confrontation in a fire fight. Nothing is so effective in stopping the development of guerrilla bands as eliminating those who have just finished training and taken to the field for the first time.

Operational Phase

If the guerrilla movement is successful, in spite of all countermeasures taken during the cadre and incipient phases, in establishing several bands of twenty or more men each in some region, it has become a real threat to the country. In this operational phase, the guerrillas try to consolidate their control of the region. Though they keep the individual bands compartmented, they coordinate their activities so as to make the maximum political and tactical impact on the area. They may thus drive the government forces out of the area completely; at least they break down the government's control over it at night. Area consolidation, in turn, enables the guerrilla to expand his supply mechanism, improve his collection of tactical intelligence, and obtain new recruits for his units.

This, in essence, is the tactic Fidel Castro used so successfully when he went into the Sierra Maestra. It is also what the FALN did in Falcón state in Venezuela. The longer the guerrillas can keep operating in one area, the more likely they are to consolidate a political and operational base there and then break out to other areas. When they get to the point that they can move with some freedom at battalion level in an area, the operational phase of insurgency gives way to one of covert warfare.

During the operational phase, the U.S. clandestine service and the host government need to take the following actions:

Intensify the effort to get intelligence on the guerrillas' strength, disposition, and plans.

Step up counterintelligence operations against the guerrillas' logistic support apparatus.

Mount psychological operations to keep the pro-government flame of resistance alive in guerrilla-controlled areas. A portion of the psychological effort should also be targeted against the insurgents themselves, offering them rehabilitation if they surrender. (Those who do should be sent to training centers for vocational and political reorientation.)

Intensify civic-action programs in the areas adjacent to those the guerrillas hold in order to prove to the populace in both that sustained cooperation with the government will produce a better and freer economic and social way of life than the guerrillas can offer.

Step up the number and intensity of guerrilla-killer operations, using the killer unit at maximum capacity to eliminate guerrilla bands in fire fights. Give victories wide publicity in all media throughout the country.

If the guerrillas are receiving logistical support from a contiguous country, and if their supply depots there can be identified, mount hit-and-run commando raids against them. Whether the commandos are drawn from the military establishment of the country in question or brought in for the purpose from a third country, they should use bandit cover in order to provide for plausible denial. Nevertheless the raids, in addition to their primary objective of destroying the depots, are intended to call attention to the supplying nation's interference in the affairs of its neighbor.

Establish population controls, giving priority to districts adjacent to the guerrilla area. The key item in the control system is an identification document issued within a limited time to all residents of a given area. This census certification, as it were, not only makes it more difficult for guerrillas to pass themselves off as innocent local farmers during the daytime but provides a point of departure for systematic counterintelligence operations.

Organize popular self-defense forces, or citizens' militia, in districts adjacent to the guerrilla areas. Controlled by the conventional military establishment and properly motivated, these forces can contribute to containing the guerrillas through a strategic hamlet program, creating strong points for protection of the people and as bases for offensive operations.

Bring the conventional military forces into full play in large sweep and encirclement operations mounted in coordination with the guerrilla-killer unit. As the guerrillas are dispersed

by the sweep and are heading for safe areas the guerrilla-killer force can both set up ambushes and engage in hot pursuit. With its superior training and equipment it should generally outrun and outfight the scattering guerrilla.

Covert Warfare Phase

When the insurgents get to operating in battalion strength in two or more large regions and running raids and terror into other areas in preparation for expansion, when pitched fire fights are held between them and the government's conventional troops and the latter begin to suffer heavy losses, when a guerrilla-killer force of battalion size is no longer adequate, then covert war is in full swing, exceeding the scope of a civilian agency's paramilitary capability. This means that the U.S. military establishment must begin to provide the government forces with large amounts of equipment and send out advisers to work with them at company level.

In this phase there is still, however, more than enough work for the U.S. civilian service to do:

- Provide airlift capacity, usually under commercial cover, to move government forces and supplies to combat areas or to bring in mercenaries as combat troops or as advisers.
- Furnish demolition technicians and other instructors for expanded training programs among the government forces.
- Continue and expand intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations, psychological programs to arouse a sense of national unity and purpose, civic-action enterprises, and "bandit" raids on adjacent-country supply depots.

Conventional Warfare Phase

When the enemy decides that his strength is sufficient to confront the government forces in decisive battle, as at Dien Bien Phu, and the United States decides to intervene in this overt conventional warfare, then the U.S. manpower needed can come only from the defense establishment. At this point the civilian intelligence agency's resources in the country are put at the disposal of the U.S. military commander. At his direction they will carry out intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations, and covert psychological and political programs. Their paramilitary operations will be redirected to raids and harassments, the promotion of escape and evasion, and the development of resistance nuclei in the enemy's rear.

Apologia

Faced with almost any concrete situation, this general statement will be found at many points inapropos. In some ways it is too incomplete, in others too inclusive. It is not meant to imply, for example, that a U.S. clandestine service should direct overt propaganda or civic action campaigns if the appropriate U.S. agencies are there to do these things. But in some times and places it must.

The outline calls for some actions that have been tried in the past in concrete situations and have failed. But it may be the situation, not the course of action, was wrong. Or maybe the actions were carried out less than perfectly.

The outline concentrates on the rural aspects of insurgency. This does not mean that urban terrorism is of little importance. But "wars of national liberation" must take and hold territory if they are to succeed, and there is established doctrine competent to deal with urban terrorism as an adjunct to insurgency.

We hope, as we said, that our generalizations may be useful as a point of departure. But if the essay even contributes to focusing thought on the problems that occasioned it, it will, despite acknowledged limitations, serve a purpose.

National stereotypes and wishful thinking as they impinge on the intelligence officer's views.

PEARL HARBOR: ESTIMATING THEN AND NOW

A. R. Northridge

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, submarines and aircraft from a Japanese fleet whose presence was totally unsuspected by our defense establishment attacked American military installations and naval vessels in the Hawaiian Islands. Achieving complete surprise, the attack was a great success. It crippled our retaliatory powers for more than a year, while the enemy escaped all but unscathed.

The name Pearl Harbor has become a symbol of our disastrous failure to read rightly the many omens in the weeks preceding that pointed to war and even to this attack. Reviewing the events and the climate of opinion of those times, it seems clear to me that we failed to foresee the Japanese assault largely because we were influenced by a faulty stereotype of what was an adversary nation.[1] Today, progress in the arts of weaponry and technical intelligence collection make unlikely another Pearl Harbor kind of surprise attack, but the faulty stereotype that can lead to grave miscalculation of an adversary's capability and intent remain with us, almost as a human condition. This fact is one I believe every estimating intelligence officer should keep in the forefront of his consciousness.

Among the more curious aspects of human relations is this stereotype, or "image," that one people forms of another. The assortment of stereotypes it holds about others is an integral component of a people's social myth—the collection of beliefs, however derived, by

[1] Of the extensive literature on Pearl Harbor, the most valuable single book is *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, 1962), by Roberta Wohlstetter. In studying the circumstances of the intelligence failure she puts most emphasis on the fact that our intelligence community was confused by a multiplicity of irrelevant signals—noise that corrupted our data input. Certainly this is a valid point, and in a sense my "stereotype" constitutes a particular kind of noise. But my thesis is more closely related to the view, which Wohlstetter also treats, of Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador to Japan at the time, who said, "National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic."

which it orders its political life, including its relationships with other national states. Some parts of a stereotype, though rarely the entire construct, are uniformly the same throughout the society holding it; some are different, even contradictory. Objectively, some parts of it are quite true, some partly true, and others totally untrue. The willful, wishful, or purposeful may hold some parts true even in the face of strong evidence to the contrary.

