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STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



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
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
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
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
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


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
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

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
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CONTENTS

Beaumarchais and the American Revolution Streeter Bass	1
<i>French intelligence assists at the birth of the United States.</i>	
UNCLASSIFIED	
Soviet Deception in the Czechoslovak Crisis	19
<i>A study in perspective.</i> SECRET Cynthia M. Grabo	
Rapid Transit in Clandestine Intelligence	35
George H. Montminny	
<i>Evolution of a system.</i> SECRET	
The Serendipity Effect Dino A. Brugioni	43
<i>On the frontiers of intelligence photography.</i> SECRET	
The Agency and the Future Charles D. Cremeans	77
<i>Time, change, and intelligence.</i> CONFIDENTIAL	




Editorial Notes	103
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature	105
CONFIDENTIAL	

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


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
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there appeared little to choose in point of significance to the literature of intelligence, and recognition is therefore extended to all of them.

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
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
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Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but reserves to itself exclusive competence in the decision.

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*French intelligence
assists at the birth
of the United States.*

BEAUMARCHAIS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Streeter Bass

“The King of England has long done me the honor of hating me. For my part, I have always done him the justice of despising him. The time has come to decide which of the two has shown better judgment and on which side the wind will cause the heads to fall.”

It was September, 1775, the King of England was George III, and the speaker of the bold words was John Wilkes, flamboyant pamphleteer, demagogue, radical Whig, rabble-rouser, libertarian, and, since the autumn of 1774, Lord Mayor of London. He was the center of a circle of the most vociferous of His Majesty's not-so-loyal Opposition and a lodestone for all those who hated the authoritarianism of George III. He presided over a series of famous (or infamous, according to the point of view) “libertarian suppers” which were attended by radical British Whigs and equally radical Americans of strongly separatist persuasion. He gave vent to this opinion of his and his King's mutual esteem at one such supper and, on this particular occasion, one of his hearers was a Frenchman, Pierre August Caron de Beaumarchais, who the next day included it in an intelligence report he was sending to Versailles.

The King's Agent

This Beaumarchais was a remarkable man. He was well known in France as a highly popular dramatist, and equally well known even beyond the borders of France as the author of four pungent pamphlets in which he had protested an unjust judgment delivered against him by the infamous “Maupeou Parlement.” His origins were humble but his talents were enormous. Born to a watchmaker in the Rue St. Denis in Paris, he was by the time he was twenty an accomplished musician, the possessor of a brilliant wit and debonair personality, and an ingenious watchmaker who had invented a new escapement mechanism which permitted the manufacture of very small watches. He had ingratiated himself at the

court in Versailles, had made a watch for Madame de Pompadour small enough to fit in a finger ring, and was giving the daughters of Louis XV music lessons. From this auspicious beginning he had progressed rapidly into the ranks of the lesser nobility. He was ambitious and he took advantage of every opportunity. He was trained by the financier Paris-Duverney in the ways of the business world and, by the time he was nearing forty, he had amassed a sizable fortune. He had a volatile temperament which constantly involved him in acrimonious controversy with prominent members of the nobility, some of whom resented his rapid rise in the King's favor. His vivid wit and facile pen demolished some enemies, created others, and made him, in a few short years, notorious in Paris.

Psychologically, Beaumarchais was an incurable adolescent to whom life was a continuous drama in which he played a succession of leading roles. What made him extraordinarily successful was his ability to absorb with his whole being whatever role he was playing at the moment, to the exclusion of any other. This delight in role-playing made writing for the stage the inevitable outlet for his creative urge and it provided as well the natural means of sublimating his personal frustrations. After several minor starts and two indifferent successes, he had, in the preceding February, gotten a smash hit onto the boards: "The Barber of Seville."

The role Beaumarchais was playing in London in the summer of 1775 was that of secret agent for Louis XVI. He had played the role twice before—once for the King's grandfather, Louis XV, who was always getting into scrapes, and once before for Louis XVI. In each case his mission had been to contact discreetly and neutralize on the best terms possible a blackmailer who was threatening to publish scurrilous material on private life among the French royalty. He had been eminently successful, and now Louis XVI, who had to devote a good deal of time and effort at the beginning of his reign sniffing out and cleaning up some of the more noisome messes left behind by his grandfather, had sent him to London to seek out and negotiate a settlement with a certain Chevalier d'Eon. This man, himself one of the more colorful figures of a flamboyant age, had been an agent of Louis XV and he was now holding the new King up for a comfortable financial settlement. His leverage was the threat of revealing to the British his secret correspondence with Louis XV on the possibility of avenging the Bourbon defeat of 1765 by attacking England across the Channel! Beaumarchais was well known to Antoine de Sartines, then Lieutenant General of Police, who with the new Foreign Minister, the Comte de Vergennes, had recommended him to the King for this assignment.

Beaumarchais, whose delight in role-playing depended on getting better and better roles in each new production, balked at first. He had played this part before. But Vergennes won him over by promising him a new part. A serious crisis was brewing between England and her North American colonies. This quarrel was spilling over into British domestic politics. The left-wing Whigs, and the anti-authoritarian party generally, were becoming more vociferous and were attacking the King in daily more strident terms. Vergennes needed to know what was going on. The French ambassador in London, the Duc de Guines, was reporting only what the British government was passing to him in his official capacity and this was hardly sufficient in the circumstances.

Possessed of one of the subtlest and keenest minds among the statesmen of his era, Vergennes was a staunch royalist devoted to the cause of restoring the greatness of the Bourbons. Since he was convinced that this inevitably meant another trial of arms with England, it was vital to him to know the nature and extent of Britain's differences with her colonies and the repercussions in London. He therefore enhanced Beaumarchais' role as low-level police agent in a blackmail case by adding to it that of confidential political commentator and international spy. Beaumarchais undertook the dual role with glee and performed it admirably. He induced the Chevalier d'Eon to accept a settlement so far below his expectations that he was thenceforth Beaumarchais' lifelong bitter enemy, and he kept Vergennes informed in detail by voluminous reporting on Britain's internal situation and her relations with her recalcitrant colonies.

Beaumarchais had arrived in London in April, 1775. By the first of May the news of Lexington and Concord had set London into a turmoil of speculation and rumor. Lord Rochford, whom Beaumarchais had known well in Spain some years previously, was still Lord North's Foreign Minister. He was garrulous by nature and his free tongue kept Beaumarchais well informed on the government's positions and plans. At John Wilkes' house, which he frequented for over a year, he came into close contact with the extreme left wing of the Whigs as well as with many Americans. He thus had excellent access to both sides of the question.

The Advocate of Intervention

Foremost among the liberal Americans with whom Beaumarchais came in contact was Arthur Lee. He met Lee at Wilkes' house and immediately found him a most congenial companion. He was witty, impetuous, ambitious, and consumed with a passion for complete

separation of the colonies from England. The two spent hours together discussing the problems of American independence and Beaumarchais became keenly aware of the depth of the rift between the colonies and the mother country. He also became imbued with a conviction of the essential rightness of the American cause. Gradually his reporting became less objective and more biased in favor of the Americans. By the autumn of 1775 he had become an outspoken advocate of the American position and a persistent proponent of the desirability of French intervention.

Vergennes agreed. But, where Beaumarchais, the volatile idealist, felt in his heart the necessity for the liberation of a gallant people who ought to be freed from tyranny, Vergennes, the political realist, felt in his head that the most direct route to French ascendancy in Europe lay in England's military embroilment on the other side of the Atlantic. In Beaumarchais' view, there was no reason for France to hesitate to support the Americans. The more realistic Vergennes, however, saw two impediments blocking the way. One was the fact that France had not yet recovered sufficiently, either financially or militarily, from the Seven Years War to risk war with England for the present; the other was the character of Louis XVI.

Louis had been brought up to take a rigid view of the Christian admonition to love one's enemies. He stubbornly refused to take advantage of England's embarrassment to further his own ends. Vergennes, Foreign Minister for only about a year, was still cautious about remonstrating with the King concerning his moral myopia. He agreed that, if Beaumarchais would write a series of confidential dispatches, addressed either to him or to Sartines, in which the pro-American arguments would be pressed with enthusiasm and persuasiveness, he would see that these reports came to the King's attention. The fact that they had been submitted by the irrepressible Beaumarchais would presumably shield Vergennes from any undesirable consequences which might result if the same sentiments came directly from one of the King's ministers.

Beaumarchais returned to London and launched a series of impassioned dispatches imploring the King to abandon his inappropriate religious scruples and to undertake acts which were in the obvious interest, if not of himself, then surely of his subjects and nation. He continued his pleadings to Vergennes and the King on America's behalf ceaselessly throughout the winter and spring of 1775-76. At the same time he stepped up his activities among the Americans and British liberals to the point where the British authorities began to suspect that the

d'Eon affair was not the real reason for his presence in London. A change of cover seemed to be in order and, at Vergennes' request, the French government gave him the assignment of purchasing on the London market Spanish and Portuguese coin, then at a premium in the West Indies trade.

In the meantime, relations between the colonies and Britain deteriorated steadily. By the end of 1775 the Americans were irrevocably engaged in an all-out struggle for complete independence. The Continental Congress had set up the Committee of Secret Correspondence, and the Committee had designated Arthur Lee as its agent in London. Lee and Beaumarchais began serious discussion of the possibilities for French aid.

The American need was certainly critical. George III had decided to crush the rebellion with a quick and vigorous effort and, since Britain was as usual unprepared for war, had hired mercenaries in Germany to provide the necessary manpower. Most observers on both sides of the Atlantic doubted that the Americans would be able to deal effectively with a large expeditionary force of experienced European troops—especially in view of their lack of artillery and engineers. Throughout the spring of 1776, Beaumarchais deluged Vergennes and the King with Lee's pleas for assistance, with his own pleas, and with reasoned and impassioned arguments for French interventions. By the end of March most of the cabinet had been won over. Only Turgot, the Minister of Finance, dissented. A short time thereafter Turgot resigned and was replaced. It was agreed, however, that the decision should be kept secret for the time being. Assistance would be given the Americans, but until the French armed forces were strengthened to the point of being able to deal effectively with the British in open warfare, France would be careful to maintain a sufficient semblance of neutrality.

Hortalez et Compagnie

Because of this need for secrecy, Beaumarchais was not informed of the decision. He was left in London dealing with Arthur Lee, and a Dr. Barbeau Dubourg—friend and correspondent of Benjamin Franklin and translator of Franklin's in France—was picked by the government to be the intermediary with the Americans. Barbeau Dubourg did not work out well, however. He was too old, he lacked business acumen, and—more serious in a venture of this nature—he was insecure and garrulous. Within a month Vergennes and Sartines, now Minister of the Navy, decided that Beaumarchais would be a better bet. He was summoned

from London and told to submit immediately a plan for the clandestine assistance to the American cause.

