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STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



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
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

EDITORIAL POLICY

Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence.

The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Editorial Board.

The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence.

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With this issue the Studies bids an official farewell to Sherman Kent, who somewhat quixotically founded the journal in 1955 and has been its prime sustainer for a dozen years. The infusions of his vigor and polymath good judgment have been so much the wellspring of its life that it has reason to tremble a little at this severance. Yet he has borne himself the wise father, encouraging spontaneity and initiative, nudging here and checking there but fostering the independent child; and he has thus brought it to a stature that can stand the shock. It can take comfort, too, that he will not be altogether out of its reach for fatherly advice. This is the end of an era, but the era's works go on.



Succeeding Chairman Kent on the Studies editorial board, as on his more history-making Board of National Estimates, is Abbot E. Smith, long his deputy on the latter.

VALEDICTION

Sherman Kent

My colleagues on the Board of Editors have asked that I mark my retirement from the Board with a backward glance at the beginnings of the *Studies in Intelligence* and a drawing of some sort of balance sheet. What follows is, I trust, a minimally autobiographical, but nevertheless wholly personal appraisal of the journal's accomplishments and disappointments.

First—about its establishment:

When the National War College convened in January 1947 after its Christmas recess, Bernard Brodie gave the morning lecture. His

topic was the Grand Strategy. To the surprise of everyone, and the disquiet of some, his presentation was not about strategy but about how few Americans had interested themselves in the study of it. Citing the case of economics, he noted that a hundred and fifty years of study had produced from scratch a large library of highly enlightening literature. What had our military produced in the way of a literature regarding strategy, the heart of their profession? He answered this question by referring to Alfred Mahan, whose contribution to this literature was unique in both senses of the word: outstanding and lonesome. The speech came to a climax when Mr. Brodie identified a couple of strategic decisions of World War II which he held in low esteem and indicated that they might not have been made if Americans had devoted more time to thinking and writing about strategy. The moral was pointed and purposefully so: strategy is your business, why don't you systematize your thinking about it and perpetuate your reflections in a professional literature?

Sunday Before Christmas

One of the reasons I so vividly remember Mr. Brodie's remarks was that I realized at the time that everything he was saying about strategy could be said with equal force about intelligence. I had just completed almost five years in the business and was poised to begin work on my book *Strategic Intelligence*. In the next few months all that I had suspected regarding the absence of a literature of intelligence I was pretty well able to prove. Calling upon the library resources of the National War College and its able reference librarians, I believe that I read practically every printed document which our military had issued on the subject of intelligence and a number of typed student articles from the services' war colleges. There was nothing from the pen of a civilian intelligence practitioner. The collection was no better than I had anticipated, and going through it was a pretty shattering experience for an intelligence buff. Clearly the profession ought to put the talent of a lot of its devotees to the creation of literature of the trade.

I did nothing much about the matter except for occasional broodings until one Sunday in December 1953. I had the morning duty in Mr. Dulles's office and after reading the cables I still had time on

my hands. It was then that I wrote the memorandum that follows.
The cover sheet of transmittal looked like this:

21 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BAIRD¹

The attached arises from:

- (1) My general interest in the "Life."
- (2) A sense of disquiet at the realization that Intelligence is a non-cumulative discipline.
- (3) A sense of outrage at the infantile imprecision of the language of intelligence—I give you the NSCID's for a starter.
- (4) A desire to give Uncle Matt a Christmas gift.

At the bottom of the copy I have is written, in Matt Baird's hand:

To OTR Staff and Division Chiefs
re parag. 4—I like to share my Christmas cheer; comments will be acceptable
in return!

MB

Here is the memorandum itself:

SUBJECT: How a major flaw in the intelligence business (its lack of a serious systematic literature) might be corrected.

1. Intelligence work in the US has become an important professional discipline.
2. It has developed theory, doctrine, a vocabulary, and a multitude of techniques.
3. Unlike most other important professional disciplines, it has *not* developed a literature worthy of the name.
4. Without a literature intelligence has little or no formal institutional memory. What institutional memory it does possess exists in (a) fragments of thousands of memoranda primarily devoted to discrete intelligence operations, not to the theory and practice of the calling, and in (b) the living memories of people engaged in intelligence work.

What kind of a way is this to run a railroad? Where would the sciences and social sciences be, if their students had not systematically contributed to their literatures?

A literature is the best guarantee that the findings of a discipline will be cumulative.

A disaster to our unlettered intelligence service such as occurred with the budgetary cut-backs of 1946-7, or as might occur with an A-bomb on Washington, could put US intelligence back to the stone age where it so long dwelled.

¹ Matthew Baird, then CIA Director of Training

5. How do you produce a literature?

Some answers.

- a. You pay for it. That is, you offer a livelihood to the man who wants to write a book or an article during the time he requires to do the job.
- b. You make sure that the man who wants to write a book or article has something to say and a reasonable command of the art of verbal expression.
- c. You subsidize his publications. That is, you print at your own expense what your critics and editors think will advance the discipline.
- d. You circulate his publications and encourage comment thereon. You may wish to publish the best written comment.

6. How would I go about the above?

Some answers.

- a. I would establish on a modest scale an "Institute for Advanced Study of Intelligence."
- b. I would have a Board of Admissions who would both (1) pass on the suitability of applicants and (2) actually invite likely candidates who did not apply.
- c. I would have no one eligible for admission who had not had a substantial and varied experience in intelligence work and who was not capable of systematic thoughtful research, analysis, and writing. Further I would accept no one who did not have a well-thought-out project.
- d. The project would have to be in the field of intelligence work, overt and clandestine; *not* in the substantive findings of intelligence. Appropriate sample projects might be:
 - (1) Strengths and weaknesses of intelligence dissemination techniques.
 - (2) An examination of the "third agency" rule.
 - (3) The theory of indicators.
 - (4) The intelligence service of country X.

Inadmissible projects would be:

- (1) The Red Army
 - (2) The Trieste situation
 - (3) The Outlook in Liberia, etc.
- e. I would have no faculty as such. I would have a director who would arrange for occasional meetings with outsiders and who would see to it that the students spent a few hours per week together in seminars at which the students would present papers and discuss them.
 - f. The greatest part of the student's time would be his own to pursue his project through any means whatever with a view to publishing something at the end of his fellowship.

- g. I would establish a journal—probably a quarterly—which would be devoted to intelligence theory and doctrine, and the techniques of the discipline. I would have an editor who fully understood the limits of his mandate. The journal could be Top Secret; its component articles could be of any classification or unclassified. The editor would provide for the separate publication of “reprints” for separate circulation where appropriate.
 - h. Along with the journal I would establish an “Intelligence Series” for longer works.
7. Some dimensions.
- a. As a starter I would have no more than 10 or 12 students.
 - b. They would receive their regular in-grade pay if they came from the government; they would receive appropriate compensation if drawn in from the outside. All would, of course, be fully cleared.
 - c. They would be expected to be “in residence” at least 50 percent of the time; that is, at work in study or seminar rooms on the school premises.
 - d. Although my major interest is in positive intelligence, I would always aim to have a few security intelligence students around.
 - e. The duration of the fellowships would normally be one year. If I found a Mahan of intelligence I would keep him as long as he would stay.

There are hundreds of details beyond this rough outline. If the idea were accepted, they could be easily worked out.

What my school *must never be* is an intelligence equivalent of the higher service schools. If you feel the need of a model, study *Institute for Advanced Study* at Princeton—the Einstein school.

The Start

True to his penciled promise, Mr. Baird did discuss the memorandum with his principal lieutenants in the Office of Training. I can only surmise, for I was not present, that the founding of an Einstein school for research in intelligence method, doctrine, and history was put on a back burner and that my suggestion for the establishment of a journal was fetched up front over moderate heat. There followed, for example, a weekend conference at a country retreat sometime during 1954 and a good bit of general conversation about a journal—who should finance it, edit it, supervise it, and so on.

Some time later I was asked to set forth orally my thoughts about the journal before an Agency gathering with the understanding that

the speech would be recorded and transcribed. This procedure was Mr. Baird's artful way of inducing me to produce, in writing, the first article of the new journal. When it appeared in print in September 1955 it bore the title "The Need for an Intelligence Literature: Articles by Sherman Kent and the Editors." My contribution was no more than an Englished version of the oral presentation, which in turn was an elaboration of the thoughts touched upon in the first five paragraphs of my Christmas memo to Matt Baird.

Before the appearance of the first number of the quarterly proper, there were two other unperiodic issues with a couple of articles each, the first including Abbot Smith's disquisition on the matter of capabilities in intelligence publications. This gave rise in the second, oddly enough, to a comment by the British intelligence officer then representing the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington, Alan Crick. I say *oddly*, because soon after the journal began to appear in its present form, the Editors ruled that there should be no dissemination to friendly foreign services. The main articles in the last issue in slender format dealt with economic intelligence.

At the initiative of one of Matt Baird's able officers, James Lowe, the journal became a quarterly with the Fall issue of 1957, and starting in 1958 under the editorship of Philip Edwards it has come out four times a year ever since.

Now for the balance sheet: what is there about the journal that we can regard with pride and happiness and what with regret?

Pluses

Let me begin with the good ones: our second five years of quarterly existence has produced a larger number of contributions and a larger number of good ones than did our first five. In recent times there have often been many more pages of highly commendable manuscript than the editors wished to commit to a single number. It is not exactly that we are being lost in a blizzard of contributions, but compared to the bleak years of the fifties, we feel that we are doing very well indeed.

As to the quality, we should have to do no more than to call the reader's attention to the list of winners of the annual \$500

prize² and advise him to reflect again on what whacking good articles they were and what a very substantial contribution to the lore of our profession they made. That the Board has on two occasions been unable to distinguish between the two or even three best essays and has accordingly split the award is explicit testimony, at least, of the Board's awareness that it has just passed through a bumper crop year.

That the *Studies* has in fact contributed to a richer understanding of the bones and viscera of the intelligence calling is beyond argument. We have run dozens of articles on intelligence *history*, the range of which can be sampled in those of Arthur Darling on the early years of CIA, the half dozen on the early struggle between the Russian revolutionaries and the Tsar's Okhrana, and William Harris's two on the March 1948 Berlin crisis, in which intelligence played a pivotal role. None of these articles required a high security classification and all of them could have been disseminated widely as long memos. But who would have sponsored them, reproduced and circulated them if there had been no *Studies* to serve as a vehicle?

The contribution of the journal to an appreciation of some of the aspects of intelligence *theory and doctrine* has been highly significant. I cite as outstanding examples the succession of articles by W. E. Seidel, George Ecklund, Clyde C. Wooten, and Julie D. Kerlin clarifying the proper role of economic intelligence in defense planning, the many articles that discuss problems of estimative intelligence,³ and the view from the summit in Richard Helms's "Intelligence in American Society."

² 1960—Clyde R. Heffter
1961—Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal (co-authors)
1962—F. M. Begoum
1963—(1) Paul R. Storm
(2) Lt. Col. William Hartness
1964—(1) Andrew J. Twiddy
(2) Theodore H. Tenniswood
(3) Thaxter L. Goodell
1965—John Whitman
1966—James Burke
1967—Henry S. Lowenhaupt

³ These are compiled conveniently under one cover in the new publication cited on p. 74 of this issue. But already this is outdated by Jack Zlotnick's "A Theorem for Prediction" in the last issue of the *Studies*, Willard Matthias's "How Three Estimates Went Wrong" in this, and Keith Clark's "Notes on Estimating," Summer 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

Valediction

Perhaps we have been at our best on intelligence *method*. Where else could a wide audience of professionals gain insight into such techniques as those illustrated in Thaxter L. Goodell's piece on cratology, Paul R. Storm's on Soviet gold, and C. N. Geschwind's comments on interrogation? Increasingly, as intelligence itself turns more and more to science, we have featured new scientific methods, from David Brandwein's "Telemetry Analysis" three years ago⁴ to the new infrared reconnaissance techniques recently explained by R. E. Lawrence and Harry Woo.

The point is that as one looks back through a cumulative index (which one should do⁵) he cannot escape the belief that the intelligence profession is indeed more professional and more durable now that it has the beginnings, at least, of this tangible institutional memory.

Another cheering aspect is inherent in the widening spectrum of contributors. There is not a major component of CIA which has not by now produced at least one author and an interesting article. Furthermore we have had a good number of contributions from intelligence officers not associated with the Agency in any way. One of our prize winners, Colonel Hartness, four years back, was such a man.

Lastly, we have had a heart-warming reaction from our consumers. The members of the Board are pretty well convinced that our fan mail represents a genuine appreciation on the part of scores, perhaps even hundreds, of readers scattered all over Washington, indeed all over the world. As old intelligence officers, we are naturally suspicious of a warm consumer reaction, for well we know how rare it is that a consumer receiving a piece of substantive intelligence will ever give anything except a "thank you." To be sure, some of the thanks are a good bit less fervent than others. But what we have found particularly pleasant have been the requests from men running small intelligence units in large and small domestic and overseas commands asking permission to incorporate this or that article into one of their publications destined to circulate among their own people.

Probably our nicest fan letter was one which Admiral B. E. Moore, then of the Cinclant headquarters, wrote to Admiral D. L. McDonald, the CNO, saying how he had come across our publication and sug-

⁴ See also his article in the current issue.

⁵ See the compilation at the end of this issue.

gesting that the CNO ask that it be sent to a good number of flag officers serving with major components of the Fleet. As a result we put some 40 or 50 additional addressees on our distribution list.

A principal cause behind these good things has been our editor, Philip Edwards, whom we know to be the best in the business. When you read these words you must realize that he has been overcome by the Board's exercise of *force majeure*, and that the paragraph is appearing in print despite his efforts to kill it. Mr. Edwards combines his great skill as a critic with a rare talent for writing, a world of patience, and a great ability to help authors help themselves. The journal's successes owe more to him than any other single person.

Minuses

And now for my regrets. The first has to do with the classification of the quarterly. The *Secret* stamp on the outside and what it means is obvious to all. The most melancholy implication is that it must be given what we call Class A storage, something none of us has in his home. Accordingly, one has had to read the journal on business premises and perhaps in business hours. This means that it has been competing for attention with urgent professional matters.

When I bespoke my hope for lots of unclassified articles in my first essay, I was clearly whistling Dixie. What the Board swiftly came to realize was that unclassified articles by people outside the government or the intelligence community were by definition going to be a great rarity—principally because we were not going to advertise that we had a vehicle to publish such writings. Even if we had successfully solicited, we would probably have had to reject most offerings on the grounds of quality or lack of sophistication. There are after all very few outsiders who have been able to keep abreast of the extraordinary developments of the profession from the vantage point of private life. And not many have chosen to do purely historical pieces or notes of reminiscence.

On the other hand, the very fact that an insider wrote such and such and that the Board thought it important enough to publish was oftentimes the *prima facie* reason to put some sort of classification stamp to it. In actual fact, the Board has upon many occasions felt impelled to question sensitive topics discussed by an author and even to do a bit of sanitizing to get the contribution by as *Secret*.

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All this is the long way of saying that, regrettable as is the *Secret* classification, it is the very best that can be done. We are convinced that there is no way by which our publication can be made into something which our readers can take home to read in the evening and which, at the same time, will have a content worthy of their attention. One reader wrote us a communication suggesting a common-sense method by which copies of the *Studies* could be kept out of the safe for an hour or so after close of business for people who wanted to stay after work to read them. We thought he had something and passed the idea along, but nothing came of it.

A second and last regret. No matter that, as noted above, the quantity of contributions has increased and the quality improved, there are by no means enough people in our vast community writing articles and submitting them. The Board of Editors, at each of its weekend meetings, spends several hours on Saturday night discussing subjects which would make interesting articles and trying to figure out who would be the best author to undertake them. Between meetings of the Board, members put in a good amount of time dunning their colleagues and acquaintances for an article of this or that specification. I should imagine that we receive in finished form one article for about every ten we ask for. Some of the articles which have finally appeared have required almost as much suasion or browbeating on the part of a Board member as they did effort on the part of the composer. On the other hand, the number of high-quality walk-ins has been low.

There are several reasons why this is so. To start with, the ideal author or authors for such and such a piece are as a rule overextended with the primary tasks of their job descriptions and cannot take on an additional duty. Nor do their supervisors by and large feel able to lighten their professional burdens for the two or three weeks which they would have to have to do the article in question.

Not infrequently the right author could be given time, but just does not want to take it. Maybe he has a quite understandable desire—to this writer, at least—to avoid the pain of literary composition at all costs. Maybe also the man or woman whose job keeps driving them down into the present and forcing them to look into the murk of the future can be pardoned for an indifferent concern about that which is over and done with. And many of the articles which we feel should be written are essentially historical in nature. Some of these have an added built-in repulsiveness. For example, who is naturally in-

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clined to go back over the history of an intelligence blooper? The fact that such a backward glance could be of immense professional importance does little to alleviate its essential unattractiveness.

Though the so-called missile gap debate owed but little to the shortcomings of intelligence, getting an article going on the subject has so far been impossible. One reason—not the ruling one—has been a reluctance on the part of knowledgeable analysts to return to the agonies of our early estimating on the Soviet ICBM force and relive those days of groping around in the uncertainties of Soviet ability to build the missiles and the magnitude of the force which the Soviets would probably wish to deploy.

No such Freudian explanation is applicable to our experience in getting the article which we published in the autumn of 1966 on "The Detection of Joe I," the first Soviet nuclear test. This piece, which recounted one of our country's truly great intelligence successes, required more effort in terms of false starts and carry-over from year to year than any other we have printed. Here perhaps the issues of security and delicacy were important inhibitors. Telling the story orally in a safe place to an inside group possessed of every clearance in the book would have been one thing, telling it in writing at the *Secret* level for publication to the community at large quite another. The stupid little mechanical difficulties of the latter course could and probably did very rapidly build up into a mountainous barrier.

Whatever the difficulties and however overcome, the *Studies in Intelligence* venture has been eminently worth while. The Board's celebration of its tenth anniversary a year ago presaged, I trust, not so much a ceremony of self-congratulation for a decade of past performance as an earnest of still other decades of good and useful work to come.

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No Foreign Dissem

*Inevitable and some perhaps remediable
lags in the highest-priority scientific
intelligence.*

INTERACTION IN WEAPONS R&D

David S. Brandwein¹

Intelligence may be thought of as having two missions in relation to military planning and weapon system development. The primary mission is to provide information on the weapon systems of potential enemies so that counterweapons may be developed. That is, if we can gather valid and timely intelligence for projections of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the opponent's military systems, we can develop weapons capable of penetrating his defense and blunting his offense. A secondary mission is to furnish information on the foreign development of weapon system components which parallel our own designs. Here, the objective is to take advantage of their R&D to produce better weapons for ourselves, thus gaining time and reducing our own development costs.

In what follows I will examine the way these intelligence missions are accomplished, primarily in the field of strategic attack and defense systems, and how the results affect U.S. research and development. I will try to point out the difficulties in generating satisfactory intelligence hypotheses on the basis of thin data, validating them by independent checkout on the part of the several analytic groups involved, and then feeding them back to the R&D community, difficulties which make the process less than ideally effective. A few illustrative case histories will show just how it has or has not worked well and suggest where it might be tinkered with.

Time and Pride

The problem is time. Too much time is usually consumed in generating and validating intelligence on weapon R&D to feed it back into U.S. planning effectively. True, the weapon-counterweapon process is a sequential one, so that limited time lags in the feedback loop can be

¹ Adapted from the author's presentation before the September 1966 Intelligence Methods Conference

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Weapons R&D

tolerated. Intelligence output, however, is usually much too late to cause the initiation of counterweapon developmental programs or to affect them directly at their initiation. While it may be frustrating to proponents of so-called interaction analyses, a look at the decision dates for some of our existing systems proves that almost all strategic counterweapons reflect recent advances in the state of the art rather than reaction to a specific opposing system. They are designed basically against hypothetical threats founded upon broad assumptions as to the capabilities of the adversary. Intelligence findings are more likely to be used to refine developmental programs already well under way, or sometimes as grounds for eliminating alternative lines of development previously undertaken to "cover all bets."

With respect to the secondary intelligence objective, our parallel weapons development program has benefited only to a trivial extent from intelligence because of the truly crippling effect of the time lag coupled with a fundamental human barrier—"Thanks, but we are doing it better." Generally, two systems being developed in parallel by two countries, given about equal capabilities in both, are likely to mature at the same rate. By the time Country A has discovered that some feature of Country B's system is superior to the corresponding one in its own, it has paid out its development money and concludes that it cannot make changes. Convincing researchers that someone else has solved a problem in a better way is not easy; there is frequently the necessity to overcome an inborn chauvinism, or at least pride of invention, which blunts the feedback mechanism.

Collection Difficulties

The first problem is to collect the intelligence. Ideally, we would like to know as soon as research and development starts on a new weapon system. The fact is, however, that information is inadequate on Soviet military R&D programs and almost totally nonexistent on Communist Chinese programs. While general information showing large increases in Soviet technical capability is available, as well as evidence of an expanding scope of military R&D, specifics are too fragmentary to allow a precise definition of the future threat. Basic research can be followed in some detail through analysis of scientific papers published in the technical journals, but the possible final uses of the research in terms of weapon systems are many and nonspecific, and only trends can be detected. The end result is a lack of sufficient accurate intelligence on R&D projects in their early stages.

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In the face of these uncertainties, we usually credit the Soviets with the ability to solve many scientific or technological problems without specific evidence of this ability. This may often be reasonable; the Soviets have the advantage of getting much information on Western advances, and their progress may well parallel ours in many instances. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to estimate greater Soviet progress as the West becomes more certain of success in the solution of corresponding scientific problems. Our assessments of the status of specific R&D programs thus may be uncertain in the near term and increasingly tenuous as estimates are projected into the future. The loss of lead time for U.S. planning of counterweapon development and an inability to present unanticipated alternatives to the U.S. R&D community is a serious consequence of these perpetual intelligence problems.

