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Argues that DoD pressure for figures on Soviet military outlays and their economic impact has brought a spurious response.

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE IN DEFENSE PLANNING*

Clyde C. Wooten

In the last few years new requirements for intelligence data on costs of present and future Soviet forces and for analysis of the Soviet economic potential with respect to supporting expensive weapon systems have been expressed:

... I believe that it is essential that all estimates of Soviet force levels be required to meet reasonable tests of economic feasibility. This means that NIEs should include cost estimates and overall budgetary implications of the estimated forces. It would be very useful to me to know how the Soviets are allocating their military expenditures. . . .

—Secretary McNamara to the DCI, 13 February 1963


We need estimates of costs . . . for several reasons. First, it is very useful for top level planners working on the problem of shaping the US defense program to know where the Soviets are putting their money. . . . Next, costs to the Soviets give us some indication of the likelihood of certain changes. For example, it is important to know what the Soviet defense budget is as a percentage of gross national product. And, it is also very useful to have some feeling for the marginal costs to them of various changes in their programs. . . .

—Dr. Alain Enthoven, 25 July 1963

It is of course obvious that economic feasibility is an important constraint on the development of military capabilities. It is one thing, however, to recognize that there are limitations on Soviet economic capability to maintain modern armed forces and quite another to measure that capability for the purpose of testing the feasibility of particular force levels. Or put another way, can "strains" in the Soviet economy caused by advanced weapon programs be effectively measured and the measurement applied in a useful way to solution of U.S. defense planning problems? The purpose of this paper is to

* This is the editors' condensation of a more comprehensive study by the author which is available on request.

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examine this question and a broader one implied by the new DoD requirements for economic intelligence: Given the kind of data available to the economic analyst, what kind of response is it feasible for him to make?

In order to comply with the DoD requests¹ it is necessary for intelligence to develop estimates of:

1. Current Soviet military expenditure allocations within the current GNP.
2. The cost of Soviet forces by mission, including with respect to advanced systems the current and future expenditures for both present and future systems (i.e., present operations and maintenance costs, current investment for present and future inventories, current R&D costs for future systems).
3. The Soviet GNP growth rate or some other measurement of economic capability to support defense expenditures, projected as far as the estimates to be tested are projected.


Allocation of Expenditures

The Soviet military budget is publicly a one-line item, a single figure for all military outlays each year. Its interpretation and breakdown, a job for economic intelligence, is not simplified by the Soviet practice of hiding increments to it elsewhere, much as we hide the CIA budget.

Figure 1 shows how this overtly budgeted amount has compared with actual expenditures as estimated by intelligence and with U.S. obligational authority for defense spending. There is considerable uncertainty associated with the estimated Soviet expenditures, not only present and future but also past, as we shall see. But accepting these figures, we see they give little warrant for extrapolating into the future on the basis of trend. This is as we might expect; military budgets are a product of compromise among contrary influences and subject to seemingly unpredictable fluctuations. We are therefore probably not justified in relying on trend analysis as a technique for estimating future military expenditures and the economic limitations on them.

A considerable amount of analytical ingenuity has been demonstrated in tracking down the hidden increments of the Soviet military budget. Data on industrial production have been analyzed to iden-

¹ Cited and discussed in greater detail in W. E. Seidel's "Intelligence for Defense Planning," *Studies* VIII 2, p. 19ff.



*The estimated expenditures are taken from "Soviet Defense Expenditures," CIA/RR MP 65-1, 2 June 1965.

FIGURE 1

tify defense production, largely by a residual method, identifying components which are not defense programs in order to isolate what may be attributed to defense. There are a number of difficulties with the residuals approach, but the most important one is that the resulting figures give little insight into the mission breakdown of the military expenditures. Such a breakdown has been made an important objective for economic intelligence, which therefore requires resort to an extensive effort at synthesizing Soviet military costs, in particular costs of Soviet weapon systems.

Soviet Costs

Meaningful analysis of expenditures requires, first, data on prices and quantities, and second, relationships between these and other prices and quantities. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled by data directly available on Soviet military expenditures.

First let us speak of Soviet prices. While it is an oversimplification to say that prices in the Soviet Union are what someone says they are, they bear no regular rational internal relationship which could form a basis for extrapolation. Because the USSR is a controlled and rationed economy, prices are not a reflection of buyers' and sellers' independent choice in a free market. Ruble costs have no necessary relationship to real costs. The variations between the two have been indirectly and approximately expressed by intelligence (and elsewhere) in terms of divergent ruble-dollar relationships.² It may be added that there is some divergence among estimates of these divergent relationships. We shall return to this matter; but for the moment it is necessary only to note that a ruble is not a ruble in the same sense that a dollar is a dollar.

This circumstance poses the first of two difficulties in the costing of Soviet military forces. Because Soviet costs derived from Soviet prices and quantities are not a true reflection of real costs, it is quite hard to make simple comparisons between the costs of different elements of the Soviet forces (either investment costs or, even more difficult, total cost of operations, maintenance, research and development, test and evaluation, etc.). Of course the difficulty is multiplied when one attempts to compare U.S. and Soviet military costs. But precisely this kind of comparison has to be made in order to estimate

the cost of Soviet elements in the first place. Here arises the second and more serious costing difficulty.

Inasmuch as very little Soviet military cost data is directly available, it is necessary to synthesize the Soviet costs by estimating the cost-generating characteristics of the Soviet forces, assigning prices to individual elements, and summing the costs of the required numbers. The long and short of this is that intelligence cannot develop the costs from economic data available from the Soviet Union. "All attempts to calculate the costs of Soviet forces" have depended "upon basic cost factors derived from U.S. data."³

The costing is thus done primarily by analogy: a weapon system is costed as if it were produced in the United States by U.S. technology and methods and with U.S. personnel. For the sake of comparability the U.S. systems closest to those of the Soviets are used and are modified to allow for known differences. Where possible, Soviet factors such as Soviet labor prices in rubles are used, though this introduces non-homogeneous units, rubles and dollars.

How good are these costs? Since the costing is by analogy with U.S. practice, it will be useful to inquire how good U.S. costing is.

U.S. Costs

The cost of advanced weapon systems has been increasing rapidly in the United States. Dr. Harold Brown has illustrated this point by comparing the fly-away cost of the World War II F6F, \$9 per pound, with that of the F4B, to be over \$74 per pound.⁴ The reasons usually advanced for the increase are a greatly increased sophistication in weapon system components and the increased cost of materials and highly skilled labor. It is well known that there are other factors; we shall mention three.

The first is inherent in the way the business is done in the United States, and more particularly in the defense industry. Suppose there is a design competition for a new weapon system. Two or more companies may carry out very extensive and expensive R&D efforts, often involving the same general technology. It is not unknown for such competitions to become quite protracted, with resubmissions

² E. D. Brunner, *Soviet Air Armaments and Their Costs, 1946-1961* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, RM-3508-PR (Secret RD), May 1963), p. 1.

⁴ Statement before a meeting of the Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Washington, D.C., 22 September 1964.

³ See, for example, the discussion in Alan B. Smith's "Costing Nuclear Programs" on p. 34 of this issue, especially footnote 7.

required. Each competitor must demonstrate competence, in terms of personnel and facilities, to proceed with the contract after it is awarded. Only one company ultimately wins the contract. The loser or losers may be reimbursed under terms of the development contract for part of their expenses, in which case this adds to current R&D costs. More usually, the company absorbs the loss, expecting to make it up through profits on other defense contracts, so that the apparent costs of succeeding systems are increased. There are advantages to this way of doing business, but saving money is not one of them.

A second factor is inefficiency in R&D. There is a dearth of data on this subject, for understandable reasons; companies are not likely to advertise their inefficiencies. But efficiency is likely to be of a different order when limitations on funds require heavy emphasis on economy and reliance on the ingenuity of project leadership and personal incentives, as against the conventional U.S. R&D practices, with cost-plus contracting, emphasis on massive documentation, detailed control of lower echelons, etc.

Recent research by Arnold C. Cooper⁵ on the cost of civilian product development disclosed no investigations into relative efficiency among companies of different size, but on the basis of an "introductory exploration" he hypothesized that "... large companies tend to spend substantially more to develop particular products than do small firms." In interviews with managers he found that most think a large company "spends from 3 to 10 times as much as a small one to develop a particular product." In a case study of a small and a large firm developing a protective coating for similar products, the small one carried out a 12-month part-time project estimated to cost \$1,400, while the larger's project lasted 38 months and ran \$11,000 in direct costs.

Cooper is careful to restrict his conclusions to R&D, avoiding any suggestion that small companies are more efficient in production activity. But it is the very large R&D costs in the U.S. missile and space field, rather more than production costs, that have created a view here that heavy expenditures are required for substantial progress, especially in the light of competition with the USSR. Such R&D activities are non-standard and difficult to control, thereby lending themselves to rat-hole expenditures and enterprises.

⁵Arnold C. Cooper "R&D is More Efficient in Small Companies," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1964, pp. 75-83. This article was drawn to my attention by Tom Glennan of the Rand Corporation.

A third factor which pyramids costs is competition for labor and materials. The missile and space industry in the United States has over the past few years been its own worst competitor for talent. When projects proliferate, new investment in facilities is required. In a competitive economy the pricing system is the mechanism for gaining priority in personnel recruitment, capital investment, and resource allocation. Therefore unit costs are higher on priority projects.

Implications for Analog Costing

The relative tightness of the Soviet economy suggests that Soviet R&D is not likely to share the rich man's results-count-more-than-the-money attitude. The Soviet design-team approach lends itself to internal communication and continuity in technology. It has been noted by intelligence that Soviet design goals are usually more modest, less prone to press the state-of-the-art, less likely to incorporate cost-multiplying modifications after series production has begun, than in U.S. practice. Priority seems to be arranged through direct allocation of resources—men, facilities, material—rather than by price adjustment. There are, of course, disadvantages to this way of operating, but it seems economical in terms of costs on high priority programs. All this would suggest that we have a tenuous basis for analog costing.

Before we turn to future weapon systems, a rather important implication of analog costing of current forces needs to be made explicit. Costs developed by the analog method depend not only on what is costed (unit costs) but on how much is costed (systems costs). "The reasonableness of the results depends, to a large extent, upon the validity of the order-of-battle estimates."⁶ But the objective in costing was to validate and set economic limits on the order of battle. If the validity of the cost estimates depends upon validity of the order of battle, how can the order of battle be validated by the cost estimates?⁷

Let us now consider estimating future costs. The question of future technology is immediately raised. There is of course great intrinsic uncertainty in projecting technology into the future, whether in foreign

⁶E. D. Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁷The objection that costs so derived may be measured against economic capabilities will be met below.

or domestic, military or civilian application. Charles J. Hitch, DoD Comptroller 1961-1965, has observed:

. . . the most important thing to understand about R and D is the dominant role played by uncertainty. . . . Predictions by "experts" of the results or usefulness of particular R and D projects are highly unreliable. . . . Developments almost always take longer and cost more than predicted (by factors of 2 to 50), . . . most fail in whole or in part . . . In addition to technological uncertainty, R and D shares with other kinds of time-consuming investment what is called environmental uncertainty—uncertainty about the kind of new product that will be saleable or useful in the unknown environment of the future years in which it will be available.⁸

The matter of military R&D and system cost prediction has received a considerable amount of study because of glaring mistakes in cost estimates associated with U.S. weapon system proposals. It has been found that estimates of total system costs made early in a development program may be less than the estimate made when the system is ready to be introduced into the active inventory by a ratio of 1.5, 2, 3 or even higher. Studies indicate that a primary and overriding cause for underestimating U.S. weapon system costs has been the tendency to change performance characteristics or the configuration of systems after the cost estimates have been completed.⁹

In the use of highly uncertain data for purposes of comparative analysis or evaluation, it is desirable that the uncertainties be of the same order or otherwise comparable. It may then be possible, in a very rough or crude way, to "factor out" such uncertainties on the basis of their comparability. Perhaps enough has been said to suggest that methods used in costing Soviet military forces may not yield the required comparability with U.S. costs. The estimated costs of Soviet forces so derived may thus not express the true cost relationships, either internally or with respect to those of U.S. forces, implied by the manner in which they are presented in intelligence estimates. This possibility may be enhanced by the problem of ruble-dollar conversion.

⁸ Charles Hitch, *The Character of Research and Development in a Competitive Economy* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, P-1297, 13 May 1958), p. 4.

⁹ G. H. Fisher, *A Discussion of Uncertainty in Cost Analysis*, RM-3071-PR, The Rand Corporation, April 1962, p. 5 *et passim*. A study of 12 DoD weapon programs made in DoD some time ago revealed that they were underbid by a factor of 3.4.

The Ruble-Dollar Problem

Let us suppose that after some difficulty in arriving at a reliable cost estimate for a Soviet weapon system (and knowing that it is reliable), we have in hand such an estimate expressed in dollars (or partly in dollars). The next problem is to convert the dollars into rubles. Although there are a number of bad ways to do this, there is no completely satisfactory way. There is no single conversion factor by any method of calculation (except of course the Moscow-pegged exchange rate), and all methods of calculation have difficulties.¹⁰ The way this has been done in costing Soviet forces, and indeed the most nearly satisfactory way, is to relate elements of the military costs to Soviet economic sectors for which ruble-dollar ratios have been established and to compute ruble costs by use of these ratios.

The same problem in reverse cannot of course be avoided in interpreting the economic meaning of the aggregated costs derived through conversion factors. If they are summed and related to costs calculated for previous Soviet defense budgets, we run into the problems we have discussed in costing methodology, costing uncertainty, determination of how and when costs are incurred,¹¹ real costs, etc. It is quite difficult to draw simple, accurate, and useful inferences from comparing such costs, say costs of Soviet general-purpose forces with those of strategic offensive forces or with data on other economic sectors, not to mention U.S. costs of similar forces.

Cost-Effectiveness Comparison

Finally, there is a perplexing problem as to how to compare U.S. and Soviet forces in terms of costs and effectiveness by any system of analysis when their relative composition, sophistication of equipment, relative austerity, and requirements for support are so different. Secretary McNamara has inquired "whether the Soviet military estab-

¹⁰ See Rush V. Greenslade, "Rubles vs. Dollars," *Studies* VI 1, p. 1-11, for a succinct explanation of the problem of ruble-dollar relationships in connection with the comparison of U.S. and USSR GNPs.

¹¹ The fact that in 1965 it was discovered that Airframe Plant No. 30 at Moscow Central Airfield had been producing MIG 21/FISHBED aircraft since about 1960, together with the fact that not enough information is available to establish a production rate, is illustrative of the degree to which distribution of costs, including distribution in time, must be based on assumptions.

ishment has certain expenditure patterns which, as compared to our own, provide more military capability for the same cost.¹²

Intelligence has long remarked that the Soviets tolerate crude workmanship where technical excellence is not required. In the first Soviet-produced jet engine the turbine blades were well made but other workmanship was inferior by U.S. standards. In Soviet systems the instrumentation and auxiliary equipment also tend to be simpler than in the U.S. equivalents. Their space vehicles, although larger, are believed to be simpler than ours. Because they are larger they also avoid the costs of miniaturization and associated problems of quality control and reliability.

It is well known that the Soviets have standards of austerity in military forces different from ours. Probably less well understood is that they also have different needs for supporting forces and facilities. As the most obvious illustration of this, Soviet general-purpose forces are for the most part deployed in Soviet border areas or in proximity to the homeland, whereas a substantial portion of U.S. general-purpose forces are deployed at great distances from the continental United States. This implies substantial differences in support requirements of all kinds. In short, the Soviet military problem is not symmetrical with the U.S. military problem, and this asymmetry has implications beyond the costs of differing mixes of combat arms.

These two differences—in standards of austerity and in requirements for support forces and facilities—are in some degree complementary, as suggested by Major General Deane, the senior U.S. military representative in Russia during much of World War II, in his description of a trip to the Soviet front after the Battle of Vilna:

On the following day we were first driven to the headquarters of the Fifth Army, which was about fifteen miles west of Vilna. Colonel General Krylov was in command and he received us with his entire staff. It was certainly a far cry from the American conception of an Army headquarters. The entire staff consisted of fifteen to twenty officers who lived and worked in a few small trailers scattered through the woods. There was one huge hospital tent, well camouflaged, which served both as a conference room and as a headquarters mess. Some offices had stenographers at work, but most of them did not. We could not help but think of the enormous installation and all the office space and facilities found at an American Army headquarters. It highlighted some very different concepts in our methods of operating. . . .

¹² Memorandum 12 January 1963 to the Joint Chiefs.

Of course the Russian problem was considerably different from ours. In the matter of supply they had only one theater to consider as opposed to the many all over the world in which we were fighting. Their supply lines were confined to an east and west rail and road net, whereas ours extended back across the ocean. To them a supply deficiency meant a few days' delay, whereas we had to wait for the availability of convoys. In the matter of personnel all Russia's manpower was close at hand, and her willingness to accept losses allowed the Red army to rely on sheer force of numbers rather than careful planning in order to achieve objectives with the least loss of life. In the matter of training Russia had the advantage of an agrarian population already hardened and for whom the rigors of battle were little more severe than the rigors of peace. Post Exchanges, United Service Organizations, doughnut wagons and other morale agencies which call for overhead were unheard of.¹³

This, from the Russian point of view, was a successful army which had accomplished everything necessary to win a great victory. The Russians possibly still carry something of this image in their minds as they build new military capabilities in a new era. What this means in terms of combat capability has not been tested.

Let us review what we have covered. We know that the Soviets have important resource allocation problems. Military expenditures can be made only at the sacrifice of other desiderata competing for the same resources. But the problem of measuring constraints on such expenditures, we have found, runs into a number of conceptual and technical problems having to do with erratic trends in military budgets, inability to derive mission breakdown from Soviet budget figures, methodology of estimating costs, translation of costs into rubles, and forming judgments about them in the framework of the Soviet economy.

It takes a certain optimism to expect intelligence to be able to cost weapon systems which cannot be described in detailed cost-generating terms, to do it by methods which have proved to be quite uncertain, to arrive at dollar costs and translate these into ruble costs without a satisfactory methodology, and to extrapolate all this, by any method, into an uncertain future—perhaps five or seven or ten years—and arrive at system and force costs which have any useful precision. Or whose precision can be guessed.

After the costs have been derived, they must be related to something which serves as a gauge of the "strain" they engender in the economy or a measure of economic feasibility. They must be meas-

¹³ John Russell Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 210 f.

ured against some such standard as GNP growth projected into the future, or in terms of the sacrifice they would require in some other Soviet objective, such as investment for GNP growth. The most impressive effort to date to assess the impact of future Soviet military expenditures has in fact adopted the latter standard. Let us now examine the attempt to make such assessments in practice.

The Intelligence Effort

The forces postulated in "Intelligence Assumptions for Planning" have been costed and found feasible and reasonable from an economic point of view. The forces listed in "Alternative Ten Year Projections of Soviet Military Forces," a group of documents produced by a CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group,¹⁴ have been costed and described as feasible. The most impressive and comprehensive effort to date, however, is the report "Soviet Defense Expenditures and Their Economic Impact Through 1970."¹⁵

Inasmuch as this latter document is the first attempt to go beyond simply costing Soviet forces and declaring them feasible,¹⁶ it is important to scrutinize its methods¹⁷ and results. Its ultimate measurement of the cost of estimated future Soviet forces is in terms of sacrifice in economic growth. How good is our understanding of economic growth?

Intuitively, there can be no question that competing expenditure programs have an influence on economic growth, and growth on expenditure programs. How much is another matter. In 1964 the intelligence community, noting that "new extensions of Soviet economic assistance to 25 non-bloc countries . . . fell to a low of \$77 million in 1962 and did not exceed \$200 million in 1963," declared, "This marked decline cannot, of course, be attributed solely to a resource squeeze within the USSR but has almost certainly been reinforced by the domestic competition for increasingly scarce resources and by the overall slowdown in Soviet economic growth . . . Economic aid to

nonbloc countries is unlikely to recover the momentum of earlier years."

But in 1965 it had to acknowledge that "the hiatus in Soviet extension of economic aid to less developed countries of the Free World was ended as new credits rose . . . [to] some \$800 million during 1964 . . . The rate of expenditure has been rising rapidly." And the dour outlook for the Soviet economy of 1964, with "chronic mismanagement," "programs too ambitious for available resources," and an economy "too large, too clumsily managed, and too complex to change gears overnight" became rapidly more cheerful.

Another example suggests the depth of our understanding of growth in the Soviet economy.¹⁸ On January 10, 1964, the *New York Times* reported that ". . . the once impressive 6 percent annual economic growth rate of the Soviet Union had slipped to 2.5 percent in the last two years . . ." This news became available through an unprecedented CIA statement to the press following a succession of massive grain purchases by the Soviet Union. It was greeted with satisfaction by the press but suffered a mixed reception among U.S. and British academic specialists on the Soviet economy.

To quite a number of the specialists, the statement said both too much and too little. A central problem was the role played by Soviet agriculture in the economic downturn. Part of the commentary involved more arithmetic than economics. The agricultural sector has been counted as 25 to 33 percent of Soviet GNP, depending on the omission or inclusion of a land rent adjustment.¹⁹ With massive crop failures resulting in a severe depression of so large a sector of the economy, one might expect the GNP to drop severely. Then it might rise even more dramatically with a good crop year. "What a very bad harvest can wreck," one observer remarked, "a quite moderate harvest can mend. If in 1964 agricultural production [in the Soviet Union] equals that of 1961, and other things grow as they did this year, except that trade and light industry expand slightly along with

¹⁴ The establishment of this group was discussed by W. E. Seidel in his article "Intelligence for Defense Planning," *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ CIA/RR MR 64-1, dated December 1964.

¹⁶ No forces otherwise estimated by the intelligence community as feasible have yet been declared infeasible on the basis of intelligence cost analysis.

¹⁷ Parts of the methodology are informally discussed by George Ecklund in his "Guns or Butter Problems of the Cold War," *Studies IX 4*, p. 1 ff.

¹⁸ The quite large misestimate of China's economic growth during the "Great Leap Forward" period is well known. See, for example, B. B. Robbechi, "Post-Mortem: The Chinese Economy," in *Studies VII 1*, and Edward L. Allen, "Chinese Growth Estimates Revisited," *Studies VII 2*.

¹⁹ Stanley Cohn, "The Agriculture Sector Weight in an Index of Soviet Gross National Product," *The ASTE Bulletin*, Winter 1964, p. 13. The same sector in the U.S. GNP is only about 4.2 percent.

the increased agricultural supplies, the national income will rise by 7%.”²⁰ It did rise, according to CIA, about six percent. The important point—that the Soviet Union is faced with a problem of resource allocation—was obscured rather than illuminated by the 2.5 percent growth figure.²¹

The general downward trend in the growth of the Soviet economy has been attributed largely to increased investment in military and space programs.²² Intelligence has taken note of the enormous costs of our own modern weapon system and space programs, which sharpen our appreciation of the economic constraints on the Soviets in similar endeavors. Thus the general intelligence judgment is that the Soviets are indeed faced with resource limitations and difficult resource allocation choices. How much farther can intelligence go? Let us see how much farther it has gone in “Soviet Defense Expenditures and Their Economic Impact Through 1970.”

Quantification

Two forces, a high and a low, along with the programs they imply, are costed on the basis of “a quantitative, physical description” contained in “NIEs and related documents.” “However, because many of the official estimates were not expressed in sufficient detail or did not conform to the desired probability criteria, it was necessary to make a variety of assumptions in order to provide descriptions adequate for costing purposes.”²³

²⁰ Peter Wiles, “CIA Bono—Reflections on the CIA’s Statement of January 10, 1964, on the Soviet Economy.” *The ASTE Bulletin*, Winter, 1964.

²¹ Cf. Alec Nove, “2½ Per Cent and All That,” *Soviet Studies*, July 1964, and Stanley H. Cohn, “Comment on ‘2½ Per Cent and All That,’” *Soviet Studies*, January 1965.

²² “. . . perhaps the single most important factor [contributing to the lag in Soviet productivity] is the demand of the defense program since 1958 for scarce resources and highly trained manpower.” NIE 11-5-65. It is noteworthy that two USIB agencies (one non-military) have joined in a footnote to the subsequent *Note to Holders* of NIE 11-5-65 and NIE 11-6-65 stating that Soviet defense spending uncertainties are “too great to support a judgment as to the general trend of Soviet defense expenditures particularly in recent years.”

²³ p. 5. It must be emphasized that the high and low forces are not represented as limits or bounds in a mathematical sense. Yet the synthesized costs of these forces have been introduced into NIE 11-5-65 as the range of Soviet military expenditures, as we see below.

Neither the systems costed nor the variety of assumptions used in costing are described in the report. However, the basis for selection of systems is described as follows:

If the judgment was that there was a probability of 75 percent that an item would appear, it was included in both the high and the low “assumptions.” If, however, the probability was only 50 percent that an item would appear, it was included in the high side only, and if the probability of its appearance was less than 50 percent, it was omitted from both sides. Then a second judgment was made concerning the number of items that would be deployed. This second judgment was ranged to reflect a probability of 75 percent.

The costs of the high forces and the low forces were arrived at “by simply summarizing the expenditures for all of the high force ‘assumptions’ on the one hand and all the low force ‘assumptions’ on the other.”

Also, no attempt was made to take explicit account of uncertainties about the prices used in the costing exercise. This decision was governed by practical considerations, particularly by the desire not to obscure the effects resulting from uncertainty as to physical posture by introducing ranges that reflect uncertainty as to cost or price. This decision should not be interpreted to imply a judgment that the range of uncertainty as to Soviet costs or prices is sufficiently narrow that it can be ignored.



This, on one page, is all that is told the consumer about the forces costed, the methods used, the reliability of the data, or the problems arising out of expressing costs in U.S. dollars and Soviet rubles. The remainder of the report is taken up with summarizing “expenditure implications” of the high and low forces, discussing the “potential impact of the expenditure series on the Soviet economy,” and comparing the “dollar equivalents of Soviet defense expenditures.”

We shall not try to summarize the 41 pages of text, tables, and charts. The following extract and the charts in Figure 2 are enough for an understanding of the general conclusions.

A possible rate of growth of GNP consistent with the high assumption might average about 5 percent for the whole period; however, the rate for the period through 1967 might be confined to 4 percent per year. A rate of growth for GNP of 6 percent, however, would be consistent with the low assumption. The empirical basis for these projections is not extensively or rigorously developed as yet, and the Soviet economy may do either significantly better or worse than projected.²⁴

²⁴ p. 17. These judgments were later introduced into NIE 11-5-65 without the qualification in the last sentence.

**USSR: Comparison of Total Defense Expenditures
for Low and High Assumptions of
Military Forces, by Mission, 1961-70**



*Research, development, test, evaluation, & space programs

FIGURE 2

The two charts in Figure 2, from the report in question, show the implied costs of the two programs. The present writer has added the later estimated expenditures to each chart.²⁵ It may be noticed that the implied costs of the forces with the high and the low assumptions extend back before 1961; how far, one has no way of determining from the charts. This is as one would expect, because the cost implications of different future force levels do extend backwards in time.

There is a certain difficulty here, though. The cost implication of the high assumption is as much as 22 percent higher than the low four years ago and becomes 45 percent higher in 1965. Now the estimated actual expenditures curve falls between the high and low assumptions, which seems reasonable. But logic demands that the estimated actual expenditures embrace both the high and low assumptions in the present and past, as either of these assumed forces could be the actual program at the time, according to the assumptions by which they were constituted. Thus the uncertainty in the estimate of actual expenditures must be at least as large as the difference between the high and low assumptions,²⁶ 45 percent of the low in 1965. If this degree of uncertainty is accepted in the estimated expenditures which have been "straining" the economy in the past and present, what basis is there for assessing a future "strain"?

Nevertheless, we find these judgments concerning the effects on economic growth of different levels of defense expenditures appearing in NIE 11-5-65 without the qualifications (which themselves seemed inadequate) that appeared in the study from which they were taken. Moreover, we note data on the absolute magnitude of military expenditures appearing without appropriate qualification. For example, NIE 11-5-65 gives for the 1964 expenditures a range from 15.0 to 19.9 billion rubles,²⁷ but this range reflects only uncertainty about

²⁵ From "Soviet Defense Expenditures," CIA/RR MP 65-1, 2 June 1965. The data are the same as those in Figure 1. It is perhaps worth noting that this current estimate of Soviet military expenditures for recent years varies considerably from previous estimates for the same years.

²⁶ Not to take into account the further uncertainties in the costing of the high and low assumptions, or in the high and low forces themselves.

²⁷ These and other data concerning military expenditures since 1961, appearing in Table 4 on page 24 of the NIE, are taken from the study we have just discussed.

the forces costed, not the costing uncertainties with which this essay is concerned. This fact is not noted in the estimate, nor does any expression of the tenuous nature of this expenditure data appear there. It is not surprising that misconceptions concerning the data arise.

Summary of Uncertainties

In discussing the means by which intelligence seeks a quantified expression of Soviet economic limitations to produce advanced weapons, we have noticed a variety of uncertainties. It may be worth while to review them. Military budgets, representing a compromise among contrary interests, show erratic trends. The U.S. budget has fluctuated to a very considerable extent and in an unpredictable pattern. The Soviet budget has also fluctuated, we are quite uncertain how much. Extrapolation does not seem a warranted method of estimating future budgets.

Increments of the Soviet military budget are hidden, so that we have no "pie" to slice into mission forces or elements. The pie must be analytically created by costing assumed elements. Meaningful costs of modern Soviet weapon systems cannot be derived from Soviet economic data; most costs must be estimated by analogy with U.S. costs. The basis for analog costing appears uncertain, and the methods used may produce costs not representative of the real costs of Soviet forces, especially in the light of incomparable features of the respective forces.

The method involves use of both rubles and dollars. These are not homogeneous units, and conversion from one to the other presents an anomaly which translates to uncertainty. Having arrived at dollar/ruble costs, there is difficulty relating these to some expression of strain or economic limitation. Intelligence has enjoyed no particular success in predicting GNP growth. Nevertheless it is in terms of limitations on GNP growth that intelligence has attempted to measure the impact of military programs.

Use in Defense Planning

It is to be assumed that economic intelligence data and judgments contained in National Intelligence Estimates, and costs of Soviet forces synthesized by intelligence at the military planner's request, are to be used in defense planning, the purpose for which they were requested. We should then not be surprised to find the following reasoning advanced in a certain sensitive military planning document of considerable importance: The United States and its NATO allies

are spending about the same amount on general-purpose forces as are the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forces.²⁸ This fiscal equivalence is a basis for judging future necessities from a force planning point of view. If the spending is the same, the essential problem is to see to the more effective use of the military resources, including more effective organization for employment, rather than adjusting expenditure levels to military needs otherwise determined.

Comparative economic measurements involving Soviet and U.S. military equipment and forces are appearing with increasing frequency in military planning documents. One finds statements like "replacement costs [of U.S. and Soviet equipment] ought to express the relative effectiveness of various aircraft," and charts relating to all kinds of forces with abscissas and ordinates labeled "Soviet costs" and "U.S. costs."

In a study which combined and summarized extensive substudies undertaken by the three services at the request of the Department of Defense we find the following as a description of its focus:

If the Soviets spend x dollars to create damage to the US and the US spends y dollars to limit damage, what is the percentage US population and industry surviving? . . . This can be expressed in terms of exchange rates—the cost for the US to maintain a given "% surviving" per dollar of Soviet expenditure to overcome it.²⁹

The current trend in the Department of Defense seems to be in the direction of increasing use of Soviet forces costing and more reliance on economic intelligence judgments. Indeed, this is a natural evolution in the use of systems analysis for defense planning. An objective of systems analysis is to explore or to refine successively a military problem so that marginal advantages in terms of some cost-effectiveness yardstick are identified and can form the basis of conclusions. Marginal utility, a concept familiar to any student of

²⁸ The following statement is from an explanatory footnote in Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-4-65 and NIE 11-5-65: ". . . [Since] the evidence is not adequate for an estimate of land armaments production [in the Soviet Union] within useful ranges of confidence, the production figures used for computing expenditures for such production were developed from assumed requirements in order to permit inclusion of expenditures for land armaments in the gross total."

²⁹ "A Summary Study of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces of the US and USSR," Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 8 September 1964, p. 14 f. It should be noted that this study was distributed for information only. Nevertheless, data from it have been used as input to other weapon system studies.

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Soviet Arms Strain

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elementary economics, is thus a primary concern of the systems analyst. He is interested in the range of diminishing returns, and he seeks to determine where marginal advantages and points of indifference between the cost-effectiveness of alternatives should influence decision making.

It is quite clear that important insights into military relationships and the tradeoff nature of various military measures may be derived through using economic data in systems analysis. It seems equally clear that conclusions may, under some circumstances, be critically influenced by inadequacies in the economic inputs. Even when findings are not sensitive to such inputs or even related to them, intuitive comparisons of economic capabilities can scarcely be avoided. Indeed, they are encouraged by the present circumstance in which data on Soviet military expenditures and costs of categories of Soviet forces appear in intelligence publications at the highest national level, often without the slightest qualification. A part of the problem is the compartmentation of the intelligence from the planning function and a failure of communication between intelligence and the military planner with respect to the adequacy of the data.

But the basic trouble is not simply a matter of communication. Nor is the difficulty of estimating Soviet defense expenditures and of understanding and measuring economic limitations wholly a matter of accessibility of data or competence in analysis. Some of it is due to the difficulty of the science of economics. Economic theory is not well developed—certainly not in a way to allow transfer of data from one economic frame of reference to another with rigor, or even to understand fully its meaning in one frame of reference. Otherwise how would it be possible for two such distinguished economists as Galbraith and Myrdal to draw opposing inferences concerning economic production in the United States from the same set of data?

Von Neumann and Morgenstern, who have made an extensive effort to express basic economic relationships in mathematical form, have remarked:

... we may also observe that part of the feeling of dissatisfaction with the mathematical treatment of economic theory derives largely from the fact that frequently one is offered not proofs but mere assertions which are really no better than the same assertions given in literary form. Very frequently the proofs are lacking because a mathematical treatment has been attempted of fields which are so vast and so complicated that for a long time to come—until much more empirical knowledge is acquired—there is hardly any reason at all to expect progress *more mathematico*.²⁰

²⁰ John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 5.

Soviet Arms Strain

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In the making of wine, more pressure on the marc may not improve the product. It may be that squeezing harder the available Soviet economic data, or the economic intelligence analyst, will not achieve the kind of product envisioned by the requester. In fact, it may not be too much to say that the pressure has already been excessive, judging from the product. At least it may be time to consider the matter.

Some Recommendations

It would seem that the expectations of Defense consumers concerning the usefulness of economic intelligence on the Soviet Union in force planning are quite high and the prospects of satisfying these expectations quite low. But, far from being informed that the prospects are low, the consumers are being provided data on costs of Soviet forces in NIEs and other intelligence products in a way that can only create misapprehensions concerning its precision. It may be that some Defense consumers have already been extensively misled concerning the basis for intelligence-supplied data on Soviet military defense expenditures, judging by their statements quoted above and others making use of it. It has been included in weapon system studies in the Pentagon, and there is every indication that it will continue to be used in such studies and accepted at face value.

It would be invidious to imply that those doing the economic intelligence analysis do not understand the limitations of the economic figures appearing in finished intelligence. Yet these are not suitably qualified when cited in estimates and studies, and no coherent, organized statement of their limitations has appeared.²¹ Rather, when requirements for such data are voiced, intelligence uncomplainingly (and unqualifyingly) seeks to meet them. Why this is so cannot easily be understood outside the framework of a group of dubious propositions about the relationship of intelligence to planning ensconced in the folklore of the business. But if this analysis of the nature and uses of economic intelligence on Soviet military forces is not completely awry, it is clear that the intelligence consumer is ill served by the resulting products.

²¹ Moreover, there exists no study elaborating the methods by which such data are derived, so an independent evaluation of their precision could be made. Even the ruble-dollar ratios employed have not been published.

For intelligence, three conclusions suggest themselves. First, there appears to be an important need for a comprehensive statement about the precision of costing Soviet forces and the limitations of economic intelligence judgments made on the basis of such costing. This could take the form of a published study on methodological problems in the production and use of economic intelligence and might include a detailed examination and assessment of the confidence limits of various categories of data. The importance of such a study suggests that it might be published under the aegis of the USIB.

Second, there should be a serious reconsideration of the utility of including costing data in National Estimates and allied documents. This is not to say that study of the problem of deriving a mission breakdown of Soviet defense expenditures precise enough to be useful should not be continued. But it is a serious question whether synthesized data for which there is no direct evidence should be certified by inclusion in National Estimates and accorded the stature of national intelligence in planning.

Third, if such data is included in NIEs, it should be properly qualified, even if the qualification destroys or greatly reduces its utility to the Defense planner. Possibly it should also be cross-referenced to other papers which more extensively discuss and qualify it. It should be a rule of intelligence that information be set into a context that, at a minimum, accords the consumer an appreciation of its limits, of what is not meant as well as what is meant. There seems to be a principle analogous to Murphy's law in industry²² which states that if intelligence can be misinterpreted, it will be.

Of course these three conclusions imply a fourth. A concomitant study by the planners themselves of the uses of economic intelligence in defense planning in the light of problems associated with its production might be worth while. It might be found that Soviet defense expenditure data received by DoD from the intelligence community does not have the character anticipated when it was asked for—or the utility. It is in the spirit of systems analysis that there should be an evaluation of alternatives in analysis methods as well as in what is analyzed. It seems clear that there is a set of potential uses of economic intelligence in defense planning for which the presently produced data are not satisfactory. There may be a set of uses for which such data, produced in the form of assumptions, may prove satisfactory. In any case, the utility of presently produced economic intelligence should not be a matter of presumption.

²² Murphy's law: If a machine can be assembled wrong, it will be.

Direct and analog methods of determining what foreign countries spend on atomic energy for military and peaceful uses.

COSTING NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Alan B. Smith

How much has the Soviet Union, Communist China, or France spent on its nuclear program? What is the cost of the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte or of the nuclear test site in French Polynesia? Is the allocation of funds for these installations proceeding on schedule? How much has West Germany spent on what facets of nuclear research and development? What would it cost India, Israel, or Japan to convert its present program for developing nuclear electric power facilities to production of nuclear weapons? The intelligence community is frequently called upon to supply answers to questions such as these for two primary reasons—to gauge the burden nuclear programs impose on the economies of the countries concerned, and to compare the sizes of different countries' programs.

Attempts to measure the economic burden are usually related to the question whether cost is apt to deter a nation from undertaking or expanding a weapons program. Analysis for this purpose of the pattern of spending also reveals much concerning the nature and probable rate of development of a program. Cost and rate-of-expenditure studies constitute a useful approach to these problems.

Comparison of the size of different countries' nuclear programs is a less cogent reason for estimating costs, and cost comparisons of this kind must be interpreted with great caution. Comparison of probable capacities for production of nuclear materials is the direct and more appropriate way to get at the relative size of nuclear programs. Size can be measured in megawatts, quantities of plutonium or uranium-235, or numbers of weapons without involvement in complicated problems of monetary conversion. Conversion requires extensive studies of materials, manpower, wages, and productivity in the nuclear industries of the countries compared, and the requisite data, as well as the time, for these are usually lacking.

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Nuclear Costs
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Two Methods

There are two distinct approaches possible in estimating the cost of a foreign nuclear program. Both are quite useful if their limitations are kept in mind and they are not used to answer the wrong questions. One is the straightforward "documentary" method of examining data made available either by open sources in the country in question—official budgets, press releases, journal articles, parliamentary debates—or through clandestine procurement. This method is particularly well suited to gauging the burden the nuclear program places on the economy. The costs thus obtained, being stated in the country's own currency, can easily be measured against native yardsticks such as gross national product and national income to determine the share of national resources being devoted to the nuclear effort. It is not well suited to comparing the size of the foreign program with that of the United States, because of the monetary conversion problem. And it is not always practicable: the required documentary data may not be available.

The other method is to estimate by analogy, i.e., to start from what it would cost the United States to build and operate the facilities known to exist in the foreign country. This method, if carefully applied, provides a basis for comparing the size of the foreign nuclear program with that of the United States; it is not well suited to determining the burden imposed on the foreign economy. One of its obvious difficulties is imperfect knowledge of what is inside foreign plants protected by strict security measures. Photographic and other types of technical intelligence are useful in identifying the nature, and perhaps the capacities, of the plants, but estimates of their internal layout, equipment, and processes can at best be educated guesses. But these guesses must remain the basis for estimating cost by U.S. standards.

Moreover, even an accurate figure for what it would cost for U.S. technicians, working at the present level of U.S. scientific and technical knowledge and with the resources of U.S. industry at their command, to reproduce and operate the foreign facilities may have little relevance to the question of what it is costing, in terms of man-hours and material, for foreign technicians to construct and operate them in their own economies with quite a different level of knowledge

and industrial support. The problems are well illustrated in the case of the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte. The official French estimate of the cost of this plant is now 5,037 million francs¹ (\$1,028 million at the current rate of exchange), and unofficial estimates have placed it at 6,000 million or more² (about \$1.2 billion). This is about one-half of the \$2.3 billion the United States spent for *three* gaseous diffusion plants, each of them much larger than the Pierrelatte installation.

It is true one should take into account the huge economies of scale achieved when the initial problems have been solved and unit sizes are increased. This can be attempted by using the cost of early U.S. facilities roughly equivalent to Pierrelatte. In the late 1940s we put \$500-\$600 million into such facilities; adjustment to present-day prices would bring this up to the neighborhood of \$800-\$900 million. So even with this adjustment Pierrelatte will cost from 25 to 50 percent more than the analogous U.S. plant, not counting savings for the latter that would result from improvements in technology since the 1940s. It is evident that a price tag put on the Pierrelatte plant on the basis of what it would cost the United States to construct such a facility today, at the present level of U.S. technology, would be so low as to be very misleading.

Since gauging the burden on the economy is the principal reason for estimating costs, the analog method should be used only when lack of documentary material makes it necessary. Failure to keep in mind the limitations and proper orientation of the two methods has sometimes led to confused interpretation and unfortunate comparison of their results.

When some documentary information is available but is an insufficient basis for an estimate, analogy may be used as a supplement. Facilities in the country under examination may resemble facilities of known cost in some other country. The known costs, adjusted for evident difference in size or conditions, provide at least something to go on in the absence of hard data. The effectiveness of this mixed

¹ Doc. No. 568, Assemblée Nationale, Première Session Ordinaire de 1963-64, Rapport Fait au Nom de la Commission des Finances. . . . sur le Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1964, Annexe No. 37, Rapport sur les Crédits du Ministère des Armées (Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 9 Octobre 1963), p. 40.

² *Le Monde*, 4 Dec 64, p. 2.

method depends on the ratio of documentary information to analog derivatives and on the comparability of the analog countries in economic, scientific, and industrial development. Circumstances, however, frequently make it the only practical means of estimating the burden imposed by a nuclear program.

These different methods can be illustrated in their application to the nuclear programs of different countries.

The Documentary Method: France

The French case will illustrate the documentary method and also highlight a number of problems encountered in analyzing the cost of nuclear programs—isolation of the military part of the costs, the allocation of joint costs essential to both military and peaceful uses, and the forecasting of probable future expenditures. Work was begun on the case soon after the first French nuclear test in February 1960, with the objective of gauging the burden the program imposed on the French economy.

A wealth of scattered documentary material was found to be available.³ Data painstakingly assembled from open sources, supplemented by occasional documentary material clandestinely procured, have afforded a reasonably clear picture not only of total annual and cumulative costs but of the allocation of funds to different kinds of activities within the program, to various individual installations, and to capital investment and operating expenses.

Summation of published historical data indicated that by the end of 1964 France had expended some 19 billion francs (\$3.9 billion at the official exchange rate⁴) on its nuclear program since it began in 1946. The annual expenditures grew from about 5 million francs in 1946 (all in the budget of the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique

³ Among the more important source materials were the annual reports of the Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique (the French atomic energy commission) and of Electricité de France (the nationalized power industry), official press releases, budget data published in the *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, committee reports contained in official documents of the French National Assembly, press coverage of parliamentary debates on appropriations, and articles in numerous professional and trade journals.

⁴ On 1 January 1960 a new franc equal to 100 old francs was introduced. Cost data in old francs were converted to new francs at this rate. Dollar comparisons use the official exchange rate of 1 new franc=\$0.2041.

at that time) to more than 5 billion francs from all sources in 1964. The sources of funds for the whole period break down as follows:

	PERCENT
CEA budget, loans from the Fund for Economic and Social Development, and income from sales of nuclear products	52
Appropriations for "The Atom" in the Defense budget	34
Investment by Electricité de France in nuclear power programs	8
Other: Operational expenses of EDF connected with nuclear power programs, budget allocations to international agencies, transfers from the Ministry of Public Works, and investment by private industry	6

Only about 1 percent of this "estimate" of cumulative expenditure involved any estimation whatever. That amount was necessary to fill in gaps in some series in the "other" category. The rest is simply a summation of published data. But the 19 billion figure must be regarded as a conservative estimate because it does not include some expenditures for international cooperation, expenditures by the military services from their operating budgets, or more than a small fraction of the investment by private industry in new materials and equipment. We know that such expenditures have been made but have no adequate basis for quantifying them.

The method by which the total expenditure was built up is illustrated by Table 1, covering the period since 1960. The program has grown progressively more expensive as a result of its expanding size, generally rising costs, and greater emphasis on military aspects.

Table 1
Expenditures on the French Nuclear Program 1960-65
(millions of francs)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965*
Payments from CEA Funds ^b	1,071	1,173	1,332	1,472	1,727	(2,186)
Payments from Defense Budget ^c	322	570	769	1,646	2,536	(3,135)
Other ^d	258	306	401	483	573	(600)
Total	1,651	2,049	2,502	3,601	4,836	(5,921)

* Appropriations in CEA and Defense budgets. "Other" funds carried at approximately the same rate as in 1964, with allowance for planned increase in expenditure by EDF indicated in *Le Monde*, 21-22 Feb 65, p. 10.

^b 1960-64 CEA, *Rapport Annuel*, 1964, p. 180.
^c 1965 Budget, *Le Monde*, 10 Nov 64, p. 10.

Footnotes continued on Page 28.

* 1960-61, 1964, *Le Monde*, 17 Jul 64, p. 9.
1962-63, State, Paris, Airgram A-3094, 6 Jun 63, pp. 10-11. *Industries Atomiques*, 1/2 1963, p. 93.

1965, Assemblée National, *Rapport Fait au Nom de la Commission des Finances . . . sur le Projet de Loi de Finances pour 1965, Annexe No. 37, Budget des Armées, Titre V—Armement, Equipment* (Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 13 octobre 1964), p. 10.

* EDF investment from: Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, N.Y., *France and The Atom*, Jun 62, p. 16; EDF *Rapport d'Activité, Comptes de Gestion*, Exercice 1961, p. 11, Exercice 1962, p. 11, Exercice 1963, p. 13; and EDF *Travaux d'Investissement*, 1964, pp. 4-6.

International Cooperation from: Ambassade de France, *France and the Atom*, p. 16; State, Paris, Dsp. 742, 15 Dec 1961; *Industries Atomiques*, 1/2 1963, p. 93; *Le Monde*, 26 Jan 1963, p. 22; *ibid*, 10-11 Nov 1963, p. 2; *Journal Officiel*, 22 Dec 1963, p. 11516; *The New York Times*, 20 Dec 1963, p. 6; State, Outgoing Airgram CA-2313, 29 Aug 1962, pp. 7-8 of attachment; State, Vienna, Airgram A-247, 23 Aug 1963, pp. 6-7 of enclosure; State, Vienna, Airgram A-570, 27 Nov 1963.

Transfer from Ministry of Public Works: State, Paris, Dsp. 742, 15 Dec 1961. The small remaining portion of the "other" expenditures came from scattered references pertaining to expenditures by private industry.

These annual costs were then related to the French gross national product at current market prices, as in Table 2, to provide an indicator (admittedly imperfect) of the burden on the economy. It was concluded that in spite of sharp increases in costs the nuclear program is well within the capabilities of the French economy.

Table 2

Costs of French Nuclear Program Related to GNP

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Gross National Product at Current Market Prices (millions of francs) *	296,223	319,689	356,299	391,837	424,700	453,000
Total Expenditures on Nuclear Program (millions of francs)	1,681	2,049	2,502	3,601	4,836	5,921
Expenditures on Nuclear Program as Percent of GNP . . .	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.3

*1960-63 République Française, Ministère des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, *Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1964*. Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, p. 479.
1964 (Preliminary) State, Paris, Airgram A-1226, 2 Dec 1964.
1965—Estimate.

The Military Share

Intelligence has been asked what portion of these French expenditures went for the development of nuclear weapons. The 19 billion total through 1964 includes, besides expenditures of a purely military character, funds spent on research for peaceful uses, on international cooperation, on electric power production, and on activities essential to both the military and non-military portions of the program. We start with the obviously military appropriations for "the atom" in the defense budget, which we have seen to be about 34 percent of the total, or about 6.5 billion francs. But this is not the entire military share. The CEA annual reports described the defense budget funds as intended "to cover the expenditures of a most immediate (or direct) military character." That this does not apply to all expenditures for the military nuclear program is confirmed by the fact that investments in facilities known to be exclusively military exceeded total appropriations for "the atom" as of the end of 1963.

Then how much of the 12.5 billion francs from non-defense sources can appropriately be regarded as military? One can eliminate approximately 2.5 billion expended for clearly non-military purposes. This figure includes funds for international cooperation in nuclear development and investment by Electricité de France in equipment for nuclear power stations. (Exclusion of the latter might be debated on the grounds that such stations could produce plutonium.) The remaining 10 billion francs must be regarded as joint costs of military and non-military projects.

Allocation of these funds to military and non-military categories was extremely difficult. A study was made of allocations to such categories as administration, research centers, exploration and mining, ore concentration plants, feed materials and fuel element fabrication facilities, the gaseous diffusion plant, and development of new reactors and chemical separation facilities. The allocations to specific functions were derived primarily from monetary and manpower data available in French documents. As in any attempt to allocate joint costs, a great deal depended on assumptions concerning each type of activity.

In the end, it was considered that another 6 billion francs might properly be charged to military aspects. Adding this to the amounts from the defense budget gives a total of about 12.5 billion francs, approximately two-thirds of the total expenditure, associated with

the military side of the nuclear program through 1964. This figure includes funds for both capital investment and operating expenses.

Of the 12.5 billion francs spent on military aspects of the program since 1946, some 9.8 to 10.8 billion were spent during the period 1960-64, after the successful test in February 1960 spurred plans for the creation of a strategic nuclear force.⁵ Payments charged to defense budgets accounted for about 5.8 billion of this, as shown in Table 1, and the military share of joint costs during this period has been estimated at approximately 4 billion. The additional billion in the higher figure is designed to take care of expenditures from the regular operating budgets of the armed services that are associated with the development and testing of nuclear weapons but not identified as expenditures for "the atom." The cost, for example, of army, naval, and air transport of personnel and equipment, the salaries and maintenance of military security details, and the cost of military participation in testing or in the development of weapons or propulsion systems cannot be quantified precisely but should be counted.

Future Expenditures

Future expenditures on nuclear programs have in general been estimated on the basis of the past trend in total annual expenditures, what is known of plans for investment in new facilities, estimates of their probable operating expenses, trends in operating expenses at existing facilities, and past relationships between capital investment and operating expenses. Early in 1963 figures for future expenditures on the French nuclear program as a whole were derived by projecting the 1962 budget authorizations⁶ for the program at

⁵ A *Projet de Loi Programme Relative à Certains Equipements Militaires* of 8 December 1960, which scheduled funds during the years 1960-64, has come to be called the "Program Law," or "First Program Law" now that a "Second Program Law," approved by the French Parliament late in 1964, provides for continuing the development of the strategic nuclear force during the years 1965-70. Intelligence estimates frequently compare the period of the first program law with the future.

⁶ Much of the work done during 1960-62 on the costs of the French program was based on authorizations rather than actual expenditures because data on expenditures then available did not permit a breakdown as to either source or allocation of funds. Inasmuch as unallocated authorizations are simply carried over to the next year, the lag in expenditures was not a serious handicap in measuring costs over a fairly long span of years. Since the middle of 1963, however, estimates have been based on expenditure data; even the estimates for earlier years have been recalculated on the basis of additional expenditure data now available for those years.

33 percent increase per year; the average annual increase in authorizations from 1958 through 1962 had been about 35 percent. The figures thus obtained were found to be roughly comparable to those derived by adding up probable investment in planned projects and probable increases in operating expenses.

Now that what was future at the beginning of 1963 has become past history, we have an interesting opportunity to compare these projections with what happened. We find that authorizations projected for 1963 and 1964 fall in the range between the actual authorizations and the expenditures for those years, as indicated in the following tabulation (in billions of francs):

	1963	1964	1965	1966
Actual authorization	4.5	5.7	5.6 ^a	...
Projection (early 1963)	4	5.3	7 ^b	9.3 ^b
Actual expenditure	3.6	4.8	5.9 ^a	...

^a Preliminary. Based on budget data.

^b Revised at beginning of 1964 as follows: 1965—6 billion; 1966—7 to 8 billion.

The authorizations projected for 1965 and 1966 will undoubtedly prove less accurate. Budget data indicate that expenditures in 1965 will probably be only about 5.9 billion francs, and in 1966 it appears they will be in the range of 6 to 7 billion francs. The margin of error on any forecast tends to increase as the projection moves farther into the future, and it was recognized from the outset that the projected levels of expenditure might not be achieved until later. They have, however, been useful as an approximation for the latter half of the decade.

For the military part of the future nuclear program one begins with the 3,135 million francs appropriated in the 1965 defense budget. To this, if it is assumed that the military share in joint costs will be as high in 1965 as the estimated annual average for 1960-64, can be added 800 million to give a total of 3,935 million francs. This estimate based on appropriations is probably conservative, because in recent years expenditures have tended to run higher than initial budgetary appropriations. Moreover, as the military program increases in size, the military share of the joint costs should really rise over the average of the past five years.

Through 1967, from what is known of plans for investment and weapons development and past relationships between investment and operating expenses, the military expenditures should continue to rise. Completion of the Pierrelatte plant and the test site in the Pacific

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alone account for some 4.5 billion francs, according to authoritative French sources. Adding the heavy expenditures for weapons testing, construction of facilities for production of lithium 6 and tritium, continued development of a nuclear submarine propulsion system, completion and operation of the plutonium separation plant at Cap de la Hague, and increased operational expenditures in general, it was estimated that the 3.9 billion figure for 1965 would increase to 4.9 billion in 1967, giving by interpolation some 4.4 billion francs for 1966.

With the completion of a number of important facilities about 1967, annual expenditures on the military program could conceivably decline. It was estimated, however, considering the cost of operating the new facilities and further development of weapons and propulsion systems, that they are more likely to remain at a level of about 4.9 billion francs per year through 1970. The sum of the annual amounts then gives a total of 27.9 billion francs, or at the official conversion rate about \$5.7 billion, for the six-year period 1965-70.

To this \$5.7 billion, rounded to \$6 billion, which has become the central figure of the intelligence community's estimate, was attached a margin of error of plus or minus \$1 billion, or nearly 17 percent, a range which is considered sufficient for about 95 percent confidence. The lower limit of \$5 billion would assume very little increase in annual expenditure above the 1965 level. Some increase is almost certain. The upper limit of \$7 billion allows for an excess of expenditures over authorizations in the Second Program Law, possible increases in the military share of the joint costs, and service expenditures that are connected with the nuclear program but not so identified in budget accounts.

Analog Method: China

The costs of the Communist Chinese nuclear program have been estimated entirely by analogy, because very little useful documentary information is available. Documentary materials and official public statements have helped to identify and describe some of the facilities, particularly some of the early research facilities, but have given no indication of cost. Most valuable in identifying and describing the nuclear installations has been Nationalist aerial photography.

Once the Chinese installations are identified and described, they have been related to roughly comparable facilities in Western countries as a means of estimating costs. For example, photographic evidence suggests that the Chinese reactor at Pao-t'ou is very similar to the G-1 at Marcoule in France. Information released by the French

CEA in 1960 indicated that the original cost of the G-1 reactor was 8 billion (old) francs, approximately \$16 million, so the one at Pao-t'ou was estimated to cost \$15 to \$20 million.

Estimating thus on the basis of roughly comparable Western facilities, it has been concluded that by late 1964 the Chinese Communists had invested at least \$500 to \$600 million in their nuclear program, including the substantial Soviet grants for equipment and technical assistance prior to 1960. If the ratio of capital investment to total expenditure is roughly similar to such ratios in some Western countries, the total cost of the Chinese program through 1964 may have been about \$1 billion. At a guess, the operating expenditures in 1964 could have run \$50 to \$75 million.

These cost estimates, made on the basis of very sketchy information, are less precise than those on any other country's program. Moreover, the dollar total is undoubtedly an inadequate measure of cost to the Chinese economy in terms of scarce technical talent, materials, and industrial capacity. It is, however, in line with costs elsewhere in the world; our estimate of what France spent in the period before its first nuclear test is approximately \$1.1 billion.

Mixed Method: USSR

Estimates of the cost of the Soviet nuclear program have been made by a mixed method. In the early 1950s, when it was first undertaken to measure the burden of the program on the Soviet economy, considerable effort was devoted to studying Soviet budgets in the attempt to identify nuclear allocations. This effort was largely unsuccessful. The hybrid method was consequently employed, using Soviet data on activities not identified as connected with the nuclear program but believed relevant and supplementing these where necessary by analogy with U.S. costs.

A description of Soviet facilities was obtained from the interrogation of former prisoners of war who had worked in or near them, and particularly from German scientists and technicians taken to the USSR in 1945 and used in the nuclear program until the early 1950s. Papers delivered in the 1958 Geneva conference on peaceful uses and displays at the Soviet exhibition in New York in 1959 also provided some limited information. Photographic and other technical intelligence contributed further to the description.

As installations were identified and described, their construction costs were estimated from Soviet data on the cost of other industrial

construction. Known Soviet electric power costs were applied to estimates of their power consumption. Soviet cost data were available for some of the chemicals used in the program. The cost of uranium, which accounts for a substantial portion of Soviet operating costs, was estimated from information on the cost of extracting and milling other minerals and from trade data on imported ore and concentrates. Soviet wage data were helpful in estimating personnel costs. But investment in R&D facilities could not be estimated from intelligence data; it was therefore assumed to have about the same relationship to investment in production facilities as in the United States.

One of the major deficiencies was in data on the cost of equipment for the production installations. To fill this gap, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission contractors were given descriptions of the plants and asked to estimate the cost of equipping them, breaking this down in considerable detail. These detailed estimates in dollars were converted into ruble costs by comparing U.S. price lists with available Soviet lists of prices and specifications for well over 100 different commodities and activities related to the nuclear program.⁷ The different ratios were then weighted according to the relative importance in the program of the commodities or activities in question.

Early in 1961 it could thus be estimated that the Soviet nuclear program had required through mid-1960 a cumulative expenditure of about 100 billion 1955 rubles, about 40 billion in capital investment and about 60 billion for operating expenses.

Since 1961 additional intelligence has made possible improved estimates of the capacities of both previously existing and new production plants. The gap in information on R&D facilities has been partially filled by analyzing fragmentary information on the number of personnel employed at some R&D centers. A recent estimate

⁷ Research during 1958-60 indicated that a 1955 ruble-dollar ratio of about 5:1 was appropriate for capital costs, reflecting average ratios of about 6:1 for labor and materials and 4:1 for equipment. (For certain types of equipment the ratio was as low as 2:1 and for others it exceeded 5:1, but for a major portion it was about 4:1.) For operating costs an average of 10:1 was derived from widely varying ratios for a number of inputs. (The 1955 ruble-dollar ratio for uranium concentrates produced in the USSR was estimated at about 12:1. The ratio for industrial wages was about 4:1 or 5:1, with labor productivity assumed to be about half that in the United States. On the basis of comparative rate schedules the ratio for electric power was 15:1, though this probably understates the difference in plant efficiency. The ratio for chemical products was generally about 10:1.)

places cumulative expenditures on the Soviet nuclear program through mid-1965 at 19 billion new rubles (the new ruble equals 10 pre-1961 rubles), about 6.5 billion for plant and equipment and about 12.5 billion for operating purposes. Current spending is estimated at about 2 billion rubles annually, or approximately 1.1 percent of GNP.

The estimate of 19 billion rubles expended through 1964 is probably conservative. Recent information indicates, though not conclusively, that the ruble-dollar ratio used for estimates of capital investment may have been a little low. Moreover, the estimates themselves probably do not make adequate allowance for cost of modernization, conversion to new processes with improved technology, or complete replacement of facilities. An offsetting factor, however, is that in recent years improved mining and refining methods may have reduced the cost of Soviet feed materials somewhat more than estimated. The annual distribution of capital expenditures is difficult to determine; estimates have been based primarily on observed construction times and on analogy with experience in Western countries. In spite of these deficiencies, the estimates are considered good indicators of the magnitude of outlays for the Soviet nuclear program.

Presentation and Interpretation

As we have pointed out, the costs of foreign nuclear programs are best studied in the indigenous currency, so they can be related to units of national accounting and expressed as a percentage of a native measure of the economy. In U.S. intelligence studies, however, they must be expressed in dollars. If told that West Germany spent about 3.4 billion marks on its nuclear program through 1964 or that the annual nuclear expenditure in Japan as of 1964 was 30.7 billion yen, the reader immediately asks, "How much is that in dollars?" For this reason costs derived in indigenous currencies are frequently converted to dollars at official rates, as in the following tabulation:

COUNTRY	ESTIMATED TOTAL EXPENDITURES		ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENDITURE IN 1964	Percent of 1964 GNP in Current Prices
	TO END 1964	YEAR PROGRAM STARTED		
West Germany	850	1956	185	0.2
Italy	580	1952	78	0.2
Japan	460	1954	85	0.1
Sweden	310	1945	45	0.3
India	220	1954	63	0.2
Israel	110-120	1952	20	0.6

Although the official exchange rates may not accurately reflect differences in the purchasing power of money spent on the nuclear industry in the United States and in the country concerned, the dollar figures at least have the merit of being readily understandable and can be reconverted to the original currency with ease. And conversion to dollars for purposes of presentation does not affect our measure of the burden on the economy; the percentages of GNP in the table were computed entirely in the indigenous currencies.⁸

Along with the desire to have the cost of foreign nuclear programs stated in dollars goes a tendency to compare the results of the conversion. It should be remembered, however, that when the conversion has been based on official exchange rates rather than ratios derived from study of relative productivity, the comparisons can be only rather crude measures of relative size.

Even if comparative costs could be accurately expressed in the same terms, a further difficulty in comparing size is that different programs are not homogeneous; aggregate costs do not reflect differences in the nature of the programs. West Germany, for example, has spent nearly as much on its nuclear program as France had by the time of its first test, or nearly as much as we estimate for Communist Chinese expenditures through 1964. Yet West Germany has no nuclear weapons program at all. Its program has been oriented strongly toward education, research, and technological development aimed at developing low-cost, high-quality equipment, particularly reactors for electric power and for ship propulsion. The table shows that India has spent only about one-fourth as much as West Germany on its nuclear program. It is true that the Indian program is much

⁸ Sufficient indigenous documentary material was available to permit fairly precise cost estimates for the nuclear programs of West Germany, Italy, Sweden, India, and Japan, both total costs and allocations among various installations and types of activities (except that information on investment by private organizations was in all cases inadequate, making all the estimates conservative). For the Israeli nuclear program, however, the estimates were reached by a mixed method, using some cost data released by Israeli sources (particularly early in the program), descriptions of the facilities obtained from observers and visitors, and analogy with the costs of similar facilities in other countries. In estimating the cost of a chemical separation plant, for example, should Israel elect to construct one, use was made of detailed information India has released on the costs of its chemical separation plant. It was assumed that Israel could buy the equipment for the plant at about the same price that the Indians paid. Indian construction costs were adjusted according to the difference in costs for labor and cement in Israel.

smaller than the German one, but although it is thus far oriented toward peaceful uses, it is so balanced that it now has all the facilities needed to produce the fissionable materials for a small weapons program. Such facts as these, which become apparent through examining the allocation of funds to various types of installations and activities, are not indicated in the overall costs.

Collection Requirements

As we have seen, the method of estimating the costs of nuclear programs, and to some extent the usefulness of the estimates, is usually determined by the availability or lack of documentary material. The more documentary evidence there is, the more the intelligence problem becomes the traditional one of painstakingly collecting, combining, and analyzing the data. It is a matter of indifference to the cost analyst whether the documentary materials were overtly published and procured or obtained by clandestine collection. A great deal of documentary information on the costs of nuclear programs is published openly.

Unfortunately, the fact that information has been published abroad in the official report of a foreign atomic energy commission or electric power monopoly or perhaps in a trade journal does not necessarily mean that it is available to the analyst in Washington. In most of our diplomatic missions abroad the publications procurement officers have that responsibility merely as an addition to other duties, and they must look for publications for a wide variety of consumers. Even if the analyst knows of a specific publication and submits a request for it, the delay before he actually gets it may be considerable; but often he does not even know that such-and-such a publication exists and therefore cannot request it.

If all types of collectors were kept aware of the need for documentary information on the cost of foreign nuclear programs they might pick up and forward useful material they ran across by chance in the course of other activities. Clandestine source materials, both documentary and of an incidental conversational variety, have proved useful both in filling gaps in overt information and as an aid in interpreting overt data. Sometimes they have lent credibility to overt materials that otherwise would have been disbelieved until confirmed at a much later date.

The supplementary method of estimating cost by analogy, used when the documentary materials are not adequate, depends on col-

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lection of a different sort. Photography and other types of technical intelligence often make possible the description of facilities that is necessary before attempting an analog estimate.

Collectors should think of the cost analyst as an insatiable sponge who welcomes data from any source on either the over-all costs or particular allocation of funds, for investment or operation, to any installations or activities connected with nuclear programs almost anywhere in the world.

*A secretive special shipment
in the Cuban missile crisis.*

ON THE TRAIL OF THE ALEXANDROVSK

Dwayne Anderson

Most often, in military intelligence, photographs are studied with the purpose of establishing military capabilities. Barracks, revetments, and launchers are counted to determine order-of-battle strength. Missiles, tanks, and submarines are measured to determine their characteristics. In one case, however, this process led to an unusual combination of photographs and the belated discovery of a Soviet operation that had peaked at the crucial juncture between the buildup and withdrawal of strategic missiles in Cuba.

Quick Round Trip

In January 1963, long after the most critical days of the Cuban crisis, a stack of photographs taken in early October of Soviet naval bases in the Kola Inlet arrived in Washington. One of these, showing a merchant ship at the Guba Okolnaya submarine missile support facility, touched off the analytic chase.

A civilian ship at this highly secure missile installation seemed incongruous enough to make a check on the Guba Okolnaya files worth while. Photos dating back several years were reviewed. No other merchant ships were seen. No component of the U.S. intelligence community had evidence that any cargo ships except naval auxiliaries ever put into the base. The presence of this ship, the Alexandrovsk, was now clearly unusual and called for further analytic inquiry.


The date of the photographs, 3 October, suggested a line of attack. This was shortly after the first deliveries of IL 28's and MRBM's to Cuba. Could the Alexandrovsk have been Cuba bound and could she have carried a military cargo? If so, what would the particular cargo be and why was it being shipped from this Arctic base when all other such shipments, as far as we knew, had been made from Baltic and Black Sea ports?

Aerial photographs of all ships bound for Cuba were reexamined. No Alexandrovsk. The odds were against her having slipped through the U.S. air surveillance net; three out of every four ships going

to Cuba had been picked up. Interest in the Alexandrovsk waned, and her presence at the naval base seemed likely to become just another in the long list of unsolved intelligence anomalies.

One routine step remained, however—to review all the photographs of ships *returning* from Cuba to the Soviet Union. This was done, and eureka! there she was. A naval aircraft had picked her up on 10 November, position 26°30' North, 53°17' West, traveling light and fast, as shown below. Moreover, several interesting vehicles, including six missile nose cone vans, were on board (toward stern). Though other vessels would also leave Cuba with such nose cone vans, the Alexandrovsk had been one of the first to leave. Partially opened hatches suggested that additional personnel may have been on board, living in the 'tween-deck area. Research was again stepped up.

More facts were excavated. Checks of shipping data now showed that the Alexandrovsk was an old-timer in the Cuba trade but all her previous voyages had originated in the Baltic. In further restudy of air photography of Cuban ports it was found that she was at Mariel on 3 November. (She may have escaped surveillance on the way in by taking an unusual, southerly course, perhaps for that very purpose.) At Guba Okolnaya, it was known, nuclear warheads were probably stored and serviced; the presence of submarine missiles was certain. Also of interest at this base was a cement arch building near the waterfront that very closely resembled those built near missile sites in Cuba. Finally, newer photography of Guba Okolnaya showed the Alexandrovsk back there on 23 November with the vehicles still on deck.



CHRONOLOGY AUGUST–NOVEMBER 1962

<u>Cuban Developments</u>	<u>Movements of the Alexandrovsk</u>
<p>Early August</p> <p>First activity at SAM sites and cruise missile sites noted</p> <p>Komar-class cruise missile boats arrive</p>	
<p>Late August</p> <p>First known delivery of MIG-21 fighters</p> <p>First activity at IRBM/MRBM sites</p>	
<p>Late September</p> <p>First known delivery of MRBM missile to launch site</p> <p>First known delivery of IL-28 jet light bombers</p>	Alexandrovsk arrives in Kola inlet
<p>Early October</p> <p>First identified flight of MIG-21 fighters</p>	Alexandrovsk at Guba Okolnaya submarine missile facility, 5 October
<p>Late October</p> <p>Quarantine proclamation, 23 October</p> <p>Soviet ground force encampments occupied</p>	Alexandrovsk probably arrived in Cuba just before quarantine
<p>Early November</p> <p>Soviets begin dismantling MRBM/IRBM sites</p> <p>MRBM/IRBM missiles taken out of Cuba</p>	Alexandrovsk at Mariel on 3 November
	Alexandrovsk photographed at sea with nose cone vans on deck, 10 November
<p>23 November</p>	Alexandrovsk back at Guba Okolnaya base

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The Alexandrovsk
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The Alexandrovsk

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Deadly Burden

The schedule of the *Alexandrovsk* now established and all available intelligence on the ship wrung out, it remained to determine the nature of her cargo. In early 1963, in the midst of rumors of missiles still in Cuba, underwater launchers, and strategic weapons stored in caves, any information on just what the Soviets had sent in or taken out was still of high interest. Moreover, the exact characteristics of the military buildup were important in evaluating Soviet intentions then and later.

Collecting information on this particular shipment had been difficult; analyzing it was much more so. Lists of plausible and possible cargoes were prepared, measured against likely Soviet requirements, and then examined in context of what the Guba Okolnaya base could supply. Hypothesis after hypothesis was shot down. Were the Soviets sending submarine ballistic missiles to Cuba? Unlikely. How about nuclear bombs for the IL-28 bombers? Also unlikely. At one point no hypotheses were left. But a few, phoenix-like, rose from the analytic ash pile.

One of the most plausible possibilities, and certainly the most significant, was that MRBM nuclear warheads had been carried by the *Alexandrovsk*. Evidence bearing on this hypothesis and on related questions was again sifted. Was Guba Okolnaya a likely transshipment point for MRBM equipment? Were naval and Strategic Rocket Force nuclear warheads interchangeable? Finally, were some of the basic identifications used in the analysis correct? Were "missile nose cone vans" really missile nose cone vans? Were cement arch buildings actually meant for nuclear warhead storage? In both cases the answer was a qualified yes.

Clearly the Soviets had intended to send nuclear warheads to Cuba; their strategic missiles were useless without them. What was not certain was whether they actually arrived, and this question seemed worth trying to answer even months after the crucial October-November period. If they had not been delivered the Soviets would have had no capability at all for attacking the United States with Cuba-based missiles during the crisis, and this might have had some bearing on their abject withdrawal. If, on the other hand, the warheads were present, the Soviet surrender was even more complete.

Overhead photography of Cuban installations had shown warhead handling and storage facilities to have been constructed but could

neither establish nor rule out the presence of the warheads themselves. A few Soviet public statements had implied that they were present, and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov said that nuclear warheads were taken out of Cuba immediately after the decision was made to remove the missiles. This, if true, would fit in with the fact that the *Alexandrovsk* was one of the first ships to leave after the decision. But there was no really cogent reason for believing the Soviet statements.

Additional research did not resolve the *Alexandrovsk* question conclusively, but it did sharpen the picture of what was and what was not known. It was clear that the *Alexandrovsk* did make an unusual voyage to and from Cuba during a critical period. She called at the probable nuclear storage facility at Guba Okolnaya before her outbound voyage and again on her return, when she carried a deck cargo of nose cone vans. If the Soviets had wanted to avoid having an incoming shipment of nuclear warheads monitored for radioactivity in the Turkish or Danish Straits, the simplest way would have been to send them from the north. It could be concluded that the *Alexandrovsk* may have carried some.

Thus ended a three months' chase which involved intelligence from a wide variety of scattered sources and analytic assistance from several organizations in the intelligence community. The results were only presumptive; we will probably never learn with assurance what the ship carried. But the exercise provided at least a small increment in our understanding of the Cuban crisis.

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*The seaman as observer, courier,
or recruiter in his own denied-
area country.*

THE MARINER AS AGENT

Art Haberstich

In surveying the possibilities for access to a denied country, the intelligence officer's eye naturally falls upon the fleets of merchant ships which steam in and out of its ports, shuttling back and forth to the outside world, each vessel potentially a carrier of the paraphernalia of espionage, each seaman a potential agent. It is common knowledge that intelligence services use seamen of their own or friendly countries' merchant fleets to make clandestine port observations in denied areas. The potential for clandestine activities broadens considerably, however, when we consider for use as carriers and agents the merchant ships and seamen of the target country itself.

For the native mariner there are no such obstacles at home as language barriers, area unfamiliarity, and the routine security restrictions applied to foreigners. He makes a voyage and returns to mingle freely with family and associates, travels unrestrictedly, and enjoys an access to people and places which the foreigner cannot hope to duplicate. Most importantly, the seaman comes out regularly to free ports where he can be reached. This periodic access to his native country alternating with our access to him outside prompts us to examine his suitability for clandestine missions under cover of his trade.

Homo Marinarius

First let us consider the man himself. In some countries seafaring is a traditional, honorable, and respected profession. In others it is not, and the merchant marine may be a sink for the dregs of a country's humanity. Either way, the job is hard and dangerous and the men are not overpaid. Most of them are alert for ways to profit from the advantages their profession offers in frequent travel to various countries. The crewman, as opposed to his officers, is often a practiced smuggler; he procures goods cheaply in one country and sells them illegally in another where the demand is great and prices high. The officers' chicanery is on a somewhat more sophisticated

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level, with rank seldom missing an opportunity to exercise its privilege. It is the rare captain or chief engineer who does not accept kickbacks from ship chandlers or fuel salesmen for channeling his business their way.

Mariners are unusual in that the enforced intimacy of shipboard life, matched in no other calling, gets them to know one another especially well. This may be true throughout an entire fleet. The men sail together; this means working together, eating together, relaxing together, talking together endlessly, all within the narrow confines of their vessel. Then in port in foreign lands they carouse and let off steam together. They enjoy a degree of camaraderie rarely found elsewhere. It would not be an exaggeration to call a ship or small merchant fleet a floating fraternity, with strong bonds of loyalty tying the "brothers" together. At the same time seamen remain intense individualists, strongly self-centered and self-reliant, and it is difficult to enlist them in any enterprise that offers them no element of personal gain.

Potential Missions: Reporting and Recruiting

The easiest mission for seamen agents is the collection of positive intelligence, and the simplest of all collection tasks is the observations a mariner can make concerning his own vessel and its cargo or the others in his fleet. These observations may be significant if detailed information on the country's foreign trade is needed. The agent, having natural access, need not go out of his way or make any special effort to collect such information. He need only observe and report accurately. The shipboard agent can also make the traditional port-call observations in the ports of his own or other denied countries. Both are usually worth while, and the seaman's access to these targets is unique.

Far more difficult, yet of correspondingly greater potential value, is using the mariner to recruit a primary source of intelligence in the denied area which is his home country. The difficulty of the task should not be underestimated, but this is the real opportunity to utilize to the full the right man's access and talents. The mariner acts as go-between for the case officer operating at one end and the primary source at the other. Most recruitments-at-a-distance have no human intermediary to bring the in-place source the boon of personal contact with the employing service. Here encouragement and counsel can be delivered by word of mouth, personally, from case officer to

intermediary to agent with minimum risk because all accesses are natural; intermediary and source will have plausible reasons for consorting with each other. Officer seamen are invariably best suited for this type of mission because their education, intelligence, and social level will more nearly match those of a well-placed primary source.

Perhaps the most critical single determinant of success or failure in such a mission is the selection of the potential source, the inside lead to be approached through the mariner. An in-depth target study of the seaman's probable circle of contacts is indispensable. He himself seldom has any real idea of the stuff of which espionage is made and will often neglect to pass on perfectly good leads. In the course of debriefings he should be asked whether he knows such-and-such target individuals. Eventually it may come out that someone in whom we are keenly interested used to date the man's sister; the two men, although they have not seen one another for some years, were always good friends. Such leads are not likely to occur to the agent until brought to his attention, hence the great importance of a target study.

One of the best circles to look into is the navy, a service closely related to the merchant marine, especially in small countries. There may be opportunities to penetrate the defense ministry if the mariner can recruit a naval officer friend. The key criteria in selecting the target inside are good primary access to information, native intelligence, ability to work independently, and (as nearly as can be determined) susceptibility to recruitment. Often, if all the homework has been done well, the candidate will prove to have greater wit, motivation, and resourcefulness than the mariner himself. He may have been just waiting for a secure contact to be offered from outside.

Experience has shown that of all methods which may be used to activate an inside lead, personal contact with a mariner friend is one of the most satisfactory to the man himself. While he would shy away from approaches by mail or from one-shot travelers, he is glad to talk things over with a trusted friend who enjoys authorized access to the outside world. The mariner then need only follow simple instructions in order to establish secure clandestine communications between the source and the intelligence headquarters; and once these are functioning, he may step out of the operation entirely and thus enhance its security. It is difficult, however, to resist the temptation

to continue using him to service the source with such materials as secret writing supplies, communications equipment, money, or technical devices, whatever he requires for his mission.

Smuggling—Packages or Persons

The idea of having the mariner service his inside recruit immediately suggests another potential use of seamen—as couriers in support of other operations. The courier need not even make personal contact with the independent agent he services if the two are taught to communicate via dead drops. In this way shipboard agents can provide a veritable supply line to compartmented nets inside the country. Money, propaganda materials, communications equipment, training manuals, all kinds of devices, etc., can be sent in by exploiting a universally acknowledged skill of seamen the world over—smuggling.

This is one mission for which the crewman is perhaps better qualified than his officers. Crewmen often boast that they can smuggle in anything they can conceal on their persons. Occasionally one will go further than that: he has cultivated a special relationship with a venal customs official or guard, who, in return for a consideration, will look the other way while the sailor brings in bulky contraband. Little training is required to transform a seaman into a valuable asset for courier support.

There is no difficulty getting a package on board in a Western country; mariners return to the ship laden with purchases almost daily. The first problem will be to conceal it on board for the duration of the voyage. The case officer can help out here by providing one of a variety of concealment devices. Possibly the best for this kind of operation is the magnetic clam, which the agent can clamp onto any of the numberless steel surfaces on a ship. His most difficult job will be to get it off the ship in the target country, and how he does this is best left to his own judgment.

An allied use of the mariner and his ship is for exfiltration. Traffic in stowaways is an old money-making business among merchant seamen. The right people with the right connections in waterfront circles can get anyone out of a country if it is made worth their while to run the risk. It is a difficult job, though, usually requiring the cooperation of some watchman or customs official on shore and of one or two seamen aboard ship, and the penalties for helping exfiltrate patriots from a denied area are heavy. Yet it is done surprisingly

often. So many refugees have fled one particular unhappy country stowed away in its merchant ships that the cargo fleet is jokingly referred to as a "passenger line."

The cunning that seamen exhibit in getting stowaways on board and out of the country shows a real talent for clandestine operations. In one ingenious scheme of which we became aware, an officer made friends with the harbor pilot and would borrow his official launch to take pleasure cruises around the harbor. In this port the draft limits were such that the ship could load only half full at quayside and then had to be moved to deeper waters in the middle of the bay and finish loading from barges. Instead of the usual dockside fences, checkpoints, and guards, the authorities relied on the physical barrier of the stretch of water and a customs official keeping watch aboard ship. On the night chosen for the exfiltration, then, our officer would enlist the aid of a confederate aboard to ply the customs man with food and wine. He himself would take the pilot's launch and after cruising around the bay until the appointed time would pick up the stowaway from a prearranged pier, take him to the ship, and get him on board while the watchman was otherwise pleasurably occupied. He would hide him in his own cabin for the voyage.

Mounting the Operation

The first requisite in setting up such a maritime program is to get a maritime principal agent for recruiting the mariners. One member of the seamen's "floating fraternity" can provide entrée to all the others. The first step, therefore, is to employ a defected mariner and play him back into the ranks of his former colleagues. The ideal maritime principal agent should:

- have served recently as an officer in the target merchant marine and consequently be on close personal terms with many of the seamen;
- have defected to the West for political reasons and be motivated by a desire to help his countrymen resist a detested regime;
- be of forceful personality, able to handle men well;
- have a good knowledge of English in order to serve as interpreter when required;
- have served as a shipboard agent himself, if possible, before defecting.

A principal agent with this background will be able to read crew lists like menus, picking out those of his old shipmates he can talk

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to and knowing which he had best avoid. Being well acquainted with their routine and habits both aboard and ashore, he can choose an approach well suited to the recruitment objective. It is usually a good idea to follow the principal agent's instincts in these early phases.

To be sure, you can make recruiting contacts without a principal agent. You can strike up conversations in waterfront bars. You can get intermediaries who have natural access to the ships, like ship chandlers, to bring candidates off. This way, however, you always have the initial problem inherent in any cold recruitment, the establishment of bona fides. The advantage of the principal agent is that bona fides is established instantly. The two mariners, usually old friends, greet one another warmly, retire to a nearby café, talk over old times, get to discussing the current situation in the homeland, and swing around to politics; in a short time your man knows what kind of agent prospect the other is. To get such an assessment by yourself may take months of cultivation.

A pitfall in this early phase is the peril to compartmentation that results from the seaman's ignorance of what the principal agent wants to see him about. Upon receiving word that his old buddy is in town the shipboard prospect is likely to invite a crowd to come along with him to the meeting, and such group reunions are no place for operational explorations. Each candidate must be approached and run singly; no matter how many agents are picked up in the fleet or on a single vessel, they must be kept unwitting of one another's activities. The case officer should not hesitate to terminate a contact if he finds him tied in with other recruited agents.

Experience has been that the average mariner is not disposed to be particularly good agent material; it is the unusual one we are looking for. Much depends, therefore, on the selection and testing process. Of ten seamen the principal agent approaches, perhaps one or two will develop into secure, reliable agents. Development of the case must be slow and deliberate enough that the prospect has time to gain confidence and overcome his initial apprehensions about what he is getting into. A trial period of three voyages, that is three sets of meetings, is suggested for testing his potential thoroughly. The patience this demands will be amply rewarded in the long run.