These stereotypes constitute the intelligence officer's greatest peril, particularly in his estimative role, because he cannot escape their influence. They form the greater part of his "input" on the problem at hand. Even though he may shut out invalid elements that he is aware of, as he reviews his materials he is bombarded by the stereotype's other elements. When he accepts a line of thought from another, say an expert in some field, he takes the risk that this opinion has been influenced by those very elements in the stereotype that he himself has rejected. He is thus inevitably and to some degree unwittingly more or less under the influence of ideas that he might consciously reject.

The Japan Stereotype

What sort of people did Americans, at the time of Pearl Harbor, believe the Japanese to be, and what did they believe about Japanese intentions toward themselves? The American view was ambiguous and shot through with inconsistencies. At the extremes it ran contrary to observed data and to common sense, but its main lines might be summarized something like this: "The Japanese people, given the conflicts of interest between us, will quite likely—or maybe only possibly—do us a mischief if they can; but they lack the capacity to harm us seriously, and they know that this is so. On the other hand, they are so cultivated and mannerly that it really is, after all, inconceivable that they would even try to harm us."

There was in the United States little doubt that Japan was an adversary and one of some consequence. In seizing Manchuria and invading China, the Japanese had acted in defiance of the League of Nations. Americans cherished peace, opposed aggression, and morally supported the League as "an instrument of peace." They made clear their displeasure at Japan's aggressive acts.

The Japanese could not be deterred without the use of force from their announced course of winning domination over eastern and southeastern Asia. As they pressed on, American interests suffered. American markets were preempted and some of our sources of commodities became Japanese monopolies. American treaty rights were abridged or ignored. Our Christian missions, not only evangelical but educational and medical missions as well, were hampered and their converts harassed. Living conditions for Americans in Japanese-occupied Asia and throughout China became all but unbearable, and the American presence there was much reduced.

These acts were, of course, greatly resented throughout the United States. It was generally clear that the Japanese wanted to eliminate our power in eastern Asia. Counteraction was often spoken of in the press, but the country as a whole was generally reluctant to resort to the use of armed force, the one thing that would inhibit our adversary. Why was this so?

For one thing, the Japanese had their apologists. While there was no denying that the general trend of their strategy was damaging our interests, it was argued by many Americans that all of this was after all going on in Asia. What real business had the United States in eastern Asia, where its mere presence threatened to involve it in a conflict between two other powers? The American in the Far East should come home. If he chose to stay, he was not entitled to protection. These were the isolationists talking.

The Wishers-Well

Others dismissed as propaganda any reports of Japanese atrocities or interpretations picturing Japanese action inimical to our interests. These were partisans of the Japanese, sometimes so vigorous in their partisanship as to deny known facts. I recall one instance when a China missionary, a clergyman of some distinction, told in calm and measured language how the Japanese had ravaged his parish and horribly abused his congregation. Another missionary, this one from Japan, after hearing out his colleague, proclaimed his disbelief. "I have worked with the Japanese for over thirty years," he said, "and I know that they simply would not act as you say they acted. Somehow you have been deceived."

If there was some wishfulness in this partisan thinking, there was more among the Far East experts in scholarly circles who believed that there was a "liberal" group in Japan that would somehow prevail over the fascistic militarists in power. These experts had a wide hearing in this country, and their argument was particularly dangerous. The Japanese liberals, they said, being a minority group and

very much at the mercy of the militarists, had to act discreetly, doing nothing to arouse the military clique against them. Americans who wished the liberals well had therefore to follow suit and avoid antagonizing the militarists. If they provoked them into retaliating against the liberals it would destroy the last hope of rescuing eastern Asia from military dictatorship. This was an exceedingly comforting line of thought: non-involvement, without sacrifice or risk, was the way to attain our aims.

There was another argument that was often related to this. The militarists, if we were only patient, would have to slow down. Japan had already swallowed more than she could digest; she could not administer or profit economically from more conquests. She might even have to disgorge much that she had already seized. This argument was heard when Japan moved into Manchuria; it was repeated when she occupied vast areas of China, including those most developed economically; it was sounded again when her armies were poised to take southeast Asia. Informed observers thus erected another hypothesis based on nothing more substantial than their predilections for a pleasant world that does not exist.

The Charms of Art

Another inconsistent facet of the stereotype was the warlike-peaceful quality of the Japanese. One would have thought it well established long before Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had demonstrated a great aptitude for martial exercises and pursued them diligently, often with relish. It should also have been clear that they were indifferent to the sufferings inflicted on their foes, combatant and noncombatant alike. That these were characteristic traits was clear enough to have been accepted automatically by all who heard the word Japanese. Yet their partisans managed to obscure this clarity, and here official organs of the Japanese government played a role.

One device used in Japan's overt international program, one that was extremely effective in countering the growing evidence that they were a cruel and barbarous people, was a beautifully produced series of publications on various aspects of Japanese art and literature. These were widely distributed and in particular made available to public schools at little or no cost. Of considerable artistic merit, they did much to foster a sentiment that people capable of producing such beauty could not have behaved so coarsely as they were being accused of acting.

Another program in the cultural field was similarly successful. For a number of years the quasi-governmental Japan Tourist Bureau had offered group tours to Japan, mainly on Japanese ships, at extremely low fares. There were six ships plying this trade from the U.S. west coast, and through the summer months they carried a large volume of American tourists. Few countries can show the foreign visitor a fairer face than Japan, and in those days probably none could give him more for his money.

In the autumn of 1938 my wife and I were exposed for several weeks to a party returning from such a visit aboard a Japanese vessel bound for Seattle. We were coming from a stay of several years in China, a year of it under Japanese military rule. The Japanese had often inconvenienced but never maltreated us, and neither of us had ever witnessed a Japanese atrocity, other than the impersonal atrocity that is an inevitable part of war. But by this time the infamous Rape of Nanking had taken place and the American river gunboat *Panay* had been sunk; and we were both deeply ashamed at the pusillanimity of our government's response to these actions. Indeed, we had taken passage on a Japanese ship only as a last resort.

We found ourselves totally unable to communicate with our fellow passengers about the Japanese aggression in Asia. All on board knew of Nanking and the *Panay*, but when we mentioned such things as these we found that the hospitality of the tour had operated to cancel any repugnance toward them. Although we attempted no crusade, we were not popular. It was as though we had mentioned before a gracious host and his guests some matter of no real concern to us which was vastly embarrassing to him.

Thus at a time when the Japanese most needed it, literally thousands of Americans were telling their friends and neighbors that first-hand observation had showed them a civilized, cultivated, honest, and gracious folk who displayed no sign of any bent for the horrible things being charged to them. Weren't we perhaps being misinformed, even by well-meaning people like our missionary clergy in China?

Incompetent Nippon

Aside from this ambiguity in the American view of Japan's martial proclivities in general, there was disagreement on the specific question whether Japan might attack the United States; and here the consensus was largely negative. It was thought that Japan would not

make war on us because of her limited military capability; she could never hope to succeed. There was some evidence, however, that bore on this point, and it was mainly to the contrary.

The Sino-Japanese war was not conducted in private. Official qualified observers from many nations were on hand, and their opportunities for observation varied from good to excellent. Large military actions took place in the environs of cities where extraterritorial privileges protected the foreigner. The hinterland was dotted with missionaries and, to a lesser extent, businessmen who could and did report to the service attaché what they had seen.