Once the adversary has made a decision to capitalize on the results of basic research and build a specific new weapon system, he goes underground with the entire process of preliminary design, laboratory test, and prototype construction up to flight (or other equivalent final) test, which is therefore secure from most forms of intelligence collection. Indeed, a study of the technical literature to see when reporting on some particular area of basic research suddenly stops is advocated as a way of learning that a military development program has been started in that area. Proving an exclusion theorem is always a difficult matter, however, and even its proof would hardly be a clear signal as to exactly what was going on.

In the development of some key weapons the final flight test phase is open to intelligence collection, but this is likely to take place three to five years after the start of preliminary design. This is the lag for long-range ballistic missiles and space systems. ABM systems, on the other hand, could well be flight-tested over a period of years without our knowledge.

Analysis, Consensus, Feedback

Let us assume that in spite of these difficulties we have finally collected a body of raw data on a new weapon system. The next step, the analysis of the data, is likely to consume a large amount of time because it is a difficult process. This is particularly true when the opponent has developed a system fundamentally different from our home-grown variety. There is generally a lack of background data for the intelligence findings and a reluctance on the part of

analysts and consultants to accept the idea that someone else was able to solve the problem differently from our solution. A short-circuit sometimes removes this obstacle when actual hardware is collected, but unfortunately this happens only very rarely, and when it does it seldom involves a major weapons system.

After the analytic efforts seem to have generated satisfactory hypothetical conclusions, we still need to validate these by having independent researchers check them out. The intelligence community needs to reach a consensus on their validity. Different analysts working separately on the same data are quite likely to come up with differing answers, particularly when the data base is thin to begin with. While we would all probably agree on the desirability of having more than a single individual or a single group take a crack at the problem, we would also hope that they communicate with each other at frequent intervals. I am encouraged by what seems to be a better rapport nowadays among the various analytical groups in the community and a greater speed in coming to an agreed conclusion than heretofore. Even so, the validation process still takes a significant length of time, in some instances as long or longer than the analysis process itself.

Now let us engage the problem of feedback. There are many channels through which this takes place. The CIA and DIA put out reports and estimates to consumers on a regular basis, many of which contain details of weapon system developments. These agencies also routinely brief officials in Defense, NASA, the Bureau of the Budget, and the White House, along with many other decision-making elements of the government. There are a number of key members of the scientific establishment, both industrial and academic, who participate in a variety of government-sponsored panels and committees and receive intelligence briefings in their fields of cognizance. These people, however, are at the policy and top management level; it is likely that little direct intelligence-derived guidance filters through them to the laboratories.

Security restrictions inhibit wide dissemination of intelligence down to the scientists and engineers at the design level, but perhaps little is lost, as the briefings at the policy level are seldom detailed. They are usually condensed to a point that a consumer would have difficulty detecting, say, a significant breakthrough in the development of a subsystem. For instance, we are prone to tell policy-level audiences that a missile has a particular accuracy but are less likely to tell them

why. Finally, even if we could get around the security restrictions in our contacts with industry, we still need to be circumspect. In our capitalistic society we lay ourselves open to severe criticism if we provide information to industry in a way that gives one company a competitive advantage over others.

Case History: ICBM Guidance

Having reached the end of the process thus still beset with difficulties, I would now like to summarize briefly some case histories which illustrate them. The first one is of parallel development work in the United States and the USSR on the same problem, the guidance system for an ICBM.

Solving this problem is one of the most difficult ingredients of an ICBM development program. It is clear now that we and the Soviets started in parallel, in about 1955, and arrived at strikingly different solutions. The U.S. systems use a simple rocket engine operating at a fixed thrust but couple with this a very complex guidance system containing an airborne digital computer. During powered flight the guidance system continuously computes the proper burnout position for the rocket so that the warhead will impact acceptably close to the target. The Soviets, on the other hand, fly their missiles on a pre-calculated trajectory with a somewhat more elaborate variable-thrust engine but a very much simpler guidance system having virtually no on-board computation capability.

Both systems work fine; but we would probably now admit that the advantages inherent in the Soviet system, simplicity and quick achievement of satisfactory reliability, would have been very appealing to us had we considered such a system during the design phase. The fact is that we did not begin to collect useful flight test data on the Soviet system until 1959, that we did not really perform enough analysis work to understand it until 1963, and that the results of this analysis did not begin to be disseminated outside the intelligence community until 1965. By this time, of course, the U.S. ICBM guidance design had long since been completed. It may be said in all candor that this particular intelligence program had no effect at all on parallel systems at home.

An interesting sidelight illustrative of our problems is that analysis of one aspect of the Soviet data showed that whereas all U.S. missiles use rate gyros or angular accelerometers to keep the control system

stable, the Soviets devised a much simpler system that dispenses with these fragile and expensive instruments. The analyst who made this determination was successful in getting a Soviet-style system incorporated into a proposal to NASA for a new launch vehicle—only to have the feature rejected by that agency with the comment that although the scheme looked quite feasible, there hadn't been enough test experience to justify its adoption. The NASA people were not aware of the fact that the Soviets had been testing it for many years because they had never received feedback in the detail required and at the right level in their organization.

ABM Radar

An interesting case history in the weapon-counterweapon field is the intelligence analysis of a large Soviet radar and its effect on the U.S. program for developing penetration aids. When thought first turned in the United States to the problem of penetrating Soviet radar defenses with ICBM warheads, there immediately arose the question of the operating characteristics of these radars. About the only contribution intelligence could make were some excellent U-2 photographs taken in 1960 of some very large radars in the Sary Shagan area which seemed to be logical candidates for the role of spotting ballistic missiles as ABM targets.

Unfortunately, deriving a radar's characteristics from a photograph of it is rather difficult. Various analytical groups looking at the same photos came up with different answers. The consensus seemed to be that the largest radar—nicknamed Hen House—was the keystone of the defensive system, and that it would operate in a UHF frequency band, at about 1,000 MHz; after all, our developers were working on radars in the 1,000-2,000 MHz region in our equivalent programs at the time. This was the word that went out to U.S. agencies engaged in devising penetration schemes.

Then in 1962 the Russians tested some nuclear warheads at high altitudes in the Sary Shagan region. Nature was kind, and we received radar signals reflected from the ionized cloud. These included a new train of signals in the much lower VHF band, which it soon developed must have come from a very high-power radar in the Sary Shagan area.

For a long time, however, there was a singular lack of interest in the peculiarity of these signals. It may be that too many analysts had

already decided that the Hen House frequency would be much higher. It seems they had convinced themselves that there was no merit in a long-range radar operating at VHF because such a radar would be blacked out by a nuclear cloud. Nevertheless, analysis efforts did go forward, and two things became increasingly clear: first, the VHF signal characteristics were such as to prove that they could have emanated only from a radar with the physical dimensions and orientation of Hen House; and second, that our work on nuclear blackout effects was based on tests in the tropics, whereas the Soviets were likely to deploy radars such as these in the Arctic, where the blackout problem was not nearly so severe.²

A final impediment to the fast functioning of the system was the fact that the validation step took an unconscionably long time. Although by late 1964 most of the various analytical groups had arrived at the correct solution, there was one that was still unconvinced, and its opposition prevented the firm feedback of this information to the R&D community. As a result, another two years went by before the message got back to the laboratories in an effective way.

We are now finally on the tracks. A serious review of our offensive capabilities against VHF radars is now under way. A VHF radar has been built at White Sands to allow us to see what the Soviet radars will see. Our own Nike ABM program is at the same time looking at ways of using VHF radars for our defensive systems. However, I would not begin to estimate the millions of dollars which could have been saved by a more speedy functioning of the intelligence process.

Outlook

To recapitulate, I have presented so far a rather pessimistic picture of our capability to influence weapons research and development, and I have given two examples illustrating how the long times needed to collect, analyze, validate, and feed back information serve to make our efforts ineffective. Ideally, this would now be the proper place to unveil a blueprint for the future, in which clear solutions to these problems are presented.

I have no such blueprint. I know of no way to collect intelligence on weapon systems at the early R&D phase except by clandestine deep

² For a more detailed account of this case history see the next following article in this issue.

penetrations of the adversary's laboratories and design bureaus. Those responsible for clandestine operations know this as well as we on the technical side do, and presumably they are doing the best they can. Similarly, I see no easy way of speeding up the analysis process. Massive infusions of people or computing machines are not likely to expedite the process. Key analytic breakthroughs will generally come from the application of brainpower by a few gifted and dedicated individuals working at their own pace.

The last two steps in the process, validation and feedback, seem to me to be the places where we should focus our attention. The effectiveness of these steps depends wholly on how we structure the setup so as to allow people to communicate and interact with one another. Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at the mechanisms by which intelligence information is provided to researchers, particularly in the final phases. This, it seems to me, is an area where no new inventions are required, no multimillion dollar expenditures are called for, and yet where there is promise both of improving our defensive and offensive capabilities and of saving millions of dollars.

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Snatches of Elint, together with a few facts and a lot of logic, silhouette an embryo antimissile system.

FORETESTING A SOVIET ABM SYSTEM

Edward Taus ¹

The summary presentation of this particular case history in inductive analysis will show how a slim amount of data may give a basis for determining the general characteristics and net capabilities of a new Soviet system before the Soviets themselves have a firm prototype of it. Such an accomplishment would not be noteworthy when U.S. R&D has already broken trail along the line of development in question, but when it is the USSR that is doing the pioneering it is much more controversial and difficult to foresee the outcome. The advantages of doing so, of course, are that it gives the U.S. developers a critical lead time in which to take countermeasures and a basis for objective planning—no small matters in the race toward Armageddon.

Apparent Soviet Anomalies

At first the theory of ICBM interception called for destruction of the incoming missile as far away as possible, while it was still outside the atmosphere. Then the development of chaff and decoys in increasing numbers and complexity led to a need for waiting until the atmospheric drag on reentry provided a way to distinguish the real warhead from the false images. Endo-atmospheric interception thus became firm U.S. doctrine, absorbing an enormous investment in the development of terminal defense radars, exotic computers, new high-performance missiles, and solutions for the complex problems of reentry physics. For it was natural to assume that the Soviet defense system would be based on similar endo-atmospheric reasoning, in fact would be a mirror image of our own. In consequence, U.S. ICBMs were designed to reenter and penetrate the

¹The author, who suffered a fatal heart attack a few weeks after submitting this manuscript, had devoted most of his last years to the work therein described. His thesis has aroused considerable dissent in the intelligence community, and reasoned counterargument is invited.

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Soviet ABM System

atmosphere as rapidly as possible, leaving a minimum of time after target discrimination for the enemy's anti-ballistic-missiles to reach them.

In the fall of 1961 and 1962, however, the Soviets performed *exo-atmospheric* nuclear experiments at their ABM research center near Sary Shagan. There were never any atmospheric tests there. U.S. intelligence had been aware of two new research radars, code-named Hen House and Hen Roost, at Sary Shagan, but the first signals from either were intercepted only when some Hen House pulses were reflected from the ionized cloud generated by a nuclear explosion during these tests.

The intercepted Hen House signals had peculiar characteristics. Most notably, their carrier frequencies were in the VHF range, a very *low* frequency relative to the L and S bands normally used for U.S. long-range radars. The Soviets had other VHF radars, for example the newly deployed Tall Kings for early antiaircraft warning; but the Hen House signals turned out to have much more information content than is needed for mere early warning. For ABM use the low frequency should have serious disadvantages, not only in tracking ICBMs but even in their early detection. Theoretically, uncertainties in propagation, both in the lower troposphere near the earth and in penetrating the ionosphere to the target vehicle, might create such errors in measurement as were thought to render VHF quite unsuitable for U.S. tracking applications. Furthermore, it might be presumed that any nuclear explosion in the radar path would blind a VHF system.

The longer wavelength does have its own virtues, however. It is harder to jam or deceive with decoys, and it makes for a cheaper system. It would maximize the radar cross-section of target U.S. ICBMs. Such a system would be a natural extrapolation from previous Soviet radar technology. The logical interpretation of the Sary Shagan tests was that the Soviets were in fact exploring the feasibility of a new *exo-atmospheric* intercept system, using VHF radar, in defiance of our *endo-atmospheric* doctrine.

Postulated Soviet System

In 1963 the U.S. Army's missile electronic warfare organization at White Sands, under the stimulation of inductive argument from a CIA liaison officer (this reporter), became convinced that Soviet researchers had found, or were finding, ways to get around the diffi-

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culties both of exo-atmospheric target discrimination and of VHF radar in ABM systems. Late that year, at about the same time that a "probable Hen House" signal from Sary Shagan was first intercepted via moon bounce,² an Army contract was signed with Data Dynamics, Inc., to study the potential of a broadly-postulated exo-atmospheric-kill ABM system based on such a radar. The contractor was given intelligence support from both White Sands and CIA.

The Hen House proved to be a large planar array of emitting elements scanning electronically and having extremely high transmitted power. Not only its peak power but also its average power was extraordinarily high, with a capability for a very high data rate. Such a radar may be called range-dominant, in that it measures range more accurately than azimuth or altitude. It had to be assumed that the Soviets were not trying to develop it for continuous tracking of ICBMs from the point of detection on the horizon to the point of interdiction; at high look angles in a wartime nuclear environment a VHF blackout would be virtually certain. The Hen House would have to get its position-prediction data quickly at long range, near the horizon, and that would be the reason for its high power and data rate.

At maximum range, however, it was calculated that no single range-dominant radar could determine target positions with sufficient accuracy. Measurements of altitude, in particular, circumscribed by the limited vertical dimension of the planar array, could not be made fine enough. To make the postulated system credible one had to assume a Soviet solution for this inadequacy, and one solution might be the operation of several radars from different locations against the same targets to pinpoint them by the intersection of their fixes, a sort of continuous triangulation. This would require reliable instantaneous communication among the several locations, along with computers to correlate in real time the multiple reception of target-reflected signals; and the Soviets had in fact installed microwave facilities at Sary Shagan as though possibly in fulfillment of this need.

A modification of the multiple-radar system so conceived would avoid the obviously inordinate expense of a large number of high-performance instruments like Hen House: several distant receivers could be grouped with each Hen House transmitter, all interlocked by real-time communications. (For experimental purposes the Soviets

² See Frank Eliot's "Moon Bounce Elint" in *Studies XI 2*, p. 59 ff.

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Soviet ABM System

could use the deployed Tall Kings as receiving sites in order to check out the feasibility of this idea.) Such a multistatic radar system would have distinct advantages against the enemy's electronic countermeasures because of the difficulty of targeting the widely dispersed receivers. This model of an ABM radar system requires a reasonably high level of sophistication in processing data for long-range prediction, but one not inconsonant with known Soviet capabilities. The important thing was that the range-dominant system model could be simulated and legitimately exercised to investigate its potentials and general vulnerabilities, even if the Soviets would not in the final analysis construct it to operate in quite this manner.

Evaluation

From these basic postulates the contractor, who had earlier done work for the Air Force on the prediction of future positions for orbital vehicles, developed the technical details and worked out the complex equations for the multistatic system. The mathematical simulations showed that such a system could have an accuracy in average target location within one nautical mile. Maximum effective range from the transmitter could be increased, say from 600 n.m. to more than 1,000 n.m., by forward location of the receivers. Though not invulnerable, the VHF radar was in many ways not so vulnerable as conventional systems. The enemy would have difficulty in horizon-to-horizon electronic jamming of a dispersed-receiver system, and requirements for high jammer power in the VHF frequency region would exact weight and size penalties. VHF chaff dipoles, to be effective, would have to be more than 40 inches in length and relatively heavy. The radar might not even register small objects, greatly easing the problem of target discrimination.

Blackout from nuclear explosions in the radar path could be to some degree avoided by locating at least the receivers well to the side of likely ICBM targets. Enemy interference with the radar by a nuclear detonation at a conjugate point on the earth's magnetic lines of force would not be possible across the Arctic horizon. The prognosticated degradation of the beam from low-angle anomalies turned out not to be prohibitive at long range. The powerful VHF beam may even have the advantage of a "knife edge" effect, curving over the horizon for useful increases in unambiguous range. The USSR seemed to be about ten years ahead of the United States in developing such a VHF-oriented system, and it was reasonable to as-

sume that their optimization of it through experimental development might be even better than any model we could conceptually imagine.

A partial answer to the problem of discriminating between warheads and decoys before reentry could be to design the ABM warhead to be effective, exo-atmospherically, against whole swarms of incoming targets, say by making its yield large enough to kill ICBMs at great distances. Was it the Soviet premise that the problem of decoys is not a serious one if the ABM warhead has a large enough lethal radius? The intelligence-based postulate of a Soviet system which encompassed this possibility appeared to have been vindicated on 7 November 1964 by the revelation of the large Soviet Galosh missile, which appeared capable of carrying a megaton-range warhead to fire at exo-atmospheric altitudes.


Prospects

Even if the Soviets had withheld the parading of the Galosh, it had been possible as early as the spring of 1964 to have, in the contracted study, a basis for ignoring the implications of their display, on 7 November 1963, of the aerodynamically-designed Griffon missile which did not fit the requirement for a long-range, high-altitude ABM. By that spring it had been possible to formulate computer sub-routines by which the contractor could continuously update simulated long-range Soviet ABM systems on the basis of the latest intelligence data. In mid-1964 operational and planned U.S. attack models were "flown" (by the same contractor under different sponsorship) against the defensive model in mathematical simulation for purposes of net evaluation.

Such very early postulation and analysis on the basis of scant data, something of a rarity in the intelligence community, may be viewed as a likely necessity now, at least in the electronic warfare field, to provide objective grounds for developmental decisions. In this case, recognition of the feasibility of an ABM system using VHF radars established a need for electronic countermeasures in the VHF region and was followed by formal military requirements for new chaff and decoys, for high-powered jamming tubes with new long-term fuel and power supplies, and for horizon-to-horizon antenna pattern developments. It led the White Sands missile electronic warfare organization to build the first VHF measurements radar in the United States. And the projection of a possible exo-atmospheric, area-kill ABM system which the Soviets could deploy in conjunction with their de-

ployment of a "finite deterrent" ICBM system aided in advance recognition of a potential strategic threat against the United States.

The U.S.-USSR R&D contest, hopefully, will get beyond the ABM-ICBM confrontation. The posture of all military, naval, air, and space forces will feel the impact of new strategic modes in which electronic warfare and net evaluations are controlling factors. The moral of this case history is that countermeasures and counter-countermeasures must keep pace in real time with the development of the opponent's threat. In order to achieve this, the intelligence community must commit itself, as indicated in the accompanying diagram, to designating the broad parameters of a threat at the earliest possible time. Research and Development must then use these broad parameters to initiate immediately the development of generally necessary counter-components and so at least move in the direction of readiness for the future threat. It is not necessary to foresee just how the enemy will optimize his developmental designs, to flesh out our model in ultimate detail, or to obtain community agreement on all the refinements in order to institute these timely measures.



INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR TIMELY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

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*Some lessons from case
histories of misjudgment
in the NIEs.*

HOW THREE ESTIMATES WENT WRONG

Willard C. Matthias

The procedure by which National Intelligence Estimates are prepared is designed to ensure that those responsible for policy decisions receive an agreed intelligence judgment (or a carefully delineated disagreement) based upon the best information and most thorough review possible. But the procedures only provide the framework within which people function, and the estimates are only as good as they are made by those who operate the machinery.

The Estimative Process

In this machinery the Board of National Estimates plays the most important managerial and intellectual role. The draft of the estimate is prepared by the Estimates Staff under the Board's direction; it is discussed with representatives of the USIB agencies and CIA components under the chairmanship of a Board member; and it is presented by this Board member to the USIB. The Staff member who prepares the initial draft also plays an important part: he is more familiar with the information than most Board members are, and if he is a skillful writer and convincing defender of his views he puts an ineradicable stamp on the estimate. The Board chairman—particularly if he has had a long familiarity with the subject and is temperamentally inclined to play a leading role—will likewise put a strong stamp on it.

Nevertheless, it is the Board as a corporate entity which bears responsibility to the DCI for the form and substance of the estimates. It is *his* Board, an instrument to formulate his views and to take account for him of the information and judgments applicable to the subject in question. While he personally may rely upon some Board members more than others, in his official capacity he must have a Board sufficiently competent and balanced in composition and experience that he can be confident that all significant aspects of the subject have been weighed judiciously.

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Three Estimates

One cannot generalize about the method or technique Board members use in arriving at estimative judgments. Each estimative situation is unique, and the estimator must lean upon a variety of supports: the amount and persuasiveness of the evidence; the methods of analysis used by the contributors; the judgment of others in whom he has special confidence, whether because of their study, experience, or sharpness of mind; his own background in the subject; and, for want of a better word, his hunches.

By dictionary definition a hunch is a feeling or suspicion not based upon evidence but upon premonition. I do not believe in premonitions, but I admit of the hunch in some sense. It must be compounded of something—a sense of the logic of a situation, a ring of authenticity in certain evidence, an uneasiness because some factor in a situation is unexplained or *prima facie* unexplainable, a sense of the general weight of evidence though no individual piece of it is sufficiently persuasive, a feeling that some leader or group is likely to act in a certain way because of emotional or ideological predilections, however irrational or illogical the course. Such factors enter in most frequently when there is no solid factual base for conclusions or when the evidence is contradictory. A most notable case of correct hunch occurred in 1962, when Director John McCone kept worrying the possibility that the Soviets might put strategic missiles into Cuba despite the absence of reliable evidence to this effect and despite his Board's judgment that they would not do anything so foolish.