Beaumarchais proposed that the Spanish and Portuguese coins he had been buying in London be used for an immediate subsidy to Congress. One million livres would be the initial amount, half of which would be sent immediately to America to support the paper money being issued by Congress and the other half used to buy arms and ammunition in the Netherlands and other European countries. These purchases would be handled by a cover firm for which Beaumarchais proposed the name *Roderigue Hortalez et Compagnie*.

The French government did not accept this proposal. Direct subsidy in support of the colonial currency came too close to overt violation of France's neutrality and France, now committed to a course which would inevitably lead to war with England, could not afford to spend money buying arms outside her own borders. There was a better way. Preparation for war with England meant the complete overhaul of the French army which had had little attention for years. In particular the artillery needed modernization. Large numbers of perfectly serviceable guns had thus become surplus. As a matter of fact, a major of artillery named Du Coudray had already been ordered to call the French arsenals for guns and other military supplies which were to be made available to Barbeu Dubourg. Vergennes, Sartines, and St. Germain, the Minister of War, now saw a way to assist the Americans securely and replenish the French treasury at the same time. The Hortalez firm would be set up as a completely "black" operation. It would buy munitions from the French government on credit, sell them to the Americans, and then reimburse the government which would thus dispose of its surplus equipment at a tidy profit.

The government, therefore, informed Beaumarchais that he should proceed to organize his cover firm. As initial capital he would receive a loan from the government of one million livres. The other Bourbon crown, in Madrid, would supply another million. He would then raise another two million by selling stock to his personal business acquaintances and friends. The firm's *raison d'etre* would be trade with the West Indies. It would purchase from French arsenals such supplies—guns, powder, muskets, blankets, shoes, clothing—as might be needed. The firm could pay outright for this materiel or replace it with equivalent articles. Beaumarchais would charge Congress a reasonable price for what he was able to deliver and accept payment in tobacco, rice, indigo, and cotton which he would be able to market in Europe. The firm would be completely self-supporting. Beyond repayment of the original

loan and payment for the purchases from the arsenals, the government would have no claim on any profits the firm might make. By the same token, the firm would have to absorb any losses. It would acquire, by purchase or charter, its own shipping and would deliver its goods to transfer points in the West Indies where the Americans would pick them up in exchange for cargoes of tobacco, etc. As an added incentive, Beaumarchais, who still stood under a sentence of "*blame*" (i.e. loss of certain civil rights) at the hands of the Maupeou Parlement, was promised full restoration by the Royal Council.

Beaumarchais, fired with enthusiasm for the American cause and delighted with his new role, eagerly accepted the arrangement. On June 10, 1776 the Treasury paid him one million livres—in gold coin. With typical theatricality, he received the money in canvas bags, had it placed in his carriage, and drove with it to his house. There he called his whole family together and, with a magician-like gesture, poured out the coins into a shining golden heap on the floor!

Two months later, on August 11th, he received another million from the Spanish Ambassador. From a group of French merchants he obtained a third million and *Roderigue Hortalez et Compagnie* was in business. He rented a large building in the Rue du Temple called the Hotel de Hollande, since it had formerly been the Dutch Embassy. Here he set up the firm's offices, moved his residence and family into the same building, and waited for Vergennes to put him in touch with a responsible American agent.

Enter Silas Deane

In March, 1776 the Committee of Secret Correspondence had named Silas Deane to be the agent of Congress in Paris. This appointment was made without the knowledge of Congress since Congress, as Franklin wryly commented, "consists of too many members to keep secrets." Deane arrived in Paris on July 5th under cover as a wealthy Bermuda merchant whose business intent was trade with the Indies. Armed with a letter of introduction from Franklin, he sought out Barbeu Dubourg and asked to be taken to Versailles. The old doctor temporized. His relations with Vergennes had, as we have seen, become somewhat strained and he was now afraid of losing his importance as an intermediary if Deane were introduced directly to Vergennes. Relying on his instructions from Franklin, however, Deane persisted and on July 17th Dubourg finally took him to Versailles where he had a two hour session with Vergennes. Gerard de Reyvenal, First Secretary of the Ministry and later the first French Ambassador to the United States, acted as interpreter. At the end

of the interview Gerard mentioned Beaumarchais to Deane and immediately thereafter informed Beaumarchais that a secret representative of the American Congress had arrived.

On July 19th Beaumarchais and Deane met for the first time. They became fast friends almost immediately and throughout their association they worked smoothly together as a team. They had no trouble arriving at mutually satisfactory terms for the delivery of the promised arms and a firm contract was embodied in an exchange of letters dated July 20th and 22nd. The contract provided that Beaumarchais would make his goods available to Congress on a one-year credit. Congress was free to pay either the value of the goods on delivery on the purchase price at the French arsenals plus insurance, shipping, and commission—whichever it desired. Payment was to be made in kind: tobacco, indigo, and other colonial goods, the shipment of which would commence immediately, as soon as shipping could be found. Deane duly reported these arrangements to the Committee of Secret Correspondence and awaited confirmation. Beaumarchais embarked on a whirlwind of activity to fulfill his end of the bargain.

For the remainder of 1776, *Hortalez & Cie.* functioned like one of Beaumarchais' own well-oiled watches. Beaumarchais seemed to be in Paris, Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre, and Marseilles simultaneously. Ships were purchased or chartered, provisioned, supplied with officers and crews. The weapons which Du Coudray had culled from the arsenals began to flow toward the ports. Donatien le Rey de Chaumont, *intendant* for supplying clothing to the French army, became one of Beaumarchais' partners. He gave the firm a credit of one million livres and undertook to supply enormous amounts of clothing. By the end of the year, Beaumarchais had collected 200 field pieces, 300,000 muskets, 100 tons of powder, 3,000 tents, and large amounts of ammunition. He also had a blanket, a pair of shoes, and two pairs of wool stockings for each of 30,000 men along with such miscellaneous items as buttons, buckles, needles, thread, pocket knives, and bolts of wool and silk for uniforms. Most of this material had been collected at Le Havre and was being loaded for shipment.

There were hitches, of course. For one thing, all this activity could not possibly escape the notice of British intelligence. Reports regularly reached Lord Stormont, the British Ambassador, of vast quantities of martial materials moving on the roads of France, to and through French ports, bound ostensibly for the French West Indies but in quantities wholly inappropriate to any reasonable needs in the islands. Stormont protested often and volubly to Vergennes, who at first professed complete

ignorance. Vergennes also pointed out—conservative royalist that he was—that he would be the last to furnish help to the American insurgents: after all, revolution was a dangerous thing; a revolution here inevitably begot a revolution there. Stormont, to whom the already deteriorating internal French political situation was no secret, seemed placated for the moment at least. This astute diplomat was, however, by no means convinced of the innocence of the French government. In the light of continued reporting from his agents indicating clandestine help to the Americans, his protests to Vergennes became increasingly insistent and the government finally felt constrained to issue ordinances against the smuggling of war supplies.

Beaumarchais soon found himself running afoul of these regulations and protested vehemently to Vergennes, who instructed him in what it means to operate “black.” He was told that the snags he was encountering were unfortunate but inevitable. He would have to be more careful and he was not to embarrass the government by getting caught in any serious breach of the regulations.

Beaumarchais also began to have trouble with Major Du Coudray. At first, Du Coudray was invaluable to Deane and Beaumarchais. In addition to the excellent job he was doing in selecting the arms to be sent to America, he also proved a valuable assistant to Deane who was overwhelmed with a flood of volunteers seeking to enlist, or rather to become officers, in Washington’s army. The problem of sorting truly useful officers from the mass of volunteers was a difficult one for Deane, who was not accustomed to dealing with Europeans. Du Coudray was particularly helpful in picking out good artillery officers and it was decided that a contingent of these should accompany the first shipment of cannon to America. By November Beaumarchais had three ships loading at Le Havre: *Le Romain*, *La Seine*, and *L’Amphitrite*. At this point Du Coudray decided that he had a golden opportunity to advance his career. He too would go to America and he persuaded Deane to give him a Major General’s commission in the name of Congress. Because of his energy, efficiency, and cooperative spirit up til then, both Beaumarchais and Deane felt that they were lucky to obtain his services for the Colonists. Unfortunately as soon as he had received his commission, Du Coudray began to behave as if he were in charge of the whole operation. He left Le Havre where the three ships, now fully loaded, were awaiting only a favorable wind to sail, and went to Paris to persuade St. Germain to send him to America under his personal orders and as his personal representative.

Beaumarchais was frantic. The ships had been loaded ostensibly for the West Indies. But the artillery officers, whiling away their time in the Le Havre Cafes while waiting for the wind, were openly bragging that they were going to America. Beaumarchais complained bitterly to Vergennes. The wind at Le Havre might turn favorable at any time but the ships could not sail without Du Coudray. Vergennes called on St. Germain, and Du Coudray was sent packing back to Le Havre. Beaumarchais followed him to be sure that nothing else went wrong. And there, after all his efforts at maintaining security, after all his complaining about security, after all his worry about the noise the artillery officers were making, it remained for him to commit the most damaging security breach of all.

In all his activity for *Hortalez & Cie.*, Beaumarchais had used the pseudonym "M. Durand." On arriving in Le Havre he found that a local theater company was rehearsing his *Barber of Seville*. The temptation was too much for "M. Durand's" theatrical sense, to say nothing of his vanity. He attended the dress rehearsals, assisted the director, gave instructions to the actors, and all with such an air of authority that it didn't much matter what he called himself thereafter. Armed with this evidence of the involvement of a known confidant of the King and the Foreign Minister in an obvious traffic in contraband of war, Stormont stormed in to Vergennes. His representations were so bitter and his threats to break relations with France so obviously sincere that Vergennes felt he had no alternative but to prohibit the sailing of the three ships. His government was not yet ready for a showdown with England and he chose the prudent course.

When Vergennes' order arrived in Le Havre, *Le Romain* and *La Seine* were still at anchor; *L'Amphitrite*, with Du Coudray on board, had already sailed. The incredible Du Coudray, however, managed to make Vergennes' order effective anyway. When a few days out, being dissatisfied with his accommodations, he took command of the ship over the captain's head and brought her back to Lorient on the pretext of repairing storm damage. He left the ship there and returned to Versailles in order to resume his efforts to enhance his military prestige.

For another month Beaumarchais' three ships remained in port. Finally Vergennes decided that things had quieted sufficiently to allow them to depart—discreetly and by night. Beaumarchais took a gamble. Instead of sending them, as planned, to the West Indies where their cargos would be transhipped, he ordered them to make for a mainland port. His purposes were no doubt several: to confuse the British fleet; to deliver the supplies as rapidly as possible to Washington's destitute

army; and partly, we must assume, knowing Beaumarchais, to achieve the maximum dramatic effect with the arrival of his first shipment. He was lucky. All three vessels eluded the British and arrived safely at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in April.

