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CONTENTS

[redacted] 25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010005-7

Intelligence has an impact during a major crisis.

POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE:
The Arab-Israeli War

J. L. Freshwater

Among the developments leading up to the outbreak of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967, there were some in Washington that provide one of those relatively rare instances in which the visible impact of intelligence on national policy is specific and clear cut.

A number of circumstances came together to make this possible. First, the basic question which the policy makers asked—who will win if the US stays out?—was sharply defined. Second, the duration of the "crisis," as far as the production of premonitory intelligence and short-term judgments were concerned, was only some three weeks, from mid-May to dawn of 5 June. The basic issues thus had no time to become fogged over. Third, the impact of the intelligence judgment was the more explosive in that this judgment ran nearly head-on into the initial impressions of some, at least, of the administration's top advisers.

This last point, which lends drama to the role of intelligence in this episode, is not easy to document. At the time, however, it was nonetheless reasonably clear that in fairly high quarters in Washington the first reaction to Nasir's opening moves in mid-May—the mobilization of Egyptian forces and their deployment into Sinai, followed by the withdrawal of the UN screening forces there—was to assume that we were witnessing the unfolding of a calculated Soviet-Arab plan to eliminate Israel (and ultimately the US) from the area. Given this assumption, and the strength—at least on paper—of the Soviet-backed Arab forces, it seemed likely that "little Israel" would lose the war being prepared against it. Furthermore, given the extent of the emotional attachment to Israel in this country developed over twenty years in the form of moral if not political commitments, it appeared to follow that the US ought to move tangibly and quickly to Israel's support. Indeed, a number of US actions early in the crisis appear to have sprung from these assumptions and this logic. Thus,

the way was cleared for an emergency airlift to Israel of spare parts, ammunition, and, because of the Egyptians' known use of chemical agents in Yemen, chemical defense equipment.

The Intelligence View

The US intelligence community was virtually unanimous in rejecting these assumptions and judgments. Soviet and Arab-Israeli experts were agreed that Nasir's initial moves must have been conceived out of misinformation about immediate Israeli intentions, and that this misinformation had reached Nasir because of miscalculation somewhere in the Soviet apparatus. On the most critical point, it was nearly unanimously agreed that if war came the Israelis would be able to defeat Nasir and the other Arabs combined, and that the Soviet military would not physically intervene. In short, the intelligence community saw no carefully calculated Arab-Soviet plan. It saw instead a Soviet blunder being compounded, to Moscow's embarrassment, by the responses of Arab leaders ridden with the compulsion to react against what they read as Israeli threats.

These contrasting views of the origin of the crisis and of the likely outcome of hostilities first collided at the top policy level on Tuesday, 23 May, the day after the Egyptians announced that the Gulf of Aqaba was henceforth closed to Israeli shipping. On the morning of that date, the President called the Director of Central Intelligence out of a briefing session with the House Armed Services Subcommittee to tell him that Ambassador Goldberg had telephoned from New York, complaining that there had been no warning of a Middle East crisis, and worrying over the possibility of a war which Israel, in Goldberg's opinion, could not win. The President asked the Director for papers on these subjects.

The Director in turn levied these requirements on his deputy for intelligence, asking that the responses be delivered to him before the White House regular Tuesday lunch.[1] The papers—"US Knowledge of Egyptian Alert," and "Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities"—were drafted by a task force [2] which had been brought into

[1] There were at that moment less than four hours remaining in which these papers had to be finished, prayed over, and delivered.

[2] A task force in current intelligence parlance is a peculiar invention, not entirely dissimilar in conception from the Manhattan Project, the object of which is to bring into organized relations all who can help the intelligence effort during a crisis.

being earlier the same morning. (The Egyptian announcement had also triggered the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board, which had been called into special session at 0030.)

The two memoranda, plus a general situation briefing for the Director's own use, were delivered to him in the ground floor lobby outside Walt Rostow's White House office. At the lunch, in addition to the President and the DCI, were Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), George Christian (the White House press officer), and Walt Rostow.

The "who will win" memorandum was clearly crucial. It delivered "the judgment of the intelligence community" that, on the ground, Israel could "hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth."[8] In the air, the Israelis "probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair." This memorandum concluded that, although the Egyptian forces had "improved substantially" since 1956, nevertheless "we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority." On the spot, the President asked Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler whether they concurred in this judgment. After they did so, he ordered both papers delivered to Ambassador Goldberg in New York.

Second Round

Wednesday, 24 May, was devoted by the intelligence community and the policy people to digesting developments and refining their appreciations. A regularly scheduled National Security Council meeting took up problems of South Arabia, while on the intelligence level the USIB Watch Committee met once again to sift the evidence bearing on possible Soviet intervention in the crisis. The Watch Committee concluded that "direct Soviet military involvement" was "highly unlikely."

Next day (25 May), however, activity stepped up. The Israelis weighed in [redacted] in Washington with a written estimate of the situation which described Arab intentions in most sinister terms. Israeli intelligence said it saw a well-orchestrated, Soviet-backed Arab plan to attack Israel, using chemical agents in addition to conventional weapons. On receiving this paper, the Director asked the Office of National Estimates to comment. Their paper was completed in five hours. Both the Israeli paper and ONE's commentary

25X1

[8] The fronts envisioned were the Sinai, Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese.

were sent post haste to the White House to Bromley Smith, the NSC Executive Secretary. The President himself had not yet returned from a one-day trip to Montreal. At a meeting on the Vietnam problem that afternoon in Undersecretary of State Katzenbach's office, the Director learned from Assistant Secretary of State Eugene Rostow that Israeli Foreign Minister Eban was making a pitch [redacted] 25X1 25X1 [redacted] and was even then talking to the Secretary of State.

The Agency's comment on the Israeli document said flatly that "we do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials," and that "it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US . . . ." The Agency's paper judged that the Egyptian positions in Sinai were essentially defensive, that the other Arabs' troop movements were gestures for political effect, and that the possibility of the Egyptians using chemical warfare could be discounted since the local conditions were most unfavorable. The paper took the position that "the Soviet aim is still to avoid military involvement and to give the US a black eye among the Arabs by identifying it with Israel." The paper concluded that the Soviets "probably could not openly help the Arabs because of lack of capability, and probably would not for fear of confrontation with the US."

Early on the evening of the 25th, a high-level group[4] assembled in Walt Rostow's office at the White House. Secretary Rusk, having seen Eban, asked if the Director agreed with ONE's comments on the Israelis' paper. Told that the Director did indeed agree, the Secretary commented: "Dick, there is only one thing I want to say—as LaGuardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut." The group then moved to the President's office.

The President had read the two papers, and again quizzed the Director and General Wheeler—was the US assessment solid? The President evidently had in mind both the question of Egyptian and Soviet intentions and the "who would win" issue, which Goldberg was still picking at. The Director replied, "we'll scrub it down again," and following the meeting threw the CIA machinery once again into gear, to produce the next day what has a good claim to have been the classic paper of the crisis, "Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States."

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[4] Rusk, Cyrus Vance (vice McNamara who was out of town), General Wheeler, Eugene Rostow, and the Director.

Reassessment and Reassertion

This paper, product of a coordinated effort by ONE, elements of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency, considerably sharpened but did not in essence alter the assessment given the President by the Director two days earlier. It estimated that the Israelis could attain air superiority over Sinai in 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the Egyptians struck first, and that Israeli armored forces could breach Egypt's forward lines in Sinai within "several" days, although the paper foresaw a need for the Israeli ground forces to regroup and resupply before they could move to the Suez Canal.[5]

As for Syria and Jordan, this paper was even more prescient. It judged that the Syrians had no capability for a successful attack and said the Israelis could break the Syrian line, though with relatively heavy casualties because of the terrain and the Syrians' fortifications. Regarding Jordan, the paper estimated that if Jordan undertook more than very limited operations, Israel could occupy most of the West Bank in a few days once major fighting with Egypt had subsided.

This paper was disseminated about mid-afternoon on 26 May. Policy makers therefore had not yet read it when they again convened in the White House Cabinet room that day. They did have, however, an ONE memorandum, "The Middle Eastern Crisis," which spelled out at some length the view of the intelligence community in general and of CIA in particular on how the crisis had come about and how it might develop. The President asked the group, which on this occasion included advisers Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas as well as the officials responsible for national security affairs, to read the paper. Its theses also contradicted the "little Israel under Red attack" view.

While ONE conceded that Moscow might have encouraged Nasir to believe that his forces could stand off an Israeli offensive once they were deployed in Sinai, the estimators did not believe that "the whole operation is a Soviet plan, or that the Soviets urged him to his present course of action." Indeed, ONE said it believed that the Soviets would almost certainly advise Nasir against a military show-down with Israel. Noting that Nasir had won the "first round" and appeared to be standing pat, this paper clearly implied that Israel, facing "dismaying choices," might well react dangerously. The Israelis had

[5] Original drafts had said "two to three" days would be needed by the Israelis to break the Sinai defenses, and "seven to nine" days to reach the Canal, but this precision was sacrificed in the debate of coordination.

the choice of risking a military strike, or of acquiescing in the "permanent closing" of the Strait of Tiran. Specifying Israel's dilemma, ONE was "inclined to believe that unless the US and other major powers take whatever steps are necessary to reopen the Strait, the Israelis will feel compelled to go to war." In discussing the Soviet role and probable actions, ONE repeated its earlier judgment that the Soviets would not intervene with their own combat forces, even though Nasir's defeat by Israel would, by extension, be a "grave setback" for the USSR itself.

Although it is nowhere spelled out in the intelligence record, the cumulative impact of these judgments over three successive days evidently led to policy decisions limiting the US material commitment in support of Israel to a fairly narrow range of "defensive" military items. Perhaps more important, it was made clear to the Israelis that, if they chose to take the military initiative, they would have to go it alone. Rarely has the intelligence community spoken as clearly, as rapidly, and with such unanimity. The result was early adoption of a policy posture in consonance with the intelligence judgment.

Denouement

This was of course not the end, nor by any means the whole, of the story of the intelligence contribution to policy planning up to the early hours of 5 June. Once the Israelis saw where the wind was blowing, they ceased the rather obvious gambits of the pre-May 26 period and took the US more fully, though of course by no means entirely, into their confidence. On 1 June, pursuant to an agreement the President had reached with the Israeli Foreign Minister, [redacted] 25X1 admitted that Nasir would not attack Israel on the ground for the moment, although he claimed that, if Israel did not act, a surprise Egyptian air strike was "very possible." [redacted] asserted flatly that Israel had erred in not striking Egypt earlier, while Nasir's deployment to Sinai was going on. But most important, [redacted] warned that Israel was being "forced to act because of the inaction of others," and it could not wait "longer than a few days or a week." When, on the next day, [redacted] was recalled to Tel Aviv along with Israeli Ambassador Harman, he [redacted] felt the moment of decision must have arrived, and that the decision must be to strike. The Director immediately informed the President of this sensitive warning.

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Directorate of Intelligence elements at CIA, configured in the so-called Arab-Israel task force, had meanwhile come to essentially the same conclusion. On 3 June the task force issued to the community a self-initiated memorandum entitled. "The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis," which warned that "all reporting from Israel shows mounting pressure for a 'decision'," while the Arabs, on their side were "sniffing blood." In this situation, the task force emphasized the dangers, physical as well as psychological, to US material and strategic interests in the area, and observed that "the damage to the US position in the area already appears serious." With these documents in hand, the whistle of Israeli jets—and the crash of breaking embassy windows—surely came as no surprise to those who were awakened early on 5 June.

As indicated earlier, however, the story would be incomplete without some reference to the flood of requests for memoranda which, in addition to the requirements of the regular intelligence and estimative media, inundated intelligence components during this period. The records of the Arab-Israel task force give some of the flavor of those days—and nights: titles included "Exercise of Overflight and Landing Rights in Spain, Libya and Turkey to Deliver Materiel to Israel"; "Nasir and a Future UN Presence Along the Israeli Border"; "Oil Tanker Operations to Eilat" (the shipping people in CIA's Office of Economic Research joined the Navy in scanning every ship about which there was even a suggestion it might enter the Red Sea); "Estimated Costs of Crude Oil Imports to Israel"; "Egypt's Capacity to Support a Sustained Mobilization"; "Reactions to the Forcing of the Strait of Tiran"; "Implications in the Moslem World of Forcing the Strait of Tiran." Nor, of course, did the intelligence community's services to US policy on Arab-Israel questions end with the outbreak of hostilities. But that is still another story.

The story told here is obviously one of a "success." The intelligence community was "right," and the "right" answers reached the very top quickly and in immediately usable form. Were we lucky? Did we merely have on tap, for this occasion, a group of unusually perceptive analysts and capable drafters? In part, the answers are perhaps yes. The present writer, having been one of them, is not inclined to dismiss the idea that talented people were in fact involved. But he is inclined to point out that the judgments were not concocted for the occasion. On the contrary, the community had repeatedly addressed itself to most of these very questions for a dozen years, through

formal estimates and—at least as, if not more important in bringing a body of experts to rub minds together—through the Arab-Israeli Ad Hoc Working Group.

This group, which produced—and still produces—the "Arab-Israeli Handbook," had been meeting periodically under the aegis of CIA's Office of Current Intelligence since before the 1956 Suez war. Originally focusing on deliveries of Soviet equipment to the Arab states, the handbook had gradually expanded into a compendium of political and military facts and current military judgments. Moreover, over the years, experts from CIA, State, DIA, and NSA had learned to know each other, to work together, and to debate on the basis of a commonly-shared corpus of information. Thus, when Nasir made his move and the Israelis reacted, the spadework on the central problems had long since been done, and the policy makers could be presented with informed judgments confidently arrived at.

The essentials of organizing a counterintelligence service.

THE ANATOMY OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

A. C. Wasemiller

The first purpose of this study was to help the authorities in emerging or young nations in which a counterintelligence capability is lacking or deficient. Such countries are especially vulnerable in this era, when Soviet skills in espionage, counterespionage, and subversion have been refined for half a century.

Even within the US intelligence community, however, some confusion and disagreement about counterintelligence persists. For example, it is often misunderstood as another name for security. Because the article strips away the flesh and reveals the bones of its subject, it may be useful to us here as well as to others overseas.

The paper describes the basic structure and functions of a counterintelligence service in a free society. The subject is not, however, a model CI service, if "model" is understood to mean an ideal or a pattern of excellence, created to be imitated. In this sense of the word, no model service exists. There are wide national variations in such matters as laws governing espionage and security, in budgets and manpower, and in the kind and intensity of threats. These differences are so great that a single model would not do for all countries, so that each must develop its own CI organization specifically adapted to its own environment and its own special requirements. It is possible, on the other hand, to describe the essential or standard functions which most such services share, and to show the kind of organization that derives from these functions.

The inquirers should also be put on clear notice concerning the gravity of the commitments they propose to undertake, and of the eventual dimensions of the task. The fact is that a defensive service usually must accept responsibilities which exceed the requirements of security if security is construed, as it often is, to consist of passive defenses against clandestine and covert attacks upon the installations, personnel, and activities of official or semi-official bodies whose methods and sources the government desires to protect against unauthorized disclosure. Although it is possible to describe and even to create

a security service concerned solely with these defenses, such an organization would soon find itself unequal to its task. Established intelligence and counterintelligence services, especially those of the USSR, are too competent and too strong to be defeated or even contained by purely defensive tactics. The counterintelligence service must be aggressive. It must learn all it can about its country's enemies. It must learn their secrets and be privy to their councils. This essay is intended as a short course in how these things can be done.

Fundamentals

Counterintelligence is both an activity and its product. The product is reliable information about all those enemies of a country who attack it by stealth. Some of these enemies are professional intelligence officers and the agents who serve them. Others act under cover to promote subversion or insurrection rather than espionage or counterintelligence. Still others may be non-Communists or anti-Communists who employ the same underground tactics to try to take by stealth and force what they cannot gain through winning the open allegiance of a free people.

As an activity, counterintelligence consists of two matching halves, security and counterespionage. Security consists basically of establishing passive or static defenses against all hostile and concealed acts, regardless of who carries them out. Counterespionage requires the identification of a specific adversary, a knowledge of the specific operations that he is conducting, and a countering of those operations through penetrating and manipulating them so that their thrust is turned back against the aggressor.

Certain pre-conditions must exist if a domestic counterintelligence service is to be effective. Once these prerequisites are at hand, the service can develop a capability to carry out its functions. The functions, in turn, determine the structure of the service.

The primary pre-condition is that the service must be established by law as an element of the central government. If its existence is not based on law, its opponents will attack it openly or clandestinely, and eventually they will weaken and even destroy it. If it has a legal basis but is not a governmental entity, its position is little better; it cannot survive indefinitely.

The service must be an element or arm of the executive branch of the government. The executive may, at its own discretion, permit the legislature a degree of insight into the service and its work. But it ought not to permit any measure of legislative control, because if

does so, the service will be unable to protect the secrets which it is legally charged with shielding. It will lose control of these secrets, partly because too many will know them for effective security. In addition, to the extent that they have control, legislators may try to use it for factional rather than national purposes. The service will stand in danger of becoming enmeshed in passing political struggles and of suffering internal splits and dissensions which mirror the factionalism of the political world.

The chief of the service must have direct access to the chief executive. The latter may interpose a person or group between himself and the chief of service for the conduct of routine business. But if the service is competent, it will from time to time obtain critical security information which must go directly to the chief executive for reasons of both efficiency and security. The need for direct access may arise infrequently, and a wise chief of service will exercise prudence in seeking it. The right to direct access, however, should be explicit and unquestioned.

The central office, or headquarters, of the service will need regional offices, except in a very small country. These regional offices should, by law or service regulation, be subordinate to the headquarters. If regional offices are autonomous or nearly so, the service can function only through the slow process of coordination and persuasion. The timing of counterintelligence operations is frequently dictated by the initiatives of the adversary or prompted by anticipating these initiatives. The delays which inevitably result from arguments about jurisdiction and pleas for voluntary cooperation would result in so many lost opportunities that the result would be a mounting heap of failures. The degree of centralization is something else again. Democratic nations rightly distrust any domestic service which wields anything even distantly approaching the power of a Gestapo or of the KGB inside the USSR.

We are here primarily concerned with the kind of internal counterintelligence service which does not have police functions and which therefore conducts appropriate coordination with the police. Sometimes, however, the two functions are blended. Many police forces have a special branch employing much the same equipment and techniques as those used by a counterintelligence service, and in some countries the special branch is the sole counterintelligence service. Under such circumstances, however, it is important that the special branch personnel be as adept in counterintelligence as in countering crime, and

that they recognize the significant difference between the two. This is a difference in targets and timing rather than methods.

The CI specialist is waging a secret war against hostile foreign intelligence services and against concealed subversion, whether it is directed by a foreign government, the international Communist movement, a local Communist Party, or any other internal or external foe. The specialist in police work is waging a war against crime. The two specialties merge when hidden hostile activity is also criminal, or when the criminal activity is concealed and directed against the country itself. When this is not the case, when the criminal is not a clandestine agent or the spy is not committing a crime, the differences between counterintelligence and police work are sharper. The duty of the police officer, for example, is to arrest a culprit as soon as possible. The counterintelligence officer, on the contrary, will usually prefer not to show his hand until he has all the information he can get. Or he may conceal his knowledge, even when all relevant facts have been dug out, in order to mislead his adversaries, to manipulate them with or without their knowledge, and thus to make their efforts serve his ends.