In some ways the estimative job is easier than it was ten or fifteen years ago. We have, for example, much more and better evidence on many aspects of Soviet military capabilities than we did then; collection methods have improved and analytical skills developed. But there are still many problems which strain the estimator's capacity. Some which cause the severest trouble are those predicting likely courses of events (a) in unstable areas or situations of tension, (b) in situations where the strengths of competing forces appear evenly balanced or are difficult to assess, and (c) where the evidence is contradictory, often through deliberate deception. In each of these types of problems the Board of National Estimates has made misjudgments in which this estimator has participated. I would like to describe as best I can recall how three estimates over which I presided came to render—if not explicitly, at least implicitly—judgments that were wrong.

Arab-Israeli Tensions

Estimates of future developments in category *a*, in situations of instability or tension, are both the most challenging and the most discouraging kind. The first reaction is that one is being asked to do the impossible, yet this kind of task can be the most rewarding if done successfully (and although I speak here of a failure, it often is done successfully). Actually, it *is* impossible to predict the course of events; but one can describe how the parties involved apparently think about a situation, how they have so far acted toward it, and how they might act toward hypothetical changes. The case I have in mind is that of an estimate entitled "The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Current Phase," published 13 April 1967.

This estimate was undertaken in the context of an increase in tensions in the Palestine dispute and in the wake of an Israeli raid on Samu in Jordan in late 1966 which shook the monarchy in Amman. These developments raised the question of whether the *modus vivendi* that had prevailed between Israel and its Arab neighbors since 1957 was coming to an end. Most of what the estimate said was right:

- a. Rivalries and disputes among the Arabs reduce their chances of doing anything significant about their quarrel with Israel; these rivalries also create some danger of precipitating crises from which large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop.
- b. The Israelis seem likely to continue existing policies, including occasional retaliatory action; they would resort to force on a large scale only if they felt their security seriously endangered.
- c. [The Israelis] could best any one of their neighbors and probably all of them collectively. Arab cooperation being what it is, Israel probably would not be obliged to take them on all at once.
- d. The Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Arab-Israeli dispute as promoting their interests. . . . But the Soviets do not want an outbreak of large-scale conflict in the area, since this would carry serious risk of a US-Soviet confrontation and thus threaten the positions which the Soviets have already won in the area.

But the estimate had one final conclusion which, though it was technically correct, conveyed a sense of reassurance and was, in light of the events of May and June 1967, misleading.

Although periods of increased tension in the Arab-Israeli dispute will occur from time to time, both sides appear to appreciate that large-scale military action involves considerable risk and no assurance of leading to a solution. In any event, the chances are good that the threat of great power intervention will prevent an attempt by either side to resolve the problem by military force.

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Three Estimates

I say that this last conclusion was technically correct because the Six Day War was not an attempt to "resolve" the Arab-Israeli problem by military force. It fits under the rubric of the conclusion (see *a* above) that rivalries among the Arabs created the danger of "precipitating crises from which large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop" and that (in *d* above) "the Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Arab-Israeli dispute as promoting their interests." A review of the available information shows that the Soviets had a role in precipitating the crisis by passing intelligence information about Israeli plans for a punitive expedition against Syria to the Syrians and Egyptians. Nasser, who had been accused in the past by his Arab rivals of hiding behind the skirts of the UN, this time sought to avoid the charge. His mobilization and the events which followed then led the Israeli leaders to conclude that their security was "seriously endangered" (*b* above). Quite clearly, both the Soviets and the Egyptians made some miscalculations about the consequences of their actions.

One can thus exculpate oneself by this kind of textual exegesis. But there was in the estimate a serious lacuna: we did not sufficiently treat the possibilities arising out of terrorist activities, border raids, troop movements, propaganda, political warfare, and the psychological effects of these in Israel and the Arab world. Had we understood these better, we should have ended the estimate by noting the danger that they could lead to an explosion rather than asserting the unlikelihood of a deliberate resort to force.

Why did we make this error? I think we were under two misapprehensions. The first was that we overestimated the Soviets' good sense, something we have done before (e.g., when the question was whether they would deploy missiles to Cuba, in 1962). It is, I think, a safe judgment that if the Soviets had thought in mid-May what they knew on 5 June, they would have kept that provocative intelligence information to themselves. The moral is that how the Soviets may think about a particular area and what they may do tactically may not be entirely consistent. We as estimators must recognize more frequently (as we often do in observing the tactical moves of governments regarding which we have more complete knowledge) that specific actions taken by the agents of a government do not always flow from the general policy objectives or posture of the leadership.

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The other misapprehension, I believe, was a failure to keep up with dynamic aspects of Near East politics. We did not realize how much more confident in themselves both the Israelis and Egyptians had become. We did not therefore realize how much lower was the threshold of Nasser's readiness to expose himself to danger, and how much lower was the threshold of Israel's readiness to fight against creeping threats to its existence. I cannot say whether this was a failure in intelligence reporting or in analysis; I suspect it was a bit of both. U.S. personnel abroad are often too much absorbed in the day-to-day business of their operations to detect a growing change of mood; analysts in Washington are too often cynically prone to think their foreign charges are the same feckless (or scheming) fellows they always were and that nothing much changes. I, for one, am prepared to be a bit more cynical myself about area specialists.

Prospects in Vietnam

The estimate illustrating misjudgment in category *b*, when the strengths of competing forces appear to be evenly balanced or are difficult to assess, is one which had a long and tortuous history. Initiated in October 1962, it was finally cleared by the USIB only in April 1963; it was entitled "Prospects in South Vietnam." At that time Diem was still president of South Vietnam and Madame Nhu was riding high. The U.S. commitment was still in the form of advisers and logistical support. The estimate was to assess how things were going, what problems there were, what the prospects were. I will not examine here all the conclusions of the paper, but only its general statements about how the war was going and what the prospects were for South Vietnam in the kind of struggle that was going on then. I quote from some of the conclusions of the draft finally approved by the USIB:

a. We believe Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt.

b. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily. . . . However, we do not believe that it is possible at this time to project the future of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war is in sight. . . .

c. Developments during the last year or two also show some promise of resolving the political weaknesses, particularly that of insecurity in the countryside, upon which the insurgency has fed. However, the government's capacity to translate military success into lasting political stability is questionable.

The estimate thus rang no tocsin. To put it in simpler language: things are not going to hell; we don't know how it will all come out, but the South Vietnamese are not doing so badly; Diem is improving, he might win the military struggle, though even if he does, don't think the political troubles of South Vietnam will be over. Half a year later Diem was ousted, and the political and military situation degenerated to critical proportions by the end of 1964. What made the estimate so wrong?

In this case the draft originally prepared by the Estimates Staff was essentially correct, but it was fatally weakened during the process of review and coordination. This was a long and painful process for me as chairman, since I had helped the Staff prepare this draft. Let me quote some of the original conclusions, *c* below being the final one:

a. There is no satisfactory objective means of determining how the war is going. The increased US involvement has apparently enabled the South Vietnamese regime to check Communist progress and perhaps even to improve the situation in some areas; however, it is impossible to say whether the tide is running one way or the other . . .

b. On the South Vietnamese side, new strategic concepts, such as the fortified hamlet, and shifts in military and security organization, training, and tactics have strengthened the counter-guerrilla effort. However, very great weaknesses remain and will be difficult to surmount. Among these are lack of aggressive and firm leadership at all levels of command, poor morale among the troops, lack of trust between peasant and soldier, poor tactical use of available forces, a very inadequate intelligence system, and obvious Communist penetration of the South Vietnamese military organization.

c. The struggle in South Vietnam at best will be protracted and costly. The Communists are determined to win control, and the South Vietnamese alone lack the present capacity to prevent their own eventual destruction. Containment of the Communists and reestablishment of a modicum of security in the countryside might be possible with great US effort in the present political context of South Vietnam, but substantial progress toward Vietnamese self-dependence cannot occur unless there are radical changes in the methods and personnel of the South Vietnamese Government. Even should these take place without mishap, this would only be a beginning; the Communists retain capabilities and support which will require years of constructive effort to dissipate.

Some of the process of dilution began in the Board itself. The Board did not change the main thrust of the paper, or alter essentially

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the wording of the conclusions cited in *a* and *b* above. But it did eliminate some of the prescient words both from the text and from the final conclusions cited in *c*. The final conclusion now read simply:

With US help, the South Vietnamese regime stands a good chance of at least containing the Communists militarily. However, the *modus operandi* of the Diem government, and particularly its measures to prevent the rise of contenders for political power, have reduced the government's effectiveness, both politically and militarily. We believe that unless radical changes are made in these methods of government, there is little hope that the US involvement can be substantially curtailed or that there will be a material and lasting reduction in the Communist threat.

The serious weakness of this change was that it shifted the emphasis from the inherent difficulty and long-term character of the problem (to which Diem contributed) to an indictment of the Diem regime. This led us into trouble at the coordination meeting with departmental representatives.

Some of the military representatives at the coordination meeting had served in South Vietnam and had been appalled at the South Vietnamese military performance. The emphasis in the paper on political weaknesses as a major cause of the military failures quite naturally appealed to their professional instincts as well as confirmed their own observations. The indictment of the Diem regime, however, no doubt because it called into question the existing U.S. policy of working with Diem, caused the State Department representative to reserve his position on this aspect of the paper. He also thought the estimate underestimated the prospects for gains through an improved military effort, although we had gone so far as to say, "With US help, South Vietnam stands a good chance of at least containing the Communists militarily."

Thus the DCI and the USIB members were presented with a paper which, although the Estimates Board had eliminated reference to the gloomy long-term prospects, was still a fairly dolorous document. But it was encumbered with a departmental reservation, and this obliged the USIB to look at it carefully. The DCI, then John McCone, was particularly uneasy about it, since it seemed to contradict the more optimistic judgments reached by those in policy circles who had been sent to Vietnam to make on-the-spot appraisals and recommendations. He therefore decided to postpone USIB consideration and asked the Board of National Estimates to consult with some of those who had been on such missions. The Board proceeded

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to meet with two high-ranking military officers and two civilians in key policy-making positions.

None of these four consultations was particularly helpful. The witnesses seemed reluctant to make a frontal assault on the judgments of the paper but equally reluctant to endorse it. They showed a general tendency to take issue with a particular sentence purporting to state a fact, rather than an estimative judgment. This or that was "too pessimistic," but there was no clear line of argument why. All four held forth some degree of optimism, largely based upon the belief that things were better than they had been. This indeed may have been true, but it was not established how badly things had been going before or how this degree of improvement stood up to the task, namely to deal with a determined and resourceful opponent who was immeasurably helped by the profound underlying political weaknesses of South Vietnam. None of the consultants was attempting to mislead, but the simple fact was that each of them in some way and to some degree was committed to the existing U.S. policy, and none of them was intellectually free at that point or in those circumstances to stand back and look at the situation in its broadest aspects.

The drafters then returned to their desks and prepared a revised draft. The Staff members, although increasingly weary of the controversy, were nevertheless much inclined to stick to their guns. I, however, had become inclined to shade the estimate in a more optimistic direction. I began to think that perhaps we had been too gloomy; and at the same time I had to get an estimate through to meet the DCI's new deadline. If we stuck to the original draft, the DCI and other CIA components might not go along with it; even if they did, this draft might now evoke still greater departmental dissent than it had the first time (since high-ranking personnel had now become engaged); in short, if we were so rigid that we invited debate and amendment at the USIB, we might find ourselves with a paper more offensive to our judgment than one which moved slightly toward a less pessimistic view. What we now wrote, in spite of some staff objection, embodied approximately the conclusion first cited above. The estimate rode easily through the USIB with the DCI's full concurrence.

Even so, this estimate was not calculated to give anyone a sense of comfort. Indeed, very recently a senior official closely associated with Vietnamese affairs, who had most likely seen only the finished

product, remarked that it was too bad policy-makers had not paid more attention to it. Nevertheless, it did not sound the alarm which it should have and would have if the first draft conclusions had been kept intact. A year or so after the date of the estimate, Mr. McCone openly expressed regret for his own part in weakening what had been "right the first time."

The lesson provided by this experience is to shun the advice of those who in one way or another are committed to or responsible for a particular line of policy. They are no doubt well informed, but it is also theirs to be hopeful. Above all, their responsibility is to their policy-making chiefs, and they can hardly be expected to recite before an intelligence working group information or beliefs which implicitly or explicitly might suggest that established policy is based upon unsound premises. Study of the premises of national policy is the business of intelligence officers, and it is as unfair to ask the executors of policy to testify on the soundness of those premises as it is unwise to accord their views uncritical acceptance.

The Goa Invasion

The estimate that illustrates the difficulty of forecasting in category *c*—when the evidence is contradictory, perhaps because of deliberate deception—was not very important in terms of its policy impact; its conclusion was so equivocal that it provided the warning needed. It was, however, wrong, and I who chaired it was among those who thought it wrong at the time. It was a crash estimate, requested on the morning of December 12, 1961 and approved by the USIB on the afternoon of the following day, concerning the likelihood of an Indian attack upon Goa. During the preceding few weeks Indian troops had been concentrating in the Goa area, public opinion—especially on the left—was clamoring for action, and a strong momentum in favor of invasion had developed. Yet the evidence was conflicting, and it was possible that these activities were designed purely to apply pressure and to bring about the incorporation of Goa into India by peaceful means.

We thought that Nehru had not made up his mind and was being subjected to contradictory pressures. We concluded:

Clearly there is strong evidence pointing to an invasion—the military and political preparations have gone so far as to be difficult to reverse without some loss of prestige to the Indian government. Although the Indians perhaps still hope that their warlike activities will extract concessions from the Por-

Portuguese, we doubt that the Lisbon Government will move far enough—if at all—to meet Indian requirements. However, relying chiefly on our judgment of what Nehru conceives to be India's basic interests and our assessment of his past behavior, we believe that the chances of a direct military invasion are still about even.

Five days after this estimate was approved the Indians seized Goa by military force.

The formulation in the final estimate was close to that of the staff draft. In a post-invasion memorandum to the Chairman of the Estimates Board, the head of the Near East Staff stated that initially he and his colleagues had rated the chances as less than even, "relying mainly on Nehru's restraint in previous crises over Goa and their estimate of his attitudes, objectives, and ability to control developments," and that he had learned through informal contacts that the State Department people went even further, calling the odds "considerably less than even." Nevertheless, impressed by the evidence of advancing preparations, the Staff was uncertain enough to qualify the chances as only "slightly less than even."

The Estimates Board members, in their review, agreed generally with the experts. It was difficult for me, as chairman, to dissent; but I was impressed more by the evidence of preparations than by the history of Nehru's political attitudes. The reports from people who had seen the preparations and talked with the Indians sounded as if the latter meant business, meant to finish off the Goa affair once and for all. Argument along these lines succeeded in moving the Board toward dead center—"The chances of a direct military invasion are still only about even"—and implying that as preparations continued and the Portuguese failed to give, the chances of invasion might rise.

The coordination meetings did not help very much. One departmental representative who wanted to raise the odds on invasion wanted also to add a paragraph about the threat to U.S.-Portuguese relations and U.S. base rights in the Azores if the Indians went ahead. It seemed to me that his position derived more from departmental interest than objective judgment, and this was not acceptable in an intelligence estimate. We stayed with the Board's "still about even" formula, and the USIB also agreed to this without dissent.

The day after the estimate was approved, the odds on an invasion rose perceptibly in reports from New Delhi. The Army attaché said he believed invasion would "take place very soon."

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the country team believed that military action was imminent unless the Portuguese promptly folded. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] The only person who did not seem to think an invasion was on was the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, who expressed the belief that action was not imminent less than 24 hours before it began.

The actual invasion gave a sense of vindication to those of us who had thought it likely, but it also raised the question of why the others had been wrong. The evidence, though conflicting—the ambassador no doubt was the victim of some deceit—did include reports with a decided ring of seriousness. Those who rated the chances of invasion as even or less than even of course read these reports. They were relying on Nehru's high-mindedness, and since this did not jibe with the evidence, they had nowhere to go but to sit on the fence. The lesson to be derived from this experience is not that one should look only at the evidence and disregard the doctrines and attitudes of leaders; that would be folly. It is that one should try to reconcile the two; in so doing one might perhaps find that, as in the law, there is more than one line of precedent.

No Rules

Other Board members could, I am sure, make an analysis of how estimates in which they participated fell short and similarly draw lessons from them. In time we could have enough lessons floating around to keep us tongue-tied. We could fall into the tragic error of the young man whose aggressive and fast-moving brother killed himself by wrapping his car around a light pole; the surviving brother, having taken this lesson to heart and resolved to plod about on foot, was run over by a truck. Our job is to make estimates; we have to take the plunge. This does not mean reckless diving, but it does not mean standing on the end of the diving board helpless with worry about every conceivable hazard to health and safety.

There is no alternative to regarding each estimative problem as a new one and applying one's accumulated knowledge and experience to it. It helps to try to determine why we were right or why we were wrong and to use these determinations as signposts along the way, but we must also remember that the specialist who misled us on one estimate corrected our misapprehensions on another, that the

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political philosophy which a national leader seemed to negate in one action he might never negate again. The problems we are dealing with are too complex for simple rules or simple "lessons." The magic words "estimate" or "judgment" are simply the exercise of good sense in light of everything it is possible to learn or to ponder concerning any particular matter.

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*The Latin American guerrilla's
protection against government
intelligence and security.*

INSURGENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Carlos Revilla Arango

The leaders of an insurgent movement anticipate and counter efforts by established authority to acquire information about their organization and activities. The success of the Irish revolutionists must be ascribed in large part to the operational achievements of their security chief Michael Collins, who made it his job to know in advance what the British were going to do, on what information they based their action, and the identity of their sources. He succeeded in this by gaining direct, personal access to metropolitan police records. A subject of his protective interest later wrote:

About a fortnight after my return I received from him, not a copy, but the original of the report from the police of the districts through which I had passed. . . . The fact that such an original document should have come into my hand was an example of the thoroughness with which Collins worked his intelligence system and enabled the I. R. A. to know what its enemy was thinking and often what the enemy proposed to do.¹

This is counterintelligence activity. The importance of a satisfactory counterintelligence effort is underscored by an instructor of Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas, General Alberto Bayo, who treated this subject in 23 of the 150 questions and answers he devised for guerrillas. In his opinion a counterintelligence agent was of greater value than 50 machineguns: he could work among the security forces and keep one advised of all their intelligence and plans.²

The insurgent organization's counterintelligence and security program must meet not only the threat posed by established governmental authority but that represented by competitive dissident groups, by the unilateral interests of third-country sponsors, sympathizers, and foes, and by disaffected members of its own organization. It must do so

¹ Padraic Colum, *Ourselves Alone! The Story of Arthur Griffith and the Origin of the Irish Free State*. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1959.) p. 215.

² General Alberto Bayo, *150 Questions for a Guerrilla*. Translation from the Spanish. (Denver: Robert K. Brown, 1963.) pp. 44, 45, 83.

through the acquisition and use of information on the personnel, organization, modus operandi, assets, plans, and activities of those that seek to penetrate or compromise it. It must concern itself not only with an enemy's deliberate efforts but with chance crises of all kinds—some weak or careless act of an insurgent, an unannounced curfew or document check, the compromise of a courier, or a natural disaster.

Compartmentation

The leaders of an insurgency make every effort to win public recognition for their cause and objectives. One means they use is to carry out propaganda activities in large communities. They accept thereby the threat from urban police and security forces, who attend their public rallies and get copies of their flyers and pamphlets. They anticipate the casualty list which follows from each night's wall-painting or window-breaking. They sign petitions to parliament demanding redress of wrongs. They do not seek anonymity, but are eager to be heard and talked about in the market place. They even lay claim to the achievements of competitive groups when these earn public approval. They turn failure to advantage if it can serve to arouse the sympathy of the people, proclaiming their martyrs to the cause of freedom.

They do these things because the future success of the insurgency depends on the establishment of a broad popular base, but there is a contradiction between the importance of security and this need for numbers. Mao Tse-tung recognized the paradox but did not resolve it when he wrote that although closed-door sectarianism was impermissible, vigilance against infiltration of the ranks was essential.³ The contradiction is in practice resolved by compartmenting overt from clandestine activities, though coordinating the steps in each, and minimizing the possibility of compromise for the secret cadres.

Because of the sensitive organizational knowledge held by an area coordinator, the fewer people who know his identity, functions, or business or home address, the better his security and that of the groups for which he is responsible. "Street" and secret cells are established in both the city and the countryside. The members of a street cell do not know the identities of their colleagues in the secret cell. The members of the secret cell may learn the identities of those

³ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*. (New York: International Publishers, 1954.) Vol. 2, p. 249.

whose overt duties get their names into the papers, but the reverse should not be true. The identity of the secret coordinator is similarly unknown to the leader of a street cell; each is required to report separately to a central committee.

As a safeguard against possible compromises among the secret cadres General Bayo recommended that an urban underground be divided into cells of no more than three persons. He warned against having cells of eight to ten men each, some of whom also served as chiefs of lesser units.⁴ His proposed figure, however, does not take into account the security hazard to an organization in which one of every three persons communicates with higher echelon. Under this arrangement an urban coordinator must communicate with seven of every twenty-one persons working under his direction. He can reduce these heavy communication needs by adopting a cell of seven, so that he deals with only three persons out of twenty-one.

For field guerrilla units General Bayo proposed no more than ten to twenty men per cell: "The smaller the number, the greater the mobility."⁵ These figures are particularly applicable to the Andean regions of South America. A larger group would find it difficult to conceal its members for any useful length of time from the gossips of the Indian communities. The guerrilla chief would have difficulty controlling his group. And forage is scarce and the Indians poor. Topography determines the size of field units in the Peruvian sierra.