Generally speaking, the Japanese armies showed their competence wherever their performance was observable. While their Chinese opposition was inferior to most Western armies and not well supplied, some Chinese formations as large as army groups fought creditably, providing a fair test. Although there were some instances of faulty Japanese generalship, foreign attachés were greatly impressed by Japanese skill in retrieving victory from near-disaster in the campaigns around Shanghai. They were impressed by the Japanese ability to move large bodies of troops over difficult terrain where transportation facilities were primitive at best. They were struck by the power of the Japanese Army Air Force and by what little they saw of Japan's naval air arm. The morale, physical endurance, and the courage and state of training of the individual Japanese infantryman were noted and often admired. Japanese weapons were seen to be serviceable, if lacking the polish of comparable pieces used in Western armies. Japanese artillery was observed to be accurate in aim and surprisingly heavy in its destructive power.

The Japanese navy remained something of an enigma. It was involved in no fleet actions. It was observed only in convoy work, in the bombardment of shore targets, and, more rarely, in exercises by larger groups of ships. It was known, however, that the Japanese were a maritime people whose merchant shipping could be seen throughout the Seven Seas. They built and operated their own merchant marine, and in this activity they were a match for any country. Against the evidence of this performance, together with the little that could be discovered about their fighting ships, it would not be prudent to count their navy less capable than their ground and air forces.

Thus what the professional and other observers saw of the Japanese military, and presumably reported to the appropriate offices, did not square with the prevailing stereotype. Here the gap between image and reality was enormous. Three separate facets of the former come to mind. One was the often repeated statement that the Japanese people lacked inventive powers. They could imitate but not innovate. Their arms were no more than copies of Western models. An often told, widely believed tale had it that the latest Japanese capital ships were built from plans stolen from British naval shipbuilders, but British intelligence had learned of the theft plot in advance and substituted faulty blueprints. The Japanese followed these meticulously, so when the new ships were launched they turned turtle and sank, just as MI-6 had planned.

Another widespread belief was that Japan's industry could not turn out a durable product. It did turn out shoddy ones wherever the world market would absorb them, and these were cited, despite plainly visible evidence to the contrary, as showing the best it could do. It was, for example, the cheap Made-in-Japan light bulb which burned out after a few hours that found a place in the stereotype, not the magnificent hydroelectric systems which Japanese talent designed and built for the home islands, Korea, and Formosa.

The third fable entering the stereotype was that the anatomy of the Japanese was deficient. He was not physically able to use the weapons of modern war, particularly aircraft. His vision was so poor that he could not see to fly or bomb. His nervous reactions were faulty, limiting him to the most elementary aerobatics. Airborne, he was bound to be a total failure. On the day of Pearl Harbor we were often offered this comforting thought by the radio announcers who told us over and over again that this was going to be a short and easy war.

Some Estimates

On the evening of 5 December, an American university professor making a public address asserted, in response to questions, that he believed Japan would attack the United States, probably that weekend, and that the attack would almost certainly include a diversionary naval raid against Hawaii to deter us from reinforcing the Philippines, where the main weight of the assault would fall. The speaker had no formal military training nor access to classified information. He had lived in eastern Asia and had seen the Japanese army in action. He drew these conclusions from what he saw in the daily press, relating it to his current courses on the politics of the Pacific.

But on that same weekend a number of well-known figures in private and official life—both civil and military, area experts, journalists, businessmen, diplomats, and so on—were holding a colloquium sponsored by one of the leading journals of a midwestern city. The announced subject was "Peace in the Pacific," and there was general agreement among the speakers that for the United States there was little or no likelihood of military involvement in the Pacific.

A military intelligence appreciation of about the same time prognosticated concerning what would transpire in the event of Japanese-American hostilities. The omens, as the oracle read them, pointed to gigantic fleet actions here or there in the Pacific. There was a reference to the possibility of Japanese cruisers raiding our merchant shipping in the Gulf of Panama. There was none to the possibility of Japanese surface ships approaching the Hawaiian Islands.

What chance was there that the professional intelligence officer assigned to estimative duties could predict the Japanese assault on Hawaii, hampered as he was by the weight of public opinion and "expert" opinion voiced loudly in public? As I see it, only a little chance. The stereotype overcame him in the end. Since that time the practice of intelligence in the United States has improved greatly, but the opportunities for self-deception are at least as great as ever. Machinery has been built up where there was almost none before. Its effectiveness, however, still depends on the human element. No one has yet found a cure for our tendency to believe what we find most congenial and reject what seems repugnant.

New Stereotypes

In today's world, the catastrophic consequences of unbridled war make it unlikely that one great power will launch a massive surprise assault on another. The condition that gave rise to Pearl Harbor, however, remains unchanged or, if anything, exacerbated. This is the system of national states, under which the globe is partitioned among sovereign political entities, each dedicated to the principle of self-interest, seeking to expand its power at the expense of others and willing to resort to force to protect its position, prospects, or prestige. The struggle among these rival entities is carried on by means short of all-out war, and the political clash has become a more intricate and sophisticated battle than ever before. The main battlefield is now the new, needy, underdeveloped nations.

In the postwar struggle for power the Communists are the aggressors. They make no secret of their intent to number the new nations, along with the rest of the world, among their adherents. Their campaign employs every weapon in the arsenal of politics, including force or threat of force when they assess as small the risk of escalation into a conflict where the new weapon will be used. This renunciation of the ultimate force for political purposes is an historical novelty, a kind of warfare to which we are only gradually becoming accustomed. Some Communist tactics and elements of strategy we have probably not yet discerned, at least not clearly enough to devise countermeasures, and for others we have found no adequate defense.

One of their current successes reminiscent of Japanese strategy in the years before Pearl Harbor is the promotion of their own stereotype of the newly emerged nations. In part it is the familiar aesopian language of Communist discourse, the use of nomenclature that reverses accepted definitions and the persistent perversion of truth in the face of objective evidence. With this particular perversion their success has been phenomenal. The stereotype pictures a land that has been thoroughly victimized by a ruthless imperial power whose only motive in its relations with the colony was greed for gain. And this picture is imposed regardless of whether the colonial relationship ever really existed in fact. The "colony" may be a sovereign state, and the "imperialist power" need not hold or even desire hegemony over it.

Further, the Communist stereotype justifies behavior on the part of the so-called colony, or Communist-affiliated political elements within it, that they would call intolerable in an "imperialist" power or in a political party independent of their control. Any politically organized fragment affiliated with the Communists is hailed as a force for "national liberation," while its native political opponents are no better than the foreign colonizers, creatures of the imperialists dedicated to the suppression of freedom. The Communist bloc has as its historic mission and trust the support of wars and other efforts of liberation.

It is true that this stereotype is not wholly accepted in the non-Communist world, particularly the Communists' nobility in promoting wars of national liberation, but much of it is evident in the more "liberal" writings on underdeveloped countries. English and American writers about these countries have tended automatically to ex-

plain their great tribulations in independence as simply the result of their colonial experience. This attribution, often of dubious validity, leads them to refuse any credit—if they do not explicitly deny it, they omit to mention it—to colonial powers for actions beneficial to colonial populations. And their acceptance of this part of the Communist stereotype tends to lend credence to the rest.