Whether the counterintelligence service should have police powers, as distinct from police duties, is moot. Generally it will not need them unless and until the spies and subversives who constitute most of its targets commit an illegal act, at which point the police can be called in to act as the executive arm if the counterintelligence service so chooses. Some executive powers are very useful to a counterintelligence service. Among these are the rights to take evidence under oath, to require citizens to give testimony which is not self-incriminatory, and to subpoena witnesses. Obtaining and using such powers may, however, arouse public resentment, and the price may be too high. A counterintelligence service in a free land needs the respect and support of the citizenry, which will fear and hate any internal service that uses dictatorial tactics or that acquires a reputation for doing so. Therefore, even if the law of the land allocates certain police powers to the internal service, they should be used very sparingly, never merely for convenience, and only when a failure to employ them would probably have grave consequences for the national security.

The director of the service may or may not have arbitrary powers of employment. The law may, for example, prescribe that the service will employ civil service regulations or procedures, including those governing hiring. The director may be barred from employing certain

classes of personnel: known security risks, sexual deviates, criminals, etc. All such restrictions would do no significant damage if applied to the hiring of staff personnel. But the director must have the arbitrary power to refuse employment to a seemingly qualified applicant and to discharge an employee without publicly stating the cause. These provisions are essential to the security of the service. The director also needs the right to stipulate certain legally binding conditions not ordinarily imposed. Among these are the obligations of the employee to submit to physical search of his person or of objects which he wishes to carry from the place of employment, to keep secret all information about his duties even after employment ends, to submit to the service for advance clearance the text of any speech or manuscript intended for public release, and to report promptly and in detail any contacts, official or personal, which are potentially or actually damaging to the security of the service. It does not suffice to list such principles merely in internal service regulations which lack legal force. The director must have effective sanctions at his disposal.

If extant law does not include the equivalent of an official secrets act, the director will be well-advised to consider the desirability and feasibility of getting such legislation on the books. It is probable that his charter will charge him with protecting classified information, as well as methods and sources. But he may not be able to do so if any journalist or other private person who comes into possession of classified information can with impunity make it public.

The internal counterintelligence service should not be a military organization or part of one unless the principles of organization and management outlined above can be followed. In most instances, it would be difficult to do so because, in any military agency, the intelligence and counterintelligence components are quite properly subordinate elements serving the purposes of command. The service, on the other hand, should be solely and exclusively concerned with national counterintelligence. Its personnel should be professionals expected to devote their careers to the work.

Other departments and agencies of the government will also be custodians of national secrets. The security of these other components is therefore a matter of national counterintelligence concern, especially if they have representatives abroad. However, the managerial and operational responsibility for this kind of security should not be assigned to the internal CI service. Each government element should be responsible for its own departmental security. One reason is that

a department so charged is likely to maintain higher standards and morale among its employees. Moreover, maintaining an effective watch over the security of the installations, personnel, and activities of other departments and agencies would be sure to exceed the capability of even a very large internal service.

It does not follow, however, that the service has no part to play here. On the contrary, it must try to establish high, uniform standards of security for all. It must provide advice and training to others. It should also keep them appropriately informed about hostile clandestine capabilities, personnel, and intentions. It ought to receive detailed reports from any department or agency which suffers security damage, collate this information, and draw conclusions. It should maintain a central registry of all non-overt operatives used by other departments and agencies, to prevent fraud and working at cross-purposes. It should also establish and keep current another kind of central file, containing information about known and suspected spies and subversives in the service of adversaries and about their superiors. In short, it needs to be kept fully informed about what friend and foe are doing and to play a central, coordinating role in the national intelligence community. But it does not play the part of policeman for the community.

Functions

All the functions of counterintelligence derive from the nature and resultant activities of the adversary. For an imaginary example, let us suppose that country "X" is conducting espionage against country "Y." The latter's counterintelligence service discovers that country "X" has changed its system for communicating with its agents in country "Y." Until recently it had done so through couriers who left and picked up messages written in secret ink and concealed in dead drops. Now most of the agents are sending and receiving coded radio messages. The result will be the creation or sudden strengthening of a group in the defending counterintelligence service which will intercept messages, conduct electronic direction finding, try to break codes, capture radio operators and play them back, and so forth.

Generally speaking, the function of the internal counterintelligence service is to protect the lawfully constituted government against concealed attack. The government has other defenders to deal with open aggression; the CI service is properly concerned only with hostile clandestine and covert activity. Clandestine activity is that which

the enemy tries to conceal totally. It usually takes the form of espionage, counterespionage, subversion, or—much more rarely—sabotage. Covert activity is not fully concealed; in fact, it is likely to take the form of a newspaper article or radio broadcast, or even terrorism, for which the widest possible publicity is sought. What the enemy tries to hide in this type of action is his sponsorship or other involvement. The goal of the CI service is to learn everything it can about these two kinds of inimical action, and therefore about the people carrying out the action, without letting these persons become aware that the service is acquiring such information. Only by making available to the government information about its enemies which is complete enough to include all essentials and which was acquired secretly, so that the enemies remain unwarned, can the counterintelligence service do the task for which it was created and designed.

Liaison

No counterintelligence service can do its job alone. The Communist services and parties are world-wide organizations which operate from Free Country "A" against Free Country "B," from "B" against "C" (or "C," "D," and "E") moving so fluidly across and over national borders that a defense which stops at the borders will lose its war. Therefore the service must have a close working relationship with other organizations, domestic and foreign, which can help it. The domestic departments and agencies most likely to have functions of counterintelligence significance are to be found in the executive and legislative branches of the government and in the intelligence components of the armed forces. The service also needs the cooperation of the citizenry.

Within the legislative branch of government there may be various committees also concerned with the country's security, and especially with its defenses against subversion. The service will find it profitable to maintain a liaison relationship with such groups.

The counterintelligence service will also need to maintain liaison with other friendly services concerned with foreign collection as well as counterintelligence. Collaboration with services in the former category is useful because they sometimes acquire counterintelligence as a by-product of positive operations. Moreover, their primary targets in (and outside) the host country are representatives and installations of Communist states. They thus share with the defenders of the country's security a solid common interest. The Communist services persist-

ently use diplomatic, commercial, journalistic, and other representations for cover. By working with non-Communist espionage services attacking these targets, the CI service affords the foreign service added protection and acquires useful information in exchange.

The need for liaison with foreign counterintelligence services is obvious. Exchanging counterintelligence information freely within the wide limits imposed by national considerations is the only way in which the CI service can cope with an attack so varied, persistent, and intense that no service could hope to deal with it in isolation. The information that can be obtained about hostile case officer "X" during his tour of duty is not likely to suffice for the purposes of negating his efforts or, better, recruiting him. These goals require all the information about him which has been obtained during his total time outside his Communist homeland—in other words, the help of all other non-Communist counterintelligence services. For these reasons the liaison branch is an important part of the CI service. Its structure and its place in the service as a whole are discussed below.

The service will nevertheless have to get most of the information that it needs through its own resources and methods. Some countries may from time to time be faced by a significant clandestine or covert threat which is non-Communist in nature (for example, a hostile non-Communist neighboring country, a Fascist group inside the country, a non-Communist opposition plotting to seize control of the government by force). The service then sets up a corresponding group or branch which studies the nature of the threat, acquires expertise, and uses it to infiltrate the opposition or otherwise negate or control it. But when we consider the Free World as a whole, the non-Communist threat is dwarfed by the danger of Communist activity. So much of the service's energy and time must be devoted to the principal adversary that it would be wrong to set up a Communist intelligence services branch or a Communist parties branch within the counterintelligence service. The service as a whole should be permeated with knowledge, skill, and a determination focussing on the chief target.

Structure

The service will rely upon clandestine methods to obtain its information about the adversary for the reason already given: to keep him from knowing what it knows. It will therefore need an operations branch, which consists of specialists in clandestine methods. One element of the operations branch should be concerned with planning

future operations. That part of counterintelligence which is essentially security work will be timed, for the most part, in response to adversary initiative. For example, a hostile service tries to recruit a local citizen as an agent; a microphone is discovered in the foreign ministry; or a pro-Communist radio broadcast is suspected of having been instigated by the KGB. Responses to these kinds of challenge cannot be planned in advance. Counterespionage, on the contrary, secures the initiative for the CI service and is therefore the activity with which the plans group is chiefly concerned. It also plans for non-CE opportunities that will inevitably arise from adversary initiative or by chance, from deception operations, for example, or an unexpected walk-in. Finally, the plans group should be available for consultation with any national service planning an espionage (or other non-CI) operation and wishing to avail itself of counterintelligence expertise in planning for the security of the operation at the outset.

Under the command of the chief of operations there should also be a group concerned with technical services. Counterintelligence relies heavily upon the various forms of surveillance. Foot surveillance teams may need radio equipment, purchased or built by the technical services group. The same is true for vehicular surveillance. All audio operations, microphone or transmitter, require equipment and expertise. It may for instance be useful to have a double agent record a conversation with an opposition case officer. Similarly, clandestine photography is often used in counterintelligence work. A technical capability to monitor all kinds of clandestine communications, including radio, and to analyze suspicious documentation, is also essential. Moreover, countering the technical attack of adversary services is a separate, though closely related, specialty.

The CI service, accordingly, will need a group of scientific experts capable of understanding all the technical equipment used in modern CI, to the point of building such equipment if it is not available or cannot be bought securely; of installing and maintaining it; of training others in its use; and of anticipating needs through a research and development program. An able technical services group is just as important in an agrarian country as in a complex, highly developed nation, because the adversary will press the technological attack regardless of the environment. The group is logically subordinate to the chief of operations because technology and operations should go hand-in-hand. An independent technical group responsive only to the chief of the service might too easily lose touch with prag-

matic operational needs. Placing the chief of operations in charge of the technical services group will ensure that this does not happen, and that he becomes familiar with the help that science can provide and stays abreast of current developments.

No national CI service can afford to be wholly dependent upon cooperative foreign services for the acquisition of counterintelligence abroad, nor can it wait until the enemy is inside the nation's frontiers before it begins to study him. The solution is the recruitment of certain carefully chosen citizens, from government or outside it, who spend significant amounts of time in Communist countries. These persons are likely to have contact with the CI services of such countries of temporary residence: diplomats who have social contact, for example, or industrialists in whom a Communist service might reasonably be expected to take an operational interest. Such persons must be carefully screened before recruitment. Normally, they are told to remain passive, neither accepting nor rebuffing hostile offers on their own but reporting approaches immediately and following instructions thereafter. The CI service may also arrange to have one of its members stationed in each of the main embassies of its country, as security officer or in some other suitable post. Such representation is valuable for the conduct of liaison with other counterintelligence services and also for investigations conducted in areas where the home country is especially vulnerable to clandestine attack. Direct representation abroad will, however, create difficulties for an internal counterintelligence service unless there is careful planning and meticulous prior coordination with other national elements represented in the same country—the foreign service, for example, and certainly the foreign ministry. Care must also be taken not to offend the host service or government.

Persons in the first category (recruits rather than staff members of the service) should be important enough so that the adversary service will take them seriously and assign senior personnel to recruiting and managing them, but they should not usually have access to important national secrets unless that access can be concealed indefinitely from the adversary.

The operations branch should also have an operating group with separate sub-groups allocated upon either a geographical or a functional basis. This branch runs the operations: surveillance and countersurveillance, penetrations, provocations, double-agent operations, technical and counter-technical operations, counterintelligence interroga-

tions and debriefings, handling of walk-ins and defectors, joint operations with liaison, and so on. It is the largest component of the service. If the country and its service are large, it is suggested that a geographic organization will prove preferable, because this kind of structure will permit appropriate grouping of language skills and area knowledge.

If the service is small or has few language and area specialists at its command, a functional arrangement may be better. In this event the operations branch will need a minimum of four groups or subgroups, for counter-espionage, counter-subversion, counter-propaganda, and operational security. Thus, counter-espionage conducts all operations directed against hostile foreign services engaging in positive or counterintelligence activity in the country. Counter-subversion carries out all operations aimed against subversive activity; its principal target will be the local Communist party and international Communism. Counter-propaganda will monitor and control those propaganda activities directed from concealment against the national interests by foreign services or by local or foreign Communist parties. The key words here are "from concealment." If the sponsorship of a propaganda attack is openly acknowledged, the government can deal with it openly. But if sponsorship is concealed, the government must depend upon its CI service to ferret it out and expose it, suppress it, or otherwise manipulate it so that it cannot harm the national interest.

Finally, operational security works closely with the plans group and with other operational elements to ensure that the service's clandestine activity is properly hidden from the outset and stays that way.

The second unit may be called Research, Records, and Reports (RRR). The CI service must grow in knowledge and capability; it is the function of the RRR component to see that it does so. As more and more is learned about the adversaries, the information is funneled into RRR, where it is organized, studied, recorded systematically, filed and retrieved, and used to produce the finished counterintelligence which Operations needs in order to work intelligently. RRR is not, however, restricted to close operational support. Operations writes case reports; RRR writes summary reports based on case reporting, but it also writes strategic as well as tactical papers. It moves from the KGB officer (who is the subject of operational reporting) to the Soviet Embassy (tactical reporting) to a finished compilation of what the service knows about the Soviet services (strategic reporting). Moreover, as the result of such studies, RRR becomes the promulgator

of counterintelligence doctrine. Scrutinizing the enemy's successes and failures, as well as the triumphs and mistakes of its own service, it is in a position to discern and express underlying principles.

From this generalizing activity, additional functions flow in the areas of training and regulations. Some services make training an autonomous or semi-autonomous function, headed by a director who reports more or less directly to the chief of the service. The disadvantage is that under such an arrangement training tends to grow isolated both from the operational context (that is, the living or recent operations conducted by the service) and the immediacy of doctrine (the constant learning from experience). Incorporating training into RRR creates an organic rather than an architectural structure. The life blood of operations and the living bones of doctrine thus become natural parts of the body of training.

The service needs internal rules, and these are best when they are a codification of doctrine. It is possible to write up internal service regulations abstractly, on a basis of what seems theoretically desirable, but such regulations tend to be legalistic, bureaucratic, and arbitrary. One desirable aim is to issue as few regulations as possible, to keep them simple in both language and intent, and to derive them, like laws, from experience and probabilities in the real world rather than upon theories and remote possibilities. Placing the regulations group in the RRR Branch will help to ensure an unblocked flow and transformation from operational facts to collated facts to underlying and unifying concepts to a body of coherent doctrine. RRR will, of course, check out draft regulations with the office of the Legal Advisor and other interested elements of the service.

The service will of course have a central collection of files or archives. If the service is large or growing, its holdings are also likely to be large or growing. Deciding what raw information should be destroyed and what kept, how it should be indexed and filed, how best to retrieve it, who shall have access to it, and all the related questions are matters peculiarly within the province of the RRR Branch. Accordingly, it should have the files or central library group under its jurisdiction.

The remaining parts of RRR, like certain elements of operations, can be organized geographically or functionally. Whichever kind of organization was chosen for operations, it is desirable to match it in RRR. If the structure is geographic and there is a USSR group in operations, it is helpful if there is also a USSR group in RRR. If

the structure is functional, then only two more RRR groups may suffice, a research and collation group and a studies group. The former receives all raw and finished counterintelligence coming from operations, from other elements of the service, from liaison, and from any other sources. From this flow of mixed information it sorts out the various subjects into separate holdings. It forwards to operations and other service elements useful counterintelligence which those elements did not themselves produce. It also produces raw or immediate CI reports of significance for the chief of service, for other national services, other departments and agencies of the government, and for liaison exchange. It endeavors to assure that these reports have a uniform format. Finally, the research group maintains controls on dissemination and sources of its reports. The studies group produces finished counterintelligence.

The third major component is the security branch. As has been said, the security of operations is itself an operational function and is therefore assigned to the operations unit. The remaining elements of security are the responsibility of the security branch. These include the security of methods and sources, physical security, and security of personnel.

The Source Records and Control Group maintains the records of all non-staff personnel formerly or currently employed by the service. An officer of the service who plans the recruitment of a source submits to this group all available information about the potential recruit, and the group checks other service and governmental files as appropriate. It passes the results to the personnel security group if investigation of the prospective agent is indicated. If any other department or agency of the government, in addition to the national counterintelligence service, recruits and directs clandestine or covert assets, the personnel security group receives from the department or agency concerned prior notification of intent to recruit. On this basis it maintains an interdepartmental or government-wide roster of agents and can thus give notice if one department plans recruitment of a person already employed by another, of any derogatory information, and of other contraindications.

The physical security group is responsible for fences, floodlights, guards, passes, safes, and the like, and the personnel security group conducts background investigations of potential staff and agent personnel. It also conducts investigations of any employee suspected of serving a hostile service as a penetration or of otherwise jeopardizing the security of the service.

The functions of the liaison branch were mentioned earlier. It may be useful to divide it into two groups, one concerned with domestic liaison (relationships with other elements of its own government), the other with liaison with foreign services.

The service needs a minimum of four other offices: those of the inspector general, the chief of administration and personnel, the legal advisor, and the public affairs officer.

The inspector general has two main functions, in addition to routine inspection. One is to prevent or detect abuse of the service by the employee: theft, falsified reporting for personal gain, abuse of official status for personal motives, and the like. The second is to prevent or detect abuse of the employee by the service. Any staff employee who believes that he has been treated unjustly and who has unsuccessfully sought redress through normal channels should have the right of access to the inspector general or a member of his office, and no punitive action should result if he avails himself of this right. If this avenue is not open, a frustrated employee can become highly dangerous to the security of the service. The office of the inspector general carries out its own investigations as necessary. The results are made available to no one outside the office except the chief of the service, who may at his discretion communicate them on a need-to-know basis to another service component. For example, if investigation undertaken by the inspector general on the basis of an employee's complaint should reveal insecure or disloyal conduct by the employee, the IG will pass this information to the chief of the security branch, who relays it to the chief of the personnel security group for action.

The office of the chief of administration and personnel handles the payroll, assignment of vehicles, vacation rosters, office equipment, promotions, and all similar matters.

The legal advisor and his staff maintain liaison with the legislative branch of the government if the chief executive wants such liaison to exist. The legal advisor's office reviews all service regulations before promulgation to ensure compatibility with law. It drafts, or cooperates in drafting, legislation not yet enacted but essential to the service. The legal advisor counsels the chief of service on legal matters, including the protection of sources and methods. He is also responsible for ensuring that counterintelligence cases can be turned over to the police without violation of the chain of evidence or other legal considerations and without security hazard to the service itself.

The public affairs officer is charged with maintaining essential public, non-governmental relationships. Private citizens who seek contact with the service because they believe that they have significant information—or for any other reason—are directed to this office. So are journalists, businessmen, and all other persons seeking non-official contact.

It is vital to national security that all significant counterintelligence obtained by governmental components other than the service, such as the armed forces, or by non-governmental groups or private individuals, be funneled into the service, either through the liaison branch or through the public affairs office. This information is screened and collated by the research, records, and reports branch and entered into files as appropriate. In this way the central holdings become the national counterintelligence repository. Each department or agency, other than the service, which conducts liaison with one or more foreign intelligence or security services should provide the national CI service with enough information about each such liaison relationship so that the service knows at all times who is doing business with whom.

This paper has attempted to lay out the functions and structure of the internal counterintelligence service. The problems that the service faces are, of course, another matter: these will vary with the size of the country and its population, the amount of support accorded the service by its government and citizenry, the qualitative level of the service's personnel and equipment, the intensity and skill of the concealed attack by Communist intelligence services and parties, the effectiveness of liaison and liaison exchange conducted with other governmental departments and agencies and with foreign services, the legal mandate of the service, and many lesser factors. The counterintelligence service of a stable country with few disloyal citizens is plainly in a far more advantageous position than is a service in a land in which revolutionary sentiment is widespread, the government is unpopular, and the opposition is nearly strong enough to resort to force or has already launched guerrilla war. Whatever the problems and their gravity, any counterintelligence service can deal with them more effectively if it manages to combine two seemingly antithetical qualities: patience and aggressiveness.