Security with Recruits

In the field, in order to preserve the security of guerrilla camps, the initial training-assessment of guerrilla volunteers is usually carried out by street-type units which operate under the guise of sports clubs. Yet the security of these units is critical. It is difficult to conceal the absence of young men from their villages or fields for any extended period of time. Their lack of discipline, their status as weekend warriors, and the possibilities of dissatisfaction or defection are matters of great concern. Therefore instructors are brought to the training camps from the cities or from another country to work under aliases with students whose true names they do not know. Classes are held at night in areas remote from main settlements. The students are kept for one or two hours at the most, or only for as many minutes

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

as they might spend away from their own villages visiting friends. The stated purpose of the instruction is training in guerrilla warfare, but at this stage the main aim is assessment of the student.

The urgent task of a training cell coordinator is to satisfy himself about the reliability and personal security of a volunteer. He tries to learn as much as possible about the man during the few hours he has him under observation. Might he really be working for the government? In any case can one trust him with secrets? With money—or the lives of others? What is his motivation?

The coordinator's assessment constitutes the first line of defense against police penetration of the insurgent organization. And if the police manage to penetrate his training group they will encounter many safeguards set up to limit damage to the movement.

In advance of the training-assessment, investigation and surveillance are essential for checking the bona fides of volunteers. For this work the organization selects individuals who have or can build a suitable cover. They may work under the cover of beggars or in the guise of persons seeking employment. The investigator asking questions about the candidate may do so under the pretext of collecting a debt or of selling goods or services to homes in the neighborhood.

In a typical case an investigator who has the job of checking a volunteer's background will first find out where he lives and talk to shopkeepers in the immediate neighborhood, corner news vendors, barbers, and coffee boys in nearby cafés. He tries to elicit comments that point to lines for further investigation: "The police often talked to him, though his mother says he has been in no trouble." "He applied for a government job and then went away." "He owed me much money and ran off." Then the investigator will report to his superiors and intensify his inquiry. His search for information is no less thorough and frequently more so than that of government investigators. The insurgent organization has more at stake.

Communications Security

Communications are the most sensitive element in any secret activity. If an adversary gains control over one of the links in a communications net it can monitor or exploit a group's transmissions, rendering the work of the group hazardous or useless and collecting leads for further penetrations. For this reason an insurgent organization must have arrangements whereby funds, material, instructions,

and reports can be passed among its members with a high level of security. It may use personal contact, mail, telephone, telegraph, newspaper advertisements, couriers, drops, and signs or signals concealed from the general public, but it observes the principles of communication which are gospel to illegal groups throughout the world.

It uses codes and cover names in both oral and written communications. It conceals the identities and missions of its couriers from echelons which have no need to know them. The couriers use a cover which fits their background and skills. They set up alternative meeting sites in any plan for contact, and they give signals to indicate an absence of danger before going ahead with a meeting. Similarly, the organization may transmit a broader warning to its people by simply refraining from an otherwise indicated action. It may direct that compromising materials be passed by means of drops even when it has authorized a personal contact between the members in question. Or it may order that personal meetings be held to a minimum even when the participants have plausible social or business reasons to meet: what seem good ostensible reasons to them may not be readily apparent to a police observer.

The significance of these precautions should be evident. Unless the police get the details of a prisoner's safety signal, he can, when they release him under their concealed control, warn an approaching colleague of danger just by taking no action to indicate its absence. Or if the police do not learn in time about a prisoner's next regularly scheduled meeting, his failure to make it will warn his headquarters of trouble. Or failure of a scheduled safety check which requires his presence at a specified place and time for observation by insurgent surveillants may give the warning.

Insurgents generally avoid the use of the mails for sensitive communications. They may send innocuous messages by telephone or telegraph to signal the safe arrival of a member or to request a personal contact, but they prefer to keep in touch by courier. A courier can see his contact, satisfy himself that the man is not in custody, conduct a countersurveillance to ensure that he is "clean," assess his behavior for the enlightenment of the leaders, and give instructions orally in more detail than a letter can.

The insurgents often use drops for the transmission of funds, instructions, or material. These drops need not have a KGB sophistication if they serve to conceal the act of communication. They may be

a hole in a tree, a hollow under a stone, or a crevice in a wall. Or a fruit jar buried in a field, a flower vase in a cemetery, or a kilometer marker on a desert road. They need only to be places to which both parties have normal access and can devise acceptable cover stories to approach.

Names and Identities

It is a common practice for members of illegal groups to use war names to help conceal their true identities from colleagues and ultimately from security forces. Peruvian security police must have spent long hours in their analysis of a message they found among the personal effects of a prisoner:

Tell D-1 that B-145 will arrive tomorrow morning at 12 noon on Canadian Pacific. Tell him to alert Grity, Malla, Maruja, Pasch, Hilda that all is well.⁶

The war name is used in secret oral and written communications—in messages, in discussions at cell meetings or around campfires, sometimes in formal reports in place of numbers. It should not be on personal documents or in pocket litter. If compromised, it is changed. A war name may or may not match the sex of its bearer. It should not link a man to a trade or a region. It may be a full name—José Armand Dubois—or simply Armand. It may be “Saxon” only if its bearer is not from Saxony; “Quasimodo” if he is not a hunchback; “Stupid” if he is not.

A change of war names creates problems for the police. They can learn of one name through penetration of enemy communications or from careless talk by members of the insurgency, record it, and begin to build a profile of the bearer. But a change vitiates these records. It leads to inaccurate estimates of insurgent strength or, more seriously, to confusion of identities. The police find themselves wondering if José has replaced Juan as the leader of a unit, or indeed whether Juan was ever the leader, or if José and Juan are possibly identical. From this uncertainty the insurgents gain a measure of security.

The insurgent organization, for its part, makes every effort to identify individual police officers, police informants, and hostile installations. It prepares lists of such individuals and installations and briefs its couriers and action units to avoid them. It avoids putting a safe-site in the area of a police or security establishment. It directs a

⁶ *Correo* (Lima, Peru), 9 January 1964, p. 2.

threatened unit to move to a place more remote from such an establishment. A courier is given the physical description of a security official operating on his route so that if he is caught he knows whether he is in the hands of security personnel or less dangerous adversaries.

Controls over Cadres

The insurgent organization usually imposes travel restrictions on its cadres and couriers. It warns them against carrying documents which conflict with agreed cover stories. It emphasizes the value of story-confirming pocket litter, such as a letter from the family requesting that their son return home (a usual explanation for travel) or match boxes from a hotel where the traveller claims to have stayed. It finances small purchases of hardware or food from the town in which he claims past residence, or of materials related to his professed occupation, and has him carry the receipts for these purchases.

The organization creates a system whereby one member of a cell or guerrilla unit is responsible for knowing the whereabouts of a colleague at all times. On occasion it checks the whereabouts of some particular member. It may send a coded telegram directing him to report to a specified address. It may telephone his residence from a pay booth to see whether he is home. It may send a courier, if he lives in a distant province, with an order that he report to the capital city. If he is absent from his assigned post without cause, the leaders order an investigation.

In an insurgency the problems of control are intrinsic, far surpassing those encountered by the government in its secret work. It is part of the secret insurgent's business to know how to cover unauthorized or illegal ventures with plausible explanations. Before he opens his door to step forth on a secret action he has readied multiple cover arrangements. (He is going to buy bread or pay an account at the café. But on the way he passes an old wall, and if there is a sign on it he must service a drop a block from the town plaza. The way to this drop is fortunately also the way to an old friend's house, so he is covered at every point.) He lives in a world of security arrangements and survives by observing them. If the police recruit him, he has only changed sponsors, not this security way of life. The insurgent leaders have a constant concern over this possibility. They cannot object to a suspect's covering his movements and engaging in practices they have taught him to be essential to good security.

They must therefore refine their controls and devise tests to assess his reliability.

Some tests are simple. The leaders may give José letters to mail to Alberto. By instruction Alberto returns these unopened. *Had José opened the letters?* They may direct José to service a drop containing a specified sum of money. José finds in the drop a sum far in excess of what he was told to expect. *Does he turn it all over, or only the specified sum?* They may order José to take a trip. During his absence a team searches his house or room for any records he may have kept in violation of secrecy rules. It also assesses his household possessions against his known income. If it finds nothing it may leave some clear evidence of its search. *Does José report a suspicion that his quarters were searched in his absence?*

The leaders may write José a letter as though from the security police and ask his cooperation. They include a sum of money as evidence of good faith and give instructions for future contact. *Does José report this attempt at recruitment? Does he hand over the letter and the right amount of money?* They may place him under carefully concealed surveillance for a period of time and then ask him to submit a written report on his activities and contacts during that time. *What items does his report omit?* They may brief him on an impending violent action against the government and then surveil its site. *Have the police been warned?*⁷

The courage, patience, and alertness of members can be tested by other devices. But the all-important thing is reliability and honesty. In a sense, with this need to be sure of the full loyalty of its people, the insurgent organization thrives on suspicion. Yet the pressure of its controls breeds discontent among members. When malcontents or traitors are uncovered, the leaders reemphasize the rules of conduct and establish new levels of severity which further disgruntle the membership. At the same time, however, these restrictions and controls do make the life of an agent who penetrates the group both difficult and hazardous, and his case officer must have a thorough knowledge of the protective tactics used by the dissident leaders.

⁷ These techniques and many other aspects of insurgent modus operandi herein cited are described in Andrew T. Molnar, et. al., *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare*. (Special Operations Research Office, The American University, Washington, D. C., 1963.) pp. 33-34 *et passim*.

The Uninvited

The insurgent takes measures to guard his camp or cell against those who come uninvited to the door. He extends a cautious welcome to any newcomer and examines the man's credentials with care. In the world of counterintelligence no one assumes he knows whom he is dealing with.

When camp outguards intercept a newcomer they follow a pre-arranged reception plan. They usually take him to a site removed from the main camp. They get his full name, address, occupation, the route by which he came, the identity of anyone who may have directed him to the camp, and the whereabouts of his family. They ask who knew of his intention to come. They ask what his friends, family, or employer think he is doing now.

The camp chief checks the man's biographic data against the knowledge possessed by members of his command. If he claims to be a fisherman from a particular village, and if there is a guerrilla in the camp who knows the people and principal officials of that village, the story can be readily checked. If he claims to have walked there by a particular route, his shoes are checked against that claim. If he says he was directed there by a friend sympathetic to the movement, the friend's identity will be checked by investigative personnel in the place concerned.

Clothing is given the newcomer in exchange for what he wore when he came. Guards check the latter for labels, quality, markings, wear, and travel stain as evidence to support or refute his story. They check letters, identity or voter registration cards, matchbooks, and cigarettes. They may check his health and appearance against their estimate of the wear and tear of his professed occupation and recent experience. The guards who live with him at the processing camp make every effort to get him to talk freely. They talk about the area he came from, question him concerning his likes and dislikes, and comment on true and notional personalities in his home village. *Does he truly know the mayor of the village? Does he also know one Señor Gasco de Barmas—a creature of their imagination? Has he really been in that small bar to the right of the alley of women?*

Conversely, the guards avoid talking about the number, equipment, supplies, plans, activities, or true identities of the guerrillas. They use their war names in conversation. They do not discuss other members of the group, their comings and goings, or their problems.

The camp chief sends the details of the newcomer's story to an area coordinator for investigation. If no information is turned up to refute the story he may then direct him to report to a training camp. When the man is gone he moves his command to another site, since its location had become known to a person of unproved reliability.

If the area coordinator concludes from his investigation that there is reason to doubt the volunteer's bona fides, he may order the camp chief simply to desert the suspect as he moves his group to the other site. Or put him in charge of a remote, unused camp site and leave him there. *This is a very good thing to do. If the boy works for the police he has no contact with them now and we can move freely out of the area. The boy guards an old camp of straw huts and latrines. He believes that we will return and take him with us. But the camp is very far away from any village. He dares not leave to make contact with the police because who knows when we might return? So he sits out the days.* Or the area coordinator may, finally, direct that the suspect be escorted to a point near the city, where he can be tricked into an overseas trip for "training," i.e., interrogation under control.

A camp chief must be concerned about the presence in his area of any competitive groups of dissidents. He remembers that Fidel Castro, as dictator, had some success in establishing state-controlled guerrilla groups which served as magnets to draw the discontented, the dissident, or the disillusioned to their graves. Or he remembers groups which volunteered to join his own but then brought problems of command which he could not control. If he discovers that he has a genuinely competitive though friendly group as a neighbor, his worries are not less. It may not have good security, may not be careful in assessing its membership. He cannot afford to be caught in a counterinsurgency sweep even though he may not be its target. *Once, said the boy, some fishermen gave me a ride in their boat. I did not know they were smugglers. The police caught us all—but it was me they tortured.*

A camp chief must beware of hunters or zoologists who roam his area. They may report his presence to the police. He must also beware of the local peasants' penchant for gossip; the civil guard has long ears. At the same time he must keep the peasants' favor, since he cannot survive their enmity. In anticipation of the eventualities he readies alternative camp sites for use by his group. At a time of

danger he may move his people to one of these or, with central committee approval, disband the force and direct its members to fade into the cities and villages.

The Counterintelligence Organization

The guerrilla chief and the area coordinator have prime responsibility for the counterintelligence effort. General Bayo felt so strongly about the contribution of counterintelligence to the revolutionary movement that he recommended the second in command be put in charge of it. The counterintelligence organization is responsible for the security of the movement's personnel, assets, and activities. It acquires sources to report on hostile security organizations and competitive groups, maintains appropriate records, and isolates and interrogates hostile agents. Ordinary members of the movement know that it has a counterintelligence capability, but not what assets are involved; the counterintelligence personnel are concealed from the rank and file.

The counterintelligence program usually includes periodic lectures on security discipline, spot surveillance of personnel, and provocative tests of loyalty. An effective program which can strengthen the group as a whole provides for each cell to appoint one of its members secretary for discipline. This member is charged with enforcing the decrees of the central committee and maintaining an acceptable level of security. He gives lectures, ensures the security of cell meetings, reports secrecy violations to the cell chief for transmittal to higher echelon, and carries out other security and counterintelligence tasks as assigned by the central committee.

The Tainted

The insurgent organization also safeguards its security by taking prompt and effective action against suspect members and newly released prisoners. When a member is arrested it orders his immediate colleagues into hiding. It seals off the activities in which he was involved, changes communication systems known to him, and sends his family to a safesite. After taking these immediate protective measures it analyzes the circumstances of his arrest. It investigates anyone who might for some reason have reported him to the police. It questions his wife to assess her attitude toward him. It may, if time permits and a preliminary analysis does not warn against it, search his home and examine his personal effects to satisfy itself

that no record of his activities is there. If his knowledge includes matters of an unusually sensitive nature, it may take action to deny the government the advantage of it—a smash-and-grab raid, or preventive executive action against the prisoner himself.

Each member of an insurgency is instructed in advance on what steps he should take on release from prison. He should make no written or oral contact with his group but proceed to a designated point at a time set for this purpose. If countersurveillance shows no hostile coverage of the former prisoner, the counterintelligence unit will pick him up and take him to a rendezvous from which a second group will transport him to a safesite for interrogation. This pattern of countersurveillance and reacquisition is standard procedure. The safeguards are obvious.

At the safesite counterintelligence specialists question their colleague in detail. When and where was he arrested? Who were the arresting officers? What charges did they levy against him? Was anyone arrested with him? Where was he taken? What questions were asked? Was he shown photographs of individuals to identify? Whom did he identify? Was he given maps on which to pinpoint facilities? What safesites or communications did he reveal? Was he asked to cooperate with the police? What did the police promise him? Was he forced to cooperate? (A man can be brave but need not be foolish, they tell him. If he was forced to talk, they know he did so from prudence and not from fear or greed.) But what did they promise him? Where was he jailed? How does he know? What were the names of his guards? How does he know? Was he indeed tortured? Did he have a cell mate? What was his name? Did they engage in conversation? What was said? Now, where did he go upon release? Whom did he talk to? What did he tell the neighbors? Whom did he try to contact? How?

It is important to know what the charges were against the member and who his jailor was. If the charge is black market dealing and the arresting authority the financial police, the insurgent group's problems may be less serious than they might have been. Although a member who deals in the black market for personal gain is not one to be trusted, financial police do not generally have the same level of competence as the security forces. Their interests do not usually impinge on the very security of the state and they are not skilled interrogators—and only determined and experienced officers can get critical information from members of a well-run insurgency.

It is also important that the group know what its colleague may have revealed of its interests. Unless he is part of the central committee, a member does not usually know how sensitive each item of information he possesses is. He may, like Ito Ritsu, whose red-herring revelation ultimately led the Japanese police to Richard Sorge, give his captors the name of a person whom he believes is expendable.

If the dissident movement believes its colleague behaved correctly, it will order him to return home and lie low for a period of time. It may permit his family to rejoin him, since that would be normal. It will direct him to cease all contact with the movement until informed to the contrary, and it alerts its membership to this effect. It then checks the details of his story through various counterintelligence assets. If it comes to believe that the man has turned against the movement, it may redouble him, turning him back against the police, or order him to leave the country illegally and go to Cuba for "his own security," i.e. liquidation.

General Bayo recommends the execution of traitors in these circumstances. Although this worked in Castro's insurgency it is not always the end of the victim's influence. An execution in the home country leaves emotional scars and memories which return to haunt the executioner. But death by accident in another country, while on a mission for the movement, provides inspiration for those who remain behind. Counterintelligence disposes of a threat and gains a hero.

Instead of by killing, a police agent may be blocked by provocation. *Once we learned that a shopkeeper in our city worked as an informant for the police. We decided to destroy him. But how? To kill was easy. But the police would investigate. They would, of course, know why he was killed. Some of our people would be picked up as suspects. They would be hurt. They were brave, but they might talk. It would be a mistake. We thought of other things.*

One of us thought of something that was very good. The informer was a good family man. A bad person, but a good family man. He had one child, a four-year-old girl. She had white hair and blue eyes. He loved her very much. We often saw him buy her ice cream, and then they would walk home together. We bought a doll that had blue eyes and white hair. We dressed it in white. It was very beautiful. We crushed its head with a rock and put it on the doorstep of his house and rang the bell. We ran off and into a building from where we could watch. He came to the door. At first he looked

around, I think a little afraid. And then he saw the doll. He shut the door very quickly. The next day he left with his wife and child for the capital. He did not return. He did not pay his servants; they were very angry. The police arrested no one.

Penetrations

The insurgency makes every effort to place its informants as servants in the homes of police officers, in police clubs, or with other hostile personalities. The value of such plants is evident. They can get useful information from dinner conversations or by answering the telephone in the absence of their master or by monitoring his mail.

The movement also uses money or persuasion to acquire informants in opposition political groups or security organizations. Since the conditions which give rise to the insurgency also affect the living standards and hopes of the noncommitted, opportunities for recruitment of sources in hostile groups are many. *A little money, a little uncertainty, a little fear—and we find friends. We even make friends in prison. If I am detained I am authorized to offer so many dollars to my guard. If he doubts the validity of this offer, because I seem poor and dirty, I let him see a part of the sum. Not from me, but from the committee. That the committee can offer such a sum, small to us but great to him, makes an impression. He leaves the question open and an open mind for the future. We do not press. The next time he has more trust.*

You see, we build trust in people. Only the police destroy; we build. Soon this guard, because he likes money, and because he has learned to respect our work, and maybe because he fears us just a little bit, is cooperative. He passes information which may or may not be important. What is important is the fact that he passes it. To know that your family will be permitted to visit you in prison is not a great thing, for example. But the fact that the guard tells you this is important. He has taken a step, a first step.

Penetration of competitive political groups is not a major problem. Since these are aiming in part at the same goals, an organization which has contacts abroad and funds at hand finds congenial spirits among such competitors. An aggressive leadership, a record of publicly acknowledged accomplishment, or a known plan for the future often suffices to ease the conscience of selected competitors who cooperate, telling themselves that the means to an end are not important.

Thus the insurgent organization takes certain protective measures to counter the espionage and disruptive efforts of opposing forces. These measures are designed to conceal its organization, plans, personnel, assets, and activities from hostile penetration. Since, however, defensive measures cannot by themselves ensure security, it assigns counterintelligence personnel the task of learning about the plans, personnel, operations, assets, and organization of its adversaries. These counter-efforts are often the first significant contact between the contending forces. They precede open skirmishes in the field; they are a prelude to any war for national liberation. On this plane, and at this time, the fate of the opposing factions is often decided.

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*The fleshing out and some
wobbly first steps as CIG.*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER SOUERS

Arthur B. Darling¹

The first Director of Central Intelligence was well aware of the latent power bestowed on this office by the President's Directive of January 22, 1946. Admiral Souers wished to see the functions of the Director mature under the guidance of the departmental secretaries and the personal representative of the President who constituted the National Intelligence Authority. But he also knew that many in the Army, the Navy, and the Department of State were still resisting every thought of a central intelligence organization which might overpower their own intelligence agencies. The Authority, the Director, and the Central Intelligence Group were bolstered by no supporting legislation from the Congress. They rested only upon this Directive by the President to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. And the President's legal authority to issue the Directive was, with the expiration of his wartime powers, at best questionable. Souers appreciated that this was no time to foster misgiving or animosity. No rough waters should be raised as Congress approached a reorganization of the national military establishment in which the central intelligence system would have a part.

Admiral Souers' immediate objective was to get the CIG established and in operation as a small body of experts drawn proportionately from the departments and serving the departments under supervision and control of the department heads in the National Intelligence Authority. The power inherent in the DCI's duties and responsibilities should wait until later for development. Moreover, Souers did not accept Donovan's principle that the DCI should ever be independent of the departmental secretaries, equal if not superior to them, and responsible directly to the President.² He believed that

¹ Adapted from a history of the Central Intelligence Agency prepared by the author in 1953. For preceding installments see *Studies* VIII 3, p. 55 ff, and X 2, p. 1 ff.

² See the author's "The Birth of Central Intelligence," *Studies* X 2, p. 2, for a summary statement of Donovan's concepts.