In other matters one can see terminology creeping into our studies, or being excluded from them, in a way that suggests we are being influenced to think in concepts the Communists would like us to use. Our own writers, non-Communists, criticize a monarchial government as inappropriate to the times and cite its neighbor, a "people's democracy" that is in fact a repressive autocracy, as one the United States should cultivate. We use the word "capitalist" only as a technical term in economics, not to describe ourselves: the pejorative flavor imparted to it by the Communists has taken hold. Similarly, the Communists have given the word "bloc" an unpleasant connotation in its meaning of a political combination against a common adversary. Thus the term "capitalist bloc," the consolidation of which is certainly an American policy objective, we seldom use except in quoting a Communist document. These two examples of Communist tactical victories in our home field may not bring any tangible gain to the adversary, but they do tend to confuse and obfuscate the analyst, whether man in the street or intelligence officer.

* * *

As we pointed out, the intelligence officer now operates in a world of interstate relations immensely more complicated than anything he has known before. His guideposts are few and often misleading, and his experience tables are of little use to him. At the same time, his mistakes have a potential for damage undreamed of hitherto by man.

Order of battle, courtesy of helpful medics and the loyal press.

INTELLIGENCE STORY IN THREE PARTS

Contributed by
Edward M. Zivich [1]

Camp Near Falmouth, Va.
April 21, 1863

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

I would respectfully call your attention to the inclosed extract published in the Washington Morning Chronicle of April 17, 1863 with the correspondence of the medical director of this army in regard to same. Already all of the arithmeticians in the army have figured up the strength of sick and well, as shown in this published extract, as belonging to this army. Its complete organization is given, and in the case of two corps the number of regiments. The chief of my secret service department would have willingly paid $1,000 for such information in regard to the enemy at the commencement of his operations and even now would give that sum for it to verify the statements which he has been at great labor and trouble to collect and systemize.

By the inclosed correspondence it will be seen that it was not published by this army. I trust that the matter may receive attention and investigation at your hands.

Very respectfully, &c

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding

[1] From the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, War of the Rebellion*, Series I, Vol. XXV, part II, serial No. 40, pp. 239-241 and 790.

Surgeon-General's Office
Washington City, D.C.,
April 23, 1863

Brig. Gen. W. A. Hammond
Surgeon General, U.S. Army

General: To your inquiries in reference to the publication of a report of Surgeon Letterman, and my knowledge of the same, I have the honor to reply that about a week since the report referred to was received at this office, and read by me as an ordinary sanitary report. Soon after its reception, a newspaper reporter came into the office, and to his entreaties for news as to the health of the army, I let him copy the letter, directing him, however, to omit the address and signature, and any marks which might denote the official, and thus attach to it importance or credibility. . . . In this connection it might be stated the only newspaper reporters who visit this office belong to the New York Times and the Washington Morning Chronicle, both of which I believe to be loyal papers, and incapable of using to the public injury information that they might obtain . . .

Jos. R. Smith
Surgeon, U.S. Army

* * *

Head Quarters Army of
Northern Virginia
May 10, 1863

Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War:

Sir: . . . We are greatly outnumbered by the enemy now. Taking the report of Surgeon Letterman, medical director of General Hooker's army, the number of sick reported by him and the ratio of the sick to the whole number, his aggregate force, by calculation, amounts to more than 159,000 men . . .

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE
General [2]

[2] Lee could have used this information to advantage before his great battle at Chancellorsville, May 1-5. He did actually get an advance on it during the last week in April from the Signal Bureau, Richmond, but he was not given the source and so discounted it in favor of his own much lower estimate.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

New Light on Old Spies

A Review of Recent Soviet Intelligence Revelations

Espionage is needed by those who prepare for attack, for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace and does not intend to attack anyone. Therefore it has no intention of engaging in espionage.—Nikita Khrushchev to Saneo Nozaka, Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, 1962.

Until recently the average Soviet citizen, had he been asked, would have denied that his Government engaged in espionage against other states. Such a dirty practice, he could have added if he faithfully followed the official propaganda line, was employed only by the imperialists, with the USSR as their target. Had not the Soviet Union been compelled to create and maintain a state security service to protect itself from just such imperialist machinations?

The average Soviet, if he was ever so naive, is now disabused of his illusions. His government has reversed a policy in force since Lenin's day to admit that it has been practicing espionage abroad all the time. For reasons not yet clear, it has created a new hero: the intrepid intelligence agent spying abroad in peacetime for the Soviet fatherland at great personal sacrifice and danger.

By this action the Soviet regime has in effect surfaced the military intelligence service (GRU) to its own citizens. The hero intelligence operative has joined the hero Chekist in the Soviet pantheon. Moreover, the hero Chekist, hitherto portrayed as the valiant defender of the regime against foreign and domestic enemies, has now become an aggressive collector of intelligence abroad. For the first time since the Revolution the espionage exploits of the Soviet military intelligence service and state security have been officially acknowledged. True, the official accounts of these exploits must seem inadequate to any Soviet mind bold enough to reflect on the matter, but their quality is not the point at issue. The crucially significant fact is that Soviet espionage activities were surfaced at all. An official policy

Soviet Spy Heroes CONFIDENTIAL

dating back to the Revolution has been dramatically and unaccountably revised.

Richard Sorge

When surfacing the GRU, the Soviet authorities chose to highlight Richard Sorge, the German citizen whose exploits for Soviet military intelligence in China and Japan before the second world war, although never revealed in the Soviet Union, have been known in the West for almost two decades. Sorge's career in espionage, and especially his penetration of the Japanese government and the German embassy in Tokyo, had been earlier examined in detail by General Charles Willoughby, Hans Otto Meissner, and Chalmers Johnson.[1] Their works, although differing in detail and interpretation of events, are largely based on reports of the Japanese investigation of the Sorge network and certain memoirs and secondary publications. All are inaccurate in varying degrees. The Japanese investigation, the principal non-Communist source on the case, was inadequately handled and left many unanswered questions but did supply the broad outlines of the affair. David Dallin, it should be noted, has barely mentioned the case.[2] As of 1965, little had been added to our knowledge of the operation.

Richard Sorge has been surfaced in the Soviet Union by means of a series of newspaper articles and popular books. His glorification was begun in late 1964 with an article by Viktor Mayevskiy in *Pravda*.[3] Written after a visit to Sorge's grave in Tokyo, this article is an unrelieved panegyric on its subject. Other articles on Sorge in the Soviet central and provincial press quickly followed. Ya. Gorev, who is said to have served in the GRU with Sorge in Berlin, presented what seems to be an official account of Sorge's career.[4] Gorev claims to have helped prepare Sorge for his Far East assignment and to have operated near him there. His use of Sorge's letters and messages indicates that he had access to official files, but he has furnished little new data on the case. Sorge is presented as a paragon of virtue; his weakness for alcohol and women is ignored. Gorev's version of the Sorge operation generally corresponds to that presented by Meissner and Willoughby. In all probability he drew heavily on these sources.

Although Moscow has for some reason suppressed Gorev's account, the glorification campaign has continued unabated since late 1964. Persons who knew Sorge even slightly have given interviews for publication. On occasion, these individuals have admitted they did not know Sorge was engaged in intelligence work. Gerhardt Eisler has contributed a short memoir.[5] V. Kudryavtsev, a Tass correspondent in Tokyo during 1931-1937, told of meeting Sorge and Branko Vukelic in Japan.[6] He had no knowledge of their intelligence work at the time. Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, East German journalists, wrote a series of articles drawing on those by Mayevskiy and Gorev, interviews with Max Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, and with Gerhardt Eisler, and such Western sources as Meissner and Willoughby.[7] Except for certain details on Sorge's early life, these add relatively little.