CI work is laborious and involves frustrations which, if not met patiently, will incline the service to hasty action, such as an abrupt declaration that a Soviet intelligence officer is *persona non grata,*

or the quick arrest of a single spy. The service which has identified a spy or his handler has taken the first big step. If it patiently studies such people, it may in time be able to control them, not merely suppress their activity, which is then resumed by unidentified successors. But patience by itself leads to the acquisition of counterintelligence for its own sake, a grave error. All counterintelligence, in principle, should be used as a basis for counteraction. The questions are, what kind of action and when? Neither question can be answered until the last piece of pertinent information is at hand.

The effectiveness of counterintelligence in the free world is crucially important to all of us. As in the past, intelligence and CI services properly continue to serve national ends. Yet the skilled cooperation of the non-Communist services in all areas of common interest is of growing importance. It is hoped that the facts and ideas discussed in this paper will contribute in some small measure both to internal or national capabilities and to our capacity for international cooperation.

Growing pains in astronautics intelligence.

THE CASE OF THE SS-6

M. C. Wonus

The public display of a Soviet SS-6 rocket at the Paris Air Show in 1967 jolted the US scientific astronautics intelligence community into awareness of many weaknesses in its evaluative processes. These revelations were of much greater intelligence significance than the factual information gleaned from inspection of the missile itself.

The space rocket is one of the new intelligence targets to emerge in the past decade, and its unique character has necessitated the invention of new and comparatively sophisticated collection and analysis devices. To insure the effective operation of these extremely complex and expensive mechanisms, the results of their employment require continuous evaluation. A variety of intelligence inputs including telemetry and radar signature information had been available for a number of years on the Soviet SS-6 system, but it was not until the display of the SS-6 that the US intelligence community had a chance to assess Soviet rocket technology directly and extensively. Its appearance thus afforded the first real opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the collection and analysis efforts which had been directed against Soviet missile and space programs for a decade.

As a result it became possible to identify many shortcomings in the analytical phase of the intelligence cycle. Successful attempts have now been made to remedy most of these. The primary benefit to intelligence of the appearance of the SS-6 in Paris is thus not to be measured by what it revealed about the technical characteristics of the system, but rather by the subsequent improvements in our analytical processes.

In retrospect, it is clear that the principal shortcomings of our analytical cycle did not result from mistakes in the interpretation of the available data, nor from deficiencies in the quality or quantity of the data. Instead, error most frequently arose from attempts to relate Soviet technology directly to that of the United States. It is now evident that this approach involves a dangerous assumption, and that Soviet technological approaches in the field of astronautics often



The SS-6 Rocket in Paris Air Show, May 1967

differ significantly from those of the United States. Erroneous judgments reached by ignoring available intelligence because it gives answers seemingly inconsistent with "our way of doing things" have unfortunately been common in the scientific intelligence field.

Initial firings of the SS-6 occurred in late 1957. Although conceived as an ICBM, it was immediately adapted to serve as a space booster, and as such has been the workhorse of the Soviet space program for the past decade, being flown with a variety of upper stages on several different kinds of space missions. The frequency of its utilization afforded opportunities to collect a wealth of intelligence information about it during all phases of its flight. For example, telemetry was available on the ICBM version from a period well before lift-off until impact. It should have been possible to reconstruct the detailed anatomy of the launch vehicle with considerable accuracy. The intelligence assessment of the system, however, was disappointingly wide of the mark.

The Specific Analytical Illnesses

In particular, the specific propellant combination employed by the system was incorrectly determined because the volumetric ratio of the bi-liquid was derived from a telemetry interpretation which *assumed* the sustainer tanks were of the same diameter.

The most surprising feature of the SS-6, the use of multi-chambered engines, was not recognized. This was due to an adverse influence of US design practice on the thinking of intelligence analysts.

The specific impulse [1] of the first stage of the system, and the overall energy capability of the stage, were incorrectly derived; both because of the assumption that the area ratio of the first stage engines should be related to the area ratio of the sustainer engine in about the same manner as in engines of US design of the same type. Many intelligence officers within the community were correct in their assessment of the specific combination employed, but unfortunately their adversaries, guided by the "divine righteousness of domestic design concepts," overruled their superior technical judgments.

The weight and thrust of the system were incorrectly derived, first of all because of the error made in deriving the specific impulse of

[1] Specific impulse is a measurement of the energy potential of a given mix of propellant. Numerically, it is equal to the number of pounds of thrust developed per pound of propellant burned per second.

the first stage, and secondly, because structure factors, or structure weights, were assumed, based on comparable US state-of-the-art in vehicle fabrication and handling.

The detailed configuration of the four boosters was improperly interpreted, principally because of the erroneous assumption that liquid propellant tanks for large rocket vehicles would logically be formed from right circular cylinders. Additionally, the general configuration (parallel, or partial), was misinterpreted by many. This argument, incidentally, grew into one of the major intelligence controversies of the decade. Those who turned out to be wrong on this issue based their decisions upon "domestic logic" rather than objectively interpreting available intelligence information such as intercepted radio telemetry. The basic Soviet philosophy of building and handling large rocket vehicles was therefore misunderstood because of the foregoing errors.

On the other hand, there were some outstanding analytical achievements in the interpretation of the intelligence information collected from the SS-6. Although a number of errors were made in the overall assessment of the vehicle, the most important parameter, the payload weight capability, was, however, derived correctly. This was possible because the energy capability and major performance parameters of the second stage were interpreted correctly. There was some support for the view that the SS-6 employed a kerosene-base fuel, but the majority view that the oxidizer was liquid oxygen turned out to be correct. Although the number of combustion chambers was incorrectly derived, the presence of four engines in the first stage and one engine in the sustainer stage was correctly derived. The detailed plumbing of the propulsion system and the positioning of the propellant tanks were also correctly deduced.

The Diagnosis and Recommended Cure

An extensive investigation was undertaken into why incorrect results were achieved in our initial assessment of this rocket vehicle. It was first of all determined that the quality and quantity of the data which were collected on the system were indeed adequate to permit the analytical entities to accurately derive the performance, characteristics, and configuration of the vehicle. The mistakes were almost entirely the result of poor judgment.

First of all, the incorrect interpretation of the propellant combination employed in the second stage of the system gave our planners

a false impression of the Soviet state-of-the-art in propulsion and propellants. The Soviet test engineers telemetered an instrumentation device from both tanks of the sustainer stage which gave a time history of the level of the propellant in each of the two tanks. Therefore, if the diameters of the tanks were the same, the relative rates at which the liquid surfaces were dropping in the tanks, as propellants were burned, would represent the volumetric ratio at which the propellants were being burned. The volumetric ratio of the propellants is thus a very important input in the determination of the specific propellant combination employed in a given missile. Considering the general characteristics of the SS-6 sustainer stage, and using US technology as a standard, the intelligence community assumed that the tanks were the same diameter. Unfortunately they were not. A mixture ratio of about 1:1 was derived from this assumption, and when considered with other pertinent inputs such as specific impulse, the specific combination was determined to be an amine-base fuel with liquid oxygen as the oxidizer.

It was immediately obvious upon seeing the vehicle in Paris that the lower tank of the sustainer had a significantly smaller diameter than the upper tank, as a consequence of the manner in which the first stage sections were faired into the sustainer section. Because of this, the volumetric ratio of the propellants was really about 1.60:1, in contrast to the 1:1 ratio which had been derived from telemetry. The propellant combination in the case of the 1.60:1 ratio would logically be kerosene for fuel and liquid oxygen as the oxidizer, consistent with the Soviet announcements at the time. Thus, an erroneous assumption overemphasizing the importance of comparable US practices, led the community astray. This was the first lesson learned from the reassessment, and an important one to consider in future efforts of this type.

Since we were absolutely confident of the scale factor of the accelerometer telemetered from the sustainer stage of the SS-6, determined through a study of on-pad telemetry, we were certain of the derived specific impulse of the second stage. Although a great deal of acceleration information was available on the operation of the first stage of the vehicle, from which a specific impulse value of that stage could have been independently derived, deficiencies in our analytical methodology limited this direct derivation. In the absence of a direct computation of the first stage specific impulse, the intelligence community again turned to US technology for an indirect derivation of this energy value. It was correctly assumed that the first and

sustainer stages of the SS-6 employed the same propellant combinations. Thus, by "scaling down" the sustainer specific impulse value, according to US optimum design, the SS-6 first stage value was determined.

Again, we went astray. As is typical of the Soviets, they adapted a single rocket engine for use on both the first and sustainer stages of the vehicle. Consequently, the area ratios and the vacuum specific impulse values were nearly the same in both stages. Intercepted telemetry from engine parameters gave this indication of common engines in both stages. However, rather than believe this direct evidence, the community once again erroneously relied too heavily on US design precepts. Thus, lesson number two was that the Soviet approach to rocket engine design can be radically different from that of the US, and that a direct comparison of the type made above can be dangerously misleading. The community should have attempted to remedy the deficiency in its analytical capability, in order to solve for the specific impulse of the first stage directly.

The failure of the intelligence community to recognize that a multi-chambered engine was employed in the SS-6 was embarrassing. In this instance a lack of telemetry from the early firings of the system contributed significantly to the failure. Considering the other indicators available, however, the engine configuration should have been recognized. When the Soviets fly multi-chambered engines they generally employ special instrumentation to monitor the pressure trail-offs of the individual chambers. This special monitoring is easily recognizable, but is generally carried only on the earlier flight tests of a system. The community was denied this initial indicator because powered flight telemetry was not intercepted from these early firings of the SS-6.

A combination of the comparatively high specific impulse and thrust level of the SS-6 engine, considering the 1957 time frame when it was being initially flown, however, should have alerted analysts to the fact that something was amiss. In addition, the strategic system which preceded the SS-6 in research and development flight testing, the SS-4, as well as systems which immediately followed it, such as the SS-5 and SS-7, incorporated multi-chambered engines. Analysts within the community were reluctant to accept the multi-chambered engine configurations of both the SS-4 and SS-5, even in the light of evidence that such was the case. Although the tendency was not as clear as in the case of the SS-6, it seems rather certain that the analysts

were reluctant to accept these indications because of the radical disagreement with US design philosophies.

The error made in the derivation of first stage specific impulse, combined with the failure to recognize that the same engine was used in both powered stages, resulted in a poor assessment of the structure weight of the first stage of the system. Although this was not of serious consequence to intelligence consumers, a more accurate assessment would have been of considerable help to analysts in their overall interpretation of the vehicle. The vehicle also turned out to be much more rigid than had been deduced by relating it to comparable US vehicles. Other incorrect findings in the analysis of the SS-6, including the thrusts and weights of the stages and the true configuration of the booster stage, were also principally prompted by undue stress on analogies in US rocket technology.

The combination of several incorrect results thus gave planners an erroneous concept of this highly significant Soviet system. In matters of space research, this may not be considered wholly intolerable. If the intelligence target in this instance had been an intercontinental missile delivery system, however, the consumers might not have been disposed to be so charitable.

The episode of the SS-6 thus illustrates the familiar tendency of the constituents of our analytical machine to get locked into inflexible departmental attitudes. It shows that these can be mistaken, and it shows the difficulty of making corrections. From the point of view of the individual analyst, the lesson is clear. He should by all means be very much aware of domestic technology associated with his assignment, but he should never feel safe in assuming that the Soviets are necessarily taking the same route as the US in their solution of related technological problems. Assumptions which must be made in the interpretation of the data should be based upon previous design philosophies of the target nation, or upon general indications available from the data base, and seldom, if ever, upon domestic philosophies. And finally it goes without saying that the analyst should also remain aware of his grave responsibility for being objective in his interpretation of the data, particularly in his dealings with counterparts in other analytical entities of the government.

Central intelligence becomes an agency, still struggling to establish its position and function.

DCI HILLENKOETTER: SOFT SELL AND STICK

Arthur B. Darling [1]

The man to succeed General Vandenberg at the head of the President's information service had been under consideration for some time. Though often credited with the choice, Admiral Souers took no part in selecting Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter. Another personal representative of the President, Admiral Leahy, did.

A New DCI

While Ambassador at Vichy from 1940 to 1942, Admiral Leahy had formed a high regard for his naval attaché's skill in working with the French underground. Hillenkoetter was expert at helping patriots escape into Africa and acquiring information from both French and German sources. "He never got caught." Earlier, he had been so successful with Ambassador Bullitt in Moscow and in Paris that the State Department wished to keep him; the Navy, according to Leahy, had had to recall him into service so that he might learn something about ships.

In 1942 Hillenkoetter organized an Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor for Admiral Nimitz and won his commendation. Then General Donovan tried to get him to take charge of OSS operations in the Pacific, but the Navy would not release him. After the war he returned to Paris, where he was engaged in collecting intelligence when he was ordered, against his wishes, to Washington to become Director of Central Intelligence.

Admiral Leahy and Navy Secretary Forrestal recommended Hillenkoetter to their fellow members of the National Intelligence Authority [2] when the Army asked to have Vandenberg returned for high

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[1] Adapted from a history of central intelligence to 1951 prepared by the author in 1953. For previous portions see *Studies* VIII 3 p. 55 ff, X 2 p. 1 ff, XII 1 p. 55 ff, XII 3 p. 79 ff, and XII 4 p. 73 ff.

[2] Predecessor of the National Security Council.

command in the nascent USAF. It was on February 17, 1947, that the NIA and the President approved this assignment for the recently promoted Rear Admiral, effective when Vandenberg should leave. The date is to be noted. It was but five days after Vandenberg had been named, as DCI, executive agent for the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy in intelligence matters, an event which was to have a decided effect upon Hillenkoetter's administration of the Central Intelligence Group and its successor Agency.

From the point of view of central intelligence, it may well be said that General Vandenberg should not have been called back into military service at that time. He had been in charge of the CIG for less than a year; its new offices were not in full working order. He had just established in the minds of the departmental secretaries that the DCI ought to be their executive agent. He had not convinced the departmental chiefs of intelligence that he was an officer above them, not under their control. They were not accepting the distinction between advice and consent. They were still, as Vandenberg left and Hillenkoetter came in the spring of 1947, endeavoring to have the business of the DCI come before them, constituting the Intelligence Advisory Board, for consent or dissent on its way to the National Intelligence Authority.

General Eisenhower, responsible in large part for the recall of Vandenberg to the Air Force, may have known little or nothing of these matters. But he readily agreed, testifying on the pending CIA legislation that May, that frequent change was wrong; there should be stability in the office of Director of Central Intelligence. Three years, Eisenhower then thought, should be the least term of service, subject of course to exigencies.

One may wonder why the third DCI was not drawn from the Department of State. It was, so to speak, the State Department's turn after one each from the Navy and the Army. There was in fact a plan fostered in the State Department to make Allen W. Dulles the first civilian DCI. Robert Lovett had mentioned him to the secretaries in November 1945; his effective work for OSS in Switzerland had attracted attention. He was publishing a book on his experiences. His views had been sought on scientific intelligence by the Technical Advisors of the Joint Research and Development Board. He was soon to give testimony before Congress on the need for central intelligence and its possibilities as a civilian career.

No answer to the question can be final. There were personalities involved. President Truman's own ideas and opinions of men had been at work when he abandoned the Office of Strategic Services, let Donovan return to his law practice, and established the Central Intelligence Group; then in the first days of CIG Secretary Byrnes raised objections which led Truman to emphasize that this was his personal information service and Admirals Leahy and Souers his personal representatives.[3] Congressional antipathies toward the Department of State were endemic for many reasons, including the suspicion that it was infested by radicals. But the most important factor may have been the influence of the Army and the Navy, supported by Admiral Leahy, who were uneasy at the prospect of a preponderant central intelligence organization now moving from the basis of executive order to institution by law.

Legal Status and Practical Problems

The Central Intelligence Agency would be created by the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, whose main purposes were the establishment of an independent Air Force and the unification of the military departments under a Secretary of Defense. Much work had gone into drafting an enabling act for the CIA, but it was decided that the time was not ripe for so complete and detailed a measure. Some of its provisions were too controversial and subject to attack by other agencies; objections would at least delay the passage of the unification act.

In the draft National Security Act proposed by the President, the brief section devoted to the Central Intelligence Agency provided essentially only that such an agency, under a DCI, should take over from the CIG the functions it was performing under executive direction and should be responsible to the National Security Council, replacing the National Intelligence Authority. The Congress, however, because of fears that such a *carte blanche* to the Executive might some day be abused, added amendments in which some functions, prerogatives, and limitations of the new Agency and the DCI were spelled out.

Headed by a DCI who might be drawn from either military or civilian life, the Agency, according to the Act now before Congress in final form, was to advise the NSC on the policies and objectives

[3] See *Studies* XII 1 p. 61.

of the national intelligence mission and make recommendations for the correlation of departmental intelligence activities. It would correlate, evaluate, and disseminate the national intelligence product. It would have no police powers and would not infringe on the internal security functions of the FBI. All intelligence relating to the national security should be open to the inspection of the DCI, and he was responsible for safeguarding the sources and methods of intelligence. He could terminate any CIA employee at his discretion. The Agency should perform such services of common concern as the NSC might judge to be most efficiently so centralized, and it should have other functions and duties related to intelligence that the NSC might assign.

These stipulations followed generally those of the President's Directive of January 22, 1946, which had set up the CIG. There were slight modifications and differences in emphasis. There was now less distinction made between the functions of the Agency and those of the DCI with respect to the departmental intelligence agencies, and the DCI was no longer empowered to inspect the activities of the latter. His right to fire employees at discretion was new; strictly, in CIG he had no employees of his own. A significant omission from the Act was any provision for an Intelligence Advisory Board composed of the departmental intelligence chiefs to work with the DCI. He was empowered to appoint an advisory committee if he wished.

But the departmental chiefs were determined that the IAB should be perpetuated and should have governing functions. They had been annoyed that Vandenberg insisted upon being in a sense their superior, certainly not their servant. Now Hillenkoetter, a newcomer among the admirals and generals, was made at once sharply aware of the animus toward Vandenberg for getting himself designated the executive agent of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. The military men let Hillenkoetter know that the Army and Navy had been in existence a long time while he was merely head of a civilian agency but recently established.

Vandenberg had urged that the DCI be designated Advisor to the NSC in the National Security Act. This suggestion was too controversial, but the concept remained in the CIA function of advising the NSC on intelligence matters pertaining to the national security. Admiral Hillenkoetter thus had authority from Congress to advise the National Security Council if he chose without first consulting a board of departmental intelligence chiefs—unless of course the NSC

should direct him so to consult. This direction the members of the expiring Intelligence Advisory Board were determined to obtain.

The new DCI furthermore inherited complicated relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board in the national military establishment, and with the Atomic Energy Commission quite apart from the latter.[4] The production and delivery of scientific intelligence—vital to all three, the Joint Chiefs, the RDB, and the AEC—would have been difficult enough to accomplish had there been complete cooperation among the departmental intelligence services and the central intelligence organization, as there was not.

Matters were still to be arranged in detail with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, particularly with regard to the coordination of counter-espionage activities. The problem would trouble the CIA Office of Special Operations for some time to come.

Admiral Hillenkoetter had also to contend with internal turbulence and disagreement due to ceaseless rows among the ambitious or pertinacious or zealous men who are found in any young and growing enterprise. There was friction between the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and the Office of Reports and Estimates. Within ORE, the conflict between its Branches and Intelligence Staff had brought about a reorganization in less than a year after its establishment to replace the Central Reports Staff.[5] Boundaries between the Office of Operations and the Office of Special Operations were still to be marked at every point. Within OSO, just completing the absorption of the Strategic Services Unit which had preserved some wartime assets of the OSS, there were plans to shift secret operations from a functional to a geographic organization.

Something had to be done to stop the Intelligence Advisory Board's interminable bickering and delay over every issue. The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff which General Vandenberg had established to work for him with the IAB had been effectively thwarted in that purpose by the interposition of successive *ad hoc* IAB committees. This battle continued as Hillenkoetter took up the task of revising the directives of the old NIA and CIG for the new National Security Council. In view of the great amount of work done on them through the previous year, this should have been a relatively simple task. It proved to be far from that.