The supplies were delivered to the northern army under Horatio Gates, and there can be little doubt that they were vital to the success of his campaign against Burgoyne the following autumn. Vergennes, who had held off from overt intervention until there should be some clear-cut indication that the American army could deal successfully with trained European troops, delayed no longer after the news of Saratoga reached Paris on December 4th. Thus it could be said that Beaumarchais, whose constant urging had been instrumental in Vergennes' decision to support the Americans secretly, had now provided the means to the victory which brought France completely and overtly to the aid of the infant republic.

Beaumarchais continued to load and dispatch vessels throughout the summer of 1777. In fact he continued to do so throughout the war, although after overt French intervention, the importance of his contribution became relatively minor. His usual route of delivery was via the West Indies, the transfer points being either Cap Francais in Haiti, Santo Domingo, or the Dutch island-colony of Statia. The deliveries in 1777 and early 1778 constituted almost all of the military goods reaching the Colonies during those critical months. It is perhaps not too much to say that Beaumarchais and Deane, by their own efforts, brought the infant United States through the most critical period of its birth.

The Inspector General

Beaumarchais' assistance to Deane was not limited to the supply of materiel. The volunteers who flocked to the American Commissioners in Paris were, as has been noted, something of a problem. Those who came in the fall of 1776 when the American cause was in perilous straits were young and eager French officers filled with idealistic enthusiasm for the birth of freedom in the New World. But many of these idealists became problems in America. They insisted on high command positions; they could speak little or no English; and they were unfamiliar with American conditions as well as the personality and psychology of the American soldier. Before long, Congress was sending frantic appeals to Paris to hold down the number of commissions being granted.

In the spring of 1777 the military situation had altered considerably from that prevailing in late 1776. Washington had succeeded in holding his army together, and had won at Trenton and Princeton, and Howe

had failed to take Philadelphia. France was beginning to show signs of serious intent to intervene and all indications pointed to a long war. In Europe no military events of significance had taken place since the end of the Seven Years War and unemployed soldiers were everywhere in evidence. Many offered their services to the Commission in Paris and Beaumarchais was of invaluable assistance in sorting out the riff-raff from the competent soldiers.

His most spectacular coup was von Steuben. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben had served as a captain of infantry in the Seven Years War. After the war he had been discharged more or less under a cloud. He tried to find service in Denmark where St. Germain—later to become Louis XVI's Minister of War—was reorganizing the army. He failed to find a suitable post. He became Hofmarschall to the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen who gave him the title of Baron but could afford him very little pay. He tried unsuccessfully to achieve a career in the armies of France and Austria and in the service of the Markgraf of Baden. In the spring of 1777 he found himself in Paris where he renewed his acquaintance with St. Germain who recommended him to Vergennes for service in America. Vergennes sent him to Beaumarchais.

Beaumarchais liked him, gave him a room in the Hotel de Hollande, and took him to Deane and Franklin who were impressed with his credentials but were under strict instructions from Congress about hiring any more foreign officers. If he would, like Lafayette, consent to serve as a private and without pay, he could be accepted, otherwise not. Von Steuben was not in a financial position to permit himself such a luxury. He renewed his efforts to find a suitable post in Europe but again without success. August of 1777 found him again in Paris and in even more desperate straits. Again Beaumarchais took him into the Hotel de Hollande and racked his brains as to what to do. He came up with a typically Beaumarchaisian solution. He dressed von Steuben in the uniform of a Prussian lieutenant general and launched him upon Parisian society accompanied by an aide and a military secretary—both paid by Beaumarchais. In due course Deane and Franklin were able to write Washington: "The gentleman who will have the honor of waiting on you with this letter is the Baron Steuben, Lieut. Genl. in the King of Prussia's service." Beaumarchais then lent von Steuben sufficient money for the trip and sent him off to America in one of his own ships. Later he sent Steuben's two nephews to join him.

Beaumarchais had no regrets. In December, 1778 he wrote his correspondent Francy: "Remember me often to my friend M. le Baron de Steuben. I congratulate myself, from what I hear about him, on having

given so great an officer to my friends, the free men, and having forced him, in a way, to follow that noble career. I am not by any means uneasy about the money I lent him for his voyage. Never did I make an investment that gave me so much pleasure, for I put a man of honor in the right place. I hear that he is Inspector General of all American troops. Bravo! Tell him that his glory is the interest on his money and that I do not doubt that, on these terms, he will repay me with usury." Von Steuben's glory turned out to be not only interest but also principal as far as any repayment to Beaumarchais was concerned. Among the unpaid bills found in his files after his death was one: "*A Steuben, pour avances faites en particulier pour passer en Amerique, et a ses neveux pour aller le joindre, 5997 francs, 2 sols, 7 deniers.*"

The Ineffable Arthur Lee

This debt was not, by any means, the only unpaid bill deriving from Beaumarchais' assistance to his "friends, the free men." From the beginning of the operations of *Hortalez & Cie.*, until September 1777, he sent five million livres worth of goods to America and received nothing in return. This total lack of performance by his countrymen of the contract he had made was a source of acute embarrassment to Deane vis-a-vis Beaumarchais, and to Beaumarchais vis-a-vis his stockholders. Three times in 1777 Beaumarchais had to appeal to the Foreign Ministry for aid to avoid bankruptcy and three times Vergennes bailed him out with loans totalling over a million livres. In September he sent a personal emissary, Theveneau de Francy, to America to investigate the situation firsthand and report directly to him.

The reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs were many and complex. The new nation was in the kind of administrative turmoil which could only result from an attempt to govern by legislature alone. Until the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 the only authority was Congress—a legislative body trying, with a predictable lack of success, to perform simultaneously legislative, executive, and judiciary functions. It was government by committee with a vengeance, and it did not work. In the summer of 1777 Congress was financially and militarily near disaster. There was no money in the treasury, Howe took Philadelphia and Congress fled to Lancaster and then to York. Gates won at Saratoga, but immediately thereafter the "Conway Cabal" plunged the army and Congress into more confusion than ever. In the circumstances it is perhaps not too surprising that Deane's appeals on behalf of *Hortalez & Cie.* went unheeded.

But far more damaging to the fortunes of Beaumarchais was the behavior of Arthur Lee. Following his recall to Paris in May, 1776, Beaumarchais drastically curtailed his contact with Lee. He did write him in June that he was preparing to send materiel for "your friend" to Cap Francais where the "friend" could pick it up against cargos of tobacco. However, the arrival of Deane, and Vergennes' demand for secrecy, put a stop to any further dealing with Lee. In August Lee heard that Deane had supplanted him as the chief agent of Congress for soliciting aid in Europe and he rushed to Paris in a fury. He got nowhere. Neither with Deane who treated him with a distant coldness, nor with Beaumarchais who was cordial but evasive, nor with Vergennes who refused to see him. He returned to London and immediately sent Philadelphia a message to the effect that any supplies shipped to America by the firm *Hortalez & Cie.*, were really a free gift of the French crown and that no reimbursement was expected! From then on Lee never ceased to deliver, in letters and memoranda to his brothers and their friends in the Lee-Adams faction of Congress, charges that the *Hortalez* supplies were gifts, that the *Hortalez* firm was a blind behind which Deane and Beaumarchais were engaging in illicit war-profiteering, and that Congress was the victim of all sorts of undercover machinations at their hands.

On September 26, 1776, Congress appointed Franklin, Deane, and Thomas Jefferson Commissioners to try to negotiate a treaty of recognition with France. Jefferson declined the appointment and Arthur Lee was named in his place. Franklin arrived in Paris in mid-December, informed Deane of his new status, and summoned Lee from London. This was of no help to Beaumarchais whatever. Franklin resented Beaumarchais' ascendancy over his *cher bon ami*, Barbeu Dubourg, and, while not actually hostile, was cold and distant. Lee, of course, was still furious at Deane and Beaumarchais and threw all sorts of impediments in their way. Deane remained friendly and cooperative but was totally unable to enlist the other Commissioners in trying to get Congress to honor its obligation to *Hortalez & Cie.*

In the midst of this state of affairs, Beaumarchais' agent, Francy, arrived in America armed with documents intended to prove Beaumarchais' good faith. He was referred to the newly-created Committee of Commerce which carefully examined the documents, decided that they were in order, and agreed to sign a definite contract. This contract, duly signed, specified in detail how the *Hortalez* goods were to be delivered and with equal detail the conditions of payment by the United States. Francy wrote Beaumarchais that their troubles were

over. Beaumarchais continued to ship his goods without interruption. But they both had much to learn about the nature of the American Congress. This body could still not bring itself to ratify the contract made in its name by its own committee.

By the end of 1777 the discontent in the army over the commissions granted to foreign officers by Deane, the confusion over the *Hortalez* payments, and the insinuations of Arthur Lee regarding Deane's competence and honesty culminated in a decision by Congress to recall Deane and to send John Adams in his place. Deane returned to face Congress in August, 1778. He felt the atmosphere loaded with antagonism and responded by showing the worst aspects of his character: haughtiness, aloofness, disdain. He brooded over his grievances, and the association with Benedict Arnold which ruined the rest of his life began at this time.

The controversy in Congress over Deane and Beaumarchais polarized the Jay-Livingston and Lee-Adams factions into pro- and anti-French groups—a fact which disturbed the new French Ambassador, Gerard de Reyvenal. It also disturbed Vergennes and he authorized Gerard to deliver officially, at a time which he thought most appropriate, a statement of the true nature of the *Hortalez* firm to Congress. The storm of public and private polemic raged throughout the autumn with now one faction in the ascendancy and now the other. The pro-Deane, pro-French, faction achieved a victory on December 8th when it forced the resignation of Henry Laurens as President of the Congress and replaced him with John Jay. A week later Thomas Paine published a blast in support of Arthur Lee. Finally, in early January, Gerard felt that the time had come to intervene. He forwarded an official communication to Congress in which he stated categorically that the supplies sent by Beaumarchais had been sold to him by the King's Ministry of War and that he had given his obligation to pay for them. They were not, in any way, gifts of the King to the Americans.

Congress confessed itself abashed and authorized John Jay to write Beaumarchais and apologize in its name and to promise fulfillment of the contracts. With vast relief Beaumarchais received this official acknowledgement of the justice of his claim from the highest quarter of the American government and redoubled his efforts to send supplies. But, then as now, politics was the order of the day in Congress; new problems arose, new squabbles claimed the attention of the delegates, and Beaumarchais was again forgotten. No remittances came.

The War Profiteer

With the recognition of France of the United States on February 6, 1778 and the open outbreak of war with England, the contribution of *Hortalez & Cie.* became a drop in the stream of troops and materiel which poured across the Atlantic. But Beaumarchais was not merely an adventurer looking for a quick profit. He was an idealist and he continued to send his cargos even though they were now relatively insignificant and even though there was no indication that he would ever be reimbursed. He now undertook new measures to try to put his cover company on a paying basis.