First time out. A solid recruitment, with the aid of the principal agent, should be the sole business of the first go-around. Along with the usual effort to establish rapport, emphasize security, and explain

the contribution the recruit can make, he should be given clear and unequivocal instructions to take the initiative in setting up a personal meeting on the next trip out. His adherence to these instructions will constitute his first hurdle in the testing process. If he fails to initiate contact the next time out, it is a good sign that he lacks interest and motivation and will not develop further. Besides this primary job of maintaining contact, he should be assigned an innocuous mission such as preparing a report on his ship's itinerary and cargo or on port observations at home. The main purpose of this exercise is to provide an excuse to reward him on his next trip.

Second time out. His meeting arrangements should be critiqued to show whether they were completely satisfactory. Praise is due his positive report, no matter how mediocre it is, if it shows effort. Unless he objects most strenuously to accepting money, he should be paid for this report and told it is just the sort of thing that is worth good money to the service. He is a rare exception among mariners if he is not interested in getting some money for his efforts. The sooner he is put on a regular salary, the smoother the operation will run.

This second series of meetings should also begin his training. If he is to be a courier, he needs training in dead drop selection and description. This is best accomplished by practical exercises around the city, in which he unloads practice drops and finds and writes up some of his own. Provided the training goes satisfactorily, his mission on this trip in will consist of finding and describing several dead drop sites inside the country. If, on the other hand, he is to go on a recruitment mission, he will need exhaustive briefing on the purpose and technique of his approach to the selected target.

Third time out. The third go-around is a good time for his polygraph examination, the main questions being who knows about his contact with the case officer and whether he did what he says he did on his last trip home. By this time the operation will have progressed to the point where it is moving forward under its own steam and its future direction will be self-evident. The recruit will have gained enough self-confidence and awareness of what is involved to merit the appellation "agent." When the agent has thus proved himself, he can be run using the same basic tradecraft techniques as any other agent who travels into and out of a denied area.

It is emphasized that the primary criteria in testing the agent are, first, that he initiate a secure contact when he comes out, and second, that he remain compartmented from others. To continue working with a recruit who cannot pass both these tests is to invite trouble.

Place and Time Problems

Two interrelated difficulties inherent in mariner operations will arise to plague the operating service. There is little that can be done to forestall these problems; one must learn to live with them. They are, first, the difficulty of arranging secure personal meetings when ship and agent are on an irregular schedule, and second, the necessity for multi-station handling, i.e., the need to send a case officer to meet the agent from whatever field station has jurisdiction in the area he happens to sail into.

In a perfect operational world the agent would remain assigned to one ship, and that ship would return to the same port every few months, so that he could use a pre-arranged plan to contact the same case officer every time. In practice this almost never happens. Personnel may be shifted and ships rerouted so swiftly and unpredictably that simply keeping track of the agents' whereabouts becomes a major problem. The difficulty is compounded if the program has grown to a considerable size, embracing a number of agents on several ships. The disadvantages are not limited to having to shift case officers.

For example, the agent may write to his accommodation address from his first port of call, Lisbon, to request a meeting in Algiers, his next stop, but a case officer is unable to get to the right place in time. The contact is missed through no fault of the agent's; he has followed instructions exactly. The case officer is then forced to initiate the contact. Despite its undesirability, there are several methods of doing this which blend into normal patterns of action. In order of desirability and security they are the following:

1. If the ship has ship-to-shore telephone, this is the easiest and safest way to get hold of anyone.
2. If not, telephone the ship's agent or the dockside porter and ask him to get the agent to the phone. It should be noted that the captain, chief mate, and chief engineer are easiest to reach naturally by telephone; they receive several such summons daily in the performance of their jobs. A phone call to a lowly crew member is unusual and may arouse suspicion.
3. Write to the agent in care of the ship's agent. Letters to the three top officers can be disguised as advertising literature, business correspondence, sales promotion, etc.
4. Use an unwitting messenger, such as a dock worker, to deliver a note on board to the agent—but personally to him.

5. A thing that seems to work no matter how tight shipboard security is is to send a young lady to the pier asking for her seagoing boy friend. No one gives this a second thought. The lady need not even be pretty; those long weeks at sea dull critical faculties.

6. If a local intelligence or security service is assisting in the program, police officers or other officials can make contact with the agent on board and arrange meetings in town.

7. Recruit someone in the port who has natural access to the ships—ship chandlers, laundrymen, salesmen, etc.

Under no circumstances should another seaman be used to haul the agent off the ship. Such an expedient could spell the beginning of the end of the operation, or indeed of the entire program.

Running an agent is difficult enough when the same case officer, having good personal rapport with him, well versed in the background and objectives of the program as a whole, and thoroughly familiar with this case, meets a given agent regularly. But in the maritime program, where multi-station handling will prove a necessary evil, different case officers, subject to the cruel accidents of time and geography, will shuttle in and out of the handling of each case. Veteran operators, aware of the dislocations that may be caused by even infrequent case-officer turnover, will appreciate the effect on the poor agent when he meets up with a new face almost every time. Even with top-notch guidance and centralized control from headquarters and with excellent coordination and cooperation among field stations, there are still bound to be some stitches dropped.

Headquarters and field elements must work hard together to ensure that these unavoidable losses are kept to a minimum. High standards of handling skill must be maintained if the agent is to respond properly to multi-station handling. Record keeping and operational reporting must also be of a high order, for the case officer at any meeting cannot be sure it will be he who will hold the next. Each report of an operational meeting must be so prompt, complete, and clear that a stranger stepping in can pick up the operation from the written record alone. Usually each field station involved in a going maritime program assigns one officer part-time to it. Frequent personal conferences of all these officers to talk over and work out mutual problems are highly desirable.

Opposition Measures

With the passage of time and the growth of such a maritime program, some strains are bound to show. The exposed principal agent,

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for one, is sure to become known. If the program is quite extensive so the merchant marine is thoroughly riddled, percentages will catch up with it and some indication of what is going on will undoubtedly reach the opposition. Inside the target area, of course, counterintelligence can bring its full apparatus to bear on suspect mariners. Surveillance and investigations can be mounted. Censorship may be concentrated on their mail. There is little the case officer can do about this except to warn the agent and keep him alerted about indications that he is under suspicion.

During voyages and calls at Western ports, however, counterintelligence can make only limited efforts to neutralize the program. Some of the measures it is likely to take are these:

Informants will be placed among the crew to observe their patterns of action. One pair of seamen was arrested because they stayed ashore overnight and crossed a national border without sufficient visible funds.

Surveillance of suspect mariners may be mounted in Western ports. This measure is usually severely limited by practical considerations such as the number of men available.

Searches of the ship, cabins, and suspected hiding places on board will be conducted. This may be done as a matter of routine, but it will be intensified if it is suspected that something is afoot. Contraband and stowaways are the usual objects of such a search, but if espionage is suspected all notebooks, address books, clothing, etc., will be searched.

All officers and men may be warned against contact with foreigners and exiles in town.

A simple if drastic countermeasure, one which is quite effective, has been used by nations with a tradition of xenophobia and spy-consciousness—prohibiting individual seamen from going into town alone. Seamen going ashore must travel in groups. In a still more extreme instance, the Czechs set up a pleasure barge—sort of a floating USO—in an isolated section of the port of Hamburg and forbade the Czech sailors manning a barge fleet on the Elbe to go into town at all. With most nationalities, however, such iron discipline proves unenforceable. The seaman's life is hard, his long stretches at sea confining and tiring. His free time ashore, his chance to expand and paint the town, is precious to him. Indeed, those who must enforce the discipline are themselves susceptible to the

lure of pleasures ashore. So no matter how strict the rules, there is usually some room left in which to operate.

We have emphasized the difficulties and hazards in mounting maritime operations in the hope of being helpful to others who attempt them, not in order to discourage them nor because we do not think them worth the effort. On the contrary, we are convinced that if his case is given the thoughtful planning and careful execution it deserves, the seaman agent can become a valuable clandestine asset.

*Samples show the quality spread in
Communist transmitters and receivers.*

ADVERSARY AGENT RADIOS

James J. Fauth

Any intelligence service has a lively interest in the tradecraft devices of its competitors. When an agent radio can be subjected to professional examination, it reveals something of the sponsoring service's technical and operational capacity. More than two dozen such radios from the Communist Bloc have been surfaced in the West in the past fifteen years. Some of these have been physically available to us for precise technical evaluation. On others we have had only photographs and non-technical descriptions furnished by other services, but even these give us an idea of the sophistication of the communications system and the kind of operations it serves. The samples range from crude, handmade, manually keyed transmitters to top-quality production-line automatic high-speed equipment.

Criteria for Comparison

Essentially three considerations, beyond the very basic one of signal strength (and consequent circuit reliability), are paramount in the design of an agent radio—on-the-air security, portability, and simplicity of operation. Security is primarily a matter of controlling radiations that might be detected by counterintelligence, minimizing both their spatial spread, as by highly directional antennas, and their duration and predictability in time, as by the use of high-speed bursts and irregular transmission patterns. The requirement for portability or miniaturization reflects the nature of the operation in question. A fifty-pound radio may be suitable for agent use, but not if he has to smuggle it through a customs control point first; its illegitimate presence away from home implies paramilitary or cross-border-supplied operations. A two-pound set of low power, on the other hand, that can be hidden in a book or under an agent's clothing, strongly suggests intracity or border-hopping communications.

Simplicity of operation, the third consideration, is the inverse of requirements for operator skill and therefore training. The more sophisticated the equipment, in general, the less skilled the operator

has to be; and the simpler the electronic design, the less simple the operation and the more training required.


The great strides made in commercial electronics in the past fifteen years are reflected unevenly in the equipment of the Communist Bloc services, which as a whole gives not much evidence of any dramatic technical leap forward. Soviet agent radios show a relatively high level of sophistication and personnel competence consistent over the years; their systems, along with the East German, are comparable with our own. The Chinese equipment remains essentially World War II in type and technique, although it has taken advantage of the availability of transistors now. There is in fact a real technical cleavage between the Eastern and Western Communist services corresponding to the discrepancy between the respective national technologies.

Bulgarian and Polish Sets

Even among the European Communist countries there is a clear demarcation between Soviet and East German sets with their production-line quality and advanced engineering on the one hand and Bulgarian and to a degree Polish agent radios on the other. These latter show an almost elementary approach to design and a handmade quality in their fabrication.

The Bulgarian set shown in Figure 1 not only illustrates this simplicity of design but is surprising in the crudeness of its construction. Examining it closely, one finds that many of the hardware components (jacks, nuts, condenser plates) were cut and smoothed by hand. The dial scale is hand drawn, and the spacing between indices was apparently estimated by eye and marked with either a shaky hand or a recalcitrant dip pen. The radio circuit is equally elementary: a super-regenerative receiver—a type that was the latest improvement half a century ago—and a single-stage oscillator-transmitter. Yet there is an innovation in the transmitter; it uses two tubes in parallel to obtain its ten watts output without the complexity and hardware needed for the conventional separate amplifier stage. Manually keyed, its power and frequency range give it limited flexibility over distances of 200 to 500 miles.


That this agent radio is crude and elementary does not necessarily imply inferior performance, however. A regenerative receiver, using the old vario-coupler and a combination detector-amplifier tube, is quite sensitive and selective; it only requires a sure and experienced



A manual CW (Morse) transmitter and receiver. The transmitter has a unique oscillator with two tubes in parallel which delivers a nominal 10 watts output to the antenna. The receiver is a conventional super-regenerative type. The transmitter operates in the range of 5 to 7 mcs., the receiver between 4.5 and 9.8 mcs. A simple AC power supply with dry disc selenium rectifier is furnished.

hand for proper tuning. The crudeness itself, well below normal hand-fabrication standards for technicians, may even mean that the operator constructed and calibrated the set himself as part of his pre-mission training. If so, we can only envy the principal agent fortunate enough to have an operator of such ability.

The Polish set shown in Figure 2 belongs to the same unsophisticated family. The quality of its hand fabrication is better, more like that of a technician or of laboratory production. Emphasis on practicality is evident in its unitized construction, leaving as external accessories only key, headphones, and dry cells. Of quite low power, 3 watts, but somewhat greater frequency range, it has operational characteristics comparable to those of the Bulgarian set.


FIGURE 2
Polish (1951)

A single-package manual CW communications system. The transmitter is crystal-controlled, using one tube. Power is supplied by dry cell batteries. Transmitter output power is 2.5 watts, the frequency range 3.5 to 8 mcs. Receiver frequency range is 2-12 mcs. Overall dimensions are 10½x5x4¾ inches, weight 8 lbs., 4 oz.

Soviet and East German


Compare these with the Soviet radio of the same vintage shown in Figure 3. Although the receiver is of similarly simple design, the transmitter is conventional and the combined unit is considerably more polished in its construction. It could possibly have been hand fabricated, but the quality is that of a factory production line. Particularly interesting is its hardware, such as toggle switches and tuning dial, which appear to be standard stock items. Its output power and frequency coverage approximate those of the Polish set, but it is much smaller, showing greater capability in miniature design.

But better samples of sophisticated Soviet agent communications equipment are found in some of the larger sets that have fallen into our hands over the years. The one in Figure 4, although of the same general period, is significantly better than the other three in a number

FIGURE 3
Soviet (1951)

A small agent CW transmitter-receiver designed for portable operation. It has the conventional master oscillator and power amplifier in the transmitter and a simple regenerative detector in the receiver. It is probably intended to operate from a battery. The output power is 1.5-2.0 watts, and the frequency range 2.2-7.4 mcs.

of respects. With an output power of 30 watts and a frequency coverage from 3 to 16 mcs, it has wider range and operational flexibility. Instead of keying it by hand, the operator can punch a 35-mm film strip before his contact time and transmit it at 150 words per minute greatly enhancing his on-the-air security. Automatic transmission also eliminates the personal peculiarities of the operator's "fist," another factor in operational security. Although mounted in a single carrying case, the set has receiver, transmitter, power supply, and keyer in separate units, which can be sneaked in piece by piece if necessary and also are conveniently replaced


FIGURE 4
Soviet (1956)

A medium-speed CW agent communications system with 25-35 watts output. Tubes are packed separately from the equipment and plugged into the set externally, making for very compact packing. The receiver has conventional superheterodyne circuitry with a regenerative RF stage for reception of Morse signals and a frequency range from 3.6 to 14.4 mcs in two bands. The transmitter, with a frequency range of 3.6 to 16.2 mcs in four bands, can be operated by keyboard or automatically with a punched 35 mm film strip up to 150 words per minute. The case is about 4 by 13 by 18 inches.

when defective. The conventional superheterodyne receiver is easy to operate.

The later Soviet set shown in Figure 5 reflects the application of advanced technology to agent radios. It unquestionably represents a superior system of covert long-distance communications. It has a magnetic tape keyer for automatic transmission at a rate of either 450 or 750 words per minute. With an output power of 80 watts and a frequency spread of 4 to 18 mcs, it is eminently suitable for intercontinental traffic. Such a radio set reveals an extensive commitment of effort to clandestine operations and a high order of professionalism.

The agent radios produced by East Germany approximate those of the USSR in imaginative design and competent workmanship. A

FIGURE 5
Soviet (1962)


A long-range agent communications system consisting of an 80-watt transmitter, a magnetic tape keyer, a coder, and an AM-CW transistorized superheterodyne receiver. Frequency shift keying is used at either 450 or 750 words per minute. Transmitter frequency range is 4.5 to 18 mcs, receiver 4.0 to 20 mcs. The transmitter case is about 4 by 9½ by 13 inches, the total weight of the set 33 pounds.

three-tube automatic transmitter, for example, features a coder with a dial for selecting the desired Morse characters. Although its magnetic tape keyer operates at the relatively low speed (for automatic transmission) of 60 to 70 words per minute, the set is small, light, concealable in a briefcase, and quite suitable for ranges of 100 to 300 miles. Another East German set, shown in Figure 6, is for short distances, operating at microwave frequencies in either clear voice or Morse. Its range with directional antenna is estimated at 5 to 8 miles, quite adequate for intracity use or communicating across the Wall. The complete package is a distinct innovation.

The Asian Bloc

Turning to the Far East, the Communist services in China, Korea, and Indochina, we find the radios much less impressive and a little

FIGURE 6
East German (1964)




A 1.5-kilomegacycle voice or Morse transmitter-receiver system. Two collapsible helical beam antennas, one with 9 turns giving a 46-degree beam width and one with 5 turns and a 61-degree beam, offer a gain of approximately 10 to 12 decibels. Output power is 140 milliwatts. The entire unit, with the antenna collapsed can be worn hidden under the operator's coat or jacket.

less disparate than in Europe. All use older techniques; Soviet know-how with high-speed automatic systems is apparently not shared with the Asian services. About the most advanced and best of the Asian agent radios seen to date is the Chinese set shown in Figure 7. Being entirely transistorized, it is of low power but has a good spread of frequencies; in terms of manual Morse communications it is quite a respectable package. The circuits are of conventional design. The flashlight batteries make an easily replenished power source. The whole set is particularly light and small. Although it shows little novelty or imagination, it does reflect competence in drawing upon commercially available products and techniques to fabricate a device for clandestine use.

The sets produced by the North Koreans and North Vietnamese are of poorer quality. Figure 8 shows a North Korean agent trans-

FIGURE 7
Chinese (1963)




A miniaturized all-transistor system. Twelve flashlight cells in a separate metal carrying case can be used as power supply or as filter for AC operation. May sometimes be equipped with rechargeable nickel-cadmium batteries. The frequency range is 4 to 15 mcs, power output 3 to 5 watts. The main case weighs about 3½ pounds, the power supply 4¼.

mitter of 1960 vintage. It is quite simple, obviously handmade and not too well at that, from components of an indiscriminate variety of national origins. Its electrical characteristics, however, are quite sound: 10 watts of power over a frequency range of 4 to 12 mcs make it well suited for use across Korean distances.

The North Vietnamese set shown in Figure 9 is about as elementary and crude as one could have and still maintain communications. To the Western handler sophisticated in the ways of clandestine communications, the need to train an operator to use this set effectively would be rather dismaying. Once this were done, however, the device should perform adequately. In skilled hands, moving from one jungle camp to another, communicating over dis-

FIGURE 8
North Korean (1960)




A simple one-tube transmitter with up to 10 watts of output over a frequency range of 4.5 to 11.379 mcs. Components used in the circuit are of various manufacture—American, Russian, Chinese, North Korean. The unit is mounted in a roughly finished galvanized metal box. No power supply is furnished.

tances of 100 to 200 miles, such a makeshift product could prove quite satisfactory.

Which brings us back to the criteria by which foreign sets can be gauged and the operational demands for them inferred. With respect to on-the-air security, which is determined in great measure by advanced transmission techniques like high-speed automatic transmission, we can infer from the Soviet and East German devices that they were designed to meet operating conditions in countries possessing a respectable technical ability and means for intercepting and locating illegal signals. The Asian Bloc countries are evidently not so much concerned with this requirement as their European counter-

FIGURE 9
North Vietnamese (1963)



A simple two-tube transmitter and regenerative receiver believed to be used by the Viet Cong. The system is contained in a crude square container; it apparently operates on dry cell batteries.

parts. The best Asian equipment we have seen is light and small, emphasizing the criterion of portability and concealment, as though these were paramount considerations in their operations. With respect to simplicity of operation, the Soviet and East German radios require less stringent training for their agent operators; it is especially advantageous in third-country operations not to have to recruit nationals who are professional radio operators or technicians and may be watched by counterintelligence for just that reason.

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Case history of a determined, idealistic German that British intelligence called "best agent of the war."

ALIAS GEORGE WOOD

Anthony Quibble

The German diplomatic courier was carrying, when he cleared Swiss customs, a 12-by-18-inch manila envelope with two red wax seals bearing the imprint of the Foreign Office and addressed to the German Legation, Bern. When delivered to the legation its seals were undisturbed, but it had shrunk to a 10-by-15 size and grown thinner. Actually, of course, the smaller envelope had been only a part of the contents of the larger, and the rest was destined not for the Nazi diplomats but for their enemies. This sleight-of-hand was performed a number of times before the spring of 1945, but the first time was on Tuesday 17 August 1943. The courier's name was Fritz Kolbe.

That evening Allen Dulles, chief of the OSS station in Bern, ran into the British military attaché, a Colonel Cartwright, who remarked that he had been approached earlier at his office by "a cove with a funny name, has a 'tal' in it; he'll undoubtedly turn up at your shop in due course." (Dulles learned later that Colonel Cartwright was the third person at the British legation who had turned the "cove" away because his only credentials were a bowing acquaintance with Minister Norton and a mimeographed sheet in German purporting to be a Foreign Office telegram.) The next morning at breakfast, sure enough, Dulles' associate Gerald Mayer had a telephone call from his banker friend Paul Dreyfuss in Basel, asking that he receive *his* friend Dr. Ernesto Kocherthaler, who would come to his office at nine. (Mayer was actually an employee of OSS's sister organization, the Office of War Information, whose offices were in the same building; but because the sudden closing of the French border at the time of the North Africa landings had caught the OSS station badly understaffed, it did a good deal of borrowing from OWI and other U.S. missions.)

Kocherthaler turned out to be a German-born Spanish citizen who had emigrated to Switzerland after the civil war. He had a German friend, he said, who was as anti-Nazi as himself and had access to

important official information. This man was in Bern at the moment and would be willing to meet with the Americans if they desired. He had brought with him these 16 Foreign Office telegrams. As evidence of good faith Kocherthaler would leave them for Mayer to study before deciding to see his friend, who, however, would have to leave again for Germany on Friday, day after tomorrow.

Visitor from Berlin

The telegrams had nothing about them to suggest a hoax. Mimeographed in double space and addressed to the Foreign Office from the German legations in Dublin, Stockholm, Sofia, Ankara, Rome, and Bern itself, they seemed the usual copies any foreign ministry must make to disseminate incoming messages. A routing stamp showed that these particular copies were intended for "Ambassador Ritter." After consulting Dulles, Mayer set up a meeting at his own home for 10:30 Thursday morning. There Kocherthaler brought Fritz Kolbe.

- ~~falle~~
- St. S. Keppler
- U. St. S. Pol
- Botschafter Ritter
- Botschafter Gaus
- Leiter Abt. Pers
- " " " " Na Pol
- " " " " Recht
- " " " " Kult Pot
- " " " " Presse
- " " " " Rundfunk
- Leit. Prot
- Op. Pol
- S. L. Inter. Int. I
- Gr. Leiter Int. II
- Arb.-Exp. bel

Kolbe, as Dulles later described him for the benefit of the British MI-6, was about five feet seven and had a round head, baldish, with prominent ears and

typically Prussian-Slavic features. Frank eyes wide apart, manner unsophisticated but well poised. He was forty-three. He had been with the Foreign Office since 1925, mostly abroad until the war began—ten years in Madrid, two in Cape Town. His son, whose mother had died in 1936, was still in South Africa, in the care of his former housekeeper. So was his second wife, a Swiss girl, from whom he was trying to get a divorce. Since being recalled to Berlin in 1939 he had worked for Minister Rudolf Leitner and then for his boss, Ambassador (for Special Duties) Karl Ritter. Ritter was the liaison channel between the Foreign Office and OKW, the supreme military command, and was



thus concerned with military as well as political matters. Kolbe's job was to screen the German and foreign press and all incoming Foreign Office traffic for him.

The 16 telegrams were a sample of that traffic. Kolbe was able to expand on some of them. Those from Dublin discussing plans to spring "Col. G." from prison referred to Col. Dr. Görtz, a captured German agent.¹ The "Hector" mentioned in the one from Stockholm as source of information about what went on at a conference held by Sir Stafford Cripps in London was another German spy; it should be possible to identify him because so few were privy to the conference.

Aside from telegrams, in four hours of talk that Thursday, Mayer (Dulles joined them later, using the name Douglas) elicited a great deal of miscellaneous information—changes of personnel and office locations in the Foreign Office, Dublin Legation's possession of a rarely used secret radio transmitter, an aborted plan to evacuate civilians from Berlin, the results of the epochal air raid on Ploesti and of other bombings, the location of a rendezvous for German and Japanese submarines, a spy apparatus in Lourenço Marques to get data on Allied ship movements, the German one-time-pad cipher system, and much else. Kolbe warned that German cryptanalysts had broken many Allied codes;² he cited from memory the substance of an OWI cable from Cairo³ to Washington signed "Parker." He drew a map showing Hitler's headquarters at Rastenburg (where Stauffenberg was to plant the bomb almost a year later), Ribbentrop's residence nearby, and the siding for the OKW and Himmler special trains some miles away.

The Higher Loyalty

Kolbe wanted no money for this information or for what he could furnish in the future. He believed the overthrow of the Nazis to be an urgent necessity for Germany's own sake as well as the rest of the world's, and he was doing what he could to bring it about. He lived by a principle his father had drilled into him, always to do what he thought right and never be afraid, and by an ideal of inner integrity

¹ The Görtz story is told in great detail by Enno Stephan in *Gehetmauftrag Irland* (Hamburg, 1961), reviewed in *Studies* VII 1, p. A26.

² Dulles already knew from his Abwehr source Gisevius that some of the Bern legation's messages had been read.

³ Dulles' cable to Washington has Cairo; Mayer's notes on the meeting, curiously, say Istanbul.

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which had infused his hiking club, the Wandervögel, in the Youth Movement. In spite of repeated pressure he had managed to avoid joining the Nazi Party without losing his advantageous job; by diligence he had made himself indispensable to Leitner and then Ritter. Immediately on return from Madrid he had got into touch with some of his old Wandervögel comrades who felt as he did, and they put out leaflets and other covert anti-regime propaganda. Several were caught and put in concentration camps; one paid with his life.

After the war began, Kolbe had made several futile attempts to get assigned abroad again. Then he considered escaping over the Swiss border, but a respected Benedictine friend, Prelate Schreiber, had persuaded him it would be more important to stay and use his position to do as much harm as he could to the Nazis. How to get information to their outside enemies? One of his Wandervögel comrades, Fräulein von Heimerdinger, had the job of assigning Foreign Office courier runs, but several attempts to put him on a run abroad ran into snags.

One center of anti-Nazi sentiment in Berlin was the university hospital, the Chirurgische Universitätsklinik, directed by the famous Dr. Sauerbruch. Kolbe was engaged, pending the divorce, to Sauerbruch's secretary, Maria Fritsch, and so was often there. In the fall of 1942 a young Alsatian doctor whom the Germans had drafted, Prof. Dr. Adolphe Jung, was requisitioned by Sauerbruch and given an office on the third floor. Kolbe had sounded him out and found him a Gaullist eager to do something for Free France. His office could be used for temporary storage of documents filched from the Foreign Office. He also had reason to make occasional trips back to Strassburg, whence his brother or a friend could get information to the French Resistance and so to London. This channel had been put to use, particularly for warnings that such-and-such Frenchmen were about to be arrested.⁴ But now this American contact would permit fuller exploitation of the torrent of material that passed through Kolbe's hands.

There was time for a shorter meeting Friday morning, 20 August, before Kolbe had to leave. He passed on some bits of information

⁴ Kolbe did not disclose these details of resistance activity at this time. They are taken from narratives written by Kolbe, Kocherthaler, and Jung in 1945. These, like the Dulles-Mayer notes on the first meeting and most of the subsequent original communications from and about Kolbe, are in Allen Dulles' private files on the "Wood case."

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he had picked up the night before at the German legation. It was arranged that his code name would be Georg Winter (but among the British and Americans he immediately became George Wood; in the cable traffic he was called Wood or 674 or 805). He would find a way to get out again or at least send information somehow. If he got a trip to Stockholm he would call at the legation and introduce himself as Georg Sommer. As a password to new contacts generally he would use a contraction of his birthdate of 25 September 1900—25900. He would address messages to a fictional Georg Mertz or Anita Mertz. Another Alsatian doctor, whose wife's parents lived in Chicago, Albert Bur of Ober-Ehnheim (now Obernai), did a lot of traveling around Europe and in fact was in Bern at the moment; he might provide one channel of communications. (As it turned out, none of these arrangements was ever used.)

Too Good To Be True

Early the next week Kocherthaler sent word that "George" got safely home and Dr. Bur was back in Ober-Ehnheim. Meanwhile the British MI-6 man, in Geneva, was informed, and he agreed to send cables paraphrasing the 16 telegrams and giving background on the source to the headquarters of both services in London. Dulles would cable the non-documentary information to London and Washington. (Later, when the "kappa" cable traffic, as Kolbe's reports were code-designated, became extremely heavy, the burden continued to be shared between OSS and MI-6. Communications from Bern were a critical problem. Until late in 1944, when the Swiss dared wink at the operation of a "secret" radio transmitter, only commercial channels were available; the legation's code had proved insecure; OSS had manpower for cipher work only by virtue of being allowed to use interned American airmen; and there was no pouch service at this time, though a slow clandestine system for sending out microfilm was set up later.)

The big question of course was authenticity, and even if authentic whether it was a matter of feeding in known textual material to help break the Allies' codes when it showed up in their communications. "Wood" himself had been convincing, and Dulles' expert on German affairs, Gero von Gaevernitz, could with great confidence vouch for his intermediary Kocherthaler. But from farther away it looked too good to be true. The British in London urged "great caution" and asked for the exact date of the first meeting with Kolbe; they were

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checking up on him. In OSS London and Washington the case was handled from the inception as an X-2—counterintelligence—matter, both because Kolbe might be acting under German intelligence control and because some of his information could be put to counterintelligence use. It was to be many months before any of it was put to any other use.

After sending to London and Washington the most important of the information, Dulles cabled on 3 September that for security reasons he would hold off with the rest, pending the outcome of the investigations into "Wood's" bona fides and the authenticity of the material. On 14 September he resumed.⁵ Thus he had scarcely finished dealing with all of it before more came—a letter from Kolbe to L[ieber] Dr. K[ocherthaler] written on 16 September and enclosing a few Foreign Office telegrams and a proper professional map of the Rastenburg area to correct a minor error in the sketch he had drawn.

The letter, four pages typed in single space, gave the daily schedule of the special train Berlin-Rastenburg, reported bomb damage to the Schweinfurt ball bearing plant, suggested other air targets, gave the locations of concentration camps, surveyed the loyalties—to Badoglio or Mussolini—of Italian missions abroad, paraphrased a Hitler decree on punishment of turncoat Italians, summarized a number of incoming telegrams, including one each from Tangiers and Lisbon giving purported intelligence on Allied invasion plans, and told what was being said about coming to terms with the Russians and about the "fabled secret weapon": according to reliable information it's just bluff. Kolbe apologized for typos and bad construction: "I write these lines in wild haste, scanning the material with one eye and typing it with the other hand." He requested acknowledgement by the phrase "Greetings from Hektor," begged that everything be burned "immediately after reading," and signed with a typed George M.

More Documents, More Doubts

On 9 October Dulles cabled cryptically that he had just got some 200 pages of *alpha* and since they were no longer sure of *beta* it would take weeks to handle. He was now fully convinced of *delta* after yesterday's *gamma* and from internal evidence. A great deal of

⁵ Whether in response to some kind of go-ahead from the investigators is not clear. The kappa cables filed in OSS archives under #80829 (Wash-R&C-37 and 77) include no Washington Out messages before 20 October 1943, when the code word was adopted.

value was lost in *epsilon* but there was no other sure way to preserve *zeta*. In a separate cable he explained that alpha equals "German two-way secret Foreign Office cables," the beta they were not sure of was "the security of the communications channel," gamma was "Wood's cross-examination" which had helped convince him of "the particular value and authoritative quality of this material," the regretted epsilon was "the paraphrasing of the cables prior to transmission," and the zeta it would preserve was "this extremely important and valuable line."

"Wood" had arrived two days before, again as courier, with 96 telegrams totaling these 200 pages, as well as oral information that filled a 10-page debriefing report. In the course of three meetings with him he was also warned against being too rash, as in transmitting his September letter to Kocherthaler. It was arranged that he should write a meaningless letter to Kocherthaler's brother-in-law in Bern, Walter Schuepp, and this, communicated through Kocherthaler, would mean that material had been left with Dr. Bur at Unter-Ehnheim. Dulles would send someone for it using the name Herr or Frau König. If Bur sent a messenger to the legation he would use the password Adelboden. If Dulles sent one to Berlin he would simply telephone the Foreign Office, ask for Kolbe by his real name, identify himself as Georg Merz, and set a time to see him at his home. From now on the Wood cover name would be replaced by Georg Kaiser. (None of these arrangements was ever quite followed, either.)

It was indeed several weeks before all this batch of information had been cabled. Dulles set up a system of several dozen cryptonyms for recurring names—colors for countries and five-letter words for cities, offices, and persons; "grand," for example, was the German Foreign Office. (Most of this system was in time abandoned, presumably as confidence grew in the security of the communications.) The cabled reports stretched out until the middle of November. By this time London was convinced of the authenticity of the documentary reports but not fully, like Dulles, of their "particular value and authoritative quality." The British thought them probably a build-up for some grand deception and in this sense "genuine fakes." In 1924 a certain Captain Kolbe had been involved with a German naval lieutenant who passed some false reports. OSS was perhaps less suspicious than MI-5; in an eight-page memorandum of 23 November to European chief David Bruce, the head of X-2 London, Norman Pearson, reviewed all the derogatory arguments that had

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been brought up but reached a rather positive set of conclusions: a) "Wood" had committed no suspicious act, b) there was no evidence against the genuineness of the documents, c) they were valuable at least for counterintelligence purposes, having actually helped in four German agent cases, and d) "Wood" should be encouraged but a watch should be maintained for deception.

To Washington, however, London recommended that Col. Alfred McCormack, director of the Army's military intelligence service, be consulted before anything was done with the reports. Washington protested mildly, asking why, but apparently felt obliged, because OSS London was working closely with the British, not to act independently. Nevertheless it appears that there was no consultation with McCormack (and no dissemination of the reports) until the end of December, when yet another batch was coming in, and that then the meeting was called on McCormack's initiative.⁶

Convincing Flood

To a number of particular questions that London and Washington had wanted put to Kolbe, Dulles had replied that he did not expect him back, presumably because of the arrangement to transmit material through Dr. Bur. But shortly before Christmas Walter Schuepp received a not meaningless letter signed *Georges*: "I'll probably be in there on the 27th, so save a bit of the Christmas goose." (The envelope was postmarked Bern; all Kolbe's impersonal communications were brought out of Germany by trusted but unwitting friends.) On 22 December Kocherthaler dropped a note to the legation for "Herr Meyer." Referring to his need to consult him on a matter, he wrote, "I've heard from a friend abroad that he will probably be in Bern on the 27th. Since I should by no means miss him, I'm going to be there then, at 13:09. If you could be there too we could talk over our pending business." On the 28th Dulles cabled, "... sorting out a vast collection of new material brought by Woods . . ." And the next day, "More than 200 documents . . . I now firmly believe in his good faith and am ready to stake my reputation that they are genuine."

⁶ There are abstract cards on the two cables from and to London in the archives; the cables themselves are missing. No Washington inter-office correspondence on the case dating earlier than January 1944 has been turned up. A 1 February memorandum refers to a meeting with McCormack "following a query from Special Branch [of the Military Intelligence Service] late in December."

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In addition to hard copy there were several pages of cramped semi-shorthand in which Kolbe had copied other telegrams, and there were 30 items of oral reporting. The first of the latter was on Germany's new supersonic fighter, the second on the secret weapon: although some munitions experts still said it was a great bluff, Sauerbruch had seen in Belgium several emplacements which he was told were for the weapon. Of the hard documents, one of the most startling was one dated 4 November from Von Papen in Ankara: "... a number of [official British] documents have come to us from a new walk-in with whose further exploitation . . . I have charged SD officer Moyzisch. Because of the compass of the material and in order to provide a better evaluation I have sent him to you with the Saturday courier to make a personal report. For the sake of security very few even here are witting of the matter; in future communications I shall designate this source 'Cicero'; request that questions about him be sent eyes only to the ambassador . . ."

Telegramm
(Geh.Ch.V.)
Ankara, den 4. November 1943
Zu Bekunnt: " 4. " " 21.30 Uhr
Nr.1600 vom 4.11. Geheime Reichssache! Citissime!
Für Herrn Reichsaussenminister.
+) bei Pol V gRs
1.) Der mit Telegramm Nr.1576*) vom 3. November übermittelte Fragebogen sowie eine Anzahl anderer Dokumente anfällt aus einer uns angebotener Quelle, zu deren weiteren Ausschöpfung ich aus sachlichen Gründen den SD Beauftragten Moyzisch beauftragt habe, wegen Umfang des Materials und besserer Auswertung entsandte ich ihn mit Sonnabendkurier dorthin zu persönlichem Vortrag. Aus Gründen Geheimhaltung auch hier Material nur wenigen Personen bekannt; werde in Zukunft Mitteilungen dieser Quelle mit "Cicero" bezeichnen und erbitte Rückfragen betreffs solcher nur an Botschafter persönlich.

This one, along with two reporting the content of some Cicero documents, both because they were of primary concern to the British and because of security considerations, were given to MI-6 to transmit to London. (To judge from the cable traffic, the British reaction was slow. On 25 January, almost a month later, they queried the precise reading of the Cicero reports and rather foolishly asked Dulles to "direct Wood" to bring more of them. After another

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month, on 29 February, they urgently requested the exact hour on 3 November the first one had been dispatched.) Others that were not susceptible of much paraphrasing, such as a list of Frenchmen the SD was proposing to arrest, Dulles broke up and had alpha, beta, etc. passages transmitted separately. For others where textual fidelity was still more important he sent one cable consisting of every second word and another with the rest.

This batch pouring into Washington effected a slight advance toward credence. A cable to London on 7 January spoke of it as seemingly authentic and "vastly" more interesting, but "in order to guard against a plant and test reliability" requested coordination with the British in getting verifications. On 4 January one report was sent to McCormack of MIS for his judgment of its authenticity; he replied on 7 January with a rather pedantic four-page memorandum saying he was "slightly inclined" to think it spurious but couldn't really determine, especially since he was allowed to see only a paraphrase. Nevertheless OSS began sending one copy of the paraphrases under the code designation "Boston Series" to the top echelon in each of Army, Navy, and State; and on 10 January Donovan forwarded "the first fourteen" to the President.⁷ Then sometime before 1 February McCormack got all these stopped except the one to Berle in State. OSS London sent any reports concerning bomb damage and order of battle to the U.S. military commands there but showed most of the rest only to Ambassador Winant. (McCormack in Washington objected to Winant's seeing them.⁸) With the British MI-5 it worked up a questionnaire about the German foreign ministry and intelligence agencies to test "Wood's" reliability and sent it to Dulles on 28 January. It was never used.

The World Situation

In February Dr. Sauerbruch was making a trip to Zürich, and Kolbe asked him to take along a letter to give a female family friend (*Nenntante*) of Kocherthaler there. In the first lines he cautioned Kocherthaler that Sauerbruch "doesn't know what's in the letter. If you should be in contact with him don't give me away. He would be deeply hurt." It is a curious letter of eight crowded pages, seven in tight script and one typed in single space. (Kocherthaler had to

⁷ For a sampling of these and later transmissions see "Memoranda to the President: Boston Series" in *Studies XI 1*, p. 81 ff.

⁸ X-2 memorandum 1 February 1944.

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be enlisted to transcribe the script.) Not as camouflage but out of literary fancy it is cast in the form of an argument that the outcome of the war was already decided and supports this thesis by a sort of survey of the world situation in which the evidence is drawn from the Foreign Office telegrams and other sources of inside information. Dulles cabled on 21 February that "it is hard to decipher the origin of all the cases as well as to differentiate . . . Foreign Office documents or policy from Wood's own opinions." The letter ended hurriedly, "I have to stop. Too bad. What good are these air raids?" and a Madrid telegram referred to was not enclosed.

The world survey contained a number of items interesting from the intelligence-historical viewpoint—the defection in Ankara that month of Abwehr officers Vermehren and Willi Hamburger, German speculation as to who Cicero was, the deciphered English text of an intercepted Irish cable from the Vatican—but one that caused commotion in Washington and London at the time was a report that the German command in Italy had ordered Rome electric power plants and all the Tiber bridges blown up if the city had to be evacuated. X-2 Washington and the Special Branch of MIS had recently been holding "evaluation meetings" on the "Wood" material, Special Branch having changed its "spurious" tune about 1 February and started looking, like the British, for the grand deception it was leading up to; and Colonel McCormack pounced on this item. (The dissemination of the reports to MIS must have been rather slow: Dulles cabled it on 23 February, but McCormack didn't see it until 11 March, when the contents of yet another letter had begun coming in from Bern.) He telephoned X-2 that at last the first piece of bad fish had come in; only Hitler, not the field commander, could make such a decision, and this was obviously an attempt to confuse the issue at the very time that a conference in the Vatican was discussing the possibility of evacuation.⁹ This ball was bounced back and forth across the Atlantic for some time.

On Washington's birthday, by coincidence, "Fritz" penned a hasty birthday card to Walter Schuepp with hearty greetings for "you and Ernst." He apologized that some child had run a line of play typing down the side; it was the only card he had. The line of gibberish, deciphered from Kolbe's private code, was a flash warning that "Yolland of OWI in Ankara is discussing defection to Germany with

⁹ X-2 memorandum 11 March 1944. This and other X-2 memoranda cited can be found under Central File 32858 Box 6.

Consul Wolff in Ankara." Although the card was unfortunately delayed in transit for over three weeks, and OWI, moreover, commented openly only that it had no employee named Yolland, this bit of ingenuity was apparently successful. Edgar H. Yolland, whom OWI Ankara had fired the preceding August, was given a German passport on 3 April but could never get an exit permit because of U.S. pressure on the Turks.

Handwritten notes in German script, likely a transcription or summary of the original document's content.

Another envelope reached Walter Schuepp first, one enclosing a smaller envelope well sealed and marked "Please speed securely to Ernesto." Inside were four densely scribbled pages of letter and a small typed slip which suggested that a magnifying glass be used on the script, listed the personnel of the Abwehr station in Switzerland, and gave several other items of information perhaps chosen because they were heavy with names and numbers. The letter proper, dated 6 March, began by specifying acknowledgement signals: on a post card about winter sports a reference to three ski jumps would mean receipt of both this and the February letter as well as the birthday card; a boast that the writer is no longer a beginner would mean that he had deciphered the birthday card; a remark on the fine weather would mean the reports were useful. The information which followed was again cast in the form of a world survey by country. Kolbe himself was impressed with its quantity, and perhaps the difficulty of reading his semi-shorthand; he closed, "Poor fellow who has

Densely scribbled handwritten text, likely the original source material or a very dense transcription.

to read all that! I had real good opportunities, and I didn't waste any of them." For further communication he said he might be sending a friend or even two, or he might send a new or old garment or pair of shoes—"Please take them apart *yourselves!*" He hoped to get there in person in April.

Kolbe was presumably sent the acknowledgement signal meaning that his reports were very useful; but in Washington, at least, what with severely limited distribution, diluted source description or none at all, and the distortion of paraphrasing, one wonders whether they were. An OSS procedural notice dated 24 March 1944 says that the reports (except those of counterintelligence import) are to be "disseminated with the explanation that they are unconfirmed and that we are desirous of . . . comment . . . on their authenticity. . . . Source will be concealed . . ." Moreover, the only dissemination outside OSS (except to Special Branch MIS, which gave them no dissemination) was still to Berle in State, and that only after Special Branch evaluation.

As for the counterintelligence items, one only hopes most of them were better handled than one in this 6 March letter that can be traced through the cable files. Kolbe had typed, "Swedish Lt. Col. Count Bonte has assured the German Abwehr representative that agent Schrott can go on working undisturbed." So on 22 March (at last) X-2 cables OSS Stockholm, "Does the following information have any significance to you? It has been reliably reported that a certain Swedish Lieutenant Colonel Bonte (possibly Bonde) has informed Abwehr that there should be no interference with an agent named Schrott," and Stockholm cables back that Bonde is head of Swedish counterintelligence but the report about him "is completely incomprehensible to me." End of investigation, apparently.

Breakthrough

On Tuesday of Holy Week, 11 April, Dulles cabled that "Wood" had arrived "with more than 200 highly valuable Easter eggs." (Washington cabled back, "What a bunny.") He also brought an oral report that ran to seven pages on subjects ranging from German speculation about the time and place of invasion (and Kolbe's own recommendations for it) to chrome ore shipments and oil production. On 20 April, while this ocean of information was still being cabled in (it took nearly three weeks), Washington raised for the last time the possibility that the whole thing was "some kind of a plant" in spite

of the "increasingly significant character of the data, . . . proportionately more damaging to German interests." Dulles in reply reiterated his conviction of the authenticity of the material, Kocherthaler's integrity, and Kolbe's bona fides, and pointed out that if some grand deception had been planned the last batch would have been the time—with the invasion imminent—to do it.

The British had just completed an exhaustive survey of all previous reports from Kolbe which concluded that only 4% of them were inaccurate, and they received the latest with enthusiasm.¹⁰ But the real breakthrough of the April material was with Special Branch MIS in Washington, and what did it was telegrams from the German military and air attachés in Tokyo, Generals Kretschmer and Gronau. They had been given an inspection tour all around the southern periphery of Japanese-held territory, and these were the reports of their observations. On 6 May, in a nine-page unsigned memorandum,¹¹ the Special Branch explained why it had the responsibility for disseminating the Boston Series (cryptanalytic potential), why it had not disseminated any hitherto (stale, second-hand), and why it was disseminating these (authentic); and it graciously promised that "if further reports of the Boston Series prove to be of interest, they will be disseminated." They now went to a "top list" of eleven high officers in Washington. It had taken almost nine months of productive penetration into the enemy's foreign ministry (from our viewpoint; of desperately dangerous activity from Kolbe's) to come so far as this.

Kolbe had suggested that messages could be got to him through the personal columns of the London Times, which he always received a week after publication. In emergency they could be broadcast by the BBC; the 10 p.m. and midnight newscasts were agreed upon, and the code salutation "Peter Peter." But when the need to send a message came, Dulles used another device. On 26 April Washington had cabled "particular felicitations for the Japanese data. The military people involved are most appreciative. . . . Far Eastern information is the most highly desired next to any hot invasion material." This priority was conveyed to Kolbe by a post card to the effect that a friend who kept a shop in Bern was having trouble pro-

curing certain Japanese goods which were much in demand and wondered if perhaps they were available in Germany.¹²

Kolbe had said that Dr. Bur would arrive shortly and call on Kocherthaler, identifying himself as Dr. Jean. He was doing research on the use of color film for medical purposes, and it would be easy for him to bring in undeveloped rolls of document negatives disguised among his own supply. Somehow this plan fell through, and it was another six months before film became the communications medium. In the meantime Wood sent six letters through the now standard Schuepp-Kocherthaler channel, with slight variations. He had, however, been told that documents proper were much more valuable than the gist of them wrapped in a survey of the world situation, so these letters contained a higher proportion of verbatim texts, either copied (mostly in script, some typed) or clipped from the originals, with his notations on the back and in the margins.

[Handwritten notes in script, likely German, covering the right margin of the page.]

Resistance and Reporting

The first of these letters, dated 10 May, was brought directly to Kocherthaler by former Consul General Mackeben, now a private businessman. He is more or less of our leaning, Kolbe wrote, it's a question of taking the last step. He doesn't know what's in the letter but is willing to bring back a package. If you're pleased with my work send Nescafé and cigarettes. I'll smoke them myself, so let there be something in them. The package will not be subject to inspection at

¹² That the card was actually sent at this time is not certain; Wood's subsequent communications do not particularly reflect the priority. The Special Branch memorandum of 6 May said that procurement of the Tokyo attachés' reports had been in response to an earlier request for Far East material; but if this were the case Dulles would not have been likely to cable them in only after almost all the European material had been sent, more than two weeks after receiving them.

¹⁰ X-2 London War Diary II p. 94.
¹¹ Filed under Wash-Dir-Int-11.

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the border. If you don't want any more material send a pair of shears.

He said the Swiss in Berlin were refusing him further visas and asked whether D&M Co. could help and to let him know. Maybe he could get to Stockholm or Madrid. Or could they use the Unter-Ehnheim contact, sending someone with the password "Strassburg goose liver"?

He declared his resistance circle was making progress, but it was frantic work. "In a few days I may have another chance to send a letter. I'll use it even if, like this, it's in the wee hours of the morning and after an air raid. Excuse the uneven style . . . I'm so busy I don't know what I'm doing. A frightful life. Even my girl friend of many years complains that I don't have time to bother with her; yet I'm very fond of her." Fatigue apparently sharpened his impatience with the lack of evident results from his work: transmitting details on the wolfram smuggling still going on from Spain, he wrote, "When are you going to wake up?"

A reply was drafted, to constitute the "something" in the cigarettes, suggesting that if he used the excuse of having to see his father-in-law, a Dr. Schoop, in Zürich to further his divorce they might be able to help with the Swiss visa. But on 20 May, before it was dispatched, Kocherthaler got a telegram: "PLEASE NO CIGARETTES. GEORG." In the next letter, 27 June, Kolbe apologized for any disquiet the telegram may have caused: "But it looked really dangerous. These haven't been nice days for me. Now suspicion seems to have been dissipated." He again suggested a message in the *Times* or over the BBC. Then after the 20 July attempt, ". . . Dr. Sauerbruch has riskily—but, it seems and I hope, successfully—interceded on behalf of the condemned former Counselor Kiep. Heads are rolling for fair here now! Von Mum has been executed. Gördeler is to be arrested at once; I'll try to warn him. Sauerbruch thinks we're all done for and that's especially true for him and me. Perhaps he's right."

In August, inmingled with copies of Foreign Office telegrams, he wrote, "I am keeping my resistance movement alive, in spite of 20 July. The thing now is to improvise, not organize. . . . This is the way I figure it. The Russians will drive to the Oder. At that time the Americans will land parachute troops in Berlin. . . . On the critical day I'll be in position with from 30 to 100 men. Can't I get by radio

advance word on when and where? Peter, Peter, say on the 9 p.m. cast? I am the only one who knows my plan in detail; I haven't let anyone in on the secret."

When he finally got to Bern again, Dulles and Mayer urged him to give up his participation in resistance schemes. He had just barely missed attending a meeting of the conspirators before 20 July where a list had foolishly been made of those present which afterwards fell into the hands of the Gestapo. What he was doing for the Allies, Dulles told him, was far more important than anything he could personally accomplish directly against Hitler.

New Departures

For four weeks before 20 September Kolbe was not in Berlin but at OKW headquarters in Rastenburg replacing a sick man in Ritter's representation there. Although this was a good listening post, he was anxious to get back to Berlin where he had means to get information out and the possibility of hearing from D&M Co. The way he managed it was to feign stomach trouble and go without eating long enough to convince the doctor. As soon as he got back he started a letter, expecting to have someone to take it to Switzerland the next day, but that fell through. Finally on 4 October he finished and dispatched it, transmitting a comparatively small number of hard documents but an unusually rich load of grapevine information and, as innovation, 35 undeveloped images of documents on film.¹⁸

One of the more intriguing pieces of undocumented information he had nevertheless got first hand. At headquarters he had talked to Kleist, director of the East Ministry, whose personal appearance he described in some detail. Kleist had been sent in the first half of September by Ribbentrop, perhaps at Hitler's behest, to Stockholm to get into touch with the Russians about ending the fighting. The Russians there refused to see him, but efforts were still being made, at present through the German embassy there.

An unworthy memorandum in the files gives us a glimpse of how Kolbe's product was still being treated in Washington. Dated 27 October 1944, it is from one OSS headquarters lieutenant to a second

¹⁸This letter, in both original script and typed transcript, is not in Dulles' private files but in archives Wash-Dir-Int-11, folder 3, along with the absurd discussion about dissemination cited below.

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giving the views of a third, who did liaison with Special Branch MIS, about some of the October reports:

Report #426 regarding German negotiations with Russia is, according to the MIS, of great importance if it is true. The report is not, however, corroborated by any documentary evidence, and MIS is inclined to doubt its credibility, in view of the fact that the Germans are known to have told Japanese not to make overtures on their behalf to the Russians.

Because of these doubts of MIS, the report has had no distribution other than to Mr. Berle. MIS would not, however, object to having it sent to the President or Mr. Hull, if the General should consider it sufficiently interesting.

Kolbe was anxious for assurance that the man who developed his films would be both technically careful and secure. He also wanted to know how they turned out. Word could be sent by his colleague Pohle who had brought this letter (as well as the one in August) or by Hans Vogel, who was on a courier run and would be at the Hotel Jura the night of 12-13 October. Perhaps he himself, he wrote, could be more useful now in Bern; if so, they should give Pohle or Vogel a message, or send a letter by them, recommending reconciliation with his wife, and he would sneak across the border.

When Vogel arrived, he brought film with shots of 56 more documents. Some of the pictures were somewhat blurred, but instructions were sent enabling Kolbe to correct this trouble, and in early November pictures of more than 100 documents arrived in good shape. Photography now became the regular medium of communication, sent out with Kolbe's unwitting colleagues—except in late January 1945, when he managed to come himself, and early April, when he came for the last time—under some such cover as a watch to be repaired.


The photography was done in Adolphe Jung's third-floor office at the Universitätsklinik, and Jung provided a description of the process, and of Kolbe himself, in an account written after the war:

... He had a horror of militarism and uniforms. He was judicious, deliberate, and prudent, although overflowing with ideas and energy. . . . He was very much aware of all the dangers. Manic perhaps he was at times, but that was his temperament. He was endowed with a lively imagination which enabled him to see, as though revealed in a flash of lightning, the right solution or the right reply in the most difficult situations. . . .

There was a period when we saw each other every day, morning or night, and yet no one ever knew of our intimacy beyond the relationship of patient to physician. . . . In the air raid shelter we would pass each other without speaking. . . .

He would bring with him the most important of the documents. You can easily imagine the great risks he ran. An accident could happen on Berlin's blacked out streets. Or an alert could force him to take shelter, brief case bulging with documents, in some cellar somewhere. If he were hurt the brief case would be opened, his pockets searched. . . .

Inside the concrete protection of the Klinik building we worked over the documents until late at night. Sometimes he would start photographing them right away fastening them with clips on a piece of cardboard well exposed to the daylight or under several electric lamps. He had an excellent little camera which took 2x2 cm. frames with great precision. I did all I could to help him.



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When he had to leave he entrusted to me the documents not yet photographed. . . . I had only an old secretary equipped with lock and key. I usually put the papers in an envelope marked "manuscript for the Journal of Medicine" and kept them there.

At night when the sirens screamed I went down to the shelter with a brief case containing my own important papers and these documents. Sometimes, though, I had to leave them up there. Often, too, I had to stay in the shelter, busy with the wounded and sick, after the alert was over. I pictured to myself bomb damage to my office and the firemen collecting all the books and papers to save them. What would happen if I were hurt? What if some day they searched the office while I was out?

After a raid we often—he and his fiancée and I—looked out at the fires raging all around and marvelled that our building once again had not been touched. When would it be?

In March 1945 he came to the Klinik one last time. He had been assigned a trip to Switzerland . . . and he was going to stay there. All night long we photographed documents. Everything that could still be of importance to the U.S. embassy we pinned up in front of the camera.

He was tired and nervous. He left us knowing that soon Berlin would be literally wiped out . . . His fiancée wept. I was upset myself. He promised that he would have D. send a plane for us as soon as possible. . . .

The question of when the building would be hit had now been answered. Kolbe brought out a letter to mail for Jung:

. . . We are trying to keep on with our work, but what difficulty! . . . Two weeks ago a large bomb made a direct hit on the Klinik. It tumbled the four upper floors into the basement . . . There were wounded and dead. . . . All the work now has to be done on the ground floor or in the cellar. . . . On a stormy night recently a tall chimney that was still standing in the middle of the ruins fell, and huge pieces of masonry coming through the ceiling demolished all the equipment in the first-aid room. The electric power and telephone wires are all cut. . . .

Earlier, on 6 February, after transmitting the great quantity of hot material Kolbe had brought out, mostly on film, in the last days of January, Dulles cabled Washington concerning an impression he had got during a year's-end visit he had made there—that the "antagonism" of Bissell at G-2 and the "mysterious methods" of Berle resulted in Kolbe's reports' being treated as museum pieces without getting full operational value from them. Why were they still handled through X-2 channels? Why shouldn't Joe Crew, for example, be given those on the Far East? Why not take military action to prevent the re-provisioning of certain enemy ports by methods described in one of them?

Apparently as a result of this inquiry, Washington began on 14 February to cable appropriate reports to OSS Chungking "for Wede-

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meyer personally." That they were valued in the China theater became evident when, because their great bulk soon overcrowded the OSS cable facilities, Washington asked on 21 March for guidance on how to cut down on them: Chungking replied that "technical reports"—there had been for example an exchange of German data on the characteristics of different rocket fuels against information on a Japanese method for high-frequency-induction hardening of metal—could come by fast pouch, but all the rest should continue to be cabled. Thus in one theater, at least, a year and half after the beginning and within a month or two of the end, Kolbe's heroic efforts bore some fruit.

Last Exit

With Berlin in smoking chaos, Ritter asked Kolbe to take his mistress and baby to a safe place in the south. They chose the Ottobeuren monastery near Memmingen where Kolbe's friend Prelate Schreiber was; his nephew was the prior. On 18 March Kolbe left Berlin with his charges in Ritter's Mercedes, but because there was no gasoline the car had to be towed by a charcoal-burning SS truck that Ritter managed to wangle. The trip took three days. After a few days at Ottobeuren he took a train to Weiler, east of Bregenz, to see his friend Mackeben, who had once played unwitting courier for him; he had a mountain cabin there.¹⁴

Mackeben had been in touch with officers of the General Staff's Fremde Heere Ost¹⁵ who had a project to turn over its voluminous (three to four freight cars full) files on Russia to the Americans. It was agreed that Mackeben should find a safe hiding place thereabouts for this material and get word to Kocherthaler when it had been received. Then Kolbe left by train for Lustenau on the border. He had some difficulty getting across because his pass gave him the option of exiting from Friedrichshafen and such options were no longer permitted; but he talked his way through.

Since Dulles was at this time much preoccupied with the negotiations that led to the surrender of the German forces in Italy, Kocher-

¹⁴ Edward P. Morgan's fictionalized but generally faithful account of the Wood case in *True* magazine for July 1950, "The Spy the Nazis Missed," for which he used Mayer and Kolbe himself as sources, says that the wife of a doctor at the Universitätsklinik also rode in the Mercedes from Berlin and now accompanied Kolbe as far as Weiler.

¹⁵ In particular with a Dr. Schellenberg (not Walter), said to be its director.

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thaler debriefed Kolbe for him and in general helped make him useful in this period of Götterdämmerung. Besides the 98 photographs and some hard documents he brought, he had in his head a lot of useful information—the new location of Hitler's headquarters ninety miles north of Berlin, what was being done to prepare the Alpine redoubt, Ribbentrop's last desperate peace feelers, the state of the Foreign Office, recent movements of the Nazi leaders, the quality of the Volkssturm, the chaos in German industry and transportation. He prepared a list of all Foreign Office personnel, categorizing the reliability of each. He got current information out of Germany from a dissident member of the Bern legation. He tried to get Minister Köcher to come over with the whole legation, and failed.

In May, after the surrender, he was sent back over the border to find leads to where the Nazi bigwigs were hiding and to what happened with the Fremde Heere Ost files; Mackeben had not been heard from. But French forces had overrun the Weiler area, arrested Mackeben, and presumably found the files; and no big Nazi fish were found. With Prelate Schreiber, Kolbe made recommendations about ways to control the countryside. But all this was anticlimax now; his great task, worked at with high purpose and dangerous exhilaration, was done.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

World War II

THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER. By *Fabian von Schlabrendorff*. (New York: Pitman. 1965. 438 pp. \$7.50.)

This is a significant addition to the voluminous literature on the plot against Hitler which culminated in the abortive coup of 20 July 1944. The author was one of the few conspirators who survived the ensuing Gestapo action, and the most gripping chapters of his book deal with his arrest, torture, and liberation. As an American prisoner of war he then came into contact with Allen Dulles' German specialist Gero von Gaevernitz, who persuaded him to write his first brief account of the conspiracy and helped him published it.¹ Later he was in touch with William J. Donovan in connection with the Nuremberg trials and evidently shared Donovan's views on their impropriety and inefficacy.

Schlabrendorff's foremost aim in writing this volume was to refute the persistent assertions—explicitly those of William L. Shirer in *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*—that Hitler was the logical consequence of Germany history and character and that Germans revolted against him only when he began to lose the war. *The Secret War against Hitler* is therefore of primary interest to the student of history; it sheds little light on the conspiratorial techniques employed by the resistance. A chapter dealing with the "Rote Kapelle" is of significance principally for its eloquent comments on the differences in motivation and ethical concept between the Communist net and the 20 July group. Another entitled "The Shield of the Resistance" pays warm tribute to Admiral Canaris and others in key security posts who were witting of the conspiracy and used their positions to advance or protect it.

Thus the reader will encounter in the pages of this book a number of well-known figures from the annals of secret operations, but he will be viewing them primarily in an ideological and moral light rather than in the more familiar professional one.

MARTIN ECHELBERGER

¹In 1946, under the title *Offiziere gegen Hitler*, translated in the American edition as *They Almost Killed Hitler*.

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THE SECRETS OF D-DAY. By *Gilles Perrault*. Translated from the French (Paris: Fayard, 1964) by Len Ortzen. (London: Arthur Barker. 1965. 238 pp. 25/—.)

M. Perrault has taken most of the well-known intelligence memoirs of World War II—from Rémy, Collier, and Montagu to Pinto, from Schellenberg to Giskes and Moyzisch—added his own unstinted imagination, whipped all together into a frothy tutti-frutti, and poured the mix into a D-Day mold evidently emulating Cornelius Ryan but unencumbered by bibliography, source credits, or index. The result is too fanciful to be history, too confusing for good fiction. A point possibly intriguing to intelligence professionals is its offhand conclusion that British intelligence deliberately sacrificed the North Pole agents, the Prosper net, and others in order to plant misinformation about the time and place set for the invasion, but that “the sacrifice was not in vain. . . . it’s sometimes necessary in business to write off five thousand francs in order to save half a million.”

ARTHUR M. DABBYE

THE RAPE OF ART. By *David Roxan* and *Ken Wanstall*. (New York: Coward-McCann. 1964. 195 pp. \$5.)

This is the story of Hitler’s project to make a cultural center of his home town of Linz, the machinery set up to collect art treasures for it from all over Europe, and the postwar recovery and restitution of these. Intelligence angles are limited to brief mentions of a French resistance penetration into the machinery’s Paris headquarters and of the OSS Art Looting Investigation Unit.

PETER JACKRELL

The Cold War

THE SPY WITHOUT A COUNTRY. By *H. K. Rönblom*. Translated by Joan Bulman from the original Swedish (*Wennerström Spionen*; Stockholm, 1964). (New York: Coward-McCann. 1965. 222 pp. \$4.50.)

Putting its primary effort into a psychological study of Stig Wennerström, the Swedish air force colonel who was a Soviet agent in Moscow, Washington, and Stockholm for fifteen years, this case history serves to point up the skill of Soviet intelligence in exploiting the inveterate weaknesses of a man—weaknesses in this case hardly noticed by those in regular association, both professional and personal, with him. The title of the American edition was aptly chosen to reflect the author’s emphasis on one of these weaknesses, a curious deficiency in emotional ties to his own country. Along with this “undeveloped patriotic sense,” the Soviets played on the Swede’s need for recognition and appreciation, a quality which he had evidenced as early as while in his teens.

That need for recognition was partly responsible for his attraction to espionage’s financial rewards, but it was fully exploited only through the “sales psychology” of his principal Soviet case officer, General Pyotr Pavlovich Lemonov, whom he was to call—tellingly—the best friend he ever had. Realizing that Wennerström was not material for ideological conversion, Lemonov astutely led him to think he could play an important international role in redressing the balance of power between NATO and the USSR and so furthering the cause of peace. His early assignments were thus directed exclusively against the United States and its allies, and the only information required about Sweden was assurance of its continued neutrality; what patriotism he had was not put to the test until he was in very deep.

Even when he came with some reluctance to the point of selling his own country’s military secrets, it was not so much patriotism that bothered him as a fetish for “correctness” as he saw it; and this quality served him in good stead. His outwardly correct behavior carried a law-abiding connotation, and to those who knew him it was incredible that so properly behaved a man could be a traitor to his country. Another facet of his psychological makeup, says Rönblom, was reflected in his acting, in spite of his gregariousness, as a lone wolf. He met people easily on a social basis but did not develop real

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friendships. "For all his skill, he could not get further than superficial contacts." But many contacts he did have.

His clandestine operations were made technically easy by his legitimate liaison with Soviet diplomatic personnel and his broad access to classified materials. He could photograph these without any elaborate security precautions at home. Eventually, of course, his luck ran out. Arrested in June 1963 and tried for gross espionage in behalf of the Soviet Union, the 57-year-old colonel was given a life sentence, the severest possible under Swedish law.

The author, a family acquaintance of the Wennerströms and a popular journalist, editor, and writer until his recent death, prepared for the foreign editions of his book a preface not carried in the original, wherein he evaluates his source material, the most important of which consisted of the final interrogations of Wennerström himself. He appears to have dealt judiciously with the material available to him. Although he remarks that Wennerström's seeming lack of imagination inclines one to accept his statements as reliable, he repeatedly refers throughout his text to the lack of confirmation for many of these. In particular, he discounts Wennerström's insinuations that he began his espionage as a double agent working for the Americans as well as the Soviets, regarding this as a distortion designed by the colonel to put himself into a more correct position consonant with that of a balancer of international power.

LOUIS HACADONE

SPY WIFE. By Barbara Powers with W. W. Diehl. (New York: Pyramid Books. 1965. 188 pp. \$60.)

This paperback, by the ex-wife of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, is a somewhat polished and expanded version of eight articles which originally appeared (25 August-13 October 1963) in the Chicago weekly newspaper *The National Insider*. The *Insider* devotes its columns largely to sensationalism, scandal, and pornography, and Mrs. Powers' articles, ghosted for her by W. W. Diehl, did their best to fill these requirements. The collection is unworthy of notice.

WALTER PFORZHEIMER

The Civil War

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY. Volume 10, number 4 of *Civil War History*, edited by Robert R. Dykstra. (University of Iowa. December 1964. 119 pp. \$1.50.)

At one time or another almost every aspect of the American Civil War has been romanticized, and not least the intelligence aspect. By the end of the 19th century a score or more of "spy" memoirs had been published. These highly readable but also highly unreliable stories are the subject of a study by Curtis Carroll Davis in this issue that *Civil War History* devotes exclusively to intelligence and security. Filled with handsome heroes, captivating heroines, and an occasional young woman astride a white horse, "a voluptuous bosom partially, but not immodestly, exposed," they are social documents, he concludes, rather than dependable accounts of espionage activity.

These same first-hand narratives lead directly to an article by Edwin C. Fishel, "Mythology of the Civil War." Mr. Fishel points out that intelligence as we know it did not exist during the Civil War. Espionage, the collection, processing, and dissemination of information, and security operations were carried on, but always on a limited scale. Drawing material from a full-length study he is preparing of such activities and their effect on military operations, he explodes some of the false beliefs that have accrued about intelligence in the Civil War. His is the most cogent of the articles for those whose interest is intelligence and the most fruitful for those whose interests lie in Civil War history.

Quoting an 1863 letter that uses a surprisingly modern scatologism in grumbling about the neglect of "spy and topog duty," Ari Hoogenboom in a brief article points to deficiencies in the maps used by the commanders and to prewar disdain for topographic analysis. He seems to forget that the Confederacy did not exist prior to 1861 and therefore could have no background in topographic intelligence. Almost from its inception it was engaged in a life struggle, so that expediency, not the development of long-range plans, was its guiding motivation. The Union, on the other hand, had never seen fit to engage in systematic mapping of the potential enemy states, whether for economic, political, sociological, or military purposes. Had it done so, the results would have been available equally to both sides, just

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as many officers of both North and South had been schooled at West Point.

The remaining articles of the issue, although they are all related to intelligence and security, would be of more interest to avid buffs concerned with the minutiae of the Civil War than to intelligence officers generally.

THOMAS A. STANHOPE

17th and 18th Centuries

THE SECRET DIPLOMACY OF THE HABSBURGS, 1598-1625.

By *Charles Howard Carter*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1964. 321 pp. \$7.50.)

This learned, careful, and accomplished work undertakes to review Spanish Habsburg policy-making and the influence of intelligence on decisions made by Spain and the Spanish Netherlands during the quarter century of relative military quiescence and intense diplomatic activity that led into the Thirty Years' War. It concentrates on the diplomatic interplay in London and the intelligence sent from there to Madrid and Brussels. Although it faithfully carries out this task, it disappoints any expectation aroused by headings like "About Spies and Such," "The Informational Base of Foreign Policy," "Intelligence from England," "A Renaissance Spymaster," and "Spanish Espionage Put to the Test" either that it should give intimate glimpses into the practice of espionage in those days or that it should add historical perspective to the ultimate question for intelligence, its application to policy.

For one thing, it takes about half the book to set the complicated stage—for an era when dynastic maneuvering had hopelessly scrambled the ethnic map of Europe and the pervasive Catholic-Protestant conflict was contorted by unending secular considerations—and introduce the characters. Of the policy makers among these the one that stands out best, because of the author's interest and the nature of the source material, is James I, but his policy and decisions are not central to the play. Then the intelligence selected for detailed examination is the reporting done by Madrid's envoy, Gondomar, and Brussels', Van Male. But Gondomar was a high-level operator who made a friend of King James and got his information for the asking from the horse's mouth; and though Van Male was a true spy-master we do not see the spies at work but only the finished Weeka, as it were, that he sent home.

Professor Carter focuses on the reporting that covered secret negotiations with two diplomatic task forces sent to London in 1621, when the peace, such as it was, had begun to break down. The first was from Louis XIII of France, seeking a marriage alliance and English help in an attack on the Habsburgs' line of communication over the Alps in exchange for French help in restoring the Palatinate to James'

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son-in-law Frederick V. Gondomar got from James and Val Male from his spies full and prompt information on these proposals and the negative English response, and this enabled the Habsburgs to temporize with the English in pre-existing negotiations for a marriage alliance with them until they had concluded one with the French and so secured their communications at the expense of French freedom to act against James' protégées the Huguenots. And all this during Madrid's upset over the illness and death of Philip III and the accession of his teen-age son.

The second mission extraordinary, a little later but overlapping, was from the United (Dutch) Provinces, rebels against the Habsburg archdukes in Brussels, who wanted English help in an attack they were determined to launch against the Netherlands before its armies could get through subduing the Palatinate and redeploy to attack them. Van Male misinformed Brussels that the Dutch were anxiously asking James' good offices to get a renewal of their truce with the archdukes that was about to expire, and on the basis of these reports Brussels sent the Dutch a proposal for peace by capitulation which only enraged them and united all factions in support of war.

The exploration is an interesting one, but the conclusion "ventured" at its end, that men must base their foreign policy decisions on information they know or believe to be true, one might have granted at the outset. And the author's further suggestion that the quality of the information is more important than that of the men needs better definition and more proof than Madrid's successful performance at a time of interregnum.

Ed. C. IANNELL

THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY ADVENTURES OF MAJOR ROBERT STOBO. By Robert C. Alberts. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. 423 pp. \$6.95.)

Held as a hostage at Fort Duquesne in 1754 at the outset of the French and Indian War, the 27-year-old Stobo, then a captain in the Provincial Virginia Regiment, sketched a very detailed and accurate map of the fort, added instructions on how to capture it, urged that it be done, signed this and another letter with his true name, and dispatched them by Indian couriers to colonial authorities at what is now Cumberland, Maryland.

Of course the drama was played out: a year later the French got hold of the signed map when they seized the possessions of the fallen

General Braddock after his unsuccessful attempt to take Duquesne. Stobo was tried, convicted of high treason, and sentenced to be hanged; he did not know the sentence was suspended. He escaped twice and was twice recaptured; on the third attempt he successfully led a party of nine, including a couple and their three children, on a hazardous 350-mile flight down the St. Lawrence from Quebec.

A free man again, he now joined up with General Wolfe, who found his intelligence channels in Quebec of (according to some) decisive importance in the successful siege of the city in 1759. After a triumphal return to Williamsburg and Petersburg, and finding life there rather dull, Stobo went back to Canada and was on hand, under General Jeffrey Amherst, for the surrender of Montreal—the fall of New France. In 1762 he suffered a severe skull fracture during the Battle of Havana, and in 1770—at a military dead end, with business troubles, drinking to excess, and still suffering from his head wound—he shot himself.

Stobo's life, full of intelligence, escape, and other adventure as it was, may not seem to merit 423 pages for the telling of it, but author Alberts has given it larger meaning by setting it against the background of the historical geography of Williamsburg-Pittsburg-Quebec-Louisbourg and Boston and by weaving it into the story of the colonial push into the Ohio valley and the momentous struggle between Britain and France for control of the New World. Eighteen photographs, 8 maps, a very full index, and a complete bibliography make this a finished and useful, as well as a most readable, book.

THOMAS F. TROY

SPY FOR LIBERTY: The Adventurous Life of Beaumarchais, Playwright and Secret Agent for the American Revolution. By Ariane Ruskin. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965. 178 pp. \$3.75.)

This book for young readers is worth noting to remind intelligence officers that there are better biographies of the versatile Frenchman whose clandestine activities rank him with Lafayette as a friend in need to the cause of American independence.

Both Georges Lemaitre's *Beaumarchais* (1949) and Cynthia Cox's *The Real Figaro* (1962) capture the spirit of Pierre-Augustine Caron de Beaumarchais (1732-1799), who excelled as watchmaker, musician, playwright, pamphleteer, businessman, and secret agent. Elizabeth S. Kite's *Beaumarchais and the War of American Independence*, by

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comparison, is more a compilation of documentary material, has less style, and, published in 1918, is less readily obtainable than the other two volumes, which are available in almost any library.

Most people know Beaumarchais as the author of *The Barber of Seville* and *The Marriage of Figaro*, but few are familiar with the fictitious company, Roderique Hortalez et Cie, he set up with the help of the French and Spanish governments as a means of sending guns, muskets, gunpowder, clothes, blankets, and shoes to the rebellious Americans before France declared war on Britain in 1778. Lemaitre gives a more complete account than Cox of the organization, operation, accomplishments, and especially the problems of this proprietary, which Beaumarchais conceived and directed with considerably more selflessness than one normally expects in international intrigue.

THOMAS F. TROY

NUMBER 7: Alexander Hamilton's Secret Attempt to Control American Foreign Policy. By Julian P. Boyd. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1964. 166 pp. \$4.)

Here the distinguished editor of the comprehensive edition of Thomas Jefferson's works takes time out to present the comprehensive case against Hamilton as in effect a British agent. His charge, the main elements of which have long been known to historians, is that Hamilton, "No. 7" of 23 informants of British Major George Beckwith, did, through "covert consultations" with Beckwith and in order to "control American foreign policy," deceive President Washington, undercut Secretary of State Jefferson, and libel the President's representative in London, Gouverneur Morris. His specific charge is that two documents written by Hamilton to Washington are "palpable and demonstrable misrepresentations of a gross nature touching upon matters of the highest public import."

Julian Boyd's supporting argumentation is not easily followed, because this is an exercise in what he calls "editorial scholarship." He has subjected the two documents, along with 21 other papers, to "collation, comparison, and investigation" in order to establish their authenticity. He has necessarily done this against an exhaustively detailed background covering a year (1789-90) of American involvement with Britain, France, and Spain over war debts, frontier posts, the Mississippi, Nootka Sound, and the threat of war. The exercise

has entailed the most rigorous reasoning about the actions, motives, and personalities of the participants and a weighing of possibilities and probabilities as explanations of words and events.

Nor is the volume completely convincing, though the author has certainly marshalled a strong case against Hamilton. Erudite and incisive, he is clearly a Jeffersonian prosecutor intent upon obtaining a conviction. All discrepancies, inconsistencies, and contradictions are resolved to Hamilton's disadvantage, and nothing is allowed to explain, attenuate, or mitigate his actions or his guilt. Thus he is "closeted" with Beckwith, though no supporting detail is given; his remarks about Morris constitute "libel," though no justification is offered for that serious characterization. One is left wanting to hear the other side.

Interesting from the point of view of intelligence, as well as vital to the severity of Boyd's moral judgments on Hamilton, is the question of Beckwith's role. While he had been very active in British intelligence operations in America during the Revolutionary War, Beckwith's role in the post-war years has been accepted, at least until now, as that of "an unofficial diplomatic agent acting on behalf of the British government." Boyd, vigorously dissenting, asserts that he was "the covert agent of an alien power" bent upon exploiting "the British interest" in this country, and he has no difficulty finding that the usually accurate Beckwith, three years after the event, was himself "in error" as to his mission; referring all things to Hamilton, he says "it is possible that he was urged by Hamilton to give [the erroneous account] of his presence in New York and Philadelphia."

This view is not without its problems. First, at a time when there were no diplomatic relations between Britain and the United States, Beckwith was publicly known as the aide of the British governor-general of Canada. Second, of the 21 actual informants on Beckwith's list of 23, Boyd names 11, who turn out to be President Washington, acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jay, Secretary of War Knox, Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton (the full cabinet!), 6 leading Federalist congressmen (4 senators and 2 representatives), and 1 unidentifiable person; were these "the British interest" or the American government? Third, one of these informants, Hamilton, was a most unreliable one, for on the basis of Boyd's study he as consistently misquoted and misinformed Beckwith as he did anyone else; he seems rather to have made use of Beckwith than to have acted as his in-

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
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formant in furtherance of his own "secret [and not so secret] attempts to control American foreign policy."

What is clearly needed is a full-length biography of this "covert" Major George Beckwith, rather overt for a case officer.

THOMAS F. TROY



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Postwar interregnum as conflicting plans for central intelligence are shaken down into a presidential directive.

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THE BIRTH OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Arthur B. Darling¹

There was more than economy in mind as Director of the Budget Harold Smith corresponded with General Wm. J. Donovan in August 1945 about liquidating the Office of Strategic Services. On the same day Smith advised the General that agencies with no peacetime activities had to go, Donovan expounded once more in a letter to him the principles which should govern a centralized U.S. foreign intelligence system. Donovan believed those principles were already at work in the OSS. But since it was to be abandoned, another agency should be set up immediately to take over its valuable assets and aid the nation in "the organization and maintenance of the peace."

The newly unveiled atomic bomb naturally dominated the thinking of the time, and some argued that it made the need for a permanent system of national intelligence preemptory. Gregory Bateson, for example, writing to Donovan from OSS headquarters in the India-Burma theater, forecast that the bomb would shift the balance of warlike and peaceful methods of international pressure. It would be powerless, he said, against subversive practices, guerrilla tactics, social and economic manipulation, diplomatic forces, and propaganda either black or white. The nations would therefore resort to those indirect methods of warfare. The importance of the kind of work the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office of War Information, and the Office of Strategic Services had been doing would thus be infinitely greater than it had ever been. The country could not rely upon the Army and Navy alone for defense. There should be a third agency to combine the functions and employ the weapons of clandestine operations, economic controls, and psychological pressures in the new

¹ Adapted from a history of the CIA to 1950 completed by the author in 1953. For a preceding portion, devoted principally to the OSS, see *Studies* VIII 3, p. 55 ff.

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warfare. But Bateson thought, and he would not be alone, that this third agency should be under the Department of State.

Donovan's Principles

Two assets of the OSS were clear, wrote Donovan to Smith. For the first time in its history this country had a secret intelligence service gathering information abroad and reporting directly to a central office in Washington. Inseparable from this service, a group of specialists were analyzing and evaluating the information for those who should determine the nation's policies. These two cardinal purposes, secret collection abroad and expert appraisal at home, Donovan backed up with the familiar points in his plan. Each department would have its own intelligence service to meet its own needs; its materials would be made available to the central agency. This agency would serve all of the departments with supplemental information obtained either by its own collectors or from other services. It would supply its strategic interpretive studies to authorized agencies and officials.

The agency should have no clandestine activities within the United States nor any police functions either at home or abroad. In time of war it would be subject to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But it should be independent of any department since it was to serve all. It should have an independent budget. It should be administered by a single officer appointed by the President and under his direction. The President might designate a general manager to act as his intermediary, but the agency should be established in the Executive Office of the President. That was the only concession Donovan would make to the critics who feared a director of central intelligence answerable only to the President.

Subject to the approval of the President, or the general manager, the director should determine the policy of the agency with the "advice and assistance" of a board representing the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and now Donovan added the Treasury. He still insisted that this board should be only a vehicle of advice, not of authority. This requirement was certain to keep alive the opposition which his proposal had met in the military services throughout the previous year. But to General Donovan the principle of individual responsibility was as indispensable as the work of experts in research and analysis and the maintenance of covert services abroad. None of the three principles should be subject to his pet abomination, compromise.

Bureau of the Budget Proposals

General Donovan's "all-inclusive" program had met doubts among officials of the Bureau of the Budget as early as 1941. Now in 1945, on September 20, a BoB paper traced the history of intelligence in this country and proposed a different kind of organization to replace the OSS. It commended the OSS for blazing new trails and raising the level of competence in the whole system of intelligence but dismissed it as a wartime agency which should not be superimposed on the normal structure of government. The principal operations of intelligence must be at the point where decisions were made, that is in the individual departments. As these were responsible for the decisions and actions, they should produce the intelligence upon which the decisions were based. Moreover, the Donovan plan did not recognize the leading role of the State Department as a "staff agency of the President." Here, it would seem, was the main point of the BoB paper.

It conceded the necessity for coordinating the intelligence operations of the several departments and supplying intelligence reports to the President and others who had decisions to make with regard to national policy; national policy invariably cuts across some departmental lines. But this could be done by a small independent central staff which could rely on the product of research and analysis in the departments. It should not engage in original research but rather harmonize the intelligence from the departments, reconciling any conflicts among them. Until the President saw fit to have such a small staff in his own office, the Department of State could provide the facilities.

The details of the organization proposed in the BoB paper should not detain us; they were significant chiefly for the support they gave to the organization then taking shape in the State Department. But it is noteworthy that the proposal embodied an unrealistically sharp distinction between security intelligence and counterespionage on the one hand and the positive intelligence obtained from collecting information on the other. It would have the two functions kept apart under the jurisdictions of two separate interdepartmental committees which would devise plans and coordinate the work of the several departments in the two fields. The nucleus of both committees was to be the Assistant Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. When these sat as the Intelligence Coordinating Committee, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce would attend. When they were

the Security Coordinating Committee, the additional members would be the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant Attorney General.

The ideas of the Bureau of the Budget won the attention of President Truman. On the same day, September 20, he directed Secretary Byrnes of the Department of State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and coordinated system of foreign intelligence. The Secretary should form an interdepartmental group to make plans for the President's approval. The goal was "complete coverage of the foreign intelligence field" and control of operations to meet with "maximum effectiveness" the needs of "the individual agencies and the Government as a whole."

At the same time, in spite of Donovan's protests to Rosenman, the President's Special Counsel, and to Budget Director Smith, President Truman signed the executive order breaking up the Office of Strategic Services. The personnel and facilities of the Research and Analysis and the Presentation Branches went to the Department of State. These, the President had agreed with Secretary Byrnes, would provide resources to aid the State Department in developing foreign policy. The War Department received the rest, chiefly assets for secret intelligence and counterespionage and for the covert action operations which were to be ended as soon as possible. These were incorporated into a Strategic Services Unit under Brigadier General John Magruder, who had been Donovan's Deputy for Intelligence. By October 26, 1945, an organization which at its peak had had some 13,000 persons, exclusive of agents and other foreign nationals in special capacities, had been reduced to fewer than 8,000. All of these measures were in line with the purposes of the Bureau of the Budget.