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[4] See *Studies* XII 4 pp. 86-94.

[5] See *Studies* XII 4 pp. 75-78.

Three Anti-Centralization Thrusts

When Admiral Hillenkoetter took responsibility as DCI and head of CIG on May 1, 1947, Admiral Inglis with close support from General Chamberlin was pressing measures in the Intelligence Advisory Board which General Vandenberg had opposed. One of these would disperse the production of intelligence among the departments according to their dominant interests, as had been done for collection.[6] To complicate the issue, controversy over air intelligence was rising between the Navy and the Air Forces which were about to become a separate department under the National Security Act. The Navy wished to keep its own air intelligence.

Another measure called for redefining "strategic and national policy intelligence" notwithstanding the fact that an explicit formula had just been established by the National Intelligence Authority.[7] The production of this final intelligence—coordinated national estimates for the makers of policy—was the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence. Admiral Inglis, however, would have it made clear that the control of "operational" intelligence was still reserved to the armed services. In other words, the DCI would have to produce his national estimates without access to items of military information, however pertinent to those estimates, if the service chose to withhold that knowledge from his estimating staff. Inglis maintained that "strategic" intelligence and "national policy" intelligence were separate and distinct, not the unitary concept of General Donovan, who had originated the phrase, and others who had followed him in central intelligence.

The third measure to greet Admiral Hillenkoetter as he came to his first meeting with the IAB on May 15, 1947, was Admiral Inglis' plan, first submitted the preceding February 20, to have all recommendations of the DCI to his superiors pass through the IAB. The agenda for a meeting of the NIA should be referred beforehand to the IAB together with copies of all papers to be considered. IAB members should either informally express concurrence or furnish comments to the DCI for transmission to the NIA. On important matters any member might request a formal IAB meeting to discuss proposals before they were submitted to the NIA.

The counterpart paper prepared in CIG on behalf of the DCI emphasized that the IAB was advisory to him. He was not responsible

[6] *Ibid.* pp. 80-83.

[7] *Ibid.* p. 86.

to it but to the NIA. He was not at liberty to reveal to the IAB all recommendations which the NIA requested of him. This of course was so true with respect to budgeting and expenditure that the departmental intelligence chiefs, though curious, never sought to interfere in these matters, thus prejudicing their right with regard to others.

On the first of the three measures, decentralization of production, the new DCI endeavored to maintain the position of his predecessor that he should have supervision over the production of intelligence by the several agencies. The IAB, however, agreed to successive phrasings of a directive which left out all specific reference to the DCI and stipulated merely that the production work should be done. The minutes of the meeting do not state that Admiral Hillenkoetter expressed disapproval, but neither do they record his assent. Although he let the action of the IAB pass for the moment without disapproval, he still had the right to recommend his own ideas to the NIA along with the IAB proposal.

The hope had been that there would be few split opinions in the IAB, that differences would be removed in its deliberations so that the NIA would receive from the DCI and his advisers considered and concerted judgments, the result of true coordination. It was ideal to talk of thus resolving problems and reconciling opposite views. But the right of decision had to belong either to the DCI or to a majority of the Board. In terms of political science, sovereignty must reside somewhere, either in the will of an individual or the tyranny of a majority.

The issue was clearly drawn. Admiral Hillenkoetter inherited from General Vandenberg the view that the position of the DCI was the official central intelligence position regardless of dissents. Admiral Inglis, General Chamberlin, and other chiefs of intelligence in the departments clung to the opinion that they had inherent right to make the IAB a working staff of the National Intelligence Authority which their secretaries constituted with Admiral Leahy, personal representative of the President. In accordance with this theory, the IAB was entitled to know the agenda of the NIA in advance. Navy Secretary Forrestal had come to this conclusion by June 26, 1947, when the NIA met for the last time.

Agent of the Secretaries

The theory had been given some support by Admiral Leahy. In the preceding July he had admonished Vandenberg that the President held

the departmental secretaries primarily responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. He had advised Vandenberg to drop the word "agent" and put in its place the phrase "act for" the NIA.[8] Since then, however, he had modified his position to endorse Vandenberg's designation as executive agent of the secretaries.[9] Now in the NIA meeting of June 26, 1947, Leahy stood by this position, and when interviewed on the subject in 1952 he still favored the idea that the DCI should be individually responsible. There should be room for dissent, he said; the policy-makers had the right to accept the dissenting view. But—and he made no distinction between estimates and other questions in this respect—the DCI alone was responsible for the central intelligence opinion, in questions of coordination as well as other matters.

In the historic final meeting of the National Intelligence Authority on June 26, 1947, however, Admiral Hillenkoetter declared before Secretaries Marshall, Patterson, and Forrestal and Admiral Leahy that the DCI did not need the authority which they had given to General Vandenberg on February 12, to act as the executive agent of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. Its revocation, Hillenkoetter said, would create better feeling with the agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Board. If he should need the authority in the future he would be the first to request its reinstatement. Both General Chamberlin and Admiral Inglis were present to hear this abnegation.

Secretary Patterson, who had favored the grant modified by the right of an aggrieved agency to appeal through its secretary, would offer no objection to the withdrawal if the authority were no longer needed. Admiral Leahy remarked that he saw no reason for withdrawing it though he would agree if Hillenkoetter wished to have it revoked. Secretary of State Marshall was concerned to know if the withdrawal would adversely affect the relationship between the central organization and the departmental agencies; Hillenkoetter replied that on the contrary he expected the relationship to improve, and Marshall appeared to be satisfied. Secretary Forrestal, whose assent in February had been fairly reticent, came out now with a definite stand; the DCI's authority to issue orders in the names of the secretaries, he said, made CIG look like a Gestapo and caused unnecessary friction. Further discussion was not recorded. It was agreed to withdraw the authority.

[8] *Studies* XII 3 pp. 83, 86.

[9] *Studies* XII 4 p. 86.

Last NIA Directive

Admiral Inglis followed up the advantage which Admiral Hillenkoetter had given him. He argued at length his plan for IAB control of DCI recommendations in Hillenkoetter's second meeting with the IAB on July 17, 1947. There were present the usual representatives of the intelligence services and the aides who served on their ad hoc committees. Mr. Eddy, for the State Department, took the side of the DCI. But General Chamberlin, along with General McDonald for the Air Forces, supported Admiral Inglis. The IAB was intended to be something more than an advisory council, they said: it had authority to commit the departments to action; it brought their intelligence services into cooperation with the central agency.

The success of intelligence in government, declared Chamberlin, was dependent entirely on cooperation. He called for an ad hoc committee to draft a new paper. General McDonald supported him, and so an ad hoc committee of the familiar persons took over once more the job of trying to reconcile the fixed views of the intelligence chiefs and the concepts of the DCI.

There was much discussion in the same meeting on the origin of the concept "strategic and national policy intelligence." Admiral Inglis made clear that he was willing to accept the concept so long as control over "operational" intelligence was not taken from the armed services. It was finally agreed that his view should prevail until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had finished reorganizing their Joint Intelligence Committee. At that time the definition of "national" as distinct from "departmental" and of "strategic" as distinguished from "operational" intelligence might be agreed upon among most if not all interested parties.

At the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board—on July 31, five days after the President approved the National Security Act—it agreed to ask that the National Security Council, when formed, should continue all of the directives under which CIG and the IAB were functioning until it could make such changes as it saw fit. According to the Act, its provisions should go into effect one day after the Secretary of Defense took office or the sixtieth day after it became law, whichever came earlier. This gave time for the IAB and its ad hoc committee to finish up the business of gaining control of the DCI. The result was one more NIA directive under the old setup before Forrestal became Secretary of Defense—on September 17, 1947, in the midst of rising tension over Russian activity against the Marshall Plan.

The report of the ad hoc committee reconciled the views of the DCI and the IAB by finding for the most part in favor of the latter. It should have some governing power. All recommendations from the DCI to the National Intelligence Authority and its successor, the National Security Council, should be submitted to the IAB in writing, with the necessary attachments and with voting slips denoting concurrence, dissent, or the request for an IAB meeting. Its members should have seven working days to consider each subject. Any recommendations, proposals, or other papers which any IAB member might originate should similarly be sent to the others. A recommendation by two or more members would be submitted to the NIA or NSC along with the opinion of the DCI.

A suggestion of the ad hoc committee for incorporating that part of the Fifth NIA Directive which authorized the DCI to act for the NIA "in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security" met resistance from both the Army and the Air Forces. It involved control over matters of espionage and counter-espionage which the Army was not yet willing to concede in any form to the Central Intelligence Agency. This part of the ad hoc committee's plan for control by the IAB was therefore deleted.

Admiral Hillenkoetter allowed the report of the ad hoc committee on Admiral Inglis' original proposal, thus modified, to become the Eleventh NIA Directive on September 11, 1947. It was but nine days before he took office under the provisions of the Act of Congress, when the National Intelligence Authority ceased to exist. Why he did not withhold his approval of a measure placing him under the restrictions of his Advisory Board is not to be explained by a desire to reverse Vandenberg's policy. He had under consideration at the time a program for continuing the essentials of that policy. He stood ready to accept advice and to safeguard the right of dissent but would not yield his independent right of making recommendations to his superiors in the National Security Council.

Some Counterthrusts

Perhaps it would have been to his ultimate advantage if Hillenkoetter had settled the issue then and there. But he found tempers so high and feelings so hard that, as he put it later, he preferred to indulge in a little "chicanery" and let the Eleventh Directive go through. After all, he said, both sides must have known that it would not remain

determining. He hoped that in time everybody would cool. Whether or not the DCI was called the executive agent of the secretaries was not of great consequence.

On the same September 11, 1947, Admiral Hillenkoetter sent to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and Admiral Leahy a memorandum of suggestions for the first meeting of the National Security Council which they were about to constitute, with a copy for Admiral Souers who had been named Executive Secretary of the NSC on August 17. Hillenkoetter suggested that he and his associates in CIA should prepare papers on a set of new NSC directives within sixty days following the establishment of the NSC. This administrative detail had not been discussed with the IAB in accordance with the provisions of the Eleventh NIA Directive. Moreover, Hillenkoetter went on to suggestions of policy which also had not been discussed with the IAB. At least we have yet to find evidence that they had.

One was that there should be a subcommittee of the National Security Council to act as the NIA had acted in control and supervision of the DCI and CIG. The idea had been discussed in the congressional hearings, where Allen Dulles especially had advocated a small governing authority over the DCI and CIA and where Donovan of course still insisted upon having only one responsible officer, the Secretary of Defense, between the DCI and the President. Hillenkoetter suggested that the subcommittee to furnish "the active direction" might be merely the Secretaries of State and Defense. His alternative was to add the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but he preferred not to, so that the Department of State would not be overshadowed by the military establishment. And then he proposed that the Director of Central Intelligence should sit with the National Security Council as "observer, counsel, or advisor," to keep in touch with the thoughts of the NSC and to answer its direct questions.

In August there was some uncertainty whether Hillenkoetter would continue the Intelligence Advisory Board. By September 19, however, its members had been informed that he intended to use his authority under the National Security Act and have an advisory committee to help him carry out his functions and those of his Agency. He told them that he wished also to readjust the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff so that it might work with a standing committee of the new Intelligence Advisory Committee. This one standing committee for the departmental intelligence chiefs would take the place of the successive ad hoc committees they had been using. Members of the

Standing Committee would remain in their respective agencies but be ready on occasion to go over to CIA and confer with ICAPS. ICAPS too would be composed of representatives from the departments, but these men, as officers in CIA, would not always be able to vote according to the wishes of their departments. The hope was that the Standing Committee for the IAC and ICAPS for the DCI would somehow be able to reconcile differences and reach coordinated recommendations. But it did not work out as Hillenkoetter hoped. The Standing Committee was to behave like its predecessors, the ad hoc committees of the old IAB.

On September 19 Hillenkoetter sent formal recommendations to the National Security Council for its first meeting on September 26: all of the NIA and CIG directives should continue in full force until changed; CIA should have sixty days in which to submit revisions. He presented his plan for the new Intelligence Advisory Committee in a separate memorandum. Then on the following day, September 20, 1947, he took office as the Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act.

The IAC Clash

Hillenkoetter's General Counsel advised him on July 29, 1947, that under the National Security Act, just approved by President Truman, the DCI as head of CIA was "solely responsible for the performance of the Agency's duties." He therefore could go to the NSC without waiting upon advice from a committee. Any committee which he chose to have would be his own. Its membership might be supplied from the respective intelligence services, but they would sit at his request. They might take adverse opinions to their own departmental heads, who constituted the NSC with other appointees of the President. But his advisory committee would in no sense be a governing board to control his thought or action. There was no idea that its members had first to give their consent before he could proceed.

Admiral Hillenkoetter, in his memorandum of September 19 to the NSC, accordingly pointed out that he was not obligated to continue the old Intelligence Advisory Board. He might have a committee which for all intents and purposes would continue the Board, but it would be more subject to his control. He requested therefore that the National Security Council should authorize participation by members from the several departments in what he named "the Director of Central Intelligence's Intelligence Advisory Committee." He would have repre-

sentatives of the State Department, of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission to serve as the permanent members of the committee. Others would come at his invitation.

The DCI would supply the secretariat for the committee. It would meet on his call as chairman. Any dissent by a member of the committee would be formally recorded so that it would accompany the DCI recommendation to the NSC. The DCI would avoid discussion of any matters on which members had not yet studied the related papers and obtained if possible the opinions held in their respective departments. He wanted a concerted opinion before making a recommendation to the NSC. In deference to the wishes of Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin, Hillenkoetter's proposal provided also that recommendations from two or more members of the committee would be presented to the Council.

The first response to Hillenkoetter's suggestions of which we have record came on September 23 from Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State. (Secretary Marshall was attending the Assembly of the United Nations in New York.) The proposal for a subcommittee of the Secretaries of State and Defense to handle CIA affairs for the NSC found favor with Lovett, but he wished to add the personal representative of the President in order to make it an authority comparable to the old NIA. The DCI should attend as a non-voting member. It would be desirable also to have him present in the meetings of the full NSC.

Lovett wrote that the DCI should consult with an advisory board to insure "prior consideration by the chiefs of the intelligence services" of matters which should come before the NSC. This made clear that the Department of State wished there to be an advisory board for coordination at the so-called working level; the secretaries ought to have the benefit of its deliberations when they discussed intelligence matters in the NSC. There was no implication, however, that the DCI should be subject to a governing board of the departmental intelligence officers.

The second reaction to Admiral Hillenkoetter's program came in the National Security Council on September 26. It adopted his recommendations that the old directives remain in full force and that sixty days be allowed in which to submit any necessary revisions. The Intelligence Advisory Board, therefore, continued to have legal standing until it should be replaced by a new directive. It was decided that the DCI should attend all NSC meetings as observer and adviser.

He was authorized to submit the CIA budget for 1949 to the Bureau of the Budget.

No action was taken at this meeting with regard to establishing a subcommittee to direct the Agency, nor is there record of opinion on Hillenkoetter's proposal for an advisory committee. But there is evidence elsewhere that there could have been considerable discussion of these DCI suggestions in the first meeting of the NSC. Secretary Royall of the Army wrote on October 6 that the subcommittee was incompatible in his view with the purpose of the National Security Council, which was supposed to operate as an entity on all matters within its cognizance, giving broad directives to the DCI.

This statement might have been construed as an invitation to Admiral Hillenkoetter to manage the CIA as he saw fit, looking to the NSC only for guidance in large matters of policy. But it was quite apparent that the Secretary of the Army did not so intend. Royall was taking exception to the suggestion of a small governing board consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense to the exclusion of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. His demurrer was closely related to other things to come. Admiral Souers knew this well, and prevailed upon Admiral Hillenkoetter to withdraw the suggestion on October 17.

Hillenkoetter's suggestion of a new advisory committee came under revision in the office of the NSC's Executive Secretary. Both Admiral Souers and his assistant, James S. Lay, had been in the Central Intelligence Group from its beginning. Together they changed the wording in several places with Admiral Hillenkoetter's consent. The DCI was made to recommend rather than request. His proprietary emphasis on the *DCI's* advisory committee was softened—"the Intelligence Advisory Committee proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence."

Souers eliminated the provision that recommendations from two or more members of the IAC were to be sent by the DCI to the National Security Council. He did this on his own responsibility as Executive Secretary, on the grounds that the chiefs of intelligence already had proper access to the NSC through their superiors, the secretaries of the departments. This provision, drawn from the Inglis plan, is not to be confused with the stipulation that the dissents of IAC members be submitted to the NSC along with the opinion of the DCI. The DCI might properly report disagreements with his own position that came out in the deliberations of his advisory committee; but there was no reason he should be used as a vehicle for the initiatives of the departmental chiefs of intelligence. As Hillenkoetter remembered it, after

some discussion he flatly refused to relay to the NSC their proposals that he opposed.

Approvals of the plan for the advisory committee as modified by Souers and Lay came back to the Executive Secretary from Secretary of Defense Forrestal on October 10, from Secretary of the Air Force Symington on October 17, and from Acting Secretary of State Lovett and Chairman of the National Security Resources Board Hill on October 20. No replies from the Secretaries of the Army and Navy are filed with these, but a memorandum from the Secretary of the Army for the Executive Secretary was sent on November 26, 1947, through the office of the Secretary of Defense. Forrestal's Special Assistant kept a copy in forwarding it before the Secretary had yet seen it.

Secretary Royall opposed Hillenkoetter's plan. He declared that the DCI had been required by the first NIA directive to refer all recommendations through the Intelligence Advisory Board, which therefore not only performed the service of advising the DCI but also insured that there would be full departmental coordination of all matters before they were submitted to the NIA. He insisted that the new Intelligence Advisory Committee should have a mandatory review of the same nature. It was due notice that in the NSC the Army would support General Chamberlin and Admiral Inglis rather than Admiral Hillenkoetter.

On Wednesday, December 3, a formal communication from the National Security Council to the DCI enclosed Secretary Royall's memorandum and requested DCI comment on it for "concurrent consideration." Hillenkoetter did comment within the week, orally before the departmental secretaries and chiefs of intelligence, Souers, and Forrestal in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Hillenkoetter remembered this conference vividly, he said, as one of the dramatic moments in his life. He could recall the words almost as they were spoken. But let us bring to the same point the parallel story of the NSC directives before we enter into the historic occasion.

The NSCID Battleground

It was evident by this time in another quarter that the intelligence services of the armed forces were entrenching against Hillenkoetter as they had in the preceding fall against Vandenberg. Members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and representatives of CIA operating offices had gone systematically to work revising and

consolidating the old NIA and CIG directives according to the September 26 instruction of the National Security Council. The NSC directives "NSCIDs," were to lay down the principles, and directives issued by the DCI, "DCIDs," would carry the relevant administrative orders.

Drafts of the new measures were ready by October 16 and circulated for discussion within the Agency on October 20. Three days later revisions had been completed and forwarded to the DCI's deputies, assistants, and legal counsel for further suggestion. The directives were practically in order for submission to the Intelligence Advisory Board, as Acting Secretary Lovett had advised be done. There had been no concealment of this activity within the Agency. The Director had sent a memorandum about the undertaking to the departments on October 9.

The only reply to the October 9 memorandum came from W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and representative of the Department on the IAB, and it reflected indirectly the displeasure of the departments at this activity in the Agency. It gave also a direct view of the tension between the State Department and the members of the military establishment. It proposed that the new directives should define intelligence in conformity with the concept of national intelligence which Vandenberg had got approved on February 12, 1947 by the National Intelligence Authority.[10] This would hardly please Admiral Inglis.