With the end of France's neutrality her ships became legal targets for British warships and commerce raiders and soon the prices of sugar and other products of the French West Indies were sky-rocketing. Beaumarchais continued to send his supply ships to the United States but, instead of trying to get cargos from Congress, he ordered them to return via the West Indies and load sugar. This trade proved extremely profitable for the first time since its inception, *Hortalez & Cie.* got itself out of the red. Georges Lemaître in his biography, *Beaumarchais*, gives the following summary:

"From its foundation in 1776 until its dissolution in 1783, the *Hortalez* firm engaged in business transactions involving over forty-two million livres, a truly enormous sum in those days. A close study of the balance sheets shows a total of 21,095,515 livres received while in the same period the general outlay was 21,044,191 livres. Thus the profit amounted to 51,324 livres—or only slightly more than two-tenths of one percent. In other words, Beaumarchais just managed to keep his enterprise on an even keel. His gains and losses, however, were very unevenly distributed. While the firm's private trade account showed an extremely favorable balance, the account with the United States was deeply in the red. Would the United States ever pay their debt? If they did, Beaumarchais would be a very rich man. If they did not, he would just about break even."

So in the end, Beaumarchais did become something of a war-profiteer, although hardly in the sense nor to the extent that Arthur Lee had claimed.

In 1783, as part of the negotiations for a loan by the French government to the United States, a determination was made by the American Consul General in Paris, Barclay, that the sum recommended by Deane in 1780 was substantially correct. However, a suspicion arose in Congress that Beaumarchais had been dishonest in that he had apparently received one million livres from the French government as initial capital without telling anybody. The idea that this might have

been a loan that he was expected to repay seems not to have occurred to Congress; in any case, payment was again deferred.

In 1787 Beaumarchais wrote Congress in stinging terms reminding it of its obligations. Congress responded by appointing, of all people, Arthur Lee to examine Beaumarchais' claims. Lee explored the matter and came up with a stunner: Congress did not owe Beaumarchais anything at all. Rather, Beaumarchais owed Congress 1,800,000 livres!

In 1793 Congress, impelled by some sort of guilty urge, gave Alexander Hamilton the task of once more evaluating Beaumarchais' claim. Hamilton's results showed that America owed Beaumarchais 2,280,000 francs. Further investigation, however, revealed that what had been a suspicion in 1780 was actually a fact: Beaumarchais had indeed received one million livres as initial capital from the French treasury. Again, no one bothered to point out that this was a loan. Congress decided that, since Beaumarchais had received one million from the King, this should be deducted from the amount Hamilton showed as due him. They further decided that Beaumarchais owed the United States interest on this million since it was, *in effect*, a gift to the United States and Beaumarchais had held it all this time. Congress further decided that the interest due it on the one million approximately equalled 1,280,000 francs—the amount still due Beaumarchais—and that, therefore, Beaumarchais and the United States were quits!

On April 10, 1795 Beaumarchais made a final effort. He wrote the American people at large: "Americans, I have served you with indefatigable zeal and I have received, throughout my life, only bitterness as a reward for my services. I die your creditor. Allow me therefore, now that I am dying, to bequeath you my daughter, that you may endow her with a portion of what you owe me. . . ." His last appeal went, of course, unanswered.

A footnote of Lemaitre sums up the ending succinctly:

"America's debt to Beaumarchais was finally settled, after protracted and complicated negotiations, in 1835. That year, Congress gave Beaumarchais' heirs the choice of accepting 800,000 francs as full settlement of the claim or getting nothing at all. The heirs took the 800,000 francs."

But Beaumarchais had died in 1799.

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No Foreign Dissem

A study in perspective.

SOVIET DECEPTION IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

Cynthia M. Grabo

The various postmortems and retrospective analyses of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 have revealed a considerable amount of disagreement among analysts concerning the deception measures taken by the Soviet Union during that summer. Some analysts believe that the USSR conducted a deliberate and fairly successful political and military deception campaign at least from mid-July onward (that is, from the start of major mobilization and deployment of the invasion forces), which was intended to conceal the scale and purpose of the military movements, and to deceive the Czechoslovaks and others into believing that there would not be an invasion. On the other hand, there are analysts who believe that the USSR did not engage in any significant deception effort, and that if we or the Czechoslovaks were misled at all it was a result of wishful thinking or self-deception. Aside from those relatively few specialists who have examined all the evidence in detail, most of us probably have a very inexact understanding of this question and why there should be a difference of opinion in retrospect.

This article does not purport to provide a definitive solution. It is intended rather to outline the problem and the evidence available and to draw some tentative conclusions. Perhaps more usefully, it also attempts to put the episode into perspective in relation to what we know of the USSR's doctrine and past practice with respect to deception, and to suggest what the USSR might be able to do to deceive us on another occasion. In short, there are some lessons to be learned from our experience during the summer of 1968.

Types of Deception

There are various kinds of measures which a nation bent on initiating surprise military operations can undertake in an effort to conceal its intentions. In all cases, standard security precautions would be taken. These, of course, may involve a variety of means to prevent outsiders or potential enemies from observing or otherwise detecting that military

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movements or logistic buildups are in progress, or at least to conceal the full extent of the buildup, the units involved, etc. It is important to understand, however, that such measures to achieve military secrecy do not in themselves constitute an active deception effort, particularly in nations which practice rigid military security as a matter of course, and the sophisticated analyst will take care to distinguish the true deception effort from conventional security measures. Nonetheless, the line between deception and security is a narrow one; the two are often confused, and an effective security program can do much to deceive the intended victim even if no other measures are undertaken. Soviet security measures therefore will be considered in this article.

The most common and easiest to carry out of all types of deception, a political deception program may involve a variety of measures. The simplest of course is the direct falsehood. Through diplomatic channels, public statements or by other means, the nation bent on military aggression or some other venture it wishes to conceal merely states that it has no such intention and that all such charges are false. Although such tactics are by no means unheard of, particularly when the stakes are very high, many nations will seek insofar as possible to avoid the direct lie in favor of some type of indirect or slightly more subtle deception. Thus, even in the Cuban missile crisis, in which Soviet spokesmen unquestionably directly misinformed the President of the United States, an examination of public Soviet statements shows that nearly all of them were indirect rather than absolute falsehoods. The USSR as a rule did not flatly deny that it was putting IRBMs and MRBMs into Cuba. Rather it said that all weapons being sent to Cuba were "designed exclusively for defensive purposes," or that there was "no need" for the USSR to deploy its missiles to any other country, etc. This type of statement, although extremely misleading, is not totally untrue and thus permits the prevaricator to maintain some degree of credibility if or after he has been caught in the act.

Among the more subtle means of political deception is the effort to mislead by implying that the situation is not serious, that the nation does not consider its vital interests at stake or that its relations with the intended victim are really pretty good. Ordinarily such a deception effort will be maintained only over a relatively short period, usually no more than a few weeks, although in some cases it may last for several months. Generally, it will involve the downplaying of the situation in propaganda and diplomacy after political means at solution have failed and a decision has been reached to conduct a surprise attack or at least to prepare military forces for such attack. This type of situation may be

marked by quite a sudden change in the tone and volume of propaganda, particularly for foreign consumption, in an effort to lull suspicions. Dictatorships, including the Soviet Union, are usually masters of this type of political deception; their complete control of the press and secrecy of the decision-making process make it relatively easy for them. For example, in the weeks and even months before the Soviet attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945, the USSR undertook to ease political tensions with Japan and to be "almost cordial" to the Japanese Ambassador, as all the while it was building up its military forces in the Far East for the attack.

Another facet of this type of political deception is to offer to enter into negotiations in an ostensible effort to solve the matter at issue, when there is actually no intention of reaching an agreement. The Soviet Union also has been known to use this tactic. On the evening of 3 November 1956, less than 12 hours before Soviet forces struck throughout Hungary to suppress the revolt, Soviet officers began negotiations in Budapest with Hungarian defense officials on Soviet "troop withdrawal." (The growing Chinese Communist concern with Soviet intentions in late 1969 is said to have been attributable in part to Peking's fear that the USSR had proposed the border talks as a deception measure prior to attack.)

In the interests of preserving secrecy as to its real intentions, a nation bent on surprise action also may attempt to deceive (or at least not inform) its allies of its plans. There is reason to believe, for example, that the USSR informed only the top leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries, and probably belatedly at that, of its plans in Cuba in 1962. It almost certainly did not make its intentions known to the non-ruling Communist parties. As is well-known, the reluctance by the US to believe that Great Britain was preparing for attack against Egypt in 1956 was based in large part on a confidence that one of our closest allies would not undertake such action without informing us first.

We have coined the term "political-military deception" to denote a type of attempted military deception which is carried out solely by putting out false statements about the nature, scale, or purpose of a military buildup. It is in effect a political deception effort designed to camouflage or conceal the real intention behind the military buildup by attributing it to something else. This type of deception, to be distinguished from true military deception described below, proceeds from the premise that since the enemy is likely to detect the military movements, it is therefore desirable to offer him some seemingly plausible explanation, other than planned aggression, for the activity.

The most usual explanation is that the troops are "on maneuvers." It may also be possible, on occasion, to find some other pretext for troop movements, such as alleged internal disturbances in a border area. US intelligence has long recognized that the Soviet Union would probably seek to mask preparations for aggression under the guise of maneuvers. Similarly, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are extremely suspicious of major NATO exercises as potential covers for attack.

True military deception, as opposed to the various means described above, is the most difficult and complex of all types of deception to orchestrate, at least on a large scale. It is most commonly used when hostilities are already in progress, when it may be used with other deception measures to disguise the scale of a buildup, the date or place of attack, and/or to lead the enemy to believe that an attack is planned in one area when in fact it is not. It involves such techniques as permitting seemingly valid, but actually false, military orders to fall into the hands of the intended victim; the sending of invalid military messages in the clear or in easily read ciphers, or the maintenance of completely spurious radio nets; assignments of false designations to military units; setting up of dummy aircraft or other equipment to suggest that units have not left home stations; sending out false "defectors" with erroneous but plausible reports, etc. Measures of this type call for very sophisticated and highly coordinated planning, since the chance that an obvious slip would be detected is great, and detection might betray the whole plan. Such measures can, however, be highly effective in tactical situations in leading the enemy to misdeploy his forces or to misjudge the timing or area of the main thrust. Obviously, such tactics have a more limited use when one is trying to conceal that an attack is planned at all.

The planting of false reports, through established intelligence channels or the diplomatic service, may be used as a part of the political or military deception methods described above. A military attaché is a useful channel for putting out a seemingly plausible explanation or disclaimer concerning a troop buildup, as is a diplomat to provide a false political story. These channels, along with the professional clandestine services, also may be used simply to flood the market with a mass of conflicting stories and reports. Particularly when reports are sensational but otherwise appear to have some authenticity, they can be a tremendous distraction. If the volume of such planted disinformation is large enough, the analytical system can be so overwhelmed by it that the truly reliable or useful intelligence may become lost in the mill. It is difficult to overestimate the damage that this type of deception can do to the process of assessing and evaluating information in a crisis situation.