Position of the Joint Chiefs

Much was happening in the few days around the fall equinox of 1945. The Joint Chiefs of Staff revived, with few changes, their January plan for a National Intelligence Authority.² But instead of the original stipulation that the new central intelligence agency should have an independent budget, they now proposed that funds should be supplied by the participating departments in amounts and proportions to be agreed upon. This was because the Independent

Offices Appropriation Act for 1945 had made it impossible without further legislation to give the central intelligence authority a separate budget. Under its terms, moreover, no part of any appropriation could be expended by any agency which had been in existence for more than a year without specific authorization from Congress.

The plan was submitted to the Secretaries of War and the Navy by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 19. Leahy asked that the Secretaries forward it to the President. Ten days later Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal sent it to the Secretary of State. In view of the executive order terminating the Office of Strategic Services and President Truman's letter to Secretary Byrnes of the same date asking him to "take the lead," they presumed that Byrnes would want to transmit the recommendations to the President.

Going its thus roundabout way from the President's own Chief of Staff and back to him, this communication joined again the familiar issue between the parties of greatest interest. If there had to be a central intelligence agency, the armed services were trying to make sure that it would develop according to their ideas. Ranking officers in both Army and Navy did not want a central agency, but they liked even less to think that a civilian instrument, whether the OSS or the Department of State, would control the intelligence system of the nation.

The Joint Chiefs' plan took note of General Donovan's principles forwarded on August 25 to the Bureau of the Budget. They recognized the desirability of coordinating intelligence, conducting activities of common concern in one agency, and synthesizing departmental intelligence on the strategic and national level. But their thinking in September had not advanced much beyond the conclusions the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had reached in January. Donovan wanted to "overcentralize" the intelligence service. He would place it at so high a level in the government that it would control the departmental intelligence agencies. The central intelligence organization ought to be responsible to the heads of the departments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored a federal rather than national principle for the permanent system of intelligence to replace the OSS.

Conditions now, however, created more urgency than there had been in January. Though hostilities were ended, the atomic mushroom darkened the future. President Truman had been through the Potsdam Conference where friction with Russia over Poland, Austria, Germany, and the Far East had become dangerous. The

² See *Studies* VIII 3, p. 85 f.

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Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to feel that an efficient intelligence service had become indispensable. It was now "entirely possible that failure to provide such a system might bring national disaster." Committees were at work for both the Army and the Navy to reconcile their differences and find common ground if they could for a single Department of Defense, and with it a central intelligence service. Meanwhile a member of the Department of State specially assigned to the task went ahead to build upon ideas in the Department and the suggestions of the Bureau of the Budget.

State Department Plan

During the fall of 1944 considerable thought had been given to establishing an Office of Foreign Intelligence in the State Department. The geographic and functional divisions did not provide a central repository where policy makers could find accumulated knowledge on subjects involving the work of several divisions. Nor was there any place in the Department for coordination with other agencies of the government. The proposed Office of Foreign Intelligence was expected to fill these needs with a planning staff and divisions of research in political, economic, geographic, social, scientific, and other matters.

Now a year later the Department contemplated not only a new internal organization but extending its jurisdiction as it "took the lead" in developing the intelligence program for all federal agencies. A Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence was to gather together the functions of collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information regarding foreign nations which heretofore, had been spread among several geographic offices in the Department. There were to be two new offices under his direction, one for intelligence and the other for counterintelligence.

As the OSS Research and Analysis and Presentation Branches came over, their functions, personnel, records, and property were to be absorbed according to the Department's wishes. Any remainder would be abandoned. The other departments and agencies of the government, as well as State's own field offices, would then be expected to send their intelligence to the Special Assistant's organization for correlation and synthesis. The similarity between these ideas and the suggestions of the Bureau of the Budget is obvious.

President Truman's letter to Secretary Byrnes enlarged the opportunity to press this plan. The Special Assistant, Mr. Alfred McCormack, came from the Army, where he had been Director of the

Military Intelligence Service. He brought into the Department Ludwell L. Montague and James S. Lay, who had also had military careers as secretaries of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; both men had helped formulate the JIC plan for central intelligence. McCormack entered with enthusiasm and conviction upon the work of taking over the whole business of correlating and evaluating intelligence for the makers of policy in the federal government. He was certain to arouse opposition in the Army and Navy.

Secretary Forrestal, seeking to develop a central intelligence agency in connection with the closer integration of the Army, Navy, and Air Force which he so earnestly desired, thought of having the heads of the several intelligence agencies to dinner to discuss the matter and perhaps remove some of their differences; and a memorandum from Thomas B. Inglis, Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence, on October 10, 1945, warned him of what he might expect: Mr. McCormack within the past ten days had declined General Magruder's proposal for an informal interim committee; until Secretary Byrnes "took the lead" as directed by the President, he preferred to conduct liaison directly with G-2, MIS, and ONI. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover was not in favor of a national intelligence agency. There probably would be "veiled antagonism" too, said Inglis, among some of the other guests. (From one of them, G-2 General Clayton Bissell, to judge from the record of his participation in the historic meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee on December 22, 1944,³ it is doubtful that the antagonism would be veiled.) Inglis suggested that Magruder, as head of the Strategic Services Unit, might be included in the dinner party. "It would be an interesting, but perhaps somewhat unconventional, meeting."

By November, the departments were clearly heading into a collision. Forrestal wrote to Patterson on October 13 that they should push the Joint Chiefs' plans vigorously at the White House. The three secretaries, Byrnes, Patterson, and Forrestal, met on October 16 and agreed in principle that any central intelligence organization should report to them rather than to the President; at least this principle of Donovan's was thus removed from the controversy. But Inglis observed on October 18 that whatever Byrnes might say about coordination, McCormack was not keeping the Navy in touch with

³ *Studies VIII 3, p. 82.*

his planning. In the War Department, Patterson authorized a special committee to study the problem under the chairmanship of Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air.

In the next meeting of the secretaries, on November 14, Forrestal asked that they devote their discussion to the proposed central intelligence agency. Byrnes suggested they endeavor to "integrate and reconcile" the several plans. Lovett, whom Patterson had brought to give his views, stated that the plan of the Bureau of the Budget appeared to fail in three respects: its coordination would be very loose; it provided for multiple collecting agencies, which were bad in clandestine intelligence; and it treated the problem as though the secretaries themselves were going to operate the agency, an impossibility in practice. Lovett advocated the plan of the Joint Chiefs to give the secretaries authority over a director and an agency under his administration.

Byrnes too did not like the idea of the interdepartmental governing committees in the Bureau's plan, nor the emphasis upon research and analysis. The scheme seemed to him too big and elaborate. Without other comment for the record, he concluded that they all favored a central agency. He proposed an interdepartmental working committee to get at the problem as quickly as possible before the existing intelligence structure disintegrated further. The funds for some units, notably the SSU, were available only until the first of January. The secretaries agreed to form such a committee. At the close of the meeting Secretary Patterson inquired if anyone knew of a good man to be Director of Intelligence, and Lovett said the only name he had heard mentioned was Allen Dulles.

Compromise Effort

The working committee met on November 19. Its members for the State Department were Alfred McCormack and Donald S. Russell; for the Army, Robert A. Lovett and Brigadier General George Brownell; and for the Navy, Rear Admiral Sidney Souers and Major Matthias Correa, special adviser to Secretary Forrestal. If Secretary Byrnes' acceptance of a central agency had meant agreement to negotiate on some basis other than the BoB plan, McCormack did not so interpret it. He insisted that the President's letter of September 20 had directed Secretary Byrnes to take the lead not only in developing an interdepartmental intelligence program but also in putting that program into operation.

The plan which McCormack was going to send to the President provided that the Executive Secretary of the authority coordinating the departmental intelligence services should be named by the Secretary of State and should be an employee in the State Department. Instead of having a central agency produce the national intelligence estimates for policy makers, McCormack would assign that responsibility to the Department's Estimates Staff under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, that is McCormack himself.

The representatives for the Army and Navy argued in response that the director of the central agency should be named by the President and made responsible to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency would produce the national intelligence estimates. As neither side would yield, there was nothing to do but ask the secretaries which concept should prevail.

Perhaps anticipating an unfavorable decision from above, McCormack reworked his plan in December and gave considerable ground in the hope of making it acceptable. The armed services were to have representatives throughout the proposed intelligence organization, including the Estimates Staff, although the commanding positions were reserved for the Department of State. The two governing committees proposed by the Bureau of the Budget for intelligence and security were reduced to a merely advisory capacity. In their stead McCormack now accepted, on December 3, a single National Intelligence Authority as advocated by the military services; but in his plan the Authority would consist of the Secretary of State, as chairman, and the Secretaries of War and the Navy. Heads of other departments and agencies might be invited by the Secretary of State to sit in on some meetings, and representatives of the Treasury and the FBI would attend to discuss matters of security. There would be no representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the armed services would already have a two-to-one vote in the Authority. The Department of State should retain the "leadership and final responsibility."

The Executive Secretary would still be appointed by the Secretary of State and be a State Department employee, but he would be responsible to the Authority as a whole. The Secretaries of War and the Navy voting together could even remove him. Moreover, on December 15 McCormack accepted from the War Department a provision that would prevent the Executive Secretary from proposing

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any operating plan to the Authority until it had been submitted to the appropriate advisory board and the opinion of any dissenting member of that board attached to it.

There were to be a host of coordinating committees covering, as in the proposal of 1944 for the Department's Office of Foreign Intelligence, politics, economics, geography, science and technology, biographical records, military affairs, and other divisions of subject matter. In all these, with obvious exceptions like military intelligence, the Department of State was to have the chairmanship. Finally, toward the end of the discussions, McCormack conceded that there might be a director of operations under the Executive Secretary to handle secret intelligence and security matters if the Authority should decide that this could be done more effectively in a central organization than by the departments.

How such a complicated setup would actually function in practice was not made clear in McCormack's proposal. In fairness to him, one must say that he had little time to elaborate upon his ideas, for at about this point the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy reached agreement to ask the President to adopt the Joint Chiefs' plan, practically as it had been revised in September.

Studies of the Armed Services

Secretary Forrestal had appointed Ferdinand Eberstadt in June to make a special study of the proposed merger of the War and Navy Departments. The Eberstadt report, published now on October 22, held that the national security would not be improved by unifying the Army and Navy under a single head. One civilian secretary could not administer successfully the resulting huge and complex structure. There were benefits to be had from parallel, competitive, and sometimes conflicting efforts. On the other hand, better coordination was required to meet the increased international commitments, both political and military, which were being assumed under the charter of the United Nations, the Act of Chapultepec for inter-American defense, and military occupation of Germany and Japan and in the face of uncertain repercussions from the scientific and engineering advances made during the war.

The report called for the organization of the military forces into three coordinate departments—Army, Navy, Air—and their close association with the Department of State in a National Security Council. There should be established also a central intelligence agency

to supply the "authoritative information on conditions and developments in the outside world" without which the National Security Council could not fulfill its role nor the military services perform their duty to the nation.

Mr. Eberstadt had named the then Captain Souers a committee of one to write a section on military intelligence for the report. As Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence in charge of plans, Captain Souers had helped in the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had attended the meeting on December 22, 1944, when debate over the "services" and "civilian" plans had led to their consolidation in January. Since then he had been actively concerned with General Magruder and others in both Army and Navy who wished to establish a permanent central intelligence system. Souers had opposed the Donovan plan because he felt that the director of central intelligence should serve not only the President but also the members of his cabinet who were responsible for the national security. Now in the Eberstadt report he also opposed the McCormack plan because it would put the intelligence system under the domination of a single department.

He reviewed precedents for a national intelligence system and dwelt particularly on the success of the Joint Intelligence Committee, working through its subcommittees and with benefit of its Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies, in producing strategic intelligence by the collaborative efforts of not only the military intelligence agencies but the AAF Weather Service Division, the offices of the Chief of Engineers and the Surgeon General, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Hydrographic Office, the Joint Meteorological Committee, the Board of Geographical Names, and the OSS. But even under the stimulus of war the interchange of information among these agencies had been neither free nor complete, and upon return to peace such collaboration as there had been would practically cease to exist. Moreover, strategic intelligence involves more than military and naval information; it requires knowledge of economic, social, and political forces that are not so readily ascertainable in swift reconnaissance as in deliberate research by appropriate civilian agencies.

For these reasons the Joint Intelligence Committee could not be considered a permanent organization. It might be reorganized to include permanent representation from all agencies concerned with intelligence, but then it would cease to be merely the instrument of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The conclusion was that while each depart-

ment should maintain its own intelligence service, each should participate in a joint central intelligence organization. This should coordinate all intelligence relating to national security, maintain activities of common concern which should not be reduplicated in the departments, and synthesize departmental intelligence on the strategic and national policy level. Souers also recommended that courses of instruction be given to indoctrinate officers with the importance of intelligence to our national security.

The Army's committee appointed on October 22 under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary Lovett gathered testimony by means of a questionnaire and written reports within the War Department. There were formal interviews with persons specially qualified: General Bissell; William H. Jackson, who had reported on the British system; Kingman Douglass, who had represented the Army Air Forces at the Air Ministry in London; Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick, member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee; David K. E. Bruce, who had been prominent in OSS; and Alfred McCormack from the State Department.

The opinions of most of these witnesses can be fairly surmised. Of particular interest, in view of his participation in the Intelligence Survey Group of the National Security Council in 1948 and his subsequent appointment as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence under General Walter B. Smith, are those held at this time by William H. Jackson.⁴

Under the new threat of the atomic bomb, Jackson said, and in the light of the lessons of Pearl Harbor, there was an urgent necessity for "imposing intelligence responsibilities on the military services within the scope of their missions" and for "compelling the coordination of intelligence functions under one national intelligence system." (These ideas of imposition and compulsion, voiced at a time when Congress was about to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster, would be sublimated in 1948 to a call for "leadership" in the central agency and "cooperation" on the part of the departmental services.) Authority over the system should be vested in the Department of Defense if it were created or in the National Security Council if the Eberstadt proposal were adopted. But he moved the central agency even farther down the scale of responsibility and away from Donovan's

⁴ Taken from a memorandum of the following November 14 to Secretary Forrestal. The testimony proper before the Lovett Committee was not available to the author.

principle than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had. Its "active direction" would be in a directorate consisting of the chiefs of intelligence in the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, a representative of the State Department, and, when their interests in national security were involved, other departments such as the Treasury and Justice. Thus something like the eventual IAC would have supervision over the director of the central intelligence agency, who would be reduced to an office manager.

Jackson, moreover, would not allow the central agency to engage in clandestine collection. That function, and foreign counterintelligence, would be reserved to the Department of State, with the participation of officers assigned from the military services. But radio interception could be given to the central agency, and it might do its own overt collection of economic and scientific intelligence.

General Magruder, out of his experience, probably made the most realistic contribution to the Committee. His proposal followed the lines of the Donovan plan but accepted the concept of authority proposed by the Joint Chiefs, that the national intelligence director should be responsible to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy as a group. Every safeguard was required to keep the central organization from becoming the instrument of policy of a single department. It should be completely denied any policy-making function to preserve its objectivity.

Magruder came down hard on practical points: the traditional mutual aloofness of the departments which would make cooperation difficult; the professional hazards and delicacy of clandestine operations, which the regular departments, whether War, Navy, or State, could therefore not afford to house; the central agency's need for the authority to require the departments to pass to it their intelligence products, which they would not do "on a voluntary level"; the importance of leaving no ground upon which the agency could be used as a political tool by the party in power; the requirement for an independent budget granted without detailed congressional inquiry into the expenditures.

The finished report of the Lovett Committee noted, as Magruder had, that there was jealousy and mistrust among the departmental intelligence services, and also that the lack of experienced intelligence officers in both military services contributed to the unsatisfactory situation; no serious effort had been made to treat intelligence as a

career. There must be a national intelligence organization, manned by permanent personnel of the highest caliber and trained as specialists in the components of modern intelligence. This could not be approached through the uncoordinated activity of the departmental units now engaged in "haphazard demobilization."

The Committee unanimously concluded that it was more nearly in agreement with the proposal of the Joint Chiefs than with any other suggested plan. It therefore recommended the creation of a National Intelligence Authority over a central intelligence agency, whose director, to insure continuity, should be appointed for a term of at least six years. It elaborated on the Joint Chiefs' idea that the director should consult with the departmental chiefs of intelligence by providing that the advisory board they made up should consider all important questions, and the director should obtain its opinion before delivering estimates to the President or other members of the Authority. If there were differences of opinion between the director and members of this board, his decision should be controlling but their opinions should accompany his report.

The Committee further modified the Joint Chiefs' plan by proposing, as General Magruder had urged, that the new agency be the sole instrument for foreign espionage and counterespionage. And a third change, also suggested by Magruder, provided that the agency should have an independent budget through appropriations granted by Congress without public hearings, even though this would require additional legislation.

Lovett himself, appearing before Secretaries Byrnes, Patterson, and Forrestal in their meeting on November 14, gave a summary of the report. He spoke particularly of its conception of a "reading panel," the proposed Intelligence Advisory Board in its capacity as an estimating body. The principal civilian agencies as well as the military intelligence services should be represented on it. The FBI, in particular, had the "best personality file in the world" and incidentally was expert in producing false documents, an art "at which we became outstandingly adept" during the war. The advantage in this plan, Lovett emphasized, lay in the fact that conclusions would be reached not by one man but by a board; it would avoid "the danger of having a single slanted view guide our policies." Thus he joined William H. Jackson in advocating collective responsibility for national intelligence estimates.

The President's Decision

When McCormack early in December accepted a National Intelligence Authority as provided in the plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representatives of the Army and Navy feared that they could lose their grip upon the negotiations unless they countered with a new initiative. As it turned out, McCormack, in carrying out Secretary Byrnes' instructions that he "resolve the issues" with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, was himself to become an issue. Critics within the State Department took exception to his insisting upon a separate office for intelligence and research which he would direct. It was over this question that he eventually would resign from the Department on April 23, 1946.

Now at Christmas time in 1945, General Magruder expressed the opinion of the military men with his accustomed poise and candor. Just a few months before there had been only scattered voices crying in the wilderness, Magruder's among them. Now many, many people were urging the necessity of a central intelligence agency and adopting the slogan as a new and original cause. The congressional investigation of Pearl Harbor was having an evident effect upon public opinion. But although there was general agreement in the Army and Navy about the urgency of doing something as quickly as possible, they felt that the McCormack plan was inadequate and administratively unsound. It placed undue weight in the State Department.

Admiral Souers brought an influential voice into the military and naval chorus. He drafted a memorandum from Admiral Nimitz to the Secretary of the Navy. As against the State Department's plan, the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was more likely to assure sound national intelligence and would prove more satisfactory to the Navy. Nimitz, who had not cared much for OSS during the war, now favored the central intelligence idea. The product of the new agency would reflect the best judgment of experts from all the departments; it would not be dominated by any one of them. He recommended that the President should select its director from the Army, the Navy, or the Marine Corps.

If the director were from the armed services, a non-political administration would be assured and its intelligence estimates would be unbiased and objective. The director would be subject to military discipline, continuing after his retirement, and could be required to avoid publicity. The plan of the State Department was objectionable because the Secretaries of War and the Navy might not be in-

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formed of the intelligence furnished the President by the State Department. There was more to the memorandum; but these arguments are enough to show that Souers and Nimitz, like Leahy and others, were parties to a resolve that the Department of State should not take over where the Office of Strategic Services had left off.

Admiral Souers feared at one time that the Army might desert the Navy and accept terms with the State Department. An elaborate arrangement was in the making to incorporate much of the Joint Chiefs' plan with the McCormack plan and provide for assignment of an Army or Navy officer to the State Department as chief executive for the Authority. Army men were talking of reservations which might be made if the McCormack plan were accepted. At the request of President Truman, Souers submitted a memorandum on December 27 stating his objections to the McCormack plan and explaining why he thought that the interests of the President would be better protected under the plan of the Joint Chiefs.

Souers argued that McCormack's plan did not give the Army and Navy equal access to the President with the State Department. The evaluation of information was not an exact science, he said, so every safeguard should be imposed to keep any one department from having the opportunity to interpret information to support previously accepted policies or preconceived opinions.

The plan of the Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, placed the National Intelligence Authority on a higher level than any department. The President would appoint an outstanding man of ability and integrity to be director. Through pooling of expert personnel in the central agency, there would be more efficiency and economy. There would be a full partnership among the three departments and operation of the central agency "on a reciprocal basis." The suggestion fitted neatly into the recommendations of the Eberstadt Committee for reorganization of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and their closer association with the State Department in a National Security Council.

Admiral Souers ended this memorandum for the President—much to his own amusement when he read it again in the spring of 1952—with the declaration that he was not a candidate for the job of director and could not accept even if it were offered to him.

With Admiral Souers, personal friend of the President, and Admiral Leahy, his Chief of Staff, favoring the Joint Chiefs' proposal, the representatives of the Army and Navy were spared having to press

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upon McCormack their formal rejection of his plan. There is no reason to suppose that President Truman himself did not prefer an arrangement which promised to bring all of the departments more effectively together in a common enterprise. In any case, though the full story may not yet be known, Secretary Forrestal of the Navy waited upon the Secretary of State as Byrnes momentarily returned to Washington from Moscow, before setting out again for the meeting of the United Nations Assembly in London and more wrangling with the Russians. The tale still going the rounds is that Forrestal said to Byrnes: "Jimmy, we like you but we don't like your plan. Just think what might happen if another William Jennings Bryan were to succeed you in the State Department."

On Sunday, January 6, 1946, with Under Secretary Royall acting for Patterson, the secretaries met in the Shoreham Hotel and agreed upon the plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, omitting the provision for a representative of the Joint Chiefs in the National Intelligence Authority. On January 9, in a conference at the White House attended by Samuel Rosenman, Admiral Leahy, Commodore Vardaman, and Admiral Souers, Budget Director Smith still argued for the State Department plan. But President Truman said at the end of the conference that the draft directive the secretaries had brought was what he wanted, and he asked that representatives of the Bureau of Budget and of the Department of Justice, together with Admiral Souers, who was to become the first Director of Central Intelligence, make such changes in it as were necessary to conform with legal and budgetary requirements.

Comparison of the secretaries' draft with the directive as finally issued on January 22, 1946, reveals interesting differences. Admiral Leahy was restored as fourth member of the National Intelligence Authority, but instead of attending for the Joint Chiefs of Staff he was to be the personal representative of the President. This had been proposed the previous year in the plan of the Joint Intelligence Committee; it restored in some degree General Donovan's original concept that the central intelligence organization should be in the Executive Office of the President. The head of the new organization would have immediate access at least to the President's personal representative and would not have to approach the President through the secretaries of the departments. It seemed a fair working compromise of the opposing principles of coordination and chain of command.

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The wording of the directive somewhat obscured the unity of the proposed national intelligence system so evident in the Joint Chiefs' plan. The new agency of the Authority was named the Central Intelligence Group and described as consisting collectively of persons assigned from the departments by the three secretaries. It was an assemblage of delegates, not a unified institution, working under a Director of Central Intelligence who was not one of them.

It is generally held that the change of name from Agency to Group was necessary pending an act of Congress to place the new organization on a statutory basis: legal connotations of the word "agency," according to the Bureau of the Budget, made its use impossible until such legislation had been obtained. In the light of subsequent controversy and friction, however, one would suspect that the collective concept had more adherents within the Group than that of unity.

The head of the new organization, on the other hand, was not Director of the Central Intelligence Group but Director of Central Intelligence. This has been explained as necessary merely because the organization was not to be called an agency. The explanation is not so significant as the latent meaning within the title. The phrase Director of Central Intelligence, neither qualified nor confined to a particular institution, is heavy with connotations of power and responsibility at the center of the national intelligence system.

There were stipulations within the directive to support this view. The Director of Central Intelligence was to plan for coordinating the activities of the intelligence agencies in the three departments. To the extent approved by the Authority, he could inspect the operations of the departmental intelligence agencies in connection with this planning. He should recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of policies and objectives of the "national intelligence mission." He should accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence for strategic and national policy and its dissemination within the government. And in doing this, he was to have full use of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies in the three departments. All of these duties and functions, though controlled by the President and the National Intelligence Authority, gave the Director more than mere administrative control over the Central Intelligence Group. Whether or not he would be successful in exercising that superior power beyond the Group remained to be seen in practice.

The Director of Central Intelligence had also to perform services of common concern for the departments, where the Authority determined that they could be performed more efficiently by the central organization. But there was significantly omitted the stipulation that he should perform the service, which the Joint Chiefs' plan had included, of procuring secret intelligence. It seems likely that the advocates of central intelligence were anxious to get the new system established and at work, and the exclusive right to collect secret intelligence was a controversial issue which could be set aside for a time while the new Director embarked on his other duties.

Magruder, Lovett, and others wished to place the clandestine activities of SSU in the new central intelligence organization. William H. Jackson, among others, thought that secret intelligence and counter-espionage should be functions of the State Department; he was still to consider this possibility with Allen Dulles in the spring of 1948. Members of the Military Intelligence Services, and doubtless of the Office of Naval Intelligence, as well as J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, were opposed to giving the Group the exclusive right to collect secret intelligence abroad. They did not wish to be denied the right to continue running whatever secret operations they wished. It would take time to settle the issue, if it ever would be finally settled.

The directive, prepared under the eye of the Department of Justice, took care, in addition to denying police and law-enforcing power to the Central Intelligence Group, to provide against its interfering with "internal security functions." Moreover, nothing in the directive should be construed to authorize the Group to make investigations within the United States and its possessions except as provided by law and the directives of the President. Anyone who still thought that it was intended to set up an American Gestapo should by this time have given up his fears.

But those who were to put the Central Intelligence Group to work in parallel with the Federal Bureau of Investigation were on their way to trouble. Distinctions between secret intelligence or espionage and security intelligence or counterespionage are easy to make on paper. They are difficult to maintain in practice. And to divide either function or both arbitrarily according to geographical areas assigned to separate administrations ignores the fact that operations in one without careful association with the other are likely to jeopardize both.

*As weighed in intelligence scales,
found wanting.*

THE SCIENCE ATTACHE PROGRAM

Wilton Lexow

World War II clearly demonstrated that science had joined economics as a no longer merely academic discipline but a practical factor to be reckoned with in the international arena. The Department of State, recognizing that this new factor would make itself felt more broadly than in strict application to weaponry, established as early as 1947 a Science Staff in its London embassy and a small Washington supporting element in its Bureau of Economic Affairs. It was not until 1949, however, that a full-dress study was made of the implications of the new factor for the organization and functioning of the Department.

In January of that year the National Security Council issued its first directive concerning the collection of basic scientific information abroad. It gave the State Department the primary responsibility for this function. Subsequent revisions of the directive^{1*} have broadened "basic" scientific information to all scientific and technical information except what is primarily military. Acting upon this directive and upon the recommendations of the Hoover Commission report of 1949, the Secretary of State appointed Mr. Lloyd Berkner to study and submit recommendations on the role of the Department in national scientific policy and how it should organize and staff for these responsibilities. Berkner formed a committee which went into the problem in detail, with the aid of an advisory committee from the National Academy of Science and a Policy Survey Group in State.

The Berkner Report

In April 1950 the Berkner committee submitted its report, "Science and Foreign Relations."² It made nineteen general recommendations on the basis of conclusions reached in the examination of nine

* References are to the bibliography at the end of the article.

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topics, each in a separate chapter. Some topics were functions to be performed, others the organizational means for performing them.

With respect to organization, the recommendations were clear and simple. The Department should set up a Science Office headed by a Science Adviser with assistants and a staff. Abroad, science attachés should be established in some fifteen U.S. embassies in non-Communist countries. Representation in Communist countries was not mentioned.

With respect to the duties to be assigned to this science office and the science attachés, however, the report foresaw and discussed at length a great range of activities—the collection and dissemination of foreign scientific information, support to international scientific activities, scientific exchange programs, technical assistance, service to U.S. scientists and scientific organizations, interagency liaison arrangements, and means for weaving scientific considerations into the process of formulating foreign policy. A classified annex dealt with the intelligence aspects of the program and recognized that the proposed attachés would of necessity bear the principal responsibility for these.

The scientific functions recommended in the report, it may be generalized, fell into three categories: collecting and reporting information, including intelligence information; promoting and protecting the interests of the U.S. scientific community; and monitoring the impact of science and U.S. foreign policy on each other. The subsequent history of the science program in the Department has to a great degree been that of the conflict for priority among these three categories. On this matter the Berkner report gave no guidance. It felt that relative emphasis in the program and the true role of the Department would have to "evolve out of experience . . . The exact blueprint will require Departmental drafting."

Ups and Downs

Acting upon the Berkner recommendations, the Department in 1951 placed scientific attachés in a number of embassies. Two years later the program was greatly curtailed because of difficulties in recruitment and increasing budgetary stringency. The five overseas posts filled in 1953 would have been cut to three in the budget proposed for FY 1955. After discussions with CIA and the National Academy of Science, the Department agreed to support five positions

from its budget, and four—London, Stockholm, Paris, and Tokyo—were actually filled.⁸

In June of 1955 the new Hoover Commission report on intelligence activities carried the recommendation, "That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such scientific attachés as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad."¹⁷ Much to the dismay and embarrassment of the CIA and the State Department, this was published without classification. The implication of espionage undoubtedly became a serious hindrance in the recruiting of eminent scientists for attaché positions. In addition, more budget cuts resulted in the withdrawal of the remaining attachés at the end of their current tours of duty. Thus in 1956 there were no longer any science attachés at all.⁶

In February of 1956 the National Science Foundation issued a report on "The Role of the Federal Government in International Science" which hinted that the NSF should assume responsibility for the science attaché program. At about the same time CIA proposed to give financial support for an expanded program either to the National Science Foundation or preferably to the State Department. The Bureau of the Budget, however, refused to approve either NSF assumption of the program or the transfer of funds from CIA to the Department. These pressures from NSF and CIA, as well as from the scientific community as a whole, may have induced the Department to review its program, now withered to one professional and one secretary in Washington, and in the late summer of 1957 it was officially determined to re-establish it, beginning by looking for a suitable scientist to serve as Science Adviser.

This search was still under way on 4 October, when the Soviets launched Sputnik I and gave an enormous push to many a U.S. scientific program. In 1958 State appointed seven new science attachés.⁹ In 1962 we had science attachés in nine of our embassies, and in January of 1965 there were 23 attachés in 17 embassies, two being assigned to each of six large ones. For comparison purposes about 25 foreign embassies have science officers or attachés in Washington.¹¹

One disconcerting aspect of the State Department's revived program has been its inability to fill the vacancy at the head of the Office of International Scientific Affairs, the office now responsible

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for the administration and direction of the science attaché system. This spot had been vacant for more than a year at time of writing (January 1966).¹⁵

Definition of Functions

The latest guidance from the State Department to the attaché makes him an integral part of the ambassador's staff with the functions of *advising* the chief of mission on scientific and technical matters, *reporting* in accordance with the embassy program, and *representing* the chief of mission and the U.S. government in scientific and related affairs.^{12 16} This instruction gives him a tremendous latitude in choosing where to concentrate his effort. One science attaché reported that his entire time was devoted to aiding U.S. and host country scientists.⁵ Another declared that facilitating the exchange of scientists and scientific equipment and meetings and communications to this end took most of his time.⁸

In these two instances when the intelligence mission went by the board, it appears that the attaché was left on his own, not only by the Department but by the ambassador, to fill whatever function he deemed most important; and scientists in this position are naturally most interested in satisfying the requirements of the scientific world. Perhaps some chiefs of mission are reluctant to meddle into the duties of such specialized members of their staff; perhaps some are not interested in the attachés' functions. A former ambassador facetiously said he "needed a science attaché like a cigar store Indian needs a brassiere."¹³

Of course it is a two-way street; the science attaché must fit into the non-scientific community of the embassy and prove that he is an asset to its whole endeavor. From a scientist on a two-year assignment this may sometimes be too much to expect.⁵

Now that after ten years the program is a going one, to the extent of placing the science attachés in foreign posts, the question is whether it will continue to receive the backing that brought about its revival. This will depend greatly upon its value to the State Department in the interaction between science and foreign policy and upon its value to the intelligence community as a consumer of scientific information. If the attachés continue, as many have, to serve primarily the interests of science and scientists, they will discourage this intelligence and foreign policy backing.

Within the State Department there have been some misgivings about the science attaché system.⁷ After all, the Department is not a prime user of scientific information. On the detailed level its interest has been very slight, and assigning to it the responsibility for collecting scientific information doesn't automatically create such an interest. With respect to the influence of scientific and technical developments upon foreign policy, it seems probable that their effects are felt only in long term and do not require constant monitoring.⁵ Furthermore, there is other policy machinery within the executive branch geared to monitor scientific developments worldwide.

Staffing Problems

There are other difficulties. Recruiting has not been easy. The scientist should ideally be an eminent person in the field. He should be known internationally in order to have the entrée he needs for collecting information in a foreign country. There are very few eminent scientists who can spare two years for such a job. In addition, many scientists, on finding out that some of its duties are on behalf of intelligence, will have nothing to do with it. They feel that association with "spying" may jeopardize their scientific careers. The public recommendation of the Hoover Commission certainly didn't help in this respect.¹⁷

Another requirement in recruiting is for special qualifications, both scientific and linguistic. A science attaché who can't speak the language of the country where he is assigned will be seriously handicapped. So will, from the intelligence viewpoint, one whose substantive scientific work does not lie in a priority field. The priority intelligence objectives have been and will probably remain in the physical sciences; biological subjects are in general of low priority. A biologist attaché can hardly be expected to report on nuclear physics; in fact he may become suspect if he is too curious about matters outside his own discipline.

There has in any case been a problem of orienting the science attaché to intelligence priorities. Perhaps it is expecting too much that a scientist unfamiliar with intelligence should fall right in with its priorities. He tends to follow his own interests or interpret the priorities as he sees them, so that he does hit-or-miss, shotgun re-

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porting. By the time his two years are up, he is just beginning to get oriented.

One remedy might be to establish a corps of career foreign service scientists to fill at least some of the attaché posts.⁵ These would have the status and the continuity of a Foreign Service Officer but would limit their activities to foreign scientific affairs. In the eyes of foreign nations they would probably be regarded in the same light as the agricultural attachés who report on important developments in agriculture abroad. During their home tours they would presumably be assigned to the Office of International Scientific Affairs. There is, to be sure, the drawback that they would gradually lose professional competence and stature by absence from the collegium of scientific study.

Desiderata

One of the biggest shortcomings of the science attaché program has lain in its not being extended to the Communist countries. All the attachés are located in countries of low priority for scientific intelligence. (Though sending one to Warsaw is now being considered.) It is not certain that a science attaché in Moscow could do us any good;⁴ the Soviets would probably try to ignore him. On the other hand, he could not be systematically quarantined from all lectures, publications, and personal contacts; and a small amount of first-hand reporting from Moscow would be more useful to intelligence than ten times as much from London.

It looks from the intelligence viewpoint as though the science attaché's functions should be narrowed to that of fulfilling the State Department's responsibility for the collection of scientific intelligence information in accordance with priority objectives. He has been too convenient a focal point for the scientists to converge on with their many problems and requirements, most of which could be satisfied through other channels, including non-governmental channels. As a result, his reporting has been negligent of priorities and basically opportunistic, producing many reports of no intelligence value. As for the science-policy relationship, this is not a matter requiring such constant attention as to warrant a science attaché program.

Once the functions were so narrowed, the establishment of a limited career foreign service scientist cadre to improve the performance of them might at least be tried.

Science Attachés

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*Observations of the attachés in the
Soviet Union in the fall of '62.*

THE FACE OF MOSCOW IN THE MISSILE CRISIS

William F. Scott

Soviet brinkmanship in the Cuban crisis of October 1962 focused the attention of Kremlinologists on a relatively new concept in the lexicon of international conflict, "crisis management." This term encompasses both the chess-like moves one opponent makes externally against the other and the internal measures he takes to control the crisis at home. It is on the latter that this article will chiefly bear.

A complete understanding of how an opponent has gone about the management of past crises is of course virtually out of the question. Censorship and security measures, along with misinterpretations and miscalculations on his part or his opponents, are but a few of the obstacles. But an insight into the enemy's habitual modus operandi in a crisis would be of such great importance in reading his intentions another time that even a modest contribution to such an understanding should be worth while.

The Weeks Before

What went on in the inner councils of the Soviet Union during the Cuban confrontation may never be known, but certain aspects, chiefly internal, of its management measures were witnessed by the military attachés of the American embassy in Moscow. What follows is their worm's-eye view of the Moscow scene during that tense period, their observations reassembled and reviewed with benefit of hindsight. A worm's-eye view is the best available to foreigners in the USSR; they are permitted in less than one percent of the total Soviet land area.¹ This was true in 1962, and the restrictions have

¹ Edward Crankshaw, "Big Brother Still Watches," *New York Times*, December 29, 1963. Both the U.S. and Canadian air attachés sent this article home as the best and most expressive description available of Soviet restrictions on foreigners. Crankshaw writes that ". . . the tourist's image is the image of the display put on for his especial benefit in certain selected places: half a dozen great cities, half a dozen collective farms, half a dozen villages, and one or two resorts. And if it is objected, as it so often is, that it is impossible to turn a whole city—Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Alma Ata, Tiflis—into a shopwindow, a display cabinet, the answer is that you don't know the Russians. Because this is precisely what the Soviet Government can do and does."

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not been relaxed since then, the nuclear test ban treaty, grain shipments, and the advent of Brezhnev and Kosygin notwithstanding.

A number of events which at the time seemed to have no semblance of a connection with Cuba occupied the attention of the Moscow attachés during October. Early in the month an assistant U.S. naval attaché was declared persona non grata. A second member of the embassy staff received the same news on October 12. Then on the 20th all attachés were speculating on the significance of China's attack on India, which Soviet media did not mention until three days after the event.

The flow of news about Cuba traced a peculiar pattern in the weeks before the crisis broke. At the end of August Che Guevara had arrived in Moscow, and on September 2 his request for armaments and technical specialists to train Cuban servicemen was reported. After that Cuban coverage came in a continual stream, reaching its high on September 11 when TASS fulminated about the "provocations of the United States which might plunge the world into universal thermonuclear war." From this point on the attention given by Soviet news sources to Cuba declined, though there were occasional articles such as that in *Izvestia* on September 28 describing American reaction to the Soviet-Cuban agreement for the construction of a fishing port. From the 1st through the 23rd of October, Yemen received far more publicity than Cuba.

The Crisis Breaks

The first information about Soviet missiles in Cuba came to the attachés in the newscasts of the Voice of America and the BBC. When these were in Russian they were totally jammed, but the jamming of the English was less severe and a part of it could be understood. The overseas editions of the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times*, generally arriving at the embassy several days late, provided avidly devoured background information.

Soviet news sources did not report the blockade which President Kennedy had announced on October 22 until some forty-eight hours later. Then *Pravda* carried on the first page a Soviet version of the President's speech distorted in such fashion that the Russian people would not know about the Soviet troops and ballistic missiles in Cuba. This kind of news management made it difficult for the Western diplomatic corps to appraise the degree of importance the Soviet leaders actually attached to the situation.

The only Soviet reaction immediately manifest was to order all diplomatic travellers, including dependents, to return to Moscow. (An exception was made for the State Department officer accompanying the Robert Shaw chorale on its tour of the Soviet Union.) Two USAF air attachés on the first leg of a Leningrad-Tashkent-Moscow trip were contacted by an Intourist representative and told the Soviet government could not guarantee their safety outside of Moscow in view of the U.S. action over Cuba. To test this travel ban, both U.S. and other NATO personnel filed, under the normal official procedure, letters of intent to travel outside Moscow. These must be filed in advance of departure, giving the complete itinerary and dates; then if there is no reply it is understood that the travel can be undertaken. In all cases during the Cuban crisis notice came that "the trip cannot be registered for reasons of a temporary nature"—the standard phraseology forbidding travel to the vast bulk of the so-called "open" areas of the Soviet Union.

At the same time the U.S. attachés put into operation a joint plan for comprehensive, around-the-clock intelligence observation in Moscow and environs, looking for anything out of the ordinary that might illuminate Soviet intentions and reactions to the situation. They were particularly alert, of course, for any indications that the Soviets were preparing Moscow for a thermonuclear exchange. Were government offices being evacuated? Were civil defense measures being taken? Were the normal number of trucks to be seen on the streets, both day and night, or was there an unexplained increase or decrease? How many people were in lines buying food at Moscow markets? What was the attitude of the people toward Americans in restaurants, theaters, and the subways; had this changed?

Among the places under scrutiny outside the city but within the forty-kilometer radius permitted were two civilian airfields, Vnukovo and Shermetyevo, the latter serving both domestic and international flights. All key installations such as these were checked at least once each day. The rounds were made primarily by automobile, although some districts were covered on foot and by subway—that deep and extensive system which, with its heavy blast doors, may constitute the world's largest and best civil defense shelter. As is customary in Moscow for U.S. personnel, no one travelled alone, two-man teams being the general rule. The Soviet surveillance was normal—that is close and constant. Seasoned attachés accompanied new arrivals, and Department of State personnel assisted whenever their normal duties permitted. The attachés of the three services completely

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pooled their efforts, sending to Washington daily a single joint report. Responsibility for its preparation was rotated among the three, and it was coordinated with the Deputy Chief of Mission or his representative before being dispatched.

Business as Usual

On the surface, life in Moscow proceeded at a normal pace. After October 24 the Soviet television, radio, and press spoke daily of the "high-handed American aggressors" and the "criminal intentions of the enemies of peace," but there was still no mention that Soviet troops or ballistic missiles were in Cuba. Further, no significant changes could be detected in the life of the city, nor any changes in the Russian people's attitude toward Americans. Waitresses in hotels and restaurants, clerks in stores, and taxi drivers gave no sign that the famed Russian grapevine was working to inform the people of the critical turn of events.

During the week of October 22 the Red Army held its usual night rehearsal for the annual November 7 parade in commemoration of the Bolshevik revolution. To a newcomer the tanks, missiles, and other weapons rolled out would have presented an ominous sight; but the experienced attachés noted that rehearsal procedures were normal and the weapons almost identical with those deployed during the last previous parade.

Perhaps the most talked-about event in Moscow during the week of the crisis was the opening of the New York City Ballet. Khrushchev had let his dislike of abstract and modernistic art be known; and here Balanchine, the world's leading exponent of the modern school of theater, was opening with an unfamiliar concept of ballet in the city where that art form had its strongest tradition. The ballet was a success. Night after night the troupe played before a full and enthusiastic house. Soviet critics, initially rather reserved until they found that the regime was not offering serious objections, gave favorable reviews. Many high-ranking Party members and Moscow's leading intellectuals attended. And at no time did they, or anyone else in the audience, suggest by their behavior an awareness of the world crisis centered off the southeast corner of the United States.

There was even a second cultural import from the United States in Moscow during that week. On October 23, while the New York City Ballet was performing at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, an American opera singer, Jerome Hines, was featured at the Bolshoi.

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The central box was occupied by Comrades Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kozlov, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Polanskiy, and Grishin. Khrushchev led the audience in the applause.

For the night of October 26 the U.S. air attaché had invited four Soviet Air Force officers and their wives to be his guests at the New York City Ballet and a buffet served afterwards in a hotel (this in return for a hail-and-farewell luncheon the Soviet Air Force had given for the new attaché and his predecessor). When the invitations had been extended, about October 16, a Soviet liaison officer had hinted that at least some of the guests would accept. With the news of October 22 it became unlikely that any would come; diplomatically, however, it was necessary to proceed with all preparations. The Soviets apparently were waiting for the invitations to be withdrawn, but the embassy protocol officer concurred that this should not be done. Finally, about noon on the 26th, the day of the party, the Soviet liaison officer called; he regretted that all the guests had been called out of town and so could not accept.

Maneuvers

There were, however, instances of manipulating both news and people for purposes of crisis management. On October 25 Soviet news media gave unexpected publicity to a telegram that Aleksey, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, had sent to U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations. It warned that mankind was threatened by the outbreak of a world war as a result of actions taken by the U.S. administration against the Republic of Cuba. The United States was violating Christian teachings. To the attachés it seemed that Aleksey's telegram was more for Russian internal consumption than for U Thant. Stalin had used the Russian church in World War II to get popular support for his government; Khrushchev might be starting to woo the nation in case of similar need.

A second device, one familiar to Americans in recent years, were the "demonstrations." On October 24, the day the Soviets reported the U.S. blockade of Cuba without mentioning their own troops, missiles, and aircraft there, a half-hearted attempt at a student demonstration was made. Fifteen or twenty students threw a few ink bottles at the embassy, then moved on to Spaso House, the ambassador's residence some seven blocks away, and threw a few more. Then they disbanded. There hadn't been enough of them even to interfere seriously with traffic in front of the embassy.

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The big official "demonstration," a highly organized affair, came on October 27. The Soviets took every possible precaution that it not get out of hand. Hundreds of troops were moved into side streets within a few blocks of the embassy to ensure complete control of the crowd at all times; these were in place before the demonstration started. The gathering of the crowd afterward in front of the embassy was no more spontaneous than the movement of the troops had been. Truckloads of children were unloaded a short distance away, lined up ready to demonstrate, and handed signs denouncing imperialism, colonialism, and so on.

The youthful protesters had no notion that the Soviet leaders were squirming under a virtual ultimatum to remove their strategic weapons from Cuba; they had been told only that the imperialistic capitalists of the United States were planning to invade the homeland of the peace-loving Cubans. What they did know was that they were getting out of a few hours of school and work. There were not more than a few thousand of them, and their performance was unenthusiastic. After about two hours, apparently an order to disperse was given, and the demonstrators appeared happy to oblige. As the last stragglers departed, the security troops also moved out from the side streets where they had been keeping watch.

The Crisis Passes

The first hint about Soviet missiles in Cuba was given to the Russians at 1900 hours, October 27, a few hours after the demonstration, when the Moscow radio argued that ". . . if the United States believes it has the right to demand removal from Cuba of missiles described by Washington as offensive, then it will be natural to recognize the USSR's right to demand the withdrawal of American destructive rocket weapons from Turkey, a country that is our next-door neighbor."

On Monday, October 29, representatives of the entire Moscow attaché corps attended a reception at the Turkish embassy. The Soviet Armed Forces sent token representation. By then the general feeling among the attachés was that the crisis had at least receded. The Turkish attachés were worried lest a secret deal had been made and recently installed U.S. missiles would be removed from their country.

That the crisis was fully ended became apparent on November 1, during a reception at the Japanese embassy. An unusual number of

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senior Soviet Air Force officers was present, and their attitude toward the U.S. air attachés was more nearly appropriate to the days some seventeen years earlier when the Russian and American allies met on the Elbe than to the aftermath of a desperate hostile confrontation. Almost completely ignoring their Japanese hosts, the Soviet officers insisted on toasting and drinking with the U.S. airmen. Clearly impelled by relief from tension, they offered toasts to peace, to friendship, and even to "the possible marriage of my grandson with your granddaughter." When a secret police officer attempted to break up the toasts between the Soviet Air Force chief of staff and the U.S. air attaché, the chief of staff told him to "get the hell away." And this unprecedented behavior was no isolated accident: on November 5, during a reception celebrating the Italian national day, Soviet Air Force officers showed a similar great cordiality to the U.S. attachés.

Net Observations

The attachés had seen nothing in Moscow during the entire period of the Cuban crisis to reflect the serious external tension. The only observable Soviet reaction was the ban on all travel in the Soviet Union, and this was not put into effect until after President Kennedy had announced the blockade. Two attachés who flew to Vienna by way of Kiev on October 26 were treated with exceptional courtesy on the aircraft and by customs officials in Kiev.

Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is still difficult to point to any unusual Soviet behavior during the month of October. The persona non grata actions against an assistant naval attaché on October 5 and a Foreign Service officer on October 12 were probably, as thought at the time, in retaliation for the expulsion of two Soviets charged with espionage in the United States. The timing of the Chinese attack on India may have been entirely coincidence; it embarrassed the Soviets who were training some Indian pilots in the USSR.

Although the public did not know it until months later, the Soviets' confidence in their own internal security was also shaken in October. On the 22nd, the day the United States announced the blockade, Penkovsky was arrested, implicating the top leadership of the secret police as well as military intelligence. In December the Soviets, believing a U.S. attaché to have been involved, updated an old film, entitled "Along the Black Path" and designed to alert the Soviet public

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against the U.S. attachés, and showed it on television and in fourteen Moscow movie theaters simultaneously.

From the viewpoint of crisis management and intelligence, this suppression of any outward sign during the Cuban crisis reemphasizes the Soviet ability to control news and deceive the people by that subtlest of propaganda devices, the half truth. And as well as could be observed during that week, the Soviet public responded exactly as their leaders desired. One only hopes that this control would not be successful in suppressing all indications of preparation for hostilities if there really were such preparations.

Did the Soviets never intend to do anything but withdraw from Cuba if it came to a showdown? Were the Kremlin leaders prepared for miscalculation and explosion of the crisis into open conflict? To what degree was the Soviet military machine alerted to this possibility? From the worm's-eye view in Moscow, such questions could not be answered. But complete domination of the internal environment assured the Soviet leadership a high degree of flexibility in utilizing psychology and propaganda. In this respect crisis management as practiced by the Soviet Union has the advantage over its counterpart in democratic countries.

For the physical and economic
geography of the USSR.

THE SOVIET ATLAS AS A SOURCE

William Terechow

Soviet atlases, world atlases as well as those devoted to the USSR itself, have attained a degree of cartographic excellence which ranks them among the best in the world. There are no American atlases comparable to them, nor are there likely soon to be, given the concept of American publishers that an atlas is "a collection of maps in a volume."¹ The contrasting Soviet concept has been summarized by the noted Soviet cartographer K. A. Salishchev: "An atlas is not just a grouping of various geographic maps nor their mechanical assemblage. It is an integral system of maps which are organically related and complement one another, a system that is governed by the purpose of the atlas and the peculiarities of its use."²

General Atlases of the USSR

The best national atlas of the Soviet Union is currently the *Atlas SSSR* published in 1962.³ It is a comprehensive cartographic study

¹ Moore, W. G., *A Dictionary of Geography*. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962.)

² Salishchev, K. A., *Osnovy Kartovedeniya*. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Geodezicheskoy Literatuy, 1959.)

³ During World War II a predecessor of this atlas became a great treasure. Volume II of the Great Soviet Atlas, the volume covering the USSR, had been printed but not generally released. There were only two advance, courtesy copies in the United States, and the only other up-to-date source available to the many government offices clamoring for information on Soviet geography was a set of maps Wendell Wilkie had brought home covering the route of his recent tour through the Soviet Union. OSS therefore borrowed the State Department's courtesy copy of the atlas to reproduce for its own and other agencies' use. Offset color printing would have been prohibitively expensive, however, several thousand dollars a page, and none of the commercial processes for color photography in those days could do the job; the black printing would always come out blurred. Luckily, OSS had hired for other photographic purposes the developer of an exclusive color process called Triak which was found to be satisfactory, and it was able to get out its American edition, with translated table of contents, on 1 February 1943.

Soviet carelessness provided a bonus in this achievement. The main maps had been edited by censorship to eliminate information that might be useful to the hostile outside world, but the censors had forgotten the larger-scale inserts covering metropolitan and other areas of special interest. These often revealed things the Soviets would not intentionally have let us know.

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of the country and contains an excellent series of general regional maps covering the Soviet Union at scales up to 1:3,000,000. It has a physical geography section comprising various geologic, climatic, vegetational, and faunal maps and an economic geography section covering such topics as industry, agriculture, and transportation. There are also maps of the former twenty economic regions showing the distribution of different types of economic activities within each.

The Soviets have also published a number of regional atlases covering particular political units.⁴ Both these and the *Atlas SSSR* contain a wealth of physical geographic information, both general and specific. The general maps do what is expected of them—show physical and cultural features and give place names, indicate relief by shades of green ascending from sea level to shades of brown for higher elevation, give the highest elevations in each region in meters, and indicate water depth by descending shades of blue. But these are backed up by a number of specific topical maps devoted to geology (the underlying strata, tectonics, and rock types), geomorphology (terrain), climate, vegetation, soils, forests, zoogeography (types and distribution of fauna), and mineral extraction (distribution of various mining activities).

Of the topical maps, those devoted to climate give the most comprehensive coverage. The *Atlas SSSR* has eleven of them showing climatic regions, solar radiation, prevailing wind directions, seasonal air temperatures, average daily air temperature, frost-free periods, snow cover, precipitation, radiation balance, and seasonal air pressure and giving considerable detailed information in each of these categories.

The economic section of Soviet atlases, either national or regional, is broken down essentially into four topics—industry, agriculture, population, and transportation. The industrial maps have such themes as fuel and electro-energy production, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, machine building and metal fabrication, chemical and petroleum products, building materials, lumber and paper production, light products manufacturing, and food production. The agricultural maps show the location and specialization of state farms, the extent

⁴As of this writing, the following regional atlases have been published: Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Georgian SSR, Armenian SSR, Azerbaydzhan SSR, Uzbek SSR, Tselinnyy Kray, Karelian ASSR, Kustanay Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kalinin Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Vologda Oblast, and Yaroslavl Oblast.

of ploughed or tilled land, and the type and distribution of grain, livestock, and various other agricultural products. The population maps usually cover ethnography along with distribution and density. The transportation topic normally comprises not only roads and railroads but navigable rivers, canals, and major air lanes.

Specialized Atlases

Of the Soviet atlases entirely devoted to special topics, the best and most useful are perhaps the agricultural atlas, the railroad atlas, and the automobile road atlas.⁵ The atlas of agriculture published in 1960, giving fuller coverage and more detailed information on Soviet agriculture than the national or regional atlases, is the most comprehensive and detailed one of its kind ever published. Its more than three hundred pages are broken down into nine sections under the following subject heads: introduction to Soviet agriculture, natural physical conditions, general agricultural characteristics, agricultural pattern including amount of arable land, livestock, agriculture in the Soviet republics, gross production of agricultural commodities, harvest yields for individual areas, and conclusions concerning Soviet agricultural production compared with the rest of the world's. Although its main value is to show the type and distribution of Soviet agricultural activities, it is excellent for determining the agricultural potential of any region of the Union.

The railroad atlas portrays the regional railway networks in the various parts of the country, including such information as the distribution of facilities, traffic flow, cities and towns served, and the railway's relationship with the physical environment. The automobile atlas gives corresponding information on roads. It distinguishes between primary and secondary roads but gives neither the kind of surfacing nor the number of lanes on a road.

The Information Yield

The administrative-political information found in Soviet atlases is confined largely to a simple breakdown into administrative units. Although this type of information is usually more readily available from other sources such as the Administrative-Territorial Handbook USSR (*SSSR Administrativno-Territorial'noye Deleniye Soyuznykh*

⁵Respectively *Atlas Sel'skogo Khozyaystva SSSR*, *Zheleznyye Dorogi SSSR*, and *Atlas Avtomobil'nykh Dorog SSSR* (Moskva: GUGK, 1960, 1965, and 1961.)

Respublik), an administrative reorganization may often show up first in a newly published atlas. If there is a boundary change a map is required, and an atlas may be the first source for one.

The economic information in the atlases consists of generalizations on the distribution of different types of commodity production. Production data are shown graphically, normally in comparison with past years, but only in averages for large regional areas. Accurate production data, either industrial or agricultural, for specific regions cannot be determined from the graphics. Moreover, official sources such as the national economic handbook *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo*, published yearly, provide more accurate information and greater detail on the subject. The principal use of the economic sections of the atlases is therefore to locate the different types of economic activities distributed throughout the Soviet Union.

Thus it is the physical geographic information in Soviet atlases that is most abundant and most useful. Although even here the prime sources for intelligence are usually maps such as the hypsometric series on scale 1:2,500,000, the atlas maps with scales up to 1:3,000,000 are sufficiently large to yield detailed information such as relief comparisons and magnitude or distance relationships. They frequently bridge intelligence gaps or verify information obtained from other geographic sources. Using them for deriving precise geographic coordinates would be somewhat precarious, but good approximations can be made; those with scales of 1:3,000,000 and 1:4,000,000 have 2-degree grids broken down into 20-minute intervals, and even those with scales of 1:8,000,000 and over have 4-degree grids broken down into 30-minute intervals.

Information on terrain characteristics can be obtained from the general maps section of an atlas, or better for specifics and detail, from the special geomorphology maps. The geomorphologic map in the *Atlas SSSR* shows relief morphology with twenty-nine distinct types of surface features such as plains, valleys, plateaus, tablelands, and mountains, morphologic elements such as ravines, gorges, river valleys, flood plains, sand dunes, and karst regions, and the immediate subsurface geological structure. The general physical maps, on the other hand, provide excellent information on general relief relationships over large land areas.

The value of the climatic information in Soviet atlases is particularly pointed up in the case of the arctic regions, on which Soviet scientific publications indicate there is a paucity of data, especially on the area

east of the Urals. The Soviet atlases give arctic climate data that would otherwise be difficult to obtain from overt sources and, although somewhat generalized, is sufficient for the reconstruction of conditions in the Soviet northeast. On all areas it is useful to have information on the separation of climatic zones, the number of frost-free days and days with snow cover in each, the maximum and minimum daily temperatures and amounts of precipitation, and the seasonal paths of cyclones and anticyclones.

Hydrographic information can be gleaned from several sections of an atlas. The general maps can be used for the size and configuration of lakes, rivers, swamps, and bogs, the location of canals and hydroelectric projects, and coastal water relationships. The transportation map will show navigable rivers, or navigable parts of them, and canals. Then the specialized hydrographic map will give the characteristics of the major rivers—perennial water level, velocity of flow, seasonal flood period and area flooded, and hydrochemical classification.

Information on Soviet soils is presented in soil maps in both the national and the regional atlases. The *Atlas SSSR* identifies sixty-five distinct soil types. The regional atlases have still more detail, giving for example soil profiles with associated graphics describing composition. Such information is of value in studies of the agricultural potential of particular areas.

The Intelligence End Product

All these kinds of information contribute to the basic encyclopedic store for the maintenance of which geographic intelligence is responsible. Some of it, however, can be put to more immediate use for special purposes. Evasion and survival studies need data on climatic and other characteristics of particular regions, their drainage pattern, the types of vegetation present, the ethnology of the inhabitants, food and water supplies available, and any peculiar environmental hazards, say the presence of wild animals. Atlases are at least a confirmatory and sometimes a unique source for such information.

Other specialized studies that may use atlas information include those seeking to locate possible ICBM sites or underground caves that might be used for nuclear testing. Geographic analysis of the suspected areas would center on the nature of the bedrock there

and the overlying terrain, the type and composition of the soil, and the depth of the water table.

Sometimes clues to secrets are turned up in the process of comparing data in a newly published atlas with previous information in the same field. Say a town and associated road complex previously shown in eastern Siberia are now missing. The experienced analyst has learned that this is seldom a matter of cartographic carelessness. A search for reasons why the Soviets would want to delete it is begun. Perhaps it turns out that a number of nuclear scientists have recently been moved to the area, or there may be a report that uranite has been discovered there. Routine geographic authentication has started a fruitful intelligence process.

Finally, Soviet atlases serve U.S. intelligence in the very way they are intended to serve Soviet citizens—as ready reference works. No day goes by but someone wants to know where Marinovka is, what is the highest elevation on Sakhalin, how far it is from Volgograd to Lugansk, how many towns in Tula Oblast have chemical plants, or what areas in the Soviet Union grow rice. He can most easily get the answer from the Soviet atlas.

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Recommendations for invigorating and coordinating the community's development of data-handling systems.

R&D FOR INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING

CODIB Task Team VI¹

The team considered conceptual and managerial aspects of establishing R&D programs for intelligence data handling to be more crucial and more in need of immediate attention than technical aspects. Rather than concern itself with what technical approaches should be adopted, what type of equipment is best suited to a particular application, and the like, it therefore sought answers to such questions as the following. To what degree are the several USIB members' R&D programs for intelligence data handling mutually supportive? Are existing and planned programs adequate in size, balanced in content, technically sound, and adequately organized, managed, and funded? Can the technical leadership for such programs be improved? How should policy be established for a coordinated community program? What outstanding opportunities might be seized as immediate practical objectives of R&D? How might shortcomings in present data handling be translated into R&D requirements and communicated to the technical leadership of the community?

Community Objectives

The team set out to find a framework of R&D goals with respect to data handling in the intelligence community to which to relate specific managerial and technical tasks and within which to identify deficiencies and achievements. It discovered instead that the community, as governed by USIB under established intelligence directives, has no organized set of R&D objectives (except as NSA and NPIC are in-

¹ Adapted from portions of its report dated 28 September 1965. The team, charged in the preceding March with defining interagency goals for R&D in the processing of intelligence data, had representation from all USIB agencies except the FBI and AEC and the help of consultants provided by the National Science Foundation. It was chaired by Dr. Ruth M. Davis of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This adaption does not necessarily reflect the views of USIB or its Committee on Documentation; neither body has yet completed action on the report.

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dividually charged with R&D for their respective specialized purposes), no policy for establishing objectives, and no mechanism for either. Although the federal government as a whole has similarly no explicitly stated R&D goals, there is a formal mechanism within the executive branch for advising the President on R&D, coordinating agency programs, and picking particular areas for concentrated attention—the Scientific Advisor to the President, his staff in the Office of Science and Technology, and the panels and committees over which he presides. The USIB community is represented in this mechanism only insofar as its member agencies are individually represented.

The intelligence community in many ways functions as a self-contained entity isolated from the rest of the federal structure by organizational, managerial, and security barriers. This isolation causes it little or no distress in operational affairs, but scientific and technical activities are another matter. Here the community is not self-sufficient. These activities, not only managerial and R&D but testing, engineering, evaluation, and implementation, are often delegated in part or whole to groups outside the community.

Much such delegation of R&D on data handling is useful, often essential. The bulk of technical competence in general information handling—information sciences technology—lies outside the intelligence community, and many aspects of intelligence data handling are identical to those of general information handling. Multi-font optical readers, for example, new storage media, large random-access memories, automatic translation, and improved man-machine communications are needed equally in intelligence and outside. There is no reason why USIB agencies should bear a disproportionate share of such R&D costs. Sharing these with others should permit the intelligence community to concentrate its limited resources on those data-handling needs which are of unique or primary concern to its missions, not only those of NSA and NPIC but also the indications and warning mission and many others.

Thus the concentration outside the intelligence community of technical competence with respect to intelligence data handling may be viewed without alarm. Lack of competence within the community in the applications of data-handling techniques to intelligence problems or systems is unjustified, however, and the team believes that at present such competence is marginal at best. This belief is backed by the frequent use of contractors for system design and development, the mediocrity of data-handling techniques and systems currently

used in the community, and the apparent lack of concrete planning for the application of more sophisticated technology.

It is frequently asserted that a lack of federal or national objectives can be compensated for by well-structured and documented individual agency objectives, so it may be that well-founded USIB member agency R&D objectives in intelligence data handling would provide a suitable substitute for the lacking community goals. The task team attempted, then, to discover individual agency objectives in order to assess their suitability. It was found that DIA, the military departments of DoD, and NSA had documented objectives. The State Department had none. The existence of CIA objectives was not determined, and the NSA objectives were not released to the team. It was obvious, however, that the objectives identified were not uniform in structure, were neither comprehensive nor cohesive, were grossly incomplete with respect to managerial considerations, and were not intended as guidelines for R&D efforts. It was necessary to conclude that the aggregate of agency objectives could not substitute for USIB objectives and that the individual objectives were of little use in judging or interrelating R&D efforts planned or under way.

Recommendations

In view of the importance of R&D in intelligence data handling, the need for sharing responsibility for it with groups outside the USIB community, the absence of any USIB goals, policies, or mechanism to further the necessary R&D, and the lack of coordination among present and planned R&D efforts, the task team recommended a set of actions. These actions are aimed at improving the managerial position of the community not only in handling its internal operational requirements but in its dealings with other federal offices and groups outside the government. It appears axiomatic that both the community and its member agencies will benefit in their individual and joint contacts with outside entities if they can assume a uniform and professional negotiating posture. The actions recommended are discussed below.

Policy mechanism. The USIB should set up a permanent body to establish community objectives and policies for R&D in intelligence data handling. This body should have representation from all member agencies and a full-time executive secretary. It should coordinate the agencies' objectives, plans, policies, and evaluations and be the principal advisor to Chairman, USIB, in this field. In critical R&D areas it might, if deemed advisable, develop its own plans and rec-

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ommend where the R&D responsibility should be delegated. It should have authority to get information on the agencies' R&D planning and budgeting but none to approve plans. Since its membership could not have the technical competence necessary to cover the whole field of intelligence data handling, it should have continuous access to consultants both within and outside the community. It should meet at least monthly.

Reporting service. The USIB should establish a formal mechanism to disseminate technical information concerning current and planned data-handling R&D in the community. This service would handle only classified information, and it would utilize channels affording the needed security. It would be given access to information in the agencies, select that to be disseminated, and give it maximum sanitization before dissemination. It has been found that linking technology to the sponsoring organization or to the operational use for which it is intended normally increases the security classification of a document and consequently the inaccessibility of the technical data in it.

For open-source materials, existing information services appear to be adequate. If it is found that they are not, additional requirements can be levied on them so that the USIB reporting system does not have to handle such easily accessible information.

The task team believes that the classified information can be drawn from existing agency reporting mechanisms functioning with little change. Bleed-off from these established systems should suffice initially, at least, and should serve to point up new requirements, if any, which would have to be imposed on them. If judicious use is made of individual agency personnel through the USIB policy body, this reporting service should need funds only for administrative support—clerical and mail services, etc.

Stimulation of personnel. Those responsible for R&D in intelligence data handling need to be impressed with the importance of keeping up with others' pertinent research and development. IDH/R&D personnel should be vigorously encouraged, if not gently coerced, to make use of the open-source information services available to them as government employees. They should be subjected to scheduled evaluation to measure their effectiveness, competence, and awareness of current R&D. The importance of their functions in terms of the responsiveness of the intelligence community to any situation, crisis or normal, cannot be overestimated; and yet they exist as an unstructured, unrecognized, and uncoordinated group with no group allegiances and no reward-punishment mechanism.

The task team had extreme difficulty in even identifying those responsible for R&D in intelligence data handling and certainly found no IDH/R&D community. Many who had responsibility for a data-handling project were not even aware of anyone else having similar responsibilities. The policy body recommended above should establish an agreed-upon organizational listing of IDH/R&D components and a directory of IDH/R&D personnel giving their individual specialties.

IDH/R&D technical personnel presumably do not differ generally in work habits from other government technical personnel. A DoD study of the information usage habits of government scientists and engineers made last spring should accordingly be applicable to them, and no separate survey of them should be needed. This DoD study, along with other evidence, points to either misuse or inadequate use of information services by technical personnel and attributes it primarily to lack of instruction. The team's recommendation, therefore, is that USIB arrange for the compilation of a report listing the 400-500 available information services and giving details on their accessibility and procedures for their use. Twelve months after distribution of the report, a study should be made to evaluate changes in information usage patterns brought about by it. This could then be the basis for recommendations for improvements. These measures—a directory of IDH/R&D personnel, a report on available information services, and a follow-up study of usage patterns—could be accomplished by a contractor under USIB supervision.

Feedback system. Feedback from users of intelligence is not systematized, nor is the extent of feedback and its impact known. The mechanisms now existing—post mortems, validity studies, field comment, consumer comment—provide limited return and this largely confined to National Intelligence Estimates. There has been little contact between intelligence analysts and IDH/R&D personnel.

It would thus appear that the nature, level and extent of feedback should be studied and the feasibility of more systematic dialogue between producer and consumer at various levels explored. The study would require the services of personnel particularly talented in the production process to work with experts in techniques for evaluating output.

The Price of Inaction

If these recommendations are not accepted and some such line of action taken, the intelligence community will continue vulnerable to

external investigative and evaluative groups, with no recognized negotiating position, from which to meet questions concerning intelligence data handling. The field of information sciences and services is a highly populated one in the scientific community. The product of the intelligence community is information, and intelligence data handling is analogous to information sciences technology. So one can expect a high outside interest in the intelligence community's R&D in data handling. Such interest is good and should be maintained; and investigations can be extremely productive if a comprehensive picture is presented to the investigators. But this has often not been the case in the past.

It is elementary management doctrine that when there is a responsible coordinating mechanism deficiencies are fewer and those which do exist are easier both to find and to correct. It would help both the external investigators and the community to have such a coordinating mechanism. Regardless of how well intentioned an investigating group may be, when the data presented it are fragmentary and not interrelated, its recommendations are even more fragmentary and unrelated to the real problems. They may "remove a thorn and by so doing implant a tumor." The intelligence community can ill afford any more such investigations.

Internally, the deleterious effects of having no over-all interagency or USIB objectives or policy in data-handling R&D are felt in every phase of the R&D activity. There is no structure on which to hang R&D efforts other than the shapeless objective of satisfying users' "requirements." The assignment to particular agencies of responsibility for urgent projects is difficult; it must be done outside of normal community channels when it is done at all. Failure to assign responsibility results in duplicative efforts on the part of every agency having some interest in the project; examples of this can be cited and documented.

Security barriers prevent personnel in one agency from acquainting themselves with R&D going on in another. Another lamentably frequent occurrence is failure to set up any criteria against which to judge when a particular R&D effort has been pursued far enough and should either be abandoned or declared satisfactory.

The recommended USIB objectives and policies should be neither so broad as to lose meaning nor so narrow as to be less than comprehensive in aggregate. To be useful, they should provide for making the best possible use of community R&D laboratories, facilities,

funds, and manpower; they should authorize and encourage inter-agency communication and coordination; they should make the most of resources and results external to the community; they should require interchange between the community and other government agencies and between the intelligence and scientific communities; they must support federal objectives; and they should provide for measuring their own impact on community requirements and individual agency resources. Without such policy and objectives, the continuing development of more expensive equipment and more complex and intellectually demanding technology will consume more and more of the community's resources, even without unjustified duplication among the uncoordinated agencies.

As technology and R&D in data handling become more expensive, in both talent and funding, the last ounce of usefulness should be realized from every project. To this end IDH/R&D personnel should be better informed about completed and current R&D efforts everywhere. As a rough estimate, one tenth of one percent of the intelligence funds earmarked for data-handling R&D in FY 66, if spent on improvement in the information usage patterns of IDH/R&D officers, would give each of them throughout the community the equivalent of a full semester of college-level education during the year. The improvement in the resultant R&D effort would conservatively be worth 100 to 1000 times that expenditure. The distribution of the recommended listing of information services and encouragement to use them is at least a slight first step toward such self-improvement.

Technical Considerations

In its effort to identify discrete areas of intelligence data handling so as to relate the R&D to managerial responsibilities, to applications, to intelligence products, and to funding, the task team after a great deal of deliberation chose two approaches. The first of these was to classify data-handling R&D by application, and twenty-two types of application were enumerated. These range from common ones like calculation of movements (say trajectories), cryptanalysis, and document retrieval to some that may not be obvious—the monitoring of systems (say lie detection systems), image interpretation, pattern recognition, predictive calculations (say in estimates), planning (say of penetration operations), problem solving (say in inductive intelligence analysis), etc. This listing provided a basis for assessing current efforts and deficiencies.

The second approach was intended primarily to highlight ways in which R&D in data handling could improve intelligence production and management in the community. The team believes that such R&D—comprising the development of theories, advanced techniques, and equipment and the application of these to the subject in question—should have the following aims:

- Experimentation with and evaluation of existing data-handling systems.
- Development of criteria and measures for evaluating or designing data-handling systems.
- Improvement of management procedures for allocating resources in the intelligence community.
- Analysis of practices used in exploiting data and data sources.
- Development and evaluation of information- or document-handling systems.
- Improvement of techniques for producing and evaluating finished intelligence (e.g., quality control).
- Development of validity criteria for information, including criteria for data purging.
- Development of improved procedures for intelligence training (e.g., programed instruction).
- Development of reporting mechanisms for R&D project funding and managerial data.

This listing served to emphasize the findings of the task team concerning the intelligence community's use of R&D resources in the data-handling area. There is no question but that this gross functional area is too large and diverse to be managed effectively as an entity. As its many constituent parts become more sharply defined, it undoubtedly will and should be split up so as to become more manageable. But the greater problem at the moment appears rather to be that a number of its essential sub-areas requiring improvement are being neglected; they are not thought of as being a part of intelligence data handling because of the parochial and limited view taken by many toward this R&D area. It was concern over this danger that prompted the above listing.

Another feature of R&D in intelligence data handling brought out by the listing is the unmistakable way it transcends the responsibilities and missions of individual agencies and so is indeed a USIB community concern. Almost without exception the intelligence pro-

duced by a given agency forms merely one part of the required community product. Thus the R&D projects of a given agency need with a few exceptions to recognize related requirements in other agencies; community priorities rather than individual agency priorities for R&D are needed; and a USIB mechanism is needed to coordinate and assign R&D responsibilities among the agencies.

In the course of the research which led to these generalizations the team uncovered certain R&D areas which seemed to demand increased attention under any criteria that might be established. The most critical single one of these is discussed below.

Indications Intelligence

Efforts to improve the processing of current intelligence information for purposes of indications and warning have been under way since 1959. Although millions of dollars and hundreds of man-years have been expended in applying automatic data processing to this effort, the results to date have been disappointing. Because of this, the level of funding for R&D in this field is currently low.

In analyzing the reasons for the past failures, it should be recognized that indications is one of the most difficult fields in all of intelligence processing. It is characterized by extremely high volumes of data, a tendency for input data to be fragmentary, redundant, and of unknown validity, wide variety in types of data, a dependence on all types of collection, severe time restrictions on processing, a critical importance for random and rare events, a tendency toward rapid changes in focus of attention, and heavy dependence on predictive evaluations. But the inherent complexity of the processing problem has been aggravated by the inadequacy of preliminary studies undertaken prior to system design. The intelligence objectives have usually been stated in such broad terms as to be practically useless to the system designer. The designer has usually been versed in some specific technology but not in intelligence. The intelligence analysts have known very little about current technology and have been too hard pressed keeping up with their work to give enough time to the system designer. The designers have concentrated heavily on statistical techniques, particularly with reference to level of military activity, which tend to obscure important anomalies rather than highlight them.

The warning problem is more a problem of logical inference and association than of statistics. Evaluations depend principally on the

talents of the analyst—his inventiveness and imagination, his ability to sense a pattern quickly, his inductive reasoning, in short, his intelligence. R&D in this field must deal, therefore, with human factors to a large degree. While the human-factors area is one in which there is much to be accomplished, it has been found to be one in which accomplishment is most difficult. A spate of human-factors work in recent years has led to a considerable amount of disillusionment. Nevertheless, several topics in this area do offer promise and should be considered in an R&D approach:

Data presentation. Many automated techniques can be used to ease the burden of the analyst in having to handle large volumes of data rapidly. Information can be so entered into a store that cumulative data on any particular topic is immediately available. Large amounts of information can be presented in simplified structure by automatic arrangement into graphic form. Different fields of information can be compared directly in combined displays and overlays. Time comparisons can similarly be made.

Time compression. Trends which may be too subtle for the analyst to note with the normal passage of time can be amplified by time-compression techniques to the threshold of recognition. Chronologically successive displays can be viewed in greatly accelerated time, and this process can be repeated (or reversed) at the analyst's desire. Such techniques can be programmed on a computer if the data stores are properly arranged. In addition to bringing out past trends, they might be useful in suggesting future trends, much like extrapolating a graph beyond its plotted positions.

Query languages. Not only have computers become more powerful and economically available in recent years, the methods of utilizing them have been greatly simplified. The recent advances in query languages make the computer accessible for immediate intercommunication with the operator, so that it serves him as a direct adjunct and tool. It is now possible, therefore, for an analyst to game a complicated problem in fragmentary data analysis in which many probabilistic variations have to be considered.

Communication fundamentals. The process of communication among people involves far more than the simple transfer of information. To be considered fully successful it must create a chain or network of understanding. The physical sciences have mastered the transfer of information. The behavioral sciences have not been so successful in the communication of understanding. This is a critical

handicap for the analyst seeking to establish meaning from fragmentary information. R&D studies in the behavioral sciences might answer questions like these: Would the establishment of common goals improve the quality of communication in the warning process? Would personal contact improve understanding among the people concerned? Would group activity among analysts (like "brain-storming") heighten their imagination and contribute to solutions?

If one were to attempt now to design an ADP system to assist the indications analyst, the following methodological avenues would have to be explored:

- Document search.
- Interrogation of intelligence analysts.
- Observation of current manual analytic processes.
- Experience with previous automatic systems.
- Research on types of indicators.
- Analysis of the intelligence infrastructure supporting the system.
- Manipulation of the ADP system under laboratory conditions.

Previous systems designers have confined their efforts almost exclusively to the first four methods, probably because these are generally straightforward and the least costly. Inadequate effort has been expended on indicator research and the infrastructure, virtually none on laboratory trials. As a result, there has been little more than an attempt to automate some part of what is already being done manually. The value of such an effort is highly questionable, given the inherent superiority of the human mind over machine capability in such areas as judgment, imagination, and inductive reasoning.

With reference to indicators, lengthy lists have been prepared by various intelligence organizations, some officially adopted by the USB. The individual indicators are identified as ominous events or conditions which it is assumed would occur prior to hostilities. But until recently very little effort was expended on developing lists of specific phenomena that particular collectors should look for as evidence that these ominous events or conditions are taking place. Thus what is needed is extensive research to list such indicators of the indicators, the assignment of individual items on such lists to appropriate collection activities, a reporting system designed for rapid communication and processing, and extensive collation of the results in the respective indications centers.

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IDH R&D

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The success or failure of any automated system is heavily dependent on the related intelligence infrastructure—coding systems, field formats, communications systems (including digital data links), interface between intelligence organizations, etc. Yet system designers working in the field of current intelligence have traditionally focused their attention on information within a particular intelligence organization treated in isolation. The result has been that, on the one hand, only a part of the data available on any given subject ever enters the system, and on the other hand, the effort required to convert into machinable form information available from other organizations swamps the personnel assigned to the task. Only by treating a given subject area, say Cuban ground forces order of battle, in its totality can an effective ADP system be developed for it.

All too little effort has been expended in attempting to analyze in depth the methods of analysis now utilized in current intelligence. It is unlikely that this can be done in the operational environment of an indications center because research and development cannot be permitted to interfere with its regular day-to-day work. What is needed, therefore, is a testing of analysis techniques using live information in a separate facility, as it were a laboratory, and comparison of the results with the regular product of the indications center. In this manner some of the areas which today are considered so difficult but which seem to offer great potential, such as cross correlation of different subject files (e.g., personnel movements with missile tests), can be explored in depth.

In summary, although the results of past efforts to improve processing capabilities in indications intelligence have been disappointing, the task is not impossible and general lines of approach can be drawn. It is believed that the present range of manual analysis can be extended significantly through these new approaches.

For Immediate Action

The task team selected five of its recommendations as in its view requiring immediate action. These are listed below. They are not in order of importance or urgency; the team believes they should all be adopted. They are not interdependent, however, and any one or any combination of them could stand alone.

The establishment of an R&D policy body to advise the Chairman, USIB. Without such a body there is nothing to which the

accomplishment of R&D projects in intelligence data handling can be related or addressed. Improvement of indications intelligence. Early expensive failures in this field have no doubt resulted in burnt fingers; but both techniques and equipment have since improved, and new efforts should be undertaken.

Heightened use of information services. This can be promoted by compiling and disseminating a report on all information services of use to IDH/R&D officers and how to use them. Then a survey of usage patterns should follow.

The establishment of criteria for evaluating data-handling systems. For this purpose two different types of systems now in use might be singled out for systematic experimentation and evaluation. In the past, IDH systems have been developed to meet recognized requirements but without benefit of authoritative criteria to insure that the requirement was fulfilled. It is anticipated that the development of such criteria will be costly in both people and resources, but the cost is justified in view of the extremely large amounts that have been spent on unsuccessful developments.

The establishment of a feedback mechanism from consumers of intelligence to producers and IDH/R&D personnel. No mechanism exists to measure and make known the results of good or bad usage of existing data-handling capabilities in the production of finished intelligence. Results are written up and utilized by USIB with very little if any follow-up to assess why an estimate proved to be incomplete or in error. An informal review group is recommended which would determine whether or not the IDH capabilities were adequately exploited and all the available data properly used. This would encourage producers of finished intelligence to work more closely with IDH/R&D personnel. An initial analysis to determine feasible feedback techniques would require about one year.

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Gambler against the Russian revolutionaries and wartime double agent with the Germans.

OKHRANA AGENT DOLIN¹

Rita T. Kronenbitter

The provincial branch chiefs of the imperial Okhrana were not required in 1904 to report to St. Petersburg the names and assignments of their informants and secret agents. Only in very exceptional cases did they seek headquarters' advice about some outstanding agent. One such case was that of Ventsion Moiseev-Moshkov Dolin (pronounced *Dallin*). Young Dolin, who had a four years' record of good work as agent and informer but had been on ice for several months, came one day in June that year to his former case officer wanting to be put in prison. What he really wanted, of course, was reemployment; a duly advertised arrest was the almost standard procedure for building cover. The case officer, Captain Shultz, newly appointed chief of the Okhrana branch in Ekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk), was undecided whether to comply.

Dolin had started as an informer in 1900 while going to school in Zhitomir, west of Kiev. He had worked there for a Colonel Potocki for two years. Potocki had recommended him to Shultz as intelligent and experienced in maintaining effective contacts among the underground leaders of the Jewish Bund, citing a whole series of subversive acts he had been able to prevent thanks to Dolin's timely information. Shultz had soon found for himself how good a man he was, raised his status to that of secret—penetration—agent, and paid him 100 rubles a month, more than any other agent in the area.

Dolin had one serious defect, however, which had been the reason for his dismissal and was why Captain Shultz now consulted headquarters about rehiring him: he was a passionate and incorrigible gambler. Although Shultz had previously warned him that he would have to live modestly and give up gambling, another agent had

¹ This case history is reconstructed principally from files of the Tsarist agency's Paris field station, which the Hoover Institution has now opened to the public. For earlier papers by the author from this source see *Studies* IX 2 and 3, "The Okhrana's Female Agents," Parts I and II.

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reported watching Bundist agitator Dolin—neither knew the other was an agent—lose heavily at dice at the town club and hearing his comrades speculate about where he got his money. This was just after several subversives close to Dolin had been arrested and people were wondering who betrayed them. So Captain Shultz had felt obliged to dismiss him. He told him to break off with the Bund and go back home to Ostropol, over by Rovno, where his father had a small business.

Applying now for reemployment, Dolin presented his own plan for his future activity. Having had no contact with the Bund for several months, he would formally join the Anarcho-Communists this time; he had already made a number of friends among them. He proposed that after being arrested he should be sent back to Zhitomir for trial and imprisonment so as to make his defiance of the police better known and admired among the subversives. Shultz passed this buck to headquarters, received a go-ahead, worked out the details with Dolin, and proceeded as planned. The agent was taken to Zhitomir and sentenced for certain political offenses someone else had committed.