Armstrong urged moreover that the DCI's right of inspection over the operations of the intelligence agencies as well as their materials be restored, as provided in the President's Directive of January 22, 1946. But Armstrong would go farther and specify that the DCI should determine the causes of omissions, inadequacies, or duplication and propose corrective measures to the NSC. The suggestion may not have been just a broadside aimed at the chiefs of intelligence in the armed services. There were suspicions in CIA that Armstrong was thinking of his own Department, where the chiefs of geographical areas opposed his work in research and intelligence just as they had McCormack's.[11]

Armstrong's letter, however, was trained on yet another target. The State Department had in common with the armed services antipathies toward the Central Intelligence Agency. The proposal in regard to the DCI's right of inspection carried with it a repeal of the section

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[10] *Ibid.* p. 86.

[11] *Studies* XII 1 p. 72.

in the Fifth Directive authorizing the CIG to undertake research and analyses.[12] Armstrong would have "centralization of functions" only when, by agreement among the departments and CIA, such functions could be "most beneficially and effectively accomplished on a central basis." His contention was that the intelligence agencies of the departments should each produce finished intelligence in the fields of their dominant interests, and the DCI should perform the inspection to see to it that they did. CIA would not produce national intelligence from source materials which it had processed for itself but from the finished departmental intelligence.

Along the same line of reasoning, Armstrong proposed to abandon the directive of February 12, 1947, in which CIG had laid down the national requirements for the collection of intelligence on China.[13] These, classified as economic, social, political, scientific, and military, were matters of primary interest to the respective departments and not the immediate concern of the central agency. With this suggestion, Armstrong could count upon entire agreement from General Chamberlin.

The CIA reply to Armstrong on November 3 was lacking somewhat in candor. It said that almost everything he desired had been incorporated in the drafts which would be complete and ready for delivery to the departmental chiefs of intelligence on November 10. Actually, there was no provision in the drafts for CIA's abandoning research and analysis on "source materials" and depending on finished intelligence from the departments for the construction of national estimates. The directive with regard to the national requirements for collection in China, too, was to be incorporated in a new NSCID. But then Armstrong was to have another chance in the IAB and, as it proved, in yet another ad hoc committee if he wished to press his case.

Telephone calls went out to the members of the IAB by November 13, inviting them to a meeting with the DCI on November 20, 1947, to discuss the proposed NSC and DCI directives. These were to go to the NSC on November 26, as it had directed in its first meeting two months before.

Stalling in the IAB

The conference of the intelligence chiefs with Admiral Hillenkoetter on November 20 was notable, but not for analysis and criticism of

[12] *Studies* XII 3 p. 81 f.

[13] *Studies* XII 4 p. 83 ff.

the proposed directives. The chiefs spent time arguing whether or not they were the Intelligence Advisory Board. It was idle discussion. The IAB continued to exist so long as the First and Eleventh NIA Directives remained in effect, and the NSC had decided on September 26 that the old directives should continue in full force at least sixty days. Admiral Hillenkoetter may have befogged the issue by pointing to the fact that there no longer was an NIA to which the Board might report, but he himself accepted the IAB as such when he accepted its request that the proposed NSCIDs and DCIDs be referred to an ad hoc committee for discussion with ICAPS.

The meeting of the IAB on November 20 was notable, then, for the demeanor of its members. The naive observer might have thought that they were relatively uninformed and so piqued at being taken by surprise, that being conscientious men who did not like to be unprepared for their duty, they were provoked because they were not ready. We have followed these men and their aides, however, through a year of meeting and maneuvering over the duties and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, the facilities and functions of the central intelligence organization, and the relationship which the DCI was supposed to have with the departmental intelligence agencies.

The thought is hard to resist that the IAB members were present on this occasion not to cooperate in an enterprise of common concern but to take exception to this, to be hesitant over that, in a word to stall and delay. They had had not just the ten days since receipt of the November 10 memorandum to consider the proposals. They had been engaged with almost all of these matters as members either of the IAB or of its ad hoc committees for more than ten months.

Instead of pressing his case for a quite different concept of central intelligence Armstrong announced that the State Department had not been able to arrive at a firm position on the directives. Secretary Marshall was leaving for London; Mr. Lovett had the matter in hand, but the Department could not be committed as yet. Hillenkoetter hoped that the members of the Board, as heads of the intelligence agencies, might be able at least to get through the first four directives, having to do respectively with the duties and responsibilities of the DCI, with collection, with production, and with the objectives of national intelligence. But Armstrong insisted that as these matters were coming before the National Security Council, the head of each intelligence agency must have the position of his department established before he could speak finally.

This was turning the function of the advisory committee upside down. If this were the true interpretation, the DCI could not seek the advice of his advisory committee with regard to his recommendations to the secretaries in the NSC until they themselves had made up their minds on what they wished their intelligence officers to advise the DCI to advise them. Admiral Inglis cut straight to the point. As chief of Naval Intelligence, he said, he was not the "mouthpiece of the Secretary." What Inglis had to say in the meetings was his own opinion.

But Admiral Inglis did not like the present situation. The Agency had produced these papers "on its own initiative and its own authority"; they should have been considered by the IAB while being formulated. Had they been new papers, there would have been more strength in his argument. But they were revisions of things with which Inglis himself had been conversant for much more than a year.

General Chamberlin concurred that the procedure being used by CIA here was difficult for them. Chamberlin had other things to do as chief of intelligence for the Army; he could not turn his responsibility off or on "at somebody else's command." As far as he himself was concerned, he said, he had come "unprepared to discuss these papers," but his subordinates had worked on them and found many things to challenge. There were "important differences of principle," he said, that had never been approached, nor included in past directives. What those principles were he did not specify.

Later on, however, he revealed a marked difference in principle between Admiral Inglis and himself over the propriety of expressing their own views in the advisory committee. General Chamberlin objected to a procedure in the committee which might "drive a wedge" between the chief of intelligence in a department and his superior the secretary; this completely destroyed "command principles." He would be inclined, he said, "to keep quiet at all times" because he would be afraid that an action in the committee would be appealed over his head.

General McDonald for the Air Force then unleashed his statement. Analysis of the proposed directives had revealed to him, he said, that it was going to be necessary for him to recommend many changes. It would be impossible to cover the directives that afternoon; no attempt therefore should be made to go into either their philosophy or their composition. There should be an ad hoc committee "for the purpose of reconciling views." And so there was another such committee, made up of the familiar aides who by now must have been expert on the

philosophies, the details, and most assuredly the conflicting views. This was to become known as the Ad Hoc Committee.

Admiral Gingrich, who was relatively new, having come on the IAB to represent the Atomic Energy Commission, went to the heart of the situation. "One point I might mention, Hilly," he said, "there doesn't appear to be any provision in these first two directives here for an Intelligence Advisory Committee, or Board, such as is executed under our old setup." Hillenkoetter replied that the law gave him the power to appoint an advisory committee. All present must have known that he had submitted his plan to do so on September 19. The members of the IAB in any case were not to be diverted from their intention to have the NSC direct him to establish such a committee as they wished. The matter went to the Ad Hoc Committee.

No one could have been surprised at the revisions of the drafts by that group. The changes, often small in detail, were persistently designed to restrict the DCI, to make him defer to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and to remove his supervisory authority over the departmental intelligence agencies. The new draft of NSCID 1 outlined the duties of the DCI and his relations with the IAC: The IAC, consisting of the intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission, was to advise the DCI on "all recommendations and advice" to the NSC and upon his own directives or administrative orders for carrying out the NSC directives. He should act for the National Security Council "through the Intelligence Advisory Committee." The coordination of intelligence activities should be accomplished "by recognizing primary departmental requirements and by supporting the intelligence agencies."

The DCI was to disseminate intelligence subject to the security regulations of the agency in which the information had originated. He was to perform services of common concern as determined with the IAC. He was to obtain personnel from the departmental agencies in agreement with their intelligence chiefs. He was to arrange with the latter for "surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence activities."

Here the Ad Hoc Committee had made a slip, but it was soon corrected. Though Armstrong for the Department of State recommended DCI inspection of departmental intelligence activities, the chiefs of intelligence for the armed services could not contemplate such interference with their operations. When the measure came from

the meeting of the IAB on December 8, the words "intelligence activities" had given way to "intelligence material," and control of even such inspection by the department concerned was restored before NSCID 1 was issued by the NSC on December 12.

Resolution

Admiral Hillenkoetter notified the Ad Hoc Committee on November 25 that he could not accept as a whole its revisions in the drafts of the NSCIDs. He called another meeting of the intelligence chiefs for December 8 to consider the changes which he would make in the committee's proposals, and he sent those changes to them on December 1 so that they might bring to the meeting whatever statements of nonconcurrence they chose to submit.

Records are not available for all of the determining events between the action of the Ad Hoc Committee on November 24 and the meeting of the IAB with Hillenkoetter on December 8. But memories of some who participated are still keen. There is recorded evidence to show why the chiefs of intelligence were in a different mood from that of November 20. And the minutes of the meeting on December 8, stenotyped but never circulated, have come to light.

When Hillenkoetter learned on November 26 of Secretary Royall's opposition to his plan for the new Intelligence Advisory Committee, he went to Forrestal. Forrestal had approved the plan in October. There followed some days of telephoning and conversation, and then Forrestal called a meeting of the armed service secretaries and their chiefs of intelligence, a representative of the State Department, and Souers. Hillenkoetter was there to explain his plan for the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Act. Forrestal had declared to Congress in the preceding spring that the Agency, after the Security Council, would be the most important institution in the forthcoming Act.

As Hillenkoetter recalled the scene in the office of the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal asked for no opinions when Hillenkoetter had finished his statement but turned to Admiral Inglis and General Chamberlin on one side of the table. Forrestal did not include the representative of the State Department in his glance. Nor, apparently, was the representative of the Air Force in his line of fire. He spoke directly to Inglis and Chamberlin: "You are not going to interfere with this thing," he said. "It is going to run as Hillenkoetter says. Do you both understand that now?" Hillenkoetter was quite sure of that last

question and of the remark to him later by Admiral Inglis: "He talked to us like a couple of plebes. I guess that makes us your servants now."

The record is not yet clear whether this meeting came before or after Forrestal received a note written on Friday, December 5, by Vannevar Bush, head of the Research and Development Board. It seems likely that Bush's letter arrived shortly after he had told the military and naval chiefs of intelligence what they were not to do. In any event, the statements by Bush, chief adviser to the Secretary of Defense on scientific matters, added weight to Hillenkoetter's authority when he met with the chiefs of intelligence again on Monday, December 8, to discuss their differences over the NSCIDs.

Bush declared with effectively restrained language that the Central Intelligence Agency was not in a good position to provide scientific intelligence to the Atomic Energy Commission, and Mr. Souers should be warned of the situation. To amplify his statement, Bush included memoranda from officers in his organization who were in direct touch with events. His chief of intelligence reported that under the leadership of the State Department's representative the Ad Hoc Committee was seeking more authority for the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The director of his program division reported that the intelligence chiefs wanted an executive order, apart from the NSC directive, to establish the IAC as the "governing committee" of the CIA. In this situation the officer responsible for scientific intelligence in the Agency was "completely stymied." Bush urged that someone "at the highest level" determine the relationships between CIA and the "operating" services so that the production of "information, detailed intelligence, and integrated strategic intelligence" could proceed.

Hillenkoetter read this statement in the meeting of December 8. The response of General Chamberlin was that he was not conscious there was any question whether the Intelligence Advisory Committee was to be a controlling or an advisory body. "I frankly admit," he said, "it is an advisory body"; others might have a different opinion. He felt that he had authority to commit his own department "on certain things" in agreement with other members of the IAC and carry out the decisions "loyally without any command to do so." Thus the IAC could eliminate a lot of "minutiae" but would still be an advisory committee.

The position was tenable, and it was logical after the admonition from the Secretary of Defense that CIA was going to run as the Director of Central Intelligence said. But there had been some evolution

in the thinking of the Army representative since the meeting on July 17 when he had called the IAB "a little more than an advisory body," and that on November 20 in which he maintained that the DCI's right of appeal to the secretary of a department over the head of its chief of intelligence destroyed "command principles."

There was action in the meeting of December 8 which the stenotypist could not record. The memory of Hillenkoetter's General Counsel, who was present, is certain on that score. Although the record is one of friendly words in half-finished sentences, Hillenkoetter's demeanor was as strong as Lawrence Houston ever saw him use. Houston sat where he could observe faces and catch fleeting expressions. As General Chamberlin's overtones conveyed his acknowledgement that "Hilly" was the boss, Houston saw an aide of the General "turn white." Admiral Inglis sat shaking his head in an unmistakable "no."

The representative of the Navy had attended nearly every meeting of the IAB from its beginning under Souers in February, 1946. Admiral Inglis had insisted all along that in most respects CIG, and then CIA, should be a cooperative interdepartmental activity. To the statement by Vannevar Bush that the Agency had to be either "almost completely self-sufficient" or "a small coordinating body" surrounded by strong departmental agencies, his response was now that there could be a "middle ground" for the Agency. As an "integrated operating agency," he said, it should have as little interference from the Advisory Committee as possible; the IAC should be "purely advisory, and absolutely nothing more." But in the relationships between the central agency and the departmental intelligence agencies, it should go beyond advisory capacity; it had something to do with "liaison, coordination and implementation." That was his "philosophy," he said, "for whatever it was worth."

There was further discussion in general terms. But the remainder of the meeting on December 8 was given for the most part to examining in detail revisions which the Ad Hoc Committee had made in the NSCIDs. For the time being the Director of Central Intelligence had his way. With the exception of the change regarding inspection of "intelligence material" and the inclusion of a phrase regarding "national policy" intelligence that was later deleted, NSCID 1 went to the NSC practically as it had been recast in CIA on December 1. Hillenkoetter sent with it on December 9 the suggestion that

the NSC might name the DCI chairman of the IAC to emphasize that it was an advisory body to help him and not a "Board of Directors or Board of Management," but the NSC approved it on December 12 without this addition.

Brief guide to a common form of deception.

SPOTTING PHOTO FAKERY

Dino A. Brugioni

When Soviet troops moved into Czechoslovakia in August 1968, television viewers in Poland were shown film apparently depicting the enthusiastic welcome the invaders received from the Czechoslovaks. The Polish audience was not told that it was in fact seeing a re-run of a film strip dating from 1945. This simple deception was an example of "photo fakery." Here we will look at other, somewhat more subtle photographic methods often employed. Although an expert job of fakery may defy detection even by another expert, there are some telltale signs anyone should look for.

Photo fakery as practiced by the Communists is usually employed to display their actions in a pleasing light, and to portray their countries and their leaders to the best advantage. It is also used as a form of propaganda support for the ongoing campaign against the United States and its allies. In any specific case, the intention is often revealed by detection of what may have been hidden, eliminated, or altered.

Visual Evidence

Photography has long been recognized as an important source of intelligence. Like other kinds of sources, however, photographs can be forged, faked, or otherwise altered to suit the purposes of the originator. Notwithstanding, the notion is still fairly widespread that a photograph of a given item is sufficient proof that the item in fact existed in the state shown by the photograph. This simple view can no longer be accepted. As a matter of fact, the art of faking photographs is as old as photography itself. Thus, portrait photographers discovered many years ago that removal of wrinkles and skin blemishes pleased customers. Although the public has perhaps become more skeptical than it used to be of "before and after" pictures or other photographic gimmicks employed in advertising, these devices have certainly not entirely disappeared.

Early techniques for altering photographs were relatively simple, but recent advances in optics, in the manufacture of film, and in laboratory processing have permitted great refinement of old techniques, and provided versatile and effective tools to propaganda, psychological warfare, and intelligence agencies. Some attempts at photo fakery are still amateurish and obvious, but the best work these days is subtle and sophisticated.

Properly used, a faked photograph can be a more effective and subtle weapon than a forged document. In propaganda or intelligence work, it can lead an adversary to wrong conclusions or cause him to dissipate his energies. The fact is that the veracity of photographs is rarely questioned. Intelligence analysts are accustomed to being critical of documentary intelligence, and as a matter of course attempt to establish its veracity and the credibility of its sources. Unfortunately, no similar critical attitude is generally applied in the appraisal of photography. Indeed, most analysts would probably not consider themselves qualified to make technical judgments of this nature. No manual on faking photography is known to this author, and manuals that treat the art of altering or retouching photography are concerned almost exclusively with techniques for enhancing the artistic or purely technical values of photography, and not with detecting alteration of the original negative or other manipulations for purposes of deception.

The purpose of this article is to warn intelligence analysts against accepting photographic evidence of Communist origin uncritically and to provide a few practical suggestions on how those lacking technical expertise can detect fakery in photography. The examples here presented have been selected from those collected in the course of research over the years by the National Photographic Interpretation Center, and other U.S. intelligence components. It is worth noting that Communist photographic forgeries were brought to the attention of the U.S. Senate as recently as 1961, and have been the object of continuing interest on the part of successive Directors of Central Intelligence.

Kinds of Faked Photographs

There are four kinds of faked photographs, distinguished by differing techniques: montages; retouched photographs; and retouched montages. The fourth category—false captioning—differs from these in

that tampering with the photograph itself is not a necessary ingredient of the fake.

A montage can be made either with photographic prints, resulting in what is known as a "paste-up" montage, or it can be made with negatives. The negative montage is the more effective of the two. Montages are widely used commercially for producing trick or artistic effects, assembling murals, and for advertising purposes. Extensive use is made of montages for portraying, and generally exaggerating, the industrial and scientific accomplishments and the military might of the Soviet Union and its allies—and others—as well as for many other propaganda and deception purposes. On occasion, photographs are altered for security reasons.

A retouched photograph differs from a montage in that only one photograph is used. By applying airbrushed paint or solvents, or by scraping, and by a variety of other techniques, the technician alters details, or obliterates portions of a photographic image. It is possible to tone down or disfigure images, and even to create an image that was not on the original negative. Since a hand brush or an airbrush is frequently used for this purpose, the terms "brushed-in" and "brushed-out" are often used in connection with retouching, even though many other artistic and laboratory techniques are used.

The third and most common type of fake photograph combines retouching and montage. In this type of photograph, an attempt is made by means of retouching techniques to soften the sharp edges of the cutouts usually apparent in a montage and to blend the varying tones and textures of the cutouts into a unified whole.

The falsely captioned photograph differs from the other groups of fake photographs in that the photograph usually is not altered. Proper captioning of a photograph normally includes descriptive data regarding the "who-what-where-when" of the subject. Photographs in Communist publications, however, are frequently printed with misleading or completely false captions, and the date of the photography is often omitted entirely. About the only way to unmask this kind of deception is to compare suspect examples with prints of known veracity. Where a date has been provided, however, close scrutiny of details will sometimes detect anachronisms that give the show away.

In Figure 1, the photographs on the left appeared in a Czechoslovak aircraft journal with captions indicating that they were scenes in a Czechoslovak jet engine factory. Actually, at least one is a retouched



FIGURE 1. False Captioning and Retouching

photograph of a factory in the United States. An artist has provided the technician on the right with coveralls, and a Czechoslovak "no smoking" sign has been added, but note the different tone and texture of these added items.

Faking Techniques

Many technical factors have to be considered in the difficult task of creating a successful fake photograph. Details, perspective, and the relative sizes of objects and the distances between them must be kept in scale to produce a convincing result. Because of the inherent limitations of the camera lens, objects at different distances from the camera are in varying degrees of focus and have different tones and textures. Tone is the tint, shade, or hue of an object. In black-and-white photography, tone is the relative lightness or darkness of the shades of gray in the scene. Texture is the arrangement, size, and quality of the constituent parts of an object; it is the quality by which one determines that an object is rough or smooth, firm or loose.