Actual Soviet Security and Deception Measures in the Summer of 1968

With this brief background, we shall attempt to analyze what the USSR did and did not seek to do in the way of deception prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This requires that we also attempt to determine whom it may have wished to deceive—the Czechoslovaks, the US and NATO, or others, including other Communist parties.

The USSR's objective in Czechoslovakia was to reverse the course toward liberalization and to restore orthodox Communist Party control there. Insofar as possible, the USSR wished to achieve these aims through the Communist apparatus in Czechoslovakia rather than by overt military intervention. The objective was not to carry out a surprise military operation, which was only the final means to the end. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies decided on massive military invasion only after a series of lesser political and military steps had not been successful. It is thus obvious that the amount of deception which the USSR could usefully employ against Czechoslovakia was limited. In order to induce the Dubcek regime to comply with its wishes, the USSR clearly had to insure that its political pressures were such that Czechoslovakia would have no doubts concerning the seriousness of Soviet intent. To lend added weight to the political effort, it was also desirable that Czechoslovakia recognize the possibility of Soviet military action—and indeed the first device used by the USSR to attempt to put troops into Czechoslovakia was simply to request that Soviet units be stationed there.

So far as the West was concerned, it was not in the USSR's interests to attempt to mislead us unduly concerning its military movements lest these be misinterpreted as a threat to NATO. And the future support of other Communist parties was of importance to the USSR; it wished these parties to understand its concern with and actions toward Czechoslovakia. To deceive them unnecessarily would be counter-productive.

Military Security Measures

As everyone knows, Soviet military security is extremely tight. As a matter of normal practice, the USSR never identifies an active military unit by its true designator in the open press, and never reports a buildup of its military forces anywhere (except temporarily for exercises). Moscow has occasionally reported a reduction of forces, although not necessarily accurately, when it has seemed politically expedient to do so. It usually identifies by position only a small group of top-ranking commanders, and

the names and locations of its military districts, groups of forces, and other major commands such as the fleets. It may or may not report the whereabouts of top military officials, including the Minister of Defense, as it chooses. It nearly always denies travel in the USSR to US and other Western military attachés (and sometimes to all diplomats and tourists as well) to any area in which significant military movements are under way; it is most unusual for any Westerner to see a unit redeployment. The same security restriction is carried out in East Germany by imposing restricted areas, some permanent and some temporary, on the three Allied Military Liaison Missions.

A review of the military security measures taken by the USSR from early May (when the first deployments to the Czechoslovak border were made) up to the date of the invasion on 20-21 August leads to the conclusion that the steps taken were about normal for the USSR. Security was not relaxed (at least not intentionally—there were a few slips), but neither was it drastically tightened. There was no announcement of the early May deployments in the Carpathian Military District, Poland, and East Germany, and no announcement that a partial mobilization had been carried out to bring these units up to strength where needed (we learned this after the invasion from a defector). Throughout the summer, the USSR denied most travel by military observers to areas of the Soviet Union where the buildup had occurred, and in East Germany a “temporary” restricted area was continuously reimposed throughout the summer in the southern area near the Czechoslovak border. At least one unusual security measure was taken in East Germany: in early August an unprecedented ban on travel by virtually all foreigners was imposed in the area of the military buildup along the Czechoslovak border.

In Poland, however, which was to be the major line of communication for support of the invasion, there was only the most minor effort on perhaps two occasions during the summer to restrict movements of attachés, diplomats, tourists and newsmen. Only the actual encampments of Soviet forces were ever placed off limits. There were any number of observations by Western sources of the Soviet troops along the Czechoslovak border, and the start of the massive movement into Poland in late July of troops from the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts was fortuitously witnessed and promptly reported to the US Embassy by several US tourists and other travelers. Why this contrast with the security measures in the USSR and East Germany? Did the Soviets want us to learn about movements in Poland but not elsewhere? A more likely explanation is that Poland traditionally does not impose major restrictions on travelers, and that it either was not prepared to or did not

wish to do so in the summer of 1968, particularly at the height of the tourist season. Presumably the Soviets made no major issue over this policy (although we do not know this for certain), but it would appear unlikely that they really wanted us to learn about their troop movements. We would judge that they would have preferred secrecy (there was a report that the Poles had a public announcement ready in late July that Soviet troops were entering the country, but never issued it), but that secrecy was not considered of overriding importance.

In Hungary, the other area of pre-invasion deployments, partial but not complete restrictions were imposed on attaché movements. Western attachés did observe the major deployments of Soviet units from their garrisons toward the Czechoslovak border in late July.

Political Deception Measures

The USSR, from at least the time of the Dresden conference in late March, repeatedly and progressively made it evident that it was most gravely concerned with the course of events in Czechoslovakia. All indications are that it used virtually every political device at its command to bring pressure on the Dubcek regime to reverse the trend toward liberalization. Thus it is evident that there was no political deception in the strategic sense, no attempt by the Soviets to play down the importance of the issues. And this message also came through loud and clear to us.

More difficult and controversial is the question whether the USSR was engaged in a political deception effort at the Cierna and Bratislava conferences and in the succeeding days prior to the invasion. The theory that the conferences were deception, convened at Soviet insistence to mislead the Czechoslovaks and to gain time for the continuing military buildup, rests largely on a presumption that the Soviet leadership took a final decision in mid-July that any further political effort was useless and that the only recourse was military invasion, that all developments from that time forward were in preparation for that invasion, and that the timing was determined solely by when the military forces were ready. This hypothesis assumes that the Soviet leaders went through the motions at Cierna and Bratislava only for political effect; they had already decided to invade as soon as all military preparations were complete; and that they concealed such an intention from the Dubcek regime.

A review of the military evidence alone yields much to support this hypothesis, and a quite plausible case can be made that the date for the invasion (or at least the date when the forces would be ready) was set well in advance. The chain of military preparations from about 20 July

onward appears almost unbroken, and a final review and inspection of the deployed forces was apparently completed by the Soviet high command on about 16 August (their visits to the forward area between 13-16 August were announced by the Communist press). It may be conjectured that Marshal Grechko then returned to Moscow, informed the political leadership that all was ready, whereupon the final military orders were issued and the invasion proceeded on schedule.

The political evidence, however, is not so readily explained. From what we know of the Cierna conference, it appears that the USSR was compelled to expend a tremendous effort to get the Czechoslovak leadership to hold the talks at all (finally agreeing to the border town as the site after other proposed sites had been rejected), that a great deal of hard bargaining went on at the talks, and that an agreement of sorts was reached whereby Czechoslovakia undertook to carry out certain measures to strengthen Party control and its relations with the Warsaw Pact. A case therefore can be made, also with considerable plausibility, that the talks were a genuine, albeit desperate, effort by the USSR to reach some sort of political accommodation so that the invasion would not be necessary. The reduction in Soviet polemics which followed the talks was then part of the agreement, not just a deception to lull Czechoslovak suspicions.

If this is correct, one cannot view the Cierna and Bratislava talks as pure political deception. This, however, does not resolve the question of what the Soviets actually told the Czechoslovaks and whether or not they misled them—by omission, direct statements, half truths or innuendoes—concerning their military buildup and intentions. Unfortunately, on this crucial question, our evidence is far from adequate. The contention, which appears logical to us—that the USSR should have given Dubcek some unequivocal warning that Warsaw Pact forces were prepared to invade unless he complied with the terms of the agreements—may or may not be valid. It was reported in Budapest following the invasion that the purpose of Kadar's meeting with Dubcek on 16 August was to warn him that the USSR would invade unless its demands were fulfilled, and it has been implied that others also warned Dubcek of this. Charges have been made that Dubcek withheld from his colleagues some of the communications which he received from the Soviet Union, including a letter from Brezhnev on 16 August and a letter from the Politburo of the CPSU to the Czechoslovak Party on 17 August, which in the view of Dubcek's opponents allegedly provided some warning of impending Soviet action. Dubcek, on the other hand, is reported to have denied to the Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum

in September 1969 that Kadar had mentioned possible imminent intervention, or that the letters from Brezhnev and the CPSU contained warnings of impending armed action. Although Dubcek was of course attempting to justify his actions and his statements therefore are suspect, there is some evidence to support his denials. We do not know the content of the Brezhnev letter, but we do have the reported text of the CPSU letter of 17 August. While it called for immediate action to implement the Cierna agreements and said that delays in this matter "are extremely dangerous," there was no threat of *military* action in the letter. Also, it must be noted that Soviet public commentaries were notably devoid of saber-rattling and statements or even direct hints that massive Soviet forces were capable of overrunning Czechoslovakia at any time.

In short, we lack sufficient evidence to make a firm judgment whether or not the Soviets directly threatened Dubcek and his colleagues with invasion and if so how convincing this was to the Czechoslovaks. Similarly, we do not really know whether most of the Czechoslovak leadership was as surprised by the final military action on the night of 20 August as it has appeared. It is probable that those who really had understood the Soviet position did expect invasion sooner or later. They may have been tactically, but not necessarily strategically, surprised. On the other hand, those who did not understand the USSR's attitude and tactics—foremost of whom was probably Dubcek himself—may have been impervious to any kind of warning and hence genuinely surprised. It is not unlikely that many Czechoslovaks, like ourselves, were the victims of a good bit of wishful thinking—they just could not believe that the Soviets would invade.

There is another type of Soviet political deception against the Dubcek regime, which was quite likely considerable although we know little about it. This would have involved an attempt to subvert the regime from within using pro-Soviet elements in the Czechoslovak Party, the security services and the armed forces. According to General Sejna, the Czechoslovak party and governmental machinery was so well controlled by the Soviets during the Novotny era that virtually nothing went on without Moscow's knowledge and usually prior consent. Although there is little direct evidence, there is some reason to suspect that the USSR hoped in the spring to carry out some type of coup within the Party whereby the conservative element would take over from Dubcek, but that it was unable to effect this. We may be almost certain that the USSR subsequently tried any number of devices, without success, to undermine Dubcek's position and to promote the conservatives. On the night of the invasion the USSR clearly had expected an overthrow of Dubcek and the

installation of a new conservative leadership, but again the plan failed. It has been suggested that one reason for this failure was that most of the conservatives were not apprised of the timing of the invasion and therefore were not ready to act. If this is so, the argument that the USSR did not directly forewarn the Czechoslovaks—other than those agents actually involved in the operation—gains considerable weight.

In sum, the evidence which we have concerning Soviet political deception of the Dubcek regime is certainly incomplete and in some important respects inconclusive. These uncertainties, however, apply more to the USSR's techniques than to any attempt to conceal its objectives. On the fundamental issue, the USSR's intent to restore orthodox Party control, there is no good reason to suspect that the USSR ever sought to deceive the Czechoslovaks.