Counter-terror in the Ukraine

Upon release from prison, Dolin was promptly welcomed into the terrorist underground. He moved back to Ekaterinoslav, which had become an Anarcho-Communist center and transit point for the terrorists. There a series of conspiracies for assassinations and sabotage were nipped short of the point of action as he succeeded in learning of the plans and reporting the movements of underground personnel. Early in 1908 the Okhrana provincial branches were alerted by headquarters against a Jewess named Taratuta, who had taken part in several killings of high officials. Dolin told his case officer, now a Captain Prutensky, that he could finger her for arrest, but it should be worth a bonus of 500 rubles. Headquarters readily approved Prutensky's borrowing the money for this purpose, and Dolin signed a receipt for it in his code name, *Lenin*. Taking extreme care to make it look like a lucky accident, Prutensky bagged Taratuta along with several other conspirators. Dolin himself was among the group, but there seemed to be no evidence to incriminate him this time.

To take off him any possible heat generated by his release, however, Captain Prutensky in August sent Dolin on an exploratory trip to Paris. He knew that the revolutionaries in his Ekaterinoslav area

were receiving funds, arms, and guidance from their comrades in France, and he wanted to look into the workings of this supply and communications line. In Paris, Dolin characteristically wired for money: for 400 rubles he could produce the mailing list of the *Burevestnik*, underground publication of the Anarcho-Communists. Prutensky, always short of cash, consulted headquarters and was told it had no interest in a list of Anarcho-Communists abroad but he should offer 200 rubles for the list of those in Russia.

Dolin arrived back in Ekaterinoslav early in September, bringing the mailing list. With its help he was able to spot for his case officer the location of two *Burevestnik* printshops in Russia, several caches of propaganda materials and hidden arms depots, and a detailed plan for the transport of activists and literature into the country. So comprehensive was this information that Prutensky wired for the Police Director's approval for him to bring Dolin to St. Petersburg to discuss it. It affected Okhrana branches all over the Empire, and he realized that such a productive agent should be reporting to headquarters, not his provincial branch at Ekaterinoslav. Headquarters, he suggested, should give Dolin a permanent assignment abroad as a penetration agent.

It happened that the Paris station needed a replacement for its penetration agent among the Anarcho-Communists, a man named Tetelbaum, code name *Yost*, who just a few months earlier had been exposed and killed. Klimovich, the Police Director, was agreeable to Dolin's transfer but wired Prutensky that it should be cleared with station chief Arkady Harting at rue de Grenelle 79, Paris, and gave instructions for secure communication direct with him. The transfer was thus agreed upon, with the provision that Prutensky could retain Dolin in Ekaterinoslav until the end of September for a special job.

Bad Rubles for Good

This job was to locate 8,000 rubles which a combat unit of the Anarcho-Communists had recently "expropriated" from the local state treasury. Dolin learned that the loot had been smuggled to Geneva, and Captain Prutensky promptly sent him there, wiring Harting in Paris in order at the same time to effect the agent's transfer. Harting expressed his delight at having *Lenin* and dispatched his case officer Captain Andreev to Geneva.

Dolin, established in the Geneva group of Anarcho-Communists, attended an underground gathering where they discussed the use of

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the 8,000 rubles. 3,000 of the total was to be allocated back to the Odessa underground to cover the expenses of an operation up the Dniester in Khotin. The plan of this operation was to smuggle in a pile of counterfeit money, 49,000 rubles, and exchange it for genuine banknotes from the state treasury in Khotin with the help of the chief accountant there. As usual in selecting operatives for such risky tasks, the conspirators cast dice, and Dolin won.

He reported the assignment to Captain Andreev, explaining that he could not possibly turn it down. He was to leave on 17 November for Kolomiya in Austrian Galicia, on the border only some 100 kilometers from Khotin. There an elderly woman named Steora Ivanchuk at 90 Starogoncharska had the 49,000 counterfeit rubles in safekeeping. From Kolomiya he was to proceed to Odessa, arriving 21 November, to coordinate with the local underground. There, Captain Andreev now instructed him, he should also contact a Lt. Col. Levdikov, responsible for Okhrana activities in Khotin. Upon receiving the spurious money he would note the serial numbers and report. Case officer and agent discussed the job in minute detail, and Paris spelled out all their arrangements in wires to St. Petersburg.

The operation turned out a complete success for the Okhrana. Chief accountant Malaidach and Anarchist Dudnichko were caught red-handed, ostensibly quite by accident and without a trace of suspicion falling on Dolin, who returned to Geneva on 20 December. Captain Andreev debriefed him there and wired to headquarters the following account:

Arriving in Khotin from Odessa, Lenin contacted through local Anarcho-Communists the accountant of the state treasury and gave him 3,000 rubles of the money taken in the robbery of the Ekaterinoslav state treasury. The accountant agreed to take 16,000 in counterfeit bills in exchange for genuine money. Lenin then returned to Kolomiya in Austria to pick up the 16,000. He came back and delivered the counterfeit notes to a go-between for the accountant, who was promptly taken under surveillance by the agents of the Odessa Branch. Lenin also gave to Lt. Colonel Levdikov a complete list of the Anarcho-Communist group in Khotin. Nine were arrested and much illegal literature confiscated. Lenin returned to Geneva. He was given a reward of 400 rubles.

A year later, in November of 1909, Dolin asked for assignment to Odessa, saying he didn't get along with the Anarcho-Communists in Paris. By the middle of the month the Odessa Okhrana had enough information from *Aleksandrov* (his new code name) to arrest the entire Anarcho-Communist underground there. To play safe,

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however, they included him among the arrested. Dolin himself maintained that he was not under suspicion in connection with these arrests, that the terrorists were convinced another person was the traitor; but he acceded to his case officer's insistence. The case officer promised that at a convenient spot he would be given an opportunity to escape, along with several other prisoners.

The branch chief overruled this plan. An easy escape, even in a group with others, might cause suspicion. Dolin had become too valuable to expose to unnecessary danger. It would be safer to send him with the rest into banishment. On 21 January 1910 he was thus shipped with other exiles to Archangelsk. Soon thereafter he received 500 rubles and a passport in the name of Gregory Solomonovich Gleichberg. At the end of May he "escaped" to St. Petersburg; a month later he reported in at Odessa. He paid a short visit to his parents, now nearby in Kherson.

Third Start

In July Dolin's case officer supplied him with a passport in the name of Heim Yankel Eisenberg, issued by the Odessa municipal government, and he made an "illegal escape" abroad. He went to Paris, where A. A. Krassilnikov was now in charge and a Colonel Erhardt became Dolin's case officer. He was given the code name *Sharl* (Charles) and placed in Switzerland. Within two months he asked for 2,000 francs, saying he needed it to pay his debts. Erhardt supported the request in a wire to headquarters: "I saw Sharl and he made a very good impression. He is genuine and conscientious. As a penetration among the Anarcho-Communists he is very close to Muzil, Muzil's wife, and others. I value him greatly and recommend approval."

Dolin's salary in Switzerland was 650 francs a month, plus expenses for trips to Paris and London to visit the Anarcho-Communist groups there. Although his operations during this prewar period never included such risky assignments as those in Russia before 1910, the value of his work was never questioned. In one instance he played a curious role in fixing the blame for some arrests he himself had arranged upon the Anarcho-Communists' own chief underground operator.

This was the case of the above-named Muzil, whose life career was that of a terrorist for the Anarcho-Communists. A Czech, at the turn of the century he had organized various bands in the Balkan

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countries in support of the Russian revolutionaries. Then he had worked in Galicia and the Prussian parts of Poland as an organizer of border crossings. By 1911 he had moved to London and become a member of the committee of the Anarcho-Communists there. Despite his great services in the past, he came under suspicion as a traitor when it was pointed out that his arrival from Galicia had coincided with the arrest of a whole net of conspirators entering Russia from that province.

The revolutionaries' counterintelligence service in Paris, run by the sometimes overzealous Burtzev, produced information which incriminated Muzil further, so the Anarcho-Communists were obliged to subject him to interrogation and judgment before a secret tribunal. Dolin had by then gained the confidence of the comrades to such a degree that they entrusted him with the investigation and membership on the tribunal. He succeeded in confirming Burtzev's charges and branding Muzil an agent of the Okhrana, thus eliminating him—although vindicated after the revolution as a faithful terrorist—from further conspiratorial work.

Dolin remained in London as one of the leading Anarcho-Communists until 1914, making occasional trips to Switzerland and reporting regularly on the revolutionaries' projects. When the war broke out he wanted to return to Russia, but a sudden opportunity to join the German service as a double agent for the Okhrana launched him on a new career, hitherto little known though one of the Okhrana's most dramatic. The revolutionary writers who have traced his work as a penetration agent among their ranks break off in 1914, purposely omitting his contribution to the Russian national war effort against Germany. His extraordinary achievements in misleading the German service, exposing it, and doing it material damage did not fit into their portrayal of him as a traitor. They only note in conclusion that he committed suicide in Russia when the Communists took over. And that, Valerian Agafonov declares in his book, was too good an end for him.

Bid from Byzantium

The beginnings of Dolin's new venture show up in a number of priority cables exchanged at the end of September 1914 between station chief Krassilnikov in Paris and headquarters. Dolin had attended an underground meeting of the Anarcho-Communists in Switzerland, and afterwards a visiting revolutionary comrade from

Constantinople had introduced himself to him. His name was Bernstein, he said, and he was fully informed of Dolin's great revolutionary merits; a brother in Milan had told him where to find him.

Bernstein had been commissioned by the Turkish government, he said, to recruit a team of revolutionaries to go to Russia and commit three acts of sabotage there. The Turks would pay big money and provide all the required equipment. Targets would be two strategic bridges in central Russia and one in Siberia. Technical details, including the pinpointing of the targets, were to be worked out in Constantinople. There would be a liberal advance allowance, and a 50,000-franc reward would be deposited in a bank. If Dolin was willing to undertake the job, he could select one or two other revolutionaries to go with him to Constantinople to organize the expedition.

Dolin responded favorably with a studied mixture of enthusiasm and caution. He agreed to look for a partner, preferably not Jewish but a fully trusted Russian. Then he reported to Colonel Erhardt, who rushed with the story to chief Krassilnikov. A venture like this had to be approved at headquarters, if only because the Okhrana was supposed to confine itself to work against the revolutionaries. Should Dolin see Bernstein again or not? Should he explore the possibilities of a double-agent operation? Should he go to Constantinople and thence to Russia? Who should be designated to go with him?

The director's reply favored the operation. Dolin should continue the talks and agree to go to Turkey and then Russia. No agent working among the revolutionaries should be made a member of the sabotage team; Dolin's aide should be a staff officer. The two should travel separately to Constantinople, never recognizing each other in public and taking utmost care against possible Turkish surveillance. Their correspondence back should be in secret inks agreed on in advance and signed with female names. If the time and location for entering Russia could not be reported in advance, Dolin should upon arrival wire Vassiliev at 40 Nadezhdinskaia, so that secure contacts could be arranged and the movement of the team watched. Krassilnikov should keep headquarters informed in detail on the operation, including membership of the sabotage team. Could Dolin pick whom he wanted or would the decision be made in Constantinople?

Krassilnikov designated Colonel Erhardt to pose as Dolin's assistant. Erhardt insisted on changing the location for further talks with

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Bernstein from Venice, the rendezvous agreed upon, to Rome. It was 4 November before the three met there. Dolin introduced Erhardt as "Tovarishch Mikhail, our chief organizer," and asked Bernstein to repeat his whole proposition to him. Bernstein revealed his disappointment that after this long wait Dolin had not brought the rest of the team so they could all proceed to Constantinople without delay. On the other hand, he was evidently glad for the chance to discuss with a top revolutionary leader further sabotage possibilities that he could propose to his bosses in Constantinople. He thus showed himself to be more than just a spotter and recruiter; in the four days of meetings that followed, he developed all sorts of ideas on likely sabotage targets. He also showed whom he was working for.

The German Hand

Colonel Erhardt had never believed that Bernstein's backers were the Turks, but he did not ask any direct questions. The story came out piecemeal. Bernstein was a civilian supplier for the German military in Constantinople and had much business in the embassy. One of the officials there had asked him to get in touch with the Russian revolutionaries to arrange the blowing up of the bridges on the Volga at Syzrani, on the Yenissei near Krasnoyarsk, and on the railroad line circling Lake Baikal, 50,000 francs to be paid upon completion of the three jobs. That was why he was here. Although he had kept moving while waiting in Italy—as a subject of Turkey, he did not want to attract the attention of the local police—he was nevertheless in steady communication with the German who sent him, and this man was getting impatient.

In the course of the talks Colonel Erhardt let it be seen that he was the one in charge but Dolin was the man to lead the sabotage team. "Why did you say at first that the Turks were behind this proposal? I would like to hear your explanation," the colonel challenged Bernstein. "As an organizer and planner for the revolutionaries, I insist on utmost frankness. We must know where we stand and whose support we can count on." Bernstein explained that he had to mask the offer until he was sure it would be accepted. Now he would be completely frank. The next thing for the three of them to do was to go to Constantinople.

Colonel Erhardt declined to go; his past revolutionary activities had so compromised him in the Balkans, he said, that his mere appearance there would endanger the project. Moreover, he needed to go

to London to get comrades not only for the three bridge jobs but for the other operations Bernstein's sponsor was anxious to undertake. He had already alerted four persons in London to wait for his personal instructions. As soon as he got there he would send an assistant to Italy to join Dolin for the trip to Constantinople and would also organize a separate sabotage team to be sent to Russia by the northern route; upon arrival in the Empire that team could coordinate its activity with Dolin and his comrade entering direct from Turkey. Thus Bernstein was consoled for the delay by the prospect of an additional sabotage expedition from London.

Before the Rome talks were over the planning was suddenly complicated by Turkey's entering the war on the German side. This would make it impossible to ship the sabotage explosives in from Turkey as planned. Erhardt assured Bernstein that they need not worry about this. The explosives could be procured in Russia; the organized workers at the Yuzovka ammunition plant could be depended upon to provide whatever materials and technicians were needed. On the other hand, it would now be extremely unwise for the Russians to go to Constantinople. The talks with the German boss should therefore be held on neutral soil, say in Salonika.

Bernstein objected that the German official was such an important person that his traveling to Salonika would draw too much attention. He said he had already wired the German embassy to send to the consul at Salonika four German and Turkish passports for the Russians. There should be no problem in visiting Constantinople, he insisted, for the Germans had become the real bosses in Turkey. They left this point open but agreed on immediate moves: Bernstein would go to Brindisi to buy three steamship tickets for Salonika; Dolin would wait in Rome for the arrival of his assistant and the two would join Bernstein in Brindisi; Erhardt would proceed to London to organize the other sabotage team. Bernstein promised to send two thousand pounds for the expenses of this team. Its targets would be three arms plants, the most important of which was one at Bryansk operated by French capital. Awards for these sabotage acts would be decided upon between Dolin and the German.

For his expenses on the return trip to London Bernstein gave Colonel Erhardt 300 francs. Submitting his progress report to Kras-silnikov in Paris, the colonel attached the banknotes with the comment that he considered them Okhrana property. The large amounts that Dolin was later to get from the Germans would similarly revert to

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the Paris station, even when for the sake of cover Dolin had to make deposits in his name.

Mission Accomplished

From this point on, action on the part of the Okhrana was rapid. Before returning to Paris to report to Krassilnikov, Colonel Erhardt stopped in Genoa and briefed the case officer, Lt. Colonel Anton Litvin, whom Krassilnikov had dispatched to join Dolin. In Paris he sent a wire to Salonika for delivery to Litvin and Dolin upon arrival saying they should under no circumstances agree to go to Constantinople; the Turks could arrest the conspirators as Russian subjects. Bernstein must persuade the German officer to come to Greece, or the deal would be called off.

Erhardt sent another wire to headquarters asking for operational support: Dolin needed an address in Russia for correspondence with Bernstein; he needed documents that would enable him to move freely in any part of the Empire; around the end of December a newspaper in the capital should carry an item about the criminal sabotage of a railroad bridge without specifying the location. "Since the German embassy in Turkey appears extremely anxious to conceal its initiation and funding of the operations," he wrote, "it would be desirable to have a subsequent news item report that two criminals had been arrested but others could not be found." As in other communications with headquarters, he begged in this one for the utmost in security precautions. Dolin's "movements must be watched at all times and contacts with him maintained in complete clandestinity. This good man has given more than ten years of excellent service with extraordinary achievement. To protect him from exposure must be our heavy personal responsibility."

Litvin arrived in Rome on 9 November and was introduced to Bernstein as Tovarishch Anatoly, operational assistant of Tovarishch Mikhail (Erhardt) and an experienced revolutionary terrorist. The three boarded ship in Brindisi separately and had no open contact with one another on the way. In Salonika, they had no difficulty persuading the German sponsor that they could not go to Constantinople; he agreed to meet them in still neutral Rumania.

The briefing in Bucharest took only two days. Dolin and his partner, it was arranged, would enter Russia from Rumania. The German furnished them passports, Dolin's in the name of René Ralph and Litvin's as Anatoly Linden. He gave them money for travel,

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supplies, and the pay of revolutionary helpers. To Dolin he gave another ten thousand francs to send to "Tovarishch Mikhail" for the northern team. Dolin was to be the sole channel for communication with Bernstein about both teams' operations, and the German control and direction would likewise all be channeled through Bernstein.

The Okhrana control was, naturally, more complex. Headquarters designated one of its top officials, code name *Orlov*, to run the operation in Russia and coordinate with the elements abroad—Krassilnikov in Bordeaux (where the field station had moved on account of the German threat to Paris), Colonel Erhardt with code name *Shpeer* for this operation, the notional group of revolutionary saboteurs in London, and of course Bernstein in Constantinople as the recipient of Dolin's communications. It was *Orlov*, then, that arranged for real but harmless acts of sabotage, saw to it that vague and exaggerated reports of them appeared in the press, and made sure they were leaked to foreign newspapers. Several Paris papers carried short items about dastardly bombings of installations in Russia, complete with dates and worded to suggest truly serious damage.

Emptor Cavet

The German service seemed convinced and gratified by the accomplishments of the sabotage teams in Russia. But when Dolin came back out in March, ostensibly with Litvin (who actually had not stayed in Russia at all), they were instructed through Bernstein to go to Bern to see the German military attaché, Colonel von Bismarck. This officer met with them twice, hearing full reports on how they had sabotaged two bridges and planted a bomb in the Okhta armament factory; and as they were telling him about this last act, he interrupted them angrily:

"That Okhta incident was not sabotage. It was not an explosion intended to do any damage. You are both liars."

When the two protested, Bismarck revealed he had another source of information in Russia who had reported that the Okhta explosion was clearly staged so as to cause no damage to life or property. But Dolin and Litvin stuck to their story, so the attaché promised he would consult his home office for further explanation and a decision on whether to continue the operation. He said he would send for them when he had an answer from Berlin.

Several weeks went by with no word from Bismarck. When Dolin and Litvin then insisted on seeing him again anyway, he said that

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since there had been no reply from Berlin he had no choice but to dismiss them. Again he accused them of not being genuinely interested in the work but only wanting to make some dishonest money. When Litvin realized that the German had no suspicion of their double game but only of mercenary rascality, he swelled with feigned anger and disgust, exploding: "You can keep your money; we want no part of it! You can't buy our services. We are revolutionaries! We aren't here to help you or get your pay. What we want is to strike against the tyranny in our country!" Dolin seconded the short speech with convincing vigor.

This act so impressed Colonel von Bismarck that his attitude immediately changed to one of apology. He told them he would send another wire to Berlin at once. In a few days, on 12 June 1915, he invited them to his villa and told them his headquarters had approved resuming the operation. He introduced them to a man he called Franklin A. Giacomini who would thenceforth work with them. Giacomini claimed to be an American citizen who was in sympathy with the German war effort; that was why the German government had asked him to deal with them.

Litvin, as he later reported to headquarters, quickly saw through this purported American. What would an American be doing in the villa of the German military attaché? The man's posture, walk, and general manner showed he must be another German officer.

The three now held a series of meetings without Bismarck. Giacomini said he was going to Petrograd—as an American citizen, he could—and was anxious to meet the revolutionary employee of the Okhta plant who had taken part in sabotaging it. Dolin and Litvin, realizing at once that the object was to check up on their story, said they did not know the man but were sure his name could be obtained from a Dr. Naum Borisovich Liakhovsky at 35 Nevsky, who was an expert in explosives and a trusted revolutionary. Begging Giacomini to be careful not to give the doctor away, they said he could give him their names as "Rekord" and "Ralph" and certify to their concurrence in the inquiry into the factory job.

To the second meeting, on 14 June, Giacomini brought a check for 10,000 francs against the Reichsbank account in the Swiss Federal Bank. He told Dolin to be careful with this money; it was for expenses in several forthcoming operations. One of these was to explode a bomb in the residence of Russian Minister Sazonov; another bomb was to be planted in the Putilov ammunition works; and several

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were to be set off in coal mines in the Donets basin. Giacomini asked Dolin to prepare a list of strategic locations where he would recommend other acts of sabotage.

At the last meeting before Giacomini's departure, Dolin and Litvin briefed him on procedure and passwords for making contact with Dr. Liakhovsky. Litvin himself would go to Petrograd and would be staying at the Severnaia Hotel in case he was needed. After the meeting Litvin wired headquarters Giacomini's personal description, his expected arrival date of 28 or 29 June, and the information that he was as familiar as a native with Petrograd. The Dr. Liakhovsky he would contact was of course an Okhrana agent, but not knowing how far the Okhrana directorate would want to carry the game with him, Litvin requested that an agent be placed in the Okhta plant to pose as the revolutionary who had helped sabotage it.

More Dastardly Bombs

Dolin deposited the check for projected operations in the Russian Asian Bank in Zurich and left for Paris. Here it was agreed that he would join Litvin in London and accompany him back to Russia. Then headquarters, oddly, objected to his going back in on the German assignments. Wires were bounded back and forth, Krassilnikov insisting he must go lest he be blown to the Germans, and also to the revolutionaries through Bernstein. In the end he was in Petrograd again by the middle of July.

Dolin's job was quite simple this time. He only had to brief a headquarters case officer on everything the Germans had instructed him to do and let the Okhrana stage the explosions or otherwise simulate the sabotage. A bomb exploded in the mansion of Minister Sazonov, just as the Germans had prescribed. It was no dud, but it was used in such a way as to cause minimal damage to the property. In sequel, the Okhrana directorate cabled to the chief in Paris:

Find ways in the French press, without revealing source, to publish the following note: "A large bomb exploded in the mansion of one of the chiefs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One servant received wounds and a section of the mansion is in ruins. The perpetrator escaped."

Put varied versions of this item in different newspapers.

A similar cable eight days later gave the text for a news item about a bomb explosion in one of the major mines of the Donets coal basin. It said the damage would stop production for a considerable length of time, that several people had been arrested, and that the

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authorities were conducting a thorough investigation. Another dated 8 August requested a story in the French press of how an armed man simulating insanity broke into the Bureau of Foreign Affairs intending to kill the Minister. Only the Deputy, Neratov, was present, and employees overpowered and disarmed the assassin. Investigation proved that a group of conspirators was behind the attempt. Paris Okhrana was not to discuss this with the ambassador; it was a planned incident essential in *Sharl's* operation.

Publicity for acts of sabotage and attempted assassinations stretched on through several months of 1915. Each simulated incident had to be realistic enough to convince any German observer on the spot. But Franklin Giacomini was not available for verification in depth. After he had contacted Dr. Liakhovsky and been left at liberty long enough to report to the German service his verification of Dolin's story, he disappeared. He was probably last seen with a group of "revolutionaries," friends of the man in the Okhta plant who had helped Dolin sabotage it.

The Germans now no longer doubted that Dolin was their man. His reputation as an extraordinarily successful German agent in Russia grew with each press report of sabotage; through him they controlled these teams of saboteurs inspired by revolutionary purposes. It was an important and costly enough operation that Colonel von Bismarck took charge of it personally, receiving and briefing Dolin on each of his visits from Russia to Bern. Up through February 1916 the military attaché kept giving him the bank drafts that duly found their way to Paris Okhrana.

Switch to Psywar

At one of their meetings, about the first of March 1916, Colonel von Bismarck sounded out Dolin about undertaking the promotion of German-directed psychological warfare in Russia. The various underground cells among factory workers and in urban neighborhoods which Dolin had described as his instruments for carrying out sabotage could perhaps now be even more useful in spreading defeatist propaganda. Dolin cautiously admitted there might be possibilities for mounting a far-flung campaign, at first strictly underground, then more open, with the major theme of ending the war with Germany and overthrowing Tzarism. Avoiding any untoward display of his own interest, he obliquely led Bismarck to see immense potential in

a well-directed propaganda program. Bismarck then asked him whether he would undertake the job.

Dolin said he would have to study the offer. His whole career, he said, had been with the Russian underground's campaign of terror and sabotage; he had no experience in agitation and propaganda. The colonel would have to give him guidance. It would be helpful to know what psychological efforts had already been made and how effective they were judged to be. He was sure that all the underground cells he had contacts with would be anxious to cooperate, but they would have to be coordinated with any other existing assets and channels for pro-German propaganda in Russia. He would need a comprehensive view of the whole psywar plan.

During the rest of March and early April Bismarck personally undertook to prepare Dolin for his new job as director of the German propaganda program in Russia. In his briefings Dolin learned about a number of German operations hitherto unknown to the Russian services. Early in May he went to Russia to get the project going. As the dispatches reveal, he was again under constant Okhrana observation and given guidance and covert support for the purpose of convincing the Germans that he and his comrades in the underground cells were assiduously waging psychological warfare for them. This was another costly operation for the Germans, who regularly deposited funds in the Swiss banks to pay the purported warriors.

Came the Revolution

Dolin's case officer Colonel Erhardt had died in a Bordeaux hospital in May 1915, and his substitute case officer and partner in notional sabotage operations Litvin had been assigned to England to handle a group of agents engaged in wartime counterespionage. Station chief Krassilnikov had thus for some time now acted as Dolin's case officer. They frequently met, in various places in Paris, before and after the meetings with Bismarck. Their last encounter was in January 1917, when Dolin left for Russia on his final German assignment. He was about to lose his greatest gamble. The Okhrana files contain no further record of him.

Agafonov, in mentioning Dolin's suicide, does not say just when it occurred. It is known that the investigative commission sent by the provisional government to Paris in June 1917 made an intense search of the records of his double-agent role. Petrograd specifically requested this in February 1918 and was sent a report of the findings on

the eve of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. It is conceivable that such a report could have been of use to the Bolshevik delegation discussing the armistice terms.

One striking aspect of this double-agent operation was the extreme confidence the Germans placed in Dolin. In the spring of 1915, when Dolin and Litvin were charged by Bismarck with deception, they took particular care to check whether they were being followed or investigated. They were never able to detect a thing. And so through 1915 and 1916, making his Okhrana contacts in Switzerland, Paris, or London, Dolin kept on guard but could find no hint of any effort to check up on him. The Germans apparently entertained no suspicion whatever after the Bismarck challenge and only learned at Brest Litovsk that their Dolin was not theirs.

The Okhrana stated its rationale for running Dolin as a double agent in the initial communications after the Germans offered to recruit him. The same reasoning was repeated in the dispatches reporting Bismarck's proposals for psychological warfare. The Germans, the argument went, would run or try to run sabotage operations and propaganda activities with or without Dolin. Consequently it would pay to let them engage Dolin and his notional underground cells, and do everything possible to convince them that he was performing efficiently. Happy with his success, they would put less effort into other such missions. The double operation would also give the Okhrana regular information on the enemy's intentions, methods, and program. It could at the same time help uncover any other German operations.

All these arguments were fully vindicated in the course of the operation, and Dolin's commendations from his chiefs at home and abroad were well deserved.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

World War II

NONE SO BLIND. By *Ian Colvin*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1965. 360 pp. \$5.95.)

Ian Colvin is best known to intelligence readers as the author of the standard work on Admiral Canaris' secret anti-Hitler activities.¹ Here he reconstructs in detail the woolly deliberations of the British makers of foreign policy from 1933, when Hitler came to power, to 1939, when the German pact with the Soviet Union and invasion of Poland began the war. The book is a sort of monument to Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs until he was shunted aside as Chief Diplomatic Advisor in 1938—in order, as it were, to clear the road for Chamberlain to Munich—whom the author sees as the one clear-eyed and steady-handed man in the government and whose papers are his most extensive new source for this account.

Because it is to this Permanent Under-Secretary that the British intelligence service reports, because Vansittart had his own sources, beyond those of the secret service and the diplomatic missions, in Germany, and because Colvin, who spent those years as a correspondent in Berlin, also played unofficial case officer to a number of anti-Hitler Germans, we are told a good deal about the information and estimates upon which the British policy decisions were based. There were, for example, estimates of German aircraft numbers and rate of production for which the sources varied from a still unknown Vansittart informant in Goering's Air Ministry to Charles Lindbergh. There was a regular flow of information on the intentions of the anti-Hitler Germans. (But would the generals really have moved against Hitler in September 1938, as Colvin implies, if they hadn't learned just in time that Chamberlain was flying in?) For Hitler's evidently inevitable move against Poland, "We have in the course of the last six months had so many dates given to us that one is naturally scepti-

¹ *Master Spy* (New York, 1951).

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cal . . .," wrote Foreign Secretary Halifax to Chamberlain a few days before the end.

The intelligence-minded author also points out how the Russians got prompt photostats of the secret 1936 German-Japanese pact and how for at least three of these years there was a Cicero-type leak from the British embassy in Rome. Two things one suspects he makes too much of—Foreign Secretary Eden's suppression of a paper Vansittart wanted to circulate to the Cabinet based on a report from resistance leader Karl Goerdeler (it prophesied German economic bankruptcy), and the influence exercised by an oral report which Colvin himself made to part of the inner Cabinet just before the British guarantee was given to Poland (he got the impression they were hearing for the first time intelligence they should have had long since).

References to these kinds of intelligence, though persistent, are not central to the story. What is central is the estimate a policy maker forms, almost subconsciously, of what makes his adversary tick. After the British leaders stopped—finally, in summer 1938—referring to "extremists now carrying Hitler with them," having realized that it was Hitler himself who made Nazi Germany tick (Canaris' emissary Kleist-Schmenzin apparently convinced them of this), the remaining question was how to manage Hitler. Did he fly into such rages because he was essentially unstable and likely to go to extremes if irritated? Or could it be precisely because he found doing it effective? The prevailing attitude in the government, wishfully perhaps, favored the first alternative and its corollary of inaction; and as late as the following spring, on the eve of the Nazi march on Prague, Ambassador Nevile Henderson reported from Berlin the crescendo of propaganda about Czech "terror" against the Slovaks and gave the typical advice, "But I doubt whether Hitler has taken any decision and I consider it therefore highly desirable that nothing should be said . . . which will excite him to precipitate action."

Somewhat biased by the author's affection for his fruitlessly staunch hero and necessarily fragmentary until the official British archives have been opened up, this absorbing history is nevertheless of particular interest to intelligence officers who have wrestled with practical inadequacies in the relationship between intelligence estimates and policy decisions.

Anthony Quibble

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BAKER STREET IRREGULAR. By *Bickham Sweet-Escott*. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1965. 278 pp. 35/—.)

This is a personal account of Sweet-Escott's experiences in the British Special Operations Executive from the spring of 1940 until after the Japanese surrender in 1945. SOE, the British predecessor and counterpart of OSS's Special Operations Division, known as SO, was primarily a covert action rather than an intelligence outfit. There are, however, some interesting intelligence aspects of the SOE work just as there were of SO's.

There are several stories of wireless operators doubled by the Germans, some of which have been in print before, and there were obvious intelligence implications in a number of operations like the negotiations for Romanian defection from German control and SOE's later activities in Burma and Thailand. At one point the author notes that he was given access to material produced by the OSS R&A Branch and was so impressed by it as to declare that SOE would have wasted less time and made fools of themselves less often if they had had a British Research and Analysis department or if the OSS product had been freely available to them.

On the whole, however, the book is a rather rambling account of attempts to organize operations, frustrations in planning and mounting them, and bureaucratic in-fighting, particularly between SOE and some of the intelligence units. One of the author's aims is to counter the postwar publicity for SOE as a group of cranks, evaders of military service, and doubtful security risks; and this is probably one reason he names a great many of his associates and gives something of their backgrounds. Parts of the biographical treatment are interesting, but it tends to bog the reader down in personalities.

Of American readers, the book will be of interest mainly to those who either worked with SOE or went through parallel experiences in OSS. In this connection, Sweet-Escott observes on the basis of his service as official liaison officer to OSS in Washington that OSS showed little disposition to learn from the experiences of SOE.

Lawrence R. Houston

NO BANNERS, NO BANDS. By *Robert Hayden Alcorn*. (New York: David McKay. 1965. 275 pp. \$4.50.)

Although Robert Alcorn keeps insisting that "the real-life operation of the secret agent" is devoid of glamor and "as unlike the cinema and

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fiction versions offered the public as one could possibly imagine," he himself offers the public concoctions of a sort that even Hollywood has outgrown since the *Perils of Pauline*. These further "Tales of the OSS" are still more jam-packed with suspense, adventure, sex, and sadism than those he first peddled in *No Bugles*.² (Let's brace ourselves against a presumably forthcoming *No Booms*.) Perhaps he is just compensating for his rather humdrum and ascetic war service as an OSS finance officer. Perhaps he has so often, in his mellowing years, spun these yarns before an admiring younger generation that he really believes what he solemnly avers, that they are all true. Perhaps he has never got over the wartime operational habit of swearing to the authenticity of counterfeit coinage. In any case, whatever kernel of fact may have given rise to these tales is now so lost in imaginative overgrowth as to be undiscoverable.

Inquirer

² . . . for *Spies* (New York: David McKay, 1962), reviewed in *Studies VIII* 1, p. A17.

Contemporary Notes

THE MISSILE CRISIS. By *Elie Abel*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. 1966. 220 pp. \$4.95.)

Much has been written *about* the Cuban missile crisis, but for a period in which so much history was compressed, a remarkably small amount of first-hand, contemporary documents were generated in its course. Considering the volume of official writing normally produced on military and foreign policy problems of considerably less interest and import, the formal record of this crisis is sparse—a result of shortness of time, tight security practices, and the informal Kennedy style. In these circumstances, probably the most important sources of information are the memories of the handful of Kennedy lieutenants who formed the Executive Committee, the famous "Excom." Elie Abel, now chief of the NBC bureau in London and long a reporter for the *New York Times*, has written a short and intensely interesting account, chronologically arranged, of the day-to-day deliberations and decisions that went into shaping the U.S. side of the great confrontation of 1962. He obviously gained access to some of the critical documents, but what is more valuable, he had fruitful talks with living participants while their memories were reasonably fresh.

Abel's emphasis is more on the making of policy than on problems of intelligence. This, of course, is faithful to the nature of the crisis itself; once intelligence had discovered the central fact of missiles in Cuba, the main story thereafter was the interaction of U.S. and Soviet policy—with intelligence serving mostly to keep a current account of how Soviet activities on the ground and at sea reflected Soviet policy and intentions. But intelligence is not overlooked—particularly the prescience of John McCone in August and the community's efficient performance in nailing down the hard evidence in mid-October. Our failure to foresee the Soviet move long in advance comes in for criticism, on the whole more judicious and sophisticated than most other published treatment of this deceptively simple matter.

There are a few inaccuracies and small distortions, for example: The U-2 does not have to skid on its belly because it lacks landing gear (p. 22). It was the USIB, not the Board of National Estimates, which considered the national estimate on 19 September; the latter had met earlier on the paper (p. 23). Targeting the MRBM sites in the

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San Cristobal area was, so far as can be determined, somewhat more of a joint effort (by an interagency working group) than is suggested (pp. 28-29). And many analysts were not so totally oblivious to the large-hatch ships arriving in Cuba in mid-September as is suggested in the citation of Roger Hilsman's hindsight wisdom (p. 41).

But none of these minor errors seriously flaw a very good book. It is not, and could not be, a definitive study of the whole affair. That kind of history-in-the-round must await more information than we now have (or may ever get) on why the Russians decided on the missile venture in the first place and what determined their reaction to U.S. counter-moves. In the meantime, Abel's account can be highly recommended to all who are interested in the meaning of this crisis—which ought to include everybody in our business.

Keith Clark

OTVETSTVENNOST' ZA IZMENU RODINE I SHPIONAZH (Liability for Treason and Espionage). By *Grigoriy Zakharovich Anashkin*. (Moscow, 1964. 198 pp.)

This treatise on the Soviet law of treason and espionage is by the Chairman of the Collegium for Criminal Cases, USSR Supreme Court, so there can be little doubt that its views are authoritative. The book appears to be one of the numerous efforts to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Soviet legal system and its protection of the rights of individuals. It recounts the injustices of the Stalin era made possible by the looseness of the criminal laws and the failure to develop a specific philosophy of the crimes of treason and espionage. It then attempts to demonstrate that these weaknesses have been overcome and that the contemporary law of treason and espionage is precise and requires proof of the violations alleged.

To the Western mind the case is not fully made, although there is no doubt some progress and definition have been achieved. At one point, for instance, the author indicates that it is not the nature of the information that makes seeking it an act of espionage but the fact that it is collected on behalf of foreign intelligence in accordance with an assignment. This concept and the territorial sensitivity it reflects account for such bizarre things as the charges against Professor Barghoorn and the more recent tragedy of Newcomb Mott.

The main intellectual interest of this volume is its extensive justification for stringent espionage and treason laws, a justification based on

the efforts of foreign countries, particularly the United States, to obtain Russian state secrets. There are long and numerous case histories, usually involving CIA, and much emphasis on the U-2 and Penkovskiy cases. The author concludes that "Subversive actions against the socialist countries and various types of encroachments on the external security of the USSR have now been raised by the United States of America to the rank of a state policy."

There is a particularly interesting implication for intelligence in the author's consideration of the theory of territorial inviolability, which he stresses time and again as one of the most important conditions for the independent sovereign existence of the USSR. He defines this inviolability as forbidding encroachment on the territory of the Soviet Union, including its land, its territorial waters, its air space, and ships under its flag. His apparently deliberate omission of outer space from this definition, in view of other Russian positions on the law of outer space, could have very important connotations for the legality of advanced reconnaissance.

The book is difficult and turgid, but it is important to students of the Russian legal system and Russian social concepts.

Lawrence R. Houston

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE for American World Policy. By *Sherman Kent*. Reprinting, with a new preface. (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books. 1965. 226 pp. \$6.00.)

Introducing this new printing of his classic in a graceful essay, the author sketches the great changes in the world and in intelligence since he wrote the book in 1948—the unfolding of the cold war, the multiplication of nations, the population explosion, and above all the technological marvels which have both revolutionized weaponry and enabled intelligence to keep up with all these transformations. Whatever the new wrinkles, however, introduced into the intelligence process by the computer and other gadgetry, there remains no substitute, he reaffirms, for the intellectually competent human collector or analyst operating within the broad limits of the scientific method—a central thesis of the book itself.

In an aside on the Soviet view of intelligence as effectively perpetrated by Alexander Orlov, that the heart of the business consists of purloining the enemy's secret documents, he points out that on some key questions—Truman's decision to fight in Korea, for example—no

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documents exist, wonders how the spy could always get the right document at the right time if it did exist, and inquires especially how, once got, it can be recognized as the right document, not only genuine but authoritative, firm, and in current effect. That recognition requires a judgment of its plausibility, and so we are back to the disciplined, knowledgeable, intelligent mind.

Mr. Kent asked himself whether the content of a book almost two runaway decades old could still usefully serve, and he answered a qualified yes. Those who for all those years have been grateful for its exposition of fundamentals rather than incidentals will echo the yes.

Philip K. Edwards

GENDAI SUPAI RON (A Treatise on Modern Spies). By *Etsuke Nakazono*. (Tokyo: Kawashima Keichi. 1965. 300 pp. ¥ 450.)

The world-wide fad for espionage in entertainment, including fiction and semi-fiction dressed as fact, seems not to have spared Japan. This book is of the latter genre. It begins with the usual pretense of noble purpose—in this case to help the Japanese mind accept the dirtiness of spying as a necessary weapon in the arsenal of modern nations—and proceeds to case histories sensationalized to set the unsophisticated reader salivating. It ranges from Richard Sorge and the Japanese spies of the thirties in China to James Bond, and it features especially the inside story of CIA as laid bare by Andrew Tully. The adventure tales would have made better reading without the naive lectures on tradecraft with which they are interspersed.

On the other hand, it is just possible that the noble purpose is real. Since Japan has no espionage law and has been constrained to avoid operating an acknowledged espionage service, such a book could conceivably be the not very subtle beginning of a deliberate conditioning of public opinion to tolerate this kind of activity. It is one at which the Japanese were skilled and successful prior to World War II.

E. M.

Soviet Intelligence

The bibliography on the following pages includes and supplements the recent Soviet works discussed, along with some older ones, in the bibliographical article "New Light on Old Spies," *Studies* IX 4, p. 77 ff.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT SOVIET BOOKS AND ARTICLES

1. About Chekists and State Security Personnel
2. About Soviet Military Intelligence and Sorge
3. About Partisans and Underground Activity
4. Denigrating the United States

This bibliography is occasioned by the recent innovation of the Soviets in publicizing some of the espionage activities of their military intelligence and state security organs and by their continued emphasis in greater volume on other aspects of security work. It was compiled in February 1966.

1. About Chekists and State Security Personnel

Anonymous. U BEREGA OKEANA (At the Ocean Shore). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 Oct. 1965, p. 4.

Story about daily life at a frontier post on the Pacific coast. Chief of the post is Senior Lt. Yuriy Mikhaylovich Kolobayev.

Anonymous. NA POGRANICHNYKH ZASTAVAKH (At the Frontier Posts). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 22 Oct. 1965.

More about the frontier post on the Pacific coast described in the issue of 16 October 1965.

Anonymous. SOVETSKIYE ORGANY GOSUDARSTVENNOY BEZOPASNOSTI V GODY VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNY (Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Fatherland War). Moscow, *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 5 (May) 1965, pp. 20-39.

Obituary. GEORGIY FEDOROVICH NAYMUSHIN. Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 28 Nov. 1965.

The chief of the Department of State Security for the Krasnodar region died "while carrying out his service duties."

Various authors. M. V. FRUNZE, Vospominaniya Druzey i Soratnikov (Reminiscences of Friends and Comrades-in-Arms). 328 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Stories about the former Red Army Commander in Chief as told by his friends and comrades. Some of these held high positions in the Red Army and some were high-ranking Chekists. Short biographies of them are appended.

Various authors. GEROI PODPOLYA (Heroes of the Underground). 542 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Twelve stories about the underground activities of Soviet patriots during the Great Patriotic War. Some of the underground units were organized by Chekists.

Various authors. KOMISSARY (Commissars). 424 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1964.

During the Revolution and Civil War (1918-1920) the commissars played a very important role in keeping up the fighting spirit of the Red Army troops. Some of them were Chekists or associated with the Cheka. Many of them lost their lives during the 1937 purge.

Various authors. MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKIY, Vospominaniya Druzei i Soratnikov (Reminiscences of Friends and Comrades-in-Arms). 248 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Stories told about the Marshal by his friends and associates. An appendix contains short biographies of some leading personalities in the Army, Cheka, and GRU.

Various authors. V GODY PODPOLYA (In the Years of Underground Activity). 383 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1964.

A collection of 24 stories about Communist underground activity during the 1910-1917 period. Some of the underground workers later held responsible positions with the government and the Cheka; Boris Abramovich Breslav, for example, was chairman of the Moscow Cheka in 1918. He perished during the 1937 purge.

Various authors. ZNAMENOSTSY REVOLYUTSII (Color-bearers of the Revolution). 206 pp. Tallin, Estonskoye gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo, 1964.

Short biographies of prominent Communist revolutionaries who were active in Estonia, among them Viktor Kingisepp, one of the organizers of the Cheka, later executed by the Estonian government. Most of these revolutionaries played important parts in the Comintern.

Arefyev, A., Major. PODVIG POGRANICHNIKA (Heroic Deed of a Border Guard). Moscow, Pravda, 10 Oct. 1965.

Col. V. F. Nenasteyev (retired) visited the frontier post in Central Asia where Larion Stepanovich Kononenko had served, a guard who sacrificed himself to save the life of his commander Vasily Ivanovich Maksimov on 22 January 1932. See Pogodin entry below.

Asanov, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, and Sturitis, Yuriy. YANTARNOYE MORE (The Amber Sea). 415 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Sovetskaya Rossiya," 1964.

A novel about a group of British agents dispatched to Latvia following World War II. The agents, of Latvian origin, were penetrated by Soviet State Security agents who posed as anti-Communist partisans.

Baygushev, A. SEDOY CHEKIST (A Grey-haired Chekist). Moscow, Izvestiya, 15 Sept. 1965.

The story of Chekist Ivan Nikolayevich Kasakov, who organized partisan intelligence in the Bryansk area during the Soviet-German war.

Borisov, Petr Aleksandrovich. CHERNYM LETOM (In a Black Summer). 80 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

A cavalry brigade under the command of Grigoriy Ivanovich Kotovskiy was dispatched to Tambov to suppress an anti-Soviet peasant rebellion. Chekist units, however, were credited with the liquidation of Antonov, the leader of the rebellion.

Bryantsev, Georgiy Mikhaylovich. KONETS OSINOGO GNEZDA (End of a Hornets' Nest) pp. 265-582. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1964.

Major Kondratiy Filippovich Stozharov, Soviet agent, penetrated a German Abwehr intelligence school posing as courier of an Abwehr agent named Savrasov active in the Ural area. His bona fides was challenged by the Abwehr, but he was able to "prove" that he was a genuine courier and thus carried out his mission. See also Petrov entry below.

Budennyy, Semen Mikhaylovich. PROYDENNY PUT (The Traveled Road). 392 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

During the civil war 1918-1920, Budennyy was commander of the First Red Cavalry Army. He describes its military exploits in the Soviet-Polish War (1920), including Stalin's differences with Tukhachevskiy about its deployment. I. S. Stroylo was in charge of Army intelligence. One of Budennyy's associates, Sergey Konstantinovich Minin, later served on the NKVD presidium.

Bykov, Dmitriy Vasilyevich. KOMKOR PAVLOV (Corps Commander Pavlov). Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965. 79 pp.

Pavel Andreyevich Pavlov distinguished himself as commander of the Red Army troops used to suppress the anti-Soviet rebellions in the Ukraine, Tambov, and Central Asia. In Tambov in 1921-1922 he worked with M. I. Pokalyukhin, a Cheka unit commander who is still alive.

Dimont, L., Captain. VORONTSOVSKIY ORIENTIR (Vorontsov's Reference-point). Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 Sept. 1965.

Story of the heroic deed of a Lt. Vorontsov, killed while arresting a border trespasser.

Drozov, V., Major General. TOVARISHCH ABEL—SOLDAT NEVIDIMOGO FRONTA (Comrade Abel—Soldier of the Invisible Front). Moscow, Nedelya, 2-8 May 1965, pp. 6-7.

Dzerzhinskaya, Sofya Sigizmundovna. V CODY VELIKIKH BOYEV (In the Years of the Great Wars). 446 pp. Moscow, "Mysl," 1964.

These memoirs of the wife of Feliks E. Dzerzhinskiy, head of the Cheka, include the texts of letters not previously published or published only in part.

Fomin, F. T. ZAPISKI STAROGO CHEKISTA (Notes of an Old Chekist). 172 pp. 2nd revised edition. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1964.

Memoirs covering the early history of state security.

Galich, B., and Goltsev, V. NEISTOVYI SLEDOPIY (The Furious Pathfinder). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 19 June 1965.

The story of Col. Nikita Fedorovich Karatsupa, the famous Soviet border guard who arrested 467 trespassers.

Golovchenko, Ivan Kharitonovich. CHEKISTY (The Chekists). 415 pp. Kiev, Vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury "Dnipro," 1964.

A collection of short stories covering individual cases from Soviet State Security said to be based on true facts. The events are supposed to have taken place in the Ukrainian SSR during the years following World War II.

Gorodetskiy, Yefim Naumovich. ROZHDENIYE SOVETSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA (The Birth of the Soviet State) 1917-1918. 532 pp. Indexed. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1965.

A study of the Bolshevik coming-to-power, Soviet revolutionary personalities, and, among other things, the Cheka's role in securing the revolutionary order.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism with the CPSU Central Committee. IZ ISTORII GRAZHDANSKOY VOYNY V SSSR (From the History of the Civil War in the USSR) volume III. 875 pp.

Among many other things, this volume contains short biographies of Cheka staffers, revolutionary leaders, and Red Army commanders.

Ivanov, Konstantin Ivanovich, and Skorokhodov, Mikhail Arkadyevich. YA VERNULSYA NA RODINU (I Came Back Home). 296 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

How Soviet Lt. Ivkin was parachuted behind the German lines on an intelligence mission in Belorussia and operated there under the alias Konstantin Petrovich Kuzmin.

Khatskevich, Aleksandr Fedorovich. SOLDAT VELIKIKH BOYEV (Soldier of Great Battles). 406 pp. Minsk, Izdatelstvo "Nauka i Tekhnika," 1965.

A biography of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. A great deal of the book is dedicated to his work as director of the Cheka. It contains a full list of the Cheka presidium. This is an expanded version of the work originally published in 1961.

Khokhlov, Aleksey Gavrilovich. KRASNAYA GVARDIYA BELORUSSII V BORBE ZA VLAST SOVETOV (The Belorussian Red Guard in the Struggle for Soviet Power) March 1917-March 1918. Minsk, Izdatelstvo "Nauka i Tekhnika," 1965.

An account of the organization of Red Army units in Belorussia. Some of the commanders of these units later served in the Cheka or occupied high positions in the government.

Khromov, Semen Spiridonovich. PO ZADANIYU LENINA (On Lenin's Order). Moscow, Izdatelstvo moskovskogo universiteta, 1964. 157 pp.

A brief account of Dzerzhinskiy's activity in Siberia in 1922 in arranging for the removal and shipment of agricultural products to starving Soviet cities.

Kirshteyn, Yan, Col. FILM O CHEKISTAKH (Film about Chekists). Riga, *Sovetskaya Latvija*, 28 Nov. 1965.

Review of a new Soviet film entitled *Kak Vas Teper Nazvat* (What Name to Call You By Now). Contains the true names of some Latvian Chekists.

Kondrashev, F. KOMENDANT "OKNA V EVROPU" (Commandant of the "Window to Europe"). Moscow, *Moskovskaya Pravda*, 2, 3, 4, and 5 Nov. 1965.

The story describes an episode in the Soviet counterintelligence operation "Trust" which took place in 1924-1925. The hero is Ivan Mikhaylovich Petrov, a former border guard, who played a double role in facilitating the crossing of the Soviet-Finnish border by Sidney George Reilly, chief of the East European section of British counterintelligence.

Kozhevnikov, Vadim. SHCHIT I MECH (Shield and Sword). Published in *Znamiya* (The Flag) #3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Pravda," 1965. Now available in book form (Moscow, "Sovetskiy Pisatel," 1965). 1030 pp.

A novel dedicated to the work of Soviet intelligence officer Aleksandr Belov (alias Johan Weiss) outside the USSR. Although this book does not say so, it has been suggested in other Soviet publications that the events it places in Latvia, Poland, and Germany preceding and during World War II are based on exploits of the Soviet intelligence officer known to the West as Col. Rudolf Abel. (Abel = A[leksandr] Bel[ov].)

Kunakov, M., Col., and Shemyakin, V. TOLKO VAM I PO SEKRETI (For You Only and in Secret). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 23 Oct. 1965.

The article stresses the need for constant vigilance among military personnel and gives several cases in which alert officers caught spies.

Latvian Academy of Science. V DNI VOYNY (In the War Days). 293 pp. Riga, Izdatelstvo akademii nauk Latvyskoy SSR, 1964.

A study of Latvian history during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Includes communist underground activities and German atrocities. Identifies Gestapo agents and members of Soviet State Security.

Lisochkin, Igor Borisovich. SOLDATY NEZRIMOGO FRONTA (Soldiers of the Invisible Front). 206 pp. Leningrad, Leningradskoye izdatelstvo, 1965.

A documentary about Chekist secret-agent scouts A. Ivanov, V. Podsekin, M. Antonov, V. Leonardov, and A. Brilliantov. Sent behind the German lines in March 1943, they were active in the Leningrad area under the code name "Luzhane."

Lukin, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. RAZVEDCHIKI (Intelligence Officers). 124 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Znaniye," 1965. (3rd edition; originally published in 1964.)

The former commander of partisan intelligence in Rovno gives an account of his operations behind the German lines 1941-1944. Some of the events described in this book were incorporated into Medvedev's earlier *Stout Hearts*.

Lukin, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, and Polyanovskiy, Dmitriy Iogonovich. SOTRUDNIK CHEKA (Cheka Staffer). 301 pp. Vologda, Vologodzkoye knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 1960.

The story of Aleksey Mikhalev, a Cheka operative who trapped spies and apprehended bandits, 1918-1920.

- Lyubovtsev, Vladimir Ilich. SERDTSE U MENYA ODNO (I Have But One Heart). 127 pp. Moscow, izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.
On June 22, 1941, the Germans attacked a Soviet frontier post whose Chekist guard was commanded by Lt. Aleksey Vasilyevich Lopatin. Lopatin was killed in the hard fighting.
- Manturov, Sergey Stepanovich. IZ REVOLYUTIONNOGO PROSHLOGO KAMYSHINA (From the Revolutionary Past of Kamyshin) 1905-1920. Volgograd, Volgogradskoye knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 1963. 147 pp.
The story of the establishment of Soviet power in Kamyshin. Contains short biographies of leading Communists and the chairman of the local Cheka.
- Mikhaylov, Viktor Semenovich. POVEST O CHEKISTE (Story of a Chekist). 399 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.
Nikolay Arturovich Heft, an engineer, entered the Soviet intelligence service and was dispatched to Odessa in 1943. There he organized an underground group and carried out his mission. The story is based on documents and on the testimony of participants.
- Mironov, Georgiy Mikhaylovich. LEGENDA BYL O RUSSKOM KAPITANE (Legend-Fact about a Russian Captain). 112 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1965.
The story of a Soviet tank officer, Capt. Nikolay Yermakov, who was taken prisoner by the Germans. Earlier his unit had had words with the NKVD guard at a railroad station and, angered by their brutality, had sworn to get even with the "enkavedisty" (NKVD men) after the war.
- Morozov, P., Col. BUDNI POGRANICHNIKOV (Workaday World of the Border Guards). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 29 Aug. 1965.
Daily life at a frontier post on the Polish-Soviet border.
- Naumov, Yakov Naumovich. CHEKISTKA. (Woman Chekist). 104 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.
Pages from the life of the deputy chief of the Kazan province Cheka, Vera Petrovna Brande.
- Nikulin, Lev Veniaminovich. MERTVAYA ZYB; ROMAN-KHRONIKA (The Swell: Historical Novel). 359 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo, 1965.
Extracts from this book appeared in *Nedelya* for 2-8 August and 11-17 October 1964. It is based on the "Trust" operation of the twenties.
- Petrov, Lt. Ge. NEZRIMYY FRONT (Invisible Front). Minsk, *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, 4 May 1965.
The author, Chairman of the Belorussian KGB, reveals in this article that the name of the Soviet agent who penetrated the German Abwehr intelligence school in Klimovichi was actually Metelkin. See Bryantsev entry above.
- Pochivalov, L. PRYZHOK V NEIZVESTNOST (Jump into the Unknown). Moscow, *Pravda*, 1, 3 Sept. 1965.
The story of a Chekist operation behind the lines of the Japanese Kwantung Army during the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945.
- Pogodin, K. TOVARISHCHI POMNYAT VOINA-PATRIOTA (Comrades Remember a Soldier-Patriot). Moscow, *Pravda*, 15 Oct. 1965.
Larion Stepanovich Kononenko, a border guard, was killed on 22 January 1932 saving the life of his commander Vasily Ivanovich Maksimov during a battle with anti-Communists in Central Asia. Col. Maksimov is now retired and lives in Corkiy. See also Arefyev entry above.
- Prudnikov, Mikhail Sidorovich. NEULOVIMYYE DEYSTVUYUT (Elusive Men in Action). 176 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.
A Chekist group under Prudnikov's command, sent behind the German lines in 1942, occupied the forest area around Polotsk and in a short period grew into a partisan brigade known as "Brigada Neulovimykh."
- Shimanov, N., Col. Gen. MOI DOPOLNENIYA K ROMANU (My Additions to the Novel). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 22 Sept. 1965.
Additional information about a Chekist featured in Lev Nikulin's *Mertvayn Zyb* (The Swell).
- Shkuta, N. D., Lt. Col.; Solov'yev, Ye. D., Col.; Krivonos, R. I., Lt. Col.; Dard'ykov, N. K., Major. NA POGRANICHNYKH ZASTAVAKH (At the Frontier Posts). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 15 Aug. 1965.
Soviet officers describe life at the frontier posts.
- Soboleva, Polina Ivanova. BORBA BOLSHEVIKOV PROTIV MENSHEVIKOV ZA LENINSKUYU POLITIKU MIRU (The Bolsheviks' Struggle against the Mensheviks and SRs for the Leninist Peace Policy) 1917-1918. 192 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo moskovskogo universiteta, 1965.
A study of the CPSU struggle against the opposition in 1917-1918. The CPSU victory was not achieved without the Cheka's assistance.
- Viktorov, I. V. PODPOLSHCHIK, VOIN, CHEKIST (Underground Worker, Fighter, Chekist). 80 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1963.
Biography of Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov, old Bolshevik and associate of Dzerzhinskiy, who became a victim of Stalin's purges.
- Vostokov, Vladimir, and Shmelev, Oleg. POSLEDNYAYA OSHIBKA REZIDENTA (The Resident Agent's Last Mistake). *Ogonek* #38-49. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Pravda," 1965.
A novel in which Mikhail Zarokov, a foreign intelligence agent, is infiltrated into the Soviet Union to help another agent escape and to obtain samples of earth and water in the Novotrubinsk rayon. Another agent helps him to recruit a Soviet citizen, Pavel Matveyev (alias Bekas, a First Lieutenant in the KGB). Zarokov is finally arrested by the KGB. Matveyev passes various tests of a Western intelligence service, including the lie detector, and becomes its contact in the USSR, under KGB control. The authors promise to relate his further adventures in a second book on which they are working.
- Zemtsov, A. PODVIC FRITSA SHMENKELYA (The Heroic Deed of Fritz Schmenkel). 63 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Pravda," 1965.
A German soldier, Fritz Schmenkel, having defected to a Soviet partisan unit in Belorussia in 1941, was trained and sent on an intelligence mission behind the German lines. He was caught and executed in 1943.

Zevelev, A. I., and Tashliyev, Sh. T. OCHERKI ISTORII KOMMUNISTICHESKOY PARTII TURKESTANA (Historical Essays on the Turkestan CP). 166 pp. Tashkent, Gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo Uzbekskoy SSR, 1964.

A study of the establishment of Soviet power in Turkestan and the role of Turkestan Communists in promoting the cause. Contains short biographies of Cheka staffers and Communist leaders.

Zubov, Nikolay Ivanovich. F. E. DZERZHINSKIY. 366 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

A revised edition of the Dzerzhinskiy biography first published in 1963. The author has added some Chekist names, taken out others, and made stylistic improvements. He has corrected the name of the chief of the Soviet Frontier Guard from Petr Frolovich Fedotov to Petr Frolovich Frolov.

2. About Soviet Military Intelligence and Sorge

Anonymous. PREKRASNYI CHELOVEK I TOVARISHCH (Superb Fellow and Comrade). Riga, *Sovetskaya Latvija*, 25 Feb. 1965.

Interview with a sister and a former comrade of GRU Colonel Lev Yefimovich Manevich telling of his wartime heroism. See Kirillova item below.

Various authors. FRONT BEZ LINII FRONTA (Front without A Front Line). 257 pp. Kuybyshev, Izdatelstvo "Volzhskaya Kommuna," 1965.

A collection of seven stories said to be based on true facts from the work of Soviet intelligence (both GRU and NKVD). The scene is both Asia and Europe preceding and during World War II. The names of the Soviet agents are given as Nikolay Arturovich Heft, Ivan Danilovich Kudrya, Nikolay Ivanovich Kusnetsov, Lev Yefimovich Manevich, Karl Libel, Johann Weiss, and Richard Sorge. Some of the stories are excerpted from full-length books.

Bezymensky, L. PO TU STORONU FRONTA (On That Side of the Front). Moscow, *Novoye Vremya*, 9 May 1965, pp. 28-31.

This interview with Creta Kuckhoff, a member of the Rote Kapelle, also appeared in the English language edition of *New Times* of the same date.

Didyk, Praskovya Cerasimovna. V TYLU VRAGA (In the Enemy's Rear). 312 pp. Kishinev, Izdatelstvo "Kartya Moldovenyashke," 1965.

Mariana Florya, a Moldavian girl who possessed a natural gift for intelligence, was recruited and trained by the GRU in 1941. She accomplished three wartime missions, one in Poltava, where she was radio operator and head of a small group of agents, and two in Poland, where she posed as the wife of a German physician who was also a GRU agent.

Kasakova, L. DOROGOY MOY CHELOVEK (My Dear Fellow). Riga, *Sovetskaya Latvija*, 20 Oct. 1965.

The story of Anna Vikentyevna Petrova, a Riga resident who sheltered a group of GRU agents in 1941.

Kirillova, E., and Raspevin, K. GEROI NE UMIRAYUT (Heroes Do Not Die). Moscow, *Pravda*, 21 Feb. 1965.

Posthumous award of Hero of the Soviet Union to GRU Colonel Lev Yefimovich Manevich, presumably for wartime services. See also anonymous item in *Sovetskaya Latvija* above.

Lenchevskiy, Vladimir Yevgenyevich. OGNEM PROVERENO (Tested by Fire). 150 pp. Volgograd, Nizhne-Volzhskoye izdatelstvo, 1964.

The author, who was a deputy chief of intelligence with the staff of 62nd Soviet army, describes the exploits of his officers and agents during the battle for Volgograd (then Stalingrad) 1942-1943. Most of the agents were women; some of them are still alive.

Novikov, Ivan Grigoryevich. VERA KHORUZHAYA. 256 pp. Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1962.

Vera Khoruzhaya, a leading Communist underground worker in western Belorussia, then a part of Poland, was arrested by Polish police and exchanged for Polish prisoners in the USSR. During the Soviet-German war, while working for Soviet military intelligence in Vitebsk, she was captured and executed by the Germans.

Petrovskiy, L. PAROL—REVOLYUTSIYA (Password—Revolution). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 1 Dec. 1965.

The story of a group of Red Army intelligence agents active behind the White Russian lines during the civil war (1918-1920). One agent, Arthur Meurte, was of American origin.

Sandalov, Leonid Mikhaylovich. TRUDNYYE RUBEZHI (Difficult Positions). 144 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

An account of Soviet military operations in Latvia in 1944, intelligence activity in Riga, and a meeting with the chief of the GRU (whose name is given as Gen. Fedor Fedorovich) and his deputy, Maj. Gen. Artemiy Fedorovich Fedorov.

Zolotov, A., Lt. Col. FIALKI PO SREDAM (Violets on Wednesdays). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 13 June 1965.

The story of Anna Morozova, a GRU agent active in the Bryansk area in 1943. Additional information about this case is given in *Vyzvayem Ogon na Sebya* (We Draw the Enemy Fire on Ourselves), by O. Gorchakov and Ya. Pshimanovskiy.

Richard Sorge

A September 1964 *Pravda* article praising the espionage exploits of Richard Sorge has initiated a welter of books and articles on this theme not only in the USSR but in other Communist countries. No two of these are alike; in some respects they supplement one another. They all do in general make a conscious effort to soften Sorge's Japanese reputation as a woman-lover, motorcycle racer, and haunter of drinking parties. In aggregate they give the following biographic data:

Born in 1895 in the environs of Baku to a Russian mother and German father, Richard Sorge was raised in Berlin. He was wounded twice in World War I. In 1919 he joined the German Communist Party and until 1924 worked as editor of a KPD publication. In 1925 he moved to the USSR and became a member of the CPSU. He was employed as a scientific worker at the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow and subsequently joined the secret service of the Red Army, which sent him to Shanghai in 1929. He was recalled to Moscow in 1933 and married Yekaterina Aleksandrovna Maksimova. In the same year he was dis-

patched to Berlin and then to Japan. There he became a close friend of German Military Attaché and later Ambassador Ott. From this point of vantage he created a widespread intelligence network. In May 1941 he sent Moscow advance information on Hitler's date for attacking the Soviet Union, then in July gave assurance that Japan would not go to war against the Soviet Union, and in October reported Japan's decision to attack the United States in the Pacific. On 14 October he and his aides Vukelich, the Klausens, Ozaki, and Miyagi were arrested. After more than three years in the Tokyo Sugamo jail, he was executed on 7 November 1944.

VELIKAYA OTECHESTVENNAYA VOYNA SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union) 1941-1945. Short History. 632 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965. The earlier six-volume history of which this is a condensation had not mentioned Sorge.

YEZHEGODNIK BOLSHOY SOVETSKOY ENTSIKLOPEDI (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia) 1965. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1965.

Demytyeva, Irina Aleksandrovna; Agayants, Nikolay Ivanovich; and Yakovlev, Yegor Vladimirovich. TOVARISHCH ZORGE (Comrade Sorge). 134 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Sovetskaya Rossiya," 1965.

Celler, Yu. NACHALNIK VOYENNOY RAZVEDKI (Chief of Military Intelligence). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2 March 1965.

Colyakov, Sergey Mikhaylovich and Ponizovskiy, Vladimir Mironovich. RIKHARD ZORGE. 204 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1965. (Originally published in *Ogonek*, 28 Feb.-17 April 1965).

Gorev, Ya. YA ZNAL ZORGE (I Knew Sorge). Moscow, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 8 Oct. 1964-1 Nov. 1964.

The Gorev articles were also issued as a pamphlet under the same title in an edition of 240,000 copies (Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Pravda," 1964), but this publication was withdrawn from sale shortly after it appeared. Gorev may be identical with Petr Aleksandrovich Skobleviskiy, a Soviet citizen who was arrested in Germany in 1923 and tried in Leipzig two years later on charges of attempting to overthrow the Weimar Republic. Skobleviskiy was later exchanged for Karl Kindermann and Theodor Wolscht, two German citizens who had been arrested in the USSR.

Kolesnikov, Mikhail Sergeyevich. TAKIM BYL RIKHARD ZORGE (Such a Man was Richard Sorge). 220 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Kornilov, Yuriy. BRANKO VUKELICH. Moscow, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 1 Oct. 1964.

Korolkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich. CHELOVEK DLYA KOTOROGO NE BYLO TAYN (The Man for Whom There Were No Secrets). 239 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Kudryavtsev, V. VSTRECHI S RIKHARDOM ZORGE (Meeting with Richard Sorge). Moscow, *Nedelya*, 1-7 Nov. 1964, p. 14.

Kudryavtsev, V. TIKSANAS AR RIKHARDU ZORGI (Meeting with Richard Sorge). Riga, *Zvaigzne* (Star), Dec. 1964.

Replay of Tass article by the same author, who was Tass correspondent in Tokyo 1934-1937 and claims to have known Sorge and Vukelich personally. This account is occasioned by the showing of the film "Who Are You, Dr. Sorge?"

Kudryavtsev, V. R. ZORGES UZTICAMIE LIDZGAITNIEKI (Richard Sorge's Trusted Collaborators). Riga, *Cina* (Battle), 22 Jan. 1965.

Replay of Tass article by the same author on the occasion of the USSR's awarding the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st Class, to Sorge's collaborators Vukelich and the Klausens.

Mayevskiy, Viktor. TOVARISHCH RIKHARD ZORGE (Comrade Richard Sorge). Moscow, *Pravda*, 4 Sept. 1964.

Millers, O. ES TIKOS AR RIKHARDA ZORGES SKOLOTAJU (I Met with Richard Sorge's Teacher). Riga, *Dzimentenes Bals* (Voice of the Homeland), 5 Jan. 1965.

Volkov, F. ZHIZN—PODVIG (Life—Heroic Feat). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 Oct. 1965.

This article commemorating Sorge's seventieth birthday reviews his activity as a GRU agent.

3. About Partisans and Underground Activity

Anonymous. OTVAZHNYE SOOTECHESTVENNIKI (The Courageous Com-patriots). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 19 Nov. 1965.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awarded orders and medals to six Russian émigrés who were active against the Germans in France and Yugoslavia during the Soviet-German war. One of them, Georgiy Vladimirovich Shibanov, is now in the USSR.

Various authors. GEROI I PODVIGI (Heroes and Heroic Deeds) vol. II. 368 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1964.

A collection of short stories about Soviet soldiers and officers, members of military intelligence, and Chekists who distinguished themselves during the Soviet-German war. Members of military intelligence are cited under their true names.

Various authors. GEROI I PODVIGI (Heroes and Heroic Deeds) vol. III. 329 pp.

Short stories about Soviet soldiers and officers, members of military intelligence, partisans, and Chekists who distinguished themselves during the Soviet-German war.

Various authors. OGNENNYE, GODY (Fiery Years). 528 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1965.

A collection of documents about Soviet youth in the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). The Komsomol organized underground movements, set up partisan groups, collected intelligence, and provided leadership for millions of Soviet youth.

Various authors. PODVIC VO IMYA RODINY (Heroism in the Name of the Fatherland). 406 pp. Kuybyshev, Kuybyshevskoye knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 1965.

A collection of short stories about Soviet soldiers and officers, including members of military intelligence, who were given the Hero of the Soviet Union award 1941-1945.

Various Italian writers. SLOVO NEPOBEZHDENNYKH (The Word of the Unconquered). 153 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1964.

Biographies of Italian Communists who were active in the underground in Italy, Spain, America, and other countries.

Andreyev, Vasily Andreyevich. NARODNAYA VOYNA (Peoples' War). 334 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1959.

The author, a Red Army straggler, joined the partisans after an unsuccessful attempt to break through the German encirclement. After he acquired experience in partisan warfare he was dispatched to Moldavia and organized a partisan detachment there.

Brodskiy, Yefim Aronovich. ZHIVYYE BORYUTSYA (Those Who Live Fight). 240 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Soviet POW's in Munich organized an underground group which, in collaboration with German Communists, assisted Soviet soldiers and officers to escape from the camps. Some members were executed by the Germans.

Bunkov, S., and Volk, I. TROPOYU PODVIGA (Heroic Course). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 21 Oct. 1965.

Georgiy Fedorovich Sinyakov, a Soviet surgeon, saved the lives of many prisoners while himself a prisoner in a German POW camp in Küstrin. He also saved various Soviet documents and military orders from falling into German hands.

Denisyuk, Ya., and Gortinskiy, Ye. POLESSKAYA BYL (A True Story of Polesye). Moscow, *Pravda*, 16 Oct. 1965.

The Communist underground in Malina, the Ukrainian Polesye, during the Soviet-German war. It was organized by Nina Ivanovna Sosnina.

Gardovskiy, Mikhail. KAVALER KRESTA GRUNVALDA (Knight of the Grünwald Cross). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 22 Sept. 1965.

Lyudmilovka, a Polish village, was decorated with the Grünwald Cross III Class for its contribution to the partisan movement during World War II. It was the headquarters for a partisan detachment led by Soviet officer Aleksandr Bayevskiy.

Institute of History of the Azerbaydzhan SSR. GEROI SOVETSKOGO SOYUZA—SYNY AZERBAYDZHANA (Heroes of the Soviet Union—Sons of Azerbaydzhan). 385 pp. Indexed. Baku, Azerbaydzhanskoye gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo, 1965.

Short stories about sons of the Azerbaydzhan Republic who distinguished themselves during the Soviet-German war. Among them are GRU officers Lev Yefimovich Manevich and Richard Sorge, both born in Baku.

Institute of History, with the Belorussian CP Central Committee. NEPOKORENNAYA BELORUSSIYA (Unsubdued Belorussia). 376 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1963.

Reminiscences and essays about the partisan movement in Belorussia in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945).

Institute of Party History, with the Leningrad Oblast Industrial Committee of the CPSU. KHRABREYSHIYE IZ KHRABRYKH (The Bravest of the Brave). 359 pp. Leningrad, Leningradskoye izdatelstvo, 1964.

Thousands of partisans helped the Red Army defeat the German invaders in the Leningrad area. They collected intelligence, attacked German communication lines, and denied the Germans full control of the occupied territory.

Janis, Marian. IDUT PARTIZANY (The Parisans are Coming). 200 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

The story of Polish and Soviet partisans in the Kielce area in 1944.

Karavanchenko, Andrey Pavlovich, and Fedorenko, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. NEPOKORENNYY PAVLOGRAD (Unsubdued Pavlograd). 160 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Story of Soviet underground activity in Pavlograd 1941-1943. In February 1943 the underground organized an armed uprising which lasted for six days before it was crushed when advancing Red Army troops were stopped by the Germans. Many of its leaders were caught and executed.

Kharkov Party Archives. KHARKOVSHCHINA V GODY VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNY IYUN (Kharkov Province in the Years of the Great Patriotic War June) 1941-1943. 426 pp. Kharkov, Izdatelstvo "Prapor," 1965.

Documents and materials related to the German occupation of Kharkov province, the Communist underground, the partisan movement, and German atrocities.

Korobeynikov, B. PODVIC RIMMY SHERSHNEVOY (The Heroic Deed of Rimma Shershneva). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 28 July 1965.

Shershneva, a courier and partisan intelligence agent in Belorussia in 1942, was killed in action.

Korolev, Lev Andreyevich. ODIN IZ "PARTII RASSTRELYANNYKH" (One of "A Group of Executed"). 102 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

The biography of a leading French Communist, Gabriel Peri, who was executed by the Germans in 1941.

Lashuk, A., and Spura, I. YESLI VERISH V RASSVET (If You Believe in Daybreak). 526 pp. Riga, Izdatelstvo "Liyesema," 1965.

The story of the Komsomol underground in Latvia 1917-1945, with biographies of its most prominent leaders. Some of them were executed by the White armies and some by the Germans.

Ortenberg, D. NA OGNENNYKH RUBEZHAKH (On Fiery Lines). 502 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Stories about Soviet soldiers, military intelligence officers, Chekists, and partisans who distinguished themselves during the Soviet-German war 1941-1945.

Pavlov, V.; Poltorakov, N.; Selishchev, I. LYUDI LEGEND (Legendary People). 655 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

A collection of stories about Soviet partisans, intelligence officers, leaders of the underground, and members of State Security during the Soviet-German war 1941-1945.

Radomirskiy, Slavcho. SKVOZ OGOON I PULI (Through Fire and Bullets). 128 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

The story of Communist underground activities in Bulgaria 1941-1944. These included sabotage and the assassination of leading Bulgarian political personalities.

Raspevin, K. PATRIOTY (The Patriots). Moscow, *Pravda*, 20 Nov. 1965.

About Russian émigrés who were awarded Soviet decorations for their struggle against the German Fascist in France and Yugoslavia during World War II.

Sboyshakov, Maksim Ivanovich. DVA YUNYKH CEROYA (Two Young Heroes). 70 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

The story of Leontiy Golikov and Valya Kotik, who joined the partisan movement and died fighting the German invaders. Both were given the Hero of the Soviet Union award.

Sebko, Georgiy, Major. PAKET S PYATYU PECHATYAMI (Letter with Five Seals). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 9 Oct. 1965.

A group of Soviet partisans deliver a deceptive letter to Gen. Mannstein, commander of German troops in the Crimea, 1942.

Tomin, Valentin Romanovich, and Sinelnikov, Aleksandr Georgiyevich. VOZVRASHCHENIYE NEZHELATELNO (Return Undesirable). 208 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1964.

Story of the uprising in the German concentration camp in Sobibor, Poland, which took place on 14 October 1943. It was organized by Soviet POW's. Some of the participants were killed, but some survived and are still alive in the Soviet Union and Poland.

Verkhos, Vladimir Pavlovich, and Carelik, Aron Leybovich. ETO BYLO V SKIDELE (It Happened in Skidel). 72 pp. Minsk, Izdatelstvo "Belarus," 1965.

A group of Soviet youths organized an underground cell in Skidel, Belorussia, 1941-1942. Eventually uncovered by the Germans, they were arrested and executed.

Vetrov, Il. ZAVESHCHANIYE ZHIVYM (A Testament to the Living). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 Oct. 1965.

Red Army political instructor Georgiy Petrovich Savchenko was captured by the Germans. Hospitalized in Dnepropetrovsk, he escaped and organized an underground.

Volf, Abram Yakovlevich. V CHUZHOY STRANE (In a Foreign Land). 475 pp. Saratov, Privolzhskoye knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 1964.

The story of the Soviet "Za Rodinu" (For the Homeland) partisan brigade in Belgium 1943-1945 composed of Soviet soldiers and officers who had escaped from POW camps. The brigade collaborated with the Belgian Communists.

Vykhodets, P., Col., and Kuznetsov, D., Capt. VZRYVY NAD GRONOM (Explosions on the Hron). Moscow, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 28 Aug. 1965.

The story of the partisan movement in Slovakia 1944. Some of the partisans were trained in a Special Intelligence School near Kiev.

Zabolotnyy, Ivan Prokofyevich. NESKORENA VOLYN (Unsubdued Volyn). 203 pp. Lvov, Vydavnistvo "Kamenyar," 1964.

Until 1939 Volyn was a Polish province populated by Ukrainians. The Volynian Communists organized underground activities and strikes in order to free it from Polish rule and join with the Soviet Ukraine.

Zars, V. SUDBA MAYORA OZOLINA (Major Ozolin's Fate). Riga, *Sovetskaya Latvija*, 31 Aug. 1965.

Soviet Major Karl Karlovich Ozolin organized an underground resistance group in a POW camp in Munich 1943-1944. It was uncovered by the Germans and its members executed.

4. Denigration of the United States

The Soviet Government spares no effort or expense to tarnish the image of the United States in the eyes of the Soviet public. It wages a continuous propaganda campaign to smear the principal U.S. government and civic institutions, attacking particularly the Pentagon, the State Department, the various intelligence organizations, and American financial, educational and industrial institutions. Not all the propaganda material for this campaign originates in the USSR. Some books, like Daisy Bates' "The Long Shadow of Little Rock" and "The Invisible Government" by Wise and Ross, produced in the United States have been fitted to the Soviet purpose. Other materials come from Japan, Vietnam, and elsewhere.

This internal anti-American propaganda is related to the public glorifying of Soviet intelligence. It is contributory to the campaign for constant vigilance on the part of the citizenry, discretion in relations with foreigners, and assistance to the KGB in its work. Following are some recent titles of the genre.

Anonymous. AMERIKANSKIY SHPION POKINUL OAR (American Spy Has Left the UAR). *Riga, Sovetskaya Latvija*, 27 July 1965.

Anonymous. OBRECHENNAYA ATAKA NA SVOBODU NARODOV (The Attack on Peoples' Freedom is Doomed). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 3 Nov. 1965.

Anonymous. TSENTRY SHPIONAZHA (Centers of Espionage). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 30 Nov. 1965.

Anonymous. VOLKI V OVECHYEY SHKURE (Wolves in Sheep's Skin). Moscow, *Pravda*, 3 July 1965.

Various authors. SOVREMENNIY KAPITALIZM I BURZHUAZNAYA SOTSIOLOGIYA (Modern Capitalism and Bourgeois Sociology). 356 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1965.

Aleksandrov, B., and Raspevin, K. VOYAZH MISTERA BRUKA PROVALILSYA (The Voyage of Mr. Brooke Has Failed). Moscow, *Pravda*, 23 July 1965.

Alenov, A., and Andreyev, V. KONTSEKSPIONAZHA I DIVERSIY (Company of Espionage and Diversion). 336 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Molodaya Gvardiya," 1965.

Antonov, I., and Maksakov, V. PADENIYE (Downfall). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 17 Nov. 1965.

Antonov, V. YESHCHE RAZ "NIKON" (Once More "Nikon"). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 18 Sept. 1965.
An orthodox clergyman practices with U.S. protection though known to have been a Nazi collaborator.

Bates, Daisy. DLINNAYA TEN LITL-ROKA (The Long Shadow of Little Rock). 223 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Progress," 1965.

Borovskiy, V. BOKSERSKAYA DIPLOMATIYA DZHEKA VONA (Boxer Diplomacy of Jack Vaughn). Moscow, *Pravda*, 10 Sept. 1965.

Borovskiy, V. PLANU "KAMELOT" OT VOROT POVOROT (Project "Camelot" Is Abolished). Moscow, *Pravda*, 12 July 1965.

Chernyavskiy, V. RAZVYEDKA I MONOPOLIY SSHA (U.S. Intelligence and the Monopolies). Moscow, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, Feb. 1965, pp. 78-85.
(The English-language version of this article appears in the January 1965 issue of *International Affairs*, pp. 55-60).

Guryev, Igor Yevgenyevich. OT KAPITALIZMA K SOTSIALIZMU (From Capitalism to Socialism). 72 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Izakov, D. KRAKH ODNOY DIVERSII (Collapse of a Diversion). Moscow, *Kraznaya Zvezda*, 24 July 1965.

Ivanova, Inessa Mikhaylovna. MIRNOYE SOSUSHCHESTVOVANIYE I KRIZIS VNESHNEPOLITICHESKOY IDEOLOGII IMPERIALIZMA SSHA (Peaceful Coexistence and the Crisis in U.S. Foreign Policy). 228 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1965.

Denigration

Katerinich, V. M., Yershov, Yu. N., Belashchenko, T. K. LITSO IMPERIALISTICHESKOY KAZARMY (Face of an Imperialist Barracks). 80 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Kirsanov, Aleksey Vasilyevich. FINANSOVYYE KORPORATSII SSHA (U.S. Financial Corporations). 142 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Finansy," 1965.

Kiselev, Igor Yakovlevich, and Moshenskiy, Mark Grigoryevich. BURZHUAZNIYE TEORII TRUDA NA SLUZHBE MONOPOLIY (Bourgeois Theories of Labor in the Service of Monopolies). 141 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1965.

Kondrashov, V. YAKHTA-SHPION (Yacht-Spy). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 30 Aug. 1965.

Krizental, Ivan Fedorovich. OPERATSIYA "BERNGARD" (Operation "Bernhard"). 156 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1964.

Kulish, Vadiliy Mikhaylovich. RASKRYTAYA TAYNA (An Exposed Mystery). 469 pp. Indexed. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Nauka," 1965.

Mayevskiy, Viktor Vasilyevich. KOGDA SHATAYUTSYA NEBOSKREBY (When the Skyscrapers are Shaking). 240 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Mazumoto, Seite. PODVODNOYE TECHENIYE (Undercurrent). 269 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Progress," 1965.

Melnikov, Danil Yefimovich. ZAGOVOR 20 IYULYA 1944 GODA V GERMANII (The Conspiracy of 20 July 1944 in Germany). 297 pp. Indexed. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1965.

Melnikov, Danil Yefimovich, and Chernaya, Lyudmila Borisovna. DVULIKIY ADMIRAL (Two-faced Admiral). 127 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Semenov, Valentin. NEPROSHENIYE GOSTI (Uninvited Guests). 240 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Sidelnikov, Oleg Vasilyevich. OTKRYTIYE MISTERA SPARROU (Mister Sparrow Makes a Discovery). 285 pp. Tashkent, Izdatelstvo khudozhestvennoy literatury "Tashkent," 1965.