Several people living outside the Soviet Union have recently contributed reminiscences of Sorge. Kai Moltke and Richard Jensen, former Communists, have written of Sorge's stay in Denmark during

[1] Major General Charles Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy, The Sorge Spy Ring* (New York, 1952); Chalmers Johnson, *An Instance of Treason* (Stanford, California, 1964); Hans Otto Meissner, *The Man With Three Faces* (New York, 1955). A German edition of Meissner's book, the title of which indicates its partially fictional character (*Der Fall Sorge: Roman Nach Tatsachen*) was published in Munich during the same year. Several short accounts of the Sorge case have appeared in espionage anthologies. Branko Vukelic, a member of Sorge's network in Japan, has been the subject of Yugoslav newspaper articles. See Dushan Cvetic, "Ko Je Branko Vukelich?" in *Politika Ekspres*, 4-20 November 1963.

[2] David J. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage* (New Haven, 1955).

[3] Viktor Mayevskiy, "Tovarishch Zorge" (Comrade Sorge) in *Pravda*, 4 September 1964.

[4] Ya. Gorev, "Ya Znal Zorge" (I Knew Sorge) in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 8 October 1964-1 November 1964. The Gorev articles were issued as a pamphlet under the same title in an edition of 240,000 copies (Moscow, 1964), but this publication was withdrawn from sale shortly after it appeared and has not been reissued up to this time. Gorev may be identical with Petr Aleksandrovich Skoblevskiy, a Soviet citizen who was arrested in Germany in 1923 and was tried in Leipzig two years later on charges of attempting the overthrow of the Weimar Republic. Skoblevskiy was later exchanged for Karl Kindermann and Theodor Wolscht, two German citizens who had been arrested in the USSR.

[5] Gerhardt Eisler, "Errinerrungen an Richard Sorge," in *Neues Deutschland*, 2 November 1964.

[6] V. Kudryavtsev, "Vstrechi c Rikhardom Zorge" (Meeting with Richard Sorge) in *Nedelya* (The Week), 1-7 November 1964, p. 14.

[7] Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, "Wir Kannten Genossen Richard Sorge," in *Junge Welt*, 15 Oct. 1964 to 2-3 Jan. 1965.

1928.[8] Sorge's wife Christine has published a short and uninformative memoir in a Swiss periodical.[9] None of these accounts makes any significant contribution to an understanding of the Sorge operation.

A popular, semi-fictional version of Sorge's career was carried by the Soviet periodical *Ogonek*, beginning on 28 February 1965. Its authors, Sergey Golyakov and Vladimir Ponosovskiy, fail to throw new light on the case. They present Sorge as declaring himself a Soviet citizen to his Japanese jailers. A sizable paperback edition of this series (300,000 copies) was published early in 1965.[10]

It is clear that the Soviet authorities wish to present Sorge as a popular hero but have no desire at this time to publish an accurate history of his intelligence operation. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on 5 November 1964 he was posthumously awarded the title, Hero of the Soviet Union. In January 1965, Max Klausen was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and his wife Anna received the Order of the Red Star. Branko Vukelic was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War (First Degree). The East German Government has conferred on Max and Anna Klausen the Gold Medal of Merit of the National People's Army. But perhaps the most significant honor bestowed on Sorge was the issuance, early in 1965, of a Soviet stamp bearing his portrait. He thus joins Nathan Hale as an intelligence agent who has been paid philatelic honors by his government. No further proof is required of the intention of the Soviet authorities to add Sorge to the Soviet pantheon.[11]

Other GRU Cases

Soviet authorities have also seen fit to give publicity to an obscure officer of the GRU surfaced under the name of Colonel Lev Yefimovich Manevich. This man was made posthumously a Hero of the Soviet

Issued in March 1965
In Honor of Richard Sorge
Hero of the Soviet Union

[8] Kai Moltke, "Da Mesterspionen Drak Bajere i Kobenhavn, in *Politike*, 27 December 1964; Richard Jensen, "Jeg Sa Sorge Sidst," *Ibid.*, same date.

[9] Christine Sorge, "Mein Mann—Dr. R. Sorge" in *Die Weltwoche*, 11 December 1964. According to *Weltwoche*, Christine Sorge's article was written ten years earlier.

[10] Sergey Golyakov and Vladimir Ponosovskiy, "Zorge, Dokumentalnaya Povest" (Sorge, a Documented Story), *Ogonek* (Light), 28 February-17 April 1965.

[11] In 1937, 1951 and 1962, the Soviet Union issued postage stamps in various denominations with the portrait of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy. He is the only chief of Soviet state security who has been so honored.

FELIKS DZERZHINSKIY, 1877-1926



Issued in 1937 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of his death

In 1951 for the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death

In 1962 for the eighty-fifth anniversary of his birth

Union in early 1965,[12] presumably for wartime services. He is credited in the Soviet press with service in an unidentified foreign country, possibly Germany or German-occupied Europe. According to the Soviet accounts he was betrayed through the cowardice of an assistant and imprisoned in German concentration camps, where he was known under the name Ya. N. Starostin. Before his death from tuberculosis at the Ebensee camp in Austria on 12 May 1945, he is said to have confided to a fellow inmate, one Grant Gregoryevich Ayrapetov, that his cryptonym was Etienne and to have asked that the Soviet authorities be notified.

Manevich is portrayed as a devoted intelligence agent who continued his work despite serious illness. According to Ayrapetov, Manevich compiled files on Soviets in Vlassov's unit, on followers of Bandera, the Ukrainian nationalist leader, and on other collaborators, all of which he turned over to one F. N. Dontsov for transmittal to the Soviet authorities. Interviews with Manevich's sister and Ayrapetov have appeared in the Soviet provincial press.[13] The reason for surfacing Manevich in particular is unclear, unless the script called for an intelligence agent whose activities could be related to the second world war. This criterion could also be applied to Sorge.

One former chief of Soviet military intelligence, a victim of the great purge, has recently been rehabilitated, apparently as part of this publicity campaign. Yu. Geller has written a brief account of the career of Semen Petrovich Uritskiy, chief of the GRU between 1935 and 1937 until he was purged and executed by Stalin. Only the most general information on Uritskiy's career is given. His intelligence work is passed over with the excuse that it cannot yet be made public, but he is credited with having directed officers of the caliber of Sorge and Manevich.[14]

The German portion of the loosely connected Soviet wartime espionage operation now known as Rote Kapelle has been surfaced in the

[12] *Pravda*, 21 February 1965.

[13] *Sovetskaya Latviya*, 25 February 1965.

[14] Yu. Geller, "Nachalnik Voyennoi Razvedki. K Semdesyat Letiyu so Dnya Rozhdeniya S. P. Uritskogo" (Chief of Military Intelligence Agents, On the Seventieth Anniversary of the Birth of S. P. Uritskiy) in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 March 1965. Yan Karlovich Berzin, chief of Soviet military intelligence 1924-1935, has been mentioned as the teacher of Sorge. See O. Millers, "Estikos Ar Riharda Zorges Skolotaju" in *Dzimtenes Balss*, 5 January 1965. This newspaper is published in Riga.

guise of a German resistance movement. Through the device of an interview with Greta (Margareta) Kuckhoff, a member of the group and presently a banking official in East Germany, the Soviet authorities have lifted a corner of the veil that still covers their wartime military intelligence operations in Europe.[15] Rote Kapelle (the Nazi origin of this name is admitted by the Soviets) is portrayed as an antifascist group that began to take shape before the Hitler dictatorship was established. Although the upper-class origin of its leaders, Arvid Harnack and Harro Schulze-Boysen, and of other members is admitted, a determined effort is made to show that it also contained many persons of working-class origin. The espionage role of the group is presented in rather incidental fashion, without emphasis. No mention is made of the GRU networks that existed in France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. Greta Kuckhoff presents East Germany as the heir to the cause for which the Rote Kapelle fought.