With regard to the West, and particularly the US, there is little indication that the USSR conducted any long-term or elaborate political deception effort—certainly nothing remotely comparable to what it undertook in the Cuban missile buildup. But, since its objectives in Czechoslovakia could hardly be kept secret from us as well, there was comparatively little room for any deception. There may be some basis, however, for believing that in the few days prior to the invasion the USSR sought to lull US suspicions by reaching an agreement to open talks soon on strategic arms limitation. Exactly what happened will have to be revealed by a policy-level official of President Johnson's administration. According to an article in the *Washington Post* on 23 August 1968, a meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin to discuss strategic arms limitation was to have been announced by the White House on the morning of 21 August. The article also noted that on the evening of 20 August, while Ambassador Dobrynin was at the White House informing President Johnson of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Secretary of State Rusk was telling the Democratic Platform Committee in Washington that "we anticipate early and important talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic missiles."

A final note is in order on the CPSU's conversations with and communications to non-ruling Communist parties. A substantial body of evidence is available that the USSR did not attempt to deceive these parties but in fact took steps to inform them between about 15 and 20 July that it might have to take drastic action, including invasion, to control the situation. While we have little information on any subsequent communications, the evidence is that these parties were forewarned about a month before the invasion to prepare their membership for this

contingency and that few if any of them were surprised. Many were dismayed by the final action, but not surprised.

Political-Military Deception Measures

We shall now examine the nature and possible intent of the various public statements made by the USSR relating to the buildup of its forces against Czechoslovakia. As we have noted, consistent with its security doctrine the USSR never announced that it was deploying any units to the Czechoslovak border. Following the initial deployments in early May, however, it prevailed upon Czechoslovakia, after considerable pressure, to announce that Warsaw Pact exercises would be held in June in Czechoslovakia and Poland. This "agreement" provided the pretext for the subsequent introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia under the guise of conducting Pact exercise "Sumava," which was held, according to announcements, during the last ten days of June. The announcement may also have been intended to provide a pretext for the presence in Poland of the troops from the Carpathian Military District which were introduced in early May, and whose movement had been reported in the Western press. Although "Sumava" was concluded on 30 June, TASS immediately retracted its announcement of the termination, and a series of subsequent statements from Prague made it evident both that the USSR had introduced much larger forces than originally announced and was seeking to keep them there. This was the first of the USSR's efforts, and a transparently evident deception, to bring military pressure on Czechoslovakia under the guise of "exercises."

On 23 July, the USSR announced that rear services exercises would be held in the western USSR until 10 August, would cover an area from Latvia to the Ukraine and would involve the recall of reservists, requisitioning of transport from the civilian economy and demobbing of military equipment. Subsequent announcements outlined a scenario of the "exercises," repeatedly described them as very large-scale, and stated on 30 July that the exercises were being extended into Poland and East Germany. The USSR also announced that a large antiaircraft defense exercise was conducted in the USSR from 25-31 July. On 10 August, a Soviet announcement implied that the rear services exercises had terminated, but no announcement was made that any of the recalled reservists or requisitioned transport were being released. Concurrent with the start of the announced rear services "exercise," the USSR began the major buildup of additional forces along the Czechoslovak border. By 31 July it was evident that substantial forces in East Germany had deployed to the Czechoslovak border, that the bulk of Soviet troops in Hungary

had moved into positions near the Czechoslovak border, and that large numbers of additional Soviet troops, both combat and rear services, were moving into Poland from the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts. It was indisputably clear that a major deployment of forces was in progress. It was less clear at the time whether exercises were also under way, although there was no discernible indication that any of the deployed forces were engaged in exercises.

What was the purpose of the announcements? Were they intended to provide some ostensibly plausible reason for the forward deployments of forces and supply columns? To lead us to believe that the only mobilization was in the rear services? To deceive us and the Czechoslovaks as to the real purpose, or primarily to put more pressure on the Dubcek regime?

Much of the disagreement concerning Soviet deception is over this issue. It has been argued, and with considerable reason, that the Czechoslovaks (who would be familiar with Soviet deception tactics and who already would have known the Pact training schedule for the year) could not have been so naive as to believe that an exercise was under way. Therefore, it is maintained, the primary purpose of the announcements was to put more pressure on Czechoslovakia, to warn but not to deceive. Perhaps so. We do not know how the Czechoslovaks interpreted the announcements.

But what about the West? Were the announcements intended to deceive us and NATO, or at least to confuse? To most observers, it would seem that they were, and that in fact many were deceived. To judge from current intelligence coverage at the time, it would appear that a majority of analysts were reluctant to say that these were not exercises, or to draw the conclusion that the *only* thing which was in progress was a mobilization and deployment. Only a minority probably firmly believed the latter at the time. And it may be noted that, even in retrospect, some analyses have persisted in referring to the "exercises."

At the same time, however, the Soviet announcements provided us the clearest indication which we had that a mobilization was actually in progress. If they left unclear the extent of it, and whether combat as well as rear services units were involved, they did serve to warn us, even before the military movements became evident, that an extraordinary Soviet military effort was under way. Thus the Soviet statements, if intended to deceive, also were an asset both to analysts and collectors.

Active Military Deception Measures

There is reason to believe that the USSR engaged in some active military deception against Czechoslovakia at least as early as June when

it began moving forces into that country ostensibly for exercise "Sumava." Numerous Czechoslovak statements both then and later suggest that the Soviets brought in much larger forces than the Czechoslovaks had agreed to, and possibly attempted to conceal the identity and size of these forces as well. Because there was so little Western observation of these movements, it has been suspected that the USSR moved forces covertly at night, or in small contingents over secondary roads to conceal the extent of this peaceful invasion during June. This may be partially true, particularly of the first elements which were introduced. A Soviet defector from a regiment which entered Czechoslovakia from the Carpathian Military District at the start of the exercise has stated, however, that his unit moved on main roads with no unusual attempt at concealment, although it did travel at night.

We are not sure whether the USSR finally agreed to withdraw its forces from Czechoslovakia during July (the withdrawal was not finally completed until 3 August) as part of a deception plan in connection with the buildup of the invasion forces, or because it really saw no practicable alternative at the time. Similarly, we know relatively little about any deception measures which may have been taken before the invasion to mislead the Czechoslovaks as to its timing. The USSR did employ some active deception against the Czechoslovaks during the invasion, perhaps more than we know. The best-known example was the flight into Prague shortly before the invasion of ostensibly civil aircraft carrying the military personnel who seized the Prague control tower to vector in the military transports. It is likely that other measures also were employed. For the most part, however, the USSR appears to have relied on security and speed of movement to insure tactical surprise.

So far as the West and NATO are concerned, there is virtually no indication that the USSR attempted any active military deception measures designed to mislead us as to the scale, location or purpose of the military buildup or the possible timing of the invasion. The Soviet military leadership had ample time to plan and complete its military buildup, and presumably could have undertaken a more elaborate and sophisticated deception effort than it in fact did. Such a plan would logically have been put into effect as soon as the major military deployments were begun in late July. The argument has been advanced that, if Soviet leaders did not decide to invade until mid-August, they had little time to devise and carry out any active deception measures. This argument appears both unconvincing and unrealistic. It presumes that the Soviet political leadership had not taken any fundamental decisions on possible military action until a few days before the invasion.

A far more realistic assessment is that the Soviet leadership in mid-July initiated the massive military buildup because it then believed that a solution by political means was unlikely and that the probabilities were that military invasion would be required to bring the situation under control. Or, to put it another way, the Soviet leadership reached the basic decision in mid-July to carry out an invasion unless a political solution could be reached, but deferred a final decision on whether military action would inevitably be required and hence also a decision on its timing.

Apart from this, however, it is in large part irrelevant to the military deception program just when the political leadership reached the final decision to invade, since the military leaders clearly were directed in mid-July to make all necessary preparations as if invasion were to be carried out, and they did so. Active deception measures would have been an integral part of the military preparations, not something reserved for the last few days.

The apparent lack of major military deception measures may indicate that the USSR saw no need for them against the Czechoslovak forces or did not wish to reveal its more sophisticated war plans and capabilities. It would be optimistic to suppose that more elaborate deception efforts would not be employed in event of attack against the West.

Confusion and Disinformation Measures

Possibly the most conspicuous missing element in the picture was the almost total absence of deliberately planted false reports by the Soviet intelligence services, whose disinformation capabilities are well recognized. There was almost no apparent effort to distract and confuse us with this type of material. Again the USSR may have seen no need for this type of effort in the circumstances. It may have preferred not to release a flood of misleading reports which might cause alarm in the West and raise suspicions that the Soviet buildup might be directed at some nation other than Czechoslovakia. Indeed, one of the most notable features of the entire Soviet military and political effort in the summer of 1968 is that it was so clearly directed at Czechoslovakia that there was no cause for any undue alarm in the West, despite the scale of the military buildup. It appears likely that this was a consequence of a deliberate decision by the USSR to keep the temperature in Europe as low as possible.

Implications of the Soviet Effort

The predilection of Soviet leaders for secrecy, security, and surprise makes it almost impossible to conceive that they could have carried out an operation such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia without employing some of their traditional deception tactics. So deeply ingrained is the concept of deception that there is reason to suspect that the USSR has sometimes employed such tactics when there was no evident political or military necessity to do so. In the case of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was probably also very important to the Soviets that the actual timing of the invasion and the details of the military plans be concealed in order to achieve tactical surprise and reduce the likelihood of any Czechoslovak resistance and loss of life on both sides.

The scope of actual deception measures employed by the USSR was probably far less than might be expected under other circumstances. The security measures were less than we would normally expect to see during a major redeployment, and the buildup was quite evident to us, and presumably to the Czechoslovaks as well. The amount of political deception, although somewhat debatable as regards Czechoslovakia, does not appear to have been very extensive or elaborate. There seems to have been very little active military deception, except possibly during the actual invasion phase. We were spared a disinformation effort by the KGB. About the only significant Soviet effort at deception, at least as far as the West was concerned, appears to have been the attempt to portray the logistic buildup and troop deployments as "exercises," and even here some observers suspect that the USSR never expected us to be deceived. This effort certainly would have been more effective had it been accompanied by drastic security measures to deny US observation of the troop movements and logistic preparations in Eastern Europe. In short, the situation was unusual and should not be regarded as a typical Soviet performance or as an illustration of what the USSR could do in circumstances calling for maximum security and surprise—particularly in an attack against the West.

Even the limited Soviet deception effort, however, serves as a useful reminder that we should always be watchful for the possibility of deception, and that we must continually look behind what the enemy says to what he is actually doing. This becomes even more essential when it is evident that a crisis situation exists in which the use of deception should be anticipated. The fact that any US analysts were taken in by the Soviet announcements on "exercises" is cause for considerable concern that intelligence analysts also might fail to recognize a deception effort

when it might be vital to US security to detect it. Our experience in the invasion of Czechoslovakia has reinforced the opinion long held by warning analysts that the US, at both its intelligence and policy levels, is extremely vulnerable to deception. The intelligence community has profited greatly in other respects from the Soviet invasion, which provided us with valuable data on Soviet mobilization, logistics, and operational concepts. It is to be hoped that the lessons learned with regard to deception will also be the subject of further study. Perhaps there should be more provision in the intelligence schools and in publications such as this journal for study and analysis of this kind of problem.