Smolenskiy, P. DIPLOMATIYA I GRANITSY (Diplomacy and Borders) 84 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1965.

Sutotskiy, Sergey Borisovich. BEDNYAGA DVADTSAT VOSMOY (Poor Fellow #28). 111 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Detskaya Literatura," 1965.

Taradankin, Aleksandr. PRESTUPLENIYE DZHERALDA BRUKA (The Crime of Gerald Brooke). *Riga, Sovetskaya Latvija*, 24, 25 July 1965.

Truong Trung Thu and Nguyen Manh De. EKONOMICHESKAYA POLITIKA AMERIKANSKIKH NEOKOLONIZATOROV V YUZHNOY VIETNAME (Economic Policy of the American Neo-Colonizers in South Vietnam). 238 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Progress," 1965.

Trushin, Yuriy Fedorovich. ZAGADKA TRESHERA (The Thresher Mystery). 64 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965.

Tsybov, Sergey Ivanovich, and Chistyakov, N. F. FRONT TAYNOY VOYNY (Front of the Secret War). 158 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo, 1965.

Vasilyev, O. VEZDE SOGLYADATAI (Spies are Everywhere). Moscow, *Izvestiya*, 11 Sept. 1965.

Viktorov, Boris Alekseyevich, Major-General. SHPIONY POD MASKOY TURISTOV (Spies Under the Guise of Tourists). 53 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo, 1963.

Published by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, this book describes alleged Western use of tourists as spies and urges vigilance on the Soviet citizenry.

Vishnevskiy, S. ZELENYYE BERETY (The Green Berets). Moscow, *Pravda*, 11 July 1965.

Vladimirov, Ye., and Peskov, Ye. RAZVEDKA I VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA IMPERIALIZMA (Imperialist Intelligence and Foreign Policy). Moscow, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, March 1964, pp. 48-57.

Wise, D., and Ross, T. NEVIDIMOYE PRAVITELSTVO (The Invisible Government). 304 pp. Moscow, Voennoye izdatelstvo ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1965.

Zhukov, Yuriy, and Sharapov, Viktor. VYETNAM, 1965. 158 pp. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Pravda," 1965.

Zorin, Valentin Sergeyevich. DOLLARY I POLITIKA VASHINGTONA (Dollars and Washington's Policy). 610 pp. Indexed. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya," 1964.

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*How intelligence has monitored
the Soviet program for lunar
and planetary probes.*

SEVEN YEARS TO LUNA 9

James Burke

On the evening of 3 February 1966 a Soviet spacecraft landed on the moon and began sending radio signals back to earth. This historic achievement was the culmination of a long, hard effort stubbornly pursued by the USSR over a period of years in the face of repeated mission failures. Our purpose here is to tell the story of how intelligence kept track of that effort through the collection and analysis of telemetric and other information.

This collection and analysis has required widespread contributions from the intelligence community, usually as a sideline to assigned tasks in support of national security objectives. Agencies of the Department of Defense, including NSA, Norad, the communications and support agencies, DIA, and particularly the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center, have joined with CIA's Office of Elint and Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center in the creation of an integrated system. Several CIA and NSA contractors have supplied essential system analyses. Special credit is due to the operators in the field, who, working often under far from ideal conditions, have done a precise and demanding job with steadily increasing skill.

The Intelligence Product

When the first radio signals from the moon arrived on earth, our collection systems were ready: we had kept track of the mission all the way from liftoff to arrival, and four stations were listening for the landed spacecraft's signal. Recordings from these stations were converted into a set of lunar panorama pictures (Figure 1) which were better than any released by the Soviets. These pictures were of great scientific interest and, having been proved genuine, constituted a powerful stimulant for the U.S. lunar program: they gave the first proof that the moon's surface is hard enough to support a spacecraft.

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An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the range of the *Studies*' purview, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the award. They will be judged primarily on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the *Studies* editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.

Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

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


FIGURE 1. Samples of Panoramic Lunar Facsimile Images Produced From Intercepted Luna 9 Transmissions.

Top two pictures show how sun angle changed during mission and also indicate that capsule moved while resting on the moon.

But the main product of our intelligence effort is not the pictures; it is the insight we have gained into the Soviet deep-space program as a whole. By some means unknown, Soviet space-flight enthusiasts have been able to obtain the support of their government for an unmanned lunar and planetary program much larger than that of the United States, although the total Soviet space program is smaller.¹ And this support has been maintained and steadily increased despite a continuing record of almost total mission failure.

The intelligence data leave no doubt as to the size of the Soviet commitment to deep space, but the reason for such a commitment continues to elude us. Only a deep penetration could reveal the decision process by which the USSR elects to keep on spending its scarce resources at such a high rate in pursuit of a non-military objective to which the United States, in spite of the pleas of scientists, has devoted only a limited effort.

The Early Lunar Program

The deep-space efforts of both the United States and the USSR began in the late fifties. The Soviets started out using their early, big SS-6 ICBM with an upper stage that came to be called the Lunik stage.² This vehicle, flying a direct ascent path to escape speed over Siberia, gave a lunar mission payload of 600 to 900 pounds. A number of such rockets launched from Tyuratam failed, but three functioned correctly and yielded the first escape (Lunik 1, "Mechta," 2 Jan. 59), the first lunar impact (Lunik 2, 12-13 Sept. 59), and the first pictures of the moon's far side (Lunik 3, 4-7 Oct. 59; see Figure 2).

During this early lunar flight program the Soviets launched no other space missions. But they were readying the next big steps. The SS-6-Lunik vehicle retired from this field, became the reliable mainstay of the Vostok and photoreconnaissance earth satellite programs. Future deep-space missions were slated to use a new combination of upper stages on the SS-6—a combination that has been the greatest visible source of trouble in the entire Soviet program over the past six years.

¹ See "A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Efforts to Explore Mars" by B. Murray and M. Davies, *Science*, Vol. 151, No. 3713, 25 Feb. 66.

² See Wheelon and Gaybeal, "Intelligence for the Space Race," *Studies* V 4, p. 1 ff.



FIGURE 2. Lunik 3 Photo of Eastern Part of Moon's Far Side.

The Heavy Vehicle

On 10 October 1960, at the instant when Tyuratam was brought by the rotation of the earth into alignment with a minimum-energy path to Mars, an SS-6 lifted off carrying a far greater weight than any ever before lofted by rocket. Intercepted telemetry showed that the loaded upper stages weighed more than thirty tons. At SS-6 second-stage shutdown a new third-stage engine ignited, burned for a few seconds, and then failed.

Only four days later, again at the exact moment for an optimum trajectory to Mars, another heavy vehicle lifted off, and again the third stage failed. These flights signaled the beginning of a huge new program. Since 1960 the Soviets have launched nearly forty of the heavy rockets, including double or triple shots at every Mars and Venus opportunity—several attempted launchings of high-apogee communication satellites and over a dozen attempted missions to the moon. The calendar of lunar and planetary attempts is shown in Figure 3.

During the same time period, by way of comparison, the United States tried nineteen deep space missions—five test shots, two missions each to Mars and Venus, and ten to the moon, culminating in the marvellously successful Surveyor soft landing on 2 June 1966. U.S. payloads were in the 500 to 2100-pound class; the Soviet spacecraft weighed 1400 to 3400 pounds. The U.S. program suffered from frequent revision of its scientific objectives, and its early lunar mission failures resulted in public criticism and long schedule delays. But because the reliability of U.S. flight equipment increased faster than the Soviet, some U.S. missions yielded high-quality data sooner than their Soviet competitors.

Collection and Prediction Through 1961

When the first Soviet ICBM tests began in 1957, it was necessary for us to expand upon the radar and telemetry collection techniques that we had evolved in previous years to monitor the testing of shorter-range missiles. Fortunately U.S. access to some of the countries bordering the Soviet Union was assured, and fortunately the Soviets elected to use the proven, simple telemetry systems that they had already developed. As a result, when the first Mars shots were launched in 1960, our understanding of the SS-6 and its subsystems was fairly far advanced.³

From the very slow acceleration recorded in their telemetry we could calculate immediately that the two October 1960 vehicles were by far the most heavily loaded ever launched. On the 14 October flight an unusually good early intercept covering booster separation proved that the SS-6 is a parallel-staged rocket, with four large boosters attached around, rather than behind, a central sustainer

³ See David S. Brandwein, "Telemetry Analysis," in *Studies VIII* 4, p. 21 ff.




FIGURE 3 SOVIET LUNAR AND PLANETARY LAUNCHINGS SINCE 1960. CURVES SHOW ENERGY REQUIRED TO REACH PLANETS (M-MARS, V-VENUS) DURING EACH LAUNCH "WINDOW". PAYLOAD POTENTIAL IS GREATEST ON MINIMUM-ENERGY DAY.

stage. On both flights the third-stage telemetry showed that the propellant pumps started up but failed to attain stabilized operation at full speed.

How did we know that these were Mars shots? Our knowledge would have been only suspicion but for a peculiarity of Soviet practice. From the beginnings of their respective programs the United States and the USSR have manifested a gross difference in launch operations philosophy. At Cape Kennedy, large rockets are placed upon their launch pads weeks or even months beforehand and are subjected to elaborate on-pad tests. For deep space missions, U.S. designers strive hard to provide on each of many days a "launch window" of several hours during which the vehicle can lift off and still, with the aid of variable guidance settings, arrive at its target.

Soviet designers, on the other hand, insist that the rocket be on the pad for at most a few days before liftoff, and they have never tried to provide a "window"; they simply demand that the vehicle be launched at the very instant optimum for the mission. Each approach has its merits, but this one surely makes the intelligence problem easier: the launch times of Soviet deep space missions are predictable almost to the minute.

Thus we were able, immediately after the October 1960 failures, to forecast an attempt on Venus in late January or early February 1961. The two shots were launched on schedule, and this time they worked better. The first placed in earth orbit a satellite which the Soviets promptly announced as history's heaviest—14,295 pounds. The second did the same, but after this satellite had coasted almost once around the world, a fourth propulsion stage ignited, ejecting itself and its payload from the "parking" orbit into a path toward Venus (Figure 4).

This rocket pioneered the concept which both the United States and the USSR now use to fling spacecraft away from the earth. Placing the interplanetary launch platform in a low earth orbit allows the maximum payload for a given launch vehicle and avoids some geometrical constraints imposed by launch site location and the motions of earth and target. But the required techniques of guidance, control, instrumentation, and propulsion are complex, and failures in the parking orbit and ejection phases continue to plague the Soviet deep-space effort even in 1966.

Early in 1961, however, the parking-orbit departure was a major technical "first," and the Soviets, justly proud of their achievement,




FIGURE 4. PARKING ORBIT DEPARTURE PATH

published a description of the launch, orbit, and ejection phases that was completely in accord with our intercepted data. They also released drawings and photos purporting to show the Venus spacecraft (Figure 5), and they began to issue bulletins on the progress of the flight.

We were not able to confirm or contradict these latter statements because our collection systems, being primarily oriented toward the Soviet ballistic-missile threat, included no sensors capable of following a weak spacecraft signal out into deep space. The Jodrell Bank radio-astronomy observatory in England did track the spacecraft for several days, and public announcements were made by its director, Prof. A. C. B. Lovell. The spacecraft apparently failed before the end of February, after completing only a small fraction of its three-month journey to Venus. During the period of the expected planetary




FIGURE 5. Venus 1961 Spacecraft.

encounter, however, in mid-May 1961, Jodrell Bank heard possible probe signals and reported them to Moscow.

There followed a unique event: Prof. Alla Masevitch and Dr. Yu. K. Khodarev came to Jodrell Bank to assist in the search for signals.⁴ They talked by telephone with people in the Crimea who were sending commands to the spacecraft trying to turn it on. They discussed both the flight and ground radio systems in some detail. Clearly they were not under any severe security strictures. At no other time in their deep-space program have the Soviets shown such a tendency to operate in an open, scientific atmosphere. Perhaps

⁴D. S. I. Report No. 200 (Secret): Visit of Prof. Masevitch and Dr. Khodarev to Jodrell Bank, 9th-17th June 1961.

during this first venture no firm security policy had been established. Public releases on the later flights mostly indicate that the Soviets are still caught between a desire to brag about partial successes and their habitual inability to be candid about failures.

U.S. Deep-Space Collection Plan

After the 1961 Venus attempt a year and a half went by without another launching of the heavy four-stage vehicle. We computed its payload potential—1800 to 2100 pounds to Mars and Venus, more than 3000 pounds to the moon—and waited apprehensively for the formidable missions made possible by these great weights. This was a period when the United States was revising its deep-space objectives downward, eventually abandoning the 1962 Mars mission altogether.

There were pro and con arguments on the importance of preparing a system for collecting intelligence from Soviet deep-space probes. It was hard to show a direct connection between such intelligence and national security. On the other hand, it was recognized that possible future efforts of both countries, particularly flights to the moon, could bring on a requirement for a high-quality collection effort. The decision was not a minor one: in order to intercept and record signals from deep space it is necessary to have a large antenna similar to those used by radio-astronomers, a highly sensitive receiver, high-quality recording devices, a local environment free of radio noise, and highly skilled personnel supported by a communication and computation network to make prompt and accurate predictions of the location and transmitting frequency of the target. The cost of a single such station amounts to millions of dollars.

Initially, a three-station collection network, giving round-the-world coverage, was proposed; it would have been directly analogous to the existing NASA Deep Space Instrumentation Facility. Budget limits ruled this proposal out. The three-station net, it turns out, may not have been really necessary anyway; subsequent data indicate that Soviet probes, unlike U.S. spacecraft, transmit during only a small fraction of their flight and only when over the Soviet Union. It was decided to build one station on essentially the same meridian as the Soviet transmitting and receiving sites in the Crimea.

The site selected was Asmara, Ethiopia, and it proved to be an excellent choice. Initially it was planned that the station would have one high-precision 85-foot antenna, with appropriate receivers and data processing equipment, to be ready late in 1965. Later it was

decided to add a 150-foot antenna of lower surface quality but simpler construction, which could become operational late in 1964.

Soviet Planetary Shots in 1962

All doubts about Soviet intentions toward the planets vanished with the massive assault on Venus and Mars in 1962. Three flights were launched for each planet: 25 August, 1 September, and 12 September for Venus, and 24 October, 1 November, and 4 November for Mars. All six attained earth orbit, but only one, the middle one to Mars, ejected into its interplanetary course. The flights followed one another so closely that there must have been little time even for diagnosing the failures, let alone trying to correct them.

The lone spacecraft to depart from earth was labeled Mars 1, and nothing was said about the failures, even though they were promptly announced in the U.S. press. Pictures of the Mars 1 spacecraft




FIGURE 6. Mars 1 Spacecraft.

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


FIGURE 7. Mars 1 Spacecraft, Second View.

(Figures 6 and 7) and a relatively complete description of its mission were released. The published data included a description of the instrumentation to be used at the planet, though normal Soviet practice is not to reveal such intentions until after the fact.

The intercept history of Mars 1 was much the same as that of Venus 1. No U.S. facilities heard it after it departed from earth. The Jodrell Bank observatory reported occasional contacts on one of the four transmission frequencies made public by the Soviets. After more than three months of travel, when the probe was 66 million miles from earth, the Soviets announced that its orientation system had failed. The spacecraft had functioned long enough to have completed a Venus mission, but it was only half way to Mars.

Renewed Lunar Program

On 4 January 1963 came the first of the long-awaited lunar missions using the heavy four-stage vehicle. The launch platform achieved earth orbit, but again ejection failed. The data we collected

enabled us to tell some things about the intended trajectory: the launch time was correct for an 80-hour transfer to the moon, with arrival along a direction nearly perpendicular to the lunar axis and the rays of the sun (Figure 8). We soon saw that this choice of trajectory offered excellent conditions for either a lunar orbiter or a landing mission. For an orbiter over the lunar poles, the arrival conditions thus selected would provide continuous sunlight for the spacecraft in orbit, assuring a ready source of power and a reference point for stabilization. The orbiter would continuously pass over the "terminator," or edge of the lighted part of the moon, where the shadows are best for photography, while the moon's slow turning on its axis in its course around the earth would continuously bring new areas into view for mapping.

For a landing, the vertical arrival path would be such as to set the spacecraft down close to the dawn terminator, again providing good shadows for imaging the surface and also assuring a maximum period, roughly two weeks, of sunlight after landing. Here once more we noted a characteristic common to many of the Soviet space systems: the designers select trajectories very cleverly to take advan-




FIGURE 8. Arrival Geometry for Soviet Lunar Probes.

tage of simplifying geometrical arrangements and then do not tolerate much deviation from the optimum.

The 4 January celestial conditions were repeated on 3 February 1963, and right on schedule another lunar probe was launched. This one failed even to achieve earth orbit. Then for the first time we saw possible evidence of reaction to failure: the Soviets skipped the March opportunity. But on 2 April they came on again, and this time the probe was ejected toward the moon. They named it Luna 4. At first, the bulletins on its progress sounded optimistic, though no description of its mission goal was given. When it was about half way to its target, the reporting took on a neutral tone; we took this, without any confirmatory data, to mean that a mid-course maneuver had been unsuccessful. On 5 April 1963, Luna 4 passed within a few thousand miles of the moon's sunlit side and sailed on out into space.

In addition to the Jodrell Bank reporting, NSA had improvised a collection capability that enabled us to record several hours of telemetry data while the probe was en route and during the fly-by. Our station was a Naval Research Laboratory experimental site in Maryland with a 150-foot antenna of the same kind planned for Asmara. Because of its western longitude this station could see only the latter part of each day's communications period when the Crimea passed under the probe. But Luna 4 was very late in arriving at the moon, the transfer taking 88 hours instead of the planned 80, so the NRL site got a good look at the fly-by. The telemetry data were complicated and full of variety: the spacecraft kept switching from one transmission mode to another as though its masters were calling upon it to execute some series of actions. But we never figured out what the data meant, and the Soviets gave us no help with a bland statement to the effect that much had been learned during the fly-by.

The 1964 Effort

When we studied the trajectories of the 1963 lunar probes, we found that they had another "optimum" characteristic: not only was each probe launched on the best day of the month for a terminator-plane arrival, but also they were all launched in winter and spring, when the moon would be well north of the equator when they arrived. This timing both assured a maximum period of viewing from the Crimea each day and caused the troublesome fourth-stage ejection to take place over the south Atlantic, in an area accessible to shipborne

instrumentation. Firings in the summer, with the moon in south latitude on arrival, would have entailed ejection over central Africa.

Taking these considerations as constraints, we predicted no further lunar attempts until the winter of 1963-64; and there were none. Indeed, the lunar effort may have suffered a schedule slippage, because when the favorable period came there still were no launch attempts until near its end, when there was a Venus opportunity at the same time. The Soviet deep-space performance in the spring of 1964 went as follows: 21 March, lunar probe failure; 27 March, Venus probe failure, called "Cosmos 27"; 2 April, Venus probe, Zond 1; 20 April, lunar probe failure.

To anyone who has seen the strenuous efforts made in the United States to avoid such schedule conflicts on the launching range, this casual mixing of four major shots in a one-month period is a source of wonderment. Either the Soviet lunar and planetary programs are largely independent, staffed by separate organizations sharing launch vehicles and facilities but able to "play through" each other without strain, or else the spacecraft development organization is very large and versatile. A third possibility, of course, is that this phenomenal deep-space launch rate was achieved by cutting corners, with its bad failure record the result.

Zond 1 repeated its predecessors' performance: it got part way to its destination and then failed. Soviet information policy on this flight took another twist: it was described merely as a "deep space probe" despite immediate announcements of its real mission in the Western press.

As the Mars launch opportunity in November 1964 approached we confidently predicted two shots, but only one was launched. It was labeled Zond 2. In our anticipatory calculations we had noticed that ejection was going to take place over Turkey just after sunset, affording ideal conditions for visual observation. We notified U.S. personnel there, and when Zond 2 went overhead a number of people were watching for it. The weather was perfect, and the jet from the fourth-stage engine, illuminated by sunlight, was seen from widely separated points on the ground. An enterprising attaché in Ankara cabled a prompt and detailed report of his observations and also produced some remarkable photographs on which we were able to fix the approximate position of the probe with reference to visible stars. Bulletins on Zond 2's progress were issued for several months, until 5 May 1965, and then a Soviet scientist visiting the United States admitted that it had failed.

Zond 1 and Zond 2 provided good exercise for our growing deep-space intercept capability. The Asmara station was not ready yet; Jodrell Bank continued to be the only source of information after the probes left the vicinity of earth. But other essential parts of the collection net were beginning to function. By tracking the vehicle right after ejection from parking orbit, speeding the results to the United States, and rapidly calculating the trajectory with the aid of large computers, we were beginning to be able with only a slight time lag to tell the deep-space sites where to look for the probe. Not the least of our achievements in this period was the successful integration of sensors and facilities belonging to three or four of the several U.S. agencies collecting intelligence.

Not only were we able to track signals from the spacecraft; we also began to intercept the command signals going up to it from the Soviet ground station in the Crimea—in the frequency region mentioned by the Soviet visitors to Jodrell Bank in 1961. But we still were not able to maintain enough coverage to confirm the execution of mid-course maneuvers and other en-route activities described by the Soviets, and we could not ascertain the exact intended mission (fly-by? impact? soft lander?) of either flight. In contrast to their open description of the planetary instruments on Mars 1, the Soviets gave us no help on Zond 1 and Zond 2. Perhaps the success of the U.S. Mariner flights to Venus (Aug.-Dec. 62) and Mars (Nov. 64-July 65) was an embarrassment to them.

All-Out Push in 1965

In accordance with the trajectory constraints described above, the Soviets launched lunar probes on 12 March and 10 April 1965. The first achieved parking orbit but failed to eject and was labeled "Cosmos 60"; the second did not go into orbit. The first Asmara antenna was now in operation, having been trucked in pieces into the Ethiopian mountains and assembled near the city on the high central plateau. In the absence of Soviet targets we exercised it and the NRL station against the U.S. lunar probes Ranger 8 and 9 with fairly good results.

On 9 May, about at the end of the proper season, Luna 5 was successfully launched. Three and a half days later, after Tass announcements that a mid-course maneuver had been made and that the spacecraft carried, "for the first time, elements of a system" for soft landing, it smashed into the southeastern portion of the moon's Sea of Clouds (Figure 9). The Soviets almost admitted the failure:




FIGURE 9. Impact Locations of Soviet Lunar Probes.

they said that much had been learned, but the system needed further "elaboration."

Luna 5 gave the Asmara station its first real chance to perform. The station intercepted both of the two spacecraft signals several times during the mission, and both Asmara and Jodrell Bank were listening during the final approach to the moon. The telemetry data were like those from Luna 4, with minor changes, and their meaning remained obscure. The Doppler frequency shift of the signal was measured, rather imperfectly on this first attempt, and gave no evidence of any retrorocket deceleration.

On the basis of previous performance this would have been the end of the lunar effort until the following winter. During the summer months the moon would be far south on the arrival dates, making tracking difficult and placing the critical ejection operation out of range of ship coverage. But this time the Soviets decided to ignore

the constraints. In what had evidently been planned months before as an all-out effort to gain a lunar landing success ahead of the United States, they kept right on firing away after the end of the favorable season.

On 8 June they launched Luna 6, which failed at mid-course. According to Tass, the engine powering the mid-course maneuver failed to shut off, causing a lunar miss of 100,000 miles. Using the knowledge of the trajectory obtained from our tracking system, we were able to show that such a large miss would require a speed change of thousands of feet per second, and this was possible only if the spacecraft used at mid-course the propellant supply carried for the main retromanuever at the moon.

On 18 July 1965 Zond 3 was launched. Almost certainly this was the second of the anticipated 1964 Mars pair, of which only one got off during the November opportunity. By holding this shot and launching it later as a test, the Soviets showed increased prudence relative to their previous prodigal expenditure of planetary vehicles. But Zond 3 was not just a deep-space test. By a clever choice of launch time, its trajectory carried it past the sunlit side of the moon and it photographed most of the far-side area left unexplored by Lunik 3 (Figure 10). Tass said that the pictures would be played back from greater and greater distances as a communication test. We did not intercept any of these transmissions because we did not have a good fix on the trajectory so as to tell our deep-space antennas where to look. This flight demonstrated the crucial importance of early and accurate tracking after ejection.

The Zond 3 photos showed that the Soviets were continuing to develop and use the concept for photo transmission pioneered by Lunik 3 and tested on a larger scale in the earth satellites, Cosmos 4, 7, 9, and 13.⁶ The concept is basically different from the slow-scan television technique used by the U.S. Ranger moon probes. The Soviet method consists of taking a photo, processing the exposed film on board the spacecraft, and then scanning the resulting transparency with a flying spot generated by a cathode ray tube. A photomultiplier detects the intensity modulation of the spot by the picture shading, and the resulting signal modulates the telemetry transmitter. Since the scan speed can be varied over a wide range, the method permits slowing down the information readout rate to compensate for the narrow bandwidth of the communication link, severely limited in

⁶ See Henry C. Plaster, "Snooping on Space Pictures," in *Studies* VIII 4, p. 31 ff.




FIGURE 10. Zond 3 Photo of Western Part of Moon's Far Side.

deep space probes. Such a system is very well suited to lunar mapping from an orbiter, and a system using the same principles is being developed for the U.S. lunar orbiter program, scheduled to begin flight tests in 1966.¹

On 4 October 1965, anniversary of Sputnik I and Lunik 3, the Soviets launched Luna 7, again overriding their own trajectory and tracking constraints. Apparently their tracking was adequate, however, because the mid course maneuver was successful for the first time, and the spacecraft impacted nearly vertically in the Ocean of

¹ The Murray-Davies article cited in footnote 1 contains a discussion of the potential of the Zond 3 photo system at planetary distances and a comparison with the somewhat different system, based on magnetic-tape storage, used by the U.S. Mariner 4 to obtain pictures of Mars.

Storms (Figure 9). The performance of our collection systems was also improved: many hours of en-route telemetry were recorded, and we were able to confirm that there was no deceleration of the spacecraft during its descent. Despite the final failure, Soviet announcements were optimistic and anticipatory of further attempts at a soft landing.

On 12, 16 and 23 November 1965 the Tyuratam rapid fire experts launched another trio of Venus probes. Two of them were ejected successfully and named Venus 2 and Venus 3. The third disintegrated in earth orbit and was labelled "Cosmos 96." Three and one-half months later, after numerous progress bulletins, Tass announced that Venus 3 had delivered a capsule to the surface of Venus and Venus 2 had made a close fly-by, but that neither probe had returned data during the planetary encounter.

As in the previous planetary flights, our collection system was unable to provide any deep-space data to confirm or contradict these Soviet assertions. The near-earth part of the system, however, was improving. These Venus probes were launched into parking orbits inclined 52° to the equator, rather than the 65° used for all previous probes, and the change afforded improved post-ejection visibility to both the Soviet and the U.S. sensors. On Venus 2, when the change came as a surprise, our coverage was incomplete. But four days later our whole network of stations tracked Venus 3 during its departure.

On 3 December 1965 Luna 8 ejected from a 52° parking orbit. It had a successful flight up to the point of its terminal retromaneuver, when, according to Soviet statements validated by our intercepted data, its attitude stabilization system failed. Our data did show deceleration during the last few seconds of the flight, but the spacecraft was probably still going thousands of feet per second when it crashed. Soviet announcements after this failure implied that the soft landing was very close to realization, and the next flight proved them right.

The Payoff

On 31 January 1966, after more than three years and following eleven in-flight failures, began the mission that was to return the USSR to its early position of leadership in the lunar race. Launch, orbit, and ejection were normal. Our sensors functioned well and soon showed that Luna 9 had an excellent trajectory. Asmara acquired the telemetry signal while the spacecraft was still over the Soviet Union on its first pass after ejection.

On 1 February the mid-course maneuver was executed, and we recorded telemetry throughout this phase. The Doppler shift showed clearly when the engine fired to place the spacecraft on a lunar-impact trajectory. On 2 February the spacecraft cruised quietly toward the moon, holding only short periods of communication with earth. On 3 February, about an hour before landing, it was oriented for the retromaneuver. Asmara, Jodrell Bank, the Royal Radar Establishment, and NRL were listening. At 1844:09.5 GMT the retrorocket ignited and our Doppler count showed a rapid slowing down. At 1844:54.5 the main retro shut off, leaving the spacecraft descending slowly toward the lunar surface. At 1845:05 the signal went off the air. The next four minutes must have been tense ones in the USSR; they certainly were at the U.S. sites. Then, at 1849:45 GMT, 3 February 1966, came the long-awaited message from the surface of the moon.

The signals from the landed capsule included telemetry modes previously heard en route and also a new mode that was immediately recognized as a photofacsimile transmission similar to those used for wirephoto service on earth. On both sides of the Atlantic facsimile machines were hastily modified to accept the signal format, and poor pictures were quickly produced. Newspaper publication of some of the pictures obtained at Jodrell Bank brought on an amusing episode: the Soviets, processing the pictures at their own pace, were scooped and complained about it.

Later processing of the recorded signals by special photo-reproducing equipment brought out much more detail and showed that the facsimile system had yielded excellent imagery of the lunar surface.⁷ Additional pictures were transmitted on the nights of 4, 5, and 6 February. In addition to showing the changing angle of sunlight, these pictures revealed that the capsule moved from its initial inclined orientation to one with more tilt, as if the ground supporting it were giving way slightly. The pictures were, of course, of enormous scientific interest, and papers describing the Jodrell Bank results were promptly published.⁸

⁷ S/O/RUGM/R-22-66 (Secret).

⁸ See "Observations of the Russian Moon Probe Luna 9," by J. C. Davies and others, and "The Moon from Luna 9," by C. Fielder and others, *Nature*, Vol. 209 No. 5026, 26 Feb. 66.

More recently these results and Soviet releases have been analyzed in an "Appreciation of the Luna 9 Pictures," by Eugene M. Shoemaker and others, *Astronautics & Aeronautics*, Vol. 4 No. 5 (May 66), p. 40 ff.

The use of the photofacsimile principle was another example of a minimum-complexity design choice. The Soviets could have used their camera with on-board film development and flying-spot read-out, as developed for other missions, if the weight and ruggedness requirements for landing could have been met. But they saw that there was no need to do this. The illumination changes so slowly on the lunar surface that the scene is essentially stationary. This means that the surroundings can be scanned slowly, point by point, by a device such as a small nodding mirror, and the brightness data for each point measured by a simple photodiode and sent to earth in real time over a narrow-band link. Thus no on-board storage via film, slow-scan vidicon, or tape is required. A system virtually identical in concept to Luna 9's was developed and tested in 1962-63 for the U.S. Ranger project, but it was never flown.

According to Soviet announcements the Luna 9 capsule carried one other experiment. A radiation sensor gave data indicating that the radiation dose at the lunar surface is due mainly to cosmic rays and amounts to 30 millirads per day. Analysts have pointed out that this choice of terminology implies an interest in the biological effect of the radiation.

The published descriptions of the Luna 9 mission validated an old, small piece of intelligence obtained many months before, reminding us that it does no harm to keep loose puzzle pieces lying in our files and look at them occasionally. In a Soviet motion picture film covertly procured in mid-1964 which described the training of cosmonauts, there is a brief glimpse of a spacecraft model unlike any of those that had been publicly described. We long suspected that this might be an early version of the lunar spacecraft launched by the heavy vehicle. Now, as shown by Figure 11, we are nearly sure it was, and we have started to measure and analyze the images in the old movie to see how the design has evolved.

Epilogue

One month after the historic flight of Luna 9 another lunar probe left Tyuratam on the same trajectory plan as the previous twelve shots. In a monotonous repetition of the fate suffered by so many of its predecessors, this one achieved parking orbit but failed to eject





FIGURE 11. Unidentified spacecraft glimpsed in 1964 Soviet Propaganda Film (at top) and Luna 9 as Displayed in Moscow, 1966 (below).

SECRET

Luna 9

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and was labeled "Cosmos 111." Undaunted by this failure, the next time the moon came around (31 March 1966) the Soviets launched Luna 10. In a striking demonstration of the soundness and economy of their early program decisions, they achieved on this mission another of the great "firsts" in space exploration—the first lunar orbit—with no change in the basic trajectory and operations plan and only minor changes in the flight hardware. The near-polar orbit of Luna 10 confirms our three-year-old predictions and opens the prospect that a future spacecraft carrying cameras along the same route will provide the first complete map of the moon.

We expect Mars shots to be launched at the end of 1966 and Venus shots in mid-1967 (see Figure 3). How many more moon shots we will see between now and then depends on decisions that have probably already been made but are unknown to us. All we can do is to continue improving our collection system and exploring the data that it has already gathered, with the aim of giving the United States a maximum understanding of this extraordinary Soviet enterprise.

Summary case history in telemetry analysis on a step in the Soviet manned flight program.

THE FAILURE OF COSMOS 57

Frank A. Whitmire

Edward G. Correll

On 12 February 1965 the Soviets flew an unmanned test vehicle in their equivalent of the Gemini program. After being injected into orbit, Cosmos 57 was tracked for one revolution, but then its telemetry ceased and a whole covey of objects appeared on radar screens where it should have been. Five weeks later, 18-19 March, came the flight of Voskhod 2, from which cosmonaut Leonov stepped out through an airlock for man's first "walk" in space. It became clear that Cosmos 57 had been an automatic prototype of the Voskhod 2, flown primarily to test the operation of the airlock. Finding out what went wrong with the test and why its failure did not delay Voskhod 2 has been an interesting exercise.

Tests and Telemetry


Testing the airlock would entail the performance of a number of operations on ground command—deploying the chamber as an extrusion from the spacecraft, opening and closing the outer hatch, pressurizing the chamber by opening a valve from the cabin, closing that valve, opening and closing the inner hatch, opening and closing an airlock vent valve, repressurizing with compressed air, and jettisoning the airlock before retrofire. It was possible for U.S. investigators, by comparative study of the Cosmos 57 and Voskhod 2 telemetry with previous take, to identify the data associated with most of these airlock operations, both the ground commands and the action

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
monitors on the spacecraft. The command codes and action indicators for other spacecraft operations could be determined from earlier experience. The important ones of these latter for our purposes here are the indicator showing that a ground command has been accepted and two indicators reflecting activation of descent system programmers, which arrange attitude and retrofire at the proper moment to land in the recovery area on next opportunity.

Cosmos 57 was launched at 0730 GMT. Our telemetry records of the flight begin about 17 minutes later. The airlock is already deployed, and a test of opening and closing the outer hatch is in progress. At 0748:36 the hatch is closed. The next step is to pressurize the chamber by opening a valve from the main cabin. The ground command channels are 46 and 45, and the code for opening this valve consists of two successive pulses at respectively 20% and 85% of band width on channel 46 simultaneous with two at 50% and 65% of band width on channel 45. This command is given at 0750:47; a downward pulse on channel 33 coinciding with the second pair of command pulses shows that it is accepted; and a change in the valve position indicator on channel 13 confirms that the valve has opened. A graphic enhancement of these telemetry traces looks like this:




Hazard of Redundancy

Pressure monitors soon show that air pressure in the cabin and airlock have reached equilibrium at about 0.7 atmospheres, but the controlling transmitter, in accordance with the Soviet practice of sending commands in series, continues to repeat the valve-open code every four seconds. Two such redundant commands are registered in downward pulses on channel 33 as accepted by the spacecraft. After that, however, the telemetry traces on channels 46 and 45 become irregular, with fragmentary command pulses, which upward pulses on channel 33 show are rejected. Reconstruction from the fragments shows that another identical series of commands is being superimposed, out of phase, on the first. Clearly a second ground transmitter, not synchronized, is beginning to take over control as the first one passes out of range. The reconstructed signals can be illustrated thus:



Then at 0751:04 channel 33 shows acceptance of a command triggered by the first of the two pairs of pulses from the new transmitter. Apparently signal strengths at this moment were such that the spacecraft took the second pair from the old transmitter followed by the first from the new to form another code, actually the mirror image of the valve-open command. Moreover, it recognized the synthetic code as the one—or close enough to it—which was to command that programming for retrofire begin, because the descent system monitors on both channels 19 and 15 show displacement downward. (Voskhod 2 would similarly start both systems at the same

time, though previous flights had not.) The traces of these simultaneous events are seen below:



Over and Out

The readings on channels 19 and 15 should have told the Soviet control that the flight would abort at the end of the first revolution and so have given time to forestall the programmed retrofire, but the controllers apparently failed to recognize the situation until the spacecraft had passed beyond range of countercommand. (Here is a hazard they accept in confining control stations to their own territory.) When we pick up the telemetry again the airlock is still attached and pressurized, but a reading on channel 43 gives the pressure in the retro bottle as almost gone and regular oscillations in the spacecraft's radio signal strength show it to be tumbling some 78 times a minute. Evidently retrofire had occurred with improper orientation for descent, either because of inadequate timer data accumulated so early in the flight or because of the eccentric mass of the unjettisoned airlock.

Nevertheless the Soviets went through with one more test operation. At 0904:40 channels 46 and 45 carry a command to close the valve whose redundant order to open had brought about this trouble,

channel 33 signifies acceptance, and the channel 13 position indicator moves back where it was. Of the required tests only those involved in refilling the chamber with compressed air, opening and closing the inner hatch, and jettisoning the airlock have not been performed. At this juncture a destruct system incorporated into the spacecraft seems to have been activated.

Presumably because the trouble would have been spotted and corrected by the crew of a manned craft, and because all the airlock operations could in fact be carried out manually, the space-walk flight of Voskhod 2 was not delayed.

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History, issues, and prospects in the matter of a congressional joint committee to oversee intelligence activities.

THE WATCHDOG COMMITTEE QUESTION

John S. Warner

For the last ten years or so there have been spasmodically recurring calls in the Congress and the press for the establishment of a joint congressional committee to act as watchdog over CIA and intelligence activities generally. The usual implication is that such a committee would function with respect to intelligence in much the same way the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does for the atomic energy program and AEC. The Executive Branch has taken an official position, though not publicly, against the idea; but there are many thoughtful people both in the Congress and in the intelligence community who are inclined to favor it. This paper examines the issues and their history in the hope of helping put intelligence officers, at least, in a position to make an informed judgment.

Legislative History

In each of the last five Congresses before the 89th, more than twenty resolutions, on the average, have been introduced in various forms calling for the establishment of a joint committee on intelligence activities. (In the current Congress the number is down to fifteen.) Most of these specify *foreign* intelligence activities; a few are ambiguous about including domestic activities like those of the FBI and Secret Service.

The most serious effort occurred in 1956, when Senator Mansfield was joined by 35 co-sponsors in a resolution which proposed that the membership of the joint committee consist of the members of the existing CIA subcommittees of Armed Services and Appropriations

in the two houses.¹ The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration cleared the resolution for a floor vote, although Senator Hayden, a member of that committee who also chaired the CIA subcommittee of Senate Appropriations, filed a formal dissent. He declared that the resolution was based on mistaken and erroneous assumptions that Congress maintained little or no control over the Agency's expenditures and that members had been kept in the dark about its activities because of the veil of secrecy imposed by the Executive Branch, whereas in fact the CIA subcommittees maintain continuing supervision of the Agency in an entirely adequate degree. If CIA must have a watchdog committee, he said, why not have one for the FBI?

¹ The present composition of the subcommittees is as follows:

CIA Subcommittees of Armed Services

Senate

Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), Chairman

John Stennis (D., Miss.) Leverett Saltonstall (R., Mass.)
Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) Margaret Chase Smith (R., Me.)

House

L. Mendel Rivers (D., S.C.), Chairman

Philip J. Philbin (D., Mass.) Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)
F. Edward Hebert (D., La.) William H. Bates (R., Mass.)
Melvin Price (D., Ill.) Leslie C. Arends (R., Ill.)
O. C. Fisher (D., Tex.) Alvin E. O'Konski (R., Wis.)
Porter Hardy, Jr. (D., Va.) William G. Bray (R., Ind.)

CIA Subcommittees of Appropriations

Senate

Carl Hayden (D., Ariz.), Chairman

Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.) Milton R. Young (R., N. Dak.)
Leverett Saltonstall (R., Mass.)

House

George H. Mahon (D., Tex.), Chairman

George W. Andrews (D., Ala.) Glenard P. Lipscomb (R., Calif.)
Frank T. Bow (R., Ohio)

The subcommittee chairman is in each case the chairman of the full committee. In each case except one the subcommittee members have been selected strictly on the basis of seniority. Membership is not listed in open publications except for that of the House Armed Services subcommittee. Because of the interlocking membership of the two Senate subcommittees, they have for a number of years met concurrently.

When the Mansfield resolution came to a vote on April 11, twelve of its co-sponsors voted against it and it was defeated 59 to 27. Among the nays was Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. Those in favor included three with later cause to be of different mind—Senator Humphrey, Senator John F. Kennedy, and Senator Margaret Chase Smith, now a member of the CIA subcommittee of Senate Armed Services. Senator Mansfield remarked that he had learned his lesson, having been beaten by the pros; and he has not subsequently introduced such a resolution or openly supported one.

More recently, in 1961, the House Rules Committee conducted hearings to determine whether a joint committee resolution should be sent to the House floor. Several of the members expressed concern about security aspects of enlarging the circle of congressmen witting of intelligence activities, and members of the CIA subcommittee of House Armed Services, including Chairman Kilday, testified against the resolution. Mr. Kilday, urging his view that the congressional supervision of CIA was fully adequate, cited the fact that in the years 1959 and 1960 the Agency had made 46 appearances before various committees and had always responded fully and candidly to his subcommittee's questioning. One member of the Rules Committee was surprised to learn that there were in fact four subcommittees for CIA affairs in the Congress. The Rules Committee let the resolutions wither on the vine.

Administration Position

In February 1956, when the Mansfield resolution was pending, the National Security Council decided not to favor a joint committee on the grounds that it would be an unnecessary supplement to the existing subcommittee setup, that this setup could accomplish any further review of intelligence activities the Congress decided was desirable, that a joint committee would have serious jurisdictional problems with other committees to which various agencies operating in the intelligence field were already responsible, and that it could raise substantial security problems and interfere with the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Branch.

In November of 1960 the question was reviewed again within the National Security mechanism, and it was decided that the 1956 action remained valid and did not require updating.

The McCarthy Position

Of the 15 measures relating to oversight of intelligence activities now pending in the Congress, it is not anticipated that there will be any action during the remainder of this session on those which would establish a joint committee.² But Senator McCarthy introduced a somewhat different resolution this year. S. Res. 210, which required only Senate approval and would not become a law, provided that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations "make a full and complete study with respect to the effects of the operations and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency upon the foreign relations of the United States."

Senator McCarthy had long pursued the objective of a joint committee. Earlier this year he indicated privately that he realized such a measure would not get favorable action and this was the reason for the new approach. There was considerable division of opinion within the Foreign Relations Committee on his proposal, some of the members seeing it as an infringement on Executive Branch prerogatives.

As a partial measure in the spirit of Senator McCarthy's wish for Foreign Relations to review CIA affairs, Chairman Fulbright suggested last April in a letter to Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, that members of Foreign Relations might sit with his CIA subcommittee. The combined Appropriations and Armed Services subcommittees met to discuss this proposal, but the result was a foregone conclusion: Senator Russell responded negatively on behalf of the subcommittee members.

The next action was a substitute resolution put by Senator McCarthy before Foreign Relations to establish a select committee of three members each from Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations to have legislative oversight over CIA, DIA and other components with foreign intelligence functions; and this was approved by the Foreign Relations Committee on 17 May. On the previous

²These were introduced by the following members:

Zablocki, Clement J. (D., Wis.)	Gonzales, Henry B. (D., Tex.)
Kelly, Edna F. (D., N.Y.)	Kastenmeier, Robert (D., Wis.)
Kornegay, Horace R. (D., N.C.)	Rosenthal, Benjamin (D., N.Y.)
Lindsay, John V. (R., N.Y.)	Cohelan, Jeffery (D., Calif.)
Daddario, Emilio Q. (D., Conn.)	Young, Stephen M. (D., Ohio)
Flood, Daniel J. (D., Pa.)	King, Carleton J. (R., N.Y.)
Rogers, Paul C. (D., Fla.)	Scheuer, James H. (D., N.Y.)
Ryan, William Fitts (D., N.Y.)	

day, however, Senator Russell and other members of Appropriations and Armed Services had made spirited statements on their exercise of jurisdiction over CIA. As the press reported, Senator Russell put his considerable prestige on the line in opposition to the intrusion of Foreign Relations into responsibility for this jurisdiction. The outcome is at this writing unresolved.

A few years back Senator McCarthy based his argument for a joint committee on charges of CIA blunders and intelligence failures; more recently he has softened in this respect. Undoubtedly his reasons are complex. Clearly, however, one of his firmest convictions is that the Congress should have more responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs. He has declared in speeches that the clear constitutional responsibility of the Senate in the field of foreign policy has been eroded. "The constitution of the United States," he says, "does not so much provide for a system of checks and balances, as is often said, but rather it provides for a sharing of responsibility." It gives the Senate a responsibility, he has quite precisely stated, for taking in the field of foreign policy a role similar to that of a parliament in the parliamentary form of government.

Another aspect of this position of Senator McCarthy's can be seen in a proposal he made in 1956. At that time a member of the House, he found it objectionable that only members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy were witting of atomic energy matters, that such information was not made available to the other members of Congress. He therefore introduced a resolution providing that the House membership in the JCAE should be put on a rotating basis, so that over a period of time a much larger number of representatives would become knowledgeable in the field.

Other Congressional Views

Part of the opposition within the Congress stems from a dislike of joint committees in principle. After the creation of the JCAE there was a strong effort to establish a Joint Committee on Space Matters, and this proposal was free of some of the complicating factors that arise in the intelligence field. Speaker McCormack nevertheless led the fight against such a joint committee, declaring that it was wrong in principle as weakening the bicameral legislature established by the constitution. Mr. McCormack continues to hold this view of joint committees in general and one on intelligence in particular.

In general, the opposition in principle in the House appears to be somewhat stronger than in the Senate. House members feel that the Senate views itself as the more exclusive club and tends to look down on the "junior body." In a joint committee, therefore, when it comes to arrangements such as for seating, chairmanship, and scheduling of meetings, the House gets, as Mr. Kilday has put it, the short end of the stick.

In addition, the proponents of a joint committee on intelligence find themselves in the unenviable position of implying that Senators Russell and Hayden, Chairmen Rivers and Mahon, and their CIA subcommittees are not adequately fulfilling their responsibilities. This can only reinforce those gentlemen in their opposition to getting a new watchdog to watch what they are watching.

The JCAE Precedent

Most proponents of a joint committee point to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a prototype. The parallel between CIA/intelligence and AEC/nuclear energy, however, breaks down in a number of places. The AEC has a continuing legislative program of some magnitude which makes a considerable domestic impact on the economy and within industry, while the CIA legislative burden is pretty small. The JCAE has basically one agency with principal responsibility in its field to deal with, whereas a joint committee on intelligence would be forced to delve into five or six departments and agencies in order to get a comprehensive look at its subject matter.

The JCAE does have an excellent record with respect to avoiding leaks of classified information. It also maintains security procedures and physical security up to the standards prescribed by AEC for storage and transmission of Restricted Data. But whether the Joint Committee constitutes a model for correct legislative-executive relationships is another question.

A few years ago a former AEC General Counsel, Harold P. Green, and Alan Rosenthal made, under the auspices of the George Washington University, a study of the JCAE as an instrument of government.³ They concluded that it has made severe and unprecedented inroads on the doctrine of executive privilege, that its encroachment on executive responsibilities is equaled by abdication on the part of

³ *The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: A Study in Fusion of Governmental Power*, published by the National Law Center of George Washington University, 1961.

the executive, that its comprehensive access to information even while matters are pending gives it the opportunity to participate in the executive's formulation of policies, that it exerts influence principally by participation in the executive's decision-making processes rather than by legislation, and that its success in doing so results from its having been established by law and from the law's provision that it be kept fully and currently informed on matters affecting atomic energy. These conclusions are painstakingly documented in a review of JCAE activities over the years, and it is demonstrated that the Committee's influence has historically transcended legislative considerations and intruded into basic policy areas.

Executive Prerogative

This question of invading the prerogatives of the Executive Branch is one of the more serious problems in determining the appropriateness of a joint committee on intelligence. It arises with respect both to intelligence and to covert operations.

Finished intelligence, under the law, is intended for the President and the policy makers in the Executive Branch. A sound case can be made that it is the exclusive property of the President, since he has responsibility under the constitution for the conduct of foreign affairs. But it is only one factor in foreign policy decisions, and giving it to Congress in isolation from other considerations might, it could be argued, lead to political difficulties in which CIA would be caught in the middle between the Executive and Legislative Branches.

In theory this danger is present even under the existing subcommittee structure. Though the problems feared have not arisen, they could in the future. But they would be more likely to if there were a joint committee, as illustrated in the case of the one on atomic energy. A very active and well-informed joint committee would be in a position to urge on the Department of State and the White House a different course of action from the one they were following and back up its case by citing the intelligence furnished it in its watchdog capacity.

CIA's responsibility for conducting covert operations raises more directly the question of executive-legislative relationships. One can visualize a situation in which either the existing subcommittees or a new joint committee was made cognizant of preparations for a Bay of Pigs operation and one or more members had serious objections to the project. It is possible that these would argue their views with

the State Department and the White House, and then losing there would plead the case in public. Here again, though this type of thing could happen under the present subcommittee system, it would more readily come about if a joint committee were engaged in continuing and vigorous review of Agency plans and activities.

Security Considerations

Many members of Congress have argued that any enlargement of the existing subcommittee system would be harmful to security. Senators Lausche, Dirksen and Russell have made recent statements to this effect.

CIA is the only major agency where strict security applies across the board to such basic matters as personnel, budget, organization, and expenditures. But to judge by experience, security is not such an obstacle to the practicality of a joint committee as it might seem. We know of no unauthorized disclosures from our four subcommittees in the past, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has a good security record. It is possible that if the membership of a newly established joint committee were not selected carefully there might be more risks than in the past, but committee membership is a delicate matter in any case. And under a resolution of the Mansfield type, where the joint committee members are specified to be the existing subcommittee members, obviously the security question is a standoff.

It has been mentioned that the creation of a new joint committee might have adverse effects on liaison relationships with foreign intelligence services. Some liaison services have exhibited apprehension about our relationships with the Congress under the present system, but when the situation has been explained to them their fears appear to be allayed. No doubt the same thing could be done if a new joint committee were established.

Security with respect to the staff of a joint committee may be a more serious matter. The staff men for the current subcommittees have heavy responsibilities in fields outside of intelligence and can devote only a small portion of their time to CIA. A full-time staff of perhaps three or four devoted exclusively to intelligence matters could be expected to be very active in studying the Agency and its activities. They would get a continuing across-the-board look at the Agency's most sensitive activities, which very few people in the Agency itself are afforded. Although the normal clearance procedures could be applied, the staff members would not be subject to Agency security discipline, and fear has been expressed that sooner or later

one of them would be tempted to make capital of his knowledge of secret matters, say by publishing a citizens-have-the-need-to-know book.

The Jurisdiction Problem

Probably the most formidable question from the viewpoint of the Congress itself is the matter of committee jurisdiction. Most agencies and departments in dealing with congressional committees can take full responsibility for their range of functions. But in answering to a joint committee concerned with all foreign intelligence activities in the Executive Branch, CIA cannot speak with authority for other agencies of the intelligence community. Moreover, these other agencies have their own lines of responsibility to different congressional committees. Would the Armed Services committees be willing to cede to the joint committee their jurisdiction over the intelligence components in the Department of Defense? Or Foreign Affairs its jurisdiction over State Department intelligence, or the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy its role in AEC intelligence? They would not.

On the other hand, there are other committees in the Congress which could, if they cared to, assert some claim to jurisdiction over at least a part of CIA's activities. The House Committee on Government Operations has indicated that it believes its charter would authorize its looking at Agency activities through its Subcommittee on International Operations. Legislation affecting CIA personnel could be claimed by the Post Office and Civil Service committees. There is a subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs which lists one of its responsibilities as liaison with the Agency. If a joint committee were established, however, it would assert exclusive jurisdiction, even as the Armed Services and Appropriations subcommittees have maintained exclusive jurisdiction for legislative oversight and appropriations under the present system.

Joint Committee as Champion

Although some members of Congress have proposed a joint committee in the belief that CIA does a poor job of running itself, others support the idea for the purpose of allaying concern on the part of the unwitting and of defending the Agency against misguided attacks. One representative who has consistently introduced joint committee resolutions did so at first on the grounds of CIA intelligence failures; now that he has learned a good deal more about the Agency he just believes a joint committee could help it in congressional and public

relations. That is what has happened in the case of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

This argument was probably more cogent in the past than it is now, when the existing CIA subcommittee members have become more vocal in championing the Agency. Last March, for example, a defector was surfaced through the House Armed Services subcommittee, and Mr. Rivers pointed this up on the floor to show how substantively his subcommittee works with the Agency. And Mr. Bates, the senior Republican, also took the occasion to say some complimentary things.⁴

The preceding January, Senator Symington had reported on the floor on his visit to some 15 CIA overseas stations. His remarks were most commendatory, both concerning performance and with respect to relations with military commanders and embassy officers.⁵ Just recently Senator Saltonstall devoted an entire issue of his bi-weekly news letter to constituents to a favorable discussion of CIA and its role as a successful producer of finished intelligence. These are but examples of the ways in which subcommittee members are protecting and defending the Agency publicly.

Part of the motivation of those who push for a joint committee derives from lack of knowledge not only about CIA but about the supervision exercised by the subcommittees. To the extent we in CIA appropriately can, we have taken a number of positive measures during the last few years to acquaint more congressmen with the Agency, its senior people, and its relationships with the subcommittees. In 1965 we met with each of the subcommittees more than ten times, as against four or five times in previous years. We have also stepped up meetings, briefings, and visits to headquarters for congressmen. In 1965 some 60 of them visited us for breakfast or luncheon meetings followed by general briefings. We believe that all these efforts have diminished the suspicion that naturally falls on activities which have to be secret.

Prognosis

Some members of Congress believe that a joint committee would be a serious threat to security and effective intelligence functioning;

⁴ He found "the Agency informed and responsive . . . indeed a great organization . . . deserves our protection and commendation at all times."

⁵ He concluded, "It is my considered judgment that the American public should be proud of this organization and its people, a group who serve our country with unstinting devotion."

Senator Saltonstall went so far as to say that "a joint committee would wreck the Agency." Actually, I believe the Agency could accommodate itself to whatever way the Congress chooses to organize the handling of mutual relationships. Review of the comparative merits and disadvantages of a joint committee does not reveal any startling differences from the present system. In theory, on the issues of security and executive prerogative, either system yields about the same results. It is only when we visualize how in practice a joint committee and staff might function that we see more problems in that solution. The most serious question, that of committee jurisdiction, need not concern us; it is for the Congress to worry about.

In any event, our views on a joint committee will not be determinative. The Administration's position will undoubtedly continue to be in opposition, primarily because of the constitutional separation of powers and the President's role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Further, the leadership in the Congress will continue to oppose the idea. With this opposition and without the support of a significant number of other members, it is difficult to see a joint committee proposal getting serious consideration in the foreseeable future.

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COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS

The Missile Crisis

Dear Sirs:

William F. Scott's article on "The Face of Moscow" in the Cuban missile crisis¹ made interesting reading, of course, for us who were much involved in the current reporting at the time and to one degree or another were concerned with the several post-mortems conducted on the affair. But we believe that the author is overly modest about the value of observations by the attachés in Moscow, especially in a crisis, and that he probably gives the Soviets credit for more "crisis management" capability than is warranted by the history of this case.

Colonel Scott tells in some detail how the Moscow attachés "put into operation a joint plan for comprehensive around-the-clock intelligence observation . . . all key installations were checked once a day . . . The Soviet surveillance was normal . . ." and ". . . life in Moscow proceeded at a normal pace." He concludes from the air of normalcy that ". . . this suppression . . . reemphasizes the Soviet ability to control news and deceive the people . . ." and that ". . . crisis management as practiced by the Soviet Union has the advantage over its counterpart in democratic countries."

Clearly, in large part because the press is an instrument of the Communist party or of the Soviet government, the USSR does have advantages in crisis management. The extent of its advantage, however, that can be said to have been demonstrated during the Cuban crisis depends primarily on the answers to the questions that begin Colonel Scott's last paragraph. Briefly, the generally accepted answers are negative: the Russians did not rightly gauge the U.S. reaction; they were not prepared against this miscalculation or for explosion of the crisis into open conflict; and the Soviet military machinery, though it moved into a position of somewhat greater than normal alertness, never got ready for a "crunch." To the degree that these answers, especially the last one, are correct, Colonel Scott's conclusion is an exaggeration of the evidence.

The evidence from the attachés' observations constituted, one might hazard the pure guess, a substantial 10% to 20% of all the evidence on which those answers are based, perhaps more at the time and less

¹ *Studies X 2*, p. 29 ff.

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in retrospect. We therefore cannot agree that Crankshaw's description of the observational ability of a tourist in the Soviet Union can properly be applied to the value of the reporting from an attaché. It would not be correct even for the tourist if he were given the language and area training and diplomatic status the attaché has.

One of the most interesting facets of Colonel Scott's story is the implicit support it gives to the view that Khrushchev and perhaps the Soviet military leadership did not anticipate a crisis over the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. The picture of a peaceful, almost serene Moscow he draws is completely in accord with the idea of the Soviet leaders being unprepared for a violent U.S. reaction, perhaps not even understanding why there should be such a reaction.

If this was the case, then it is unlikely that there would have been much unusual activity for the attachés to see and report. In effect, this would mean that Soviet capabilities for "crisis management" were not fairly tested in the Cuban affair. Certainly the Soviets do exert effective control over what is told the Russian people at any given time and in any given situation. But give due credit to the well-trained, professional U.S. military officer on attaché duty: some symptoms would have been evident to his practiced and capable eye if the Soviets had really expected and prepared for trouble.

Harry Eisenbeiss and
John Hicks, with other
CIA officers

Add the Hotel Engineer

Dear Sirs:

Mr. Lagrone's article on "The Hotel in Operations"² was of particular interest to some of us who had been involved in hotel operations eight or ten years ago. It confirmed and expanded on our experience in most respects, but it seems the author overlooked the operational potential of the hotel chief engineer, whom we, at least, found to be a useful asset, to wit:

When it was necessary to move a target guest into a different room, the engineer could arrange for faulty plumbing, air conditioning, telephone connection, etc. as a pretext for the move.

² *Studies IX 4*, p. 43 ff.

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He could legitimately enter a target's room to "inspect" or "adjust" appliances in it during occupancy, making it easy to check on faulty technical surveillance devices.

With a little technical training he could make certain technical installations in emergency.

If it was necessary to set up a listening post in a room several floors removed from the target's room, he could use his access to the hotel's utility systems to tie the two rooms together.

He could have a mirror-window installed.

In our case, at least, the chief engineer had a grand master key and could let himself into any room, storage closet, or equipment area in the house. He was on 24-hour call and did not work shifts. Moreover, in some of the "less developed" countries he is likely to be an expatriate and thus perhaps more amenable to recruitment.

Raymond Earp

*Operational implications of his
personality and attitudes toward
authority.*

THE CHINESE AS AGENT

Robert M. Leviness

The assessment of an agent's character and personality, essential for handling him successfully and evaluating his production, is of special significance with respect to Chinese agents because of certain distinctive Chinese traits. The great majority of the Chinese exhibit the same general personality pattern, and it is one that makes using them as agents difficult. They belong to a type that underneath the surface is withdrawn and self-contained, that is not sensitive to diffuse or subtle outside stimuli, and that psychologically insulates itself against the outer world. By nature and by tradition the Chinese rely on a structured, institutionalized society to which they give their loyalty as long as it protects and sustains them in their outward life and leaves their inner independence unimpaired. An understanding of these characteristics that make up the general type will help a case officer find the best ways to handle them when they manifest themselves in an individual.

During the past ten years a considerable effort has been made to accumulate data on the Chinese psychological make-up. Samples have been taken from a variety of sources—graduate students in Hong Kong, other refugees from mainland China, defectors from the Communists, Chinese Nationalist soldiers and aviators, overseas Chinese in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, agents from the mainland, dock coolies from Hong Kong, Hong Kong white collar workers, and American Chinese from California, New York, and Hawaii. The sample remains less than systematic; it is heavy with people who for one reason or another could not adapt to mainland Chinese life. Nevertheless, the primary characteristics of those from the different groups, as revealed under intensive psychological assessment, show a uniformity of pattern that is possibly quite representative of the general Chinese population. This pattern is consistent with and clarifies the old stereotype of the “inscrutable” Chinese imbued with qualities of patience, politeness, clannishness, fatalism, stoicism, cruelty, xeno-

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phobia, deviousness, frugality, and industriousness. The ultimate effect on it of lifelong Communist conditioning cannot now be gauged.

The Chinese Pattern

A characteristic common to all was found to be a kind of psychological isolation. This is not externally evident, and it seems paradoxical applied to the superficially gregarious Chinese. But underneath, they showed themselves to be of a type to whom psychological security and independence is of fundamental importance and who earn this by following the discipline and rituals prescribed by their protectors—whatever authority they are subject to—with great conformity in order to avoid prying attention. A very unusual percentage, almost 75%, had test patterns associated with a schizoid personality structure, that manifested by people who routinize their social behavior in order to free themselves for highly private and personalized mental activity. As long as there is strong external authority to guide and direct such people, they can be efficient and productive; but once that authority is destroyed or removed, they become splintered and chaotic.

These kinds of people exist in every culture. What is significant is their extraordinary prevalence in the Chinese sample. An original tendency toward this type may have been amplified by the crowded and unsettled milieu of prewar and wartime China, not conducive to much social intimacy or sensitivity. Genuinely outgoing, socializing people were met with disillusionment, distress, and distraction; and the easiest way to escape was by inward retreat. It is, of course, impossible to determine whether the environment made them take that course or whether those who inherently tended to take it survived.

In general, then, the Chinese have the underlying tendency to withdraw into their own thoughts. They can engage actively in the bustle of the workaday world without really putting themselves into it. They feel no need to share their inner experiences or overcome their self-centeredness. This internalizing tendency explains their apparent patience in the face of privation. It is a consequence of detachment from their surroundings and preoccupation with their thoughts; they are at bottom independent of their environment as long as conditions for survival exist. Thus they are not bothered by living in a grubby neighborhood, and they are hardened to the suffering of others. They exhibit a marked lack of urgency, participating superficially in life's hustle for the sake of inner solitude and tranquillity.

The Chinese ideal is not a world of social interaction and personal relationships but one so organized and ordered that little initiative is needed to meet the requirements of social living. The more structured the external behavior, the freer their inner activity. The ritualizing of external life in order to avoid real commitment is manifest in their emphasis on rote learning as opposed to comprehension and in a stylization of behavior in social situations. The famed Chinese politeness does not come from consideration for others; it is a ceremoniousness which, like other formalizing, serves to maintain appearances while at the same time warding off involving relationships. Another manifestation is extreme conventionality with avoidance and dislike of individual self-expression. A corollary is a literal-mindedness and an emphasis on recorded precedent which stifle innovation and imagination.

Status, Duty, and the Family

These psychological characteristics are reinforced by the Chinese tradition of formal structured life. In the old society that grew out of life in the villages, everyone had a certain station; he was always the superior of some people and the inferior of others. The old were superior to the young, males to females, fathers to sons, etc. Though one's station in life might change with time, no one was exempt from classification in the social hierarchy.

Status was not merely ceremonial; it carried with it obligations. It was the duty of inferiors to defer to the wishes of superiors both inside and outside the family. Inferiors were obligated to work for their superiors, to seek and accept guidance from them, to pay taxes, perhaps to perform military service. Superiors for their part had the obligation to protect their inferiors and insure their livelihood, to give advice and decide conflicting interests, and to support community interests. The relationship was thus one of mutual obligation for mutual benefit and no one had the right to act individually.

Mutual obligations began at home in the family. Each member had to receive family approval for any undertaking. No one could take it upon himself to go into a business without family consultation and consent. He could not even travel to a distant place without family discussion and approval. Though many of the old restrictions on individual decision began to be loosened even before the Communists achieved power (most notably on individual selection of a mate), a strong sense of family solidarity still persists today.

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Family members will not, as a case in point, lightly implicate each other in risky ventures such as espionage. Recently an otherwise cooperative agent concealed for seven months information about a disaffected brother who worked in an electronics plant in Peking. In other cases, some agents have felt compelled to report their agent roles to family members.

Family relationships and obligations are thus sometimes inimical to agent operations, but they can also be helpful, say when a member living abroad agrees to cooperate in the defection of one inside China who is able to travel abroad. Unfortunately, the Chinese Communists are also aware of this possibility and seldom send people with relatives abroad to staff their foreign missions.¹

On the debit side, again, mutual obligations sometimes lead to nepotism in operations. An agent may be under considerable pressure to place relatives on the payroll, especially if he has an enabling overt position, as, say, in a publishing enterprise we support. Even if our vigilance should prevent his hiring them, he may yield to their demands for financial assistance and so have to pad his accounts or otherwise misuse our funds. Awareness of this hazard will be useful in policing operations.

Authority

Outside the family, the ultimate superior is the regime, which must live up to what is expected of it as a protective authority in the same way a father must. A most striking example of these expectations was found in examining the cases of 21 defectors from Communist China on whom the data was sufficient to determine motivation. Almost all of these defectors felt that the regime had let them down or was about to.

The long tradition of authoritarian government in China, together with their kind of family life, has accustomed the Chinese to rely on those above them not only for protection and means of livelihood but to tell them what to do. That the modern Chinese who may consciously disavow the old attitudes probably continues unconsciously to act on them was illustrated in a recent defector who had lived under Communism since he was nine years old. Commenting on his adjustment to life in America, the defector said he had found it most difficult to make decisions about what he wanted to do. He wished others

¹ See "Chinese Defections Overseas," by Henry Flocks, in *Studies* IX 4, p. 19 ff.

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would have told him what they wanted him to do rather than ask him about his own preferences.

No doubt the Communists have found this acceptance of authority useful for many of their purposes, but the stifling effect it exercises on creativity, imagination, improvisation, and innovation has surely hampered them as well. For us an inference should be that in directing an agent unaccustomed to exercising initiative and inclined toward literal-mindedness, we should be explicitly detailed, leaving nothing to his poor imagination. In general the Chinese are the kind of people who need "How To" manuals.

Many other consequences of significance to our operations stem from these attitudes toward authority. In seeking recruitments and defections, first of all, we are attempting to substitute ourselves as the target's protective authority. To succeed in this effort we must impress the target with our ability to perform the role and meet its obligations. Rather than pose as an unprepossessing student, businessman, or journalist, we should make it clear whenever possible that we represent the United States Government. Our manner, though gracious, should be slightly aloof. Yet we should avoid arrogance, for the Communists have sensitized the people to what one defector termed "feudal manners."

The Chinese defector does not expect, or want, to be treated as an equal. The egalitarian tendency in American society and the freedom it permits do not hold the attraction for him that one might suppose; one escapee from the mainland said these qualities of American society were positively frightening. He prefers a society more secure, less equal or free, and therefore less competitive. Though he may expect us to talk in terms of freedom, individual dignity, virtue, etc., he will really be listening for a clear statement of our expectations of him, risks he may have to take, and specifics of our ability to protect him. He will want to know what compensation he will receive, what training he may expect, where he may eventually be resettled, what his prospects for earning his living are, and other practical information. We should be prepared to give him this.

On the other hand, we should also think in terms of the obligations of the defector to us and capitalize on the Chinese disposition to fall in with the desires of constituted authority. If he respects the person directing him and clearly recognizes him as a representative of authority, he will do his best to meet our expectations of him, even to the point of going back, if feasible, and working for us in place.

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Fatalism

Of some bearing on the Chinese acceptance of our authority may be his traditional "fatalism." In a recent letter from inside China to a relative abroad, a Chinese complained bitterly about his lot under the Communists, only to conclude that nothing he or anyone else could do would change his circumstances. "Communist rule is new," he said. "It has not yet run its course, so no matter how many people oppose it, it will not collapse."

In dynastic times the Chinese believed that a dynasty fell because Heaven had withdrawn the emperor's mandate. Crop failures, floods, droughts, pestilence, and banditry were not seen as causes contributing to the collapse but as signs of Heaven's displeasure. The rebellion that finally toppled the emperor succeeded only because it was in harmony with the forces of destiny. Clever men would always be alert for the right time to switch their support to a new dynasty.

We should be able to capitalize on this traditional concern with reading the trends of destiny in our efforts to promote defection among Chinese Communist officials abroad. In both the propaganda we direct against these officials and in agent contact, we should try when possible to illustrate that the tides of change are turning against the Communists. When we reach the point of open approach to a target, we might suggest that he break off his identification with the losing regime and live outside of China where he could improve his skills while waiting for the trend to turn. This concept might provide a satisfactory rationalization for an official who would otherwise consider defection an unpardonable departure from accepted rules of behavior.

Face and Fabrication

The imperatives of fulfilling his role in his structured society lead the Chinese to an extreme reluctance to admit failure in discharging an obligation. (The Communist institution of criticism and self-criticism, clashing head-on with this trait, can have prevailed only by virtue of Chinese submissiveness to requirements and conformism with group behavior.) His face-saving may reach the point, if he cannot plead that a changed situation invalidates the obligation, of trying to make it appear that he has discharged it when in fact he has not.

The bizarre sequel of such an attempted deception by a Chinese agent some years ago was the agent's blaming his case officer for his having fabricated several intelligence reports. "If he had not

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constantly pressured me to produce," he said, "I would not have had to fabricate." It was of vast importance for him to avoid the shame of not having lived up to his role as an agent, and he felt no guilt at having used deception to this end. Though Chinese ethics teaches honesty and personal rectitude, the shame of failure may seem a greater threat to one's integrity.

This incident need not have happened. The case officer had failed to realize that in merely asking the agent to undertake a task he had accorded him a certain standing that the agent would seek to protect. It would endanger it to express doubt about being successful. If the case officer had fully discussed the proposition, explicitly considering the possibility of failure, the agent could have qualified his commitment; he would not have felt pushed out on a limb.

The case officer also probably missed important later clues. Before resorting to fabrication, the agent likely procrastinated in the hope that he would not be pressured further. Or perhaps he attempted to convince the case officer that unexpected difficulties (difficulties that did not reflect on his own abilities, of course) had arisen, only to have them brushed aside. When the warnings were ignored, he had no way out except to fabricate.

Levels of Reward

The Chinese agent should not be over-rewarded or often rewarded in advance. He will take bad pay and ill treatment when he has no alternative, but he becomes increasingly ritualistic and less productive as he feels more and more secure. He aims to progress to a status in which he no longer needs to earn security because he already has attained it. A single month's salary in advance may do no harm, but regular advance rewards will not necessarily instill a corresponding obligation. To get the most out of his agent, the case officer should use a sliding scale of rewards on which each point is set at the lowest level acceptable to the Chinese.

Case officer's and agent's understanding about compensation must be identical. The Chinese may expect certain benefits not explicitly agreed upon and feel wronged if he does not get them. He may regard, and prefer, a small salary as condition for increased benefits covering sickness and old age. He expects the case officer, as protective authority, to play the role of benefactor in time of need, and if the case officer refuses he cannot count on the Chinese to make any special effort for him.

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The Chinese expects rewards for loyalty and seniority even though he is doing the same type of work as always and doing it less efficiently. This explains the large Chinese bureaucracy and the army's retention of large numbers of men in their fifties and sixties. The government feels responsible for providing for them. It cannot pension them economically or find them employment elsewhere. If it suddenly renegeed on this obligation, not only those affected but the Chinese public at large would react in anger. Explicit agreements on all these matters will help avoid later complaints and poor morale.

Recap

The Chinese personality pattern and the legacy of traditional Chinese society (between which there is presumably some causal relationship) combine to make the Chinese as a target—notably the Chinese official abroad—difficult to dislodge from his quid-pro-quo loyalties to regime and family. The principal wedge is a failure in the quid pro quo. These same factors require that, once recruited, he be handled with a tight-reined paternalism, with special regard to his immediate and permanent security, with a close eye to the limits of his capability, and with authoritative direction in detail. The case officer should of course not assume that any particular Chinese individual will fit this pattern precisely or at all—and continued conditioning under the Communist regime may modify it significantly—but it does embody the dominant observed tendencies and should be useful as a frame of reference against which to gauge the man at hand.

The larva and pupa stages, as it were, of the Tsarist political police's main center for anti-revolutionary work abroad.

PARIS OKHRANA 1885-1905¹

Rita T. Kronenbitter

The numerical strength of the Okhrana at home and abroad has been subject to much exaggeration. According to some Communist versions published both before and after the revolution, tens of thousands of Okhrana officials and agents in mufti were placed in every province of the Empire to prey upon the peaceful people and brutalize them. The agency is pictured as running a police state within the autocracy, subject to no authority and exerting its power on all, from the Tsar and his court down to the remotest muzhiks. The Okhrana's own documents show that this picture is largely propaganda.

In consideration of the size and population of the Empire and the tasks that faced the Okhrana, it seems about the smallest government agency in Russia, in most of the gubernias quite insignificant. According to Aleksei Vassiliev, the last director of police under the Tsar, it never had in all of Russia more than a thousand men.² Headquarters in Petrograd had fewer than 200 employees in all sections; Moscow's office was much smaller; and the branches at the seats of gubernias and volosts normally had two or three employees each.

The Okhrana abroad was likewise surprisingly small, and its requirements for headquarters support engaged less manpower than one would expect of a fairly modern and very active system. Agents under the Paris center employed in penetration operations had to be backstopped by headquarters or branch offices within the Empire

¹ Based chiefly on its files in the collection *Zagranichnaya Okhrana* recently opened to the public at the Hoover Institution. For earlier articles from this source see "The Okhrana's Female Agents," Parts I and II, in *Studies* IX 2, p. 25 ff and IX 3, p. 59 ff, and "Okhrana Agent Dolin," *Studies* X 2, p. 57 ff.

² A. T. Vassiliev, *The Okhrana* (London), p. 38.

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with legends, documents, money, and whatever else was required to make their positions safe and tenable among the revolutionaries. It seems clear that headquarters and Paris must both have been practical, imaginative, and expeditious to meet such exacting demands with an extremely small number of personnel.

Cumulatively, the total number employed by the Paris center from its beginnings under Rachkovsky in 1885 to March 1917 when the revolution terminated it was almost one thousand. This includes everyone who received remuneration for services rendered in any capacity during the 32 years—chiefs, assistants, office administrators, staff agents under deep cover for penetration operations, Russian penetration agents and correspondents, non-Russian principal agents supervising investigation and surveillance networks, the hired detectives under their supervision or working independently, informers and police officials paid for their cooperation.

The operations were in perpetual flux. Many officers and agents served for long periods, but their duties were subject to constant change. Only the chief and his office staff, seldom numbering more than eight people, were a stable group. Some two hundred internal (penetration) and external (detective) agents operating at the height of the center's activities were subject to the most diverse movements and assignments. The networks formed and reformed for tasks in Germany, France, Italy, and elsewhere.

The Paris center had a somewhat different character under each of its four successive chiefs. While the paramount task of each was the same—collecting intelligence on revolutionary movements—it happened that each was confronted with a new situation requiring revision of plans and concentration of effort in new directions. Each also had his own style of operation. Not counting an abortive effort begun by Korvin-Krukovskoi in June 1883 which ended in January 1885 with his dismissal, the successive administrations were as follows:

Peter Ivanovich Rachkovsky—March 1885 to November 1902
Leonid Aleksandrovich Rataev—November 1902 to August 1905
Arkady Mikhailovich Harting—August 1905 to January 1909
Acting: Captain Andreev and Captain Dolgov—February to November 1909
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Krassilnikov—November 1909 to March 1919

This article will examine the first two of them.

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Rachkovsky: Office and External Nets

Arriving in Paris in March 1885, Rachkovsky found no records covering Korvin-Krukovskoi's nearly two years of service; there was not even an office for him to take over. The only organized remnant was a group of detectives under an ex-Sûreté agent named Barlet. Krukovskoi had been paying this "Barlet Brigade" mostly for reports copied down in the French police and security offices; its members did not conduct any surveillance and investigations for themselves. At best the Brigade amounted to a liaison arrangement exploiting personal connections in various French offices.

Rachkovsky was given two rooms in a side wing of the Imperial Embassy at 97 rue de Grenelle, with a separate entrance from the courtyard. He installed an additional door with a lock in the hall and heavy bars in the windows. His T/O called for three assistants, to be selected from among MVD personnel already in France and Switzerland. He chose Leonty Golshman, a long-time MVD correspondent, and for clerical and code work Nikolai Chashnikov, an embassy employee fluent in French. Throughout his tenure, until 1902, these two remained his only permanent office staff.

Okhrana chief Semiakin, in his earlier capacity as a sort of inspector general, had found the Barlet Brigade the one thing he could praise in Krukovskoi's operation; but Rachkovsky was never quite happy with it. On headquarters' insistence he renewed the contract and increased the number of agents to six. But he soon realized that he could not buy their primary loyalty away from their former employer, the Sûreté. He needed completely independent investigators to go beyond what Brigade members could get from the daily transcripts in police and security offices; the host services would make available only what it was in their interest to pass on to the Russians. He was anxious also to learn as much as possible about the French services themselves, especially about their principal leaders. Before terminating the contract with Barlet in 1887, therefore, he cultivated agent Riânt, one of the Brigade, to the point that he supplied information on the Sûreté and its leaders.

Under the terms of the contract Barlet maintained a private office to which the members of the Brigade brought their reports for transmission to Rachkovsky. Safe quarters were used for all communication, and the usual contact was Rachkovsky's assistant Golshman. None of the Brigade had access to the offices at 97 rue de Grenelle. When the contract was terminated, Rachkovsky assigned a formerly

independent MVD agent, Wladislaw Milewski, to serve as case officer for all external, non-Russian agents. Milewski rented a new safe house, got in touch with former Brigade members Riant and Bint, and rehired them and two new men, Douget and Dove. An experienced anti-revolutionary operator in Paris and London, he trained the four in surveillance to supplement the liaison work with the French services.

As soon as his safe house was ready for business and the new team was reporting to it, Milewski made a trip to London and hired two external agents there. One was a certain Murphy, a long-time acquaintance of his in Scotland Yard; the other he called "John." He gave both of them instructions to report directly to his address in Paris on the activities of Russian revolutionaries in England. The information was to be obtained from contacts in Scotland Yard and from their own observation. This was an informal beginning of the London outpost of Paris Okhrana.

Penetration Agents

Some half dozen agents sent abroad by the MVD were already in circulation in France and Switzerland, reporting directly to headquarters by personal correspondence or through consular channels. But none was fulfilling the requirement for inside information on revolutionary activities, and it was Rachkovsky's principal mission to organize penetrations of the adversary. Impatient for the formation of at least a small group of internal agents for such penetrations, headquarters had sent to France and Switzerland an MVD counsellor, S. Zvoliansky, to smooth the way for the Paris center and to spot recruits. After reviewing Rachkovsky's initial efforts, Zvoliansky now urged headquarters not to pester him for immediate reports but to give him time to organize the internal service. He asked also that Rachkovsky be sent to Switzerland to study the targets there and locate possible recruits.

The first such recruit was found in Zurich. He was studying at the Polytechnical College under the name Landesen, in hiding from the revolutionaries. Under his true name, Abraham Hackelman, he had been exposed as a police agent working among students belonging to the terrorist Narodnaia Volia at Petersburg and Riga. But headquarters' evaluation of him was most complimentary and he was recommended for rehiring. Rachkovsky agreed to pay him a monthly salary of 300 rubles plus travel expenses. His targets would

be the Narodnaia Volia exiles and newly formed groups of the Socialist Revolutionaries.

Other recruitments followed slowly. By the end of 1885, Rachkovsky had three penetration agents—Landesen among the Narodnaia Volia terrorists in Paris and Switzerland, Ignaty Kornfeld among the Anarcho-Communists, and Prodeus, a much traveled and well-known revolutionary, reporting on various revolutionary centers. Rachkovsky clearly recognized that his main task was to penetrate the conspiratorial groups, but he proceeded with extreme caution in building up the organization to do the job. Incoming dispatches brought many nominations from headquarters, but he ruled most of them out for lack of access to target groups or other reasons.

It was probably because of this cautious pace in Paris that Okhrana headquarters and the branches in Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, and elsewhere sent other agents abroad on penetration assignment with instructions to report directly home. The practice led to much confusion. The Paris office did not know when Odessa, Kiev, or Moscow had an agent in France, Switzerland, or England. Moreover, Okhrana headquarters itself was not always informed when a local branch sent an agent abroad. Despite much correspondence in the matter, it was only Rachkovsky's successors that succeeded in getting agent operations abroad coordinated. As the system worked during his term in Paris, he had no knowledge of such agents as the famous Evno Azev working under headquarters control in Germany and Switzerland.

During the Rachkovsky period the Paris internal service came to include the following major penetration agents:

- Ilya Drezhner among the Social Democrats in Germany, Switzerland, and France;
- Boleslaw Malankiewicz among the Polish anarchists and terrorists in London;
- Casimir Pilenas, a spotter for Scotland Yard recruited to work among the Latvian terrorists;
- Zinaida Zhuchenko among the Socialist Revolutionaries and their terrorist Fighting Unit;³
- Aleksandr Evalenko, assigned by headquarters to New York City for work among the Jewish Bundists and terrorists, but under Paris control.

³ For her story see the "Francesco" case in *Studies IX 2*, p. 28 ff.

Modus Operandi

No system of case officers or intermediaries between the Paris chief and the penetration agents was really established under Rachkovsky or his immediate successor, Rataev. When in Paris, these agents would report directly to Rachkovsky or sometimes to his case officer for the external service, Milewski. From elsewhere they reported either by mail or through confidants in the Russian consulates, as Evalenko did from New York.

The Paris office enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with autonomous agenturas in Berlin and Sofia. Rachkovsky had founded the one in Berlin, but a headquarters memorandum of 9 December 1900 gave it an independent chief, Arkady Harting, who was the same Abraham Hackelman that Rachkovsky had recruited under the name Landesen as his first penetration agent fifteen years before. Berlin like Paris had an internal and an external service, each set of agents reporting to a different case officer in a safe house. The case officer for the external agents, principal among them Carl Woltz and Henry Neuhaus, was Michael Barkov. For the internal agents Harting himself, like Rachkovsky, often had to serve as case officer; headquarters was still reluctant to assign permanent staff personnel to such duties. In 1902 Harting acquired the important penetration agent Dr. Jacob Zhitomirsky, who worked among the Social Democrats in close association with Lenin and Litvinov.

The Balkan agentura came under Rachkovsky's control by default. A service had operated there since the early 1880's as an outpost of the Odessa Branch. It followed the activities of subversives in Rumania and along the Bessarabian border. Because of inadequate headquarters control of this—as of other operations abroad—the expanding efforts required in the Balkan countries were integrated under general supervision from Paris. A Colonel Trzhestyak headed this Sofia service, with case officer Ivan Osadchuck handling the agents.

Under Rachkovsky's direction the Okhrana abroad was thus not a well constituted and integrated intelligence service. Shortage of personnel made necessary a constant shifting of agents in order to obtain some coverage of the multiplying centers of Russian subversives in Western Europe. There was no adequate control of operations through experienced case officers; agents had to be left to their own devices to run themselves.