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such independence would not place the Director close to the President, but would tend in fact to isolate him from the President. An independent DCI would discover that often he and his agency were shut off from the President by the interests and representations of the departments. Through their prestige and functions they were likely to have greater power, at least of obstruction.

As a practical matter, in politics and the science of government, such an extraordinary officer as the DCI needed, in Souers' view, the company of other officials. On occasion he might find their opposition almost as useful as their assent. His position might become clearer and stronger, at least it would command attention, because it had to be formally opposed. An independent Director of eminence and exceptional force might realize Donovan's concept, by-passing the departments to deal directly with the President, regardless of obstruction. But even such a Director would have to keep everlastingly at it, and he would always have a hidden war on his hands. The time for a DCI with those attributes was not at the start of the new organization in February 1946. It might not survive the battle.

A Cooperative Formed

It was Admiral Souers' nature to remove issues rather than to create them. And like Eberstadt, he was mindful of the benefits which might be obtained from "parallel, competitive, and sometimes conflicting efforts."³ According to the President's Directive, which he himself had shared in writing, the persons assigned from the departments were "collectively" to form the Central Intelligence Group. His draft on February 4 of the first directive to himself from the National Intelligence Authority, therefore, declared that CIG should be organized and operated as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." There should be in it "adequate and equitable participation" by the State, War, and Navy Departments and by other agencies as approved by the Authority. The Army Air Forces should have representation on the same basis as Army and Navy; there was likely soon to be a Department of Air.

Those in the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of Justice who watched legalities were uneasy about the dubious validity of the President's Directive. The draft of an executive order, approved

³ From Eberstadt's study for Forrestal of the proposed merger of the War and Navy departments. Souers had written the military intelligence section of this report. See *ibid.*, p. 10.

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by Acting Attorney General J. Howard McGrath, was ready in February to replace the Directive. The view of the National Intelligence Authority was that no impediment had so far been encountered in carrying out the Directive, but there was no objection to having an executive order as well, if its effect were to "confirm and formalize" the status of the Authority and the CIG as a "cooperative interdepartmental activity, rather than a new or independent agency requiring legislation for its existence."

The questionable rationale for regarding it as a joint activity rather than an agency rested on the fact that personnel and funds were to be contributed by the participating departments. It should be noted, however, that administrative chaos would have been the result of trying to administer it on a joint basis. The departmental secretaries therefore had to empower the Director of Central Intelligence to exercise the same authorities over the funds made available to him as they themselves could exercise. Thus the effect was to create an operating agency.

Further discussion and study of the question continued through the spring. By May 23rd all parties were willing to accept the above rationale and let the Directive stand for the time being. No one in the Executive Branch was going to raise the issue publicly and formally; and the Comptroller General, who could have done so, agreed with the need for the organization and was willing to let it proceed until legislation could be obtained. Until superseded the following year by the Central Intelligence Agency, established by act of Congress, CIG therefore rested upon the President's authority under the Constitution, with no particular reference to his war power, in the face of a statute that prohibited the establishment of an operating agency except by legislation.

To satisfy President Truman's wish that CIG should bring all intelligence activities into coordination and harmony, the first NIA directive constituted of the departmental intelligence chiefs an Intelligence Advisory Board, and Admiral Souers planned to keep its composition flexible. Its membership, in addition to the chief intelligence officers from the Departments of State, War, and the Navy and the Army Air Forces, should include representatives from other agencies of the government at the Director's invitation. This gave room for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, to have a representative present on questions of internal security or the collection of intelligence in Latin America.

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Having the same purpose of coordination in mind, Admiral Souers preferred in the beginning to name ad hoc committees to study and report on specific problems of interdepartmental concern. The committee members would represent the permanent departmental members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, with a chairman drawn from CIG to act as "coordinator." In theory this procedure promised the greatest cooperation and harmony possible. The practical difficulty of obtaining the representatives from the departments to man the ad hoc committees and to accomplish their work in time, however, was discouraging. Souers soon turned to his Central Planning Staff to handle such problems.

It was going to be none too easy to apportion out CIG appointments among the departments and secure persons both competent and inclined to enter the central intelligence service. But Admiral Souers did not find it hard to fill his top positions. Kingman Douglass, who had been a representative of the Air Forces at the Air Ministry in London and knew much about the British system, became Assistant Director and Acting Deputy Director. Captain William B. Goggins came with intelligence experience from the Navy to head the Central Planning Staff. In April Souers would appoint Colonel Louis J. Fortier Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services. He had served on the Joint Intelligence Staff for the Army and had just finished chairing a study of the clandestine operational assets left by the OSS and now held in escrow in the War Department as its Strategic Services Unit.⁴

Souers obtained James S. Lay, Jr., from the State Department to be Secretary of the Authority and of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Lay had been Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ludwell L. Montague also came from State to head the Central Reports Staff. He had been Secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee in the fall of 1941, then Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a senior Army member of its Joint Intelligence Staff throughout the war. Both Lay and Montague had participated in the discussions which had contributed, along with Donovan's "principles" and Magruder's thinking, to the eventual formulation of the President's Directive. They had been chosen by Alfred McCormack for

⁴In July, after General Hoyt Vandenberg took over as DCI, both Douglass and Goggins were transferred to positions under Fortier's successor, Colonel Donald H. Calloway.

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his prospective central intelligence system under the State Department.⁵ Both were expert in the work which the new CIG was to undertake and qualified to aid Souers immediately, as they did, in writing the directives of the National Intelligence Authority. CIG had begun to take form on January 25.

Operational Information

The draft of the first directive to Souers in February followed the general design of the President's Directive of January 22.⁶ But there was one clause in the draft so filled with past controversy and indicative of more to come that it did not appear in the directive as finally adopted by the NIA. Article 7 of the draft submitted by Admiral Souers stipulated that the DCI should have "all necessary facilities, intelligence, and information in the possession of our respective departments, including necessary information as to policies, plans, actions, capabilities, and intentions of the United States with reference to foreign countries." At Souers' own suggestion, the clause concerning the capabilities and intentions of the United States was stricken from the draft in the first meeting of the NIA on February 5, 1946. There was no explanation in the minutes, but one can reconstruct the reasons.

It is easy to presume that those who had been so reluctant to give the Office of Strategic Services and its Research and Analysis Branch access to strategic information⁷ were no more willing now to supply to the new DCI knowledge of their own capabilities and intentions. And at the first intimation that the specific inclusion of this provision might stir resistance in the armed services over their right to withhold "operational" matters, Admiral Souers preferred to remove the statement with no argument. The beginning of the CIG was precarious enough without inviting trouble that could be postponed. According to Souers, the Army and the Navy both understood that he was entitled by the President's Directive to have all intelligence in their possession. From their point of view, he said, information about "policies, plans, actions, capabilities, and intentions of the United States" was not intelligence. In their thinking, the new

⁵ For McCormack's plan, as opposed to that for an independent or at least interdepartmental central intelligence, see "The Birth of Central Intelligence," *Studies* X 2, pp. 6-10.

⁶ For a résumé of the Directive's provisions see *ibid.*, pp. 17-19.

⁷ See the author's "Origins of Central Intelligence," *Studies* VIII 3, pp. 62-65.

Central Intelligence Group was expected to purvey all its knowledge to the departments, but the reverse was not entirely true, particularly with respect to "operational" information.

Close examination of Article 7 as issued in final form by the NIA nevertheless reveals that the Authority gave to the DCI the right to have "as required in the performance" of his authorized mission, "all necessary facilities, intelligence, and information" in the possession of the departments. This distinguished "intelligence" from "information" but applied to both the unequivocal "all," modified only by the requirements of the CIG mission. That mission, as stated in Article 2 of the directive, included furnishing "strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy Departments." And knowledge of the nation's own capabilities enters into the intelligence which is necessary to determine the policy for maintaining the nation's security. The requirement of an effective national estimate is that it shall be compounded from all facts to be had from every available source.

Dissents

Article 3 of the first directive to Souers stipulated that "all recommendations" of the DCI should be referred to the Intelligence Advisory Board "for concurrence or comment" prior to submission to the Authority. If a member of the IAB did not concur, the Director was to submit with his recommendation the member's explanation of his non-concurrence. Only if the IAB approved the Director's recommendation unanimously might he put it into effect without action by the Authority.

The Lovett Committee⁸ had proposed such a procedure for national estimates to safeguard the interests of the departmental intelligence services as they came under the coordinating power of the central intelligence organization. William H. Jackson's letter to Secretary Forrestal contained a similar provision.⁹ But this stipulation, which eventually became established practice in estimating, was to be, in its application to "recommendations," the center of controversy be-

⁸ Set up in the War Department on October 22, 1945, to study the diverse proposals for centralizing intelligence. Its report did much to crystalize interdepartmental thinking and led directly to the President's Directive of 22 January. See "The Birth of Central Intelligence," *Studies* X 2, pp. 8, 12-14.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

tween subsequent DCIs and the IAB over the administration of the CIG and its successor CIA. The chiefs of departmental intelligence used it to try to make themselves the governing board of the "cooperative interdepartmental activity." If they had their wish, it was not to be an independent agency.

Secretary Byrnes, just returned from London, presided over the first meeting of the NIA on February 5, 1946. Byrnes wished to make it clear at once that the Department of State was responsible for reporting to the President on matters of foreign policy. And this included performing the service that the President himself had expressly designated the first duty of the new CIG: Instead of the piles of cables, dispatches, and reports on his desk, President Truman wanted a daily summary that was comprehensive. He wished to be rid of the mass of papers, and yet to be certain that nothing significant had been left out.

Admiral Souers endeavored to reassure Secretary Byrnes that the President expected the DCI only to have the cables and dispatches digested; there was no intention that the information should be interpreted to advise the President on matters of foreign policy. The Secretary nevertheless pressed the point that it was his function to supply the President with information upon which to base his conclusions. Admiral Leahy entered the discussion as the personal representative of the President; information from all three departments, he said, should be summarized in order to keep the President currently informed. Byrnes replied that Admiral Souers would not be representing the viewpoint of any of the departments; any man assigned to CIG from a department would be responsible to the DCI.

Secretary Byrnes felt so strongly about the matter that he appealed to the President personally on behalf of the Department of State. According to the recollection of Admiral Souers, his argument ran along the line that a digest of incoming dispatches was not intelligence within the jurisdiction of the CIG. President Truman said it might not be generally considered intelligence, but it was information which he needed and therefore it was intelligence to him. It was agreed in the end that the CIG daily summaries should be "factual statements." The Department of State prepared its own digest, so the President had two summaries on his desk. From his point of view, that was at least some improvement.

Central Planning, March-June 1946

The Central Planning Staff, drawn from the departments, was to be sensitive to the interests of them all. It should assist the Director in preparing recommendations with regard to policies and objectives for the whole "national intelligence mission," according to the second NIA directive of February 8. Admiral Souers advised Captain Goggins on March 4 that "as a general rule, the Staff should take the active leadership in arranging and conducting interdepartmental studies." One of its members should participate and act as coordinator in all meetings concerning foreign intelligence related to the national security. As the use of ad hoc interdepartmental committees proved difficult, the Central Planning Staff was soon loaded with orders for investigation and report upon a variety of subjects that were intricate and sweeping.

The Staff had a hand in preparing the executive order which was intended but not used to confirm the President's Directive. On March 21 it undertook a broad survey of all clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. On March 28 it received instruction to make a survey of the coverage of the foreign-language press in the United States. The next day it was assigned an interim survey of the collection of intelligence in China. On April 20 it was directed to examine the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board of the Joint Intelligence Committee and determine whether there should be a change in its supervision and control.

The Central Planning Staff inherited a share in the study of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service which the Federal Communications Commission had organized to monitor foreign news and propaganda. The Service had been taken over by the War Department on the preceding December 30 for the remainder of the fiscal year, and the War Department wished to have it placed in the new central intelligence organization. But Souers was not eager to expand the operational services of the Central Intelligence Group. On the basis of an ad hoc committee's report he had recommended on April 26 that the War Department continue to operate the Service with a new organization, that is with personnel thoroughly screened for security. The War Department had demurred, May 8, on the ground that the State Department was the chief user of this "predominantly non-military intelligence function." The matter was discussed the next day by the IAB.

It was at this point that members of the Central Planning Staff were directed to consult with representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff

(G-2) and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. The result was that the latter, now William L. Langer in place of Alfred McCormack, agreed on behalf of the Department of State that it should support the FBIS budget, while the War Department continued to operate the Service, at least during fiscal year 1947. (This working arrangement was later superseded; eventually the opinion prevailed that CIG should take over the function as one of common concern.)

On May 31 the Central Planning Staff was directed to make an informal survey of the intelligence available in the United States from colleges, foundations, libraries, individuals, business concerns, and other non-government sources. On June 4 it received instructions to study explicitly the exploitation of American businesses with connections abroad. On June 6 it was told to look into the problems of psychological warfare. And on June 7 it was called upon to make an interim survey of the adequacy of intelligence facilities related to the national security.

The Central Planning Staff set for itself on the one hand the tremendous chore of elaborating a "complete framework of a system of interdepartmental intelligence coordination" to be contained in a series of studies for the DCI. Subjects would include the "essential elements of information" in a national system and the coordination of counterintelligence with security, of intelligence research with collection of information, etc., by means of a coordinating board, a scientific committee, and other interagency committees on military, economic, political, and geographical matters. At the other extreme it made an office space survey of the Central Reports Staff, allotting 90 sq. ft. per person to it.

The Defense Project

In the meantime a substantive interdepartmental project was being organized. Colonel J. R. Lovell of the Military Intelligence Service proposed on March 4 a plan for producing "the highest possible quality of intelligence on the USSR in the shortest possible time." The intelligence services of the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and State Department should have equal representation on the planning and working committees of this endeavor, soon to be known as the Defense Project. It should be subject to CIG coordination. Admiral Souers accepted the offer at once.

A Planning Committee drew up a proposal which on May 9 was incorporated into a CIG directive unanimously approved by the IAB.

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The Planning Committee should choose its own chairman and secretary. A coordinator from CIG should meet with the committee when appropriate; in case of disagreement within the committee he would submit the question to the DCI for decision. This DCI responsibility, however, was more fearsome in prospect than in fact. It would be some time before there could be any great decisions possible. The evidence had first to be accumulated.

It was the Working Committee, under the chairmanship of the secretary of the Planning Committee, with the CIG coordinator acting in advisory capacity, that had the first and most important job. It was to compile a veritable encyclopedia of "all types of *factual* strategic intelligence on the USSR." From this Strategic Intelligence Digest the member agencies would individually prepare Strategic Intelligence Estimates as required to meet their own needs or when requested by the DCI. Whenever "the national interest" required it, the CIG too could prepare estimates from the Strategic Intelligence Digest. But there was no attempt to establish here a single national intelligence estimate which should govern the thinking of all agencies concerned.

The CIG Central Reports Staff was still too small to undertake this extraordinary project, but it would not have been assigned it anyway. The plan originated in the Military Intelligence Service. Its military advocates looked to CIG for a coordinator and for editorial assistance on the Working Committee, but they considered it primarily their own affair. CIG had still to establish its right to means of its own for procuring and processing the raw materials of intelligence. Its central facilities had yet to become so useful to the departments that their intelligence officers would rely on it for services of common concern.

The first task of the Working Committee was to review the papers of the Joint Intelligence Staff on the Soviet Union. This took a couple of months. By June 4, however, an outline had been made and allocations of the work planned. The use of task forces, interdepartmental committees, was rejected on grounds of security; an agency's files would have to be opened to persons not under its control. Instead, the work was assigned by subject to particular agencies, sometimes illogically. For example, the Military Intelligence Service was charged at first with preparing certain economic and political data. Later the plan was revised so that the greater portion of the political material was allotted to the State Department.

Colonel Lovell's expectations were not met; the project could not be finished by September. It was far from complete in December when

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work was stopped pending the decision of an interdepartmental committee on a program of National Intelligence Surveys to take the place of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. This program changed CIG's attitude toward the Defense Project; it was no longer merely a question of coordination. Though the most important, this Digest would be only one of several surveys to be produced by CIG/CIA. When resumed in April 1947, the project was still an interdepartmental activity, but it was no longer centered in the Pentagon as a major interest of the Military Intelligence Service. The official date of publication for the Strategic Intelligence Digest was March 1, 1948, but it was nearer the beginning of 1949 before all three bulky volumes were complete.

Reports and Estimates

By direction of the National Intelligence Authority on February 8, a Central Reports Staff was to assist the Director in correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and in disseminating within the government the resultant "strategic and national policy intelligence." Admiral Souers followed the directive with an administrative order dated March 4, though the Staff had already gone to work during February and had produced the first Daily Summary for the President. There were in what was then called the Current Section seventeen persons seconded from the Departments of State, War, and the Navy. They were established in the Pentagon under L. L. Montague, with the expectation that they would be joined shortly by other persons assigned from the departments to form an Estimates Section or Branch.

The purpose from the start was to have the CIG take over the major function of producing the strategic estimates for the formulation of national policy, as Donovan had proposed. But it was not yet decided that CIG should have a division comparable to the old OSS Research and Analysis Branch. There was doubt that it ought to engage in initial research. Many believed that it would do well to remain a small and compact body which should receive from the several departmental agencies the materials of intelligence and produce from them the "strategic and national policy intelligence" for the policy makers. The Department of State was still uncertain whether it should continue its own Office of Research and Intelligence as McCormack had expected to have it when he hoped to retain there the function of making intelligence estimates for the policy makers.

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Now on March 4 Admiral Souers' administrative order, prepared by Montague, elaborated the organization and functions of the Central Reports Staff. There was in this administrative order a provision embodying ideas which are still of interest for the production of national intelligence estimates. As Montague wished to have the Staff constructed at that time, there should be four Assistants delegated to him, as Chief, by the permanent members of the IAB. Their distinction from other persons furnished by the departments for the Staff was to be that they should not be responsible to the DCI but to their parent agencies, although serving full time with the Staff. The purpose was to have the Assistants represent in the Staff the interests of their respective departments and also to represent the Central Reports Staff in its relations with those agencies. Montague had acquired these ideas from his experiences as representative of the Army on the Senior Team of the Joint Intelligence Staff.

The Assistants would aid in directing the work of the Staff, review all its reports and estimates, make recommendations on the dissemination of them, reconcile conflicting departmental estimates when possible, and otherwise formulate dissents for their principals on the IAB. Thus Souers and Montague hoped to establish a panel of intelligence experts drawn from the departments who would continue to understand and represent the interests of those departments but at the same time through their continuous work in the Reports Staff would become experts too in the business of central intelligence and the production of national estimates.

The benefits to accrue from the continuity and momentum which might be gained from such an estimating board were left unknown. The ideas were put on paper but were not tested. Difficulties in obtaining personnel and in meeting other more pressing demands in the new central intelligence organization prevented the establishment of such a board.

Within a month of its formal activation, the Central Reports Staff entered another phase of its development. Montague proposed on April 1 a revision of the administrative order to make possible two things. First, experience with the allotment of personnel by the Departments of State, War, and the Navy demonstrated that there should be more flexibility within the proportions agreed among the departments. The right persons for particular positions were not to be had according to any predetermined ratio. The difficulty grew worse with the necessity of apportioning within each grade. Navy captains, Army

colonels, and civilian "P-8's" were not equally available in number or competence. The principle of proportion could be maintained, but deviations should be permitted so long as there was no substantial change in the budgetary obligations of the departments.

We should note at this point the predicament of CIG as a whole with respect to personnel. The departments had been directed by the President to assign personnel to CIG. To make the general statement that they minimized the obligation to supply able persons, as soon as possible, is doubtless to do injustice in some cases, perhaps many. A reading of correspondence on this matter from the spring of 1946, however, and conversations with some who were present and responsible for recruitment at the time, lead to the conclusion that there were many recommendations for office in CIG that were not bona fide nominations. Some nominees were not really available because they were headed toward more important positions in their own services and could not remain long in CIG if they came at all. Six months was often the limit. Some appeared on the lists because they had become surplus—good fellows, but with no future in the service to which they had given so much of their lives. The name of the best man available was often left off because he was wanted where he was.

It was neither easy nor desirable to select the personnel of the new CIG staffs, branches, and sections from such lists. Admiral Souers and his successor, General Vandenberg, were not able to do much about solving this problem so long as they were obliged to request referrals from the departments and hope for the best. Whether or not they minimized their responsibility, the departments failed to provide adequate personnel for CIG. Why General Vandenberg sought an independent budget and the right to hire and fire his own personnel is clear.

The second change in the Central Reports Staff was intended to provide it with area specialists as it set up its Estimates Branch. The Estimates Branch itself was not to have geographical segments, but the plan was to have five such sections supporting it—Western Europe-Africa, Eastern Europe-USSR, Middle East-India, Far East-Pacific, and Western Hemisphere. The staff of each section would be apportioned by grade and among the departments.

The Central Planning Staff objected to so early a rewrite of the administrative order to effect these changes and formally disapproved the plan. There ensued a test of strength between the two Staffs which Central Planning lost. It was discharged from further con-

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sideration of the proposal, and the principle was established that the chiefs of the component parts of CIG should be responsible for the organization and administration of their respective domains as they deemed fit.

Espionage and Counterespionage

The remnants of the clandestine parts of OSS were being held in a Strategic Services Unit in the War Department. By Executive Order 9621 of September 20, 1945, the Secretary of War was to discontinue any of its activities whenever he deemed this compatible with the national interest and was to wind up all affairs related thereto. The policy under this Order was to maintain those intelligence functions which would be required permanently in peacetime, such as espionage and counterintelligence, and to release personnel from other activities, such as sabotage and black propaganda, for which no peacetime need was seen and close them out. General John Magruder, the SSU chief, kept at this task of liquidation through the fall of 1945 and into January, until the number of military and civilian personnel had fallen from over 9,000 to nearly 3,000.