State Security: Abel

The admission to the Soviet people that the state security service, long portrayed as a defensive, counterintelligence arm of the state, does in fact engage in peacetime espionage abroad is equally dramatic. By virtue of its internal, repressive activity, the security service is only too well known to the Soviet population. Few Soviet citizens can have avoided some brush with the heavy hand of the security component, but equally few of them have known until recently what every literate Westerner has long known, that the state security service is also a principal arm of Soviet espionage abroad. In keeping with the dogma that only aggressive imperialist states engage in espionage, the existence of the First Chief Directorate of the security service, the foreign arm, was never admitted. The surfacing of its espionage in foreign countries, therefore, represents a major shift in Soviet intelligence policy.

This policy shift was signaled by an article on the career of Col. Rudolf Abel that appeared in *Nedelya* (The Week) during May 1965.[16] According to its author, Abel was born in a city near the Volga, entered the state security service about 1927, and worked before and during World War II as an intelligence agent against Germany, being covered as a member of the German minority in Latvia. It is significant that Abel's espionage activity after the war is shown as motivated by a personal desire to neutralize the activity of "fascist criminals" who had taken refuge in the West. The theme of working against Nazi criminals presumably would be popular with the Soviet people and fits the time-honored portrayal of state security as a defensive organization.

Colonel Abel is also the hero of a novel by Vadim Kozhevnikov now being serialized in *Znamya*, the organ of the Union of Writers.[17] Kozhevnikov's novel has not yet appeared in book form in the USSR. It is also being serialized in the Yugoslav newspaper *Borba*.

According to the author, Abel's true name is Aleksandr Ivanovich Belov. Since the work is frankly fiction, however, none of the data it contains can be accepted without verification. The significant fact is that the Soviet government has thus belatedly chosen to portray Abel as a hero Chekist employed in espionage abroad.

The theme of work against postwar Nazis, it is interesting to note, also appears in the purported memoirs of Gordon Lonsdale (Conon Molody), the state security officer who was convicted of espionage in the United Kingdom and later exchanged for Greville Wynne, a British subject involved in the Penkovskiy trial. Lonsdale claims that he wished to operate against former Nazis who were employed in the United Kingdom. The Lonsdale "memoirs," which have been serialized in the British press[18] but not published in the USSR are clearly designed as a deception operation. Their accounts of his Canadian birth, a childhood spent in Poland, and intelligence work with Colonel Abel in the United States before going to the United Kingdom are, from evidence on hand, complete fabrications. They are designed to confuse Western intelligence services, sow dissension between the British and American governments, and denigrate both British security and British justice. Any truth they may contain is merely incidental to these purposes.

[15] L. Bezymensky, "Po Tu Storonu Fronta. Rasskaz Grety Kukkhof o Podpolnoi Antifashistskoi Organizatsii, Deystvovavskey v Gitlerovskoy Germanii" (On That Side of the Front. An Account of Greta Kuckhoff Concerning the Underground Anti-Fascist Organization That Was Active in Hitlerite Germany), in *Novoye Vremya*, 9 May 1965, pp. 28-31. This interview also appeared in the English-language edition of this periodical of the same date.

[16] Major-General V. Drozdov, "Tovarishch Abel—Soldat Nevidimogo Fronta" (Comrade Abel—Soldier of the Invisible Front) in *Nedelya*, 2-8 May 1965, pp. 6-7. *Nedelya* is the Sunday supplement of the newspaper *Izvestiya*.

[17] Vadim Kozhevnikov, "Shchit i Mech" (Shield and Sword), in *Znamya* (The Banner), No. 3, 1965.

[18] Gordon Lonsdale, "How I Spied for Russia in Britain," *The People*, 7 March-25 April 1965.

Dzerzhinskiy

For several decades the Soviet regime has endeavored to justify the counterintelligence activity of its security service, calling it the "punishing sword of the Revolution," the defender of the Soviet nation and state against foreign and domestic enemies. Its intimate relationship to the party leadership was deliberately blurred; its full role in intra-party struggles for power has been concealed.

The participation of the security service in these struggles and the purges they brought forth, events that are well remembered by the Soviet people, made difficult the task of investing it with any sort of glamour. In practice it was necessary to concentrate on the earliest period of its history, the period of revolution, civil war, and early post-revolutionary years, when it was headed by Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, the Polish revolutionary idealist, friend and associate of Lenin, who died before Stalin began his purges. The Dzerzhinskiy period of the service is portrayed as a time of high idealism, a golden age.

The exigencies of Soviet internal politics have made it impossible to glorify Dzerzhinskiy's successors, who were either nonentities (Menzhinskiy), mere tools of Stalin (Yagoda, Yezhev) or latter-day villains in their own right (Beriya). Soviet party leaders will do nothing that might undermine the effectiveness of the security service as the defender of the regime, hence the history of the service under Stalin's dictatorship is not likely to be revealed. Their efforts to refurbish its image will never be allowed to endanger its internal efficiency. It is unlikely, therefore, that any detailed history of state security will appear in the foreseeable future.

Historical material on the service nevertheless continues to appear. As noted above, much attention is given to the life and personality of Dzerzhinskiy, so much in fact that something of a cult of personality seems to have grown up around him.[19] In 1956, selections of his diary and family letters, all pre-revolutionary in date, made their appearance.[20] P. G. Sofinov published during the same year a popular biography of Dzerzhinskiy that made use of certain hitherto unpublished archival material.[21] In the following year, a selection of Dzerzhinskiy's writings that emphasized his work in other components of the Soviet government such as the Commissariat of the Interior, Commissariat of Transportation, and Supreme Council of the National Economy made its appearance.[22] A more rounded view of his career is thus now available.[23]

During recent years Soviet authors have continued to mine the ore of Dzerzhinskiy's life and career. A. Khatskevich published a careful biographical study of him in which he uses his subject's pre-revolutionary documentary files.[24] On the other hand, N. Zubov has produced another popular biography repeating well-worn facts and stories.[25] Dzerzhinskiy's eighty-fifth birthday was commemorated by the appearance of a rather barren volume of reminiscences that adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the man.[26]

Perhaps the most interesting volume on Dzerzhinskiy to appear in recent years is Mme. Dzerzhinskiy's memoirs, published in 1964. She gives the texts of letters never before published or previously published only in part. She also provides an interpretation of her husband's background and development based on an association of many years that should contribute significantly to an understanding of the man.[27] It will be interesting to see whether Soviet historians

[19] Robert M. Slusser, "Recent Soviet Books on the History of the Secret Police," in *Slavic Review*, March 1965, pp. 90-98.

[20] F. Ya. Kon, et. al., trans., *Dnevnik i Pisma* (Diary and Letters), Moscow, 1956. A second revised and enlarged edition, prepared by the same translators, *Dnevik. Pisma k Rodnym* (Diary. Letters to Relatives), appeared in Moscow in 1958. An English translation of this second edition, *Prison Diary and Letters*, was published in Moscow the following year.

[21] P. G. Sofinov, *Stranitsy iz Zhizni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo* (Pages from the Life of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy), Moscow, 1956, edition of 200,000 copies.

[22] Institute of Marxism-Leninism *F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Izbranniye Proizvedeniya v Dvukh Tomakh* (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Selected Works in Two Volumes), Moscow, 1957. An earlier volume of Dzerzhinskiy's writings, *Izbranniye Staty e Rechi, 1908-1926* (Selected Articles and Speeches, 1908-1926) had been published in Moscow in 1947; a translation into German of this latter item (*Ausgewahlte Artikel und Reden, 1908-1926*) was issued in Berlin in 1953.