Rachkovsky as Diplomat

By personally winning the good will and cooperation of the services of host countries, however, Rachkovsky indirectly assisted his agents and crowned their efforts. For instance, when a penetration agent in Geneva had supplied the essential information about a gathering of terrorists there and external agents had located by surveillance their clandestine printshop and weapons store, Rachkovsky could call on Swiss security units to help destroy the underground and arrest the ringleaders. This happened in 1887; it was repeated in 1888, then again and again in other countries. His powers of persuasion were sufficient to convert Lev Tikhomirov, one of the leading terrorists, when he had been softened by contrived exposure, and get him to write an anti-revolutionary book.

Rachkovsky's political action operations, often highly successful, were exclusively his personal effort. He devised some plans for using others, but in every major instance he was the sole operator. He befriended a Danish journalist, Jules Hansen, during his first visit to Paris in 1884. Besides being one of the bright lights of his profession, Hansen was a counsellor in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a friend of Minister Delcassé. He became the principal channel for promoting a friendly press for Russia in western Europe, and he made contacts for Rachkovsky with leading ministers and politicians, including even President Loubet. On the other hand, Rachkovsky also cultivated important personages in the imperial government and at court. In these activities he was, as revolutionary writers accused him of being, a manipulator behind the scenes preparing the ground for acceptance, both in Paris and at Petersburg, of the Franco-Russian alliance signed in 1893.

Rachkovsky devised and developed access to several other governments beside the French. The files contain copies of dispatches about an audience he had with Pope Leo XIII and a proposed exchange of diplomats between Russia and the Vatican with particular view to the unrest in Catholic Poland. Advisers to the Tsar in Petersburg turned down the proposal, but the idea of combatting the insurrectional campaign in Poland by using religious interests clearly illustrates Rachkovsky's high-level concept of political action.

Rachkovsky's major provocation operation—his were probably the only specifically planned instances of this formally banned practice in the annals of Okhrana—was primarily in support of political action. In 1890 agent Landesen, having promoted among the revolutionaries

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in Paris an elaborate plot to kill the Tsar, arranged that after one underground meeting a large number of the terrorists would each have on their persons their weapons and written notes on the parts they were to play. The French police, tipped off through cutouts by Rachkovsky, arrested the entire group, and that summer they were tried and sentenced, Landesén in absentia. Rachkovsky thus scored a victory not only over the enemies of the state but against those in Petersburg who had opposed the Franco-Russian alliance on the grounds that France was too soft on subversives. The stern police and court action proved to Petersburg that France too had a strong government capable of dealing with internal enemies.

Despite his many successes in this formative age of Paris Okhrana, Rachkovsky was dismissed in 1902, principally because he dared expose in an intelligence report a charlatan and hypnotist named Philippe who told fortunes for the imperial household. His enemies at headquarters used this report to turn Tsar Nicolas against him. In 1905, however, after martial law was introduced at Petersburg, he was brought back to head the entire Okhrana, first as MVD Special Commissioner and then as Deputy Director of Police.

Rataev: Decline

In 1902 the annual authorized expenditures of Paris Okhrana were about 267,000 francs. This amount did not include the cost of agents sent from headquarters and provincial branches to operate abroad independently of the Paris office, and it did not cover the funding of the Balkan and Berlin agenturas. It covered the costs of the Paris office and safe houses, the salaries of external and internal agents and their case officers, and the needs of outposts in Switzerland, England, and Galicia.

Director of Police Lopukhin, who had never been friendly toward Rachkovsky, favored the selection of Leonid Rataev for the Paris post and increased the personal allowance for it with his appointment. But he also instructed the new chief to cut off the salaries of all agents not reporting directly to him. Rataev was apparently ill qualified for the Paris post, as he had been for his prior job as personnel chief of the Petersburg Okhrana. He had been in police service for some twenty years, but both of his bosses, the Director of Police and the MVD Minister, considered him a weak administrator, little more than a socialite figurehead, and regarded his appointment to Paris as a way to get rid of an incompetent at headquarters. At the same time they anticipated that he would be easier to handle

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there from headquarters than the vigorous, independent, and scheming Rachkovsky.

Rataev proved to be as ineffective a manager as they expected. Although the number of penetration agents under him increased, none of these were his recruits. They were sent abroad by headquarters and such branches as Moscow, Kiev, and Warsaw; after reporting at first to their original offices, they were transferred to Paris for administrative and operational handling. Rataev did nothing, either, to develop professional case officers but let his office staff manage all agent personnel.

A contraction of Rataev's mission began to be noticeable soon after his arrival. His budget total was lowered step by step until it was halved at 135,000 francs. The Galicia outpost was taken away from Paris control, first being made an autonomous unit and then put under Warsaw Branch. Harting in the Berlin agentura, a friend of Rachkovsky, was *ergo* an enemy of Rataev, and Berlin very soon began to encroach on areas in the Paris domain—Switzerland, Austria, the Low Countries. Rataev protested, but to no apparent effect.

Penetrations

What made Rataev as successful as he was in collecting intelligence and disarming the revolutionaries was a small group of the Okhrana's ace agents assigned to the Paris center. These men and women came fully briefed from headquarters, impressively backstopped in Russia, and with their operational targets fully spelled out. Rataev's office was thus little more than a support facility for them, paying salaries and expenses and handling communications. Agents' reports, to be sure, were prepared as outgoing dispatches by Golshman, who had become an excellent editor, but Rataev contributed very little to mounting operations and handling the agents.

The first team of three agents assigned to Paris by headquarters was headed by Leo Beitner; the other two members were his wife and his unmarried sister Maria. They were to operate in Paris, Geneva, and Brussels. In Paris, Leo's target was the home of Vladimir Burtzev, which served as a revolutionary publishing office and headquarters for a newly emerging revolutionary counterintelligence bureau; in Geneva, the target was the center of the Socialist Revolutionaries, assigned at first to Maria; and at Brussels, Leo and his wife were to trace how the revolutionaries smuggled arms to Russia. The Beitner team's work was a success under Rataev and under his successors

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an outstanding Okhrana achievement against revolutionary smugglers and counterfeiters.⁴

The second team was a married couple named Zagorski. The man reported to headquarters as agent-at-large, traveling almost constantly, while his wife concentrated on the Fighting Unit of the Socialist Revolutionaries in Paris and Germany, reporting through Rataev's office only.⁵

At about the same time the later famous Evno Azev was given to Rataev. He had served in Germany for several years and then been ordered dismissed by Rachkovsky as unreliable, but he was rehired by headquarters when he gained entry to the central committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries and their Fighting Unit of assassins and "expropriators."

The names of some other important penetration agents sent from Russia were Aleksandrov, Chizhikov, Borovskaia, Brodski, Fudim, and Gramm. In addition, Rataev retained all the agents he inherited from Rachkovsky. The only deep-cover agent he himself hired was a Frenchman, August Doré, for a counterespionage assignment in Vienna. This man, however, landed in jail soon after arriving in Austria in 1905 and later caused much trouble by demanding compensation for his six months in prison.

Rataev seldom acted as case officer for the penetration agents. For the most part, they had had years of experience in intelligence operations in Russia, several of them under the personal direction of Zubatov, chief of the Moscow Branch and a master mind in penetration work. Whatever operational guidance they needed in the field was given in headquarters communications. As a rule, however, Rataev would be informed of the identity of the agent and his background, the briefing he had received, the target assigned him, his approximate date of arrival, his pseudonym, and often the recognition passwords to be used.

Overt Staff

Rataev increased his office staff to four men, retaining Chashnikov and Golshman (until the latter's retirement during this period) and adding Ivan Molchanov and Ilin in 1904-1905. They acted as reports officers and also as case officers to the extent of meeting and taking care of new arrivals from Russia.

⁴ See the "Julietta" case summarized in *Studies IX 2*, p. 26.

⁵ See the "Sharzh" case in *Studies IX 2*, p. 38 ff.

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The external service during this period acquired only a few new agents but was better systematized by the use of principal agents to lead the networks of non-Russian investigators. Henri Bint, who had served since the days of Korvin-Krukovskoi, became the principal agent in Paris. He maintained constant personal contact with the Sûreté offices and was in charge of surveillance men in France, Switzerland, and the French and Italian Riviéras.⁶ Bint's home was also his office for meeting agents and receiving mailed reports. To get his own instructions and pass on information he normally met Chashnikov or Molchanov, never Rataev. Bint's more important detectives of the period were Eugène Invernizzi, first hired in 1899 for investigations in Italy; Albert Sambain and Eugène Leveque in Paris; and Boquet, Rigault, Depassel, and Deleamon in Geneva and other cities of Switzerland.

The most permanent liaison agent in Paris was a man named Fehrenbach whose more than 5,000 identity reports during this period were all copies of Sûreté records on Russian émigrés in France. Their volume indicates that Fehrenbach must have spent most of his working time in the Sûreté offices. The arrangements for this liaison assignment had been made by Rachkovsky, but the bulk of production from it came during Rataev's tenure.

Fringe Operations

The outpost in London, referred to as an agentura in Rataev's dispatches, acquired agents Powells and Michael Thorpe. Powells was a retired Scotland Yard detective recommended to the Okhrana by Thorpe, his former boss and a younger man with similar background. Both had previous experience in operating against Russian revolutionaries in London. The organization of the Berlin agentura remained the same as it had been, with Michael Barkov as case officer for German investigators and Harting handling the Russian penetration agents and high-level liaison with the Prussian Sicherheit Dienst.

Rataev was not at all a political activist like his predecessor. An important political action operation did develop during his term in Paris, but he was at most only a channel for funds, the principal operator receiving all instructions directly from headquarters. This was Ivan F. Manasevich-Manuilov, a nobleman, moving diplomat, and high-level contact man, who as a spotter for the MVD back in the 1890's had had occasional encounters with Rachkovsky. The Okhrana sent

⁶ Some of his later operations are described in *Studies IX 3*, p. 60 ff.

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him to Paris in 1903 under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover to resume work started two years previously with an organization called the "Circle of French Journalists." How Manasevich-Manuilov operated with this and another organization, the "League for Saving the Russian Fatherland," is not recorded in Rataev's dispatches. The only references to his activities are the gross amounts of expenditure. These, which reached thousands of rubles monthly, do reveal that newspapers like *Figaro*, *Echo de Paris*, and *Gaulois* were recipients of subsidies from the operation.

Succession

After mid-1905 the Paris station was to experience a great revival under Arkady Harting. But his is a story that should stand alone.

Operational detail of professional interest in the testimony of the famous Swedish spy.

NOTES ON THE WENNERSTRÖM CASE

Alexander Mull

The story of Stig Wennerström, the Swedish air attaché who for 15 years served as a Soviet agent in Moscow, Washington, and Stockholm, has been told well from open sources, principally his own testimony, in H. K. Ronblöm's book.¹ From the professional viewpoint Ronblöm brings two big points out especially well—the Soviet recruiter's pitch based on the important role the Swede could play in maintaining the international balance of power and world peace; and then the permanent Soviet handler's command over him as "the best friend I ever had." Nevertheless, being written for a popular audience, the book naturally slights some details of handling technique and tradecraft revealed in the testimony that are of interest to intelligence officers.² These notes cover the most salient such features.

Recruitment

The non-Marxist ideological rationale and basis for Wennerström's recruitment is best expressed in his testimony referring to a later period. During the 1950's, he said, the Soviets had staked everything on developing an intercontinental rocket with nuclear warhead and had "consciously entered a period of weakness" in other military and technological fields, "so that in the sixties, if they survived the fifties" a real balance of power would be reached and "the quicker they could achieve a balance of power, the quicker they would be able to get ahead with insuring world peace. . . . I came to feel myself a trusted member . . . of a very large team that was working to get through the fifties without a war, so that the sixties would come in and the balance of power would be a real fact."

At first, however, he had dallied with adventurism. In 1948, in Stockholm, he had half-jokingly offered to give Soviet attaché Ryba-

¹ Translated as *The Spy Without a Country* (New York, 1965), reviewed in *Studies* X 1, p. 93 f.

² This is true in much less degree of Thomas Whiteside's "Annals of Espionage" in *The New Yorker* for 26 March, 2 April, and 9 April 66—the best single unclassified history of the case from the intelligence point of view.

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chenkov the location of a secret Swedish airfield for 5000 kronor. The deal was consummated, and when Wennerström was posted to Moscow at the beginning of 1949, clandestine contact with a previous acquaintance, Soviet intelligence officer Nikitushev, was arranged. Nikitushev, after sounding him out and explaining the Soviet strategic handicaps in trying to maintain world peace, took him to lunch with a general of the intelligence service, who made the formal recruitment proposal in their private conversation before lunch.

The general repeated most of what the other had said about the importance of achieving a balance of power, thanked Wennerström for his assurances of Sweden's neutrality, and said he need not be uneasy that the Russians would press him for information relating to Sweden. Then he brought out the map Wennerström had given Rybachenkov locating the secret airfield. "He thanked me for my collaboration with Rybachenkov in Stockholm, after which he tore the map up and threw it in the waste paper basket with what I should characterize as a roguish glint in his eyes." He then emphasized that for the present the most important of all tasks was to "endeavor to get hold of the principles of NATO war planning," with special attention to aerial warfare and invasion.

The general explained that the Soviet intelligence service was organized with a headquarters in Moscow which had a number of geographic sections, and the most important of these was the American. Then he asked Wennerström whether he wished to enter the service with assignment to the American section; Wennerström was free to answer the question at his leisure, if he wished to answer at all.

During lunch Wennerström made up his mind to accept the offer and did so during the serving of coffee and tea. "The particularly good meal and the joyful atmosphere" put him in a "happy and elevated frame of mind. . . . Everyone had been friendly and pleasant. . . . I thought the door was open for great intelligence work . . . in the cold war. . . . At the same time it was clear to me that this work would not be directed against Sweden."

Testing Period

Wennerström's first mission for the Russians was to obtain the best possible contacts "within the American embassy, above all, but also other NATO embassies" and to render oral reports on his findings. At first he was asked for names, positions, personal characteristics, simple biographic data, etc., later for information on the kinds of work various individuals did, where they traveled, etc. This was his

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testing period. At first, he said, "I had the feeling of being accepted quite immediately. . . . It proved, however, that this first impression of mine was rather erroneous. They did not have entire and complete confidence in me, but instead . . . they were trying to make sure that I was really to be relied on."

Contrary to Soviet expectations, Wennerström succeeded in making good contacts at the NATO embassies rather easily and quickly. In the case of the Americans, this was due primarily to the fact that he had known one of the defense attachés "from earlier times when I had taken special care of him in Stockholm. Through him, I very quickly 'got in' at the American embassy. This embassy had a distinctly dominating position among the diplomatic corps in Moscow, and if one only secured entrée there, the rest came almost by itself."

Wennerström consciously forced the testing period to a close by photographing, during a visit to Stockholm, an important defense analysis, apparently prepared in connection with inter-Scandinavian negotiations. This document was evidently much prized in Moscow but, being in Swedish, required a crash translation effort. When he got back to Moscow, Wennerström was therefore taken to visit the photographic reports center of the American section of the intelligence service. Consisting of about 20 people, the center was set up on the assembly-line principle. Incoming photographs, normally of English-language documents, were opened, registered, developed, copied, assembled, and classified as to the type of information in them. "When something comes in which is written in another language, the operational cycle is interrupted and one must see to it that a translation is done at another place; this was the actual reason for showing me this center." The lesson was: send everything in English except when absolutely impossible.

Handling

Wennerström now became a fully vetted "top agent." He was assigned a code name and a general from the American section as his permanent case officer. He was made to feel—and he attached great importance to this—that he and the general formed a two-man team. "The pair-work arrangement . . . is used when there is an agent from whom . . . important information can be obtained and a fully qualified person who can be spared from within the service . . . The pair works in more or less close contact depending on how the best results can be obtained."

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He said this system was used with him for 14 years and would have gone on for at least another five but for his arrest. The general was due for retirement in 1964 or 1965 "but a special arrangement had been arrived at by which he would not retire until we had finished our work together . . . His increasingly wide experience and background of knowledge became very important, in that it awakened my interest, carried me along, and engendered my enthusiasm, all of which was further sharpened by his personal knowledge."

The general seems to have met more or less regularly with Wennerström in person during the Moscow period. In the subsequent Washington years there were three successive contact men, Soviet air attachés, who acted merely as live drops. Apparently no one else was witting; when the contact man became ill everything came to a halt. The general was once scheduled to come to Washington, whether legally or illegally Wennerström did not know, and meet him in a motel, but the arrangements were called off. He did meet with him, usually in Helsinki, during home leaves and his final tour of duty in Stockholm, where otherwise an air attaché again served as live drop.

Training

Training seems to have been surprisingly scanty and casual. "There was never any thought in my case of having me undergo training. What was of value from their point of view was the knowledge and connections I had when I started out." There was only a sort of "continuous training" in "small matters . . . useful in intelligence work" and by virtue of his "political and military orientation . . . in an increasingly wide field" over the course of years. Even in connection with his briefing for the Washington assignment, he received from the Soviets practically no instructions on photography, methods for delivering materials, or where contacts would take place and how. As a "top agent, I was supposed to use my own resources in fulfilling my assignments."

He mentions (see below) practice in passing a roll of film during a handshake. But the only systematic instruction seems to have been given for standby radio reception in case of war. When asked to set up a receiver he made a trip to East Berlin to clarify methods of operation and get a bit of communications training. Then after buying a Hallicrafter, as suggested, and setting it up at home, he listened on a frequency schedule laid out a year in advance to messages in coded Russian every other Sunday. He transcribed these for prac-

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tice, then burned them. At Moscow's request he sent in one exercise for checking.

For seven or eight months before his arrest, from about the time of the Cuba crisis, he had received no messages. (The maid heard him listening as late as May 31, 1963.) He assumed that the radio was too busy with other tasks, or perhaps Moscow did not desire to spend any more time on his training. At the time of his arrest, he had a note in his little red notebook to remind himself to ask his case officer about this matter.

Communications in Moscow

During the testing period Wennerström met his contact in automobiles and safe houses. Nine "meeting places" were pointed out to him on a map, all of them in central Moscow, some in small back streets or inner courts. "The principle was that Nikitushev, sitting in a car, was to wait at these places, and I was to come forward in the most convenient manner and get into the car." The contact points were changed from time to time, "not all nine at once, but one might be changed one month, and then another the next month."

The procedure varied according to the duration of the meeting. "Perhaps it would be enough if the car were merely to drive around the block. It might be enough to take a short ride into the suburbs and then come back again. But if there was need for a longer meeting, we went either to the apartment or to the villa," where lunch was frequently arranged for meetings planned in advance.

Throughout the Moscow period Wennerström and his contact had a car and two chauffeurs reserved exclusively for their use, with another car in reserve. Reserve meeting places were arranged as part of the regular procedure and "we had two reserve times after each set time." These were not determined by any standing system but decided on at each regular meeting. "For example, meeting place No. 1 on Monday; and if I could not come there it would be, for example, place 3 on Wednesday; and if I didn't come then either, then perhaps it would be place 4 on Thursday."

For his first assignments Wennerström used an oral reporting system based on notes and in so doing formed note-taking habits which were to persist to the end of his career. "I took down notes in accordance with long lists of points or items. At the meetings I reported on these items and answered any questions asked; Nikitushev took down everything. I did the compiling work at home. . . . I used an apparently careless slip system of papers which after all

worked quite well . . . When I came home from meetings with Americans and had to recall certain data, I jotted them down; but sometimes it was a question of notes being made while one talked to one's colleagues. Eventually I had all the material I needed . . . in my safe at home; often I carried it with me, in my notebook or in the main folder, that is to say, a catalog of the data I had compiled."

When he became a cleared "top agent," a special telephone service was arranged for Wennerström and his new case officer. No one not involved knew the number, and there was someone on the other end of the line 24 hours a day. Wennerström memorized the number; he was forbidden to make note of it anywhere. He was to call it only from public booths. To insure against wrong-number connections, he was to let the phone ring three times, hang up, ring again, and pass his message without saying who he was. Conversations were to be kept as short as possible.

The two cars and chauffeurs were now so employed as to provide unscheduled or emergency contact on the case officer's initiative. Wennerström knew the license numbers and knew the chauffeurs by sight. If at any time he saw one of the cars park in front of his residence or the embassy he was to telephone as promptly as possible. If he were going somewhere, the car would shadow him, then pass him and stop at the curb so that he could see it. Ignoring both car and chauffeur, he would take this as a signal that he should telephone. If, however, the general was sitting in the car and beckoned, Wennerström should get into the car. Thus a two-way connection was provided if anything urgent came up.

Brush Contacts

For passing material in Stockholm and Washington a variety of brush contact methods were developed. Such a contact with the Soviet military attaché in Stockholm took place at the Soviet consulate, where Wennerström had to go to get his visa: "It was arranged that I was to be there at a certain hour and Yacovlev was to sit in the writing room, where the delivery was made in a very plain and direct manner. It had been agreed that Yacovlev should sit there reading a newspaper . . . When I passed him I simply threw a parcel . . . so that it dropped on his newspaper. Thus there was no closer contact. We did not speak with each other."

Wennerström was introduced to the delivery of a roll of film during handshake by his case officer in Moscow: "The Soviet general said that it was not so easy as usually believed, and we started

exercises . . . He had very large hands, which greatly facilitated the procedure. After some practice we found that we had familiarized ourselves with the proper technique."

Later "the first time I met my contact man in Washington we went on and practiced [the handshake] a while. But that was more because he couldn't do it than because I couldn't. No great advanced training is necessary, but I think two persons that had never tried it would have difficulty, since it is necessary to be able to do it when other persons are standing around who must not be able to observe anything. For example, once in Washington the delivery took place in the middle of a room right under the noses of high-ranking American officers. And that can't be done without practice. There is a little technique of taking hold of it with the little finger and the ring finger."

If more than one roll of film had to be delivered, a second handshake could be done while saying goodbye. But Soviet contacts did not deliver materials to Wennerström by this means. At speeches or demonstrations, "we stood close to each other and there was more or less of a crowd and . . . an object was passed from my right hand to his left hand or the other way around."

At the Russian embassy the procedure was to "leave the object in one's topcoat and let the other party pick it up there. For example, it was indicated beforehand to the contact man where the pockets were located and which pocket was used; as a rule it was the inner pocket of the topcoat. When you went in to the reception you always had to know the number of the hook your topcoat was on. Then it was not even necessary to greet or contact the other party . . . You only had to mention the number 24 or whatever it was in his hearing, and he would go out as soon as possible to pick up the object. When he came back he would nod almost imperceptibly."

When attachés were invited on trips in the same aircraft, "it was easy to deliver material. On such occasions one took safety pins to secure the material to be received or delivered in whatever pocket one desired." Sometimes the material was taken out while in the bathroom and pinned to the trousers in back. Or in town: "It had been agreed to meet while walking in opposite directions in a certain street at a certain time, or it was planned to meet in a certain section of a department store at a certain hour. There was only one thing to watch; we should look surprised and should shake hands and nod to each other and each continue on his way."

In such contacts "it never happened that objects were handed over under suspicious conditions or circumstances . . . One never retired behind a tree or house or in any other way separated from the group; on the contrary, the delivery was usually made in a crowd when people stood as close to each other as possible."

Even turn-overs of the local Stockholm contact were made in open circumstances. When General Yushchenko was succeeded by General Nikolskiy, the outgoing attaché introduced his replacement in Wennerström's own office. Nikolskiy, in turn, pointed out a new contact at a party in the Soviet embassy: during a gap in the receiving line he said to Wennerström, "He stands behind you by the curtains with his arms crossed."

Meetings

Routine meetings were usually held either in an out-of-the-way place in the city—"a street or a park where one knew by experience there were few people and where one could take a little walk together"—or out in the country. They required detailed planning as to routes to be taken, where to park, the exact time and place to meet. The Soviet general liked to combine personal meetings with his fishing trips. Then at a fixed time and place arranged in advance he and Wennerström could meet, have food and refreshments, and "sit there in quietness . . . , deliver material, and discuss the time and substance of the next routine meeting."

In principle, all such meetings out in the country were held in daytime, all those in the city in the evening and generally quite late, 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. At all a danger signal was necessary: "The whole system was very simple, one should always have the left hand freely swinging back and forth as people do when they walk. If there was anything to carry, you did it with the right hand. When you believed that danger was imminent, you put the left hand into your trouser or topcoat pocket as soon as you knew that your contact had seen you." Then the two would ignore each other.

To detect or evade surveillance, Soviet embassy personnel had to make "special arrangements" when attending personal meetings. They were obliged to drive "here and there" from 2 to 5 hours. "For my part, I was not subject to such regulations, but I was told in a general way that I should leave in good time so that I would not go directly to the place but make detours, take care of suitable errands, and make sure that I was not being followed. One was not watched so much in Washington because the diplomatic corps was exceedingly

large and the resources . . . were very few compared to the size of the group . . . The authorities had to confine themselves to spot checks or to keeping an eye on a limited number of persons permanently."

In Stockholm, if any clandestine meetings with the local contact were necessary, Moscow was to be informed. Then the local contact could, if warranted, arrange to use one or perhaps two Soviets as decoys for Swedish security, having them act as if on important assignments but not losing their surveillants, while he himself would lose his surveillance if he still had any.

Wennerström has described one of the meetings with his case officer he held during home leave. At 8:00 p.m., a time fixed by Wennerström, both parties walked toward a given gate from predetermined points and met. Wennerström wore an easily recognizable top coat and carried a brown briefcase in his right hand. The danger signal was as usual to put his left hand into his overcoat pocket.

The meeting was held at a villa and refreshments were on the table during the business conversation. The general marked off item after item as each was covered. Wennerström himself now rarely brought notes to such meetings. The usual loud music played. At the end of the conversation, they burned the papers no longer needed and flushed the ashes down a toilet. Papers to be taken from the meeting they put in order and properly concealed in their clothing. Then they had a "good meal," in the course of which—"after the worst hunger had gone"—the general placed on the table a paper listing some broad political, military, and strategic problems. These points were discussed one by one during the remainder of the meal. Later there was "unplanned conversation." These discussions, Wennerström said, were "to clarify my views on certain situations in the world; they wanted my reactions to statements by well-known people . . . These talks made it possible to obtain a clear picture of Russian views."

Employee Benefits

During his Washington tour, the Soviet contact man brought to Wennerström standard application blanks for citizenship in the Soviet Union. The Soviet filled them out in Russian, Wennerström giving the answers as required. He never heard any more of this matter. "The idea was that the papers should be completed and ready in the

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Wennerström

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intelligence service in Moscow to make me a Soviet citizen should it be necessary."

Wennerström trusted his case officer to take care of payments into his escrow account in Moscow faithfully. "There was no reason," he declared, "why I shouldn't trust him because the Soviet intelligence service functions like precision clockwork. There is no question of cheating any of the members." In another context, "I want to emphasize," he said, "that in the Soviet intelligence service for which I worked nothing happens by chance. It is an enormous organization in which everything is regulated and set out in detail and where iron discipline is maintained so that everybody follows the directives and directions and does not improvise on his own."

Good private dinners are an excellent way to gather information.

—Richard Sorge

CONCERNING ESPIONAGE AND SOCIAL COURTESY

25X1

[Redacted]

Of the many ways in which adversary intelligence services go about recruiting agents a particularly insidious one is by "social contact," when officers of the service operating under diplomatic cover first approach their targets at receptions, parties, sports affairs, conventions, etc., or through social calls at home. This approach is distinguished by the fact that it initially carries no hint of resemblance to the classical methods of recruitment that depend upon blackmail or other kinds of duress. Far from upsetting the target, it presents itself to him as a pleasant relationship apparently devoid of any kind of danger. This is exactly why he needs to be put on his guard against it.

The usual pattern of such an operation exhibits the following phases.

The Meeting

First is the initial contact. It may be really accidental or just have every appearance of accident. To the target, in any event, it will always seem accidental. The handler, who is ever on the lookout for agents, will at least have made it a point to be where fruitful contacts are likely. That is why the first approach most often comes, not in mass gatherings, but at affairs that attract a particular intellectual or social elite.

In this first contact the handler will usually confine himself to bland but friendly conversation, learning the prospect's identity and professional position and identifying himself and his cover position. If the prospect interests him, he will suggest having a coffee or lunch together sometime soon.

25X1

Operation Charm

The second phase is the laying of groundwork. The handler strives to make the target like him. He is most engaging, treats the target to a good meal, and produces tickets for the ballet or a sports event. At the same time he takes advantage of the favorable atmosphere thus created to try to learn more about his companion, getting him to talk about his family, how his children are doing at school, his way of life, his money problems. He also brings up, circumspectly and without taking sides, current political topics and the international situation; if he is from the Soviet Bloc he emphasizes that what his country wants is peace. He tries to find out whether his guest has strong political opinions and whether he nurses any definite antipathy toward the Eastern nations.

If at this stage the target has a negative or guarded attitude and has perhaps declined invitations, there is an intermediate phase in which the handler renews his suit and will not let himself be put off. He mails him some new show tickets, say, along with his visiting card, or telephones in a friendly way to suggest getting together again, or he may sometimes even venture to call on him at home. In most cases he is at least partially successful; out of simple courtesy the target cannot go on forever categorically turning down all invitations.

Nibble on the Bait

The third phase is the intelligence approach proper. It sometimes begins quite a long time after the end of the preceding phase. The handler now knows his target's personality well and tries to exploit its most vulnerable aspects—financial need, ideological leanings, weakness of character, hunger for an important role, professional ambition, etc., as the case may be. As soon as he feels on sure ground he ventures a first request, a quite natural-seeming one for some innocuous information obviously in the target's field of familiar knowledge.

The essential purpose of this request is to test the prospect's reaction. But the handler, in return for the harmless information he gets, does not hesitate to offer him some little gift, perhaps something for his wife. After this, the dinners to which the nibbler is invited are likely to become quite sumptuous and the checks so high that he does not even offer to pay his own.

The Trap Closes

The fourth phase is that of recruitment and manipulation. Having established that the target is ready to furnish information which he does not consider very compromising, the handler—and this is the most difficult part of his task—gradually directs the conversation to the man's professional duties. Finally he asks direct questions about documents or information to which he has access, but at the same time he tries to make it seem a mutual exchange by offering to supply *him* with some that will help him in his work.

The chaste "social contact" is over; they have begun to talk business. Now things will move fast as the handler proceeds to drive in his last wedges. Gauging his speed by the psychological reaction, he thrusts by stages or directly to the burning questions. He may pull another stop to overcome the last bit of resistance, producing a more substantial gift. After that it will be hard for the beneficiary to refuse to get more important and somewhat more confidential documents. When these are delivered a reimbursement for the effort will be called for.

At this stage the meetings occur on two levels; alongside the "social contacts" are more furtive ones, as of hurried businessmen. Soon the confidential aspect begins to predominate: "Better not call me on the telephone." Finally, when they arrange to meet in a safe house, a subway station, or a public park, the target will perhaps realize that he has embarked on a clandestine operation.

This is the point of no return. The handler sometimes now turns him over to one of his colleagues, who, not being bound by the atmosphere of friendship that permeated the earlier phases, can force him to toe the mark, make him understand if he doesn't already that he has taken an irreversible course, and ultimately use blackmail if need be. As a last step the recruit will have thrust upon him a complex system of communications, involving dead drops, secret writing, or perhaps trips abroad to meet a handler from the headquarters of the adversary service.

Unhappy Ending

Need one tell the rest? There are only two possibilities: either the target, recognizing the machinery in which he is caught, will at the last moment have enough courage to go to his own chiefs or to the security service with the story; or he will be irretrievably enmeshed, the docile tool of a foreign intelligence service. From then on he loses


25X1 all freedom of action and, as [redacted] put it, "ceases to be a friend and colleague and becomes instead a common spy."

In the midst of friendly faces, of animated social intercourse, it is hard to believe that it may be "later than you think." And yet it may.

A Stitch in Time

In a sense it is never too late to stop the progression of treason. A sudden awakening of conscience and understanding can undo a lot of harm even long after stepping across the line. But it is so much better to forestall the risks; all too often, otherwise, we can only assess the damages without any hope of repairing them.

25X1 There is one extremely simple step which can shield everyone from these dangers and protect our security—namely, for those who have access to classified documents to keep their superiors informed of any contact with foreigners. They will have a clearer conscience for doing this. And they will help us protect our common heritage.



A review of information on enemy forces available to the commanders in the first campaigns of the Civil War, its sources and how it was used.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63

Edwin C. Fishel

Part I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg

The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.

Obviously, though, information about the enemy—good or bad, firm or fragmentary—must have influenced events in that war about as much as in any other. And a little probing in the records¹ establishes what information (or misinformation) it was in each case. Evidently intelligence has been slighted because of the reticence of the men who knew its inside story. So the story was buried and forgotten almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Confederate paroles at Appomattox, and the battalions of Civil War historians have not thought to dig it up.

Once brought to light, it significantly changes the history of the war. To begin with, it upsets most of the fixed beliefs about Civil

¹ Principal sources of this study are: *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (128 volumes), much used by historians but still yielding new findings on a hundred and one aspects of the war; manuscript records in the National Archives, Library of Congress, and several State collections; and notable among private collections, the papers of Gen. Joseph Hooker, whose prominent connection with this subject is developed in part II of the article.

War intelligence itself (this alone would have been a sufficient reward for the digging). But it also changes accepted views about how battles were won and lost; it sharpens the picture we retain of the principal commanders, raising some reputations and lowering others; it explains the unexplained.

The Bull Run Legend

Exhibit A is the First Battle of Bull Run. It is a common belief that this, the first major engagement of the war, turned on intelligence supplied to the Confederates by Rose Greenhow, a Washington society widow and friend of President Buchanan. Mrs. Greenhow, it is said, sent General Beauregard at Manassas two warnings of the Federals' march from Washington. This information supposedly caused Beauregard to call for reinforcements under J. E. Johnston which arrived from the Shenandoah Valley in the nick of time.

A good story, but it doesn't pan out. Beauregard's dispatches show him sounding the alarm only after his outposts were driven in—half a day or more after he is supposed to have had the second warning.² Thus we begin our search for decisive intelligence by discarding one of the most prominent instances of it in the literature. The records are generous but they are also perverse.

The Confederate commander's hesitation on receipt of this intelligence does not look like the behavior of a Beauregard, the gamecock conqueror of Fort Sumter. So one speculates that he may not have found Mrs. Greenhow's warnings very cogent. But the second one would have been hard to discount, when she and everyone else in Washington had seen many of the blue regiments crossing into Virginia.³

A likelier explanation of Beauregard's hesitation is that the portent of a big war finally starting caused him to freeze a little. No one would deny that that is a hard kind of intelligence to act on. Yet

² Two later accounts by Beauregard heap the credit on Mrs. Greenhow but contain serious discrepancies with each other as well as with his contemporary dispatches. The Creole general was given to romanticizing.

³ Of course, Mrs. Greenhow's sources were not all quite so overt as this. Both the Confederates who employed her and the Federals who arrested her evidently credited her with having numerous highly placed contacts, an impression she made no attempt to change, even among her Federal captors. But contacts are not quite the same thing as sources, and the distinction is evident in her surviving reports.

the war that was coming to his doorstep was one he had invited by his action three months earlier at Charleston.


There has also been an intelligence myth on the Federal side. McDowell, commanding at Bull Run, did not receive word that Johnston's brigades had left Winchester until three days after their departure, and by that time he had committed his army to battle on a plan that counted on Johnston's being pinned down in the Valley. Thus Johnston achieved a spectacularly successful stolen march, for which credit has always gone to the two cavaliers Jeb Stuart and Turner Ashby and the cavalry screen they set up.

What Happened

The fact is that by the time Johnston's rearmost units left Winchester, word of the movement had already reached the headquarters of the Federal commander in the Valley, General Patterson. It came through channels operated by a civilian member of Patterson's staff, a Valley native who was then and thereafter able to get news, usually via Negro messengers, from Unionists beyond the Confederate lines. But this, his first important report, was not accepted by Patterson until corroborated (presumably by reconnaissance) two days after Johnston was gone. Communicating the discovery to McDowell through Washington consumed a third day, even though the telegraph lines were in order all the way to Fairfax Station, within a few miles of McDowell's headquarters.

During most of those three days McDowell was busy forming a plan of attack on the basis of reconnaissance which had to be conducted after he reached Bull Run. His march had been forced by pressures on the Federal Administration, and among the things he had not had time to get around to before leaving Washington was an adequate intelligence preparation. Later in the war it turned out there had been no lack of Union sympathizers in the locality who could have pinpointed in advance the undefended fords McDowell had to find while his army was kept waiting.

The plan he developed sent his main force on a wide turning movement to the right. He would have taken the Confederates in the rear had they not had their embryo Signal Corps on the field. A signal observation post spotted the turning column and sped a warning by flag to Beauregard in time for him to wheel about and meet it. Thus, after each side, through espionage, had had notice of the other's movements in good time, the decisive intelligence at First Bull Run was a mere report of visual observation on the battle-



Intelligence 1861-63

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field. The only particular interest attached to it is that the means by which it was communicated was novel at the time.⁴

Decisive intelligence, but unspectacular—so its importance has been almost unnoticed while the Greenhow story goes on accumulating fame. Which illustrates the general point that in order to win a place in the literature a Civil War intelligence story had better have about it either the scent of magnolia blossoms or the odor of horseflesh.

Not surprisingly, the war for which each side was ill prepared opened with blundering application of intelligence on both sides. Beauregard's poor use of his advance information would have earned him defeat had not the Federals been busy reconnoitering up and down Bull Run for three days, making up their homework. It was at the end of those days that Johnston's troops began arriving at Manassas.

Pinkerton Assessments

The Federal defeat at First Bull Run led directly to the elevation to high command of Major General George B. McClellan. The history of the fifteen months that passed before Lincoln washed his hands of this commander suffers from no lack of references to intelligence, and to McClellan's intelligence officer, the famous, or notorious, Allan Pinkerton, a successful Chicago detective. The standard view of McClellan runs like this: He was a superb organizer and administrator but was afflicted with a Napoleonic complex and a vast hesitancy to use the great army he built. His super-caution and the failures that flowed from it were largely the result of Pinkerton's fantastic overestimates of Confederate strength.

This view stands up only as long as it takes to read a few of Pinkerton's reports. Pinkerton did habitually credit the opposing army (led by J. E. Johnston and then by Lee) with two, three, and even four times its true strength. In this much the standard accounts are correct. What the historians have failed to notice is a fraudulence

⁴Alphabetic signaling by flag had been possible for many years (the telescope dates from the early 1600's), but it remained for Albert Myer, a U.S. Army surgeon, to invent a practical system in the late 1850's. The Confederate officer who detected the Federal movement across Bull Run happened to have been Myer's chief assistant in his early experiments, and Myer was on the field with McDowell—with no signalmen. The Federals had counted on using a balloon for observation, but the bag, which had to be inflated before leaving Washington, was caught in roadside trees and abandoned.

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in Pinkerton's reports so transparent that it is impossible to believe McClellan could have swallowed them.

Pinkerton's basic order-of-battle compilation was good enough. For example, at about the time of the Seven Days' Battles (June-July 1862), in which Lee drove the Army of the Potomac from the eastern environs of Richmond, Pinkerton had listed about 220 units of regimental size. This was some 40 too many, but the list included every one of the 178 that the Confederates did have.⁵ And his assignment of these to brigades and divisions, though less complete and correct than his list of regiments, was good enough to refute the charge that he and his bureau were totally incompetent.

But if he quizzed his sources to get an average strength for a brigade or regiment, he did not extrapolate this into a figure for the entire army. Instead he derived what he called a "medium estimate" or "general estimate" by striking a round average of numerous gross estimates of the total enemy force. These gross figures he obtained from everyone who would hazard a guess—prisoners (whose source was almost never better than mere camp gossip), citizens and refugees (source: rumor or pure imagination), deserters (frequent source: careful instructions from a Confederate general), and spies (who seldom if ever came by any halfway official figures).

The shabbiness of this method showed clearly in Pinkerton's presentation, so clearly that even a casual reader should have rejected his conclusions. There also was an external reason for rejecting them—common sense. They reached 200,000 by the time Lee got to his top strength of 88,000. This total, and the earlier ones, could not have looked reasonable to anyone who stopped to consider the total manpower available to the South, and especially the number of weapons that the Confederates could lay hands on. Such numbers in the Richmond area would have left at least a couple of their other key points so lightly defended that the Federal armies should have been able to move in almost at will.

⁵ Evidently none of the scores of writers who have discussed Pinkerton's work, in terms ranging from regret to ridicule, have taken the trouble to compare his O/B tabulation with the actual Confederate organization. Both have been in print for 80 years. Although Pinkerton's tabulation is not available in its contemporary form (it appears in his postwar book, *Spy of the Rebellion*; Chicago, 1883; pp. 587-607) and thus could contain after-the-fact correction, it bears numerous earmarks of authenticity; in fact, it appears to be an unedited version of the kind of working chart that might have been in daily use in his bureau.

And these results—his "medium" or "general" estimates—were not the most revealing transparency in Pinkerton's reporting. His very reliance on gross estimating suggests a shallowness of which no well-intentioned intelligence chief, even of limited intellect, would be guilty. His language alternates between puerile nonsense and a labored vagueness which it would be hard for anyone to achieve if he had a supportable thesis to present. Finally, there is his logic.

It is best illustrated by his continual insistence on the existence of considerable numbers of unknown forces, over and above those covered in his "general estimates." His point of departure in this argument was the number of regiments and brigades that he had identified. Early in McClellan's campaign that number was much smaller than the number the Confederates obviously had. This meant, Pinkerton argued, that the general estimates must also be much too small.⁶ Later on he purged his reports of this non-sequitur only to replace it with another. When he had identified four times as many regiments, he again said the general estimate must be well below the true figure—this time because organizational specifics indicated *so large* a number of regiments.

This line of reasoning led him, by the time his O/B chart was fairly complete, into an even more absurd position. Saying that there was a substantial number of additional troops in units not part of the known enemy force was tantamount to saying there were additional divisions⁷—perhaps even another entire army—in the enemy lines, from which he had never had a single prisoner or deserter and about whose existence he had never received a breath of rumor—while the divisions he did have represented were well filled out with regiments and brigades.

McClellan, Pinkerton Assessed

If any belief in Pinkerton's estimates remained after the method of arriving at them was understood, it must have been destroyed by this display. The question arises how McClellan could have tolerated such a sorry intelligence job. There is no answer until it is remembered that he was constantly insisting on his need for more men and

⁶ At a time when his general estimate of the enemy in McClellan's immediate front was 100,000-120,000, Pinkerton had identified about 50 regiments. In equating the strength of these 50 to the 100,000-120,000 total, he was saying in effect that the Confederates had 2000 to 2400 men per regiment—double the T/O strength and 4 to 6 times the actual strength.

⁷ Lee did not organize his army into corps until the fall of 1862.

more time. Then it becomes plain that he was not looking for information about the Confederates so much as he was seeking to justify his demands. In other words, intelligence was to McClellan not primarily a weapon against the enemy; it was a lever against his superiors.

That is a grave charge, but the view it gives of McClellan is of a piece with other behavior—his arrogance, his dissembling in other matters, his belittling of Lincoln—that is by now a historical commonplace.

How he could have expected to exert leverage with such patent nonsense is another question. So far as this can have an answer, the answer must be that his estimate of the credulity of a countrified President was practically unbounded. One doubts that he even had the good taste to give Lincoln only gross figures and withhold the supporting "reasoning." Suspicion of the estimates was not confined to McClellan's superiors; even the Quartermaster General was aware of the fraud, and in fact it was he who rose to suggest that such reporting might be the work of disloyal hands.

But Pinkerton's secret service career persisted; he was McClellan's creature and McClellan was surviving despite his numerous effronteries, of which the use of Pinkerton's intelligence to support his demands was one. McClellan was able to hang on because the country was poverty-stricken for generals and because he was not by any means all weakness and sloth. He built a magnificent army and he won not merely its confidence but its affection. Neither was his secret service all bad: besides conducting comprehensive interrogation that produced good basic O/B data, Pinkerton succeeded in getting several spies into Richmond for extended periods,⁸ and he evidently did a good counterespionage job in the face of almost superhuman difficulties presented by the secessionist population of Washington and vicinity. McClellan, and Pinkerton with him, were each able enough and successful enough to lend a credibility to their efforts that kept them in their jobs for a third of the war. Their intelligence operation, however, must go down to posterity not as a serious effort that through well-meant errors badly delayed the war—the usual

⁸ Pinkerton's account of this espionage in his book is so heavy with imaginary dialogue and other embellishments as to induce strong suspicion that he fabricated whole incidents and episodes. Most of his claims of penetrating Richmond, however, are supported to some extent by contemporary records. Although these do not show missions and results, they do reflect the spies' absence "within enemy lines" at the time Pinkerton's narrative puts them there.

charge against it—but as an essentially corrupt activity consciously aimed at justifying inaction and failure.⁹

Along the Shenandoah

While McClellan was inching up the Peninsula that spring, Stonewall Jackson was consuming the attention of Federal forces in and west of the Shenandoah Valley. Outnumbered, he relied on fast movement and deception. A ruse for which he has won much praise turns out to have been decidedly less successful than supposed.

While occupied in the Valley with General Banks, he was threatened with an attack on Staunton by other Federal forces back in the Alleghenies. His first act in countering this threat was to send a pseudo-deserter into Banks' camp with a report that he was moving to Richmond. In order to make the story stick, he actually marched his men over the Blue Ridge and put them on a train. It was typical of Jackson to assure that the waiting train would be headed east. Then to the surprise even of his immediate subordinates, he ordered the train's crew to take it to Staunton, whither it steamed in reverse, back over the Blue Ridge and across the Valley.

All this was supposed to set Banks in motion eastward. But Jackson reckoned without the incompetence of Banks' information service. Banks failed to detect the march across the mountains; he

⁹ Soon or late this revelation of shady work in Intelligence's back room will be seized upon as new evidence against McClellan's loyalty, a question that has never entirely abated. The Quartermaster General who saw possible treason in intelligence estimates that were evidently fashioned to McClellan's order was only one of many contemporaries who suspected that the general was motivated by more than a desire for a comfortable advantage in men and materiel. McClellan consorted with anti-war Democrats and nursed political ambitions that were neither open nor well concealed; thus it was easy for his enemies to conclude, from his foot-dragging leadership of the army, that he was plotting a dictatorship or purposely allowing the South to win independence by stalemate. When he ran for President in 1864, however, he repudiated the Democratic peace platform. The view of modern historians, though by no means settled, is generally that McClellan was devoted to the Union, a Union that was to be saved according to his own lights.

To the present writer that view does not seem to be upset by the findings presented here. The discovery of fraud in McClellan's intelligence does not essentially change what has long been known about his character, and the transparency of the fraud is as weighty a factor as the fraud itself. It is hard enough to believe—though we are forced to believe it—that estimates so obviously dishonest were used in an effort to get more men and more time; it is even harder to believe that if McClellan had been plotting treason he would have placed such dishonesty on view, as he did. Thus the transparency of the estimates argues against the disloyalty theory.

noticed only that the Rebels were missing from his front. He sized up the deserter's story for what it was and concluded that Jackson had gone to Staunton. He gave chase, but too late to help the small Federal force west of that place, which had to draw away.

While our attention is directed to the Valley we may as well dispose of the Belle Boyd legend. Belle, barely eighteen at this time, owes her fame to a reckless trip afoot to deliver information to Jackson as he arrived before Front Royal to achieve the main stroke of his celebrated Valley campaign. Banks had a small outpost at Front Royal which Stonewall surprised and overran, thereby outflanking his opponent and forcing him to retire across the Potomac. Miss Boyd is said to have made her way, clad in white, out of the town and across hills and fields, finding the Confederates by the sound of their guns.

The story is true enough, but her information could have had little or no value; it is unfair to Jackson to credit any part of his success to her supposedly fortuitous appearance. Jackson believed in Providence and good planning. What happened at Front Royal was exactly what he had planned, and the basis of his plan was some careful intelligence work. For two weeks he had been diligently collecting information from cavalry, citizens, prisoners, deserters, and spies. Evidently his conclusion from this was that he could probably strike Front Royal with complete surprise.

Belle Boyd may have contributed to this information, but that is not what she is famous for. It would be hard to establish that she was not a Confederate spy, but equally hard to say that the foolhardy act for which she is chiefly known was one of espionage.

Miss Boyd literally flouted the fire of the Yankees. Mrs. Greenhow had done the same thing only figuratively, but so brazenly that she soon received a visit from the gentlemen of Pinkerton's bureau. Both women seem to have been ruled by an impulsiveness that ill suited them to espionage. The main point of interest in the Boyd case is the fact that the Front Royal story has survived as a hair-raising example of Civil War intelligence operations. Such is the poverty of the literature.

John Pope vs. Lee

It has been shown that McClellan was an even greater non-user of intelligence than history has made him. John Pope has also had the reputation of being an abominably informed commander; in his

case the verdict must be considerably softened and his campaign reevaluated.

Pope became Lee's victim at Second Bull Run because he lost command of the situation once the armies were at close grips. This much has been known, and it would be hard to overstate the extent of Pope's misunderstandings on the battlefield. But it has not been noticed that up to that point he had provided himself with excellent information and had handled his army very skillfully on the basis of it.

Pope in June 1862 was given command of the various forces that Jackson had kept so well occupied in and near the Valley. The new commander moved his army east of the Blue Ridge, as if to threaten Richmond, while McClellan was engaged with Lee on the opposite side of the enemy capital. Lee, after driving McClellan away from the gates of the city, began detaching forces against Pope, who was maintaining an exposed position with a none too numerous army.

Pope had given his subordinates stern orders to use spies and maintain an active search for information. Though he had the same small cavalry force from which Banks had got so little results, he drove it to the limit. Through this insistence and persistence he kept track of the Confederate buildup in his front as each new detachment arrived. His possession of firm information does much to explain his willingness to expose his army, a subject that has brought puzzled or critical comments from many historians.

In August, when McClellan's army was ordered back up the Potomac, its initial embarkations at Fort Monroe gave Lee the signal to turn on Pope in full force. By rail he suddenly moved out, taking the bulk of the army then still at Richmond. He concentrated, well covered behind a mountain, directly across the Rapidan from Pope.

Moving from Richmond with the Confederates was one of Pope's spies, a sergeant in an Indiana cavalry regiment. In the role of pseudo-deserter he had landed a job as locomotive engineer with the Confederates. He jumped the train on which he was a passenger at the time, filtered through Lee's camps somehow, swam or waded the Rapidan, and was lucky enough to find Pope visiting a forward headquarters near the river. Pope pulled out of the trap as it was almost ready to spring.

The literature often gives intelligence credit for Pope's escape. This heartening historiographical liberality, however, singles out the wrong piece of intelligence—a dispatch that a Federal cavalry party captured, along with Jeb Stuart's adjutant and Jeb's own famous plumed hat. Actually the dispatch fell far short of the sergeant's

information as an indication of danger to Pope's army and it reached Pope after the sergeant had reported.¹⁰

For a week after leaving the Rapidan, Pope sparred successfully with Lee in the vicinity of Culpeper and Warrenton. Stuart returned the enemy cavalry's favor by a raid on Pope's rear headquarters which turned up dispatches showing that McClellan's divisions were beginning to join Pope. Unable to face a prolonged stalemate in light of this news, Lee broke it not by retreating but by detaching Jackson with 25,000 men on a 55-mile sweep around Pope's right flank, all the way to Manassas, the Federal supply base, directly in Pope's rear. It was this stroke that threw Pope off balance. He never again had a halfway correct sizeup of the enemy's dispositions. Once Lee came up and rejoined Jackson, the Federals were routed.

Lee could not have had any real hope that Jackson's march would go undiscovered, but that was what happened. Nor could he have hoped that Pope would almost completely lose command of the situation in a pitched battle; that also happened. This result raises the question how an information service that had been so effective up to that time could have fallen down on the job so completely.

Part of the answer is that Pope's spies were too few to cover as much ground as Lee was then covering. One of them got into the Confederate lines and found plenty of forces to report on, but these constituted Lee's rear, and his advance position—Jackson's—was changing by the minute. The rest of the explanation is that the main reliance for discovery of such a movement, and of enemy positions after battle was joined, was on the cavalry, and by this time Pope's horsemen had only about 500 serviceable mounts. His constant pressure for information had just about exhausted his facilities for getting it. On the battlefield he was not necessarily empty-headed, as so many students of the war would have it; he was simply empty-handed.

¹⁰ Authority for attributing the Federals' escape to this capture is undeniably respectable: it is Pope's own statement. The conflicting version, stronger and more explicit than Pope's, is found in an unpublished affidavit by Gen. McDowell, who was with Pope when the sergeant reported. This conflict and others like it reveal one of the main causes of the obscurity of the Civil War intelligence story: There was no security-classification system, and official dispatches and campaign reports commonly found their way into the press. This possibility evidently caused commanders to hold back the intelligence background of their actions or overstate the influence of overtly obtained intelligence.

Antietam

Because it is impossible to persuade oneself that McClellan had any serious intention of using intelligence in directing his army, the intelligence incidents in his Richmond campaign seem almost irrelevant; hence their omission here. Intelligence is inextricable, however, from the story of his campaign against Lee in Maryland, in September 1862. There the general who was so indifferent to the truth about the enemy received the most stunning piece of intelligence of the entire war, so stunning that even a McClellan had to act on it. An operational copy of Lee's plans fell into the Federals' hands.¹¹

Lee, after his crushing victory over Pope, seized the opportunity to invade the North. He crossed the Potomac to Frederick, at which point he decided to reduce the Federal position at Harper's Ferry so that he could use the Shenandoah Valley as a line of communication. He sent off more than half his army on this mission, and it was the order that directed this movement which a Federal soldier picked up in a bivouac area the Confederates had used at Frederick. McClellan saw his opportunity but moved so slowly that Lee had time to reconcentrate behind Antietam Creek. Lee's far smaller army fought the Federals to a standstill, but it was so depleted that he had to retire into Virginia.

That much is a well-known story. It reveals McClellan profiting little from a devastating piece of intelligence (which, be it noted, was obtained not by effort but by luck). Had he moved with even moderate speed, he could have caught the Confederates while they were split into four segments, three advancing on Harper's Ferry from different sides and a fourth remaining with Lee.

In fact the wastage of intelligence was even worse than the standard version indicates.

The "Lost Order," comprehensive as it was, left something to be desired. It gave a timetable for investing the Ferry, but there was reason to question whether the movement was up to schedule. It was only partly specific as to the placement of the force left with Lee in the vicinity of Hagerstown (and in fact the one specific position it gave had changed significantly). But McClellan learned something of the progress of the largest of the three detachments, and he also discovered Lee's positions about Hagerstown.

¹¹ See Millican, Gelman, & Stanhope, "Lost Order, Lost Cause," in *Studies II* 1, p. 103 ff.

This information came mainly from a volunteer spy, an itinerant Lutheran preacher whose travels had put him in the Confederates' path near Harper's Ferry. Possibly because the attack on the Ferry was commanded by the pious Stonewall Jackson, the parson was allowed to go his way. His way took him quickly to a Pennsylvania cavalry company picketing north of Hagerstown. He had bypassed the town, so he went back through the lines, filled in that gap in his information, and reported to the cavalry captain, who rode over to McClellan's headquarters by night and gave the story in full. Two days had elapsed since the "capture" of the Lost Order, but it was two more days before McClellan attacked at Sharpsburg, a scant ten miles' march. By that time most of the enemy's detached forces were back with the main body; the remainder arrived during the battle and turned back the Federals' final push.

The best intelligence is seldom good enough. The Lost Order was the best any commander could ask for, and—again through no initiative of his—McClellan greatly improved on it. This was enough to insure the near-destruction of Lee's army. All McClellan gained was a technical victory.

At Antietam intelligence did not simply influence a battle; it caused one. Without the Lost Order and the parson's espionage, McClellan would probably have contented himself with protecting Washington and Baltimore, or at most with maneuvering to get Lee back across the Potomac without a fight.

Fredericksburg

McClellan's successor when Lincoln relieved him in November was Ambrose Burnside, a general who is remembered favorably only by historians of the barber's art. Burnside knew the Chief wanted action, and he delivered it. He moved the army immediately from Warrenton to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, stealing a march on Lee, who couldn't make up his mind what was going on for eight days. The Southern leader was mindful of several courses of action open to the enemy and he had information to support all of them; this, as one author points out, left him "accepting everything as equally credible and equally incredible."¹²

What Burnside had in mind was crossing the Rappahannock and marching for Richmond. But he waited so long for pontoons to put

¹² Kenneth P. Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General* (5 vols.; New York, 1949-59), II, p. 512.

him over the river that he gave Lee time not only to arrive at a correct reading of his intentions but to bring up the entire Army of Northern Virginia from Culpeper and the Valley. When the Federals finally crossed, it was into the teeth of a fortified position on a high, steep ridge. The result was a slaughter, and Burnside's early removal.

Without knowing what information Burnside's plan was based on, his attack looks like pure madness—which in fact is what some explanations of the affair add up to. Others, however, note correctly that it originated in a misunderstanding of the Confederate dispositions. Burnside made his main thrust against Lee's left, behind the town, because he believed that that sector was relatively weak; he thought most of the enemy strength was ten to fifteen miles downriver. In fact the Fredericksburg ridge was more densely defended than the less formidable ground on the Confederate right.

Explaining a decision-maker's ignorance is likely to be a bit harder than tracing a correct decision back to some correct information. Where Burnside's misconception came from is not clear. Wary of the numerous hands through which telegrams to Washington passed, he gave the General in Chief only his conclusion about enemy dispositions and did not say what specific reports led to it, or indicate their sources. Certainly there were interrogations; perhaps some of the subjects were persuasive pseudo-deserters. Certainly there was observation by balloonists and signal officers; perhaps cover and deception were used against it with good success. And certain it is that the Federals enjoyed the advantage of reading the cipher used by the enemy flag stations; evidently the messages that the Confederates put "on the air" were deceptive or of little significance.

In any case, Burnside's problem was not so much having incorrect information as having little information of any kind, good or bad; and the fault was his own. His failures of understanding are far less excusable than Pope's; the front was stable, he had plenty of cavalry and plenty of time, and he also had the initiative, which enabled him to concentrate on finding the enemy's weak spot. The "intelligence explanation" of his disaster consists of a list of omissions:

(1) Pinkerton, who understandably could feel that his service was tied to McClellan's, had left the army. So far, so good. But Burnside did not seize the opportunity to replace him with an effective secret service. The new bureau consisted of one man, John C. Babcock, a 26-year-old ex-private, who had no lack of ability but

could not command even enough support to be sure of getting his hands on subjects for interrogation.

(2) Burnside's plan made sense when it contemplated crossing to Fredericksburg in the face of a small enemy force. He was not sufficiently vigorous in seeking to discover the enemy's gradual reconcentration that made it progressively less feasible. A few of John Pope's "Send out and get me some information" dispatches would have helped, though perhaps not enough to dissuade the impatient Burnside.

(3) Worst of all, Burnside allowed his cavalry to limit its scouting to the enemy's far flanks. Some of his horsemen should have been sent across the river close to Fredericksburg, to take prisoners, reconnoiter, and if necessary probe the Confederates until they revealed where they were strong and where weak.

Some accounts have it that Lee trapped Burnside into attacking in the wrong place. Perhaps so; but it is evident that Lee's considerable abilities in deception were overmatched by his opponent's ability in self-deception.

Part II, to be carried in a future issue, covers the Chancellorsville and Gettysburg campaigns (in which the Federals had a new intelligence bureau that produced information of great value to the commanders), summarizes the principal methodological lessons of the article, and evaluates the commanders most prominently mentioned as intelligence users.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

Contemporary Problems

NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: By *David Williams*. (London: Hutchinson. 1965. 224 pp. 35/-.)

This book by a teacher of law at Oxford is by far the best work on the British Official Secrets Acts and the problems relating thereto that this reviewer has seen. Because it does consider the broader implications of secrecy in government, it not only is an excellent text for students of English law but is of distinct interest to students of government in the United States, where there are many parallel problems.

After reviewing thoroughly the history and development of the Official Secrets Acts, the author describes their modern application in the light of the Cold War as manifested in the numerous espionage trials of recent years. This then leads him to a discussion of the role of secret service in a free society, the development of what the British call "positive vetting"—the investigation of their civil servants—and the problems of security terminations. He also has an excellent discussion of the principle of executive privilege, wherein he notes that British courts exercise far less independent initiative than the American in requiring information from the executive branch of the government.

His conclusions contain a warning against secrecy for secrecy's sake and against too broad an application of the Official Secrets Acts, which are susceptible of interpretations that would not be tolerable in the United States. The whole atmosphere of his book, however, is dispassionate and understanding of the needs of the government as well as the importance of individual liberties. It is also written clearly, uses a minimum of technical verbiage, and gives a wealth of well-researched examples, including a number of comparisons with situations in the United States. Because of this and of the similarity of the fundamental problems here and in the UK, U.S. intelligence officers concerned with these will find it a better text than any one volume by an American writer.

Lawrence R. Houston

Three Research Memoranda by *Hilton M. Bialek, Jerald N. Walker,* and *Joanne H. Hood* of the U.S. Army Leadership Research Unit, Presidio of Monterey, under the technical supervision of the Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University:

"Exploratory Efforts Concerned with a Study of the Interrogation Process: Survey Activities, Conceptualization, and Pilot Studies." May 1962. 21 pp.

"An Experimental Approach to Tactical Interrogation." February 1963. 71 pp.

"An Evaluation of Three Screening Procedures for Interrogation." (Without Bialek.) May 1963. 31 pp.

In their first study, attempting to "conceptualize" the problem and develop a basis for field experiment, the researchers arrive at the following formula: $R=f[(I, E, Id)+T]-C$, meaning that "to the extent that a source perceives the interrogator as inimical, perceives the sought information as important to the well-being of his group, and identifies with his group, the greater will be his propensity to resist supplying the information." Fear of punishment, which acts as both inhibitor and inducer of disclosures and so should show up in a balance-of-fear factor, is not isolated.

In the second they report on an experiment simulating the field interrogation of resistant and indifferent prisoners of war. Of their score of findings and conclusions the following appear to be the most significant from a pragmatic standpoint:

It is possible to stimulate a tactical interrogation if the use of extreme duress can be "meaningfully" excluded.

More of the resisters fell for deception and simple tricks such as being told the interrogation was over and then engaged in "conversation" than for such pressure as the interrogators could apply; this resulted from the situation.

There does not seem to be a way to design field-laboratory experiments which would allow interrogators sufficient range of manipulative behavior to reach findings applicable to the problems of the consumer. One alternative would be the study of interrogation problems in a natural setting.

The third study reports an effort to determine whether, in screening cooperative enlisted sources as to knowledgeability, it is more efficient to interview them in groups or individually. It concludes that screen-

ing is accomplished faster in groups but interrogators prefer single interviews.

These exercises illustrate once more that the establishment of dependable criteria in a field of such complex human and situational interactions as interrogation, even on the tactical level, is a very difficult undertaking. Resort to a mathematical formula gives one the impression that the researchers were casting about for some way to reduce the subtle problems involved to engineering terms.

The conclusion that a field-laboratory experiment is not likely to develop findings "applicable to the problems of the consumer" seems to accord with the experience of most practitioners of the art of interrogation, who have learned that a multitude of fluctuating variables makes each interrogation a unique event, requiring intuition and personal inventiveness beyond the capacity of any regulation to cover. The way in which the competent research talent reflected in these papers might more profitably be used is touched in the allusion above to "study of interrogation problems in a natural setting."

C. N. Geschwind

ON THE TIGER'S BACK. By Aberogba Ajao. (Cleveland: World. 1962. 149 pp. \$3.50.)

One of the earliest contributions to the slowly growing body of literature from Africans disappointed by their treatment in the Communist world, *On the Tiger's Back* has probably been useful in the propaganda field. It is of scant use to the professional intelligence officer seeking to learn more about Soviet techniques for coping with problems peculiar to the African milieu.

The author, son of a Lagos timber importer, describes how he underwent "indoctrination and technical training in various parts of East Germany as a potential nationalist subversive." The reader is tempted to conclude that only a paucity of such potential assets could have kept the Soviets interested in this difficult chap, who emerges as a highly self-centered and ideologically muddled individual. Indeed, Ajao's relations with his mentors were frequently marked by friction, and his side of the story understandably consumes the bulk of the narrative.

At best, this confusingly written little volume merely reenforces what has been painfully apparent to the Communists in more recent days, that they, like the West, lacked sure political answers and guidelines for Africans in the beginnings of Africa's rush to independence.

R. A. Geisler

World War II

NEVIDNA FRONTA (The Invisible Front). By *Vladimir Vauhnik*. (Buenos Aires: Svobodna Slovenija. 1965. 445 pp.)

Walter Schellenberg describes the kinds of material an agent of his obtained from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. *Of special interest*, he says, *were the reports which V-----, the Yugoslav Military Attaché in Berlin, sent to his General Staff. Their style was admirably clear, both in language and construction, and his knowledge of the political and military plans of the German leadership was amazingly comprehensive and exact.* Schellenberg goes on to tell how the *Sicherheitdienst* learned something of V-----'s sources and methods of operation, finally arrested him at the beginning of Hitler's Balkan campaign, and turned him into a German agent, working chiefly in Italy.¹

Here is "V-----'s" own corrected and much more comprehensive story of these events. Part I, entitled "On the Lookout," recounts his activities in Berlin from 1937 to 1941, and does so exceptionally well. It begins with a short analysis of the political, military, and social setting in which the author developed his overt program of observation and his eventual clandestine structure. The latter included a diverse assortment of sources, from the ruling elite, the top military and industrial leaders, down to factory workers, railroad men, and even forced labor units. This account amplifies and clarifies Schellenberg's rather unconvincing description of Vauhnik's "society espionage" and reveals his methods of accumulating intelligence assets in high social circles.

But this social spying, although effective, was a minor part of Colonel Vauhnik's activities. Collecting data from less romantic sources, comparing their substance, adding new items of information to the assembly, and studying and evaluating the whole made him probably the best informed foreign observer in Berlin. He channeled to his government detailed information, weeks and even months in advance, on every major German plan of attack. Berlin habitually camouflaged such plans by ingenious disinformation schemes, but Vauhnik's methodical analysis removed the camouflage in a series of highly important cases. The revelation of his tactics in planting sources, avoiding disclosure of movements and contacts, making full use of information, and maintaining liaison with other military at-

¹ *The Labyrinth* (New York, 1956), Chapter 17, "Society Espionage."

tachés makes this Part I, while never dull, virtually an instruction manual for MA's.

Part II, "The B.B.Z.," covers the period from March 1941 to late 1944. While imprisoned at Gestapo headquarters Vauhnik was interrogated by many military leaders and top security officials besides Schellenberg. He was treated as a military and intelligence expert, respected to the point of being allowed an occasional book in his cell. In one book given him he found a slip of paper bearing a single sentence in German: "Go to Slovakia or Croatia and await further instructions." He swallowed the paper.

Some days afterwards, by coincidence, Schellenberg sent for him and offered him the post of German organizer with Pavelich's army in Croatia. Vauhnik ostensibly accepted and went to Zagreb for a month, but he never entered on duty. Feigning illness such as to need sanitarium treatment, he moved to Ljubljana, where he received the instructions promised on the slip of paper. They came from A.A., code for Emil Anich, a British agent from Fiume.

A.A. became technical leader of a network established at Ljubljana under the designation B.B.Z. (This name was adopted by chance. The first communications to Switzerland went under the cryptonym "Berliner Boersenzeitung," but this full title was too long while its initials looked like Vauhnik's in Cyrillic script.) Reporting from the network continued for three years.

Ljubljana was a convenient location for the network's main center because the province, under Italian occupation, was at times like a no-man's-land in the "brutal friendship" with the Germans. It was unique in that travel permits could be obtained from there to almost any part of Fortress Europa. There were six secondary centers, in Trieste, Zagreb, Belgrade, Split, Vienna, and Munich. Sixteen agent outposts in Yugoslav territory, nine in Italy, five in Austria, and one each in Budapest, Prague, Bratislava, and Berlin and on the Polish-Czech border reported to these six centers or directly to Ljubljana. There were some radio facilities, supplied mostly by the British, but the bulk of communication was by courier. From Ljubljana the main courier run went via Milan to Switzerland.

There were 60 permanent agents and many more couriers and occasional agents, chosen mostly from business travelers and railroad employees. The agents were patriots, working in large part without remuneration. Funds were meager, but private citizens often turned

up with assistance. Some material help came from the British customer in Switzerland.

The Ljubljana center itself was literally underground, its location known to only three people—Vauhnik, his secretary, and A.A. The outfit's considerable success from the standpoint of cover, documentation, and transmittal of information to the British is described in detail. Losses had to be faced, however, first in Split and then Zagreb. When the hunt was narrowed down to Ljubljana, Vauhnik escaped to Switzerland and A.A. to Italy, leaving no traces behind. The Trieste center was the last to go. Of the 60 agents 14 ended at the wall or on the gallows.

The highly instructive contents of this book merit translation. It is a professional treatise, factual and explanatory. Just as Part I could almost be used as a text for MA trainees, Part II, though it could stand some reorganization to eliminate certain repetitions, would be of value to intelligence officers training for work on hostile terrain in time of regular or civil war. More broadly, the exposition of the social structure of the Axis powers at war, their differences, and their final breakdown and collapse, as seen by an intelligence observer, makes a significant contribution to the history of the period.

Tom Kristan

LA GUERRE A ETE GACNEE EN SUISSE: L'Affaire Roessler. By Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet. (Paris: Perrin, 1966. 317 pp. 15 fr.)

What we know of Rudolf Roessler's wartime work as Alexander Foote's source "Lucy" has come chiefly from Foote's book.¹ Foote, who is not given to overstatement, says that "Moscow largely fought their war on 'Lucy's' messages," and members of the Swiss general staff, which also received his information, have in general terms confirmed its high quality. It consisted principally of order of battle, authoritative, comprehensive, detailed, and prompt, on the disposition of the German forces.

What has remained a mystery is how Roessler, in Lucerne, got this information. It could only have come from inside Hitler's High Command, and by radio; and it was not interrupted even by the purge after 20 July 1944. The principal contribution of the present book by way of purported new light on the case is a solution, albeit skeletonized, of this mystery. The authors give us the initial letter

¹ *Handbook for Spies* (London, 1949; second, posthumous edition 1964).

of ten surnames, ten military ranks (five of them General), common German first names for the generals, and the statement that one of these worked for communications boss General Fellgiebel and so was able to use the Wehrmacht transmitters to send Roessler the information. Since they do not document these identificatory hints—or anything else—the reader's confidence in their authenticity will be influenced by the way the book treats facts known to him.

Accoce and Quet have tried to weave into a coherent narrative Foote's story, published accounts like General Guisan's of Swiss defense activity during the war, books like Walter Hagen's and Walter Schellenberg's (and perhaps some interrogation reports on them) about German counterintelligence, records of the postwar flap over Schellenberg's clandestine meetings with Swiss intelligence chief Masson,² and general works like William Shirer's covering the war on the eastern front and events at Hitler's headquarters. They have added local-color descriptions of the scenes of action and what information they could pick up in interviews and have fleshed out the whole with imaginatively supplied detail, including verbatim conversations complete with gestures, grimaces, and inflections.

Many of the invented conversations and documentary passages are short on verisimilitude. This would not matter if the authors were careful not to upset any established facts in the course of their inventions. But they are not. For one instance, Schellenberg, between his October 1942 and March 1943 meetings with Masson, is said to have been busy with two matters, Operation Bernhard and the Cicero

² Although an official inquiry exonerated Masson of blame for these meetings, the wisdom of his having held them is still a subject of dispute. This book, while admitting that Masson made a mistake in revealing to Schellenberg that he had a source good enough to report on the status of German contingency plans to occupy Switzerland, portrays him as ultimately beating Schellenberg at his own game. (Its interpretation of the reciprocal purposes of the two seems simplistic and distorted, but this matter is too complicated to treat here.) Jon Kimche, on the other hand, in his *Spying for Peace* (London, 1961) made him most naive and blundering and then reinforced this view in his preface to the book's second edition.

Kimche's English title, incidentally, refers only to his chapter covering the Roessler case, the Masson-Schellenberg meetings, and similar intelligence matters, not including Allen Dulles' "Sunrise" operation, which has a chapter of its own; the book as a whole should be called something like "General Guisan's Switzerland, 1939-45," as in the French and German editions it more or less is. Some portions of its broader material quite irrelevant to the Roessler case—Swiss military dispositions, economic measures, refugee policy, efforts to cope with Nazi political influences—have crept intrusively into the Accoce-Quet book too.

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affair. Bernhard perhaps, but Cicero was a year later. For another, Foote tells us there were cover names for the provenance of the Lucy material, giving as examples *Werther* for the Wehrmacht and *Olga* for the Luftwaffe, with others for the Navy and other departments. A&Q forget the others and apportion their ten initials between Werther and Olga, eight and two respectively.

Roessler's effort to get into touch with the Russians is described, beginning with a December 1940 scene in which Hitler "reads" to his generals the plan for Operation Barbarossa (Directive No. 21, summarized here in terms taken from Shirer). A week later Roessler gets a complete true copy of the plan. But by the time, the following March, that he has forged the Taylor-Cissy-Rado channel to the Russians as described by Foote, this precious document that occasioned the effort is forgotten—there is a later reference to a "mysterious" Operation Barbarossa—and Lucy's first reports concern German troop movements in Bulgaria. Moreover, A&Q have Foote staying up all night on 15 March to transmit these, whereas Foote says he first began to handle the Lucy material in early June when the volume got too much for Rado.

Of the rather complicated arrangements made to get money into Switzerland to pay for the net, Foote says that, although Moscow told him they could accomplish each transaction within ten days, often it took a great deal longer. A&Q, to make the story better, write that "none of the many transactions took longer than ten days." Foote tells us that Lucy's single erroneous report, one that cost the Russians 100,000 men, centered on Kharkov in 1942. A&Q, for reasons not immediately evident, change this to Kiev in 1941.

Foote was asked by the Center to look up the former agents "Lorenz" and "Laura" (who it turned out had gone over to the Germans); A&Q have *them* looking up Rado and so reaching Foote. When they secretly take Foote's picture, a thing he found out only later, A&Q make him see the camera trained on him. As the net begins to break up in the fall of 1943, A&Q compress into one day a Foote-Rado telephone call and meeting that were actually three weeks apart and so inactivate Rado in October instead of November. Then they show Cissy and Taylor, who were *successive* cut-outs between Rado and Lucy, bringing Foote Lucy's material together, as a "couple." And finally, deceived by the posthumous annex to the 1964 edition of Foote's book, they say he is still alive, hinting darkly that he works for British intelligence.

In view of these indications of their predilection for graphic detail and attitude toward existing evidence, the *prima facie* supposition must be that A&Q's ten sources designated by rank and initial are an invention just like the true copy of the Barbarossa plan. But even if they represent genuine new information—obtained conceivably from Roessler's widow—the addition to our knowledge is too slight to compensate for the authors' clumsy muddying of what we had before. An all-source story of the Roessler case would be a valuable thing, but it should not be done in the spirit of historical fiction.

Inquirer

Miscellany

THE UNDERGROUND WAR AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE: The Missions of William Wickham 1794-1800. By Harvey Mitchell. (London: Oxford University Press. 1965. 286 pp. 35/-.)

This history centers on British interest in and covert support to the French counterrevolution in the years of the Directory before Bonaparte's assumption of power. The funds the Secret Service expended vainly in this cause ran close to a million pounds. Although the program included, more in plans than in practice, the fomenting of underground armed rebellion to complement the overt military campaigns being rather lackadaisically waged against France by Britain and her allies Austria and Russia, its chief ingredient was a political action project that reached its high in 1797 when it succeeded in electing to the *Conseils* a solid majority of royalist deputies.

The principal assets inside France for the project had grown, curiously, out of a Spanish intelligence operation. From Paris a small group of royalist intriguers sent military and political intelligence to Madrid through the Spanish legation in Venice. The case officer in Venice, with Madrid's approval, passed most of the reports to the French princes in exile; but unbeknown to Madrid and in return for financial support, he also let William Wickham, covert British representative in Switzerland, in on the operation. The British rapidly took over.

Even with Madrid out of the picture, the lines of authority were pretty messy. The Paris Agency, as it came to be called, was formally subject to Louis XVIII and his court in exile; Wickham had to persuade the King to give the right orders. Then the Agency, when Wickham would set limits on its funds and functions, would go over his head and send emissaries to London, who persuaded the Foreign Office in one instance to authorize an additional grant. The slow communications of the times made this multiple management especially confusing. In Paris, the head of the Agency and a number of its operatives were arrested on the eve of the elections and there was a struggle for power among the remaining leaders.

In the meantime, however, it had set up, under cover of an *Institut Philanthropique*, a pervasive royalist organization, in original concept paramilitary but then turned to political ends for the election campaign, with cells in most provinces of France and secure communica-

tions to Paris. The ensuing massive propaganda effort was a major causative factor in advancing the counterrevolution to the point where for a brief time a restoration of the monarchy seemed almost in the bag.

This book is written for scholars specialist in the French revolution. For a layman to that specialty it is heavy going; the forest tends to disintegrate into its multitude of unfamiliar trees. Even the author occasionally gets caught in his own complication, as when he writes, "Unfortunately their inflexible stand . . . did not save them from avoiding that which they most dreaded—political suicide."

Anthony Quibble

SPIES WHO NEVER WERE. By Colonel Vernon Hinchley. (London: Harrap. 1965. 211 pp. 18/-.)


By title and introduction, this book sets out to pooh-pooh the sensationalism and distortion of fact which tend to develop spy legends about people who never really were spies. The idea holds promise of a different approach from the spies-I-have-known technique so overused by present-day writers, but Col. Hinchley fails miserably to follow through. For 211 pages he ably proves himself as good as anyone at the sensationalizing and contriving he claims to deplore. To make matters worse, he displays an alarming naiveté about the hows and whys of espionage. I need quote only once, from his chapter on Burgess and Maclean: ". . . there are many suggestions that [Burgess] never was a spy. Would the Russians—no amateurs in espionage!—engage a drunken homosexual as an agent?" The intelligent reader should know the answer to that one, if Col. Hinchley does not.

Not worth reading, even for laughs.

Wallace A. Furyk


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The first postwar crunch with the Soviet Union helps develop an embryonic national estimating process.

MARCH CRISIS 1948, ACT I

William R. Harris

THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD

An annual award of \$500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the *Studies*. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.

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Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

The "March Crisis" of 1948, as it is usually called, featured, following a half year of steeply aggravated Soviet hostility, a series of aggressive political acts in Europe, accompanied by military deployments in the Soviet Zone of Germany suggesting a possible armed attack, which culminated in restrictions on access to Berlin at the end of the month. For Allied intelligence services the crisis posed the exceedingly difficult task of assessing Soviet intentions at a time when the separate intelligence agencies in Washington were each anxious for the autonomy of its own estimative machinery. It forced the creation of ad hoc interdepartmental committees which became the forerunners of the present national estimates system.

To the Soviets, the March Crisis consisted of only the second act of what was for U.S. intelligence a two-act play, an act which they consciously precipitated by a decision taken on the 18th and carried out with their troop maneuvers and alerts of the last week of the month. But the first act, where the curtain rose on a March 5 cable from General Lucius D. Clay in Berlin and in effect rang down with the IAC¹ meeting of March 15, was the more critical for U.S. national interest and the development of supradepartmental intelligence. It was also with reference to these ten days that public curiosity was titillated when the Eberstadt report² was released the following December, with its charge that "a mistaken intelligence estimate, prepared by a departmental intelligence agency, stimulated recommendations which, if followed, might well have had serious consequences."

¹ Intelligence Advisory Committee, forerunner of the USIB.

² See first documentary source in note 3 below, third paragraph.

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March Crisis

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What follows is a tentative and incomplete account of this first act of the crisis, drawing upon the memories and records of participants, previous reports and surveys, and some additional research.³

³The author is writing a history of *The Origins of the Berlin Blockade and the Western Response* (TS) for the Historical Office, OSD, and would appreciate any corrections to this account or new information from readers, care of this journal.

For the sake of simplicity in this presentation, detailed documentation is omitted. The principal personal sources of information on the crisis were the following: Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Theodore Babbitt, William B. Ballis, Bernard M. Baruch, Jacob D. Beam, Robert Blum, Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Gen. Sir Nevil Brownjohn, John A. Bross, Alan Bullock, Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Lt. Gen. Steven J. Chamberlin, Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Franklin H. Copp, Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, Lewis W. Douglas, William H. Draper, Jr., Dana B. Durand, Ferdinand Eberstadt, Col. David G. Erskine, Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Haydon, Lt. Gen. George P. Hays, Lawrence P. H. Healey, Lord Henderson, John D. Hickerson, Brig. Gen. Frank B. Howley, Franklin P. Huddle, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Vice Adm. Thomas B. Inglis, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, David E. Lilienthal, Lord Longford, Robert A. Lovett, Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Ludwell L. Montague, Robert D. Murphy, Lawrence E. deNeufville, John H. Ohly, Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Pope, Col. Claude H. Purkitt, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, Brig. Gen. Peter P. Rodes, Kenneth C. Royall, Peter M. F. Sichel, Lord Strang, Maj. Gen. Sir Kenneth W. D. Strong, Sen. W. Stuart Symington, DeForrest Van Slyck, Maj. Gen. Robert LeG. Walsh, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Carroll L. Wilson, and Gen. Robert J. Wood.

The principal documentary studies used were these: [Eberstadt] *Task Force on National Security Organization, Hoover Commission Report, Appendix C*, released December 16, 1948 (Washington: GPO, 1949); Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa, *The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence, A Report to the National Security Council* (TS), 1 Jan 49; Memo from DeForrest Van Slyck, Global Survey Gp. ORE, CIA, to the DCI, 23 Dec 48, subj: "CIA Relations With the Air Force on Estimates of Soviet Intentions" (TS); Memo from Robert Blum, Special Assistant, OSD, to the Sec/Def, 23 Dec 48, subj: "The 'March' Crisis" (S), in "The Forrestal Diaries," Princeton, N. J. (TS), entry of 23 Dec 48; Memo from Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Erwin, Director of Intelligence (G-2), to C/S, U.S. Army, 4 Jan 49, subj: "Intelligence Estimates in March 1948" (TS regraded S); Memo from Col. Robert J. Wood, Aide to the Sec/Def, to the Sec/Def, 10 Jan 49, subj: "Intelligence Estimates on the March 'Crisis'" (TS regraded S), in OSD file CD 12-1-26; John A. Bross & Arthur E. Sutherland, "Report to the Eberstadt Task Force on the Central Intelligence Agency" (Revised), 36pp, in Ferdinand Eberstadt et al., *Report*, Vol. I (1948); G. Jackson, Historical Staff, CIA, "Notes on the 'March War Scare' of 1948," Paper No. 16, 21 May 53 (TS); Arthur B. Darling, *A History of the Central Intelligence Agency to 1950*, Chap. VIII (TS); Vice Adm. Thomas B. Inglis, "The March Crisis of 1948, an Intelligence Episode as Remembered, 18 Years Later, by a Participant," February 1966, 26 pp (S), courtesy of Admiral Inglis; Lawrence P. H. Healey, "The March Crisis of 1948," March 4, 1966, 8 pp (S), courtesy of Mr. Healey.