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Evolution of a system.

RAPID TRANSIT IN CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE

George H. Montminny

Substance, security, presentation, authentication, speed—these are the watchwords in the handling of clandestine intelligence information reports. Substance, of course, is the *sine qua non* in all forms of reporting. Security, always important, is a peculiarly vexatious problem in reporting from clandestine sources. Presentation is the packaging of the information in a clear, concise, readable, usable form. Authentication tells the reader, within operational security limits, what is known or believed about the authenticity of the information. And speed is—speed.

Each of these words stands for a value, a problem, and a goal. In the past twenty years the Clandestine Service of CIA has taken many steps to get better information, to protect sources, to improve presentation and authentication, and to accelerate transmission from collector to consumer.

The problems are inextricably interwoven. Obviously they involve some inherent conflicts: speed vs. presentation, authentication vs. security. Since none of the values can acceptably be sacrificed, they must somehow be harmonized or compromised. But conflict, with its corollary compromise, is not the whole story. Measures taken to promote one value have redounded surprisingly to the benefit of another. In particular, actions taken for the sake of speed have yielded unexpected dividends in appearance, organization, and clarity.

This paper focuses on the story of speed—how it has been achieved, and what some of its by-products have been.

In the forties and early fifties Washington was a daytime intelligence production arena. The hot intelligence was digested during the daylight hours, and the summaries went to policy-makers at the end of the day. With the creation of round-the-clock analytical facilities, this began to change. During the Korean war, current intelligence officers began the practice of drifting into their respective agencies well before dawn, in order to be ready early with up-to-the-minute briefings. The community was like a city which has grown large enough for a morning paper as well as an evening edition. It has never been the same again.

SECRET

35

These changes in Washington reached out and affected the movement of clandestine intelligence information from the field. From its beginnings, the Clandestine Service had had a serious problem in moving information rapidly from field station to consumer. The problem was rooted not only in human fallibility but in the very nature of clandestinity. The identities of sources must be zealously protected, yet the reader must be given an adequate idea of their access, qualifications, and reliability. To make possible the discharge of these obligations, cabled intelligence was often interlarded with operational and semioperational information requiring thorough sifting by the Headquarters desk. In the matter of presentation, Headquarters reports officers sat in judgment on the field collector—interpreting, rewriting, converting what was merely a “cable” into something that could properly be called a “report.” If they sometimes overdid the interpretation, annotation, and editing, that was an inescapable hazard of the system. All this took time.

For some years it was thought that the only alternative to this method was that of the Foreign Service, whose field reports went directly to Washington consumers without prior review by the Department of State. This alternative was considered impracticable for the Clandestine Service, primarily because a Headquarters review was deemed essential on security grounds and also because field stations, knowing their cables would be rewritten, often did not attempt to turn out a finished product. At its worst this practice developed into a vicious circle: sloppiness in the field provoked fussiness at Headquarters, and *vice versa*. At its best, it enabled the field to concentrate on operating without editorial distraction.

Under the pressures of the fifties, a program was adopted which greatly reduced reporting time from agent to consumer. Its essence was to reduce drastically the time spent in Headquarters review and “processing,” and to make this reduction possible by improving the quality and presentability of field reporting. This last was done partly by training and exhortation, but primarily by means of a device which became known as the “INTEL format cable.”

The INTEL Format Cable

There was nothing particularly mysterious or complicated about the “INTEL format cable.” INTEL format was nothing more than a standard format which separated operational data from intelligence and which contained mandatory entries in sequence: the country the report dealt with; the date of the information; the subject; the place and date

the information was acquired; the field report symbol and report number; the source authentication statement; the text of the message; and finally a record of the field dissemination given the report. At the top and bottom of the intelligence portion it was necessary to insert classification and controls. These required entries insured that all essential elements enabling Headquarters to pass rapid judgment on the information would always be present. It guaranteed that cabled intelligence would be received in Headquarters in something approximating disseminable form.

In a short time the station-to-consumer span was reduced from days to hours—an average of thirty-six hours. This was better but still not good enough. Fortunately, the state of the communications art improved but there were still unacceptable delays—about eighteen hours time—in the action divisions while specialists edited, checked references, added Headquarters comments, and sometimes rewrote the whole report.

The INTEL format, instituted in October 1957, was the first major breakthrough in the search for speed and paved the way for a serious attack on the problem of too much time between case officer and consumer.

Proposal for a Clandestine Service Intelligence Watch

On March 4, 1959 a proposal was approved for the establishment of a team of Intelligence Watch Officers who would work around the clock and would be responsible for the immediate processing and the fastest possible dissemination of the more urgent intelligence cables. Initially this group would consist of a Chief, an intelligence and administrative assistant, and six Watch Officers, and would act only during *non-duty* hours. The hope was expressed that after a period of trial the hours might be extended and the unit might be able to handle an increasing number of intelligence cables. The original proposal recommended that the Intelligence Watch (IW) should handle cables bearing the precedence IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY, and, where time permitted, selected routine cables.

The centralization of Washington dissemination of cabled field intelligence in a small group of officers who could not be experts on every country required a further improvement in the caliber of field reporting. The Office of Training included solid blocks of reports instruction in operational courses, and a new course in Intelligence Reporting, Reports and Requirements was established. To date there have been more than eighty runnings of this latter course, and more than six hundred persons have been trained in it.

There was an understandable reluctance on the part of the area Divisions to accept the principle that a group of officers, centrally located and not attached to a specific Division, could master the intricacies of reporting from all corners of the globe. But the Deputy Director for Plans had approved the establishment of the Intelligence Watch, and all concerned realized that the need for speed was paramount even if in the early stages the quality of the product might suffer.

At midnight on February 5, 1960, IW went into operation fully staffed. Organizationally, it was a branch within the Foreign Intelligence Staff, but its duties were to be much more in the nature of a service of common concern, than those of a Staff element. Its principal responsibility was to act after hours in behalf of the responsible area division in disseminating cabled intelligence information to the Washington Intelligence community. The men chosen to serve in IW were experienced operations officers, but none was selected solely on the basis of area specialization, since each in the course of his duties would have to handle intelligence cables from any and all areas.

After two months of after-hours operation, approval was given for the full-time operation of the Watch¹ around the clock. On May 2, 1960 the Clandestine Service Intelligence Watch assumed total responsibility for the screening of all cables received in INTEL format.

Relationship of IW with Signal Center and Cable Secretariat

The handling and rapid processing of cabled field intelligence at Headquarters is a cooperative venture. The first point of entry for cabled intelligence is, of course, the Signal Center which rapidly passes a mat to the Cable Secretariat. The Cable Secretary, responsible for *internal* CIA distribution of all cables, is in a position to discharge his obligations quickly by determining distribution, reproducing copies and slotting them for Divisions and Staffs. However, in recognition of the responsibility of the Clandestine Service to effect prompt *external* dissemination of the intelligence which it collects to those officials of the government who have a need to know, the Cable Secretariat defers processing of INTEL cables till they have been reviewed by IW. Physically located within the confines of the Cable Secretariat but actually an element of the Clandestine Service, the Intelligence Watch

¹The Clandestine Service Intelligence Watch is not to be confused with the Operations Center, frequently referred to as "The CIA Watch," nor the Clandestine Service Duty Office which is physically located in the Center. See "Studies in Intelligence," Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 1968, "View from the Hot Shop," pp 39-45.

receives the cable and examines it as a candidate for rapid dissemination to the Intelligence Community.

Responsibilities of the Intelligence Watch

The Watch Officer can do one of two things. He can disseminate the information, identified for community reference as a "TDCS" (Telegram Dissemination, Clandestine Service); or he can refer the cable to the responsible area division within the Clandestine Service for a decision as to whether, and how, the information should be disseminated to the Intelligence Community. He cannot kill the report. He cannot decide that the information is not worth a Headquarters dissemination. He can and must in many cases decide that the information will not be disseminated outside the Agency *by IW*. If he reaches the latter conclusion he takes care of a few clerical details and returns the cable to the Cable Secretariat. This action must be taken promptly in order to enable the Cable Secretary to fulfill his responsibilities for the rapid dissemination of cabled information within the Agency. If the IW Officer decides that he should not disseminate the information as a TDCS, it is still made available promptly to the CIA Operations Center as a cable. This action enables the analytical side of the Agency to have quick access to the information. Should it feel strongly that the information needs to be disseminated in spite of certain problems with it, a call from the Senior Duty Officer to IW will re-start the dissemination machinery. In such a case the Watch Officer will call in an area division Reports Officer after hours, or call him at his desk during normal working hours. It may be that the entire report will have to be rewritten, or that with minor changes the information can be made available quickly to the Intelligence Community.

The decision to disseminate or refer is not reached blindly. The Watch Officer has certain "supplementary data" which accompany the intelligence portion of the cable before him. These data might give a clue which will assist his judgment. He also has a safe full of source cards, provided by the area division, which tell him quite a bit about the source and which give him a disseminable source description. He checks what the field station says about the source in the authentication statement and compares that with what the division has provided on the source card. If the field source authentication statement is too vague or too revealing he will probably change it to conform with what the division has supplied. If in doubt he will consult the responsible division. The source description should include a basic designation of the individual, show his access to the information, and testify as to his reliability. On the

other hand, it must not be so specific that there is grave risk of pinpointing the source.

What has just been described is the procedure followed on the large majority of INTEL cables. There are, however, occasions—usually involving exceptional source sensitivity or delicate policy implications—when considerations not obvious to IW may necessitate referral to, or at least consultation with, the responsible area division. For these situations the field station has at its disposition an indicator which requires IW to consult the division before taking action.

Advantages to the Intelligence Community

The presence of responsible senior officers on duty in IW has enabled the Clandestine Service to be in touch with other twenty-four hour components on dissemination matters at all times. There are other specific advantages which accrue to the Agency and to the Intelligence Community because the doors of IW never close. These include the clearance function, electrical transmission of high precedence traffic to the White House, State Department, Department of Defense and other agencies, and conversion of extremely important and timely information into a CRITIC report.

Since the *Central Intelligence Bulletin* and the *DIA Intsum* must contain up-to-the-minute information they go to press before dawn. During the night IW is able to grant clearances for the use of Clandestine Service information in these publications in a manner denied by the controls.

During fast-moving situations such as the Arab-Israeli June War, the Viet Cong Tet Offensive, or a Presidential trip, IW in its strategic location close to the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center was able to effect electrical relays of high precedence traffic to key government agencies in a matter of minutes.

Similarly, there have been occasions when IW, recognizing the urgency of information which should have been, but had not been, slugged CRITIC by the field station, converted the message to a CRITIC and sent it electrically to NSA which controls the CRITICOM network.

Within the Clandestine Service the activities of IW have removed a heavy burden from the shoulders of the Divisional Reports Officers. Since four out of five intelligence cables are disseminated to the community by IW, these Reports Officers are enabled to devote more time and attention to professional guidance of field collection efforts.