[23] Slusser, *op. cit.*, states that the editors' choice of material indicates that they were under orders to avoid his work in the security service, but he does not prove the point.

[24] A. Khatskevich, *Soldat Velikikh Boyev: Zhizn i Deyatelnost F. E. Dzerzhinskogo* (A Soldier of Great Battles: The Life and Activity of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy), Minsk, 1961, edition of 5,000 copies. A second reworked and expanded edition of this volume in 17,000 copies was published in Moscow during 1965.

[25] N. Zubov, *F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: Biografiya* (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: A Biography), Moscow, 1963, edition of 100,000 copies.

[26] *Vospominaniya o Dzerzhinskom: K 85-Letiyu so Dnya Rozhdeniya* (Memories of Dzerzhinskiy: For the 85th Anniversary of his Birth), Moscow, 1962.

[27] Sofiya Sigizmundova Dzerzhinskaya, *V Gody Velikhikh Boyev* (In the Years of Great Battles), Moscow, 1964, in an edition of 31,000 copies.

produce additional significant material on Dzerzhinskiy's career as chief of state security. If, as one authority contends, the Cheka archives were destroyed, that task may be difficult.[28]

Other Chekists

Few other officials of state security have been honored with biographies. I. V. Viktorov's rather sparse and matter-of-fact biography of Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov, an old Bolshevik and associate of Dzerzhinskiy, is unusual in that it covers in part the period of the great purges. According to Viktorov, Kedrov's son Igor and a friend, one Volodya Golubev, both employed by state security, discovered in early 1939 that Beriya and his associates were betraying the USSR in the interest of Hitler. The two young Chekists, after consulting the elder Kedrov, who by then was out of the service, decided to make the facts known to Stalin and the Party Control Commission. When the young men were arrested, as they anticipated being, M .S. Kedrov was to approach Stalin, reveal the facts of the matter, and call Stalin's attention to a letter accusing Beriya that he (Kedrov) had written to Dzerzhinskiy in 1921.

But Igor Kedrov and Golubev were arrested in late February 1939 and shot. The elder Kedrov was arrested several months later. Despite the fact that he succeeded in proving his innocence, he was not freed, and in late 1941 Beriya disposed of him also. This story, which also serves to denigrate Stalin, is reported without details or substantiating facts. Viktorov's book perhaps serves to rehabilitate M. S. Kedrov, but it adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the state security service.[29]

An Estonian official of the Cheka, Viktor E. Kingisepp, has also been honored with a biography.[30] Kingisepp took a prominent part in the investigation of the attempt on Lenin's life in August 1918. Memoirs of old Chekists are rare in Soviet literature. The memoirs of F. T. Fomin, a retired member of state security, were published in 1962 in an original edition of 350,000 copies, certainly a very large printing for a book of this type. A second, revised edition appeared in 1964.[31] Fomin, it is interesting to note, admits that Chekists could misuse their authority for personal goals, citing the activities of a Baltic baron in the Ukrainian Cheka to prove the point. Perhaps it is significant that the miscreant was of noble birth. It is also noteworthy that Fomin presents a highly favorable picture of V. R. Menzhinskiy, Dzerzhinskiy's successor as chief of state security, a weak man whose tour at the head of the service is considered an interregnum between Dzerzhinskiy and G. G. Yagoda. Fomin, however, does not mention the much more significant Yagoda, whose role in state security until he was purged by Stalin was considerable.

Operations

Histories of the state security service and its operations have been even more rare. When they do appear, such volumes cover the early period of the service, the time of the Cheka. The most significant historical study of the Cheka to appear in recent years is P. G. Sofinov's volume, Historical Sketches, published in 1960.[32]

The Soviets have also seen fit to surface in part the highly successful TRUST operation of the mid-twenties. This counterintelligence operation, which was mounted by state security, was designed to neutralize the anti-regime activities of Russian émigrés and the intelligence operations of European services. Using as decoy a national organization, the "Monarchical Organization of Central Russia," usually called TRUST, Soviet state security was able to deflect and control the attempts of its enemies to overthrow the Soviet regime during the time of its greatest weakness. A new and untested service thus succeeded in misleading the most experienced intelligence services of Western Europe and in almost completely neutralizing the dedicated work of its émigré opponents.

Not the least of its achievements was the enticement into the Soviet Union and seizure in 1925 of Sidney George Reilly, an able British intelligence officer who had operated in Russia with Robert Bruce-Lockhart in 1918. Lev Nikulin has described the enticement and

[28] Slusser, *op. cit.*, quotes Boris Nikolayevskiy, the Menshevik historian, as citing an unidentified émigré source to the effect that the Cheka archives had been destroyed in order to prevent historians in future from studying the Cheka terror and Lenin's part in directing it.

[29] I. V. Viktorov, *Podpolshchik, Voin, Chekist* (Underground Worker, Fighter, Chekist), Moscow, 1963.

[30] D. Rudnev, *Viktor Eduardovich Kingisepp,* Leningrad, 1962. Another fictionalized biography of a Cheka official is that of D. N. Medvedev. See A. Tsessarsky, *Chekist,* Moscow, 1960.

[31] F. T. Fomin, *Zapiski Starogo Chekista* (Notes of an Old Chekist), Moscow, 1962, 2nd revised edition, Moscow 1964.

[32] P. G. Sofinov, *Ocherki Istorii Vserossiiskoi Cherezvychainoi Komissii* (1917-1922) (Sketches of the History of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission), Moscow, 1960.

seizure of Reilly in an article in Nedelya.[33] Not unnaturally, Nikulin shows great pride in this achievement of the security service and its young officers. He undertakes to smear the image of Reilly, however, quoting what purports to be Reilly's offer to Dzerzhinskiy to give full information on the organization and staff of the British intelligence service, members of the Russian emigration with whom he had worked, and—significantly—the American intelligence service. Since U.S. intelligence was moribund by the middle twenties, any information thereon supplied by Reilly, if indeed he wrote such a letter to Dzerzhinskiy, would have been historical.

Nikulin's article was described as a chapter from his forthcoming "novel-chronicle" on TRUST. This book, *Mertvaya Zyb* (The Swell) apparently has not been published up to this time.[34]

Soviet Motives

As is often true of Russian policy, the objectives to be served by the surfacing of Soviet espionage activities abroad are not immediately evident. The reasons for the adoption of such a policy are difficult to disentangle. Perhaps the interplay of personal ambitions and jealousies among Party and government leaders has played its part. Although no evidence on the point is available, this unusual Soviet frankness may reflect the growing influence of Alexander Shelepin, former chief of the KGB who has played an increasingly prominent role in Soviet affairs since the overthrow of Khrushchev. It may be assumed, in any case, that the decision to admit to the Soviet people that their government also engages in actions hitherto credited only to bourgeois and fascist states was not lightly reached on the spur of the moment. Undoubtedly it was made at the highest Party levels, after lengthy and possibly acrimonious discussion. Party leaders must have agreed that the advantages of such a revelation outweighed any ill effect on the Soviet population.