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Cold War Warming

During the fall of 1947 the U.S. military governor in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, noticed that his Soviet counterpart, Marshal Sokolovskiy, was far more cautious than before in his dealings with the Western powers. The two were still on friendly terms, but Sokolovskiy was unwilling to "wheel and deal," Clay puts it, in the fashion to which he had been accustomed in 1946 and early 1947. As Marshal Sokolovskiy himself said in August, rejecting an American proposal for quadripartite currency reform, "Although I have a very friendly attitude to General Clay, I cannot modify my position." Clay had thought little of Marshal Zhukov's recall to Moscow in early March 1946—without even bidding good-bye to General McNarney or Clay—but by the fall of 1947 he believed that this change was made because Zhukov had tried to avoid squabbles with the Western powers. He knew that Marshal Sokolovskiy wished to avoid another war, but he was apprehensive that decisions in Germany might be taken out from Sokolovskiy's control.

Soviet-Western relations had been marked during the year by U.S. promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan and launching of an anti-imperialist propaganda campaign, a growing stalemate in the round-robin Conferences of Foreign Ministers, and the creation of the Cominform in September. When in October, following Soviet security measures along the interzonal borders and during Red Army maneuvers in the Zone, it began to be rumored among the public that the West might withdraw from Berlin, Clay cabled his troop commander in Heidelberg that he did not wish to remove dependents of U.S. personnel from Berlin "unless you have intelligence reports not yet available here. This is a war of nerves, and we must have the stout nerves. Any indication of weakness on our part would jeopardize our position in central Europe . . . We must be as well trained as possible and on the alert to avoid a surprise action. Otherwise, we are airtight."

General Clay recalls having been startled by Marshal Sokolovskiy's speech before the Allied Control Council on November 21; the tone and style were so unusual for him as to arouse the suspicion that his authority in Germany had been undermined. Then on December 12, when he listened to Molotov's attack at the London Foreign Ministers' conference, Clay recognized some phrases and felt sure that Sokolovskiy had been reading a typical Molotov speech on order.

Even after the breakdown of the London CFM, however, General Clay did not expect war. He recalls having discussed the possibility

with Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas and British officials in mid-December. Although he believed that the formation of a West German state allied to the West might possibly cause the Soviets to launch a military attack, he considered it highly unlikely. The Russians were capable of overrunning Europe to the Pyrenees, but they would suffer tremendous destruction at home, especially in view of America's atomic monopoly. As U.S. Commander in Chief in Europe, he was nonetheless keenly aware of the insufficiency of ground forces remaining in his theater. On December 27 he wrote his old friend Al Wedemeyer, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations:

. . . The penetration of Communism has been checked, if not stopped, by the thin American and British screen through the middle of Germany and the middle of Austria. Certainly this military screen is part of a coordinated effort.

With the split-up at London, conditions in Germany, and I am sure in Austria, are tense. While I personally discount the prospects of war, I can not forget for a moment that this is possible and that if it occurs we must not be caught as we were at Pearl Harbor . . .

Over the next two months a number of events gradually modified this position of discounting the prospects of war. From intelligence reports Clay was aware that the highest-level Soviet officials in Germany were shuttling rapidly back and forth between Berlin and Moscow; he viewed the halting of U.S. military trains bound for Berlin as an attempt to probe our steadfastness; and he interpreted the contacting of his political adviser, Robert Murphy, by a General "Georgiev" (who was really Lt. Gen. L. A. Malinin of the MVD) as an additional Soviet effort to gauge American plans for Germany. Most important in altering his feeling about the likelihood of war were his personal contacts with Soviet officials in Germany. In half a dozen lengthy sessions during January and February 1948 he bargained, or argued, with the Soviets about currency reform and other matters. He had infrequent informal meetings with Marshal Sokolovskiy, and he noticed that the Marshal was now surrounded by MVD and MGB "advisers" and appeared unable to make decisions on his own.

When General Clay flew to London on February 22 for the opening of the London conference which would lay the plans for a West German state, he sensed a distinct shift in Soviet attitudes, but he was not sure of the new course which the Soviets would follow. Even when he briefly revisited Germany on February 25, the day follow-

ing the collapse of the non-Communist government in Prague, he was unable to obtain any hard intelligence on prospective Soviet actions in central Europe. Back in London as the Czech coup became accomplished fact, he discussed it with Ambassador Douglas. Both regarded it as a portent of new Soviet aggression; its brazenness startled them.

The Washington End

Because Douglas was planning to return to Washington after the first round of the London conference, Clay thought the Ambassador would be an appropriate messenger to convey his new apprehensions to Secretary of State Marshall. The oral message would be that with the new tensions in Berlin Clay was no longer sure the Soviets would not risk war for a number of years. It had been General Marshall who had first authorized Clay to inaugurate inter-Allied defense planning in April 1947, and the two had corresponded ever since, discussing the state of joint Allied defenses under cover of the state of "Lieutenant Peters' health." Thus it was Clay's first instinct to warn Marshall when he sensed trouble ahead. Clay returned to Germany on March 1, but the conference dragged on, and Ambassador Douglas was unable for another week to leave for Washington.

In Washington it was budget review time, and DoD was preparing its FY 1950 budget, while seeking a supplemental appropriation for FY 1949. On March 2 Senator Chan Gurney, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, notified Secretary of Defense Forrestal of his plans to hold closed hearings on the budget. Forrestal, the three service secretaries, and the chiefs of staff were scheduled to appear before the committee on Monday morning, March 8.

It must have been during this first week of March that Director of Army Intelligence and Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2) Lieutenant General Steven J. Chamberlin flew in and met with Clay in Germany.⁴ General Clay recalls how he discussed his own apprehensions and asked for Chamberlin's impressions. Chamberlin replied that we did not have any evidence of impending Soviet military action, but spring would be the best time for an attack. Then he asked Clay to cable Washington about his fear of possible war. Clay remonstrated that he had no definite facts which would justify a formal report, that he

⁴This account is based on General Clay's detailed story; General Chamberlin has "no recollection" of such a meeting.

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had already sent a warning informally via Ambassador Douglas, and that Chamberlin, as G-2, could convey these undocumented qualms to the Chief of Staff. But Chamberlin wanted to have, when he got back to Washington, a cable he could show around the Pentagon; word-of-mouth advice wouldn't have nearly so much impact.

On Friday morning March 5, after Chamberlin had flown back to Washington, Clay revealed his doubts to his European Command G-2, Major General Robert L. Walsh. General Walsh remembers having been greatly relieved to learn of his chief's change in attitude; for many weeks he had been urging the reluctant Clay to warn Washington of impending trouble. He now interrupted him, saying "Lucius, if you feel there's a good chance of war, we had better get the word to Washington," and looked around the office for some paper to write on. He did not want to let Clay out of the room until a cable had been prepared, lest he change his mind. Clay began to dictate, his G-2 taking down what he said, as best he could, on a long pad of yellow paper.⁵

General Clay gives his reason for acceding to Chamberlin's suggestion, aside from the possibility of a surprise attack, as the likelihood of trouble in Berlin. He cites his proposal of the preceding December to send armored convoys through obstacles on the autobahn if necessary. He recalls having hoped that his warning might encourage a quickening of rearmament, so that his position vis-à-vis the Russians would be as strong as possible when the crisis broke.

General Walsh recalls that Clay originally began, "Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude . . ." But when he read what he had dictated he decided to move to the top a sentence near the end explaining what his previous belief had been. When the cable was ready for transmission they found, in a last-minute check for any confirmatory intelligence, that the Berlin commandant, Colonel Frank L. Howley, who had also sensed trouble, had made a report which was already being sent to Washington via intelligence channels. General Walsh added a reference to this and gave orders that the message be transmitted by "the underground

⁵ A recent history of these events thus errs in its interpretation: "In notifying Washington that something was up, General Clay was acting purely on his own initiative . . . This was one of the rare cases in recent American history when the responsible Commander on the spot has not only sensed something that the intelligence experts had overlooked but also dared to communicate this feeling to his superiors." (Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin*; Baltimore, 1963.)

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radio," double-encrypted in a special cipher and sent through Army Security Agency channels.

The Trigger

The transmittal of the message to ASA at Arlington Hall commenced at 3:15 p.m. Berlin time, March 5:

FROM CLAY EYES ONLY TO CHAMBERLIN.

FOR MANY MONTHS, BASED ON LOGICAL ANALYSIS, I HAVE FELT AND HELD THAT WAR WAS UNLIKELY FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS. WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, I HAVE FELT A SUBTLE CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDE WHICH I CANNOT DEFINE BUT WHICH NOW GIVES ME A FEELING THAT IT MAY COME WITH DRAMATIC SUDDENNESS. I CANNOT SUPPORT THIS CHANGE IN MY OWN THINKING WITH ANY DATA OR OUTWARD EVIDENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS OTHER THAN TO DESCRIBE IT AS A FEELING OF A NEW TENSENESS IN EVERY SOVIET INDIVIDUAL WITH WHOM WE HAVE OFFICIAL RELATIONS. I AM UNABLE TO SUBMIT ANY OFFICIAL REPORT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORTING DATA BUT MY FEELING IS REAL. YOU MAY ADVISE THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THIS FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH IF YOU FEEL IT ADVISABLE.

Colonel Howley's information arrived in Washington during the afternoon:

Upon failure of London Conference, Soviet Kommandatura representatives at all levels were completely unprepared and acted in routine manner.

After weeks of calm, last 2 Kommandatura meetings, 26 February and 2 March, showed such increased Soviet violence in attacks that it is believed that General Kotikov, Senior Soviet Member, is acting under new instructions. Attacks are thoroughly prepared, unprovoked, and often unrelated to any incidents of meetings.

. . . The apparent pattern, with reference to Soviet intentions in Berlin, which may be temporary or permanent, includes the following elements:

1. Effort to build case that quadripartite government is unable to operate in Berlin.

5. Complete opposition to agreement of any kind in quadripartite meetings.

As Walter Millis noted in editing *The Forrestal Diaries*, Clay's cable "fell with the force of a blockbuster bomb." One unnamed CIA official unaware of the background of the warning later told the press, "There was a world scare just because General Clay had some bad

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apple strudel the night before . . ." General Chamberlin evaluates the warning as "greatly instrumental in bringing the dangerous situation to a focus among those in responsibility in our government and . . . prophetic of what happened a few months later." But he is not "so certain that it succeeded in quickening defense measures."

Chamberlin hand-carried the "war warning," as it was thereafter called in G-2, to General Bradley, interrupting the Chief of Staff in conference. He recalls having distributed it further only as specified by Bradley, but General Bradley does not recall what recipients he authorized. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, remembers having read it that afternoon, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal entered a copy of it in his diary under the March 5 date. Aside from Forrestal, there is no indication that any non-Army personnel saw it at this time; as General Chamberlin hinted later, it was apparently regarded as "an Army matter" for the first six days after it came in. High officials of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Air Force, and the Navy and of CIA say that they first received formal notice of it on March 12. And President Truman's first known mention of it on that date suggests that even he may not have been among the original recipients.

Rumors of Wars

In advance of the 4 p.m. cabinet session that Friday, March 5, the G-2 and General Bradley met briefly with Secretary Forrestal, presumably to discuss the Clay cable. Meanwhile, down the corridor from General Chamberlin's Pentagon office, in Room 2E756, a G-2 Intelligence Group under Colonel Riley F. Ennis began work on a "crash estimate" of Soviet intentions.

That evening Secretary of the Army Royall was the host at a buffet dinner for the service secretaries, Secretary Forrestal, and the AEC commissioners. Unaware of the warning cable, AEC Chairman Lilienthal was surprised by the tenor of the conversation:

When I came into Royall's office, he was asking (and later we all explored the question): How long would it take us to get a number of "eggs" to, say, the Mediterranean? The idea of using them, Royall said, disturbed him a great deal. Symington said the American public was completely misinformed about how quickly we could go into action and what we could do. And so on; it was a rather grim hour of this kind of talk.

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On Saturday Ennis's Intelligence Group reported on its deliberations to Secretary Royall and top Army officers. The key paragraphs of its estimate read:

It is unlikely that the Soviets will take military action either to drive us out of Berlin, or Germany, although they have the undoubted capability of initiating offensive operations in Europe and the Middle East without appreciable warning. However, we have no evidence that they intend to do so at this time.

It remains our estimate that the Soviets will continue their expansionist policy taking care to avoid war . . . The possibility remains that such action might inadvertently touch off a general war.

The following Monday, March 8, at the closed hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Forrestal told the Senators about Clay's warning in order to emphasize that we could not assume any "safe" period of years but must prepare for the contingency of war so as to reduce its likelihood. Also on March 8, Ambassador Douglas flew in from London and probably gave Secretary of State Marshall General Clay's message.

On Tuesday, the day after Forrestal's closed-door testimony on the Hill, rumors spread around Washington about a Clay "letter" warning of war, and on Wednesday, at Forrestal's news conference, there were questions about "a certain Clay letter to you in regard to a change in the evaluation of the international situation with regard to the possibility of war . . ." and about "a report that it was said before a Senate committee in closed session that this Government or the military chiefs no longer felt we were safe for a decade." Forrestal tried to answer these in general terms.

CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates, under Theodore Babbitt, sent an issue of its periodic *Review of the World Situation* to press on March 10, having heard nothing about Clay's warning:

. . . The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia has created widespread apprehension. We do not believe, however, that this event reflects any sudden increase in Soviet capabilities, more aggressive intentions, or any change in current Soviet policy or tactics . . .

Also on March 10, Army intelligence sent out a revised collection directive to 59 military attachés and six army commands around the globe:

. . . Indications are that, after period of deliberation since breakup of CFM last December, Soviets may have decided upon policy for 1948. Historically, spring or early summer has been the season selected for initiation military operations Western Europe. Therefore, information bearing on Soviet intentions next four to six months of vital and immediate interest to Dept. of Army.

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On March 11 the morning papers carried stories about the mysterious "suicide" of Jan Masaryk, the Czech Foreign Minister, raising the question whether his knowing too much may have precipitated his death. By this time Air Force intelligence had learned informally of the Clay cable. (G-2 had maintained, General Chamberlin and the then deputy A-2, General Cabell, agree, a somewhat "paternalistic" attitude toward A-2 during this period, sometimes providing it with information withheld from other departments.) It is not known, however, whether this knowledge had any causal relationship with the Air Force's commencing on that date the first short-range atomic war planning since World War II. Informal knowledge of the cable or indirect repercussions had already caused reviews of war preparedness outside the Department of the Army. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Inglis, writes:

To the best of my recollection the existence and contents of this [March 5] despatch were not made known to me by General Chamberlin for several days thereafter. However, indications reached me that there was increased tension and anxiety in high places. Therefore, I was not completely surprised when General Chamberlin disclosed the despatch to a meeting of Intelligence Chiefs in his office on March 12, 1948.

Interdepartmental Coordination

On March 11 the service chiefs of staff flew to Key West for a weekend meeting with Secretary Forrester, in an effort to improve interdepartmental cooperation, delineate service roles and missions, review possible requirements for a supplemental FY '49 budget, and set guidelines for the FY '50 budget. Secretary Forrester's effort to create an interdepartmental "spirit of Key West" may have triggered General Bradley's wish to have an interdepartmental review of Clay's warning. Moreover, a sound appraisal of Soviet intentions would greatly assist the JCS and Secretary Forrester in deciding what budget requests to make of President Truman and the Congress. And there was the question of other defense measures: prior to the formal sessions of March 12-14 at Key West, there were discussions of whether to ask for the immediate restoration of selective service and of "whether or not now is the time for turning custody of [atomic] weapons over to the Armed Services."

Whatever the precise motivation, before leaving for Key West General Bradley, possibly on Forrester's suggestion, appears to have asked Chamberlin to obtain a combined estimate on the "war warning." Bradley and Chamberlin are unable to recall the circumstances

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for sure. The late Robert Blum summarized most of what was known back in December 1948:

In the course of the [Dulles-Jackson-Correa] Intelligence Survey, I have gathered some information . . . and since the publicity given to [the March Crisis] by the Eberstadt Committee, I have tried to collect more. Reports as to what actually happened are quite divergent and no two people tell the same story. There are, however, some points which seem to emerge. In the first place, the messages received from General Clay were not examined in an orderly coordinated manner in order to arrive at an agreed intelligence estimate. There was some cooperation between the Departments, but I am not yet certain whether this was by the Army or Air Force. Finally, CIA did not come up with a correct evaluation when the others were wrong, although eventually and after considerable delay, there was coordinated interdepartmental examination of the situation under the auspices of CIA.

These observations now require slight modification: there appears to have been some mutual exchange between Army and Air Force intelligence; and although CIA did not "come up with a correct evaluation when the others were wrong," it did reach a correct evaluation when the warning was made available to it.

One additional reason that General Chamberlin resorted to the IAC as an estimating forum appears to have been his fear that CIA estimates, written without knowledge of the Clay cable and consistently minimizing the likelihood of war, would be given undue weight:

. . . I do not recall that I was so disturbed over an immediate probability of war in the Spring of 1948 . . .

. . . I do remember that we had some hesitancy of taking an all around strategic estimate from the CIA because of the comparative youth: I felt that only by using the resources of all intelligence agencies could a sound estimate be attained.

On March 11 or early on the 12th, Chamberlin telephoned the DCI, Admiral Hillenkoetter, and asked whether he would mind convening a special session of the IAC in Chamberlin's office. When Hillenkoetter asked why, Chamberlin cited without further specification an "important Army matter." Although IAC meetings were usually held in the CIA headquarters, Hillenkoetter agreed to a special meeting at the Pentagon, and it was scheduled for the morning of Friday, March 12.

The State Department intelligence chief, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., recalls having thought, during the ride out to the Pentagon, about

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the precedent which was being set, with its appearance of subjecting the IAC to the control of a departmental service, rather than CIA. He wondered what the meeting would be about; had he known that it would involve estimating Soviet intentions, he would have brought along OIR's Eastern Europe chief, William B. Ballis.

Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Inglis was also puzzled by the meeting in General Chamberlin's office. Mr. Armstrong remembers that during a prolonged discussion about procedure before the meeting reached the substantive issue, Inglis wanted to know what was happening; was this a meeting of the IAC, in which case Admiral Hillenkoetter should be at the head of the table, or was it just an informal get-together? Chamberlin immediately offered to turn the chairmanship over to Hillenkoetter, but the DCI declined on the grounds that it was General Chamberlin's meeting and in his office. Finally it was agreed to be not a formal IAC meeting but a "Meeting of the IAC Directors," chaired by Chamberlin.

Chamberlin then opened the meeting and tabled as the subject for discussion Clay's cable, which he read aloud to the assembled directors. The reactions were varied, but again the subject of immediate discussion was procedure. Admiral Inglis relates:

This disclosure immediately raised two questions: (1) the weight to be attached to the substance of the despatch and (2) the manner in which it had been handled. As presented at that meeting, I was not satisfied with either.

Amy G-2 and Air Force A-2 were taking the contents at face value—so seriously that the possibility of immediate national mobilization in preparation for a full scale shooting World War III was mentioned.

My first reaction was to take the substance of the message with a grain of salt, but in any case to subject it to thorough staff evaluation before arriving at a conclusion. My second reaction was dismay that the despatch had not been referred to CIA forthwith for coordination and correlation.

This was the very function for which CIA had been established . . .

When the discussion turned to the substance of the cable, no one voiced an expectation that war would "come with dramatic suddenness," but there were distinct differences of view: Hillenkoetter, Inglis, and Armstrong were inclined to doubt its likelihood, while Chamberlin, with General McDonald of A-2, was less confident that peace could be maintained. Some of the participants thought that Chamberlin considered war imminent. General Chamberlin himself, however, recalls having been primarily concerned about the inadequacy of U.S. preparedness. In his view a major and immediate

buildup, primarily of land forces, would serve both as a warning to the Soviets and as insurance against their launching an attack.

Procedural Milestone

Admiral Inglis suggested establishing an ad hoc committee under CIA chairmanship to study the matter of Soviet intentions, and this was at once agreed. Its estimating procedure would be different from the usual one wherein CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates would assess a situation, prepare an estimate, send it around to the IAC agencies to get criticisms or proposed additions, revise the draft, and then let the other agencies either concur or attach dissents.

This is what had been used on the standing ORE estimates which predicted hostile Soviet actions but nothing likely to culminate in a deliberate war. The new procedure would give the other agencies the feeling of being centrally involved in the estimating process and encourage their disclosure of information which they had previously kept for their own departmental use. Thus the IAC chiefs' agreement on March 12 was a milestone in interdepartmental cooperation and a forerunner of the system of a national estimates introduced in 1950. The report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey later in 1948 observed:

The most significant exception to a rather general failure to coordinate intelligence opinion in national estimates was a series of reports on Soviet capabilities and intentions, beginning in March, 1948, by an ad hoc committee . . . This case illustrated that, when properly used, the existing interdepartmental arrangements can, under the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency, provide the President and top policy-makers with an authoritative intelligence estimate.

After some initial delay following the receipt by the Army of a disturbing message from General Clay, the President on March 16, 1948 received . . . a brief short-range estimate . . . The importance of this procedure, particularly in an emergency situation, is difficult to overemphasize.

After the March 12 meeting each agency sent out requests to the field for information useful in clarifying Soviet intentions. Admiral Hillenkoetter returned to his office and asked his Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, Theodore Babbitt, to prepare for a follow-up session of the IAC directors, accompanied by their experts, to be held that same evening. ORE was organized along geographic lines, but there was one general section, a "Global Survey Group" to which Mr. Babbitt turned for the forthcoming task. The "group" consisted of only two people, Ludwell L. Montague and DeForrest

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Van Slyck; the latter was to become chairman of the proposed ad hoc committee.

Mr. Lawrence P. H. Healey of ONI's Estimates Staff recalls learning of the Clay cable at Main Navy late in the afternoon that Friday:

... when the March crisis of 1948 suddenly appeared, the Estimates Staff was ... primed for such a situation and further aided by the fact that ONI was small and consequently easy to coordinate. The most important factor was that Admiral Inglis was always available to all hands if the subject was one of importance.

I remember vividly that Admiral Inglis summoned me to his office ... late in the afternoon ... He told me that General Chamberlin of G-2 had set up a special briefing on the Soviet threat and had invited attendance from Navy, Air Force, and CIA. [Also State.] ... Admiral Inglis asked me to go along with him ... I believe it was at this point when Admiral Inglis showed me the Clay dispatch that appears in *The Forrestal Diaries*.

General Chamberlin's ... officers and analysts ... covered all pertinent aspects of the Soviet condition and then sat by. As I recall, there were probably about 20 guests listening. After the presentation, General Chamberlin—who appeared quite tense—asked for comment. Admiral Inglis stated ... that the G-2 people had arrived at the same position that ONI held.

General Chamberlin ... stated that he did not [entirely] agree with his people and gave his own opinion to the effect that the impending situation could be dire. General McDonald of the Air Force (A-2) ... strongly supported General Chamberlin. He also introduced General Cabell, who was to succeed him in a matter of days.

... As I recall, the first CIA speaker (probably Mr. Van Slyck) gave a rather diplomatic summary of his views which agreed with the substance of what Admiral Inglis had said. Shortly after, however, Dr. Samuel A. D. Hunter of the CIA Western European group stood up to say that the G-2 presentation admirably presented the known capabilities but he felt that many intangibles changed the picture (what he called "the logic of the situation") to one of grave concern. ... [Generals Chamberlin and McDonald] rushed over to him, asked his name again, shook hands and congratulated him.

The presentation and comments over, Admiral Inglis and I rode back from the Pentagon with a feeling that we were going to have to spend some time on what we used to call "intelligence in reverse," i.e., the ordeal of undoing a faulty intelligence picture which had been [circulating] ... in "the front offices" around town.

The members of the ad hoc committee under Van Slyck prepared for their first formal session on Saturday morning, the 13th. The State Department representative, William B. Ballis, recalls having to tell his wife of the Saturday meeting, without much satisfaction, but knowing that the President—whom Hillenkoetter had presumably

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briefed on Friday—expected word on Soviet intentions by Monday morning. Van Slyck had not been given a copy of the Clay cable, but he at least knew it was Clay's opinion that war might be imminent and that this was why his committee had been convened.

On Friday each of the armed services had sent to its field headquarters a request that the readiness of current emergency plans be reviewed:

Recent developments in world situation make it advisable for all addressee[s] to survey carefully your current emergency plans and insure that such implementing instructions as might be required to expedite placing these plans into effect are prepared.

This message is based on general situation and not on any new developments not known to you. The Navy and Air Force have dispatched similar messages.

Also Friday and Saturday, U.S. intelligence officials around the globe—at embassies, military intelligence headquarters, and CIA stations, undertook to reassess Soviet intentions. The CIA station chief in Berlin and his deputy, Dana B. Durand and Peter M. F. Sichel, for the first time learned of General Clay's March 5 warning. They visited the OMGUS intelligence chief, Colonel Peter P. Rodes, and his R&A deputy, Lawrence E. deNeufville, to make an informal estimate, and all four agreed that the Soviets were not ready for war. In December 1947 Durand and Sichel had predicted a major Soviet drive to oust the Western powers from Berlin; this warning had led in Washington to a CIA Special Evaluation forecasting that the Soviets would use "every means short of armed force" to compel the Allied withdrawal. As they now reviewed the situation, these two were convinced that the Soviets were planning further measures, short of war, to the same end. OMGUS intelligence had reached the same conclusions, although Colonel Rodes' chief, Major General Walsh, considered war a distinct possibility and had therefore made arrangements to evacuate his family from Berlin.

Other reports for the ad hoc estimating committee came from the Heidelberg, Pullach, Wiesbaden, and Karlsruhe headquarters, from the embassy in Moscow, and from London, where Winston M. Scott, Major General Clayton L. Bissell, and their staffs obtained information from British intelligence. In Washington, each agency had key personnel working overtime to assemble the material. One interdepartmental committee, chaired by Captain Samuel B. Frankel of ORE's Eastern European branch, provided an excellent compendium of

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information on the USSR. This committee of Soviet experts had developed from an informal series of weekly lunches; it now served as a convenient clearing-house for material on the Soviet Union.

Estimative Tug of War

On Saturday morning the ad hoc committee met at CIA headquarters with Van Slyck in the chair. State Department representative Ballis remembers that the two major "protagonists," as he called them, were Van Slyck of CIA and Colonel Ennis of G-2, whose respective organizations would have the bulk of relevant field-source information. Colonel Ennis was under instructions to get backing for the Army's efforts to obtain passage of a selective service act and universal military training, as Van Slyck later reported to the DCI:

... the G-2 representative had stated that General Chamberlain [*sic*: Chamberlin] wanted to have included in the estimate a recommendation for the draft and universal military training, which I emphatically refused to consider.

Van Slyck declared, he recalls, that he was "running an intelligence estimates committee, not an appropriations committee," and the group then limited its enquiry to its mandate from the IAC respecting Soviet intentions. The effect of a selective service program or UMT would be considered, if at all, in a separate estimate. It was not until the IAC meeting of the following Monday that G-2 again stressed the need for an estimate supporting the draft and UMT.

According to participants' recollections, the committee's proceedings that Saturday involved a prolonged debate over semantics and whether war could be called "unlikely," "improbable," or whatever. Although none of the members argued that war was likely, the G-2 and A-2 representatives opposed any direct statement that it was improbable or unlikely, as Van Slyck, Ballis, and Healey regarded it. During the drafting sessions officials from the several departments came in from time to time with additional data. Admiral Hillenkoetter stopped in occasionally to ask, as Van Slyck remembers, "Van, is there anything I can do for you?" or, as Ballis recalls, to bring everyone a cup of coffee.

Van Slyck produced a preliminary draft estimate which underwent revision during the sessions on Sunday, March 14. Mr. Ballis notes the importance of this procedure, of the fact that "Van Slyck wrote the estimate, and we reacted to it. He was the key man in the

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drafting." By the final session on Sunday, unanimous agreement had been reached on a draft estimate that war was improbable over the next 60 days. This conclusion was supported by details concerning Soviet activities, military and political, in which the absence of any of the usual indicators of impending hostilities was presumably controlling.

While the committee was drafting this joint estimate over the weekend, the several departmental intelligence organizations were preparing their own drafts, in order to help their representatives contribute to the joint estimate and also to highlight differences with it or bring out nuances lacking in it. General Chamberlin improved the weekend by preparing, for General Bradley to read upon his return from Key West, a major review of the international situation, the possibility of war, and the inadequacy of U.S. forces. The memorandum ran eight pages of single-spaced type, 312 lines in all. Its tenor can be gauged by the following excerpts:

Memorandum to the Chief of Staff
Subject: Estimate of World Situation

14 March 1948

1. World Military Imbalance.

The Soviet Armed Forces, reorganized and largely reequipped during the past year, overshadow the whole of Europe and most of Asia. . . . The Soviet Armed Forces have weaknesses . . . These weaknesses, however, . . . do not appreciably affect the short-range capabilities of quickly overrunning great expanses of the European continent.

The United States has no forces in being which could prevent the Soviet overrunning of most of Eurasia. . . .

. . . Present forces which might oppose Soviet aggression throughout the world are incapable of offering more than a weak and unorganized delaying action in any of the likely theaters.

2. Increasing International Tension.

The world is now divided into two camps, heightening the element of strain and making it possible that otherwise trivial incidents may be magnified into the spark that touches off war. . . . The advent of spring, coupled with coming elections in Italy, . . . afford no prospects of an early lessening of the tension which prevails . . .

3. U.S. Armed Forces Unequal to Commitments.

4. War Increasingly Possible.

. . . All intelligence agencies believe . . . that a general war might be precipitated through mischance or through a miscalculation on the part of either the Soviets or the United States . . . This examination . . . does not offer

any evidence which is more conclusive now than was the case six months or a year ago. However, the risk of war is greater now . . . In the light of the current increase of international tension, war will become increasingly probable.

5. Summary.

. . .

United States policy . . . without the backing of adequate armed strength is not proving successful in stemming the Soviet advance . . . The Soviets could overrun much of continental Europe and the Middle East before our latent strength could be brought to bear . . . The armed forces can no longer base their strength and plans only upon their estimate of future Soviet military action. Continuously prepared, the USSR can determine upon war whenever she deems it necessary.

6. Conclusions.

. . . To an extent not approached by the other Services, the Army is carrying the burden of military occupation duties and overseas commitments . . . [but it] is the least prepared of the services to fulfill its national defense mission . . . The Army must immediately prepare itself . . . along the following general lines . . .

- a. Intensify . . . planning world-wide.
- b. Bring the Regular Army to . . . strength . . . by resorting as necessary to compulsory military service.
- c. Augment the size of the Regular Army . . .
- d. Bring our machinery for general mobilization to an alert status . . .
- e. Limit the acceptance . . . of further foreign commitments . . .

General Chamberlin did not mention our small but significant stockpile of atomic weapons or the Army Plans & Operations consensus that after initial setbacks the Western powers would be able to re-conquer western and central Europe and cause irreparable damage to the Soviet economy. He did cogently argue the need for rearmament, more than a year before the Soviet atomic bomb and events leading to the Korean War. This was more a policy than an intelligence paper, though it was the "departmental intelligence estimate" which the Eberstadt Task Force, without having seen it, thought might have had "serious consequences." General Chamberlin's concern was the improvement of U.S. military capabilities; his deputy on the ad hoc committee, Colonel Ennis, had just agreed that the Soviets were not planning to launch an attack.

Admiral Inglis thought that the hysteria which might attend some degree of mobilization could result in "serious consequences" and might possibly trigger an accidental war. In the second act of the March Crisis, however, we shall find that the Soviets, in launching an elaborate deception operation on March 18, accompanied it by measures of troop discipline and control designed to minimize the

risk of accidental war and that in fact the March confrontation at no time came close to war. And if a personal opinion is allowable, it is this writer's belief after five years of contemplating the March situation that even a major mobilization program as recommended by General Chamberlin would not have triggered war. It is always tempting to dramatize the brink-of-war situation; in Thomas Hardy's words, "War makes rattling good history, but Peace is poor reading."

Among the agreements reached during Forrestal's meetings with the JCS at Key West was one to press the President and the Congress for a supplemental appropriation for FY 1949. By any of the several possible measures, the defense budget for FY 1948 was the lowest of those between World War II and the present. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, returning from Key West, were wary of any intelligence estimate which might be used, in an election year, as an argument against the supplemental FY 1949 appropriation and the increment in the FY 1950 budget which they considered essential to the nation's security. In advance, therefore, of the IAC meeting on Monday March 15, the chiefs of staff made known their apprehensions to their respective intelligence chiefs. Admiral Inglis recounts:

While the Intelligence staffs were deliberating, and thereafter, outside pressures were building up. I was called by A-2 (I believe it was General Cabell, then Deputy A-2) and possibly by General Chamberlin, who tried to convince me that ONI's estimate was too conservative; that it should be more in line with the purport of General Clay's message. I consulted Healey again. We stood firm.

Admiral Inglis recalls having been also under some internal Navy pressure to adjust the estimate with a view toward budgetary considerations:

I was told that the other services, especially the Air Force, were using General Clay's message to obtain more Congressional appropriations, especially for the 70 groups of bombers; that the Army would use it to obtain the draft and/or Universal Military Training; that the Secretary of Defense was also advocating UMT. The Navy was being placed at a competitive disadvantage. Would I change ONI's estimate to something threatening impending war? The Navy needed more appropriations, too.

I stood firm, explaining the reasons for ONI's estimate. But didn't I realize that this was March? In Central Europe the harvests were in and the ground was drying and firming. This was the logical time to expect the Russians to "march."

My reply was to the effect that if . . . the Navy needed more appropriations it would have to make its case with reasons other than a phony war-

scare from ONI. Quite gratuitously, and outside the scope of Intelligence, I may have added that if anyone really expected war, he had better recommend an immediate, full-scale crash mobilization rather than a ponderous time-consuming UMT.

The dialogue ended.

It was this stand of the DNI which ultimately set the pattern for the other service intelligence chiefs at the IAC meeting on Monday morning, when they and their top advisers, including the members of the ad hoc committee, held a formal session at CIA chaired by Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Agreement

Van Slyck presented the conclusions of the ad hoc committee. With its detail and showing the effects of a compromise effort to sit the fence on the likelihood of war, the draft estimate was unacceptable to the IAC. The following is Admiral Inglis' recollection:

The IAC, including CIA of course, then debated at some length the semantics of the joint estimate which was to go to the President and NSC. I believe A-2 wanted to include a reservation that "the possibility of war could not be ruled out." ONI did not concur. G-2 may have offered a plug for UMT If so it was probably voted down as being beyond the scope of an intelligence report.

But Hillenkoetter, who had seen the President again, required an answer for him that morning regarding Soviet intentions. The ONI representative on the ad hoc committee, Lawrence Healey, has reconstructed the scene:

. . . our draft was so late and split that Admiral Hillenkoetter decided to narrow the issue and strongarm the indecisive . . . Hillenkoetter said something to the effect that the President wanted flat Yes or No answers to three questions *with no elaboration of answers*. The questions were:

- (1) Will the Soviets deliberately provoke war in the next 30 days?
- (2) In the next 60 days?
- (3) In 1948?

These questions were rather poorly hectographed on a plain sheet of paper. Their informality, brevity and bluntness had the effect of an unexpected ice-cold shower on the participants . . . it is my impression that at least the majority answered No.

As there was general agreement that war was unlikely for at least the next 60 days, it was decided to consolidate the answers to questions

(1) and (2), deferring (3). An estimate was drafted on the spot which summarized Soviet intentions in two paragraphs:

I. An examination of all pertinent available information has produced no reliable evidence that the USSR intends to resort to military action within the next 60 days.

II. It is not believed that the USSR will resort to military action within the next 60 days . . .

While argument continued about a "Nevertheless . . ." clause, the DCI handed this statement to Theodore Babbitt, and Babbitt hand-carried it as a CIA estimate of March 15, without any other concurrence, to President Truman at the White House. Later in the day the IAC directors reached agreement on the full text. As a concession to the Air Force a third paragraph contained a "Nevertheless . . ." clause, and as a concession to the Army a separate estimate was drafted on UMT and selective service.

With slight variations, the estimate was distributed under several different covers on the morning of Tuesday, March 16: to the President as CIA Intelligence Memorandum 17 without other concurrence; to the President, the NSC, and other recipients of CIA's *Daily Summary* as Special Evaluation No. 27, with unanimous concurrence of State, Army, Air Force, and Navy; and with notice of the concurrences, to the President as Intelligence Memorandum 21. As it was finally hand-carried to the White House:

Memorandum for the President

Reassessment of Soviet Intentions for the Next Sixty Days

a. An examination of all pertinent available information has produced no reliable evidence that the USSR intends to resort to military action within the next sixty days.

b. The weight of logic, as well as evidence, also leads to the conclusion that the USSR will not resort to military action within the next sixty days.

c. There is, nevertheless, the ever present possibility that some miscalculation or incident may result in war.

In an even briefer Intelligence Memorandum, IM-18, the IAC disposed of the effects of UMT or the draft upon Soviet intentions:

Memorandum for the President

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, War [*sic*: Army], Navy, and Air Force agree that if the Congress passes a universal military training act and/or selective service act these measures, taken singly or together, will not of themselves cause the USSR to resort to military action within the next 60 days.

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Although the formal estimates were not distributed until Tuesday, the "crisis"—to the extent that there was a crisis—was over by Monday morning. Admiral Inglis has summarized the situation as of March 15:

So far as U.S. Intelligence was concerned the "March Crisis of 1948" ended with the meeting of the IAC on March 15, 1948. It was then generally accepted that intelligence must be correlated, that CIA had the authority and responsibility to do the correlating, that CIA must be provided quickly with all information from all sources, and that all the other agencies must be consulted and all information exchanged except when the item was obviously technical and of interest to only one department.

Other war scares followed but henceforth they were taken in stride. The procedure had been established.

There were strong temptations to allow our judgment to be warped. As regularly as the cherry blossoms bloom in Potomac Park, every spring in Washington witnesses a scramble for Congressional appropriations. A little war scare recurs at this time of year, not every year perhaps, but often enough to be more than a coincidence.

The easy way for us might have been to "Remember Pearl Harbor" and push the panic button . . .


However, had we succumbed to these temptations and given face value to the message, it might have led to an ill-conceived and enormously expensive general mobilization. This would have put the whole world in an uproar. It might even have precipitated a war.

It took a measure of intestinal fortitude to stand up against the pressures . . .

The procedures facilitating interdepartmental teamwork in the estimating process, thus established by March 15, were to prove invaluable during the last days of March, when the second phase of the crisis reached its climax. What appears to have been a well-planned Soviet deception program led to a flurry of excitement, but with the estimating procedures built up under the tensions of early March the Soviet activities were correctly assessed and reported, so that the highest policy makers in Washington could concentrate upon the local challenge, a threat to the Western presence in Berlin. These steps in March 1948 were small but crucial ones in the development of a genuine intelligence community.

An undernourished but obstinate infant monitoring system is rescued by its own target, the first Soviet atom shot.

THE DETECTION OF JOE I



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*Defense of the intelligence input to
systematic planning for defense.*

MILITARY-ECONOMIC ESTIMATING: A POSITIVE VIEW

Julie O. Kerlin

In an article entitled "Economic Intelligence in Defense Planning" in a recent issue of this journal,¹ Colonel Clyde C. Wooten examines aspects of the economico-military research done on the Soviet Union as input to systems analysis of U.S. defense needs. He concludes with some exasperation that the data are unusable, the methodology questionable, and the product spurious.² In this essay we shall examine the character of the product and show that in the process an intelligent methodology provides a logical ordering for data which are indeed sparse but which can be used to advantage in place of an otherwise unknown, intuitive input into military judgments. Military plans *must* reflect, among other factors, judgments concerning the potential enemy; exposing the basis for these judgments and putting the data into logical array improves the plans and provides flexibility through control of changes in the data.

Aggregate Resources and Specific Allocation

The product of military-economic intelligence on the USSR divides naturally into two categories. The first covers general or aggregate aspects of the Soviet economy and its military establishment. An illustration of this type is a judgment made in 1962 on the size of the Soviet gold reserves. By estimating the reserves—through techniques analogous to those used for military costing³—at a level much lower

¹ *Studies* X 1, p. 1 ff.

² ". . . a sometimes monumental frustration with systems analysis as a method is bound to arise."—E. W. Quade (Ed.) "Introduction," *Analysis for Military Decisions* (Chicago, 1964), p. 10.

³ The methodology is summarized in Paul R. Storm's "Estimating the Soviet Gold Position" in *Studies* VII 4, p. 1 ff. For a contemporary appraisal see "Soviet Gold Production & Reserves Reconsidered" by Keith Bush in *Soviet Studies* (University of Glasgow) Vol XV No. 4 (April 1966), p. 490.

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than had been accepted on the basis of informed intuitive estimates, economic analysts exposed an important aspect of the Soviets' guns-or-butter problem. Another illustration is the estimates CIA made public of significantly reduced growth rates for Soviet GNP in the 1960's.⁴ Western economists and many Soviet economists have since endorsed the general order of that judgment and the predictions made at that time.⁵ It is because of studies such as these that Colonel Wooten is able to write, "We know that the Soviets have important resource allocation problems."

The relationship between Soviet aggregate military expenditures and GNP suggested by the terms "stress," "strain," and "economic feasibility" can serve, in conjunction with assumptions about the economic and political environment, as a broad guide to the U.S. military decision maker. In a gross sense this relationship expresses the marginal cost to the Soviets of various possible defense postures in terms of their economic and political goals, say living standards or industrial growth. For this purpose changes in the relationship are more important than absolute levels; consequently the need for certainty in the measurements gives way to a less stringent one that they be taken in a consistent and reasonable way.

No more detailed exposition of analytic procedures in this macro-economic field will be attempted in the limited space available here. The second category, to which this paper is primarily addressed, concerns allocations of military expenditure to particular weapon systems. Because, as Colonel Wooten points out, it is difficult to isolate military expenditures in the published Soviet budget, the total is estimated by adding up costed estimates of Soviet forces. Costing and production estimates are also the way to get at the allocation of these military resources among weapon systems, an important ingredient in the U.S. military planner's decision on how to allocate his own resources. The kernel of Colonel Wooten's question is, "Can present data and methods quantify Soviet military forces and potential with sufficient accuracy to assist the U.S. military planner in this decision?" We believe they can and do, with due regard to the statements of uncertainty in which the producers of the estimates, especially when

⁴ For a recent discussion of this topic, see "Latest from Inside Russia," *US News and World Report*, March 28, 1966, p. 20.

⁵ See *L'Affaire Aganbegyun, Its Economic Revelations*, CIA/RR EM 65-27, November 1965.

prognosticating, seek to communicate the nature of their product and the care needed in using it.

The following explanations of the costing methodology, the meaning of the results, and the way the process is handled in the community should help answer some of the questions raised by Colonel Wooten. It does not deal, however, with his doubts about the validity of using ruble costs to get a measure of opportunity cost or economic scarcity in the Soviet Union. The academic detail involved would take up a disproportionate amount of space, and the question has been discussed elsewhere by experts on the Soviet economy.⁶

Methodology: Ruble-Dollar Ratios

First, dollar prices of Soviet equipment are estimated: these are what it would cost the U.S. DoD to procure the Soviet weapons from U.S. manufacturers. The technical specifications of the Soviet weapon are given to the manufacturers in the same way they would be for a proposed U.S. weapon. Some adjustments to the U.S. technical environment may be allowed, for example in standard dimensions of materials or in standard processing techniques the alteration of which to meet Soviet specifications would be expensive without significantly affecting performance. The purpose of the dollar figures is stated, with the necessary caveat, in a recent paper:

The dollar valuations of Soviet military programs . . . can provide US planners with an appreciation of the physical magnitude of given Soviet programs and also provide a useful basis for comparison with US programs. Because of significant differences in the price structures of the two countries, however, the dollar valuations of Soviet programs do not necessarily provide the most accurate indication of the relative costs of given programs from the Soviet point of view.⁷

Then it is attempted to cost the Soviet military expenditures in rubles, that is in terms of the Soviet economic environment. Ideally, this will show what portion of Soviet resources are being directed to the military effort and the distribution of this effort among different military programs as seen by the Soviet planners. How close reality

⁶ For example: *Value and Plan* by Gregory Crossman, University of California Press, 1960; "The Soviet Price System" by Morris Bornstein in *The American Economic Review*, 1962; *Price Determination in the USSR* by Lazar Moseyevich Kantor, JPRS translation no. 34,385, 3 March 1966.

⁷ *Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy*, CIA/RR MP 66-1, April 1966.

comes to the ideal depends not only on how closely the ruble reflects relative economic scarcities—the question on which the reader has just been referred to expert treatises—but also on how good the estimated ruble prices are. The Soviets' ruble prices for some military items like aircraft and tanks have become available from time to time. Others must be constructed from information concerning the weapon, inputs to the weapon, and the technical circumstances of its production.⁸

When the ruble prices must be constructed, the U.S. manufacturer is asked to apply his experience to cost the Soviet weapon using Soviet inputs, Soviet plant, and ruble values. The ruble values of the inputs are drawn from information available on the same or manifestly similar inputs outside the military field—construction costs, wages, electronic components, inputs into merchant ships, etc. Division of the thus estimated ruble price of a weapon by the estimated dollar price produces a ruble-dollar ratio for that weapon. This ratio remains valid until there is significant new information on or changes in the proportions of different inputs or in their ruble or dollar prices.

Because of the very different scarcity relationships in the U.S. and Soviet economies, the more specific the ruble prices are to each weapon the better they will express their relative value. A single ruble-dollar ratio for all military hardware would ignore the different scarcity proportions in different weapons which should be approximately reflected in their ruble prices. At the other extreme one might try to cost in rubles every one of the thousands of pieces of military hardware or even all the inputs to them. As a practical compromise, a ruble-dollar ratio is constructed for each broad category of weapon and used to convert to rubles the dollar cost of all weapons in that category.

Production Estimates

The use of production experience to estimate costs of proposed production, the basis for this method of estimating Soviet weapon costs, has been found sufficiently reliable by U.S. manufacturers in prognostications about their own new products except with respect to R&D and to the possibility of subsequent changes in the product or

⁸ Examples of this kind of information can be found in *Composition and Size of the Military Sector of the Soviet Electronics Industry*, CIA/RR ER 64-17, June 1964.

conditions. The uncertainties of R&D, as explained below, are segregated from the costing of individual Soviet weapons. The uncertainty of possible subsequent changes remains, but no more than in any future estimating, whether of U.S. or foreign, civilian or military production. Estimates are always subject to change in the light of subsequent information. Their reliability depends on the quality of the data base, the soundness of the producers' judgment, and equally important, the context in which they are used.

Production techniques improve with experience, and consequently costs decline with continued output. This phenomenon has been studied quantitatively, the rate of decline being represented by a "learning curve." A learning curve for each type of production is constructed on the basis of U.S. and Soviet experience and of known production conditions. From it can be read the cost per unit at any cumulative production level.⁹

It is useful to know the independently estimated order of battle as a check on production estimates when choosing the appropriate cost along the learning curve. Often it is even necessary to use order-of-battle estimates in order to arrive at production estimates. But this use of corroborative or combined sources to arrive at quantities and costs involves no such circular reasoning with respect to judging economic feasibility as Colonel Wooten seems to think. Gross economic feasibility could be judged without reference to production estimates simply by costing the order-of-battle estimate.

As Colonel Wooten emphasizes, R&D—or more accurately Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation—is probably the most difficult area not only to cost but even to define. Definitional and statistical efforts on U.S. RDT&E activities have a very short history, and such activities are not attributable with precision to particular weapon systems. Consequently no attempt is now being made to cost Soviet RDT&E by weapon system for use in aggregate figures. Test vehicle estimates are dropped from production estimates, and RDT&E figures are separately derived from published Soviet data—the budgetary "science" figure and "funds for science from other sources." A ruble-dollar ratio is independently estimated for this line. The difficulties involved in judging costs of research and development in the Soviet Union, as in the United States, do not, therefore, permeate the military expenditures estimate but are confined to the one item, RDT&E.

⁹ See Randolph Payne's "Production at an Aircraft Plant" in *Studies* VI 2, p. 27 ff.

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Those who worry about analogy costing because of differences between U.S. and Soviet RDT&E practices should find solace in this segregation.¹⁰

The High-Low Range

There is a misunderstanding about a most important attempt to define the costed range of possible Soviet choices. Colonel Wooten is distressed by the 45% gap between some of the low and high assumptions made for the level of Soviet forces in the study "Soviet Defense Expenditures" (CIA/RR MP 65-1, 2 June 1965) because he interprets these as defining the range of confidence for a single estimate of the most probable Soviet outlays. But the high and low projection lines do not bound such a confidence range, a range within which any single-estimate line is as likely as any other. The inference that a similar range of uncertainty must be applied to any estimate on Soviet defense expenditures and the conclusion that no meaningful measure can be based on such uncertain estimates are therefore completely wrong.

The range is comparable rather to that in a scatter diagram where the high and low occurrences have been traced to band the scatter. Within the full band one can expect all occurrences to fall; there is 100% confidence that any event will be in this range. The statistician would then draw narrower bands according to the data, defining the range within which, say, 99%, 95%, 90%, and 85% of the events occur. These bands would not necessarily parallel the 100% boundaries. If the events were systematically related to the variables against which they were plotted one would expect a high proportion of them to fall within a narrow band covering perhaps 10% to 20% of the full range.

The high and low assumptions of the analysts might similarly be described as covering a comprehensive range of Soviet military force structures or as banding the spread of practical possibilities. Within this range, considering technical, military, economic, and political circumstances, a single most probable force structure is then chosen. While there is of course less confidence in the single estimate than in the whole banded area, there is greater confidence in it than in

¹⁰ See *Soviet Defense R&D Expenditures*, CIA/RR Project 50.6038, September 1966.

any other single structure possible. And the degree of confidence is not at all determined by the width of the banded area.

The high-low estimates thus provide a frame within which judgments applied to the problem of U.S. forces can be accommodated to the widest range of circumstances. The dual estimates are a quantified means to reduce the appearance of incontrovertibility in a single estimate and a basis for introducing contingency insurance into decisions based on it.¹¹ The defined spread of alternatives makes it possible for policy decisions to allow not only for uncertainties in the data but for the possibility of unforeseen environmental changes that could lead Soviet policy makers to shift their decisions. It permits a variety of sensitivity analysis on the policy level, making for greater flexibility in the decisions.

Community and Confidence

An expansion of interagency cooperation has accompanied the community's efforts to meet DoD requirements on Soviet military expenditures. The inclusion of more cost analysis in the NIEs has resulted in broader participation in the evaluation of cost estimates, the published figures and discussion being an agreed summary of contributions from the community. Much benefit is derived from the distribution of the detailed contributions to participating agencies. Community review in the representatives' meetings helps clarify methodology and communicate degrees of confidence.

In the NIE, confidence levels are indicated in general terms by words like "possible" and "probable." Explanations of methodology, documentation, and specific discussions of confidence are available in the individual contributions and, often in greater detail, in published research and analysis on which the contributions are based. To require that each NIE contain all these materials would make it so compendious that there would no doubt be a request for the separate publication and distribution of a summary—i.e. the NIE.

The Intelligence Assumptions for Planning and National Intelligence Projects for Planning papers, also subjected to the USIB review process, do contain discussions of the limitations of their expenditure estimates. Footnotes, in addition, provide an alert to areas of disagreement. Machine runs for these estimates are available to readers having a need for more detailed input figures.

¹¹ See especially "Analysis and Design of Conflict Systems" by Albert Wohlstetter in *Analysis for Military Decisions*, Ch. 7.

Another interagency cooperative effort to estimate military expenditures, the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group's alternative projections for Soviet forces, use generally the same procedures and pricing factors in costing. The first five pages of the "Foreword" of their costing study is devoted to a discussion of cost estimates and their limitations. The Foreword also explicitly invites users "to consult with JAG regarding the degree of confidence associated with cost items of particular concern to them and . . . inform JAG of any projections which appear to be in error."

Consumers are everywhere encouraged to consult the military-economic analysts. Users of the NIEs and NIPP have ready access to the producers. In particular, a close working relationship has been established between personnel of the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, a major user, and cost analysts in CIA, so that they are in continual consultation without any formalities. Other agencies have similar relationships when needed.

The increased formal and informal cooperation within the intelligence community provides an opportunity for joint improvement of cost estimates as additional input data become available and as methodology is improved. The concomitant increase in interaction between the producers and consumers of expenditures estimates enables the producers to keep aware of and respond rapidly to the needs of the policy maker, including his need to know the limitations of the product for a particular use.

The State of the Art

Do the acknowledged gaps in information and the large role played by human judgment in arriving at estimates make it impossible for the intelligence community to produce figures which will meet the needs of the systems analyst? His needs are less exacting than may be realized. *Analysis for Military Decisions* provides a thorough review of the systems analysis approach to organizing the components of complex questions of choice in the face of uncertainty, questions such as occur in the field of national defense. It emphasizes repeatedly that the systems analyst does not pretend to provide certain or absolute answers as input to military policy. He himself must accept input data derived from human judgments to form the basis for other judgments. In a recent DoD-sponsored symposium on cost analysis, Alan Enthoven offered his general impression that the art of systems analysis is now at about the same state as medicine

was during the latter half of the nineteenth century; that is, it has reached the point where it can on the average do more good than harm. He added that it would be just as unwise to stop systems analysis now as it would have been to stop medical research then.

Under these circumstances producers and consumers should both be continuously alert for errors and unjustified conclusions. One kind of error is illustrated in that correctly cited by Colonel Wooten, the 1964 extrapolation of a declining trend in Soviet economic assistance to "non-aligned" nations. The error was not in the economic quantification but in the implied judgment that the Soviets would not reexamine the political value of expenditures consuming such a small portion of the national product. This particular prognostication should have been recognized as one especially vulnerable to political considerations.

Errors resulting from gaps in data also occur. Such was the absence of information on production at Airframe Plant No. 30 and its consequent omission in 1960-65 estimates. This is the reason for continuous scrutiny of all source data; data gaps must be expected to occur, especially in the more dynamic sectors of military procurement. The error introduced in this case, cumulated for the five-year period, was approximately 0.1 billion rubles, by itself too small to have appreciable influence on aggregate figures given in billion rubles "correct" to one decimal. It does however represent a limitation, one of the uncertainties of which intelligence customers are warned. It should always be assumed that there are gaps in production information, many of them filled by technical judgments but some completely unknown and unmeasurable except by interpolation from order-of-battle estimates.

Summary Assessment

We conclude, therefore, that the data base, though not solid, is usable, the methodology logical, and the product rational. Reasonable intelligence estimates, as an element in making military decisions, must be quantified; and no alternative method of quantification has been proposed. There is no question but that many improvements can be made—and indeed this is an important aspect of the work of military intelligence analysts throughout the community—but within the framework of the present methodology and organization.

The real lesson to be drawn from the discomfort Colonel Wooten feels with the current product may be a need for quantification of

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uncertainty through sensitivity analysis, measuring the effects of variations in input. Such analysis, done at the technical input level, would not be suitable for incorporation into the published NIE, but it could be communicated to users in other ways. Although sensitivity analysis is practiced to a limited but growing extent in the current methodology, it is legitimate to suggest that it and other methods describing confidence levels be made an integral part of all basic work on estimates of Soviet military expenditures.

It would be wrong, however, to expect statistical techniques and descriptive language to eliminate uncertainty as a continuing element in Soviet military expenditures estimates. Acceptance of uncertainty in military policy formation is a necessary ingredient in preparation for reality.¹²

¹² For an excellent discussion which includes references to alternatives for quantitative estimates of Soviet military posture as well as the present and future needs of systems analysts see *Dealing with Uncertainty About the Enemy: Some Rand Experience in Systems Analysis for Military Planning*, by F. I. Mossman (RM-4416-PR, Jan 1966). This study gives a clear picture of the need for and use of intelligence estimates on enemy posture. It shows the method of handling the expected uncertainties and at the same time indicates areas of hoped-for improvement in quantity and quality.

The Soviet military intelligence agency's system for selecting, training, and assigning officers to foreign intelligence operations.

CAREER TRAINEE PROGRAM, GRU STYLE

Richard Framingham

By consolidating information derived from a number of different Soviet sources, it has been possible to reconstruct the process Soviet intelligence uses to spot, screen, train, and assign case officers. The procedures herein outlined had their beginnings in the mid-1940's, were generally established by the mid-1950's, and to our knowledge remained substantially in effect as late as 1961 and projected at least to 1964. The system described is that of the GRU, the military intelligence organization. State Security, the KGB, operates separate but similar machinery, in addition to having a hand, as we shall see, in the GRU's.

The GRU strategic intelligence directorates—four area directorates charged with foreign strategic intelligence operations—have the mission of collecting information broadly defined as contributing to General Staff estimates of the willingness and capability of any nation to wage war. The development of cadres for these directorates and their training for specific foreign assignments is done in a three-year program of the Staff College of the Soviet Army, commonly called the Military-Diplomatic Academy by members of the GRU. The use of MDA as an unofficial title for the Staff College grew out of the fact that a major function of the College is training military attachés, and a faculty which once handled this training was called the Military-Diplomatic Training Faculty.

The Staff College is actually a university of intelligence, for it carries on a number of related programs, including refresher, mid-career, specialized training, and ad-hoc courses, and awards the degree of Kandidat to those who complete the requirements for this doctorate-level diploma. Although administratively under the control of the GRU, the MDA is formally a joint GRU-KGB establishment, and

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the KGB's Foreign Directorate in fact shares in its output, has done so since its founding in 1944-45. The main MDA campus is in the Sokol suburb of Moscow, some seven and a half miles northwest of the Kremlin, but various elements are scattered about the city and other suburbs.

Spotting

A number of roving teams called "Mandate Commissions" look for potential candidates for the MDA. On the teams are members representing the interested elements of the GRU—the strategic intelligence directorates, which handle foreign operations and so establish training doctrine, the Personnel Directorate, which is responsible for staffing the operations and for support of training, and the MDA administration, which coordinates the selection, training, and assignments of new officers. These spotting teams rely most heavily on the graduating classes of the twenty or so military academies of the Soviet Union, starting their scrutiny of students' records early in the calendar year in order to locate candidates for September enrollment. But they also scour the military districts, consider graduates of civilian colleges, take candidates already in the GRU, and review the recommendations of GRU officers.

Those with the most promising records are sounded out about continuing their education in an institution run by the General Staff. There is no reference to intelligence or espionage, and no commitments are made. Those who are interested are asked to complete detailed biographies of themselves and their families and to stand by for further notice. In the interval, the KGB and the Central Committee of the CPSU separately undertake intensive and continuing investigations of the candidates. Eliminations by the Mandate Commission and the investigations leave a pool of candidates perhaps two and a half times the number that will actually be enrolled in the MDA in September.

Those who receive orders to report to the MDA thus show marked aptitude, in the opinion of well-qualified judges, for case officer assignments and have no readily discoverable blemishes in their background. Kulak or White Russian parenthood, relatives living abroad, criminal records in the family, or unstable home environments would probably be disqualifying. Now they undergo further culling by a Medical Board, a Selection Board, and a Special Group representing the Cen-

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tral Committee of the CPSU, who will reduce the candidate-pool to the number actually required for the entering class.

Screening

As the GRU gives all its officers medical examinations every three months and before they go overseas, high physical requirements for the MDA are not surprising. Although physical reasons are sometimes used to reject gracefully a candidate with a minor political blemish, genuine medical disqualification is the most frequent of all causes for rejection. A representative of the Medical Board sits on the Selection Board, and any candidate on whom he reports adversely is eliminated from further consideration.

Since the pool from which the Selection Board will choose is made up of male graduates of Higher Educational Institutions—usually called VUZ's—it is already a selection from the upper 4% of the age group. Graduation from a VUZ requires not only high academic ability but considerable physical and mental stamina, self-discipline, and political reliability; and thus VUZ graduates (including the 3% who are females) constitute an elite under Soviet standards. Candidates from military academies are understandably preferred for the MDA, but graduates of equivalent institutes are also considered if they are military officers.¹

Jews have been automatically excluded since 1953, and minority nationalities such as Uzbeks, Armenians, and Georgians get short shrift. Some Ukrainians and members of other minority groups have been admitted, but most are Great Russians, and all are members or eligible to be members of the Communist Party. Candidates must have acceptable manners, be reasonably good-looking, and come from backgrounds that will pass close scrutiny; their wives must be such as to become assets rather than potential liabilities if sent abroad.

The Selection Board has about six members, chiefs of area directorates or men of similar calibre, assisted by a small staff of senior-officer adjutants. The members begin with summaries of the candidates' files, the findings of the Mandate Commission on them, their

¹ Unlike our military academies, the Soviet ones train not only staff and command officers for the Soviet Army, Air Force, and Navy but also specialists in supporting subjects. Military academies that train linguists, engineers, chemists, economists, and the like are generally considered superior to their civilian counterparts. The MDA preference for military graduates thus represents sound judgment rather than prejudice.

biographies and the reports of the KGB investigation, and a good idea of their interests and aspirations. There are no competitive written examinations—they would add nothing in a screening like this—but the candidates appear individually before the Board to answer questions and discuss any topics the members choose. But individual Board members also meet the candidates informally and talk with them in relaxed and casual situations. Thus they are able to form a well-based, albeit intuitive, judgment,² generally objective though sometimes apparently influenced in a minor way by pressures of friends and associates who want their sons or sons-in-law to win acceptance.

The Board not only chooses who will be invited to matriculate, it also designates the regional area in which each will specialize and picks the target country he will work in. It selects the relatively few who will operate under deep cover—as *illegals*, in Soviet parlance—rather than official cover. It chooses the languages most appropriate to the student's initial assignment and decides on the nature and extent of any supplemental training he is to receive. The candidate is allowed to express his preference, but the final decision is based on the Board's judgment of his physical appearance and manner, his aptitude for intelligence specialties, and—for illegals—the likelihood that he can pass as a native or at least as a non-Soviet resident in the target country. There is some bargaining among Board members shopping on behalf of their own area directorates, trading say a light blond suitable for Scandinavian deep-cover operations against a swarthy candidate who might pass as indigenous to the Balkans.

Because regional and country assignments are based on projections of operational requirements three years hence, dual designations are sometimes made against future contingencies. Official-cover assignments are made to Spain and the Iberian region, for instance, against the day when diplomatic recognition will permit sending in a contingent of qualified legals without delay; the alternate for this assignment might be a Latin American or other Spanish-speaking country.

The languages are selected according to operational advantage, not necessarily by what is native in the target country. English can be used effectively in Japan, Iran, Israel, and a number of Arab states and is useful in GRU operations for many other purposes; it might,

² The Soviets have little confidence in personnel selection tests and seldom use them. They tend to rely on subjective individual and group assessment, especially when critical assignments are in question.

then, be the primary language for students going to these areas, with Japanese or Parsi or Hebrew or Arabic secondary. Aptitude for language, as determined by an examination, is also a factor in the decision; a student may be given a simpler one if it would require too much time and energy for his talent to master the esoteric primary language.

The Special Group representing the CPSU Central Committee exercises its judgment only after all prior administrative approvals have been given. Its concern is only a final determination of the candidates' political reliability. Its right to disapprove a candidate is seldom exercised, but it is never questioned.

Attractions

The professional intelligence officer, the candidate already in the GRU, wants to attend the MDA because he cannot normally expect to advance beyond the rank of major without its diploma. The typical candidates, however, are regular officers of the Soviet Army, Navy, or Air Force, and for them it is a question of changing careers. The advantages in the change are numerous. They retain their current grade and keep their seniority, thus starting the new career at their present pay instead of beginning at the bottom. They are furnished suitable apartments if married and are supplied with both military and civilian clothes. They will have more opportunity for promotion than in their present units.

GRU officers, like other military officers, receive the base pay for their military rank and also the pay for their duty station slot; a major will get his regular salary and if assigned, say, to an operations officer's slot the pay of such an officer too—both salaries in full. Special bonuses of 10% for each foreign language were at one time allowed (the student knows Russian, a provincial language, and at least one foreign language from his VUZ training, and he may learn one or two more in the MDA), but there are some indications that these were discontinued at the same time the special tax exemptions granted medal winners under Stalin were withdrawn.

The candidate knows that as a student he will remain in the Moscow area for three years, and Moscow is considered an excellent duty post. He will be with his family for this tour, and he and they will have their reputation enhanced by the numerous prerogatives a GRU officer enjoys. He continues his education, a thing he does not value lightly, and may win the degree of Kandidat and the 15%

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raise that accompanies it. The security of his career is enhanced, for removing an MDA graduate from a GRU position is a long and involved process and one therefore seldom undertaken. He has not only the opportunity but a commitment to go abroad and see what lies on the other side of that curtain the capitalist countries keep referring to.

He will, of course, be subject to the stresses normal in the intelligence profession—the GRU ulcer rate is probably as high as ours—but he is still young and in extremely good physical condition; he is academically competent; and through long conditioning he has developed a high order of self-discipline. He is apparently not warned of the disadvantages. A few decline the recruiter's pitch, and though he has cited the importance of serving the Motherland in positions of great responsibility, no stigma is attached to the refusal.

Matriculation

The MDA program has varied from two to four years; it was three at the time of our most recent data. Area and language training starts immediately and continues until graduation. Non-intelligence subjects are taught for a few months until final clearances are received. The program is modified to fit individual needs within GRU requirements: highly proficient specialists, or students with extensive prior intelligence experience or language and area knowledge, may complete their studies in less than normal time. It is more sensible, in the GRU view, to train a subject-matter specialist as an intelligence officer than it is to take an already competent operative and give him training in some highly technical field required for a special operation or peculiar assignment.

The degree of Kandidat requires passing courses in Marxism as well as in intelligence and in the student's subject-matter specialty. Like the Ph.D., it requires a learned dissertation. After the student successfully defends his dissertation before an academic board (which passes on it by secret ballot, using procedures similar to those of Western universities), he gets the degree. And the 15% bonus.

Although the Selection Board has ruled on the student's program, the first six months are probationary. During this time he is kept under close observation by his instructors and presumably by the MDA Party Commission and KGB informants among the students. Some time after his final security clearance, his assignment is reviewed and either confirmed or changed; only then is he officially informed

of his prospective career. Careers may actually be redirected at any time, and students are occasionally withdrawn when required for special assignments, regardless of how close they are to graduation.

Student Life

The student is most likely to be a captain or major; some colonels are reported. He ordinarily will be at least 25, generally not over 29 years old, but exceptions have been made to age 35. He may be married and have children even in their teens. But it will be the unmarried, usually 25 years old or so, who are chosen as illegals. All are treated as the mature men they are, with the dignity and seriousness the Soviet system devotes to fulfilling its priority purposes. There is some horseplay, of course, but apparently no time or energy is wasted on hazing. The students and instructors help each other meet the high standards of the MDA system rather than compete for position along a theoretical distribution curve.

The entering class, which numbers from 60 to 100 according to needs (there are 1,000 or more GRU case officer positions abroad to fill) is controlled by a class proctor, a position carrying the rank of general although it has been held by senior colonels. The proctor, his deputy, and a small staff both mother and monitor the group. They submit detailed assessments of each student which, with reports prepared separately by the MDA Party Commission and the chief instructors, govern the student's final assignment.

The school year starts in September, continues through August. Classes are held six hours a day, except that after the probationary period Wednesdays are free for research, special training, work on the dissertation, and reading in the Spetsfund—Special Repository, a library of classified material on espionage. Students with special interests in technical matters have various laboratories to use for self-study, and all are encouraged to supplement the substance of lectures with outside reading. Those lacking in zeal in this respect (as gauged by hours spent in the Spetsfund) must justify their behavior to the class proctor.

Single students live in campus dormitories, married ones being furnished apartments in the area. All spend much time in study but are otherwise as free as their schedules permit. Apparently there is an increase in free time as one progresses through the course. Students usually spend Sundays in Moscow, returning to Sokol by metro in time for Monday morning classes.

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Except in attending general lectures, students are divided into units of three to five according to language and target country. These units meet with those from adjacent study areas for regional seminars. Written examinations are given in subjects whose mastery is essential for the projected assignments, but academic evaluation rests primarily with the instructors, who prepare narratives on the students' attitude and performance and rate them on a five-point evaluation scale.

Students are discouraged from taking notes for security reasons, but the practice is not forbidden. They are allowed and presumably encouraged to ask questions, yet the general practice seems not to do so. There is no indication that academic failures occur; the selection process would generally preclude them, and the Soviet system tends at this level to dropbacks rather than washouts. The discovery of undesirable character traits or less than impeccable background results in summary dismissal. Students so banished are apparently returned to their original military units, and there is no indication that their non-GRU careers are jeopardized.

The original KGB and Central Committee investigations are backstopped further by the KGB security control program, whose agents under MDA student cover guard against hostile penetrations, detect incipient conspiracies, and observe the students' personal, social, and sexual proclivities. Overt KGB monitors warn the students away from restaurants frequented by foreigners, instruct them not to have their pictures taken in Moscow or with their comrades, and generally keep tabs on them both on and off the campus. Although the students and staff recognize the KGB's responsibility for internal security in the armed forces, including the GRU and the MDA, snide comments indicate that the ever-present KGB observers are irritants that GRU officers would like to do without.

The Faculties

The teaching staff is organized into faculties and departments according to subject matter, and a few distinguished scholars have been awarded special chairs. A fairly permanent cadre, including some women, comprise the language and area faculties, but most of the instructors are intelligence officers on two-year rotation tours. MDA is considered excellent duty, and appointments are highly prized. The recipients are typically senior officers, colonels and generals with considerable status in their respective fields. Trade-craft instructors are generally experienced legals or illegals who have

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had cheek-to-jowl experience in handling agents, often rezidentura chiefs or deputies. The students have considerable respect for their teachers. Guest lecturers and VIPs of international prominence occasionally speak on topics of special interest, and the MDA instructors regularly hold sessions in other GRU schools in the Moscow area.

A Faculty of General Studies teaches art, architecture, economics, history, music, logic, philosophy, and psychology. It may be responsible also for law; Soviet, international, and Western legal procedures are taught, but the faculty has not been identified. In these subjects the student tends to learn history and theory rather than acquire skills, the purpose being to give him the cultural polish he should have to operate in Western societies and will not have acquired from his military academy studies.

There are two separate faculties for Area Knowledge and for Language Studies, but they coordinate closely with each other and with others whose subjects involve language and area knowledge. In languages the aim is conversational ease approaching native fluency. Area studies follow the typical intelligence breakdown—geographic, transportation, economic, political, and the like—but they stress also a practical knowledge of the behavior, customs, manners, social patterns, and taboos of the indigenous people, so as to be able to work with them without giving offense.

Faculties of Military Science and of Foreign Armed Forces are also separate but work closely with each other and with the area and language faculties. Military history courses begin with the early Roman era. The study of military science and tactics concentrates on armed forces organization and order of battle in the United States, Great Britain, France, and of course the student's target country. The student's whole orientation toward his target country is along military-strategic lines, for his intelligence requirements will likely lie in this area. Field trips and demonstrations keep students abreast of the latest developments in weaponry.

A Faculty for Special Training teaches espionage and intelligence subjects and also the courses in military attaché duties that earlier were run by the Faculty of Military-Diplomatic Training. Intelligence and tradecraft run the usual gamut, but stress is placed on the organization and operation of rezidenturas, the practices of the intelligence and security services in the target countries, and third-country operations. This faculty works closely with those of area and languages, for effectiveness in personal relationships with non-

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Soviets is a central theme of the tradecraft curriculum. These courses extend over two of the three MDA years, but they are considered to impart only a basic intelligence training; specialized training in depth is given outside according to individual needs, both during and after the MDA program.

Supporting Activities

Technical tradecraft is apparently taught by specialists from the GRU's First (Technical) Department. The depth of the training varies; most subjects such as secret writing, photography, micro-photography, concealment devices, and the like are covered only to the familiarization level, but different aspects of radio operation may be taught successively over a period of two years. Driver training, important to a man going abroad who has probably never owned an automobile, is handled by an element under the MDA's Deputy for Administrative Matters. In addition to the operation of different makes of foreign automobiles, the student learns mobile surveillance, doing photography from cars, and how to conceal compromising material in them.

The inevitable Marxism and political theory courses are handled by a Political Instruction Section under the Deputy for Political Matters, who is also chairman of the MDA's Communist Party Commission. Should disputes arise between GRU and KGB interests in the MDA, this Deputy would apparently be the one to resolve them as directed from the Central Committee.

A Department of Scientific Instruction is responsible for pedagogical matters without doing any teaching itself. It organizes the study procedures, compiles the schedules, runs support elements like Training Aids, Publications, Stenographic Pool, and Translation Units, maintains the General Library and the Spetsfund, keeps custody of instructors' papers and student notes, and otherwise provides professional guidance and support to the instructors. An Academic Board, apparently consisting of MDA faculty and department heads, seems to set the training policy that the Department of Scientific Instruction carries out and to handle matters that cannot be resolved at lower levels.

Lectures, demonstrations, discussions, case studies, laboratory assignments, term papers, field trips and tours, self-study by general reading and browsing in the Spetsfund, and research for the doctoral dissertation (which may require extensive visits to other institutions)

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are all devices for instruction. Tradecraft is practiced on the streets of Moscow under the watchful eyes of both the KGB agents and the instructors. Most of the training is in-house, but students visit other locations for special assignments, particularly if they are being groomed for deep-cover operations.

Beginning in 1954 it became the practice to take graduating students on thirty-to-forty-day field trips to stations abroad, where, under tutelage of field case officers, they study the organization of the rezidentura and the way it functions. They inspect its operational files and see how its analysis of the operational environment is applied in operational planning. They observe agent meetings and participate in what they think are bona fide agent contacts, though these are actually with case officers from other rezidenturas. In accordance with Soviet stress on communications breakdowns as a cause of security failures, they are given a tour through the communications facilities of the center.

The purpose of the field trips is to relate classroom theory to the reality of the operating areas. Students are shown what can and can't be done, the local factors that affect access to target personalities, the limitations under which these can be sought out and developed, and the reasoning behind the operational decisions. They are generally impressed by the personal diligence and frankness of their field mentors and find this transition step most helpful.

Fruition

At graduation ceremonies, the importance of which is marked by attendance of the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, the students are awarded diplomas. These are put for safekeeping in their dossiers in GRU Headquarters.

From 10 to 25 percent of the class (but the proportion has run up to 50 percent) are invited to join the KGB, which thus keeps itself supplied with military expertise. None of GRU's illegal designees are so proselyted. Acceptance is not enforced, but the presentation is so attractive that few decline. The proselytes may take another two years' training in the KGB's Higher Intelligence School before being assigned to its Foreign Directorate.

The graduates earmarked as GRU deep-cover operatives generally go on to individual training in safe houses. The rest are assigned abroad as case officers under cover of military attachés or officials of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TASS,

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Aeroflot, Novosti, Sovfracht, Morflot, etc. Some leave immediately after graduation; most are overseas within six months. A few receive interim assignments until openings develop, but the delay is generally brief, often just long enough for them to read in on current operations in the area and get acquainted with the desk that will support them. Arrived abroad, the new case officer will continue his intelligence schooling, joining his colleagues in formally scheduled training and review sessions that may run something like half a day biweekly. After completing his tour he may return to Moscow for a desk assignment, for specialized or refresher training, or even as an instructor at the MDA.

Commentary

Few countries have poured as high a proportion of their energies and resources into educational activities, in the broadest sense, as the Soviet Union has. From the beginning, organized learning has been treated with greater seriousness by the Soviet leadership than by political leaders in other countries, and this seriousness is shared by Soviet teachers and students at every level of the system. Further, the Soviet leaders possess the controls necessary to impose their attitudes on their country; the system of educational admissions and weeding-out and redirection is so devised that it leaves little room, particularly at the VUZ level, for the political waverer, the leisurely scholar, or the lily-fingered *beloruchka* disdainful of manual or applied arts.

The non-Communist observer has difficulty judging the Soviet system in that his own standards often do not apply. The Soviet system is expressly designed and controlled to help build a Communist society, rather than to liberate the individual's intellect. Its success or failure is judged by the extent to which it serves the political and social ends of the CPSU. The British or American observer may be appalled by the tight central control, the sheer weight of cramming and emphasis on memorizing, the enforced social conformity and constant political indoctrination; and certainly these faults have frustrated the more talented Soviet teachers, inhibited the effectiveness of their training, and impaired the skills of their graduates. Unlike the Chinese, however, the Soviets are increasingly willing to revise, reinterpret, or even ignore Marxist educational theory in order to meet the needs of reality, and this realism in examining the causes

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of success or failure seems especially pronounced in their intelligence training.

In charter, priorities, and resources, the Soviet GRU differs from its counterparts in the Western world, and comparison of disparate training systems must necessarily be generalized. But we have a number of interests and objectives parallel with theirs, and they and we are confronted with almost identical problems in staffing overseas intelligence installations. If we—cutting across cultures—paralleled GRU practices, we should recruit only the cream of our service academies' and leading universities' graduates for our intelligence assignments. The Western intelligence academician is unpleasantly aware that some 15 years back the GRU had developed a system to select the best candidates available in the USSR and develop them into military intelligence officers of premium quality. Its program is one that any intelligence service must look on with respect.

*Past progress and future desiderata
in interdepartmental safeguards for
the secrecy of intelligence.*

SECURITY AS AN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCERN

Patrick L. Carpentier

In the past half-dozen years we have seen an interesting and valuable evolution from an agency to a community concept of security for intelligence, in spite of difficulties that have stood in the way of the interdepartmental approach to protective measures. In the following pages we trace this recent evolution and look at the prospects ahead. Our purpose is generally to promote wider open discussion of those security questions which all our intelligence agencies have in common and particularly, with respect to some major problems which have been recognized within the community for years but whose resolution requires executive or legislative action, to contribute to a broadening appreciation of their critical importance that can ultimately lead to such action.

E Pluribus

Security has traditionally been a departmental matter, something for each agency head to administer as final authority in his domain. This disjunction of authority derives from the fact that the agencies of the government were each established for a distinct national purpose and given corresponding prerogatives and responsibilities. Security concepts and standards, like other departmental programs, were shaped by internal considerations. The disjunction is strikingly illustrated in the fact that an employee terminated for security reasons by one agency can, if found eligible by the Civil Service Commission, be taken on by another. These departmental prerogatives remain in force in the intelligence community; a concerted community program has to be built on a basis of mutual understanding and common purpose. Only the President or the Congress could dictate general

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security measures beyond the minimum requirements now established by basic executive order and legislation.

In these days of joint intelligence activities and widespread dissemination of materials extending beyond the intelligence community proper, the traditional security concept does not give intelligence agencies, particularly those producing sensitive materials, the protection they require. For sensitive intelligence the basic executive orders and legislation have had to be supplemented by agreement on special measures. The inadequacy of the minimum standards is especially evident when budgetary considerations are permitted to dictate the degree of security that is provided—a situation most likely to prevail outside the intelligence community, where the threat of hostile penetration is not fully recognized and community agreements cannot be enforced.

The statutory responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect sources and methods, as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, is not accompanied by any implementing authority. Allen Dulles, in *The Craft of Intelligence*, expresses the opinion that the legislative history shows an intent to limit this responsibility to CIA intelligence assets. In practice, at any rate, the DCI has never exercised command authority over other agencies in regard to the protection of intelligence. If it were practicable to confer such authority on him it would obviate the difficulties of the voluntary approach to concerted measures, in which strong departmental prerogatives are partially compromised in order to achieve workable solutions that are still not completely satisfactory.

Even CIA assets, moreover, cannot be limited to the confines and protection of the Agency, and the same thing is true for all other intelligence agencies. The intelligence effort has become continually more interwoven. Thousands of reports are exchanged daily; innumerable joint meetings are held. Indeed, it is doubtful that any one agency can now carry out any major intelligence activity in isolation. The resultant danger of widespread damage from a single penetration was illustrated in the recent cases of Sgt. Jack Dunlap and Sgt. Robert L. Johnson, in which practically every agency in the community suffered seriously.

Thus the most effective security program imaginable in any individual agency goes for naught; the level of security is that created by the lowest standards maintained anywhere in the intelligence flow. And the flow, as highlighted in the case of Sgt. Johnson, a

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career soldier assigned to the Armed Forces Courier Service, extends beyond the circle of the intelligence community. The adversary, seeking a point of penetration, will concentrate on the weakest links. The security problems of one agency therefore become the problems of all others affected and their resolution a common concern. One such problem has been the lower personnel security standards set up for military personnel. Substantial remedial action is now being taken, but major problem areas remain.

The USIB Committee

In this atmosphere dominated by departmental prerogatives but tempered by recognition of the need for coordinated action, the United States Intelligence Board in early 1959 instituted a community program for the protection of intelligence assets by establishing its Security Committee. During the first years the Committee members each remained jealous for the prerogatives of their own agencies. It took three years of negotiation to chalk up the first major accomplishment, the issuance of DCID 1/7, approved 21 February 1962, establishing uniform control markings and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence. But now the mutuality of all agencies' interests has been fully recognized. Interagency discussion is uninhibited and information is freely exchanged within the limits of effective security. Seldom if ever is any agency with serious interests in a security problem not informed fully and made a participant in the remedial action. Limitations on concerted Committee action have been reduced for the most part to matters that lie beyond the authority of the intelligence agencies.

Another major accomplishment of the Committee has been the establishment of a coordinated community mechanism to investigate security breaches more effectively and without duplication. In July 1962 a USIB policy statement established responsibilities for the exchange of counterintelligence and security information. Damage assessments and remedial recommendations covering audio penetrations of U.S. embassies led to the establishment in December 1964 of a USIB Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures which more effectively promotes and coordinates technical inspections and R&D programs. The Security Committee has also prepared damage assessments and recommended remedial action in espionage cases. Personnel security programs have been substantially enhanced through Committee efforts. The Committee initiated the President's

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Directive of 23 May 1960 forbidding unauthorized disclosures of intelligence and an Agreed Guidance of 29 June 1960 implementing the Directive.

Excellent examples of coordinated community measures are the systems of compartmentation maintained for the protection of various categories of sensitive information. The special protection given compartmented information, however, has unfortunately tended at times to depreciate the importance of protecting uncompartmented information. A document classified Secret or below within a system of compartmentation is subject to higher standards of both personnel and physical security than one marked Top Secret without a code word. Those responsible for the handling of Oleg Penkovskiy, for example, would presumably have found code-word standards of protection advantageous in their operation.

There is to be submitted to the USIB shortly a proposed DCID establishing uniform personnel security standards for access to compartmented intelligence information. It will greatly enhance personnel security and simplify its administration not to have independent standards for each community system. A major accomplishment will be the extension of the same standards to both civilian and military personnel. Uniformity should also greatly facilitate security processing in joint projects. Hopefully, this approach will be carried to its logical conclusion and eventually cover all intelligence, not just compartmented systems. In essence, this would mean a distinct and unified personnel security program for all intelligence personnel and outsiders who have continued access to intelligence. The operation of the proposed DCID may give impetus to this eventuality.

Similarly in the matter of physical security. Executive Order 10501 of 5 November 1953, "Safeguarding Official Information in the Interests of the Defense of the United States," sets the basic minimal standards, which, particularly for the storage of Secret material, do not give adequate protection in vulnerable areas abroad. The Security Committee took up this problem in 1961 during a government-wide review of the Order and considered certain measures specifically designed for locations overseas. Budgetary considerations, however, prevented departmental representatives from taking a firm position on these measures in spite of their recognizing the hazards of inaction. Hopefully, the stringent physical security given compartmented information will eventually be applied to all intelligence or at a minimum to sensitive uncompartmented materials.