Since retouching or the creation of a montage usually results in inconsistent variations of tone and texture, the technician will frequently reproduce a fake by the halftone process. This is a technique of representing shadings by dots produced by photographing an object (or, for instance, a montage) through a fine screen. By subjecting retouched photographs and montages to the halftone process, dots are substituted for continuous tone imagery, and this more or less elimi-

nates break lines and variations in tone and texture. Most newspaper reproductions of photographs are produced by this process, and practically everyone is aware that the sharpest lines and strongest contrasts of a glossy print are softened and blurred in newspaper reproductions.

Shadows of objects are present in most photographs, and in creating a convincing fake, the technician must make all shadows fall in the same direction and be consistent in relative size and shape with the objects photographed. The technician must also account for any motion or action and corresponding reaction represented on the photograph, and all elements of the photograph must be consistent in this respect. Obviously, smoke does not blow in different directions from the stacks of adjacent factories. Finally, the creator of the fake must make sure that his masterpiece as a whole is all of a piece. He must insure, that is, that elements added to or deleted from the photograph do not result in incongruity; a soldier does not wear naval insignia, nor does a watchmaker have pipe wrenches on his workbench.

The means of detecting a fake as described here are effective only when the faker has been careless or in the occasional instances when the original unchanged photograph is available for comparison. As noted, however, a good fake photograph is remarkably difficult to make, and the alert intelligence officer armed with a knowledge of what to look for can often avoid being taken in.

Clues to the Detection of Fake Photographs

The first and most obvious clue to fake photography is its source. The intelligence officer should have the same ingrained skepticism of photographs that he has of other documentation from Communist sources. Imbued with this basic skepticism, he should look for the following clues.

Clues to a montage. Since the final product of a montage made from prints is another photograph, the result cannot possess quite the same textures and tones of objects as depicted in the originals. Thus, such a "paste-up" montage will often appear flat and gray as compared with an original photograph. The montage made with negatives, while retaining much of the quality of the originals, still presents problems to the technician when he attempts to blend tones and combine textures. Hence, on negative montages, certain images tend to stand out from other images in the photograph. To detect either type of montage, the intelligence officer should look for identical images



FIGURE 2. Action-Reaction in Montage

in the photograph. He should also look at the corners of images for match or join lines, the result of improper illumination at the time the montage was photo copied. The artist often fails to remove crop lines which indicate the presence of two or more photographs.

Combining two or more photographs in a montage often results in incongruities violating principles of action and reaction or technical consistency. This is the clue to the fake in Figure 2: not one person in the large crowd depicted is looking up at three helicopters flying a few feet over their heads, nor does there appear to be any prop wash.

Clues to retouching. To detect this type of fake, the intelligence officer should look for flat unbroken lines where objects appear to have been removed from the picture. In doing this, the artist often fails to remove parts of objects and to add an appropriate texture to the area. Such clues are visible in the retouched photograph of a hangar shown on Figure 3. The uncluttered gray area in the depth of the hangar on the right is in sharp contrast to the clutter in the rest of the hangar and is a clue to "brush-out" retouching, possibly to delete items for security purposes. A careless technician has provided positive evidence of retouching here by failing to brush out the stabilizers of two aircraft that have otherwise been deleted.

Placing a retouched photograph under magnification often reveals the marks of the artist's brush or artificial discoloration. When something is added to this type of photograph, the telltale features may be abrupt texture breaks and a flat, painted appearance. The perpetrators of photographic fakery often forget the shadows in retouching or in



FIGURE 3. Retouching

montages, and the tip-off to the intelligence officer can be an object which does not cast a shadow, shadows falling in different directions, abnormal tonal contrasts in shadows, or shadow-object ratios which do not match. Shadows falling in opposite directions are a clue to deception on Figure 4. In this photograph of an alleged Communist Chinese amphibious exercise, shadows from the door of the landing ship in the left background fall to the right, but shadows on the amphibious tank in the foreground fall to the left.

Scale and proportion. Scale is the ratio of image size to the actual size of an object. If the size of one object in a photograph is known, the relative sizes of other objects can be determined by photogrammetric methods. When the size of one object appears to be out of proportion to the sizes of surrounding objects, the photograph should be suspect as a fake. Faulty proportion is the tip-off to the fake shown on Figure 5. The missiles in this photograph are identified as SA-2 surface-to-air missiles known to be 35.6 feet in length. If scale and proportion in this montage were correct, the marching men on the right would have to be pygmies. A crop line, characteristic of a montage, is apparent along the top of the shrubbery partially concealing the missiles.

Depth of focus. The terms depth of focus, depth of field, and depth of definition refer to the characteristics of lenses, and relate to size



FIGURE 4. Shadow Fall in Montage



FIGURE 5. Shadow Fall in Montage

of the area within which details are sharply defined in front of and beyond an object focused on. Notice that the aircraft and the peasant shown on Figure 6 are some distance apart but in the same sharp focus. At the lens setting which would give this depth of focus, the distant foliage should also be sharply defined. The fact that the foliage is instead blurred indicates that more than one negative was used to make this print. The intelligence officer should compare the sharpness of objects in the foreground and background of photographs for indications of fakery.

Halation as a clue. Halation is the fog or halo in a photograph around the image of a highly reflective surface or light source. It is caused by lights in a night photograph or by reflectors or curved surfaces in bright sunlight. A faked photograph may show halation around one object and not around similar objects oriented in the same direction with respect to the sun. In the case of a night scene, halation may appear around some lights but not others. Thus in Figure 7, the tip-off is duplicate halation montaged to make this Chinese oil field appear larger. Perspective and scale are also faulty since the supposedly more distant items in the top half of the picture are the same size as those in the lower half.



FIGURE 6. Depth of Focus



FIGURE 7. Halation in Montage

Conclusions

Every intelligence officer should be aware that photography can be, and sometimes is, faked before its dissemination. Viewing Communist-source photographs with a critical eye, the analyst can detect and take steps to neutralize a good deal of this kind of deception. A basic knowledge of the concepts and mechanics of faking photography as presented here can thus pay worthwhile dividends to our total intelligence effort.

The intelligence war between the British and Irish Intelligence Services.

MICHAEL COLLINS AND BLOODY SUNDAY

Martin C. Hartline
and
M. M. Kaulbach

Until Easter Week 1966, the statue of Lord Nelson stood peacefully on its column in Dublin Square. It was blown up on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rebellion, which the British had finally subdued on that very spot. Although the figurative decapitation of the hero of Trafalgar made the front page of *The New York Times,* the event was but a footnote to history, recalling one of the most newsworthy stories of the early 1900's, The Irish Revolt.

For nearly four hundred years prior to the Easter Rebellion of 1916, Irish nationalists had been fighting British colonialism without success. The most striking difference between the Easter Rebellion and the uprisings of the past was that this new Irish revolt occurred at a most unpropitious moment for the British. The war against Germany had strained and exhausted the economy of Great Britain. Resources to arrest the growing insurgency in Ireland were not available.

Despite the disruptive effects of World War I on Great Britain, it would have been unrealistic, even in the land of the leprechaun, for the Irish to expect to defeat by conventional military tactics the world's foremost military power. In fact, most of the leaders of the Irish nationalists felt that the opportunity for success rested squarely on their capability to exploit Great Britain's lack of will to continue a costly and domestically unpopular war. Their eventual success in doing so constitutes a classic example of the effectiveness of unconventional warfare in forcing a powerful adversary to the negotiating table.[1] The Irish intelligence service was one of the architects of the victory.

The Director of Intelligence of the Irish Republican Army during the last act of the drama was Michael Collins, already a legendary figure when he was appointed in the summer of 1919. He had been

[1] On 5 December 1921 a treaty was signed granting Ireland, less the six counties of Ulster (Northern Ireland) Home Rule. Under Home Rule, although Ireland remained within the British Empire, the Irish were given primary responsibility for domestic affairs with Britain retaining control over defense and foreign affairs.

in the movement since early 1916, and had earned the cachet attached to deportation and imprisonment for a year in a British jail. By 1919, the Crown was offering £10,000 in rewards for Collins "dead or alive."

Despite this tempting offer and hard times in Ireland, very few dared to offer assistance which would aid the British in capturing him. The few who were tempted met a quick end. The familiar IRA calling card found on the bodies of informers, "Convicted Spy Executed by Order of the IRA," proved to be a sufficient deterrent. Frequently, informers were tried *in absentia*. It is sufficient to recall Collins' remark regarding the accused to guess at the outcome of these trials: "For the future the rule should be guilty until proven innocent."

Collins has often been described by both friends and foes as a cold-blooded character. His remarks after the bloody execution of a number of British intelligence officers and informants bring out this aspect of his character.

> My one intention was the destruction of the undesirables who continued to make miserable the lives of ordinary decent citizens.
>
> I have proof enough to assure myself of the atrocities which this gang of spies and informers have committed. Perjury and torture are words too easily known to them. If I had a second motive it was no more than a feeling such as I might have for a dangerous reptile.
>
> By their destruction the very air is made sweeter. That should be the future's judgment on this particular event. For myself, my conscience is clear. There is no crime in detecting and destroying, in war-time, the spy and the informer. They have destroyed without trial. I have paid them back in their own coin.[2]

Although informers were dealt with ruthlessly, Collins came close to capture a number of times. On one occasion a Black and Tan [3] raiding party besieged a house where Collins was present. He calmly walked down the stairs, brushed the intruders aside, and bolted out the door before they knew what had happened.

Soon after this incident, Collins had a master builder named Batt O'Connor construct a secret room, with sleeping quarters, on the same premises. O'Connor succeeded so well that the next time the Black and Tans staged a raid, Collins was able to continue a meeting then in progress without interruption.

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[2] Rex Taylor, *Michael Collins*, London, 1958.

[3] The Black and Tans were not members of the British regular army but a new force recruited for service in Ireland. They were drawn heavily from the unemployed and received their name from their attire—khaki coats, black trousers and caps.

The Collins Organization

Collins surrounded himself with a small group of counterintelligence operatives—soon labelled the Inner Circle—who directed the penetration of various British installations. Their network eventually extended from Ireland to America, England, and Egypt. It penetrated prisons, postal facilities, and government departments from the British headquarters in Dublin Castle to Whitehall itself. Sympathetic postal officials in London, Dublin and generally throughout all of Ireland, enabled the Irish service to intercept, and decode many of the oppositions' cipher messages.

Recognizing the need to compile information on their opposition, the Inner Circle very early in the struggle established a central records center, eventually called the Brain Center, within 200 yards of Dublin Castle. A lawyer's office provided the cover, and although its unusual clientele increased in number, this dual-purpose establishment went undetected.

Presumably the IIS established its "Brain Center" so dangerously close to Dublin Castle to hasten the dissemination of reports received from Broy, Kavanagh, Neligan and MacNamara, all trusted employees of the British, but agents of the IIS. This records center contained dossiers on personalities of security or operational interest including military leaders and government officials, as well as captured and stolen documents and extensive ciphering and deciphering material.

The British React

The British Intelligence Service (BIS) apparently lacked detailed information about the Inner Circle and the Brain Center, although it certainly felt their presence and Michael Collins' influence. In consequence, the BIS set out to capture Collins, hoping thereby to neutralize the Irish apparatus. One of the BIS' earliest efforts in this direction was turned into a propaganda extravaganza by the IIS. A convicted forger in a London prison, one F. Digby Hardy, mailed a letter to Lord French, Governor General of Ireland, offering his services as a spy. Lord French accepted the proposition. Hardy was to travel to Ireland and establish contact with the IIS.

Hardy's letter, however, had been intercepted and transmitted to IIS Headquarters, where Irish operatives began to amass a dossier of incriminating information concerning Hardy's past. Collins permitted Hardy to make contact with the IIS, and shortly there-

after arranged what Hardy had been led to believe was a conference with IIS officers. Those present were in fact American and British journalists anticipating the scoop that Hardy was shortly to provide.

During this meeting the leaders of the IIS confronted Hardy with his infamous past, his letter to Lord French, and his mission to penetrate the IIS. When Digby learned the true identity and purpose of his host, he made a full confession, hoping thereby to obtain leniency from his inquisitors. Because of Digby's cooperation, the IIS spared his life and gave him until the next morning to be out of Ireland. The story made international news headlines, and the BIS suffered a humiliating reversal before world opinion.

Not all British efforts were as transparent as the Hardy fiasco. An experienced BIS officer named Burn, alias Jameson, succeeded in penetrating the "Inner Circle" of the IIS and in winning for a short time the confidence of Michael Collins. Jameson had come to the attention of the IIS while feigning Bolshevism as a member of British Labor circles, all the while performing in the role of agent-provocateur. Jameson impressed Collins with schemes to obtain arms and money from the Soviet Government.

An unsubstantiated report from Dublin Castle, and the near capture of Collins while engaged in a clandestine meeting with Jameson, provoked suspicions and the IIS prepared a plan to test Jameson's loyalties. With deliberate carelessness Collins permitted Jameson to see parts of a bogus document which referred to important papers held in the home of a pro-British ex-mayor of Dublin. Jameson in turn relayed this information to Dublin Castle and soon afterward the Black and Tans raided the ex-mayor's home. Predictably, perhaps, shortly after the raid Jameson's body riddled with bullets was found bearing the familiar IRA execution card.

In their penetration efforts IIS operatives were considerably more successful than the British. Early in the conflict, the IIS recruited and ran-in-place four Dublin Castle officials: Ned Broy, James MacNamara, Joe Kavanagh, and Dave Neligan. During their weekly debriefings, these agents passed valuable information to Collins at a Dublin safehouse owned by Tom Gay, an inconspicuous librarian. One of these agents, Ned Broy, who had access to the headquarters of the Dublin Detective Force, arranged to be on duty alone one night during which Collins was able to make a midnight visit and spend several hours of the early morning there reading secret documents and gathering valuable information.

Although Broy, Kavanagh, Neligan and MacNamara provided Collins with extremely useful information, the most valuable of all Collins' penetrations was the mysterious Lt. G., a member of British military intelligence and one of Collins' chief agents and confidants. Not only was Lt. G. able to pass information concerning troop movements, order of battle and military plans that enabled the IRA to ambush British troops and supply convoys, but he also provided Collins with advance warning of British plans to raid suspected IIS installations.

In Collins' personal notebook-diary, there appear seventeen notes initialed "G," of which the following is but one example:

> "Don't overdo. The road to Parnell Square is too well trod. Fifteen men, including you, went there (to Vaughn's Hotel) last night between 9 and 11 p.m." [4]

Little else is known of Lt. G. but his case demonstrated the abilities of the IIS to recruit and run-in-place an unusually valuable and well-placed British military intelligence officer.

The Cairo Group

Despite the efforts of Dublin Castle to stymie the IIS, the British position in Ireland in 1919 had so deteriorated that the British authorities in Whitehall decided that radical measures were required. Heretofore the British had been concentrating on controlling the general public and only sporadically fighting the IIS. But Irish successes had nevertheless mounted. A major assault was in order. Accordingly, certain of the most experienced British deep-cover CI officers were called to Ireland and directed to seek out and assassinate the Inner Circle of the IIS.

At the time of the Irish Revolt most of these operatives were stationed in Cairo. One by one, they arrived in Ireland, travelling under aliases and using commercial cover, several taking jobs as shop assistants or garage hands to avoid suspicion.

The so-called Cairo Group was directed by two men, Peter Aimes and George Bennet. These individuals maintained liaison with three veterans of the campaign, Lt. Angliss, alias McMahon, who had been recalled from Russia to organize intelligence in South Dublin, an Irishman by the name of Peel, and D. L. McLean, the chief

[4] Rex Taylor, *Michael Collins*, London, 1958.

of intelligence at Dublin Castle. Besides being more experienced intelligence operatives than those earlier working in Ireland, the members of the Cairo Group increased the threat to the Irish because they immediately reorganized the British intelligence effort, which until their arrival had been decentralized and uncoordinated. They moved quickly to correct weaknesses. Their accomplishments led ultimately to the events of "Bloody Sunday."

Although the IIS was aware that changes were taking place on the British side, it was some time before it ascertained the identities of the Cairo Group. Their first break came following the execution of John Lynch, an Irish Treasury Official, by the Group. After this episode, Lt. Angliss, drunk and despondent, divulged his participation in the execution to a girl who inadvertently passed this information to an IIS informant. The remaining members of the group were identified after an unwitting landlady revealed to another IIS informant that several of her British guests regularly went out very late in the evening. At the time Dublin was under a very strict curfew, and only authorized personnel were allowed on the streets. The individuals in question were taken under observation by the surveillance and enforcement arm of the IIS—called the Twelve Apostles [5]—which determined that they were in contact with previously identified members of the Cairo Group. To the Twelve Apostles, this meant that they were instrumentally involved with the Cairo Group.

In addition to the information provided by these sources, a comparatively low-level technical operation revealed the identity of another key participant in the Cairo Group. Shortly after the new British team arrived in Ireland, Michael Collins had received a typewritten death notice reading:

> "An eye for an eye
> A tooth for a tooth
> Therefore a life for a life." [6]

Collins ignored the message but filed the letter, as he did all correspondence bearing upon his intelligence and related activities.

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[5] The Twelve Apostles were responsible for surveillance and executions. Because they operated in friendly circumstances and enjoyed popular support, they were efficient and effective.

[6] Jacqueline Van Voris, *Constance de Markievicz in the Cause of Ireland,* Amherst, Mass., 1967.

Soon afterward, the IIS intercepted the following letter from Capt. YZ addressed to Capt. X, War Office, Whitehall, England:

> Dear X,
>
> Have duly reported and found things in a fearful mess, but think will be able to make a good show. Have been given a free hand to carry on and everyone has been charming re our little stunt. I see no prospect until I have got things on a firmer basis, but still hope and believe there are possibilities . . .[7]

The IIS hurriedly recruited a typewriter expert, who determined that the typeface of the Captain YZ letter matched that of the death notice sent earlier to Michael Collins. Captain YZ was therefore linked to the Cairo Group and thereafter was the object of special investigation. In the end, by intercepting correspondence, examining contents of wastebaskets, tracing laundry markings, duplicating hotel room keys, and similar efforts, all members of the Cairo Group were identified and placed under surveillance.

Before all this had been accomplished, however, the Cairo Group had begun to close in. Three IIS senior officers, Frank Thornton, one of the Twelve Apostles and the man responsible for maintaining the surveillance of the Cairo Group, Liam Tobin, the senior officer in charge of the IIS "Brain Center," and Tom Cullen, his assistant, were arrested. Unable to break the cover stories of Thornton, Tobin, and Cullen, the British interrogators released them. Tobin and Cullen were detained only a few hours. Thornton, however, underwent a gruelling interrogation for ten days.

These arrests understandably alarmed the IIS. Shortly after Thornton's release, Collins received information that the Cairo Group was planning more arrests. Fearful that additional interrogations would be successful and reveal IIS personnel and installations, Collins met with his staff and formulated the plans for "Bloody Sunday."

On 17 November Collins had written to Dick McKee, Commander of the Dublin Brigade:

> Dick . . . have established addresses of the particular ones. Arrangements should now be made about the matter. Lt. G. is aware of things. He suggested the 21st. A most suitable date and day I think. "M" [8]

Early Sunday morning, November 21, 1920, while most of Dublin slept, eight groups of IIS officers including the Twelve Apostles went into action. They executed eleven British intelligence offi-

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[7] Piaras Beaslai, *Michael Collins, Soldier and Statesman,* Dublin, 1937.

[8] Rex Taylor, *Michael Collins,* London, 1958.

cers. As many more marked for extinction escaped. McMahon and McLean were among those executed. Of the leaders of the Cairo Group, only Peel escaped. Most of the others who escaped had not been direct participants in the British plan.

The British reaction to "Bloody Sunday" was quick. Carloads of Auxiliaries [9] were almost immediately dispatched to Croke Park, Dublin where a large crowd had assembled to watch a football game. Accounts of what followed are conflicting, but one of the most widely reported stated that the Auxiliaries fired into the crowd, killing fourteen and wounding many others. Despite the confusion, Dick McKee and Peadar Clancy, who both had participated in the liquidation of Bloody Sunday, along with an innocent visitor to Dublin were arrested and taken to Dublin Castle, where shortly thereafter they were executed.