[33] Lev Nikulin, "Konets Sidneya Dzhordzha Reili" (The End of Sidney George Reilly) in *Nedelya*, 2-8 August, 1964. Another article by Nikulin, "Istoriya Odnogo Voyazha" (The Story of a Voyage) appeared in *Nedelya*, 11-17 October 1964, pp. 10-11. This article, presumably another chapter in Nikulin's book on TRUST, describes the clandestine visit to the USSR made by Vasiliy V. Shulgin in 1925-1926 under the auspices of TRUST, that is, under state security control. On his return to Western Europe, Shulgin described this visit in his book, *Tri Stolitsy* (Three Capitals).

[34] An uneven and not completely satisfactory account of the TRUST operation, largely drawn from Western sources, is contained in Geoffrey Bailey (pseud.), *The Conspirators*, New York, 1960.

What are the possible advantages of the revelation?

Such foreign espionage operations as have been surfaced up to this time are related to the Germany of Hitler and the second world war. The work of Manevich, if that was in fact his name, is presented as having been done in Eastern Europe, probably in Germany or a German-occupied area, and in a Nazi concentration camp. A series of paperbacks on the frontier guards and wartime partisan operations continue the anti-Nazi defense theme.[35] Abel, it is said, worked against the Germans; his postwar activities were motivated by a desire to get at former Nazis who were active in the West. Lonsdale is made to admit the same motivation. Although Sorge's prewar operational activity cannot be denied, his intelligence targets were obvious—the German embassy in Tokyo and Japan, Germany's ally. Work against the Nazi, at whatever time it was undertaken, would be applauded by Soviet citizens. Such espionage operations, although carried on abroad, can be interpreted as defensive in intent and purpose. The Soviets, it must be noted, have not yet admitted that their postwar operations were directed primarily against the British and Americans.

The Soviet authorities may believe that revelations of Western espionage against the Soviet Union in recent years call for defensive action. Operations such as the U-2 flights and the Popov and Penkovskiy penetrations have certainly resulted in talk and speculation within the USSR. The Powers and Penkovskiy show trials must have convinced even optimistic Soviets that, despite official disclaimers, some harm had been done to Soviet security. Many must have asked, why don't our people do that same thing? It is possible, therefore, that several terminated espionage operations have been surfaced to assure the Soviet people that their government is also active in such operations abroad. The first line of Soviet defense, they are being told, is in good hands.

[35] Since this article was sent to press an anonymous Soviet study of the role of the state security service in the fighting on the German front has become available. By Soviet standards rather copiously footnoted, it gives the service a most significant part in the victory and reproves Stalin for not accepting state security intelligence reports on German intentions and military plans. It is published under the title "Sovetskiye Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" (Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Fatherland War) in *Voprosy Istorii* (Problems of History) No. 5 (May) 1965, pp. 20-39.

The new publicity is probably designed to improve the image and morale of military intelligence and the state security service. The Penkovskiy case (and the Popov case as well, although it received little publicity) must have been disastrous to the morale of military intelligence officers. State security officers must have been affected adversely by previous efforts of the Soviet authorities to create a bland image of their service. Public acclaim of service heroes, even of those who at first glance appear to have failed in their missions, has undoubtedly improved the tone and morale of both services.

Such revelations can also be made to serve operational purposes. It will be noted that the Soviets use fictionalized biographies to surface both operations and intelligence agents. Fictional techniques permit the telling of a lively story without need to adhere to the facts of the case. Embarrassing aspects and significant operational details may be distorted or omitted without endangering the seeming integrity of the account. Even though not so labeled—possibly because they were intended for foreign consumption—the Lonsdale "memoirs" are largely fictional. The Soviets have enlisted fiction as an intelligence weapon.

Although at first glance it would seem to be a pointless task, these fictionalized memoirs and biographies should be subjected to expert counterintelligence analysis. Such accounts must contain at least a substratum of fact. This may be discovered through analysis. Significant omissions and distortions may be ascertained by comparison of the fictionalized versions with data available in counterintelligence files. But the most important purpose of such analysis is the discovery of the disinformation objectives that these accounts may serve. We must assume that all memoirs, biographies, and historical studies of the Soviet intelligence services are prepared with the aid of disinformation experts.

A careful watch must be kept on this new Soviet program of controlled intelligence revelations. Although their goals are not yet clear, for the Soviets it is a new technique and one that may do serious injury to Western morale. It must be analyzed and closely followed.

Olivia Halebian

Miscellaneous

CAMARADE SORGE. By *Nicole Chatel* and *Alain Guérin*. (Paris: Julliard. 1965. 380 pp. 24 francs.)

This is a French Communist treatment of the famous spy whom the Soviets last year so pridefully acknowledged to have worked for them in the Far East before and during World War II. Little is known of Chatel, but Guérin has for some years worked for the Party organ *L'Humanité*. An "afterword" is written by Yves Ciampi, a Party sympathizer and director of a movie on the Sorge case that has been well petted in the Communist press. Ciampi's Japanese actress-wife, Keiko Kishi, who had a role in the film, is said to have helped the authors in their researches.

Chatel and Guérin acknowledge that the book is not a history of Sorge and his case but rather a history of their inquiry into it. The six chapters are each in two parts, of which the first, chatty and discursive, treats some aspect of Sorge's life, usually by describing interviews with supposed acquaintances, and the second is called a dossier documenting the foregoing. Thus they do not tell a consecutive or by any means complete story.

Perhaps the authors hastened into print to beat a scholarly study of the case by two distinguished Oxford dons, Profs. F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry; they allude to this forthcoming work in their text. But *Camarade Sorge* has little to offer in the way of important new material. Rather it is a rehash of Communist outpourings during the past year, and it seems just another item in this campaign to publicize the heroic activities of Soviet intelligence.

Walter Pforzheimer

I SPIED SPIES. By *A. W. Sansom*. (London: Harrap. 1965. 271 pp. 18/—.)

One approaches such a book hoping that the title was imposed by the publisher and does not reflect the quality of the story. But this one is even more swashbuckling than the title promises. The author, a Cairo-born insurance salesman with an aptitude for languages, became Chief of British Field Security for the Cairo area during the Second World War. He evidently adopted a strong-arm approach to upholding the security of the British forces, and he recounts stories of fist and gun fights in the back alleys of Cairo with relish.

For all his love of adventurous autobiographical ancedote, his book is nevertheless a contribution to the operant literature of professional officers engaged in personnel and installation security work. It realistically surveys World War II cases of this kind in Cairo, and its review of postwar cases is probably still more significant. In particular, Sansom's views and frustrations over British defector Donald Maclean's activity during his Cairo Embassy tour (pp. 234-41) will be shared by many security and counterintelligence officers who have had to deal with that kind of problem.

Salem Zain

THE BERLIN WALL. By *Pierre Galante.* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 1965. 277 pp. $4.95.)

This is the story of the Berlin Wall told in terms of the experiences of many little people on whom the barrier had, as it is still having, an impact ranging from inconvenience to tragedy. It is made up of isolated incidents loosely linked around a fairly detailed account of the adventures of one "Pimpernel of the Wall" who escaped from East Berlin and returned repeatedly to engineer group escapes.

The author, a French journalist, offers much interesting material, giving insight into the motives of escapers and escape organizers, illustrating the variety of methods of escape, and picturing in general the battle of wits between those who would cross the wall and those who guard it, a battle in which the guards' advantage inevitably increases as loopholes are blocked and new ones become harder to find. On the debit side, parts of the book suffer from over-dramatization and contrived suspense, and its illustration is meager, being limited to one tunnel diagram and a sketch map of a small section of the wall. More graphics, including at least one map of the whole wall, would have added interest and helped readers find their way through a clutter of local names.

The West can only gain by having the story of the Wall widely told. Galante's book, though in no sense a definitive work, contributes to this end.

Louis Thomas