On January 29, 1946, the Secretary of War directed that the Strategic Services Unit should be closed by June 30. The SSU records, along with those of the OSS, transferred to the Office of the Secretary of War by the Executive Order, were "placed under the operational control of the Director of Central Intelligence." Title to these records remained to be settled later.

General Magruder strove to make clear that the assets of the Strategic Services Unit were indispensable for the procurement of intelligence in peacetime. In a memorandum of January 15 he detailed the irreparable loss that abandonment of the Unit's properties, plans, and personnel would entail. Its Secret Intelligence Branch, he said, had stations in seven countries through the Near East and four in North Africa that were already converted to peacetime work. There were continuing activities with the military commands in Germany, Austria, China, and Southeast Asia.¹⁰ Plans were being completed for operations in the Far East, and studies were in progress elsewhere. Selected persons from the old covert action branches had been transferred into the Secret Intelligence Branch to be ready for the future.

¹⁰ The military commands in Southeast Asia actually terminated on V-J Day. One or two SSU men were left in the area.

The Counterintelligence Branch, X-2, had some 400,000 dossiers on individuals. It was still at work against the operations of foreign intelligence services and secret organizations. This work was done in close liaison with other American agencies, and in military areas in cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Army. The two Branches were supported by components for communications (though reduced), technical services, special funds, a training program, and other elements of the old OSS still in operation.

As the new Central Intelligence Group got under way, General Magruder sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War on February 4, 1946, answering criticisms of the SSU and recommending immediate action by the National Intelligence Authority to appraise its value. Again on February 14 he urged that the Authority place the Unit under the Director of Central Intelligence and set a date for transferring all its assets. Had this been the only idea abroad in Washington, there should have been no further delay. But there was more than one opinion on the matter.

At a meeting held in the War Department on February 8, representatives of the intelligence services were still discussing which facilities and functions of the SSU should be kept, and which of these should be operated by CIG and which by the departments or other existing agencies. There was question whether the whole SSU belonged at the center of the national intelligence system. There was strong doubt that CIG should have exclusive collection of foreign intelligence by clandestine means, as Magruder was advocating. It was agreed in this meeting that "an authoritative group" should make a study and that prompt decisions should be reached. On February 19, 1946, therefore, Admiral Souers, with the concurrence of the IAB, established an interdepartmental committee to study the SSU problem.

The interdepartmental committee, with Colonel Fortier as chairman, met continuously until March 13. It listened to General Magruder and his principal subordinates, inspected files, obtained opinions on the value of the Unit from agencies which used its product, and heard testimony from ranking officers with OSS service overseas. The members made individual studies of the SSU branches and divisions.

The Fortier Committee heard that the bulk of the information for intelligence purposes came from friendly governments. A large amount of material, such as commercial and other economic statistics, was obtained from activities other than secret collection. This testimony supported the opinion that the SSU should not be taken over

whole by CIG. Another reservation frequently expressed in the investigation was that the SSU personnel had not been adequately screened, especially in the light of changes from wartime conditions and the new threat from the East.

The conclusions of the Committee were nevertheless in favor of saving the SSU structure. It was a "going concern" for operations in the field. It should be "properly and closely supervised, pruned and rebuilt," and placed under the CIG. The Committee proposed that the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of Central Intelligence should reconsider the existing division of "analogous functions" on a geographic basis—the FBI doing in the western hemisphere what SSU was doing in the eastern.

The Committee suggested that the SSU as subordinated to CIG should concentrate on the current activities of the Soviet Union and its Satellites. Plans should be made to penetrate key institutions in support of possible U.S. military operations. Liaison with the intelligence agencies of other countries should be developed for the same purpose.

Liquidation should continue substantially as proposed by General Magruder. But at the same time such personnel and facilities as the DCI wished to have should be transferred to CIG on terms of new employment. Until CIG should have an independent budget and funds of its own, the War Department should continue to supply the amounts needed.

The Fortier Committee also proposed that there should be closer coordination of the SSU with research and analysis activities. The OSS Research and Analysis Branch, which had been transferred to the State Department, was "closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief customer and their chief guide" in the selection of sources and the evaluation of intelligence. Their files were interrelated, and their activities interwoven.

Following the report of the Fortier Committee and agreement between Admiral Souers and Secretary of War Patterson, the National Intelligence Authority issued a directive on April 2, 1946, that the DCI take over the administration of the SSU pending final liquidation, which would be delayed another fiscal year, through June 1947. The

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DCI (represented by his Acting Chief of Operational Services, Colonel Fortier) would determine which funds, personnel, and facilities of the Unit were required in CIG. Secretary Patterson reserved the right to determine what portion of the funds, personnel, and facilities could be made available.

These provisions, rather than a simple executive order, were legally necessary to avoid shifting the SSU en masse from the War Department to CIG, in the way the OSS Research and Analysis Branch had been placed in State. It was necessary in dealing with personnel to bring to an end the appointment of everybody in SSU and give new appointments to those who were wanted in CIG. Otherwise seniorities, preference for veterans, and the whole intricate mechanism for Civil Service reductions in force would have prevented a satisfactory screening of personnel for security and suitability for peacetime clandestine activities.

The plans, records, and properties of the Unit were to be handled differently. There were funds, such as rupees in India, that were not to be turned back to the Treasury but retained like a stockpile for future use. There were physical properties which could be transferred to other agencies but which should be available first to CIG. The equipment, techniques, codes, and other facilities of communication came through intact. The legal question of title—the Economy Act of 1933 prevented the transfer of property without reimbursement,—was bypassed in assigning control and use of the assets to CIG. Later, the National Security Act of 1947 would transfer the “personnel, property, and records” of CIG to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Oversight

After accepting Admiral Souers' program for the SSU on April 2, 1946, the National Intelligence Authority did not meet again formally until July 17, when it conferred with General Vandenberg about his reorganization of the CIG. It was content to rely upon the Intelligence Advisory Board and Admiral Souers, personal choice of President Truman, to establish and activate the new central intelligence organization as a “cooperative interdepartmental activity.”

The IAB too held but occasional and desultory meetings. It discussed on February 4 the proposed policies and procedures governing the CIG but made no important comment. On March 26 the plan for liquidating the SSU interested but did not excite it. The men who composed it had made their decisions elsewhere. This session did

touch upon one pregnant problem. General Vandenberg, representing the Army, remarked that applications were coming in from persons who wished to be secret agents abroad. Admiral Souers preferred not to confuse the existing operations of the SSU with the permanent clandestine program. Until the latter was established, therefore, he thought the individual agencies should continue their own operations. He agreed with Vandenberg, however, that eventually "all such operations should be under a single directing head." Here was one opinion giving promise of more lively meetings of the IAB.

At the third IAB meeting, on April 8 with Kingman Douglass in the chair as Acting DCI, Alfred McCormack reported that the Bureau of the Budget had reduced the amount requested by the Secretary of State for intelligence activity in 1947 and there was uncertainty in the Department whether to continue its work in research and analysis. Admiral Inglis for the Navy and General Vandenberg for the Army both favored transferring the function from the Department to CIG if the Department did not wish to retain it. Here was another promise of things to come. Some two weeks later, as Secretary Byrnes issued an order dispersing State's intelligence research among its geographical divisions, McCormack resigned, and within four months there was an Office of Research and Evaluation in CIG.

The last meeting of the IAB before the end of Admiral Souers' tenure came on May 9. There was discussion of the request from General Vandenberg that State take over the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, and the matter was referred, as we noted above, to the Central Planning Staff. The IAB listened to the plan for the Defense Project but made no suggestions worth mention. Again, the intelligence officers present had done their deciding elsewhere. Then they considered methods of clearing personnel for duty with CIG. The suggestion of Admiral Inglis that there should be an interdepartmental screening committee for the purpose did not meet approval, and each department was held responsible for clearing the persons it assigned to CIG. The CIG security officer would have the right of review, and final decision would rest with the DCI. (This method did not prove satisfactory; the directive was rescinded on October 4, 1946, and CIG undertook full responsibility for clearing its personnel.)

There was one more meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board with Admiral Souers in the chair as General Vandenberg became Director of Central Intelligence on June 10, 1946. Souers expressed

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his appreciation of the unstinted cooperation he had received. He took "great satisfaction" in turning his duties over to General Vandenberg. As he reminisced in 1952, there was no doubt in his mind that he did. He had been reluctant to take the office. He had sought others for it in his place at the start. He had recommended a successor for his public appeal and personal attributes.

The first Director of Central Intelligence left a progress report, dated June 7, 1946, to summarize his administration and point to the immediate needs of his successor. Responsible officers in the departments had cooperated wholeheartedly in meeting his requests for personnel, he said, but the process had been slow because of demobilization in the armed forces and CIG's very specific requirements. He had given priority to the Central Planning Staff as a necessary "prelude to accomplishment." Concentration now should be upon the Central Reports Staff.

The primary CIG function was to prepare and distribute "definitive estimates" on the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries. Since it required the best qualified personnel, it had been slow in filling the complement of the Reports Staff. This had delayed too the solution of the relationship to be established with the departments, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies in regard to the production of such "national policy intelligence." Listing the interdepartmental problems which the Central Planning Staff had undertaken to solve or study, Souers stressed in particular the CIG function of supporting the budgets for departmental intelligence. "Coordinated representation to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress," he said, promised to be "one of the more effective means for guarding against arbitrary depletion of intelligence sources at the expense of national security." It was an interesting suggestion, leading far into the future of the national intelligence system. But it was not one to have smooth sailing.

The final paragraphs of Admiral Souers' progress report came to vigorous conclusions for benefit of General Vandenberg. CIG's relationship with the National Intelligence Authority and the Intelligence Advisory Board was sound. But CIG was suffering from the departments' inability to give it the personnel and facilities it must have. It could recruit no personnel from civilian life. Without enabling legislation, it could make no contracts for essential services. It was now ready to monitor foreign broadcasts, collect foreign intelli-

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gence by clandestine methods, produce studies of foreign countries, establish a central register of information, and do basic research and analysis in economics, geography, sociology, and other subjects of common concern. The National Intelligence Authority and its Central Intelligence Group should have "enabling legislation and an independent budget" as soon as possible, either as part of a new national defense organization or as a separate agency.

* * *

Textbook on Estimates

A volume entitled *National Intelligence Estimates* has been issued by the Intelligence Production Faculty of CIA's Office of Training. A ten-page exposition of the national estimating setup and process is therein followed by a compilation of *Studies* articles about estimating and estimates, to which have been added Fred Greene's and Roberta Wohlstetter's reviews of the Cuban missile crisis. The text of pertinent directives, a list of USIB committees, and the NIE subject codes are given in appendices. The over-all classification is Secret.

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

III Told Tales

SPION VOOR NATO. By *Evert Reydon*. (Amsterdam: Polak & van Gennep. 1967. 330 pp. f8.50.)

Evert Reydon, an engineering officer in the Dutch merchant marine, was recruited by the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service in 1957. From then until 1961 the Dutch Service, in conjunction with MI-6, used him primarily as an observation and Elint collection agent in Soviet ports at which his ship called. In July 1961 he and a merchant marine colleague were sent as legal travelers by automobile on an observation mission to the USSR. As they attempted to leave the country, on 20 August, they were arrested by the KGB. In October they were tried, found guilty of espionage for NATO, and sentenced to 13 years in prison. In November 1963, after considerable behind-the-scenes negotiations, they were released and returned to The Netherlands. Reydon's colleague, who had stood up nobly during his trial, telling the court he was proud of his services to his country and the West—something Reydon did not do—suffered a nervous breakdown soon after his return and has been in a Dutch mental institution ever since. Reydon found on his return that Dutch shipping companies, most of which do business with the Bloc, would not rehire him. With official help he bought a gas station but failed to make a go of it; he was a taxi driver at the time he wrote this purported autobiography.

The publication of the book in May 1967 created quite a stir in the Dutch press and was even noted by the Soviets in their domestic broadcasts. This was understandable; Reydon was the first Dutchman to have written about his espionage exploits for his country and her allies since World War II. But except for recounting the disclosures made at his Moscow trial, he offers the reader a story with little relation to his actual activities. The following caveat, which, in small print on the inside of the face plate, is calculated to be missed by most readers, betrays the real tone of the book: "All the situations and most of the persons described in this book live only in the imagination of the writer, and hopefully will live only in the imagination of the reader."

The book is divided into three sections. The first details Reydon's youth, his entering the Dutch merchant marine, and his recruitment

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and training as a "NATO spy" in The Netherlands, the UK, and France; the second tells of purported espionage activities, primarily for the British, in the Middle East, where he claims he was employed under a BOAC cover; and the third covers his training, dispatch, fancied exploits, capture, interrogation, trial, and imprisonment in the USSR. He claims he dealt with George Blake in the Middle East and met Gary Powers, Greville Wynne, and others in his Soviet prison. The book is filled with his adventures with women of various nationalities, including an American college girl in the Middle East.

Facts are lost in fantasy, with great self-damage to the author, for he had served his country and the West well. By making himself a junior James Bond he may have boosted the sale of his book, but this cheap, flamboyant story can only degrade his real contribution.

Herman L. Bauwens

THE BROKEN SEAL: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster. By *Ladislav Farago*. (New York: Random House, 1967. 439 pp. \$6.95.)

It was perhaps inevitable that Ladislav Farago, veteran spinner of espionage and other yarns, would sooner or later turn his attention to Pearl Harbor. In *The Broken Seal* he has brought forth an untidy compilation covering the whole interbellum period, much of it irrelevant to the problem of the Pearl disaster, all of it put together with approximately the care and perception we have come to expect in a routine espionage potboiler.

The book is based on extensive research, however, and it claims a big purpose—to answer the question "Since we possessed this fantastic source of intelligence [the Magics] . . . why did we fail to anticipate the blow?" It had seemed unlikely that anyone would try to improve on Roberta Wohlstetter's answers to this question (in *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*; 1962). Evidently Farago was emboldened to try by the knowledge that there were several stockpiles of source material that had not been exploited. These new materials made his book, but they also unmade it; they seduced him into admitting stories

unrelated or only vaguely related to his stated object, to the point where he seems to have forgotten that object. *The Broken Seal* is essentially not the analysis he promises but a long, shallow narrative; it makes several additions to the fund of information on the intelligence background of Pearl Harbor, but does so without improving our understanding of the surprise.

Farago's biggest such addition—a real eyebrow-raiser—is his story of how the Japanese in the spring of 1941 came to suspect that we were reading their diplomatic traffic. He reports that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, in attempting to convince the Soviet ambassador that the Germans were going to attack the USSR, showed him telegrams to this effect which the Japanese ambassador in Berlin had sent. This revelation then leaked to the Germans through an agent of theirs in the Soviet embassy in Washington, whence it passed to Berlin and on to Tokyo.

Japanese suspicions of the safety of their cipher systems appeared in messages that we read. The ciphers remained unchanged, but the Magic custodians, not knowing how the leak had happened, reacted with their near-boycott of the White House, where a couple of accidental mishandlings of Magics had occurred. The Magic service to the White House was not resumed until months had passed, and then only at the President's insistence.

What Farago has contributed here is not simply an explanation of the military men's caution (which has been explained—with caustic comment—in practically every Pearl Harbor account), but a revelation that the leak was not where their suspicions pointed. This part of the story does not lack for detail, but it does for documentation; it is attributed to anonymous sources.

Another major finding of the author's is that the Japanese decision to attack Hawaii was influenced by indiscreet revelations of U.S. military information by Postmaster General Walker, the President's representative in the "John Doe" negotiations that were conducted in 1941 outside regular diplomatic channels. Like most of Farago's theses, however, this one loses something in the presentation—and if it is an intelligence story it is a story about Japanese intelligence, not U.S. intelligence that could have warned us.

The most persistent of Farago's theses is the failure of the Magic producers and their customers to recognize the warning value inherent in the traffic of the Japanese espionage agents in Hawaii. But his chief example of this supposed blundering is the message available

on December 6 that revealed a proposed shore-to-ship communication system so clumsy as to invite the belief that whatever it was the Japs had afoot in Hawaii, it was surely frivolous. His explanation of the G-2 and ONI failure to appreciate the importance of these messages is that because they bore diplomatic addresses and signatures, their military significance was not evident. Here Farago has added emphasis, but not persuasiveness, to the testimony on this point in the Pearl Harbor hearings.

One story clearly pertinent to Farago's announced purpose concerns the inability of G-2's Colonel Bratton to get an audience for the implications of the Japanese code-destruction message that reached the Washington embassy December 3. This failure the author attributes to Bratton's misfortune in having stirred up the High Command during the previous week with his conviction that the Japanese would open the war on the weekend of November 29-30. What Farago contributes in this case is new appreciation of old information—and evidently some overplaying.

Because he indicates that his sources included participants in the Pearl Harbor cryptologic events, the reader's expectations rise when he begins his chapter on "How the Japanese Fleet Was 'Lost'" by our interceptors before and during its voyage to Hawaii. But this account is half-hearted—short and unsatisfying—and obviously garbled (for example, what presents itself to Farago's mind as radio camouflage looks like no more than ordinary radio security). This reader, led to expect an account of successful communications deception, was surprised to turn the page and learn that our interceptors realized, and reported, that they had lost the target fleet. That being the case, the loss was in itself an important piece of intelligence, which fact Farago does not appear to notice.

He implies that the Purple cryptosystem may have been used for deception, but later we find that the only deception in these communications that he is really prepared to accept is Tokyo's deception of its ambassadors in Washington. This seems a correct analysis—but we have been led up and down several confusing layers of dissimulation to arrive at a point long recognized as absolutely basic to the whole story of the disaster: Nomura and Kurusu were being told as little as possible; their instructions from Tokyo could never have revealed to us where the blow would fall.

Farago's conclusion on the question whether a "winds code execute" message was ever intercepted is simply that this remains an unsolved

puzzle. But he found, in the files seized by the FBI at the Honolulu consulate, a decrypted *telegram* whose text ("Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain") is similar to the meanings assigned to two of the looked-for *broadcast phrases*. This suggests that Tokyo sent telegrams in lieu of a broadcast that might be missed by some outposts—in other words, that the winds code scheme was left unused, presumably because it was never more than a precaution against the closing of the commercial radio circuits, and these remained open. But Farago, overlooking this plausible but undramatic conclusion, chooses to view the telegram as evidence supporting in some measure those who contended that there was an execute broadcast message.

One of *The Broken Seal's* main contributions, and it is no mean one, is its wealth of background on the Japanese preparations for war, especially their intelligence preparations—and especially Yamamoto's long-shot effort to sell his plan to attack Hawaii. This story, however, scarcely bears on the subject of our intelligence—unless Farago means to suggest that if we had had a Richard Sorge in Tokyo we might have learned these secrets, which were of course held within a very small circle.

In dealing with the history of cryptologic operations Farago acquired just enough information, and possessed just enough technical knowledge, to entangle himself in a series of stories which are unsatisfying at best (e.g., the account of the "loss" of the Japanese fleet) and badly misleading at worst. Some of his blunders require no special knowledge to detect, as when he labels as "Magic's finest hour" the report by a Navy cryptologist (August 1941) that Japan was not going to attack Russia but instead would make her major move to the *south*. Other errors are of a kind visible only to participants in the cryptologic events of the time, but these are massive ones—long accounts of cryptanalytic operations which Farago renders (a good word, *renders*) in such a way as to make them only barely recognizable to actual participants in the events, some of whom were interviewed for the purpose of this review. Perhaps the key to Farago the cryptologist is his repeated references to "encoded cipher." The cryptosystem he refers to in each case is *enciphered code*—but there's quite a difference. Even a layman, if he stops to think, will see that if the Japanese had communicated by anything so cumbersome as encoded cipher (as Farago conceives it), Admiral Nagumo might still be lurk-

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ing in the western Pacific waiting for the communicators to finish decrypting his orders to sail against Pearl.

This complaint is no mere technicality; Farago's blundering signals a warning that as cryptologic and intelligence history *The Broken Seal* is altogether unreliable because the author went far beyond his depth. For the general reader the cryptologic matters pertinent to Farago's stated theme could be treated adequately at a completely nontechnical level; that he elected to do otherwise must be attributed to a belief that any reference to cryptology, however obscure or confused, lends a certain aura of mystery that can only further the sale of books.

This is the most research-oriented of Farago's opuses, but the practiced spinner of popular spy stories still comes through. We do not read far before we encounter the inevitable Nip agent peering quizzically through thick-lens spectacles, bowing, hissing, and emitting mysterious frozen smiles. Even earlier comes that other stereotype, the U.S. diplomat wearing morning coat and affected mannerisms. Cryptanalysis, it seems, is the province of persons for whom there was no adequate one-word label until *kook* entered the language. On the attaché circuit intelligence is obtained "by a judicious mixing of sensitive topics and powerful cocktails." A fair sample of Farago's idea of cryptologic "in" lingo is "the message that emerged from the crypt." In his sentence "the strain became arrant" (during those months of brain-breaking work on the Purple solution) we detect the presence of Roget close by the author's side.

But his offenses are against more than fact and style. His documentation, though lengthy, is generalized and slippery, with some key passages left undocumented (evidently not because of any desire to shun attribution to anonymous informants, for there are several instances of this). Another form of carelessness, constantly repeated, is the burial of significant narrative points in footnotes—which leaves us uncertain as to the author's view of their significance. The most serious violation of good practice, however, is the use of selective hindsight; the whole narrative, so far as it bears on the announced subject, focuses on Hawaii and on the pieces of intelligence that *could* have alerted us, to the exclusion of the pieces that drew attention elsewhere. Avoidance of this way of reading history was the essence of Mrs. Wohlstetter's study; Farago realized he was setting an easier discipline for himself, but his awareness does not save him.