Bloody Sunday remains a day of infamy in British history: and the day after remains equally infamous in Irish history. But once the violence of the two days is dismissed, it seems clear that the British plan to destroy the Irish service failed. By acting first the IIS had delivered the *coup de main* to the British intelligence network in Dublin.

Cathal Brugha, then Irish minister of defense and chief of staff, later assessed the outcome as follows, in words which were perhaps applicable to the conflict between the intelligence services:

> "We proved for all time that no nation however great, can either govern or destroy a little country if the will of the little country be set. We proved it by 'The Invisible Army.'" [10]

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[9] In addition to the Black and Tans the Auxiliaries were recruited in England to serve in Ireland with the police. The men were ex-officers of the army, qualified for no pension, and were not under military discipline.

[10] Shaw Desmond, *The Drama of Sinn Fein,* London. 1923.

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On the difference between cover and clandestinity.

THE OLD WINSOCKIE SYNDROME

W. B. Lavender

Several years ago a station succeeded in placing a clandestine microphone and transmitter in the office of the local chief of a hostile intelligence service. The audio quality was excellent, the LP was conveniently located and the translator routinely produced transcriptions within 48 hours. Over a period of time the installation, combined with other activities, produced considerable information about the activities of the hostile service: among other things, it was busily attempting to penetrate the local trade unions.

One summer while the audio operation was active, a headquarters-controlled contract agent was sent to the area to spend several weeks in each of a number of the capitals in the area. His mission was to spot, assess, and develop trade union officials for use in an area-wide international trade union operation. The contract agent was utilizing impeccable—indeed, legitimate—academic cover. He was well-known as a specialist in the area and he had produced a number of scholarly works dealing with the development of trade unions. For his visit to this particular station, a case officer was assigned to handle the contract agent and clandestine contact arrangements were made by cable.

The contract agent arrived on schedule, contact was duly made, and the following day the case officer reported to his chief. After making the previously arranged clandestine contact, the case officer and agent had gone together to the coffee shop of the agent's hotel, where they drank coffee together while discussing the operation. The case officer reported with considerable amusement that at one point the chief of the hostile intelligence service, accompanied by one of his known agents, had come into the coffee shop. When it was objected that the contact with the contract agent was supposed to be clandestine and the case officer was upbraided for meeting publicly in the coffee shop, the case officer had a triumphant reply: "But we have natural, legitimate cover for meeting openly. I actually took

a course from the agent at Old Winsockie University a few years ago, so there is nothing at all unusual about my meeting with my old professor."

The case officer's confidence was shaken, however, when 48 hours later the transcript from the audio operation became available. The chief of the hostile intelligence service had returned to his office from the coffee shop and for over an hour, in a discussion with a colleague, he had berated American intelligence and its activities in the labor field; his particular anger was directed toward the newly discovered fact that the academician was an American intelligence agent, an obvious conclusion to be drawn from his association with the station case officer so shortly after the professor's arrival.

It should be noted that up to this point the station had no reason to believe that the case officer himself was known or suspected to be intelligence connected; but he obviously was, and his public association with the agent, no matter how casual it appeared, immediately led the Opposition to correct conclusions concerning the agent.

The incidents related above graphically illustrate a fallacy which became known to a small group at the station involved as the "Old Winsockie University Syndrome"—the mistaken belief that, as long as a cover story is on tap, clandestine relationships can be successfully carried out through overt contacts. The case officer and the agent had perfect cover for meeting—a legitimate professor/student relationship. However, the Opposition neglected to ask why the two were together and jumped immediately to correct conclusions; while the cover story retained the perfection of truth, unused, and known only to the two people involved.

The case cited above is unusual only because, due to unique circumstances at that particular station, the fallacy was so thoroughly and promptly exposed. The "Old Winsockie University Syndrome" is unfortunately to be found in a great number of operations, in which "social cover" or "business cover" or some other plausible reason is adduced for overtly meeting individuals with whom our relationship is, or should be, clandestine. The Syndrome is so firmly ingrained that one case officer, who had taken over from his predecessor a recruited agent and had continued to handle him in clandestine meetings, recently reported that he was actively attempting to arrange an overt acquaintance with the agent so the two could then

meet overtly—the purpose being to "increase the security" of the relationship.

Officers seem to be particularly prone to meet staff agents with unofficial status under "social cover." The usual pattern is that the case officer in an official installation and the staff agent outside become close friends; one or the other drops in casually for a drink after work, the two families invite one another to dinner, and with one thing and another the two get together at least once a week and frequently more often. They conduct their business in the privacy and comfort of home, and are "secure" in the knowledge that their relationship is so obviously innocent and overt that no one could possibly suspect any clandestine activity. This is, usually, rationalization pure and simple. Case officers who take the trouble objectively and honestly to assess such "social cover" will more often than not realize that the only people they see "socially" so frequently over a long period of time are those with whom they have an operational relationship. If one or the other of the participants is known or suspected by the Opposition of being intelligence—and it should be remembered that official cover is usually pretty thin—the other will automatically become suspect merely because of the association. It is instructive to look at our own operational reporting to note how often we have classified people as "probably IS" because we have noted them in the company of known or suspected intelligence officers. The Opposition does the same, and the effectiveness of an agent may be reduced just as much if his status is suspected as it would be if the Opposition had positive proof. Particularly in the case of staff agents, who usually are put in place under a cover arrangement with considerable difficulty and expense, it behooves all operators to make an extra effort to avoid suspicion.

As indicated above, the Old Winsockie University Syndrome is not used exclusively to rationalize "social cover," but to rationalize any open operational contact with agents. In one case reported recently the agent in question is a tradesman, with whom the case officer would normally have no social relationship at all. The Syndrome explains the weekly evening visits to the case officer's home in terms of repairing electric appliances which keep breaking down. Thus a ready answer is available should someone ask about the visits; but no one has asked and no one is likely to do so. The Soviets or the local service, if they have noticed the visits, draw their own conclusions and are not interested in explanations.

The necessary ingredient for clandestine relationships is not cover, but clandestinity. Such relationships should be hidden through use of tradecraft, not flaunted in the hope that observers will assume the truth of whatever legend we have chosen to explain the situation.

This is not meant to imply that there can be no secure overt relationship with agents. Indeed, there are areas where the US community is so small that deliberate avoidance of such a relationship between, for instance, two US nationals would be, if not impossible, at least highly unusual. However, if there is to be an overt relationship it should be kept completely natural and separate from the clandestine one; e.g., a social relationship should be kept just that, and clandestine business should be conducted in clandestine meetings. A social relationship carried on for operational reasons will not appear natural for the very good reason that it is in fact *not* natural; meetings will invariably be too frequent and too exclusive, since clandestine business must be carried on. If operational business is carried out clandestinely, however, purely social meetings are likely to attract no attention. The frequency of social meetings will be normal; and usually there will be other people present to chaperone, and by their presence emphasize the innocent nature of the contact.

The operational climate in no two locations is precisely the same, and tradecraft must be adapted to local conditions rather than applied blindly. Too many stations, unfortunately, get into the habit of "adapting" tradecraft right out of existence, using the specious reasoning that "here" things are different, and that it is not necessary to be clandestine "because we went to Old Winsockie University together." It is admittedly a lot easier to run operations on that basis; but it is not very professional and not very secure. It would be profitable for all case officers to take an honest look at present and future operations to make certain that we are keeping them clandestine; and that we are not merely putting our faith in "cover," in the blind hope that relationships will be interpreted as we wish.

COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Dear Sirs:

In the Winter, 1968 issue of *Studies in Intelligence*, Sherman Kent shared with us his reminiscences of how the *Studies* came to be founded, and drew up a balance sheet evaluating the first dozen years of its publication. The founders had in mind a journal which would serve to develop the methodology of intelligence as a discipline, and Mr. Kent classes the articles which have been published as falling into the categories of intelligence history, theory and doctrine, and method.

Few would argue with Mr. Kent's favorable assessment of the contribution that *Studies in Intelligence* has made to the intelligence profession, but there is something to be said for starting a periodical devoted to the content of intelligence. According to virtually every criterion intelligence is a scholarly discipline, just as sociology, chemistry and English literature are. Although each field of study has its own characteristics, they all share many attributes: the formulation of problems, the gathering of evidence, testing hypotheses, scrupulous impartiality and the drawing of conclusions in conformity with the available information.

The requirements of security impose limitations on the intelligence scholar but do not significantly alter the similarity between his work and that of other scholars. Research workers in this as in all fields are plagued by gaps in information, inadequate conceptual frameworks, personal deficiencies in training and knowledge, loss of information due to faulty memory and bad filing, insufficient exchanges of views with others working in the same and related fields, and excessive conservatism in enunciating and testing new hypotheses.

Each field of study has peculiarities that make it especially vulnerable to these difficulties in proportions differing from those of other fields. The last two items on the above list seem to be especially pertinent to intelligence. While members of the intelligence community work together in close physical proximity compared to, say, anthropologists, this advantage is more than offset by organizational divisions and the lack of communication which tends to be imposed by a secure environment.

More serious is the conservatism which naturally follows from the deadly seriousness of the subject matter with which intelligence officers deal. In an academic environment, mistakes are accepted as part of the price that must be paid for advances in knowledge, or, at worst, result in a diminution of personal reputation. In the field of national intelligence, however, the possible consequences of wrong conclusions extend to the very worst catastrophes. The new intelligence analyst quickly learns that the most unprofessional posture he can assume in a given case is an extreme one; the unforgivable sin is to be "alarmist." Previously coordinated judgments tend to be repeated since this obviates the necessity for breaking new ground. The avoidance of *appearing* to make errors at times seems a higher virtue than the publication of accurate and timely intelligence. While the killing of intelligence between the analyst and the policy-maker is the most serious potential consequence of these circumstances, the actual danger of this is not great. Especially in critical situations, professionalism is likely to triumph over bureaucratic timidity.

However, the ability to transmit finished intelligence to its ultimate consumer is no guarantee that the analytic process is being carried out under the most productive circumstances. Indeed, the need to be "right" in producing finished intelligence is probably the most serious barrier to the stimulation of creative thinking. While informal discussions and the coordination process do provide some opportunities for exchanging ideas, this is pretty much a hit-or-miss proposition.

Intelligence analysts need a periodical comparable to, say, the *American Political Science Review* or the *American Historical Review*, journals which have counterparts in other scholarly disciplines. There does not appear to be any publication at this time which fulfills this need. *Studies in Intelligence* deals only incidentally with substantive analysis and, moreover, its classification is too low. But it serves a valuable function and probably should not be tampered with in any major way. Other publications, such as monthly reviews, are produced through the usual administrative channels and therefore do not provide the necessary outlet.

The editing of a scholarly intelligence journal of the type here advocated involves special problems. The quality check provided by supervisors and the coordination process would be absent, thus imposing a greater burden on the editor. To make the project work as intended, only the loosest sort of control should be placed on the

editor. He should be responsible for the logic of argument, the presence of evidence, the clarity of the writing—in other words, the general quality—but not for the correctness of the conclusions. He would have to exercise careful judgment to encourage the free exchange of ideas while avoiding half-baked and cranky material simply not good enough for publication in other forms.

To be successful, such a project would have to possess recognized priority. Corners could easily be cut in the production (by mimeographing the final product, for example) but not in the substantive work leading to the final product. The importance of the project should be emphasized by its placement in the organization—the editor, for example, might be responsible directly to a principal officer. The editor should not be burdened with time-consuming outside responsibilities which would prevent him from doing his job effectively and he should be given adequate secretarial support. It goes almost without saying that he should be an experienced intelligence officer capable of doing the job as well as commanding the respect necessary to generate the widest possible participation.

The periodical here envisioned ought to have certain characteristics not common to most other intelligence publications. Since the purpose is to encourage the writing and dissemination of new ideas, bureaucratic roadblocks which might frustrate this should be eliminated. The most obvious way to accomplish this is to bypass the usual chain of command. Authors should be able to submit articles directly to the editor of the publication without reference to superiors or to any coordination process.

Articles published in this way might include material that is incorrect, or only partly valid. The publication therefore ought to be restricted in its circulation and bear any notation that might be necessary to discourage the indiscriminate use of its contents in finished intelligence. The circulation of the periodical should, however, be broad enough to reach virtually all analysts who are responsible for finished intelligence, but not so broad as to require an unnecessarily low level of classification. Moreover, there should be a section devoted to lengthy letters to the editor, or a policy of publishing articles in rebuttal—which would encourage healthy controversy.

Herbert Schlossberg

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

SAILOR IN A RUSSIAN FRAME. By Cdr. *Anthony Courtney.* (London: Johnson. 1968. 256 pp. 35s.)

"I'm not a Profumo, but . . ." was the title on the illustrated handbill, with photos to match, which was sent to the British press and the wife and political friends and enemies of retired Royal Navy Commander Anthony Courtney, Conservative Member of Parliament for Harrow East, in August of 1965. Before a year had passed, Courtney had lost his wife, his seat, and most of his business as a result of a KGB political action operation in the heart of London. His book is the story of why the Soviets "framed" him and how he fought back, and almost won. The episode vividly exemplifies how the Soviets employ assiduous data collection and personal provocation in political action.

Courtney's father had exported machine tools to Russia during World War One and became a Russophile, leading his son to practice one-upmanship among his schoolmates with assiduous study of *Hugo's Russian Course, Part I.* A tour with the China Station in the late 20's as Sub Lieutenant of *H.M.S. Cornwall* gave the younger Courtney practical experience, particularly with the "many delightful girls in the White Russian clubs and cabarets" of Shanghai, and probably provided the first entries in RIS files. In 1933 he had been awarded nine months' leave to study Russian in Rumania. In 1935 he spent his summer leave in the USSR. Subsequently he was assigned to the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty in London to re-write the "Russian Intelligence Report." This gave him a chance to meet Soviet military officers in London, including Marshal Tukhachevsky. Back to ships by 1937 and married in 1938, he was not involved with Russia again until he was assigned as Deputy Head of the British Naval Mission to Moscow in October of 1941. By his own account he made the most of his year there to get close to the natives, and after the war he was placed in charge of the Russian Section of the Naval Intelligence Division for almost three years. At the end of 1948 he was assigned as Chief of Intelligence Staff to the Flag Officer, Germany. In 1951 he returned to the Admiralty and retired in 1953 with a small pension, no capital, but ". . . three assets: a naval training, a good knowledge of three languages and the best wife a man has ever been blessed with." During the next five years he sought election to Parliament, finally succeeding in 1959.

During the same five years, he also sought with some success to re-establish his father's commercial trade with Russia and other eastern countries, and broadcast a weekly talk in Russian on the BBC. He exhibited at the Poznan fair in 1955, 1956, and 1957; in the last year, after a property dispute, he was escorted out by the UB, never to return. He therefore turned to Moscow, where he renewed old acquaintanceships and made new ones, so that by early 1961 he was on top of the wave commercially, politically and socially, having made his maiden speech in Commons on the hope for improved Anglo-Soviet relations through commerce and adding China to his list of Communist trading posts. Two years of negotiations had resulted in that rarity of east-west trade, a successful contract with the Russians. In March, however, Courtney's wife of 23 years, "the first Elisabeth," died of a heart attack, and here his fortunes changed.

In the summer of 1959, while staying at the Hotel Ukraina, Courtney had met "a pleasant woman" on the INTOURIST staff, Zinaida Grigoryevna Volkova. By the following year, "Zina" had accepted an invitation to the theater. In May of 1961, there was held in Moscow the first British Industrial Exhibition since the Revolution, with which Courtney had much to do. Despite meetings with the Khrushchevs and Suslov, Courtney found life rather boring, since many of his friends were away from Moscow on vacation. Not so Zina, however; she had given up part of her annual holiday from INTOURIST to work at the exhibition.

"Since Elisabeth's death her attitude towards me had been noticeably warmer, and she knew full well how desolate life had become, now that there was no wife waiting for me on my return to England . . . . Just how it occurred, I have no idea, except that it was certainly on her initiative, but it is a fact that for the first and last time in our acquaintance she came up to my [hotel] bedroom after dinner and stayed there with me for several hours. Our affair was not a success. It was therefore not altogether surprising that on the next occasion when we met she expressed some distress at having behaved in the way she had, saying she knew now that it was not really what I had wanted . . . In June, 1961, rightly or wrongly, the thought never entered my head that a successful operation might in fact have been mounted by the KGB against myself."

A year after Elisabeth's death, Courtney married another Elizabeth (with "z" this time), the widowed Lady Trefgarne, in the Crypt Chapel of the House of Commons. His new wife, a Director of the

family firm of machine-tool manufacturers, was quickly accepted as both a commercial and political asset, and in 1962 travelled with him on a trip to Moscow, Leningrad and China. Zina took her sight-seeing.

Despite his increasing dependence on the Soviets for his business success (or perhaps because of it, in that he may have feared to be charged with a conflict of interest), his speeches in Commons often criticized the Government for failure to protest KGB harassment of British Embassy personnel in Moscow. In the light of the Vassall and Blake cases, he also spoke to the House on what he considered Foreign Office incompetence in the security field. (He had personal knowledge of Blake since he had arranged Blake's naval cover to attend a special Russian course at Downing College, Cambridge, just after World War II.)

He also made an increasing number of trips to the Soviet Union, and it was there that he received at his hotel a letter which had come through the British Embassy, from his wife. "The letter was very much to the point. My wife had decided to leave me, as our marriage had not turned out the success she had hoped: no more specific reason was given . . . I duly telephoned my wife at home and managed to persuade her to change her mind. But great damage had been done. The telephone call, which I was forced to make on an open line from my hotel, had undoubtedly let the KGB discover that there was a weak link in the Courtney armour." The file was growing swiftly.

Courtney survived the general election of 1964 but lost half his majority in the general trend toward Labour. In November an incident occurred which he does not describe in detail but which seems to have involved a fortnight's indiscretion on the part of his wife, and in January Courtney's eldest stepson, the leader of the Conservative Party (then Sir Alec Douglas-Home), and he all received anonymous letters "from a source or sources which appeared to be very well-informed about my wife's private life," suggesting he resign "as our M.P." Then, his critical review of a Soviet book on the naval history of World War II for the *Evening Standard* was attacked in *Red Star*. By March, 1965, when he was next to visit Moscow, he realized that he might be in danger there, and wrote a letter to the Foreign Secretary for his wife to mail in case anything happened to him. Although his business efforts seemed to go better than ever, one old friend of 23 years' standing refused to accept a call or a visit, which Courtney could only interpret as an urgent warning.

He nevertheless continued his criticism of Foreign Office security and his efforts to get the Soviets to agree to the first chartered Anglo-Soviet commercial concern with three British and three Soviet directors. In July 1965 he was to visit the Soviet Union again, but three days before his departure Sir Alec Douglas-Home resigned from the Leadership of the Conservative Party and Courtney could not leave London. Ten days later, two days before the Summer recess, members of the press and Parliament received copies of an illustrated handbill which "contained six photographs, five of them being of myself—with appropriate captions . . . . Two of the photographs represented me in company with a woman (or women) in circumstances which plainly indicated sexual intimacy." The impact of a special mailing to his wife was apparently not lessened by the fact that he had told her about the incident with Zina in 1961 soon after their marriage in 1962.

The remainder of the book is an engrossing picture of Courtney's fight to retain his political position in the face of his Party's unseemly haste to dump him as a candidate, his winning of his constituency's support and overthrowing the local Conservative leadership, and his subsequent, heartbreaking loss of his seat by 378 votes while the former leadership sat on its hands. Ten weeks later his wife was granted a divorce, and March 1967 saw a special party meeting packed with Young Conservatives choose one of their number to be the prospective conservative candidate for Harrow East. "For me the decision was a blow that seemed politically mortal. The process set in train by the KGB in August 1965 had been completed."