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Legislative Needs

It has been recognized that the secure administration of a sensitive agency requires that its head have absolute authority, when he deems it in the national interest, to remove any employee summarily, without recourse to administrative review. Only thus can the highest standards of personal integrity, loyalty, and security be kept inviolate. The first summary removal authority seems to have been granted in 1940 to the Secretaries of War and Navy (50 App. USC 1156)—a wartime measure directed against possible subversives. Then the Director of Central Intelligence was granted similar authority in 1947 under Section 102 (c) of the National Security Act. This authority has been affirmed by the courts, and one case appealed to the Supreme Court was refused a review. The Director of NSA has by recent legislation (PL 88-290, March 26, 1964) also been given such authority under delegation from the Secretary of Defense.

An Act of August 26, 1950 (PL 733) granted discretionary removal authority to eleven specified agency heads, and Executive Order 10450 of April 27, 1953, "Security Requirements for Government Employment," extended this authority to all agencies of the government. This Order serves as the basis for the personnel security programs of all community agencies, either as enabling authority or, in agencies like CIA that operate under a separate authority, as a model in establishing criteria for employment. Removal procedures required by it, however, are formal and detailed, quite inadequate for serious cases. Statutory authority for summary removal should still be given the administrative heads of all intelligence organizations.

Today Restricted Data, classified information on nuclear energy matters, is probably afforded without comparison the most distinct safeguards given any category of classified material. Its protection is specifically required by statute (Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended). Special personnel security criteria for access to atomic energy information have been established. Only for Restricted Data may a judicial injunction be petitioned against threatened disclosure. CIA has without success proposed similar statutory protection for "Intelligence Data" whose peculiarity in sources and methods requires it. The present espionage laws are not adequate: conviction under them depends upon proof of intent to harm the United States, and classified information must be produced in open court to demonstrate the damage. No injunction is possible.

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An ad hoc committee of the USIB prompted by the defection of NSA employees Martin and Mitchell considered several proposals for remedial legislation. The committee was unable to come to an agreement, however, and further efforts were abandoned.

Although there has been official recognition at the highest levels of deficiencies in the espionage laws, other remedial proposals that have been made on numerous occasions have all been similarly unsuccessful. A major reason is undoubtedly the consideration that too stringent espionage laws could be given broad applications that would encroach upon civil liberties and basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The hard fact remains, however, that as things stand, purposeful acts of espionage have occurred and undoubtedly will continue to occur without adequate legal redress. It should be possible to secure adequate legislation against these within the framework of constitutional limitations. Efforts in this direction must not be abandoned but renewed at the earliest propitious time.

Press Leaks

These considerations lead us to the continually plaguing problem of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence materials, specifically through public information media. A great deal of time and effort have been expended in the investigation of such occurrences without appreciable effect. This problem impinges directly upon the freedom of the press, perhaps the most jealously guarded of the constitutional guarantees. Here again the espionage laws are completely inadequate; the criminal element inherent in espionage, intent to harm the United States, is not even present. Usually some high-level official makes the disclosure deliberately in order to elicit public support for a program which he considers to be in the national interest. Motivation is suggested by the fact that most disclosures occur during periods of budgetary debate. Personal gain for an enterprising reporter can also be a factor.

The resulting damage to sensitive sources and methods, delicate international relations, and the national welfare has unfortunately led to no positive action to abate the problem. Newsmen, admonished on occasion by security authorities for acting against national interest, have shown no concern; they have been assured by the releasing official that the information leaked is not damaging. Such an official is usually well removed from intelligence collection activities, has no understanding of source protection, and feels no guilt at circumventing

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the established channels for public dissemination which would have provided for a security review.

The question of remedial action in this area inevitably brings up the British Official Secrets Acts, which afford practically absolute protection against unauthorized disclosure of any information originating within the British government. They have been interpreted to cover even the premature release of certain wills which happened to be of popular interest. They make the mere fact of unauthorized disclosure sufficient to prosecute; the defendant must prove that his act was not unlawful. Moreover, the court proceedings are held in secret to protect the information involved.

In the United States such legislation, by almost overwhelming legal consensus, would be unconstitutional. But the fear of unconstitutionality has also inhibited any effort to pursue lesser legislative measures which could be effective within the constitutional framework. A Commission on Government Security instituted by Congress in 1955 to study ways to "establish fair, uniform, effective, and realistic measures to safeguard both the national security and the right of individuals" was aghast at the problem. It recommended making it unlawful for any person to disseminate information classified Secret and above to any unauthorized person and unlawful for anyone to receive such information knowing or having reason to believe it to be classified, with punishments of a \$10,000 fine or 5 years in jail or both. As usual, the proposal received little attention.

The general belief that any corrective measures would meet with strong opposition from the press may not be completely accurate. Responsible American newsmen have spoken in favor of an official secrets act, not of course one with the extreme stringency of the British Acts, but some kind of controls for public information. Some disapprove, for example, of the publication of personal memoirs of government officials in the know so soon after their resignation as to affect sensitive activities and the work of their former fellows still in the government. They know how easy it is to develop sensitive information from government contacts, and they deplore the fact that if a responsible newspaper withholds from publication some matter of sensitivity it is only likely to be scooped by a less conscientious rival.

In a recent book on the British Official Secrets Acts, *Not in the Public Interest*,¹ Mr. David Williams decries the travesties resulting

¹ Reviewed in *Studies* X 2, p. 97.

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from excessively broad applications of them, but he does not question the frequent need for executive secrecy. He describes an informal, nonofficial "Services, Press and Broadcasting Committee," originally formed in 1912, consisting of representatives of the government, the press, and now broadcasting and television. The Committee issues to news media "D" (Defense) notices specifying matters which are sensitive and asking the forbearance of editors. Mr. Williams does point out that "D" notices have sometimes been used to cover up departmental errors. Nevertheless, this kind of active participation of the press in its own disciplining in the national interest seems to be a promising approach to the problem.

Perhaps an ad hoc committee of representatives from responsible news media and from the government should be constituted, preferably by executive action, to study the problem and submit recommendations. They could consider among other things the feasibility of such a permanent committee to review proposed releases and furnish guidance in sensitive matters. If the whole field of national security information seems too broad a jurisdiction for it, it could be limited to sensitive intelligence information.

There is one other aspect of public release that calls for brief mention. The release of national intelligence requires USIB approval, but there is no provision for joint review of releases by individual departments concerning matters falling within their jurisdiction. Such releases, however, may be based upon and revealing of intelligence collection efforts, and the effect on these efforts should be evaluated in advance by those responsible for their protection. It has been the exception rather than the rule that a proposed release has not been submitted for this kind of evaluation, but the impact in these cases has been so substantial as to make it worth reaffirming that coordination with all affected parties should be accomplished prior to release. In almost every instance the release can, if necessary, be rewritten so as to protect the sources without interfering with its substance.

Conclusion

Security problems are not the unique property of intelligence, but the integrated character of community activities requires that all agencies and all their personnel join here in a common front. Nor can it be a static front, or a matter of adherence to minimum standards. Opposition penetration techniques are constantly shifting as areas of

vulnerability are exposed; security efforts must be dynamic and flexible to counter them.

Departments that have administrative control over intelligence components and activities should recognize the distinct need for protection of methods and sources that sets intelligence apart from nonintelligence activities. The intelligence chiefs should have latitude and discretionary authority wherever possible, in order to participate in a community approach to security. The difficulties are complex, particularly with the advent of machine systems which give voluminous access to information automatically.

Intelligence acts as chief promoter of security measures for the nation because it is most aware of the hostile threat, dealing with it daily. Some measures to achieve greater security are difficult to harmonize with a free society, and that is why they have not been taken in the past. But the nation needs to keep a constant watch on the balance between security and personal freedoms. If the imbalance is too great in either direction, then corrective action is warranted in the national interest. Perhaps this paper will help focus thoughtful attention on the question.

A study of the information that opposing commanders acted on substantially modifies historical evaluations of the Civil War.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63

Edwin C. Fishel

PART II. CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG¹

The few historians who have thought seriously about Civil War intelligence have generally concluded that it left much to be desired. They are near the truth, though not necessarily for the right reason. The belief held by some that intelligence in that war was more than ordinarily laden with error is an example of a wrong reason. Another is the assumption that it was seldom of much influence in battlefield decisions. The valid reason for deprecating Civil War intelligence is the limited scope of both the Northern and the Southern effort. Intelligence was not pursued on a scale that seems commensurate with the size and desperateness of the conflict. What was pursued was almost altogether military, and even the military sector was not fully covered: strategic intelligence was severely subordinated to the tactical.

Family Affair

The reason for the neglect of political and economic intelligence was simply the common ethos and ethnos of the civilian leaders of the North and South. Having known each other for much of their political lives, they had little motivation for investigating what the other side was fighting for and how far it would go. As they knew the enemy's geography and his language, they also knew the extent of his economic wherewithal.

This is not to say that opportunities for political intelligence combined with subversion were entirely ignored. The Confederates in particular engaged in such attempts, their effort being directed toward

¹ For Part I see *Studies* X 3, p. 81 ff.

turning the Copperhead conspiracy into an effective peace movement. But this was a mere forlorn hope, and its outcome was pathetic; when the point of action was reached at the time of the Democratic convention of 1864, the Southern agents saw their collaborators melt away.²

The same inbred knowledge of the enemy limited military leaders' inquisitiveness, accounting in some measure for the lack of interest in strategic and even in tactical intelligence. The generals and admirals knew each other even better than the politicians did; they had gone to school together, lived together, fought together. This familiarity enabled many an officer to foresee how his adversary would act under given conditions. Thus, for example, the Confederates could predict that McClellan would try to "engineer" his way to Richmond; and they were right, for he jumped at the opportunity to build siege lines when he encountered thinly held fortifications half way up the Peninsula.

And even tactical information was not always felt to be a requirement for planning an action. When Lee sent Jackson around Pope's flank to Manassas, he was without information as to where the Federals' front might be vulnerable; so he picked a point where there could be no question about vulnerability—directly in their rear. When McClellan landed on the Peninsula to begin the long-awaited campaign that was supposed to end the war, he had woefully little knowledge of what particular obstacles he would face; it came as a surprise to find in his path the Warwick River, a stream of no mean size. Burnside made so little effort to obtain information before Fredericksburg that he misplaced an enemy concentration that was directly across the Rappahannock, only a mile or so from his own pickets.

These cases, and others about to be seen, were manifestations of the Civil War commander's habit of thinking that possession of the initiative greatly reduced his need for information, that it was up to the threatened forces to find out what was going on. But in only one of these cases—Lee's attack on Pope—was the initiative an adequate substitute for information, and it was adequate then only because of the impotence of Pope's cavalry.

² The literature contains hints that political intelligence was actually practiced on a far greater scale than this, through spies whom each side succeeded in placing high in enemy councils. While this remains a possibility, these references to high-level spies omit the evidence, if indeed there is any; they are usually mere innuendo, the wishful figments of "popular" historians.

Secret Services

To a considerable extent, however, the smallness of Union and Confederate intelligence activity is an optical illusion resulting from the tendency to measure it on a modern scale—not only the scope of the activity but more particularly the size of the bureaucracies associated with it. Only a handful of organized intelligence entities have surfaced, none of them giving any appearance of great size or authority. The largest had a peak strength of 70, counting cooks and teamsters along with operatives. Several important commands—Lee's army, for one—appear to have done without any separate intelligence organization whatever.

As one of the chief misconceptions about Civil War intelligence touches this question of size and organization, it will be worth while to pause and examine the matter. The literature reflects a widespread belief that the Union had a "Secret Service"—presumably a nationwide or army-wide organization. This belief has existed side by side with the contradictory one that intelligence bureaus were few in number, small in size, and of limited influence.

What the North had was a lower-case secret service comprising a hodgepodge of unintegrated, uncoordinated intelligence, counterintelligence, and military police activities. The service in the field was improvised pretty much according to the taste of the individual commander. It was most often under the direction of the provost marshal, but it was sometimes assigned to the adjutant of the command or to the signal officer or the chief of staff. In some commands, particularly those with the more sizable positive-intelligence efforts, a special staff position was created for the purpose. This was the case with Pinkerton's bureau, though nominally it was under McClellan's provost marshal. Some commanders took a direct hand themselves in supervising their spies and detectives. The variety was rendered complete by the not uncommon practice of assigning intelligence to one staff officer and counterintelligence to another.

It goes almost without saying that under these conditions the exchange of information between neighboring commands was usually haphazard, and that nothing but good luck or geographic separation could prevent duplication of effort on the one hand or working at cross purposes on the other.

This unsystematic system seems inevitable when it is realized that there was no superior intelligence and counterintelligence agency at

Washington. Two bureaus operated there at overlapping periods, but with authority that was more local than central. And even their local operations were so ill coordinated that members of one were occasionally shadowed or arrested by the other.

One of the two was Pinkerton's bureau, attached not to the War Department but to the Army of the Potomac. Its positive-intelligence element was at the capital for the eight months in 1861-62 when the army was headquartered there. When McClellan took the field in the spring of 1862, Pinkerton's spies went along, leaving behind a small counterespionage element that remained until Pinkerton resigned at the end of the year.

The other bureau, the counterespionage and police organization³ headed by the notorious Lafayette C. Baker, was initially under the State Department, but from early 1862 until it passed from view five or six years later it operated under the War Department. Baker's position as Department provost marshal did not, however, give him wide authority. Although his activities often ranged afield (for example, he sent detectives on the trail of Confederate agents in Canada, and for a time he kept a small office in New York City for liaison with the local police), special orders were required for him to invade the realms of the field armies or geographic commands, whose provost marshals operated independently (and often outranked him). Washington and environs remained his main field of operations.

It was Pinkerton and Baker themselves who fathered the "Secret Service" myth, not unwittingly. They published memoirs in which each named himself chief of the "United States Secret Service"—in each case an *ex post facto* title self-conferred. Then historians whose purpose it served to accept the existence of a Secret Service during the war took it from there, each solving the problem of the chiefship by naming whichever of the two men he happened to be writing about.

³ Generally thought, mistakenly, to have been also a major positive-intelligence organization. Baker did make one or two trips to Richmond early in the war, and later on some of his men occasionally engaged in minor espionage projects. Although Baker's account of his Richmond adventures is hard to swallow, it is partially supported by expense accounts and a credential made out in the name he claims to have used there and signed by the Confederate Secretary of War; this latter paper is in the Walter Pforzheimer Collection on Intelligence Service, Washington, D. C.

The Confederacy's intelligence system was both more and less systematic than the Union's—more so in that there was a department-level bureau in Richmond, less so in that field armies tended to do without a distinct and recognizable intelligence organization. (This apparent lack, however, may be partly due to the comparative scarcity of Confederate intelligence records.) At least there was some uniformity in the Confederate commander's practice of making intelligence a routine part of the mission of subordinate generals and letting it go at that. The high competence of Southern cavalry, attained early in the war, probably had something to do with this. Jeb Stuart, for example, was an intelligence collector and evaluator par excellence (though he preferred to employ his cavalry in more bellicose pursuits whenever he could).

The intelligence bureau in Richmond, though highly placed, was not a complete intelligence service. An alter ego of the Confederate Signal Corps headquarters, it was concerned more with communicating intelligence than with any other aspect of the job. It was generally known as the Signal Bureau, and its overt activities consisted of issuing army and State Department ciphers and enciphering and deciphering the correspondence of the Richmond authorities. But it also operated courier lines to the Potomac and beyond, and it was involved at least incidentally in obtaining and directing agents at the far end of these lines. In this capacity, and in various projects concerned with sabotage, ship captures, development of infernal machines, and collaboration with the Copperhead secret societies in the North, it was known as the Secret Service Bureau.⁴ With these activities it had a far broader mission than any or all of the Northern bureaus, but it would have served the Confederacy better if it had had a less ambitious set of functions and had done a bigger and better job as a straightforward information service. The bureau was in a position to develop an army-wide Secret Service; it does not appear that anything on that scale was even attempted, if indeed conceived.

The revelation that the Confederacy did not go all-out to obtain intelligence will not disrupt popular belief in the intrepidity, cunning, and invariable success of the Southern secret agent. But as we are

⁴ Information on the bureau's title and on its non-intelligence secret-service functions is from an unpublished manuscript by David W. Gaddy of Carrollton, Md.

about to see, the scenario theme that Reb ran rings around Yank in scouting, spying, and all related matters is another myth. Had it not been for Joe Hooker, that might not have been a myth.

New Sharpe Look

Hooker succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac (headquartered still at Falmouth, Virginia) in January 1863. Among many improvements wrought by Fightin' Joe (whose forte was actually administration) was the founding of an organization called the Bureau of Military Information.⁵ This bureau was an improvement over its predecessors because any real effort to get and report the facts would have been an improvement; but happily there is more to the story than that.

Two principal factors in making the bureau a success were these: (1) Hooker was as strongly committed to the idea that Rebels were only about six feet tall as McClellan had been to the vastness and invulnerability of the enemy legions. With Hooker in command, the Confederates' strength ceased to be an all-absorbing question. Their positions (especially of fortifications and batteries) and movements became the main question to be answered—as it should have been all along. (2) Hooker supplied the bureau with real talent, especially at the top. Its chief was George H. Sharpe, a 35-year-old colonel of volunteers, an upstate New York aristocrat, a lawyer, linguist, and former diplomat. Sharpe, having refused brigade command in order to stay with his regiment, naturally took on the staff assignment with misgiving. A return to line duty was always in his mind, but he was too effective an intelligence officer to be spared.

John C. Babcock, the young civilian who had been Burnside's one-man secret service, readily accepted a stepdown to the No. 2 position in the bureau. Sharpe brought in a fellow townsman, Captain John McEntee, as No. 3 and recruited a dozen or so spies from among Unionist citizens of the locality and from the enlisted ranks of the army.⁶

⁵ "Information" was at that time the full-fledged equivalent of "intelligence," which was still about three decades short of acquiring its present place in the military lexicon. Alone, "intelligence" carried no implication that it was information about an enemy or foreign power.


⁶ Spy duty was beneath the dignity of officers in the plebeian North but, curiously, not in the aristocratic South.

Like Pinkerton, Sharpe was placed under the army's provost marshal, but—again like Pinkerton—only nominally. He sent his reports directly to, and obtained most of his guidance from, Hooker's chief of staff, Major General Daniel Butterfield, heir of the American Express empire.

Sharpe's bureau was not only the most highly developed intelligence activity on either side; it had a modernity about it that parallels the war's numerous other military innovations. It was a complete intelligence operation. Sharpe established detachments in neighboring commands. He had his own scouting facilities independent of, but cooperating with, the cavalry. When there was a cavalry expedition to distant country his men went along whether or not the main purpose of the raid was to probe for information. Interrogation of prisoners, deserters, and refugees became routine and thorough; the commander who forwarded prisoners to Washington instead of to Headquarters heard about his error in short order.

Sharpe was the army's spymaster (a status Pinkerton had never fully achieved); though independent operations did not entirely disappear, they were few and limited in scope. An example of his authority is the fact that when the army invested Richmond in 1864 he took over direction of a ring of resident spies in the city who had previously been controlled, well enough it appears, by a local Federal commander long in the area.⁷ Finally, his bureau in one way or another managed to get its hands on information reaching headquarters from all sources—which (besides those under his direct control) consisted of newspapers, scouts working for corps and division commanders, a few spies in similar status, the cavalry, the balloons, the Signal Corps observers and cryptanalysts, and dispatches from distant commands and from Washington. Though the army commander and his chief of staff and adjutant had the first look at much of this material, Sharpe gathered it all, added it up with his own information, and produced digested, semi-evaluative reports.

⁷ This is the ring in which the chief figures were Elizabeth Van Lew, a wealthy spinster, and Samuel Ruth, manager of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad. There is every reason to believe that it was far more successful—at least more continuously successful—than the more highly publicized Confederate espionage in Washington. The Richmond ring's story is omitted here because nearly all of its known activities belong to a period later than the campaigns covered in this article.



Intelligence 1861-63

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Sharpe's reputation soon spread west; from the Mississippi theater came a request for his cooperation. Finally he became intelligence officer for Grant as commander of all the Union armies, but since Grant elected to take the field in Virginia, Sharpe's activities remained essentially what they had been with the Army of the Potomac. (Had Grant based himself in Washington with Sharpe at his side, the Union might have acquired some semblance of an army-wide intelligence service.)

Chancellorsville: the Intelligence Base

Sharpe quickly got results. One of his spies—another Indiana cavalry sergeant like Pope's savior on the Rapidan⁸—was so well received by the Rebels that he was permitted to make a 10-day, 120-mile guided tour of their front and rear lines⁹ and then to get away across the Rappahannock unchallenged. Back at the Falmouth headquarters, he gave Sharpe the locations of troop concentrations, fortifications, and artillery positions, in many cases with pinpoint exactness. A Northern-born farmer living in Lee's lines west of Fredericksburg sent information that corroborated the sergeant's picture of low enemy strength in that locality and added the compelling point that around Chancellorsville there was a six-mile vacuum between the positions on the river and the nearest troops to the rear.

Babcock, a ready-made O/B expert, derived after several weeks' work an organization chart that was considerably better than Pinkerton's chart of the previous year. Devoting particular effort to getting brigade and regimental averages, he added up Lee's strength to 61,800

⁸ Names of Ohioans, Indianans, Illinoisans, and Iowans abound in the records of Sharpe's bureau and other Federal intelligence organizations; presumably Easterners were excluded because of the dialect problem. On the Confederate side, some of the leading spies were from the border region but no sharp geographic pattern is evident. Apparently it was easier for a deep Southerner to drop his drawl than for a New Englander or New Yorker to assume one.

⁹ He was in Confederate uniform, but if he had represented himself as belonging to some regiment or battery of the Southern army he would in all probability have been sent promptly to that unit. It is a reasonable conjecture that he claimed membership in one of the partisan organizations operating in northern and western Virginia, and that his trip under escort was a pretended effort to make contact with his company.

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plus artillery personnel—a total that was as close as the Confederate returns could have given it.¹⁰ Although Hooker could not have known how good a piece of work this was, he could not have failed to see that Babcock's service under Pinkerton had not afflicted him with any hallucinatory disease.¹¹

While this reformation was going on, the Confederates' chronically haphazard intelligence did not improve. Lee's dispatches at this period show a surprisingly poor understanding of Army of the Potomac organization; when well-informed prisoners were taken the Confederates often could not fit the most basic O/B data into place. An effort to get a spy into Washington failed. Lee complained that his scouts could not get past Hooker's pickets. When a full and correct statement of Hooker's strength reached Richmond through a medical return printed in a Washington newspaper,¹² its relay to Lee was so poorly handled that he did not appreciate its authoritative character and instead relied on his own estimate, which was 25 percent below the mark.

The Action

Hooker, appointed in midwinter, had three months to ready a campaign. The farmer-spy's report gave him the opening he was looking for: weakness on the enemy left, and a gap that opened directly on the rear of their main force. The gap could be reached, however, only if the Federals could evade discovery in a long march through country that Stuart's cavalymen were watching.

Hooker's march did evade effective discovery. Part of this success was due to security measures far more stringent than any the army

¹⁰ It was within ¼ of 1% of the figure now most generally accepted, though the last few percentage points of accuracy were accidental: Babcock was decidedly low on two of the infantry divisions and too high on the cavalry, and the errors canceled out.

¹¹ Babcock had served under Pinkerton on the Peninsula and seems to have had a hand in the O/B work of that period, which (as noted in Part I) produced adequate basic data. But he deplored the ponderous record-keeping enforced by Pinkerton; he also deplored, it would seem from his own later work, the detective's practice of making strength estimates that had little or no relation to his unit-by-unit findings on the composition of the Southern army.

¹² See *Studies IX 4*, p. 75 f., "Intelligence Story in Three Parts."

had ever seen.¹³ To these Hooker added signal deception. His plans for his cavalry occasioned this piece of trickery. Intending to send the horsemen to raid toward Richmond when the infantry marched, he placed them 30 miles upriver, poised to jump off southward. His signalmen planted, with what seems a singular lack of subtlety, the word that the cavalry was headed for the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate flagmen copied and deciphered this message (and the Federal interceptors ascertained that they had done so); Lee alerted his forces in the Valley and kept Stuart upriver, ready to follow the Federal horse.

This left a 20-mile stretch of front so lightly patrolled that Hooker marched his main striking force of 55,000 men upcountry, across the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and back downriver to Chancellorsville—an average distance of 50 miles—before Lee realized what was happening. By that time Hooker had within his reach a position only three or four miles in the rear of Lee's center. Once this position was taken, the Confederates could save themselves from wholesale loss only by retreating, and even in retreat they would be punished severely.

But Hooker held back the coup de grace. A few miles short of the target position he inexplicably assumed the defensive,¹⁴ and in a

¹³ Hooker's security actions are a story in themselves; there is room here for only an outline: (1) He not only tightened picketing but on the eve of his march placed officers within earshot of all pickets to prevent leaks through across-the-river fraternization, to which the armies on the Rappahannock front were much addicted. (2) Early in his command he stopped civilian visits to the army, so that this telltale action would not coincide with his march. (3) Also early in his command, he canceled newspaper exchanges with the enemy and sharply curtailed flags of truce. (4) He punished newspaper conjectures about army movements without regard to their truth or falsity, and he attempted—though probably without much success—to crack down on the soldiers' habit of putting military secrets in their letters home. (5) On the eve of his march he stopped all outgoing soldier mail at the Washington post office. (6) He had a shipment of pontoons brought by a circuitous back route to avoid Confederate observation on the Potomac. (7) Synchronized with the upriver march of his main body was a sizable secondary action against the heights below Fredericksburg. He took pains to see that ordinary security measures protected this latter movement; anything less risked exposing its diversionary nature. (8) He protected the main movement by an unusually thorough sealing-off of the countryside, which included stationing guards at farmhouses to prevent local residents from spreading word of their observations. Although most of these measures seem obvious, they were none the less departures from previous practice.

¹⁴ Possibly not so inexplicably: long a heavy drinker, he forced himself to go through this campaign without chemical support.

poor position—around Chancellorsville, in dense wilderness relieved only by an occasional farm.

Lee was quick to accept the initiative thus tendered him. Stuart's men found the enemy right flank unguarded, facing south; Lee sent Jackson on another end run to the west of that point. Jackson's attack—his last, for he was fatally wounded that night—rolled up a large part of one Federal corps. It was enough to spread demoralization through Hooker's entire force, or at least as far as his headquarters.

This battle was a classic in several ways; one of them was the Federals' misconstruction of Jackson's march, which they could see at several points. Thinking the underbrush much too thick to let even foot soldiers get through, they did not believe that what was happening could really happen. Commanders on the Federal right, receiving many reports from their own scouts, pickets, and signal posts that showed an attack to be imminent, rejected them because of Headquarters' confidence that the movement was a retreat. Headquarters was thus denied information from the front that might have changed its mind.

A sufficiency of cavalry could have caused the true character of the march to be reported to Hooker in time, but he had held only three cavalry regiments back from the raid to the south. He was almost as empty-handed on the field as Pope had been at Manassas, though as a result of his own deliberate choice.

After two more days of fighting and shifting, Hooker worked the army into a position where the attacking Confederates would have been at a disadvantage. But then he retired across the Rappahannock to his old camp, apparently in the belief that Lee had been heavily reinforced. This story, entirely false, came from a pair of deserters who reached the Federal rear headquarters at Falmouth. Hooker's chief of staff believed they were telling the truth, but Babcock, who also questioned the men, insisted for several days that they were not.¹⁵ Then he too accepted the story, though only overnight. It was during that night that Hooker decided to retreat. Hooker's state of mind, however, was such that it is difficult to assign any strong influence in his decision to the enemy's supposed reinforcements, which would still have left them at a considerable numeric disadvantage in any case.

¹⁵ Babcock's rejections were telegraphed to Sharpe at Chancellorsville; the opposite assessments of the chief of staff reached Hooker directly by the same route.

Post Mortem

Chancellorsville was a campaign based on flawless intelligence but lost to a defender who was caught flat-footed and who, even at the moment of striking the decisive blow, had only begun to recover from that condition. If it had been Hooker who attacked that day, he would have known what corps, what divisions, and probably what brigades he was striking. Lee had not identified in advance even the corps that became his victim, and if he had, the information would have been a new entry on his mental O/B chart (presumably he kept no other kind).¹⁶

As usual, the role of intelligence in these events has been appreciated only dimly. Hooker's plan is repeatedly characterized as the most brilliant of the war—but one searches the literature in vain for a trace of suspicion that intelligence might have had something to do with it. The possibility that a report of enemy reinforcements was of some influence in Hooker's decision to retreat also goes unnoticed. That Lee based Jackson's attack on knowledge of the vulnerability of the Federal right flank is well known, but his otherwise uninformed and misinformed state is not recognized, even though it makes the result he extracted from that one perceived fact all the more remarkable.

The usual impression of Confederate superiority in intelligence is largely owed to this faculty of Lee's for manufacturing a victorious stroke out of such fragments of information—or out of no information at all; in other words, out of imagination and prescience. Had he possessed less of this kind of genius, he would have been forced to provide himself with a better, more organized information service. He understood the art of war much better than the art of military intelligence.

The reverse was true of Hooker. He is remembered as the general who, bidding strongly to end the Army of the Potomac's history of frustration, led it to its most unnecessary defeat. But if the intelligence side of the Chancellorsville story makes his defeat seem all the more tragic, it at least reveals him as the creator of a hard-hitting, effective information service that persisted after he was gone, contributing substantially to the victories of the army he left behind.

¹⁶ The corps in question was that of O. O. Howard, who Lee thought commanded a division. Howard's advancement had taken place three months before.

Potomac Pas de Deux

The Battle of Gettysburg, together with the maneuvers that led to it, has an intelligence story that has suffered from a negligence and fantasy proportional to its prominence in the national heritage.

Early in June, a month after his battle with Hooker, Lee began drawing westward from Fredericksburg, leaving a third of his army temporarily behind as cover. His plan was to march northward through the Valley. A pause at Culpeper to receive reinforcements and supplies lengthened Sharpe's opportunity for discovering what was going on.

Though he had predicted a general movement of this kind, Sharpe soon afterward fell for a story that the stirrings across the Rappahannock were connected with an impending raid by Stuart. The story may not have been spread by the Confederate command, but if it was not it was the most successful non-plant of the war. Hooker ordered Pleasonton, his cavalry chief, to break up the raid.

Pleasanton caught Stuart by surprise and fought a gigantic cavalry battle with him, but drew off without a victory. After the Gettysburg campaign was over Pleasonton covered this failure by explaining that his attack was really just a reconnaissance in force and that it had succeeded in unmasking Lee's movement toward the Valley and Pennsylvania. The historians have trustfully repeated Pleasonton's improvement on the facts. Actually his reports after the cavalry battle, and papers captured during it, strengthened the Federals' inclination to believe that a big raid by Stuart, rather than a massive infantry move, was in the making.

It was another four days before Hooker began an all-out pursuit of Lee, and what sent him on his way was a routine interrogation. The interrogator was Captain McEntee of Sharpe's bureau, who had been upriver with Pleasonton for two weeks, trying without success to get some of the bureau's spies over to Culpeper. He chanced upon a Negro boy, one Charley Wright, who had "refugeed" from Culpeper in the wake of the cavalry fight. The boy had been a servant to Confederate officers for a year. He said he had seen two infantry corps pass through Culpeper en route to the Valley, and when his knowledge of Confederate organization turned out to be about as good as McEntee's own, the captain got off two quick telegrams to Sharpe.

These set the army into motion on June 13. Despite Lee's partially successful effort to confuse Hooker and so delay pursuit, the Federals'

discovery of the movement came soon enough to put them on the Potomac in good time. When Hooker set up headquarters at Fairfax on the 17th, his army in front of him, the Confederate advance was about Hagerstown and had raided into Pennsylvania,¹⁷ but Lee was another week in assembling the rest of his army near Winchester.

His crossing into Maryland took place June 23-26. Hooker crossed, east of the Blue Ridge, on the 25th and 26th. By now Hooker was marching almost abreast of Lee, and on an inside track.

Because Hooker had had to take care not to cross prematurely,¹⁸ only intelligence or prescience could have made his move into Maryland so timely; and no one has ever accused Hooker of prescience. The intelligence that put his army over the river has been in published records for many decades, but its obvious effect on his actions—on the whole outcome of the campaign—has not been seen. So the fact that it was substantially erroneous intelligence has of course also escaped notice.

Its chief author was John Babcock. Sharpe had sent him to Frederick on the 17th to organize local espionage. Crippled by the presence of Confederate soldiery and busy secessionist citizens who knew his purpose,¹⁹ Babcock had to hide out and operate at a survival level. The result was that when two men he had sent beyond Hagerstown returned on the 24th, their report was his first real news in four days. He jumped at it so eagerly that he oversold it. It put all of Lee's army at or over the Potomac; this was correct as to the leading half of the Confederate main body, but it placed the rear half two days' march ahead of where it actually was—still about Winchester.

By the time Babcock's emphatic telegram arrived on the 24th, a dozen other bits and pieces of information pointing to the same conclusion had filtered in. Some of these appear to have derived from the Confederate habit of sowing false leads; if that was their origin, the trick served not to confuse the enemy but to hasten him on his way.

¹⁷ En route, this force—almost 25,000—surprised the Federal garrison at Winchester, capturing 3,500. It had marched the 75 miles from Fredericksburg without being discovered. Hooker had neglected for a full day to report to Washington that the enemy was moving north; it was during that day that Winchester was invested.

¹⁸ His orders required him to protect Washington as well as to find and fight Lee. After Jackson's stolen marches of the previous year, the Federals constantly feared an attack on Washington from the Virginia side of the Potomac.

¹⁹ He was seen in company of one of his recruits, a resident of the locality who was known to have spied for the Federals during Lee's 1862 visit.

In any event, once Babcock said that no Confederates were lingering in Virginia, Hooker lost no time in issuing marching orders.

It was this action, founded on a misplacement of the enemy, that more than any other single factor caused the Federals to arrive first at the place of eventual collision and take possession of the famous fishhook-shaped ridge that gave them an insuperable advantage.

But thus told, Babcock's error makes a better story than it deserves. If one set about to list instances in which wrong intelligence pointed to the correct action more forcibly than correct intelligence would have, this one would surely stand near the head of the list. But the story is robbed of some of its beauty by the fact that Babcock was only half wrong, and the correct half of his findings was itself a compelling indication that this was not a raid or a feint. The story loses a bit more when it is realized that Hooker's action was such as to leave a good margin for error. Washington, after all, is on the Maryland side of the Potomac. If after Hooker crossed, Lee's rear elements had struck for Washington on the Virginia side, Hooker could have detached enough force to deal with them, in front of the city if not sooner.

Well Met at Gettysburg

The most general distortion in the standard version of Gettysburg is the theme that the battle was an accidental collision of two great armies groping about almost as if blindfolded. That is correct enough for the Confederates; it is false for the Federals.

The reason Lee was in the dark was that he had failed to appreciate the object lesson Hooker had presented for him on the Rappahannock: he had voluntarily parted with the bulk of his cavalry. Before crossing the Potomac he allowed Stuart, who was smarting under newspaper criticism of his surprise by Pleasonton, to ride off to the east and march on the Federals' right. There is an entire sub-literature on this march and its wisdom or unwisdom; it may be summarized here by saying that Stuart had an image-restoring trip, full of raids, captures, and skirmishes, but the country was so full of enemy soldiers that he did not find Lee's army again for ten days—at Gettysburg, fighting for its life.

Not until the night of the 28th did Lee learn that the Federals were in Maryland. The discovery came from a spy sent out weeks before, not by Lee but by Longstreet. This man—named Harrison, a civilian—had, the story goes, been sojourning in Washington. More prob-

ably he had been following Hooker's army, at least for some days. On his way to rejoin Longstreet he passed through or near several Federal corps. They were about Frederick, and comparatively stationary—for June 28 was the day Lincoln replaced Hooker with George Meade,²⁰ and the Army of the Potomac was catching its breath while the new chief got his bearings.

The Confederates were strung out for sixty miles, from McConnellsburg to the Susquehanna, in an excellent position to be whipped one element at a time. Lee, after first doubting Harrison, sent out messengers with orders for a hurried concentration about Gettysburg, a point all his infantry forces could reach in a day or two.

Harrison had saved an army in the manner of Pope's spy on the Rapidan. His story has won a place in the literature, but its numerous retellings never capture a full sense of the absolute vitalness of his service; they do not depict an escape creditable to one man. Yet the Confederacy conceivably owed the last year and a half of its existence to Harrison, *fnu*.

While the Confederates were getting their key intelligence from a single spy, the Federals were reaping the benefits of team espionage. Most of the citizens of the invaded region remained behind shuttered windows, but a few dozen self-appointed patriots were out spying, scouting, and making courier runs to Harrisburg. From there their news was telegraphed to Washington and forwarded to the army—thus making a circuit of nearly 360 degrees.

From these dispatches and from his own sources, Meade correctly placed the bulk of the enemy force on his left, about Chambersburg. But his marching orders sent the army fanning out from Frederick over a wide angle, with scarcely any more strength on the left than on the center and right. On the 30th, though he had comparatively little evidence, he predicted with phenomenal accuracy the movement of the main enemy force eastward toward Gettysburg; but he still did not reinforce his left wing, which was moving on that place. Thus his actions have given the impression that he did not know where to expect the enemy—hence the Federal half of the collision-of-two-blind-armies myth.

Luckily Meade's generals on the left were even better informed than their chief, by virtue of the advance of Union cavalry beyond Gettysburg. Federal horsemen detected enemy approaches from

²⁰ Hooker had been bickering with Washington and despite his excellent march was not trusted to fight another battle with Lee.

west, north, and east, and captured some revealing dispatches. The wing commander on July 1 hurried his infantry on to the town, where by now the cavalry, dismounted, was fighting against heavy odds. The infantry seized the ridge and adjacent hills and managed to hold on for the rest of the day.

Not until news of this battle reached Meade did he order up the rest of his army, some of which was still in Maryland, more than a day's march away.

Although the Confederates were surprised by this collision, believing all the Federal infantry to be well down in Maryland, they had a big numeric advantage at the outset because they arrived from all directions at about the same time. While they had been concentrating, the Federals had been dispersing. Again Lee had seized the upper hand while being less well informed than his adversary; but this time the blow he struck did not quite turn the battle.

He attacked again on the 2nd and again inflicted heavy punishment. That night Meade called a council of war, asking whether the army should retreat. The vote was negative and he accepted it as his decision.

Every One But Pickett's

Though the demoralizing effect of such a retreat had weighed heavily in the council, some writers give intelligence a share of the credit for this decision. These, however, repeat an error already seen in the case of Pope's escape on the Rapidan. The decisive intelligence at Gettysburg, they say, was a captured dispatch—this one from President Davis addressed to Lee, which Union cavalry scouts took from a courier party on that July 2 over near Hagerstown. It contained the important information that the Government could not send the Army of Northern Virginia any more reinforcements, and in explanation of the shortage Davis gave a tremendously revealing summary of military conditions throughout the Confederacy.

That Lee was getting no new troops was good news to Meade, but the chief value of the captured document was strategic. It was of more significance in Washington than in the field. It does not look like the kind of information that would have swayed a roomful of generals who had been in a desperate fight for two days; their concern was with the forces Lee then had in hand. If Davis had said he was putting 20,000 men on the road for Pennsylvania the next day, Meade and his generals might only have shrugged their shoulders, knowing

it would be two or three weeks before the reinforcement could arrive. Almost certainly, moreover, this dispatch, like the one supposed to have saved Pope, arrived after the decision it pointed to had been made.

To the extent that intelligence influenced the decision, it was intelligence obtained on the field, but in a manner that will never make a TV script. This intelligence was a simple tabulation, compiled from prisoner interrogations, of Confederate regiments and brigades that had been in the battle. Sharpe and Babcock had set to work on this as soon as they reached the field, of course; by afternoon of July 2 it was a most revealing compilation. It showed that the entire Army of Northern Virginia infantry was present except one division, and that every brigade present had been in the fight. By evening, when Sharpe reported to Meade just before the council of war opened, he was able to add that this one division, Pickett's, was now on the field and could be expected to be used heavily on the morrow. As Meade's rear elements had arrived only a few hours before and he could count on having an advantage of about 6 to 1 in fresh troops, the decision to stand fast cannot have been as hard a one as has been supposed.

Here in all probability was the war's biggest payoff for the bookish side of intelligence, the headquarters staff work that was then almost a novelty. Despite a drastic reorganization Lee had carried out just before marching north, the O/B chart that accompanied Babcock everywhere (except, presumably, to Frederick) was in so good a condition that the enemy situation could be reconstructed in a matter of hours²¹ by the jigsaw method. This was a precise kind of battle-field intelligence that the Confederates could not have produced even if their chief intelligence arm, Stuart's excellent brigades, had been put to proper use.

Not only was Pickett's Charge foreseen, but the sector at which it was to be delivered was divined by Meade. It came against the center of his line. Two other divisions were with Pickett's; the three were smashed—thrown back in a state of complete disorganization—by about 10,000 Federals, two-thirds the number of the attacking force.

The Army of Northern Virginia, badly spent, fell back to home soil. Vicksburg surrendered to Grant July 4, the day after the battle

²¹ The Federals did not have a good cross-section of prisoners until the battle of July 2 was well advanced. Babcock may have been on the field the first day, but Sharpe probably did not arrive until the night of July 1-2. McEntee's activities at this stage of the campaign are unknown.

ended in Pennsylvania; the Federals now held the Mississippi to its mouth. From then on the most the Confederates could hope for was to keep armies in the field until the North should tire of the war.

Some Generalizations

Though the events covered here represent only about a quarter of the major campaigns of the war, several instructive points can be drawn from them:

*The importance of the contingent factor,*²² and of having the intelligence resources to deal with it. This is an unsurprising discovery, the more so when one is aware of the Civil War commander's preference for tactical over strategic intelligence. Yet it is striking to see the principle at work. Two battles—First Bull Run and Chancellorsville—were decided, so far as intelligence decided them, by information obtained during the action, and arising out of it. The principle was also at work at Gettysburg (though the intelligence obtained on the battlefield was of less profound influence than the advance information that put the Federals on Cemetery Ridge ahead of the enemy).

Equally striking is what happened when the principle was not observed. A whole series of examples is available, for not until the Pennsylvania campaign did the Federals consistently keep their intelligence abreast of the action. Lee often divided his army—so often as to make it seem a habit: at the beginning of the Seven Days, before Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg, and during the fight at Chancellorsville. He took these risky actions, and won battles by them, in the knowledge that Union generals would probably lack either the facilities or the aggressiveness to discover his dispersion in good time, or would be unlikely to call him fully to account if they did make a timely discovery. Even when dispersion led him into a losing battle at Antietam, the loss was not due to tactical reconnaissance by the enemy. Not until Gettysburg did the Northern army display enough vigor in discovering his positions to inspire any great fear of the consequences of dispersion.

"It takes all kinds." Each type of intelligence—espionage, intercept, interrogation, etc.—sometimes produced about as expected and sometimes fell short. Each also produced windfalls—discoveries and

²² "[The] contingent factor is three times as ponderable in close action as the preconceived plan."—D. S. Freeman in *Civil War History*, I, No. 1 (March 1955), p. 13.

results of great impact, and of a kind not ordinarily expected. In espionage, the shortfall is exemplified by Pinkerton's evidently barren penetration of Richmond, normal good performance by the farmer-spy who told Hooker the way to the enemy rear, and surprise successes by Harrison and by Pope's spy, neither of whom could have been expected to move with enough speed and luck to save an army in the way they did. Signal interception, after a slow start,²³ leaped to an extraordinarily fruitful performance in the deception that opened the way for Hooker's march to the enemy rear (for all that the plant seems to have been thrust at Lee with too obvious a generosity).

The bread-and-butter sources—interrogation, cavalry, etc.—followed the same pattern. Interrogation, at least as a source of O/B information, certainly fell short under Lee. It achieved good standard results not only for Babcock but even for Pinkerton. Two of its greatest successes, however, were in much more vital matters—uncovering the Confederates' movement to Pennsylvania and showing, at Gettysburg, what the result would almost certainly be if Lee continued attacking, as he did. Cavalry, ordinarily the main reliance on the march and in close action, often did produce according to expectations, as for Lee at Chancellorsville and for Pope until he wore out his mounts; but it performed over its head in numerous captures of important dispatches, most notably Stuart's theft of Pope's entire files; the frequency and importance of these captures was abnormal. And newspaper intelligence, though ordinarily a yawn-producing activity on account of the masses of error, bluster, and planted information that it had to deal with, had its day in that one authoritative disclosure about Hooker's strength, though the validity of this was not apparent to Lee until their main encounter was over.

Each different type of intelligence thus enjoyed at least one fine hour; all were indispensable. Conclusion: it took all kinds, and the greater the total effort, the greater the scope for serendipity—which was the most beneficent supplier of all.

²³ Flag signaling made it possible for enemy correspondence to be intercepted in far greater quantities and with much more ease than ever before in the history of warfare. (It was overwhelmingly the main medium of Civil War intercept, though in the general literature of the War virtually all cited incidents of interception and cryptanalysis involve telegraph or courier dispatches.) Little capital appears to have been made of these opportunities in the earlier campaigns, not because ciphers were unusually secure but precisely because they were insecure: commanders were cautious about putting valuable secrets on the air.

But to say that all types were important is not to say that their importance was fully appreciated. Had these commanders been asked to name the one information source they could least afford to do without, the cavalry would have been their choice. Their willingness to employ it on other tasks even at critical times is perhaps the best single indication of the Civil War general's lack of passion for intelligence.

How a big built-in advantage in intelligence can be overcome. In the contest for tactical information the Confederates held the upper hand by virtue of fighting on home ground 95 percent of the time. It seems to have been habitual with Federal commanders, when operating in the Confederacy, to concede the enemy this advantage.²⁴ Pope resisted this tendency and by force of effort succeeded in getting an even break or better as long as his cavalry held out. Like Pope, Hooker was too stubborn to be resigned to coming in second in the information contest. Other Union commanders were liberal in regard to newspaper and flag-of-truce exchanges, probably because those were situations in which the Northerners for once stood to get a quid pro quo. Hooker clamped down hard on both. By these and other strong security measures, and by his insistence on vigorous and competent intelligence work, he marched to Chancellorsville with well nigh perfect information while Lee, surrounded by a friendly population, suffered from information that was as bad as Hooker's was good until the armies had been at close grips for two days. And the advantage Hooker seized early in his command did not prove transient; Sharpe maintained it, apparently, all the way to Appomattox.

A characterization of commanders as getters and users of intelligence. Three rather sharp classifications emerge from the performance of Hooker, Meade, and Lee respectively.

Hooker, administrator par excellence, saw the value of intelligence and knew how to get the job done right. He also did an excellent job of translating his intelligence into a campaign plan. And an excellent job of security. But in the pinch he did not trust the plan that he must have admired as much as history does. It is hard to put one's finger exactly on his flaw, but this much is clear: he could

²⁴ In the Mississippi theater, at least, Federal spies were instructed to tell the Confederates the truth about Federal forces, on the assumption that the Rebels would have correct information anyway and that the spy who made misstatements would only betray himself. At least one spy who ventured to interpret this rule to suit himself wound up by having to be reassigned east.

comprehend a big picture (before the battle), and he could see a big plan, but he could not see it through.

There is no particular reason to believe that if Meade had inherited the army without a going intelligence outfit, he would have set up as good a one as Hooker did. But he had one ability in which Hooker did not especially distinguish himself: as an evaluator of intelligence evidence he could hit the bull's eye as surely as someone else could find the target. On the morning he left the Fifth Corps and rode over to army headquarters to take command, he was completely uninformed of the enemy situation (Hooker had carried security too far); by evening he had picked out the correct information from a great welter of conflicting reports.²⁵ In the succeeding days he continued this performance, though not against such great odds. It is hard to believe that if he had been in command at Chancellorsville a flanking movement would have been read as a retreat or a planted story of enemy reinforcements would have been entertained for several days.

But Meade was far from an ideal applier of intelligence. While in Maryland he read the evidence correctly and then acted as if the erroneous reports were as sound as the correct ones, and the army would therefore have to go out and look for enemy concentrations all over south-central Pennsylvania. It is reasonable to question whether, if he had not had his generals' views to rely on in the council of July 2, he would have made the decision that his information pointed to.

Lee, as has been shown, did not do anything like the job Hooker did in providing himself with intelligence. Evidently he also lacked Meade's flair for evaluation; for example, despite his own habitual use—over-use—of deception, he accepted a planted signal message that should have seemed suspiciously gratuitous. But Lee excelled in putting information to work. Give him a scrap of it and he knew what action to take, and he took it, and saw it through.

Thus each of these men seems to have excelled in but one of the three skills—getting intelligence, evaluating it, and applying it. The second of these skills is of a higher order than the first, and the third is higher than the second, but the higher orders do not seem to require any degree of excellence in the lower ones. This stratification, though

²⁵ Undoubtedly Sharpe aided Meade in this, but the language of Meade's orders and of his dispatches to Washington reflects a strong evaluative role played by the commander himself.

it looks a little over-sharp, may be exactly what a psychologist would expect to find; but it is something that the abundant legacy of Civil War history has not previously been made to demonstrate.²⁶

Evaluation

Clearly, Civil War intelligence was not the pale, irrelevant stuff that the literature reflects (and here we are speaking of the whole literature, not merely that of the horseflesh and magnolia blossom school). Yet one may fairly ask whether its story is more valuable than any other piece of antique intelligence history.

It is in one way—in what might be called Intelligence's public relations. The Civil War remains our most profound national experience. It is disturbing that a collection of myths²⁷ has been permitted to usurp the place of intelligence in the history of a struggle so important and so well documented—to usurp without even filling it, leaving millions of words of campaign narrative that explain critical decisions weakly if at all.

Will the story, once set right, necessarily establish that intelligence contributed substantially to the result? At this distance, Northern might looks so overwhelming that one is tempted to believe the end would have been the same, and would have come as quickly, if the Union armies had made no organized intelligence effort at all. Yet the fact remains that a rebellion which holds at the start a big and integral territory is quite likely to prevail, even in the face of greatly superior might. The American rebellion of 1861 was such a one. And the outcome was touch and go up to the autumn of 1864; the Confederacy's defeat could not be foreseen until the Northern anti-war element lost at the polls that November, thanks largely to the Federals' battlefield successes of the months immediately preceding.

The contribution of intelligence to the 1864 victories is missing here, and until it is supplied we cannot represent that this was another American war in which intelligence had as much to do with the outcome as in, say, the Second World War. But there were at

least two earlier points at which a Confederate victory might have won Southern independence. These were Lee's invasions of Maryland in 1862 and Pennsylvania in 1863. Had Antietam or Gettysburg gone the other way, the North might have given up. At Antietam decisive intelligence came to the Federals merely by virtue of their being in the vicinity of the enemy. But in the next year's campaign they won an intelligence contest that ran from the Rappahannock to Cemetery Ridge; they won every round of it, and by organized effort in each case. And the product of this effort affected the battlefield result as profoundly as the Lost Order affected the decision at Antietam. Not a bad heritage, all by itself.

²⁶ One commander who may have shown two or all three skills is Grant. He seems to have been well informed from his Vicksburg campaign onward, and his ability to use intelligence sometimes appears to belong in the same class with Lee's. But this study has not yet touched his history in detail.

²⁷ For a catalog of these myths set against the corresponding realities see the author's "Mythology of Civil War Intelligence" in *Civil War History*, X 4 (Dec. 1964), pp. 344-367.

*History and methodology of
"flying saucer" intelligence.*

THE INVESTIGATION OF UFO'S

Hector Quintanilla, Jr.

Unidentified flying objects are not a new phenomenon. In 593 B.C. Ezekiel recorded a whirlwind to the north which appeared as a fiery sphere. In 1254 at Saint Albans Abbey, when the moon was eight days old, there appeared in the sky a ship elegantly shaped, well equipped and of marvelous color. In 1520 in France there were sighted a round-shaped object with rotating lights and two fiery suns. In 1874 in Texas a farmer reported seeing a dark flying object in the shape of a disc cruising in the sky at a wonderful speed. These are a mere sampling of the many such events recorded by historians.

The modern era of UFOs, however, can be dated from 24 June 1947, when a flyer made some strange observations which national news coverage and authors with a poetic license so played up as to excite public entertainment of a notion that our planet had been visited by unknown vehicles from outer space.

Supersonic Saucers

On that 24 June, Kenneth Arnold was out flying in his private plane. He was looking for a Marine transport that was supposed to have crash-landed somewhere on the southwest side of Mt. Ranier. First he flew directly toward the mountain from the west at an altitude of approximately 9,500 feet, searching all of the various ridges for the downed plane. Then he made a sweep back to the west, found nothing, and headed again toward Mt. Ranier. The air was so smooth that it was a real pleasure flying; he trimmed out the aircraft and relaxed, admiring the crystal-clear sky and the terrain. There was a DC-4 to his left and rear at approximately 14,000 feet.

He hadn't flown more than two or three minutes on this course when a bright flash reflected on his airplane. He couldn't find where

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the reflection came from, but to the left, north of Mt. Ranier, he did observe a chain of nine peculiar-looking objects flying from north to south at approximately 9,500 feet. They were approaching Mt. Ranier very rapidly, and he at first assumed them to be jet aircraft. Every few seconds two or three of them would dip or change course slightly, so as to catch the sun at an angle and reflect brightly. They were too far away for him to determine their shape or formation.

As they approached Mt. Ranier, however, he observed their outline quite clearly—except that, oddly, he could not find their tails. He watched them pass the southern edge of Mt. Ranier flying directly south-southeast down the hog's-back of a range. Their elevation seemed to vary by as much as one thousand feet, but they remained very near the horizon, therefore around his own elevation. They flew rather like geese, in a diagonal chain as though they were linked together. They seemed to maintain their orientation while swerving in and out of the high mountain peaks.

Arnold estimated the distance from him to the objects at approximately 25 miles. Using a Zeus fastener and a cowling tool, he estimated their size to be about two-thirds that of the DC-4. Watching them pass a high snow-covered ridge between Mt. Ranier and Mt. Adams, he saw that as the first object was leaving its south crest the last one was entering its northern crest. Later the length of this ridge, and therefore that of the chain of objects, was determined to be about five miles. Arnold timed their flight from Mt. Ranier to Mt. Adams, 47 miles, at 1 min. 42 sec., a speed of 1,659 miles per hour.

In a subsequent interview with newsmen, Arnold described the objects as appearing like saucers skipping on water. This description, shortened to "flying saucers" by newsmen, gave rise to the popular term for UFOs. The sighting, like most, was not reproducible for purposes of investigation; it involved uncontrollable atmospheric conditions. The Air Force was left with one man's subjective interpretation of what he had experienced. Scientists who reviewed Arnold's sighting concluded that the objects were a mirage. The smooth, crystal-clear air that he noted indicated the very stable conditions which are associated with inversions and a high index of refraction of the atmosphere.

Although Arnold's experience could not be reproduced, another phenomenon in some respects similar and observed in the same area

found a satisfactory explanation. Navy Commander W. J. Young reported in November 1948 that on several occasions he had seen over the Willamette valley and the plains of eastern Washington and Oregon what could easily have been mistaken for flying discs. One striking example occurred over the Willamette valley on a clear sunny day when the ever-present blue haze seemed somewhat thicker than usual. His aircraft was flying at altitudes between 1,000 and 5,000 feet when bright flying objects appeared, some on his beam and others on the bows or dead ahead. From time to time they would disappear and new ones appear.

Young finally determined that what looked to be aircraft at various altitudes were reflections of the sun from the aluminum roofs of farm buildings at great distance from his plane. The perspective of the land converging with the sky on the horizon, with limited ground visibility, made it appear as though the roof reflections were actually airborne at various altitudes in the haze. Thus one UFO sighting was solved by the observer himself. Although there is no uniform pattern among reported UFO phenomena, some characteristics of one may be found in others, as in Young's and Arnold's.

Sign and Grudge

Newspaper publicity for Arnold's flying saucers started an avalanche of other sightings. The Air Force began receiving reports from people in all walks of life. Before December 1947 no specific organization was responsible for investigating and evaluating these. Without any basis in measurable data or controlled experiment, the reported phenomena were variously assessed, even within the military structure, as due to a new aerodynamic configuration, to natural occurrences, to misinterpretation of conventional objects, or to space ships under intelligent control. The military interest touched the fields of air defense, R&D, and intelligence, responsibilities vested in many different organizations.

To end this confusion, the Chief of Staff directed on 30 December 1947 that a project be established to collect, collate, evaluate, and distribute within the government all information concerning sightings which could be construed as of concern to the national security. Responsibility for the project, assigned the code name "Sign," was given to the Air Technical Intelligence Center. In February 1949 Project

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Sign, having completed its evaluation of the 243 UFO cases submitted to it, issued a report:

No definite and conclusive evidence is yet available that would prove or disprove the existence of these unidentified objects as real aircraft of unknown and unconventional configuration. It is unlikely that positive proof of their existence will be obtained without examination of the remains of crashed objects. Proof of non-existence is equally impossible to obtain unless a reasonable and convincing explanation is determined for each incident. . . . Explanations of some of the incidents revealed the existence of simple and easily understandable causes, so that there is the possibility that enough incidents can be solved to eliminate or greatly reduce the mystery associated with these occurrences. . . . Under wartime conditions, rapid and convincing solutions of such occurrences are necessary to maintain morale of military and civilian personnel.

With the backlog of cases disposed of, the project was continued on a reduced scale and under a new code name, "Grudge." Project Grudge completed its evaluation of 244 reports in August 1949, relying heavily on the work of university scientists and other outside consultants, as well as the USAF Air Weather Service and the U.S. Weather Bureau. The Grudge Report concluded that the UFO sightings signified nothing that would constitute a threat to the national security of the United States, that they were chargeable to misinterpretations of conventional objects, a mild form of mass hysteria or war nerves, and fabrications for the sake of hoax or publicity.

Special Report No. 14

The soothing conclusions of Project Grudge caused very little comment, and the project was continued on a reduced scale. Nevertheless, the fringe of people that still believed in extraterrestrial visitation was growing with the popularity of science fiction articles and magazines. In December 1951 a contract was let to an industrial firm for a detailed study, unclassified, of the UFO cases on file. It took three years to complete this study.

Meanwhile, in March 1952, the project was given its present name, "Blue Book." During this period numerous books were written about the UFOs. Some representative titles are *The Coming of the Saucers*, *Space, Gravity, and the Flying Saucer, Is Another World Watching*, *The Flying Saucers Are Real*, *Flying Saucers from Outer Space*, and *Flying Saucers Come from a Distant World*. UFO hobby clubs were formed throughout the country. Most professed to be studying the phenomena scientifically, but few, if any, had physical or behavioral

scientists on their so-called evaluation committees. During the early fifties it became fashionable to accuse the Air Force of censorship or of withholding UFO information from the public.

In January 1953, while the three-year contract study was still in process, a Scientific Advisory Panel was formed to make an authoritative quick evaluation. It was composed of civilian scientists outside the government with well-known and respected names—H. P. Robertson, Luis W. Alvarez, Lloyd V. Berkner, S. A. Goudsmit, Thornton Page. Following is an extract from their report:

The panel . . . has reviewed a selection of the best documented incidents. . . . We firmly believe that there is no residuum of cases which indicates phenomena which are attributable to foreign artifacts capable of hostile acts, and that there is no evidence that the phenomena indicate a need for the revision of current scientific concepts. The panel further concludes that the continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena does, in these perilous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic. We cite as examples the clogging of channels of communication by irrelevant reports, the danger of being led by continued false alarms to ignore real indications of hostile action, and the cultivation of a morbid national psychology in which skillful hostile propaganda could induce hysterical behavior and harmful distrust of duly constituted authority.

The panel recommended:

That the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the unidentified flying objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have unfortunately acquired.

One action taken on this recommendation was to establish, within the Office of Information at the Air Force Secretary's level, an office to answer public questions and release information regarding UFOs. Throughout the years, the responsibility for releasing UFO information to the public has remained with the Office of Information, Secretary of the Air Force.

When the unclassified contract study was ready at the end of 1954, it was immediately released to the news media. It was released under ATIC cover, because the competent company which produced it wished to remain anonymous in this field of research. It is commonly referred to as Special Report No. 14, the first 13 having been administrative progress reports.

Special Report No. 14 reduced and evaluated all the UFO data held in the Air Force files. It contains graphs showing the frequency distribution of sightings by time, date, location, shape, color, duration,

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azimuth, and elevation. It records an attempt to build a model of the typical UFO and an ultimate finding that UFOs come in all sizes, shapes, and colors. It concludes as follows:

It can never be absolutely proven that "Flying Saucers" do not exist. . . . Scientifically evaluated and arranged, the data as a whole did not show any marked patterns or trends. . . . A critical examination of the distributions of the important characteristics of sightings, plus an intensive study of the sightings evaluated as unknown, led to the conclusion that a combination of factors . . . resulted in the failure to identify as *Knowns* most of the objects classified as *Unknowns*. An intensive study aimed at finding a verified example of a "Flying Saucer" or at deriving a verified model or models of "Flying Saucers" led to the conclusion that neither goal could be attained using the present data.

It is emphasized that there was a complete lack of any valid evidence consisting of physical matter in any case of a reported unidentified aerial object. Thus, the probability that any of the unknowns considered in this study are "Flying Saucers" is concluded to be extremely small, since the most complete and reliable reports from the present data, when isolated and studied, conclusively failed to reveal even a rough model, and since the data as a whole failed to reveal any marked patterns or trends.

Therefore, on the basis of this evaluation of the information, it is considered to be highly improbable that any of the reports of unidentified aerial objects examined in this study represent observations of technological developments outside the range of present-day scientific knowledge.

Investigation Procedures

The objectives of the UFO program, outlined in 1953 by Air Force Regulation 200-2, remain unchanged:

- (1) To determine if UFO phenomena present a threat to the security of the United States.
- (2) To determine if UFO phenomena exhibit any technological advances which could be channeled into U.S. R&D.
- (3) To explain or identify the stimuli which caused the observer to report a UFO.

Our Project Blue Book office at Wright-Patterson has a complement of only one officer, two sergeants, and one civilian stenographer. The initial investigation of all UFO sightings is therefore undertaken by the commander of the nearest Air Force base. In its subsequent analysis of UFO cases, also, the project office is assisted by many organizations and professional individuals. Project Consultant for the past eighteen years has been Dr. J. Allen Hynek, astrophysicist

and Chairman of the Dearborn Observatory, Northwestern University. It is Dr. Hynek, obviously, who has maintained continuity on the project, in addition to evaluating all suspected astronomical cases. We have used the services of Dr. Charles P. Olivier, head of the American Meteor Society, in evaluating some suspected meteor cases.

For help on suspected aircraft sightings we have gone to Federal Aviation Agency offices, local airports, the Strategic Air Command, and the Air Defense Command. In suspected balloon sightings we have called upon local airports, local weather stations, the U.S. Weather Bureau, Holloman AFB Balloon Control Center, the National Center for Atmospheric Research, General Mills, Raven Industries, Sea Space Systems, and colleges and universities conducting balloon research. For suspected satellite sightings we use the printed Echo schedules, NASA satellite reports, the Smithsonian North and South Equatorial Crossings, and the professional services of the Space Detection and Tracking System. For suspected missile observations we go directly to Cape Kennedy, Vandenberg AFB, Point Magu, Wallops Island, Eglin AFB, Holloman AFB, and Green River.

For radar analysis we contact one of our internal organizations. For photo analysis we use an internal organization but also Kodak in Rochester, N.Y. On physical specimens we have used the services of the Air Force Materials Laboratory, Battelle Memorial, the Food and Drug Administration, Libby Owens, Corning Glass, Institute of Paper Chemistry, and the Northwestern Geology Department. Numerous other organizations and individuals have helped the project in the past. No individual, government agency, or industrial group has ever refused assistance.

As indicated above, UFO sightings are classified according to the suspected real event that gave rise to each report. The characteristics of these different categories are sketched below.

Propeller Aircraft

Regular scheduled airliners fly in air corridors, are usually controlled by FAA. Lighting will probably be typical red and green wing lights with rotating beacon. They use landing lights on takeoff as well as in landing pattern. Sighting report may include hovering or stationary period if the aircraft is in a turn or approaching the observer. Total duration should be consistent with flight maneuvers, not likely to exceed five minutes unless some series of maneuvers is being performed. Landing light, blotting out the red and green

flashing lights, is often reported as a single light at night. Experimental and unusual lighting effects can vary with the lighting configuration of each aircraft. Color most often reported as white, can be red. Objects reported in straight flight at certain altitude can be checked against local flight corridors; then FAA can be checked if there remains doubt that an object is an aircraft or if positive identification of a specific flight is required. There may or may not be sound associated with the visual effect reported. If near an airport, this type of object is not classed as a UFO; moving lights in and around airports which could be caused by aircraft are assumed to be aircraft.

Private or non-scheduled flights have the same characteristics in general. Speeds may be slower and duration longer. Altitude usually lower. No sound if the wind is blowing away from the observer. Duration should not exceed seven or eight minutes unless maneuvers can account for additional time. Normally flight is cleared from some local airport and not carried on radar plots through FAA; hardest type to make positive identification of. Evaluation made on reported flight characteristics consistent with aircraft.

Jet Aircraft

Airliner and high-altitude missions are similar to conventional flights in visual characteristics with the following exceptions: (1) The color is most often reported as red. (2) No sound is associated with the object. (3) Flight is usually straight or with one turn. Duration is about three to five minutes, depending upon the length of arc visible. FAA has designated airways for these flights.

Special low-level military missions are flown at 2,000 feet in known air corridors. Sighting is usually brief, one minute or less. May be reported hovering if flight is directly toward the observer. May include a sudden burst of speed. No sound if wind is away from observer. Usually reported as a single light, but may be more than one. Sightings are at night; during the day these aircraft can be seen too well to be misinterpreted.

Special test or training missions, varying from a single plane to multiple flights or major air operations, may give rise to reports. These flights can be determined by contact with local, regional, or major air commands.

A jet with afterburner in operation, viewed from the side, may give the appearance of a short flame. It is usually reported as blue and

tapering. When the afterburner is cut off, the object may be thought to have either just vanished or zoomed off into space. Duration is usually brief. The sighting is frequently during climb. As viewed from the rear, the jet may be reported red or orange with some yellow and of no distinct shape. Here again the disappearance may be sudden. If at high altitude, only a nondescript light may be reported.

Refueling Missions

Here lights on the tanker and the multiple aircraft engaged add new visual characteristics. Sightings are at night only; daylight operations would be recognized for what they are. They may be at low or high altitude. Multiple lights will be moving around, in formation, going on and off. The basic light formation will fly straight for a set distance, then may make a 180-degree turn. Duration in an area may run as high as 15 minutes, but any single pass should not last more than four or five. Lights may be seen going one way and then appear on their return path later. The 922 Air Refueling Squadron at Wright-Patterson furnishes information on the visual characteristics of night refueling operations, and SAC recently photographed a refueling mission for the benefit of UFO analysts.

Refueling operations are controlled and conducted in specific areas. A "Flight Planning Guide" issued by the Aeronautic Chart and Information Center gives the location of these areas and the agency controlling each. A phone call to the controller will determine whether an area was in use at a particular time and what squadron flew the mission. Then communication with the squadron will give the number and type of aircraft flown and their entry and exit times.

Photo Aircraft

Aircraft using flare drops for photo work are most often reported simply as flares. Similarly, aircraft using strobes to illuminate their target, which may work at either low or high altitudes, are reported as a series of evenly spaced flashes. Duration of these sightings is usually less than two minutes, more frequently 30 seconds.

Infra-red photo planes have turbine generators to drive their equipment. These make a whining noise which can be heard above the noise of the engines. Not many agencies do this work, which is often classified. The planes used are rather slow, less than 125 mph.

Much of the work is done early in the morning, with landing lights on because of the low altitudes flown.

Advertising Aircraft

Planes towing targets or banners during daylight hours are not usually misinterpreted unless they remain at such a distance that the observer cannot distinguish the tow vehicle and sign. Frequently in such cases the reports are accompanied by drawings picturing the towed banner as part of the UFO. Duration is longer than for other aircraft sightings, and the flight generally includes maneuvers. The frequently used loud speaker would presumably not be heard unless the flight were close enough for correct identification. Local investigators can check for these aircraft, since FAA regulations require a permit for such flights.

Aircraft with electrically lighted signs have the same essential characteristics except that they are normally sighted at night. On occasion the sign lights have been mistaken for windows of a much larger craft. Flights are relatively slow, characteristically maneuvering back and forth in one area. One usually operates over the same area for more than one day and can be viewed on successive nights, weather permitting.

Helicopters

Motion slow, may or may not hover. It needs to be far enough away from the observer to escape daylight identification. It may be reported as a black speck moving back and forth, up and down. During the night weird effects can be caused by the red rotating beacon flashing through the canopy. Motion will be erratic if the flight includes hovering. Positive identification is usually simple to obtain by checking the flight schedules of military and civilian helicopters in the area.

Balloons

Flight characteristics here are affected by meteorological factors. Wind data is obtained from the Weather Bureau. An Air Weather Service liaison officer assists in evaluating the meteorological data. Low-level weather balloons are described in sightings as round or oval, occasionally oblong. The flight may be reported as hovering, rising, zig-zag, or erratic, but the object must be moving with the

wind. It will be picked up by radar only if a radar reflector is attached. A frequent time for sightings is at dusk, before the balloon disappears into earth's shadow. It is rarely sighted at night; its small white lights are not visible to ground observers from above 10,000 feet without optical aids. The sighting from planes is usually very brief, and on occasion even experienced pilots have attributed unusual motion to balloons.

An upper-air balloon may be described as round or oval, usually silver during the day and orange at dusk. It will appear stationary or in slow motion. Actually, it moves with prevailing winds at the altitude—six months to the east and six to the west. It will probably be picked up on radar and remain in the area long enough to be identified by aircraft scrambled or diverted for this purpose. Sudden disappearance is to be expected at dusk, and may be reported as a zooming off into space. The sun's reflection through folded panels can give unusual flashing effects. Every effort is made to pin to a specific launch any reports attributable to upper-air balloons; this practice has assisted the scientific community in recovering some of them.

Upper air research balloons are launched by military and civilian agencies for cosmic ray and other studies. These are about 100 feet in diameter, usually of polyethylene. They can be programmed to fly at various altitudes between 80,000 and 125,000 feet or higher. Their appearance may vary with the equipment suspended below and other attachments, but what is visible from the ground without optical aids is generally the same for all. The speed will vary with the wind, from hovering in the same area for some days up to 200 mph in jet streams. At night the balloon will descend as the gas cools and the next day go back up to the programmed altitude. It usually carries a radio beacon which is followed by tracking stations, as well as running lights and radar reflectors. Occasionally, multiple balloons are used to carry heavy equipment. Pilots scrambled to check on this kind of balloon cannot reach its altitude but can get close enough to identify it. At dawn the balloon may appear suddenly, as it moves into sunlight, and similarly disappear at dusk.

Earth Satellites

In order for a report to be evaluated as deriving from an artificial satellite, the following criteria must be met: (1) Time of sighting must be at night and at such an hour that the vehicle can reflect the

sun's rays. (2) Object should resemble a star in visual characteristics. (3) Direction of flight can have a westerly component only in the case of retrograde satellites. (4) Duration (considering the degrees of arc through which the object is observed) must be consistent with satellite orbital velocities.

Satellites are normally reported as star-like moving lights, most frequently white but occasionally yellow, green, blue, orange, and even red. Motion may be steady, hesitating, or zig-zag; portions of the flight may be seen as hovering or stationary. The path may be reported straight or arching, and a turn may be ascribed to it at the beginning or end of the flight. The object may appear or disappear suddenly. The speed should be about 15° of arc per minute, the average duration three to six minutes.

When a known satellite has a flight path over the observer's area at the time of the report (only Echo and Pegasus schedules are screened), and the above considerations are fulfilled, the sighting is evaluated as of that specific vehicle. There are more than 30 satellites in orbit visible to the naked eye. When a reported object does not correspond with Echo or Pegasus passages but displays the required characteristics, it is then evaluated as a probable or possible satellite.

Astronomical Events

The most common UFO reports are of astronomical sightings—bright stars, planets, comets, fireballs, meteors, auroral streamers, and other celestial bodies. When observed through haze, light fog, moving clouds, or other obscurations or unusual conditions, the planets, especially Venus, Jupiter, and Mars, have been reported as UFOs. Stellar mirages are also a source of astronomical reports.

Other Categories

There are three other classifications used for UFO reports. An *Insufficient Data* category takes care of those in which one or more elements of information essential for the evaluation are missing—for example the duration of the sighting, the date, time, location, or position in the sky, weather conditions, and the manner of appearance or disappearance. If there is any indication that such a sighting may be important from the viewpoint of security, scientific or technical value, or public interest, every attempt is made to obtain

the additional information necessary before placing the report in this category.

Another category is a catch-all labeled *Other*. It includes missiles, reflections, mirages, searchlights, birds, kites, spurious radar indications, hoaxes, fireworks, and flares.

And finally, a sighting is considered *unidentified* when a report apparently contains all the data necessary to suggest a valid hypothesis but its description cannot be correlated with any known object or phenomenon.

Through 1965, 10,147 UFO reports had been disposed of and classified in one or another of the seven categories. In 1964, a fairly average year, the figures were as follows:

Astronomical	123
Aircraft	71
Balloon	20
Insufficient Data	99
Other	88
Satellite	142
Unidentified	19
Total	562

Policeman's Report

One intriguing, classic case of the 19 listed above as unidentified will also illustrate how widely government agencies, industrial firms, and individuals cooperate in the UFO project.

On 24 April 1964 at approximately 1745 hours, a Socorro, New Mexico, police officer, Lonnie Zamora, was headed south chasing a speeding automobile when he suddenly heard a roar and saw a flame in the sky to the southwest. He decided to let the speeder go in favor of investigating the flame, because there was a dynamite shack in that area and it might have blown up. He turned right onto a gravel road that ran by the shack.




As he was driving slowly along the road, Zamora saw above a steep hill just ahead a funnel-shaped flame, bluish and sort of orange. The base of the flame was hidden behind the hill; there was no smoke connected with it. He had trouble getting the car to the top of the hill because of loose gravel; he had to try three times before he made it. As he reached the top of the hill he saw a shiny object to the south, this side of the dynamite shack, about 150-200 yards away. It was off the road to the left in an arroyo, and at first glance it

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looked like a car turned over; but when he drove closer, it appeared to be aluminum color, not chrome, and oval-shaped like a football.

Zamora drove about 50 feet along the hill crest, radioing back to the sheriff's office, "10-44 [accident], I'll be 10-6 [busy out of the car] checking a wreck down in the arroyo." From this point, seated in the car, he could not see the object over the edge of the hill. As he stopped the car, he was still talking on the radio, and while he was getting out he dropped the mike. He picked it up and put it back and started down toward the object.

Just then he heard a very loud roar, not exactly like a blast but not steady like a jet engine. It was of low frequency at first and then became higher. At the same time he saw a light blue flame, sort of orange at the bottom. Zamora believes this flame came from the underside of the object; he could see no smoke but some dust in the vicinity. He panicked; he thought the object was going to blow up. In his own words (with slight rearrangements for the sake of clarity):

As soon as saw flame and heard roar, . . . ran away from object but did turn head towards object. Object was  in shape. It was smooth—no windows or doors. As roar started, it was still on or near ground. Noted red lettering of some type like . Insignia was about 2 1/4 inches high and about 2 inches wide, guess. Was in middle of object, like . Object still like aluminum white.

[Running], bumped leg on car—back fender area. Car facing southwest. . . . Fell by car and [sun] glasses fell off, kept running to north, with car between me and object. . . . I guess I had run about 25 feet when I glanced back and saw the object . . . rise to about level of car, about 20 to 25 feet, guess. Took, I guess, about six seconds when object started to rise and I glanced back. . . . It appeared about directly over the place where it rose from.

I was still running, . . . [then] about 50 feet from car I ducked down, just over edge of hill. . . . I stopped because I did not hear the roar. I was scared of the roar, and I had planned to continue running down the hill. I turned around toward the object and at the same time put my head toward ground, covering my face with my arms. . . . When the roar stopped, heard a sharp tone whine and the whine lasted maybe a second. Then there was complete silence about the object.

That's when I lifted up my head and saw the object going away from me . . . in a southwest direction . . . It did not come any closer to me. It appeared to go in straight line and at same height—possibly 10 to 15 feet from ground, and it cleared the dynamite shack by about three feet. Shack about eight feet high. Object was traveling very fast. It seemed to rise up, and take off immediately across country.

I ran back to my car and as I ran back, I kept an eye on the object. I picked up my . . . sun glasses, got into the car, and radioed to Nep Lopes, radio operator, to look out the window, to see if you could see an object. He asked, what is it?

I answered, it looks like a balloon. I don't know if he saw it. If Nep looked out his window, which faces north, he couldn't have seen it. I did not tell him at the moment which window to look out of.

As I was calling Nep, I could still see object. The object seemed to lift up slowly, and to get small in the distance very fast. It seemed to just clear the Box Canyon or Mile Canyon Mountain. It disappeared as it went over the mountain. It had no flame whatsoever as it was traveling over the ground, and no smoke or noise.

Feeling in good health. Last drink—two or three beers—was over a month ago. Noted no odors. Noted no sounds other than described. Gave direction to Nep Lopes at radio and to Sergeant MS Chaves [of New Mexico state police at Socorro] to get there. Went down to where the object had been, and I noted the brush was burning in several places. . . . I got my pen and drew a picture of the insignia on the object. . . .

Then Sgt. Chaves came up, asked me what the trouble was because I was sweating and he told me that I was white, very pale. I asked the Sgt. to see what I saw and that was the burning brush. Then Sgt. Chaves and I went to the spot and Sgt. Chaves pointed out the tracks.

When I first saw the object (when I thought it might be a car) I saw what appeared to be two legs of some type from the object to the ground. At the time, I didn't pay much attention to . . . the two legs. The two legs were at the bottom of the object, slanted outwards to the ground. The object might have been about three and a half feet from the ground at that time. . . .

Diagnosis: Unsolved

There is no doubt that Lonnie Zamora saw an object which left quite an impression on him. There is also no question about Zamora's reliability. He is a serious police officer, a pillar of his church, and a man well versed in recognizing airborne vehicles in his area. He is puzzled by what he saw, and frankly, so are we. This is the best-documented case on record, and still we have been unable, in spite of thorough investigation, to find the vehicle or other stimulus that scared Zamora to the point of panic.

During the course of the investigation and immediately thereafter, everything that was humanly possible to verify was checked. Radiation in the landing area was checked with Geiger counters from Kirtland AFB. The Holloman AFB Balloon Control Center was checked for balloon activity. All local stations and Air Force bases were checked for release of weather balloons. Helicopter activity was checked throughout the state of New Mexico. Government and private aircraft were checked. The reconnaissance division in the Pentagon was checked. The White House Command Post was checked. The Commander at Holloman AFB was interviewed at length about special activities from his base. Down-range controllers

at the White Sands Missile Range were interviewed. Letters were written to industrial companies engaged in lunar vehicle research activity. The companies were extremely cooperative, but to no avail. The Air Force Materials Laboratory analyzed soil samples from the landing area.

The findings were altogether negative. No other witnesses could be located. There were no unidentified helicopters or aircraft in the area. Radar installations at Holloman AFB and at Albuquerque observed no unusual blips; but the down-range Holloman MTI radar, closest to Socorro, had been closed down for the day at 1600 hours. There was no unusual meteorological activity, no thunderstorms; the weather was windy but clear. There were no markings of any sort in the area except the shallow "tracks" Chaves and Zamora found. The soil analysis disclosed no foreign material. Radiation was normal for the "tracks" and surrounding area. Laboratory analysis of the burned brush showed no chemicals that could have been propellant residue.

The object was traveling at approximately 120 miles per hour when it disappeared over the mountain, according to Zamora's best guess of the time it took. Not an interplanetary speed, at any rate; and the findings are also negative for any indication that the Socorro UFO was of extraterrestrial origin or that it presented a threat to the security of the United States.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

SECRETS OF ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE. By John M. Carroll.
(New York: Dutton, 1966. 224 pp. \$3.95.)

This is a light and rather superficial review of the half century of electronic surveillance activities which began in World War I soon after the discovery of the vacuum tube. A short evening's reading, it will appeal more to devotees of *Popular Mechanics* than to *Scientific American* subscribers. Those knowledgeable of electronic espionage today will not find much of interest in it except perhaps a reminder that in World War I, as now, the thing was to apply the latest scientific techniques to espionage. Then it was the first vacuum tube amplifiers; now it is tunnel diodes and lasers.

The book could have been put together, whether it was or not, by going to standard reference works for what took place in the two world wars and then keeping a good file of clippings from newspapers and magazines to cover events in the last 15 years. The scissors-and-paste technique gives the reader a series of episodes rather than a coherent history of the subject.

There are a number of inaccuracies, growing more serious as the story approaches the present time—"Army Air Force" rather than Air Corps, "C-47" for C-54, glass "tubes" instead of rods in fiber optics, and then the retrieval of capsules ejected from satellites by nets *strung between planes* in flight. Illustrations in the section devoted to ferret activities and overflights are mostly photos of planes in their conventional configuration, not the aircraft modified for Elint or technical surveillance.

The account of the Soviet audio penetration of the American embassy discovered in 1964 is almost completely erroneous. It has only the 8th through the 10th floors bugged, neglecting the 6th and 7th, and counts only 40 microphones, a 25% error. In several pages describing the microphones buried deep in the walls, the author tells us they were attached to long wooden pegs extending almost to the surface of the plaster to pick up the walls' voice-induced vibrations, wooden pegs being used instead of the metal spikes of contact microphones in order to defeat search by metal detectors. In reality, these were wooden tubes leading to open holes in the plaster behind the hot water radiators and so providing an air path to each microphone's diaphragm. He says the microphones were connected to

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the telephone lines; they had their own wiring systems. He describes the transponder concealed in the Great Seal as U-shaped with a steel vibrator; really it was a small cylindrical resonant cavity with a thin aluminum diaphragm at one end and a short antenna rod projecting from one side.

Those concerned with the possible compromise of today's technical operations need not worry over this publication. Many sensitive developments are completely ignored; others are given superficial treatment. No mention is made of the Navy's underwater short or long range anti-submarine surveillance efforts. Although our interest in Soviet space technology is mentioned, little is said of particular techniques for monitoring Soviet missile launches or observing the re-entry characteristics of nose cones. In the field of audio surveillance techniques there is nothing that hasn't been thoroughly rehashed at Congressional hearings or in the open press, and some things in fact which have received wide press coverage are not mentioned. When discussing the monitoring of conversations by bouncing some sort of beam off window panes, for example, the author mentions only techniques which are quite unrewarding.

It would be interesting to know if this discretion of Mr. Carroll's reflects a lack of information or a deliberate effort to preserve security. In view of the disproportionate coverage he gives to airborne activities, I suspect that he has drawn heavily on *Aviation Week* as well as on *Electronics*, and his slighting of the subaqueous field may well be due to the lack of any similar periodical devoted to oceanography.

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