This much derogation of a veteran author's big opus has to have a point, and it is this. The flaws in his treatment of his material are

no less than tragic; for if a major addition to the Pearl Harbor literature is possible at this time, Farago's material should have produced such an addition. As a piece of research *The Broken Seal* is monumental. Earlier authors must be devastatingly embarrassed at the amount of unused material he turned up in that out-of-the-way depository, the Library of Congress, which has harbored a stockpile of micro-filmed Japanese Foreign Office documents for now these two decades. His other documentary sources—in Hawaii, Japan, even Germany—also contain numerous surprises; equally surprising is the amount of hitherto obscure material he found in published sources. Farago has given us all a lesson in Pearl Harbor bibliography.

What may be only a minor tragedy for scholarship generally is a more serious one for the intelligence community, which must now sit back and watch a new spate of Pearl Harbor studies come out, touched off by Farago's discoveries. Some of these will be improvements, where they mine Farago's documentary sources carefully and stick to the rules of the game. But it is likely that all of them will be dependent on *The Broken Seal* itself for the long stretches of inside information Farago got from private sources; thus they will perpetuate and magnify his extensive distortions and errors. It is becoming increasingly clear that if we want a straight story going beyond Mrs. Wohlstetter's—and that is surely a reasonable want—it is going to have to be produced by intelligence professionals. This is true not only because of the unlikelihood of getting an adequate "outside" study but also because a really complete study involves information still classified. Much of it does not even exist on paper; it consists of the recollections of cryptanalysts, translators, and other participants in the intelligence events.

This is not the place to write a prospectus for such a study, but a few descriptive or prescriptive points may be suggested. For one, the participants' recollections, wanted for their answers to the present-day intelligence officer's questions, happen also to make the story several times as interesting as anything written on Pearl Harbor to date. For another, the coverage of events before, say, 1939 need be of only the briefest and most prefatory character, if only to avoid burying the story under its own weight as Farago tends to do. For a third, although only the cryptanalysts can explain some of the ins and outs of the intelligence events, it does not have to be, and should not be, a heavily technical story.

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Meanwhile, *The Broken Seal* is with us. Now that this much-heralded book is to hand, we have two recommendations for anyone who wants to bone up on Pearl Harbor: (1) Read Farago's bibliography and source notes. (2) Re-read Wohlstetter.

Edwin C. Fishel

World War II

ADVENTURE IN DIPLOMACY. By *Kenneth Pendar*. (London: Cassell. 1966. 382 pp. 42/-.)

Early in 1941, an agreement was negotiated between Robert Murphy for the United States and General Weygand for the Vichy government. Under its terms we undertook to ship certain specified commodities for the benefit of the civilian population in French North Africa, and the French agreed to accept American observers to see that the supplies were used for the designated purposes and not reexported. Pendar was one of the U.S. "control officers," and this book stems from his sojourn in Morocco and Algeria from June 1941 to July 1943.

The assignment provided both an opportunity and a cover for travel throughout the area and the collection of information and impressions concerning the attitudes of French and Arabs and the degree of German influence. Increasingly, it came to involve the clandestine gathering of military information in preparation for the Allied landings in November 1942.

The account of these activities, however, takes up only the first hundred or so pages of this book. It is a good picture of the field of play: the heritage of Lyautey, the nature of the French protectorate and the Frenchmen who served it, the stresses of conflicting loyalties to which French officers were subjected, the characteristics of the Moroccans and Algerians themselves. Pendar, who before long was appointed vice-consul at Marrakesh, came to be a good friend of the legendary El Glaoui. But there is not very much specific detail about the strictly intelligence aspects of the work of Pendar and his colleagues.

This is by design, not accident, as is shown by the book's subtitle, *The Emergence of General de Gaulle in North Africa*. The last hundred pages of text, and thirty-four appendices which run to another hundred-odd pages, are largely given over to a persuasive exposition of Pendar's thesis that de Gaulle was from the start far more intent on securing his own political role in postwar France than in making a military contribution to the winning of the war. Jean Monnet emerges as a subsidiary villain who, as a self-appointed adviser to General Giraud, effectively delivered that political innocent into de Gaulle's power.

In 1967 none of this is particularly novel. In fact, the publishing history of the book may at this stage be more interesting than its content. It was originally brought out in 1945 in a small U.S. edition. A larger edition was published in France in 1948. Now comes the English edition, using the original text with only very minor changes and a fair number of footnote references, mostly to such later material as Murphy's own account of the same period in *Diplomat among Warriors*. But about half of the documentary appendices are new since the first edition, as well as a Prologue and an Epilogue in which Pendar reiterates his disillusionment with de Gaulle. He can probably look for a more responsive readership now than in 1945.

James Cooley

MY OWN RIVER KWAI. By *Pierre Boulle*. Translated from the French by Xan Fielding. (New York: Vanguard Press. 1967. 214 pp. \$5.95.)

The outbreak of World War II found Pierre Boulle on a rubber plantation some 50 miles from Kuala Lumpur. Other Frenchmen, as well as Danes, Britons, and Americans, were in Malaya as plantation managers and employees at the time. Like Boulle, most of them tried to get into the war action in some form. Some went into military organizations; a number were associated with British and American quasi-military intelligence groups in the area.

After reporting via Singapore to Indochina for mobilization, Boulle began a series of frustrations and hardships that lasted for over four years, two of them spent in prison. His friends from Malaya were part of a group that identified with the Free French movement and so found themselves in opposition to the French colonial establishment and frequently treated as traitors.

The story of Boulle's adventures in traveling to Indochina, then back to Singapore, then into Burma, and from there up into Yunnan in southern China makes up the early part of this book. He then moved into northeastern Thailand and finally into Indochina where, after a horrendous trip via rivers and rapids, he fell into the hands of the Vichy-oriented French establishment. He was condemned and spent two years in prisons, sometimes in solitary confinement and sometimes shackled in circumstances that clearly formed a basis for some of the

fictional incidents related in his well-known "Bridge Over the River Kwai."

There is not a great deal about intelligence in this book, but it does picture the process of gaining information from tribal groups in the Indochina, Chinese border, and Thai areas. The Westerner's exasperation with the tribal social protocol through which he has to work, dealing with village head men, chance couriers, porters, and guides, is clearly reflected in the incidents of Boule's journey. Withal, however, he tells the story without complaint and with some understated humor. It is interesting to remember, with respect to intelligence work, that of the previously mentioned plantation managers and experts there were a number who, trading on their experience with ethnic groups and knowledge of how to handle them, contributed a great deal to British and American intelligence activities in that part of the world throughout the years 1943-45. This reviewer recalls in particular one manager who knew the Malaya countryside well from traversing most of it in his peacetime duties. After the Japanese occupied the Southeast Asia peninsula down to Singapore, this man regularly flew on day-long trips, belly down in a B-24 bomber, scanning the roads and bridges to check on their state of maintenance and to spot vulnerabilities and other information needed at CBI and SEAC headquarters, as well as by British and American clandestine elements.

Shortly after returning to Malaya at the end of the war, either through distaste for the problems of reconstruction in Malaya or because there was at work in him the ferment of creative expression, Boule took account of his assets, threw up all his Malayan plantation experience and future, and returned to France to begin a career as a writer of fiction. This particular book, he admits in an introduction, was undertaken out of some irritation at frequently being asked what background he had for writing *The Bridge Over the River Kwai*. While the setting of the book that became the famous motion picture was geographically well to the west of his own area and the incidents in it were based on prison experiences that were not his, still the river and jungle terrain of that part of Southeast Asia is sufficiently uniform and the true hardship conditions of his own confinement sufficiently similar to those that obtained in Thailand and Burma to give the novel authenticity. If the author really needed justification, *My Own River Kwai* does the job.

John R. Ohleger

Spy Fiction

THE MAN FROM MOSCOW. By *Greville Wynne*. (London: Hutchinson. 1967. 222 pp. \$4.20.)

When one writes of Greville Wynne, one must put first things first. The first thing is that Mr. Wynne, when confronted with a great challenge and a grave threat not only to his livelihood but to life, responded with courage and intelligence. Nothing he has said or done since meeting that challenge can detract from the honor due him—not even this book.

When reading it, I had to keep reminding myself of that first thing because, unfortunately, Wynne has not written a closely factual account of his involvement in the Penkovskiy case, one which could have been the authentic statement of a man who was in his own way a hero of our time. Instead he has chosen to record his fantasies of Greville Wynne as James Bond to a degree which largely vitiates the factual material his book includes.

Wynne in reality had something in common with the seedy little men in Eric Ambler novels who suddenly find themselves thrust upon the stage of history in some dark scene of international intrigue. The fundamental difference between him and Ambler's antiheroes is that Wynne met the challenge and ultimately emerged from the difficult situation with dignity and respect. That story could have made a very moving book. Instead, we have a novel about 008½ being set on the trail of Penkovskiy in 1955 and gradually circling closer and closer to his target until the day—that London had foreseen from the beginning—when Penkovskiy turns to Wynne and confides to him not only his intentions to serve as a British spy, but his first photos of classified Soviet documents. Wynne depicts himself as a carefully selected and long-trained British undercover agent whose career in intelligence goes back to the beginning of the Second World War. The true Wynne, the indifferently successful salesman with a limited education and no serious experience in the kind of undertaking in which he found himself involved, is a much more sympathetic man and his role in the Penkovskiy operation much more deserving of our admiration.

Wynne describes at length how he foiled the interrogators who pressed him for months to confess all the details he knew of the

Penkovskiy case. He also tells stories of involvement in other intelligence operations, information which he managed to conceal from the Soviets to the very end. Unfortunately, neither as a record of what happened nor as a guide to defense against interrogation is Wynne's account very useful. There is not much point in going into the various absurdities of the story of his interrogation and imprisonment as he relates it here. In view of the arrest and confession of Penkovskiy and the evidence accumulated during the investigation prior to his arrest, Wynne's confessing to his own role with relatively little reticence is certainly understandable and would have made a more moving story than the months of clever repartee between him and his various Soviet adversaries in the Lubyanka.

The same absence of fact irretrievably mars his account of the Penkovskiy operation. I hope this book is not widely circulated among potential Soviet spies, or at least not believed by them if it is. Wynne's romantic and highly fictionalized view of intelligence tradecraft is characterized by a neglect for the most ordinary security precautions and compartmentation on the part of the British and American services that would appall anybody with experience in clandestine operations. Wynne naively describes these things with precisely the opposite intent. In his imaginings he has used James Bond rather than reality as his guide. For example, he portrays the debriefing of Penkovskiy in London as conducted in an "operations center [where] . . . in place of the prim bedroom furniture, were installed typewriters, tape-recorders, coding machines, radio equipment, a private line to Washington, and a projector for slides and films. Stenographers, typists and interpreters in case of technical language difficulties. A doctor with stethoscope, syringe, and pep pills to keep Alex awake and alert; during his whole stay in London he never had more than three hours' sleep a night. And relays of British and American Intelligence officers to question, question, question."

Wynne also tells how American and British intelligence services rounded up from Britain and America a host of twenty Soviet defectors and introduced them to Penkovskiy to assure him that former Soviet citizens can succeed in life in the West. Wynne says "the effect on Alex was electrical." If Penkovskiy had really been confronted with a room full of twenty defectors, the effect would almost certainly have been fatal.

The whole story is skewed by Wynne's placing himself at the center of the operation when, in fact, both Penkovskiy and his British and American colleagues looked upon Wynne as a vehicle of opportunity for communication. That role was, as Wynne's subsequent experience proved, as dangerous and in its own way as demanding as that of anyone involved, with the sole exception of Penkovskiy. It could have been told well and truthfully and the library of books on intelligence operations would have been enriched thereby. But Wynne chose to cast himself in the role of Penkovskiy's closest friend and confidant, as a trained intelligence officer who in many ways directed the operation, and as a man skilled and educated to fit the public conception of the master spy. Being in truth none of these things, he has written a hollow and unrewarding narrative.

And yet in writing of Greville Wynne, one must also say last things last. Who can say, without having undergone what Wynne experienced, how he himself would conceive of his own role and how he would go about exploiting it once he had managed to endure the mental and physical stress of being the courier, of being subjected to interrogation and trial, and finally of imprisonment?

Wayne Lambridges

TOPAZ. By Leon Uris. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1967. 341 pp. \$5.95.)

Two interesting intelligence cases are recounted in *Topaz*. One begins with the defection of a Soviet operative and ends with the discovery of a French officer spying for the Russians in an inter-allied headquarters. The other describes how an agent of the French service observed a Soviet missile being moved along the streets of Havana and how his report triggered the final steps to the confrontation. What is more, these stories are placed in the context of decision-making at the national level, in both the United States and France. A good deal is said about the immensely delicate situation which arises between two Western governments when one is known to have been penetrated by the Soviets. There is also some well-informed writing about the way in which Soviet disinformation operations are carried out at the highest levels in the Western alliance.

These promising ingredients, however, are ground into a crowded and overly emotional novel. French hostility to the United States is

the subject matter of the main plot, with the chief of French operations in Washington billed as a tragic hero. As the story moves toward its catastrophe this worthy returns to Paris burdened with the unwelcome news of a Soviet penetration at the top of his government. He also carries with him the knowledge that he has helped the Americans—a serious offense—by giving them the missile report. There, at headquarters, in an atmosphere laden with deceit and tension, he spends his last days in the service of his country.

Some years ago this kind of story might have been cast against the background of the cold war. Here Soviet espionage and a Cuban missile crisis are but props in dramatizing the gradual disaffection of a senior French officer. The inside view of a malevolent foreign service is not to be had in Moscow or East Berlin but in Paris. This is not just innocent fun; Uris evidently let himself go writing about the French.

At the popular level, *Topaz* has all the paraphernalia of a spy thriller. There is a love story, some sex, and a little sadism, all acted out by foreigners. The American operators are tight-lipped, dedicated, and competent, their tradecraft crisp and their operations sound. It is a simple world of the good and bad, peopled with black-and-white characters whose doings have little meaning beyond the most obvious.

For the reader who is looking for adult fare, *Topaz* must stand, then, on the appeal of the spy cases it incorporates. On this basis it does quite well. The stories have an authentic ring. They merit the reader's attention; and the rest of the book can be easily skimmed.

Gordon Stewart

L'ACTUELLE GUERRE SECRETE (The Secret War Today). By *Pierre Nord* (pseud.) and *Jacques Bergier*. (Paris: Editions Planète. 1967. 254 pp. 17 frs.)

The most that can be said of this interestingly organized and well illustrated volume is that it reveals a painstaking perusal of the contemporary press and a soaring imagination. One utterly delightful paragraph will show something of the spirit of the book:

The Chiefs of the CIA, in the luxury and calm of their offices, in bedroom slippers and suspenders—which is how they like to dress when taking their

ease—can exploit the work of the satellites such as Midas II which detects missiles. This enables them to count the number of intercontinental missiles the Russians have in stock at Sverdlovsk . . . and listen to the count-down of Luna No. Y. at Kapustin Yar in deepest Russia

It is a little bit premature to say that [CIA] is listening to the most intimate discussions held in the Kremlin—as in 1955 it listened to the telephone conversations between East German authorities, natives as well as occupiers, thanks to a tunnel which led right into the transmission center in East Berlin.

We are treated to the inevitable bit of French hauteur in the political realm, it being well known that all Americans—*in rerum natura*—are political cretins. Messrs. Dulles and McCone “were politically frequently wrong.” And “the CIA has done a great deal on the technical side in the secret war . . . The CIA is a machine perfectly adapted to scientific war . . . but politically it is weak.”

With respect to other agencies: “to become a member of the famous FBI, a G-man, one does not have to be a fine marksman or a judo expert—but one must absolutely be an expert accountant.”

The book is not pointedly anti-American. It is like any French book on America. All Frenchmen know from birth that the American intellect ends at the flat end of a screw driver and that the world would be happier if the Quai d’Orsay were to run the Department of State. As for its contribution of information, it has nothing to tell a dutiful reader of *Ramparts*.

William D. Fresland

Military Intelligence

DER DEUTSCHE GEHEIMDIENST: Geschichte der Militärischen Abwehr. By *Gert Buchheit*. (München: List Verlag. 1966. 494 pp. DM 29.80.)

It may be that intelligence organizations are the most hazard-ridden of all possible subjects for historical description. Outsiders are strongly tempted to write sensational exposés, insiders to produce whitewashes and glorifications. Sources are often mainly the personal recollections of two or three individuals with strong prejudices about the organization and with personal interests to defend. Their memories are sometimes extended with a few documentary scraps, but the files of the organization usually remain closed—a state of affairs which, however excellent for security, poses a major obstacle to serious historical study. Good history seems to require a substantial volume of hard evidence worked over by a number of independent investigators who criticize each other and name their sources.

If any secret services can be treated seriously in public print, it should be those of the Third Reich. Here the files—to the extent that they have escaped destruction—are largely open, and officers of the several organizations still survive in some numbers, so that their accounts can be questioned and compared. Much has already been published on the Nazi state and the Wehrmacht, and some of it treating subjects close to intelligence has been of high quality. Dr. Buchheit now makes the first serious attempt at a comprehensive study of the Abwehr itself; he covers a span from 1912 to 1945. Although he succumbs to some of the hazards, he has made a real contribution.

An ex-Wehrmacht officer with some intelligence experience, Buchheit has also written books on Hitler and on General Ludwig Beck, to some extent glossing over the latter's less admirable characteristics. In the work under review here he was encouraged and assisted by Col. Otto Wagner, who has become a leader of the Abwehr veterans, so that the book might be considered a sort of authorized history of the organization. It has an official history's virtues and faults. Almost invariably the Abwehr and its chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, emerge as effective, upstanding, loyal to the Fatherland, and unstained by Hitlerite crime. (Since the work of this company of

honorable gentlemen is contrasted with the misdeeds of the Sicherheitsdienst, perhaps someone will undertake a rebuttal on behalf of that organization.) In one area familiar to this reviewer, Buchheit plays down the role of the pre-Hitler Abwehr in some activities which might seem less creditable today—protecting the security of the Reichswehr's illegal rearmament preparations, or spying on politicians and diplomats for General Kurt von Schleicher. More generally, given the documentary material available in German and American archives, much of which he used, he might have made a more detailed analysis of selected Abwehr operations.

Two of the author's themes may especially interest readers of this journal. One is the problem the Germans faced in intelligence collection and counterintelligence defense on the Russian front. Before hostilities began, the military attaché in Moscow told Canaris that it would be easier for an Arab wearing a flowing white burnoose to pass through Berlin unnoticed than for a foreign agent to escape notice in Soviet Russia. After 22 June 1941 the mass executions by the SS *Einsatzgruppen* ensured the hostility of the people, prejudicing intelligence as well as operations. Soviet partisan bands were rapidly mobilized and expanded under long-standing plans, harassing the German rear and sending intelligence to the Red Army; the reader will see the resemblances between these partisans and today's Viet Cong. The French underground also became much more active after the Russians were engaged. Buchheit makes no bones about the superiority of Soviet intelligence, claiming only that the Abwehr managed to mount a serious opposition. He says that the Abwehr succeeded in recognizing 50,000 out of 130,000 Soviet agents and "making 20,000 harmless" (not necessarily executing all these; many were turned and played back). German intelligence units on the front lost 30% of their strength to enemy attack.

The other theme, one running through the whole book, is the intelligence officer's problem of honesty and honor when his objective reports are considered "defeatist" at a high level, or when he is made a witness to or an unwilling participant in inhuman acts. What is he to do when protests go unheard? In early 1940 one high Abwehr officer, General Hans Oster, deliberately gave information on impending German attacks to the Dutch, hoping to frustrate Hitler's plan. He also conspired with other generals against Hitler. Canaris did not go this far, but he did work to discourage a German attack on Gibraltar, and he warned the Swiss that Hitler intended to overrun

their country. Such extreme actions could only be justified under and against a Hitler. But on a more ordinary level, we are constantly reminded that any intelligence officer in any service sometimes has a duty to speak unwelcome truths. The Abwehr, at least as Buchheit describes it, had a good record for such *Zivilcourage*.

J. L. Lilienfeld

THE MILITARY ATTACHE. By *Alfred Vagts*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1967. 408 pp. \$10.00.)

This is a good book. It is well documented; it is interesting; it is, at times, humorous. Additionally, it accomplishes what it intends to accomplish, i.e., to give the reader a history of the service attaché post—as used by many countries—and to show the various fields of activity in which attachés have engaged.

Professor Vagts has apparently elected to delve into this aspect of his continued field of interest, the history of militarism, with little updating as to source material. He mentions a few *New York Times* articles from the early 1960's, but of approximately 50 books and lengthy documents comprising his bibliography only one has been published in the past ten years. That one is the revised edition (1959) of his own *A History of Militarism*. Also, to the best of my recollection, none of his illustrative examples involve either an air attaché or a marine attaché. It is true, however, that his well-selected quotations and incidents, though devoted to army or navy instances, make his point for all the military services.

With respect to intelligence in particular, there is little that is instructive in "Part I: Historical Outline." This first section does include, however, many not-so-well-known items for one's storehouse of anecdotes—from the caning of a Roman army officer by an ambassador in the camp of Syphax (so as to protect the officer-spy's cover as a slave of the ambassador) to the freeing of a U.S. male attaché for field duty in 1944 by the appointment of a WAC major as assistant military attaché in London.

Part II, which occupies about sixty percent of the book, is of more interest from an intelligence viewpoint. Surprisingly, though, there is much more on intelligence in its Chapter 17, which deals with "Service Attachés and the Alliances"—in two sections, before and

after 1918—than in those with the more likely intelligence titles of “The Attaché as Observer” and “Spying Attachés and Diplomacy.”