It must be admitted that Courtney probably gave the Soviets even more cause for enmity—and perhaps hope for success—than he makes explicit in the book. In 1947 or 1948, he had had "certain ideas involving the use of fast surface craft and submarines in cooperation with the SIS," and after he contacted "C,"[1] "discussions took place about the feasibility of obtaining information from the Black Sea area" using such craft. Unfortunately the man SIS assigned to the discussion was Kim Philby, who "listened to my proposals with interest, for he had a wide knowledge of Turkish affairs and his support was essential if Naval Intelligence was to make any contribution to the common effort in the Black Sea." Yes, indeed. "But nothing whatsoever emerged from this meeting . . ." Nothing daunted, in 1949 or 1950,

[1] General Stewart Menzies, then head of MI-6.

when assigned as Chief of Intelligence Staff to the Flag Officer at Hamburg,

> "Once again I found myself working closely with the Secret Intelligence Service, and at last I had the opportunity to put some of my ideas into practice by providing the SIS with direct naval assistance in the Baltic . . . I was struck by the potential capabilities of stripped-down ex-Kriegsmarine 'E' boat hulls, powered by the incomparable twin Mercedes-Benz 518 diesel engines. With my assistants . . . at Hamburg and Kiel I was frequently at Lubeck and Flensburg and other smaller harbours such as Eckernforde and Kappeln, from which we mounted our operations. Little did I know that the penetration of the Foreign Office and SIS by the Russian Intelligence Service must have not only doomed our efforts from the start, but had involved me personally in sending many a brave man into the jaws of a Soviet trap."

Not only that but, as the press has reported for years now, the boat crews and even the teams themselves were penetrated, in both the Baltic and Black Seas and probably in the Far East as well.

It is amazing that Courtney's post-war commercial enterprises got as far with the Soviet Union as they did, and in fact his success only becomes plausible in the light of his deduction that it was leading him into an elaborate trap. He believes that trap was to have been sprung on him in Moscow in July 1965; that he was to be held to exchange for Soviet spies such as the Krogers or George Blake, then in jail in England; that he escaped the trap only when he had to cancel the trip at the last minute because of a Party crisis; and that the handbill, originally designed to discredit him and render him defenseless while in a Soviet dungeon, was simply too far along to be stopped by the bureaucracy when the KGB realized he had not arrived on schedule in Moscow.

Perhaps, but it seems more likely to this reviewer that the KGB planned to recruit him—or perhaps even tried just before the trip—and that the publication of the handbill was a vindictive substitute for the original plot. Courtney naturally does not want to admit that perhaps the Soviets had reason to believe he would be vulnerable to recruitment, but by then his publicly expressed "weakness for blondes" had been documented in his KGB dossier for 35 years. It may in fact have figured in the UB action against him in 1957. As he put it later to the press, "I knew the danger of microphones but never thought of cameras. This was before James Bond and . . . the idea never occurred to me." He obviously thought he could have his cake without paying the baker, and probably had been doing so for some years.

Courtney's writing is excellent, his index professional, and his approach, considering the subject, dignified. Above all, however, we must

respect his political and personal courage in this matter, even though it was described in some quarters as "cheek," since the KGB's role was never proven. The subject matter must have been almost irresistible to the British press in the wake of the Profumo affair, but it was relatively restrained, perhaps influenced as much by libel laws as by a sense of fair play and anger at Soviet high-handedness.

But worse was to come than is mentioned in the book: in March, 1968, Courtney won a suit against his former friend, the out-voted ex-head of the Harrow East Association, Sir Theo Constantine, for repeating Courtney's estranged wife's statement that the incident depicted in the photographs must have occurred in 1963 after their marriage, rather than in 1961 before it, because in 1961 he did not yet wear that kind of "underpants." This must have seemed to Courtney the lowest blow of all and it apparently undermined the Party's faith in him beyond recall. Whatever the facts of the affair, we can only wish with Courtney that the Conservative voters of Harrow East had risen to the occasion and cast their votes, if not for Courtney, at least against the KGB.

R. H. Sheepshanks

Miscellaneous

THE OKHRANA: The Russian Department of Police. A Bibliography by *Edward Ellis Smith.* (The Hoover Institution Bibliographical Series XXXIII. Stanford University. 1967. 280 pp. $10.00.)

The Russian imperial secret service, the Okhrana, is the only major security establishment of the twentieth century about which a comprehensive bibliography, including material from its own files and interrogations of its leaders, could possibly appear as an open publication. It went out of existence in 1917, when the provisional regime took over and the revolutionary mobs destroyed most of the centrally and provincially kept records. The Bolsheviks promptly established their own Cheka, but in no way as a continuation of the Okhrana. Instead of safeguarding the secrets of the predecessor agency, the Cheka of the Soviets publicized and exploited them to serve their purposes.

Despite the voluminous Soviet writings about the Okhrana, however, nothing has as yet come out of the USSR in the form of bibliography on this important agency of the old regime. The present volume coming from the Hoover Institution is therefore unique, perhaps the only publication of the kind in the West. It is also logical that such a book was prepared at the Hoover Institution, well-known as the most comprehensive repository of the Okhrana materials. Its holdings include the nearly intact archive of the Paris headquarters, which duplicated the records kept at the home office in Petrograd, as well as voluminous data on international intelligence operations which were not as fully recorded at the capital.

The author points out in his introduction that "no general work exists encompassing the Russian security-intelligence organizations for the period from 1881 to 1917," the Okhrana's span of life. Various authors have written about it, but "narrowness of treatment and bias mark most works on the Okhrana," so that the resulting tracts on the subject are notably subjective. He is entirely correct in this respect, and his own analysis of the titles and contents does not entirely escape the taint of the partiality of the authors.

Some of the writings discuss the Okhrana's antecedents with centuries-old origins, dating back to Ivan the Terrible and his Oprichnina, and follow stages of evolution as landmarked in imperial decrees and statutes. For an understanding of the Okhrana, and the subsequent

Soviet security establishments, such historic factors and mores underlying the whole system of Russian counterintelligence and counterespionage, past and present, are of cardinal significance. The Okhrana, as sponsored by the imperial decrees, and as described by some of its former top officials in exile, was an essentially humane agency for the preservation of law and order. Its task was to safeguard the existing regime and specifically to neutralize or eliminate the elements that threatened it: the anarchists (nihilists), assassins, revolutionaries, and other political troublemakers. In contrast, the writers on the revolutionary side universally dubbed it as a tyrannical and brutal police state within the state. Their flood of propaganda precluded any objective writing about it at home or abroad.

No matter how wild the accusations or distortions, the Okhrana itself, or the government behind it, could not and would not commit itself in its defense. Because of the imperative secrecy about the agency, it could not reveal facts. It consistently chose not to deny any accusations. It could not make public that it was perennially understaffed, with an average of a few dozen officers and employees in each major city and province, while propaganda had raised the figure into tens of thousands of officials and spies in every *gubernia*. It chose not to explain that the Okhrana was not in charge of the gendarmes and the city police, or that the prison administration and the Siberian exile camps were in no way under its control. The Okhrana was essentially an investigative agency targeting at subversives at home and abroad and using any available methods to penetrate their groups and control their activities. Its plans and operations could never be publicly confirmed or denied even when the adverse propaganda contained elements of truth. As a result, the literature about the Okhrana has remained to this date essentially one-sided, all *contra*, with only an occasional morsel of *pro* and, therefore, hardly anything objective in-between.

Smith's Okhrana bibliography epitomizes this situation. He has a total of 909 entries of books, pamphlets, articles, compendiums of reminiscences, some isolated rosters of police and Okhrana personnel, circulars, and the like. Over two-thirds of the bibliography refers to newspaper articles and editorials which, in turn, are almost exclusively from the revolutionary and post-revolutionary Communist and other leftist press. Although the writers of articles draw on reminiscences or post-revolutionary discoveries of certain Okhrana acts, bias is seldom concealed. The post-revolutionary, officially approved

writer, likewise, could not depict the old security service as anything but a beastly conspiracy against the Russian nation. Also included are the works of two Okhrana defectors, Leonid Menshchikov and Mikhail Bakai. Smith describes them as valuable in illustrating *modus operandi,* but these authors were disputed by other revolutionary writers as incorrect. Smith considers Valerian Agafonov's book *Zagranichnaia Okhranka* (Okhrana Abroad – Kniga, Petrograd, 1918) as probably the best available work on the Paris Okhrana. He analyzes it chapter by chapter. Agafonov served as a member of the commission sent to Paris by Kerensky's regime to investigate Okhrana archives. As a revolutionary (Agafonov was once engaged in Burtzev's counterintelligence), he wrote about the Okhrana only what was acceptable to the new rulers. For instance, he was fully informed about Paris Okhrana's counterintelligence operations against Germany after August 1914, yet his book made no mention of that substantial achievement against the enemy at war. Works like Agafonov's, praised by the compiler of the *Bibliography,* should instead be marked as partisan and overly subjective.

The major part of the present compilation is given the general title of "Operational Methodology" which, in turn, is subdivided by subheadings on "Internal Security" and "Operations Against Revolutionaries" and "Other Organizations and Movements," at home and abroad. A professional counterintelligence analyst would no doubt use a different approach. The titles under "Internal Security" are a mixture of writings that could be classified under other chapters. Some are treatises on government policy and regulations; others, articles on individuals and their experiences with Czarist authorities; but none add up to a definitive description of how the internal security service was organized and how it functioned. The longest chapter, on "Operations Against Revolutionaries," is perplexing. It contains an analysis of 217 titles, but these deal almost exclusively with reminiscences about arrests, police brutality, life in prisons, court trials and exiles in Siberia. The Okhrana, although a special section within the Department of Gendarmes, could have played only a secondary, if any, role in making arrests and trying or exiling people; by law it was not a punitive agency. This section also refers to one interesting pamphlet containing instructions on how the revolutionaries are to behave in interrogations. These instructions, published in 1900, are in no way different from current day guidebooks for subversives caught by the authorities.

The chapter heading "Intelligence Against Other Nations" is especially unfortunate since none of the writings included under it are concerned with this subject. Only works dealing with Russian revolutionists abroad are listed. The Okhrana's operations were limited in peacetime to the pursuit of Russian revolutionaries, anarchists, and other troublemakers. This was the assurance the Czarist government gave to thirteen other nations which in the decade before World War I signed a pact to cooperate in such pursuits. Russia strictly adhered to this pact as long as there was no war. In the conflict with Japan, however, the Okhrana in Paris placed a strong team of operatives into Belgium who succeeded in intercepting and decoding messages of the Japanese military attaché there. That complex operation was fully described by Ivan Manasevich-Manuilov, the staff officer in charge. A copy of his notes is among the Okhrana files at the Hoover Institution.

Okhrana officials abroad themselves protested against Okhrana operations against other nations. For example, the archive at the Hoover Institution contains a set of dispatches to the home office objecting to an indirect assignment for gathering intelligence on the Austro-Hungarian navy and the ports of Trieste, Fiume and the Dalmatian coast. Bound by law, the Okhrana staff abroad refused to comply with such requests in time of peace.

With the outbreak of World War I, the Paris Okhrana soon converted its activities to counterintelligence and counterespionage tasks against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Some ingenious operations were mounted, and the Okhrana records at the Institution give a comprehensive account of the methods of handling the respective double agents, of the network stretching into a third country (Switzerland to Germany), of disinformation to confuse the enemy, and the like. Assuming that Mr. Smith had access to the Okhrana files, one would ask why that material is omitted from his *Bibliography.*

Other data at the Hoover Institution should not have been omitted. The archive contains reams of printed regulations and circulars from the home office dealing with the *agentura* structure, its functions and legal restrictions. Folders of circular letters show how various officials and agents were dismissed from the *agentura* because they failed to comply with regulations. Other printed materials, some of which are in the Okhrana archive and others of which may be available in libraries elsewhere, deal with statutes and imperial decrees regulating internal security agencies. A bibliographer cannot disregard that phase

of literature, for that would look as if he had adopted the slogans of the revolutionists forever proclaiming that the Okhrana officialdom disregarded its own laws. Mr. Smith included only N. T. Volkov's compilation Zakony politsii (Police Laws), but that work, published in 1901, was superseded by volumes of other legislation, much more pertinent to the Okhrana structure and tasks.

Still other materials, some well-known, could have been included. The Duma's stenographic records of the sessions discussing Okhrana scandals merit inclusion in this bibliography. From the standpoint of operations abroad, the Okhrana recruitment of foreign agents, organization of teams, liaison with foreign services, penetration of post offices of host countries, live surveillance, and other such topics were occasionally on the agenda of the parliaments in Paris and Rome. As a result of interpellations, the press of the two countries was able to disclose the names and activities of most of the Okhrana agents in France and Italy who were nationals of the two countries. The parliamentary debates often went into such details from agent revelations that mention in this bibliography would seem appropriate.

In his introduction, Mr. Smith set the question of how it happened that perhaps the first and best modern security-intelligence agency, at the height of its efficiency, failed in its mission to protect tsarism. He refers to historians who blamed it upon Russia's military defeats in World War I. That, no doubt, was the paramount cause, but the implied Okhrana efficiency or strength to combat the underground no longer existed in 1914-1917. The efforts of the *agentura* at home and abroad at that time were turned away from the revolutionists. Mr. Smith's bibliography does not show this, but the fact stands out that all major Okhrana agent assets abroad and most of its operators, especially after 1915, were harnessed to the Allied war effort. The Okhrana archive attests to that fully. It contains accounts of how three or four staff members operating from all Allied capitals mounted a double agent network to mislead the German general staff, as illustrated by the case of agent Dolin. It includes reams of materials which show daily liaison on counterespionage with the Allied Command in Paris and coordination with the British through an Okhrana outpost at Newcastle, England. Several key men among the Okhrana detectives were converted into deep cover agents, as for instance Henri Bint and his team, for third country espionage operations, for example from Switzerland into Germany, and the Jollivet family of Okhrana agents, and other minor operatives.

These shortcomings do not diminish the worth of Mr. Smith's book in a broader sense. To say the least, it shows how the revolutionary writers distorted the true picture of the Okhrana and how and why the few apologists for it failed so utterly. It should be of greater value to the historian than to the intelligencer, to the sociologist rather than the student of law enforcement. And the intelligence official, too, in this broader sense, should find the book worthwhile for reference.

With few exceptions, the book is properly and well indexed, and has a glossary of terms and a roster of periodicals consulted. The notations on each volume are adequate. Nuisances are the endless recurrence of typographical errors, mistakes in dates, too casual translations of Russian titles into English, and unexplained abbreviations. These may be considered as minor faults, but more consistency in transliterating proper names would normally be expected in an academic publication.

Thomas G. Therkelsen

THE ZINOVIEV LETTER. By *Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay,* and *Hugo Young.* (London: Heinemann. Philadelphia: Lippincott. 1968. 218 pp. $5.95.)

The intelligence officer who vaguely remembers the Zinoviev letter only as a relatively minor incident in British politics during the '20s will do well to reflect on this book. Its publication is an indication that the matter is far from dead these forty-five years later. At the minimum, the book demonstrates that the episode of the Zinoviev letter was incredibly complicated, and that it was as many have long suspected and the Soviets have long insisted, a black propaganda operation, one with massive repercussions unforeseen.

The bare public facts, it will be recalled, were that the London press published the text of an inspirational letter to the British Communists bearing the signature of Zinoviev, Chief of the Comintern, only days before the General Election of 1924, in which one of the main issues was Labourite Ramsay MacDonald's allegedly pro-Bolshevik policy. Labour lost the election, and the trade treaty with the Russians which had been awaiting ratification by Parliament withered on the vine. British relations with Moscow were blighted for years thereafter.

The authors demonstrate that the letter was almost certainly forged by a small group of White Russian conspirators in Berlin, who were, we are told, astounded by the results. The details of how the letter

was surfaced in London, and by whom, are also reasonably well established as a result of what must have been a major effort in journalistic detection. With regard to the question of how the letter found its way to London, the authors resort to ingenious but not entirely convincing speculation. They themselves point out, however, that the moment the forgery left the hand of its contrivers, the European intelligence services came on the scene, so that it ought not be surprising that the trail grew dim.

The wonder is rather that so much can be reconstructed from public or non-official sources. The authors make a point of emphasizing that they received no assistance in their researches from the British Foreign Office or intelligence services. Their expressions on this point betray a certain ambivalence with respect to the desirability of official help. "It is tiresome," they say, "to find the Foreign Office of today sitting pat on the departmental errors of nearly half a century ago." They go on to make the generalization that reliance on unofficial sources "is the way in which any unauthorized history involving the intelligence services must be written; and on the whole it tends to be a more fruitful exercise than the rehearsal of romantic escapades doctored to satisfy the present controllers of MI5 and MI6." On the other hand, they do not say whether they sought assistance from the Soviet authorities. One wonders what they might have thought fitting to record in the way of *obiter dicta* had they done so.

All of which brings this reviewer to raise perhaps an unfair complaint about this otherwise exhaustive reconstruction of a long-past, fateful series of events. The authors invite acceptance of their finding that the British press, Conservative party, Foreign Office, intelligence services, and individuals of distinguished report were all in one way or another co-conspirators in a colossal fraud. By implication, they also invite acceptance that the Soviet intelligence services stood idly by throughout the perpetration of a most damaging covert attack on essential Soviet interests. This really will not do. It may be that the Soviet side of the story can never be told. It may be that it would take another book to explain why not. In any case, it does seem that the authors ought to have displayed some awareness—as they do not—that the question of the role of Soviet intelligence in this extraordinary episode does in fact arise from their own analysis.

With that reservation, *The Zinoviev Letter* can be recommended, not perhaps as bedside reading, but as a fascinating, indeed tantalizing document. It ought to be very useful in the training syllabus.

Unravelling the tangled threads of the story, and deciphering the authors' innuendoes would unquestionably be excellent exercise. For the less energetic, *The Zinoviev Letter* will still be good value, even for those who think they have no illusions about the technique of black propaganda as a weapon of calculable or controllable effects.

Joseph O. Matthews

BAY OF PIGS. By *Albert C. Persons.* (Birmingham, Alabama: Kingston Press. 1968. 96 pp. $1.50.)

For once a book concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bay of Pigs has received little publicity. The author is a journalist and flier who was recruited with a number of other American pilots to perform support missions for the Brigade of Cuban Freedom Fighters who went ashore at the Bay of Pigs. Of primary interest is his account of what he personally saw or was involved with which comprises the main part of the book. He also speculates on other aspects of the episode and allocates blame and praise as he sees fit. On the whole, however, his account is not by any means hostile.

P. O. W. By *Douglas Collins.* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 1968. 310 pp. $5.95.)

This interesting work relates World War II escape and evasion experiences in a corner of Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania) that has been touched only lightly by comparable narratives. If it suffers in detail for having been written 20-odd years after the fact, it gains in perspective.

Captured at Dunkirk, the author, Douglas Collins, spent the next four years trying to escape. Altogether he broke from custody 10 times. Starting from the heart of Germany, he gradually worked his way south and southeastward. His seventh escape was from Hungary. The eighth and ninth efforts in Rumania took him to the Bulgarian frontier, as close as he ever got to Turkey, his goal. When the Red Army occupied Rumania in 1944, Collins was flown to England, thus, he shortened his captivity by months and had the satisfaction of being back in Europe with the British Army when Germany surrendered.

The specifics on how and why Collins was recaptured while attempting to cross Hitler's Europe would make good evidence for any

text on evasion. The boldness that made him a great escaper seems, in the wisdom of hindsight, to have been his undoing as an evader.

Collins' accounts of some of his experiences have value as general World War II history, particularly his data on the Ploesti air raid of August 1943 and his portrayal of the German retreat from the Wallachian plain.

Louis Thomas

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