This is not a book to be read through at one sitting. There is an unexpected number of footnotes (1,040 of them), and these sometimes prove more revealing than the text proper. But even reading a bit at a time, one cannot avoid the cumulative thrust of the historical incidents which the author brings in again and again to show the conflicts that civilian-military relationships create for attachés from most nations at the various world embassies. Vagts’ quote from an instruction issued in Germany

Since no mission can pursue two policies in its relations with a foreign state, every report of a military attaché must be submitted to the Ambassador.

highlights an attaché problem of 1891—and of years before, and since.

Several attachés-designate of my acquaintance have now read *The Military Attaché*. They were distracted by its multitude of footnotes and disappointed by its almost total lack of reference to the past decade. If neither of these peculiarities will unduly affect you, you will probably find in it a good deal to enjoy, stretching the reading out over a period of time.

William C. Rein

THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. By *Monro MacCloskey*, Brigadier General, USAF (ret.). (New York: Richards Rosen Press. 1967. 190 pp. \$3.78.)

This inept concoction will not do at all.

Not that the book does great harm. It bears no malice, grinds no axes, and seems to have no deeper purpose than to turn an honest dollar. Its intended audience is no more exalted than, say, the reserve lieutenant who needs to eke out a point toward retirement by boning up on the book for a talk on intelligence to a meeting of his reserve unit. But it is a thoroughly unsatisfactory job. The reason for reviewing such a book here is twofold: to lessen the chance that, given the importance of the subject and the impressive military background of the author, some training establishment will put it on a list of required or recommended reading; and to discourage other amateur researchers from undertaking a subject so far beyond them.

The book is apparently the eighth title in its publisher's "Military Research Series," of which the other seven entries were also by Gen. MacCloskey. But military research is exactly what it is not. The lieutenant boning up for his point could compile a more accurate and useful treatment of the subject by browsing for a few hours in any reasonably good public library. He would be spared having to accept misinformation like this on the say-so of a retired general officer with some intelligence experience:

The [US Intelligence] Board meets at least once a week at CIA headquarters to weigh the input from the operating agencies and to prepare a comprehensive summary of secret information known as the National Intelligence Estimate. This report is sent to the President weekly and provides him with an excellent compendium of events and trends world-wide. In addition to the weekly presentations, about twenty-five special reports are prepared each year. . . . The work of the Board is performed by about fifty special committees. . . . (p. 58)

Those are four of the sixteen sentences on USIB, which take up rather less space than the author gives to a passage about diplomatic immunity quoted from a training manual for defense attachés. On the other hand, he does give to USIB a little more space than to Mata what's-her-name, whose career he recounts in a couple of dozen lines that end with an erroneous date and a fearless judgment:

. . . executed by a firing squad on October 15, 1916. Though much famed in fiction and motion pictures, her actual accomplishments in espionage would hardly be worthy of a footnote in military intelligence history. (p. 31)

In point of fact, the author treats his whole large subject as unworthy of footnotes. The book has none of the elementary apparatus of scholarship which any serious reader has a right to expect, and which indeed the title of the series promises. No citation of authority however flimsy, except the two acts of Congress quoted in appendices and a training manual or two; no bibliography however fragmentary; not even an index. The level of research is exposed most cruelly in the chapter on the defense attaché system, which is the field of intelligence the author knows best:

In late 1966, there were 168 Air Force officers and 260 enlisted airmen assigned to Defense attaché offices. Strengths of the Army and Navy attaché offices may be assumed to be roughly the same. (p. 113)

But what is most damaging is not the author's laziness, it is his total want of discrimination, judgment, ability to evaluate evidence.

Recent Books: Military

He read somewhere, no telling where, that Bismarck owed his quick successes over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 to the clandestine operations of "the notorious Prussian spymaster, Wilhelm Stieber." So that goes into the chapter on "historical background" (p. 27), along with Christopher Marlowe and Mata Hari. Then he read somewhere else that Bismarck owed those same quick successes largely to "the volume and accuracy of the intelligence information furnished by attachés." So that goes into the chapter on attachés. (p. 106).

In short, this is a thing of shreds and patches; one of those books which string together threadbare assertions, unverified, unquestioned, unrelated to the subject at hand, often pointless, scavenged from other incompetent secondary sources which acquired the same shoddy goods the same way. How many times have you read the flat assertion that in 1929 Secretary Stimson said, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail?" Dozens. But have you ever seen one of these hacks make even the feeblest effort to document that assertion? I never have. Here is one more publication on that low level of research and analysis.

Hugh T. Cunningham

Intelligence and Policy

THE ESPIONAGE ESTABLISHMENT. By *David Wise* and *Thomas B. Ross*. (New York: Random House, 1967. 308 pp. \$6.95.)

In this new book the authors have undertaken an ambitious forward step in exploitation of the groundwork laid in their earlier one. Where *The Invisible Government* capitalized on the dramatic effect of exposure, *The Espionage Establishment* represents a more serious and in many respects a more effective resort to analysis. This will offer little satisfaction to the professional intelligence officer who, taking his business seriously, strives to retain a general sense of proportion with respect to the nature and purpose of his endeavor. Messrs. Wise and Ross frankly deplore its nature, although they will concede with some reluctance that it probably cannot be dispensed with in today's world.

The concept of the intelligence community as a source of secret power threatening the freedom it is designed to defend remains the authors' basic premise, but they have now widened the arena. Focusing first on the intelligence services of the four major powers, they lay great stress on the institutional features of espionage. They depict the parallel roles played by the major services in their respective countries. That done, they launch a new thesis which in effect comprises the main thrust of the book. The *espionage revolution*, as Ross and Wise term it, is predicated upon the mushroom growth of vast espionage "establishments" following World War II, and on the inevitability of open and spectacular collision between them. Out of this collision Ross and Wise see emerging a new set of rules governing international espionage, unwritten but understood, which taken as a whole represent a new, permissive way of looking at the spy business on the part of governments and people.

The authors naturally view this phenomenon with considerable alarm. Reader reaction to it is likely to vary according to attitudes developed prior to perusal of the book. Viewed charitably and with appropriate concession to the authors' premises, *The Espionage Establishment* stands up under scrutiny as a better than average specimen of its genre. It is superior in almost every respect to *The Invisible Government*. The writing is good journalese, and the narrative flows smoothly with only moderate exploitation of the sensational potential

of the subject matter. While the cut-and-paste-approach is not entirely disguised, there is reasonable coherence and sustained momentum.

Good marks are also in order for the authors' treatment of the Soviet intelligence system. Drawing largely on factual data that have been in the public domain for some time, they have compiled an accurate and readable account of a subject that should fascinate but rarely does. The espionage cases they feature are all Soviet operations targeted at the United States except for the Stashynsky assassination and the mustard gas attack on West German electronics expert Schwirkmann. Soviet "illegal" operations are handled extremely well. With allowance for inaccuracies discernible to few outside of professional circles, this is probably the most lucid exposition of the subject currently available to the layman.

Her Britannic Majesty's intelligence and security services are treated shabbily in what is certainly the most objectionable portion of the book. The detailed exposure of MI-5 and MI-6 exceeds by far anything previously in print. Undoubtedly Messrs. Ross and Wise have exploited information long available to the British press which it could not print in the face of the D-notice system backed by the Official Secrets Acts. The extent and significance of damage thus inflicted on our British counterparts can better be judged by them. The authors would certainly argue—as they did in the case of *The Invisible Government*—that all they have done by cooperating with British journalists to circumvent British security procedures was designed simply to tell the public what it had a right to know. British Intelligence, they would contend, once it recovers from the shock, can go on to greater glory under the new ground rules.

The chapter on Chinese Communist Intelligence has a dogmatic ring of authority, but it falls flat upon scrutiny. Its dramatic case for Kang Sheng as the leading light of the Chinese intelligence service cannot be authenticated. A number of factual inaccuracies and much dated information mark the sections dealing with the service's organization and distribution of responsibilities. On the plus side, the authors present a reasonably accurate picture of the intelligence role of Peking's embassies and trade missions. For reasons difficult to explain, they occasionally resort to such dubious generalizations as "in the rest of Asia, and in Australia as well, the KGB has become so bogged down in counterintelligence operations against the Chinese

that its subversive activities had practically come to a standstill." Overt sources—*Time* magazine and other periodicals—would account for most of the material included in the chapter.

The "establishment" motif is played for all it is worth in the chapter on the United States. Ross and Wise appreciate the existence and scope of the rest of the intelligence community, but in their 44 pages devoted to the subject, CIA—clearly a source of better copy—receives their total attention. Names are named, some of them for the umpteenth time, all designed to reflect the Agency's intimate partnership in the select circle of public figures presumed to be in control of national policy. For background and color, all the old tales from the cocktail circuit are trotted out and replayed in apparent seriousness. A sense of humor, which the authors clearly lack, might have added some badly needed perspective and served to offset the superficiality of their approach.

In their search for novelty Ross and Wise have now "discovered" the CIA Domestic Operations Division. They make a good deal of it, and go to some pains to question the legality of the activity centered on 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue. The net effect of the effort is to cast a hazy shadow over it all, without ever really coming to grips with the issue. Specific data relating to Agency personnel and operations are taken from public sources. In this sense they do no particular damage. The net effect, nevertheless, is bad. The citizen reader in his innocence, scanning these pages uncritically, will probably find what he bargained for at the counter—a bit of sex, a touch of murder, a powerful agency relentlessly expanding, its soiled cloak and dagger only half concealed by its Madison Avenue style. Some of this is plain nonsense. Some of it is patently irresponsible. Regrettably, the specifics will escape rebuttal and the authors enjoy the last word.

When all is said and done, it is obvious that although Ross and Wise have widened the scope of their interests to encompass the intelligence services of the other world powers, they have done so only as a *tour de force*. CIA and all its works and pomps are their real concern. The main arguments of *The Invisible Government* echo again and again through these pages. They insist that the President, despite protestations to the contrary, is not informed of many of the Agency's important activities. To support this they cite President Johnson's statement last February that he was "totally unaware"

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Recent Books: Policy

of the Agency's involvement with the National Student Association. They dismiss the various forms of control over the Agency, including congressional supervision, as inadequate. Congress, they contend, has virtually abdicated its responsibility to act as a check on the vast hidden power of "the invisible government." They hold further, in reviewing the NSA "scandal," that the Special Group and the Agency violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Agency's charter. They conclude by urging that the "obsolete" machinery for control of the Agency be replaced by a visible and credible guardian, thus assuring the public that the secret instruments of government are the servants and not the masters of the national will.

It is difficult to debate the Ross-Wise thesis, in part because they dismiss one's premises out of hand, and in part because of their reluctance to accept at face value anything reflecting favorably on CIA. Their elaboration on the new role of espionage in world affairs, although contrived and specious, is not uninteresting. It will certainly help to sell the book. Few readers can fail to react to the exhortation that espionage *per se* is a potential threat to world peace, "infinitely more dangerous" now than ever before. Few can but be impressed by the authors' assurance that espionage today creates an atmosphere in which the veracity of government is questioned even when it is telling the truth. The credibility gap, according to Messrs. Ross and Wise, arose out of the Government's need to hide and protect its espionage activity. When they argue that the Government has no right to lie, few would disagree. Concomitantly, they seem to imply that the Government has no right ever to remain silent. The Press, by the same token, must ferret out the truth and force the Government to confirm its impressions.

Ross and Wise allude frequently to the "literature of intelligence." In it they see the lamentable extent to which espionage has permeated the consciousness of modern society. They deplore the genie's escape from the bottle. Oh, for a return to a quieter age! There is a tongue-in-check quality to all of this. The genie has, after all, brought zest to the new journalism, and nobody knows it better than Messrs. Ross and Wise.

Lois A. Bookhalter

COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE and Twentieth Century Diplomacy. By *Richard W. Cottam*. (University of Pittsburgh Press. 1967. 243 pp. \$5.95.)

The core of this book is the development of an "ideal type model" for foreign policy planning and its illustration in application to U.S. policy in Iran. The model comprises a statement of objectives, explicit and detailed analysis of the situation and trends, formulation of a strategy for changing these trends in favor of our objectives, and selection, through an elaborate system of probes, of tactical steps in pursuit of the strategy. In Iran, for example—to simplify radically—one of our objectives is a stable non-communist government, one of the trends is toward a concentration of power in the hands of one man who might be assassinated, so part of our strategy should be to gradually broaden the base of the government, using our overt leverage and covert assets in specified tactical moves to that end.

Intelligence comes into this not to make the required situational analysis—Professor Cottam despairs of the "bureaucracy's" ever doing such a careful and explicit job or being objective about it, and he would have scholars do it for the benefit of congressional critics of administration policy—but by way of CIA's "other duties and functions," for covert political action. It is artificial and old-fashioned, he says, to shrink from this kind of meddling in other countries' internal affairs; competitive interference is the very essence of foreign policy in the nuclear age. But it should be done early, continuously, and unobtrusively, instead of waiting until unfavorable trends have taken their course and then having to do a crude thing like unseating Mossadeq. CIA should therefore not be thought of as merely a supportive arm of foreign policy, an instrument to be resorted to in crisis, but integrated functionally into all stages of policy formulation and execution. The new interdepartmental committees are a step in the right direction.

Like most books on foreign policy, this one virtually ignores the role of intelligence proper in planning and decision. Otherwise its argument is logical, closely reasoned, and concretely illustrated, though not phrased for easy reading. One suspects, however, that the "ideal type model" is all too ideal ever to be put into practice.

Eduardo Tudela

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Recent Books: Policy

WHITE TIE AND DAGGER. By *Andrew Tully*. (New York: William Morrow. 1967. 257 pp. \$5.95.)

If this latest "inside story"—of diplomacy—is not a potboiler, it has all the disarming characteristics of one. Spy stories and diplomatic scandals from the Profumo affair to the Cuban missile crisis—in which latter it appears that the Briton Ormsby-Gore had the hidden guiding role—are dressed in inimitable graphic detail and verbatim quotations of the author's imagining and strung tenuously on a provocative theme addressed in the last chapter, "Is Embassy Row Obsolete?" This chapter offers food for pondering in a belief attributed to Dean Rusk that international "tensions will decrease if international relations can be kept in the background."

In pursuit of this line Mr. Tully actually appears to have run out of material when he had only about half enough pages for a book, so he introduces a section on lobbying, a chapter each on Red China's effort to influence Washington, on the Formosa lobby, and on Julius Klein and sundry lobbyists; and then, since that added only about forty pages, comes a section on ambassadors of history at the threshold of U.S. wars—Serurier in 1812, Lord Lyons in 1861, Von Bernstorff in 1915-16, and Nomura-Kurusu in 1941. But this cold outline gives no idea of the high humour with which the author writes. Let him speak for himself, as he describes the practical joke of a "bibulous British diplomat" on a Soviet minister counselor:

"It's not Johnson at all, you know," he told Zinchuk. "He was assassinated during the campaign, but they kept it quiet and elected a double. It was quite easy, with Goldwater running on the Republican ticket." Zinchuk, one of the more urbane Soviet diplomats, tore himself away as soon as it seemed safe, convinced the Englishman was mad. But the British envoy later reported he had checked with "an intelligence bloke" and discovered that Moscow was making discreet inquiries about a reported "accident" to Johnson during the 1964 campaign.

Anthony Quibble

CHALLENGES. By *James B. Donovan*. (New York: Atheneum. 1967. 155 pp. \$4.50.)

The purpose of this book appears to be to demonstrate the author's versatility. It is a collection of rather short talks or papers which he has delivered at one time or another, each concentrating on some

experience he has had or some role he has played. These do have a wide range: war crimes trials; his defense of unpopular clients, as of Colonel Abel; the Cuban prisoner exchange after the Bay of Pigs; and a number of different episodes from his work with the public schools in New York. Only one section, entitled "World Power and Strategic Intelligence," has to do with intelligence. It is a rather simple outline of what the function is and how important it is in the modern world, with emphasis on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. While it is nice to have such kind words appear in print, the discussion offers nothing instructive for intelligence officers, being probably well suited to the audience to which it was delivered at the Lake Placid Club in New York.

Lawrence R. Houston

Miscellaneous

THE YOUNG STALIN. By *Edward Ellis Smith*. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 1967. 470 pp. \$8.50.)

This book is built around the thesis that Stalin was an Okhrana agent throughout his prerevolutionary career, and all the evidence presented—the product of a very substantial research effort—is shaped to fit this view. The results are sometimes persuasive but frequently awkward and incredible, even to a reader who was originally predisposed toward the author's thesis.

For Mr. Smith tries too hard. All too often, when evidence is either lacking or completely ambiguous, he constructs a highly speculative and improbable hypothesis which he later alludes to as established fact. (His depiction of Stalin's supposed conspiratorial relationship in 1913 with the Bolshevik leader and known Okhrana agent Ramon Malinovsky—at a time when by Smith's own showing Stalin was in very bad odor with the Okhrana—is an example of such a hypothesis.) More than once he sets forth an impressive generalization which he himself subsequently undermines, apparently unwittingly: thus he attaches (p. 59) tremendous sinister significance to the fact that Stalin "alone" escaped arrest in the Okhrana raids in Tiflis in March 1901 but three pages later alludes in passing to a more important Georgian revolutionary, Ketskhoveli, who had similarly escaped. This overenthusiastic approach to the facts creates unnecessary distrust in the reader and weakens confidence in some conclusions which may nevertheless be correct.

The author does best in the first third of his narrative: although he does not *prove* his thesis, there seems nothing inherently impossible and much that is reasonable in his suggestion that Dzhugashvili may have been tapped by the Okhrana as a low-level agent shortly after his expulsion from the Tiflis seminary in 1899, that he systematically informed on comrades in party organizations in Tiflis, Baku, and Batum over the next few years, that he acquired a highly unsavory reputation among the Social Democrats of each city in turn, that he was finally arrested for cover purposes in 1902 when revolutionary suspicions about him were about to boil over, and that the Okhrana furnished

the otherwise invisible means of support for the family he acquired after 1904.

It is after this that Smith begins increasingly to strain the evidence. He insists that the Okhrana was behind Stalin's masterminding of the particularly bloody and ill-fated Yerevan Square robbery in Tiflis in June 1907, although he is not consistent enough even to examine the question of whether the Okhrana endorsed all the other Caucasus "expropriations" Stalin is believed to have planned for the Bolsheviks in 1906 and 1907. These operations were congenial work for Stalin, and it was through them that he first acquired importance in Lenin's eyes—surely sufficient motivation in itself for performing them. From here on the effort to explain Stalin's behavior in terms of supposed Okhrana operations becomes ludicrous in the light of what both the Okhrana and Stalin actually did. The Okhrana arrested Stalin five times in the nine years between March 1908 and the February Revolution, and it left him at large a total of 3 months in 1908, 6 months in 1909, 3 months in 1910, 2 months in 1911, 6 months in 1912, 2 months in 1913, and not at all in 1914, 1915, or 1916. In September 1911 Stalin had barely been in St. Petersburg two days before he was picked up again and sent back to his term in exile. This seems to go well beyond any conceivable requirements of cover. For Stalin's part, when he was helping to run *Pravda* in St. Petersburg late in 1912 he took a temporarily conciliatory line toward the Mensheviks—which, as Smith admits, was precisely the opposite of what was wanted by both the Okhrana and Lenin.

Smith recognizes that Stalin was not at all under Okhrana control by 1912, yet stubbornly insists (p. 202) that he must have continued to have a regular contact in the Department of Police in St. Petersburg to whom he supposedly could plan to denounce Roman Malinovsky for disloyalty to the Okhrana. One of the weakest aspects of the book is the failure to consider carefully when such links must have disappeared, at what point Stalin must have decided to opt for the Bolsheviks rather than the police. The evidence provided in the book itself suggests strongly that this occurred much earlier than the author is willing to admit, and that if Stalin had once had a foot in the Okhrana camp it was probably withdrawn by 1907 or 1908.

Harry Gelman

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ESPIONAGE. By *Arye Hashavia*.
In Hebrew. (Tel Aviv: Ledory Publishing House. 1967. 339 pp.)

This is the title printed in English on one of the flyleaves. The actual Hebrew title translates as follows: "Espionage: Encyclopedia of Espionage and Spies." It covers the ambitious effort to present in one volume of 48 chapters a historical review of the development of espionage and a description of the structure of intelligence services in the West, of present-day political and economic intelligence, and of the essence of cryptology, secret writing, listening devices, and wire tapping, as well as summaries of some famous spy cases.

Obviously, with such a wide range of topics, the author could give no more than snatches of tradecraft and some briefest synopses of case history. But he is not interested in a serious analysis anyway. He is writing not for the professional but for the layman, and more specifically for youthful readers attracted to the glamor of cloak-and-dagger activities. (Two previous books under his name, possibly a pseudonym, deal with exploration and discovery.) For this audience he does very well. He writes in a light, entertaining tone which makes for easy reading, treats the actors in the case histories sympathetically, on the whole, and invests their exploits with an aura of romance.

The book begins, predictably, with the reconnaissance party Moses sent into the Promised Land and Joshua's mission to Jericho; it ends with the U-2 flight of Francis Powers. From U.S. history come also the stories of Benedict Arnold, the Civil War nurse Emma Edmonds, OSS's Dr. Stanley Lovell and his unconventional gadgets, and Yoshikawa, "Hero of Pearl Harbor." Alongside these are ranged the internationally famous spy stories of Mata Hari and her daughter, "Cicero," Klaus Fuchs, Eric Erickson, Lonsdale, and others.

Of especially Jewish interest are the case histories of the Dreyfus affair, the Nili spy net in Turkish Palestine during World War I, the Israeli spy Ali Cohen, caught and executed in Syria, and Frances Hagen, the U.S. pro-Arab female spy caught and sentenced in Israel. There are no revelations about Israeli intelligence, however; the author's principal source appears to have been the prolific writings of Kurt D. Singer, whom he specifically mentions in several places.

Marvin J. Heiberg

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