Rapid Transit

SECRET

The Watch Officer

Of all the assets found in IW to assist in the proper handling of cabled field intelligence, none is more important than the informed judgment of experienced officers. Although the volume of cabled traffic received in IW has doubled since 1961, the job has been done by increasing the staff by only two officers. The background and training of these officers instinctively come to their assistance. The Watch Officer's sense of security tells him that a source description is too revealing. His knowledge that information must be used by analysts and policy-makers lets him know that another description is too bland and unenlightening. His sense of urgency tells him when information is of such a critical nature that it must be relayed electrically, or that a Division officer must be called regardless of the hour.

Although none of the officers was chosen as an area specialist, the current staff includes men who have served on all continents in eighteen countries.

For a man of mature years with the outgoing personality usually associated with an operations officer, assignment to the chair-borne life of a Watch Officer comes as a bit of a shock, yet most officers have found the adjustment not too difficult to make. IW gives the Watch Officer a picture window on the world where he formerly gazed through a narrow port hole. In a matter of weeks the rotating shifts which often involve daytime sleeping along with the night work, become a matter of routine. One newly assigned Watch Officer, after finishing his first stint on the midnight shift, reported that on arrival at home at 0830 his wife asked what he would have for breakfast. To this he replied scornfully, "Breakfast!!!!, my day is done. I want a martini."

The work of the Watch Officer is confining and many officers have reported that their friends in the Agency think they are still overseas since they seem to have dropped out of circulation in the Washington area. The swing shift keeps an officer away from many a cocktail party. It also gets him out of attending a PTA meeting or of getting trapped into becoming scout master. The eyestrain is severe and so is the strain on the back. But there are bright spots in the working day. These are usually caused by sun spots or other activities of the gremlins and grohms. The motto of the Watch Officer is, "We never make mistakes, but those errors do creep in." It behooves him to catch these errors because many of the garbles result in unprintable language. Here are a few printable examples:

"He was awarded the Lenin *Peach* Prize."

In Laos "*Sex Battalions* were observed."

In Africa "A courier was carrying a *dipsomaniac* pouch."

In Pakistan "An attempt will be made to obtain a *Haneas Morpus* writ for Bhutto."

"The Saigon government has a *dipity* prime minister."

"The Mekong jungle area contained 2000 *Bribesmen*."

A report from Yemen referred to "The *Gulp of Yemen*."

A Middle East report described a local rogue as "*The Scarlet Pumpernickl*."

A report on the United Nations referred to "*The Untied Nations*."

In Pakistan an airport has a *rumway*.

A report from Sierra Leone said that "A female police corporal *retired* for misbehavior has now been rehired."

Paris has a source with *expensive* far eastern experience.

Rumors are *ripe*.

Finally, in the spirit of George Washington's farewell address, to show that we do not wish to get involved in foreign entanglements there is the report with the slightly garbled control "No Foreign Kisseem."

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No Foreign Dissem

*On the frontiers of
intelligence photography.*

THE SERENDIPITY EFFECT

Dino A. Brugioni

Although the word serendipity is coming to have various meanings to people engaged in such diverse occupations as music and medicine, its present dictionary-limited meaning (“an apparent attribute for making fortunate discoveries accidentally”) is applicable in an exciting sense to photo interpreters engaged in producing intelligence. These PI’s, who are for the most part highly trained and skilled in interpretation related to weaponry, daily demonstrate an uncanny talent for discovering important information accidentally. That is, the discoveries are accidental in the sense of being unsought and not necessarily related to prime intelligence objectives.

Interpretation of aerial photography is often hampered by the presence of clouds, snow, shadows, haze, darkness, or obliquity, not to mention equipment failure. On the other hand, there are missions when all equipment works, the weather is ideal, and the resulting photography is nearly perfect for interpretation. There are also times when optimum conditions occur as if by accident to produce bonus intelligence not anticipated. In still other instances, the result unaccountably exceeds that which the designed characteristics of the camera system are supposed to produce. There are yet other times when the information obtained is not of specific interest to the intelligence community but is of great interest to other branches of the government or of society in general. Arthur C. Lundahl, Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) has termed this the “serendipity effect.”

The justification for what are called overhead reconnaissance missions is, of course, the gathering of intelligence. Here, however, I want to emphasize that through serendipity we have provided bonus information which has proved to have great value in such diverse fields as geology, hydrology, meteorology, oceanography, agriculture, and forestry. A great quantity and variety of data is obtained in each photographic mission. The information acquired for intelligence purposes alone often falls into several groupings. Missions are normally flown to satisfy *intelligence*

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needs, but there are also empirical *byproducts* of the latter. Data obtained for military mapping purposes are perhaps the easiest to understand. All other information derived from aerial photography may be grouped into a gigantic basket labeled "*peaceful uses*." The categories involved are not well-defined, and are subject to change without notice. Innovations in photographic systems or techniques of exploitation can and do alter categories, or cause a given subject to subsist simultaneously in several categories of reference. For example, if an accurate system of crop forecasting by means of aerial photography could be developed, the result would fall into both the "*peaceful uses*" and the "*intelligence*" groupings, since it would be a valuable tool not only to the economic intelligence analyst but to the agriculturalist as well. All of which is to say that the serendipity effect is important, and that its consequences deserve serious study.

This is beginning to happen. An important effect of discoveries of the various uses of photography is that various scientific disciplines are conducting discussions. This discourse has resulted in close cooperation between the intelligence and the "*peaceful uses*" groupings, thereby enabling the various "*peaceful users*" to reap the benefits of techniques, experience, and equipment developed at NPIC.

The revolutionary breakthroughs in aerial reconnaissance and photographic interpretation in the past 20 years, have produced a host of serendipity effects. The increase in speed and altitude of photo-taking vehicles has made it possible to survey larger and larger areas. Advances in the design and manufacture of optics and in the chemistry of film have permitted the use of cameras with longer focal lengths, resulting in better resolution as well as greater loads of film per reconnaissance mission. Improvement in processing and viewing equipment has enabled the extraction of more information from the images captured in each exposure. Most importantly, personnel engaged in this work have gained extensive experience and skill, with the result that more and more serendipity effects are being recognized and exploited.

The route between recognition and exploitation of the serendipity effect can be long and sometimes arduous. First, there must be vision to recognize serendipity effects; then there must be support and encouragement, and finally there must be leadership and management to exploit the effects. We all know that in the vast vineyard of intelligence there are more tasks than we can dispose of in the normal day's work. It often happens in PI work that a supervisor is called upon to look over an interpreter's shoulder and observe some new phenomenon. Success or failure in discovering a new "effect" is often determined at

such moments of creative insight. Knowing this, and recognizing that NPIC does not have a charter for "peaceful uses" work, NPIC has nevertheless encouraged all hands to report their findings which, in turn, can be discussed with other agencies and organizations.

The following pages will demonstrate some of the ways in which the serendipity aspects of photographic interpretation have affected intelligence as well as other fields of activity. We will examine some of the recent advances in photographic interpretation techniques and equipment as well as in other sensory systems discussed, and discuss the effects they have had on the requirements of the user community.

Synoptic Observation

In photographic interpretation, synoptic observation—the observation of all parts of a large area simultaneously—is necessary for the analysis of situations that fluctuate over time, such as an order of battle or traffic patterns. Heretofore, such analysis could at best produce only an estimate derived from the coverage from several missions (and times), postulating assumptions as to how a situation would change in the intervals of coverage, and by extrapolating from the analysis of the covered areas to account for the areas not covered. Now, however, the speed of the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft provides near-synoptic observations of large areas. Several flights of the SR-71 can furnish information that previously required many missions to supply.

Prior to the flight of the first SR-71 missions in 1967, for example, the North Vietnamese had constructed almost 200 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. After the first site was identified in April 1965, the North Vietnamese began to play a kind of shell game, moving the missiles and launchers from site to site. Each low-level reconnaissance mission covered only some 10 sites, of which two or three were occupied. This partial coverage combined with the shuffling of SAM equipment made a total equipment inventory impossible. Estimates of the North Vietnamese inventory of SAM equipment were based on sampling techniques (counting the times the observed sites were occupied combined with the times and places missiles were fired at our reconnaissance craft) and on logic (postulating the number of SAM sites that would be required to defend an area of targets adequately).

The first clear photography from an SR-71 mission covered the major portion of North Vietnam and revealed 133 SAM sites, of which 20 were occupied. A later SR-71 mission revealed that 29 sites contained SAM equipment. Since that time, the North Vietnam SAM pattern has been shifted from time to time, but the number of occupied sites has remained

essentially the same, and most of the occupied sites have consistently been defending the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This synoptic look at the North Vietnamese SAM defense system thus has enabled photographic interpreters to make an accurate count of SAM equipment. Their findings are no longer estimates, but more and more hard fact.

The synoptic capability of the new systems, however, is not the only consideration affecting our chances of obtaining serendipity effects. We will now look at some of the other circumstances, some technical, some natural or physical, bearing on the problem.

Date and Time of Exposure

The optimum yield of photographic intelligence is derived from photographic missions flown in the springtime after snow has melted and before leaves have appeared on trees, and at or near noon when there is little or no shadow. This timing is not always possible in intelligence operations because missions must be conducted throughout the year. However, certain advantages may be obtained from missions flown at other seasons of the year, or days of the week, or times of day. Moreover, there are conditions when it is not advantageous to fly a mission at the normally ideal times of noon and in spring. For example, during a typical day in the tropics, clouds build up in the morning to release rainfall at noon. In China, spring is the monsoon period and clouds cover the land mass for weeks at a time.

Missions in winter when snow is on the ground often provide unique insights in interpretation. By observing snow melt on buildings (buildings that are heated), an interpreter can readily identify areas of habitation and work. Further, by noting areas where the snow has been removed or plowed, the importance of a facility can often be established. Snow also aids in the identification of camouflaged areas. Snow obliterates painted disruptive patterns (Figure 1) and highlights those areas where camouflage netting (Figure 2) or plastic sheathing is employed.

Tall, very slender structures, such as communication towers and electronic installations, are difficult to discern in the absence of shadow, but on photography taken in early morning or late afternoon they cast long shadows which allow their identification and measurement. They are easily identified on winter photography in which snow and low sun angles cause long shadows and produce high contrast of black shadow on smooth white backgrounds.

Photography from missions flown in the spring over permafrost areas reveals buildings under construction, thereby yielding details of the

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Figure 1. *Now You See It, Now You Don't.* The disruptive pattern painting seen in July are concealed by snow in January at the Ladeburg SAM Support Facility, East Germany.

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Serendipity




Figure 2. *Like a Sore Thumb*. This missile site was effectively camouflaged by netting until snow starkly revealed the surface-to-air missile on its launcher

buildings' interiors, while coverage in the fall will reveal completed buildings or the results of the year's construction activity.

The best military order of battle information is normally obtained on Sunday morning when most military equipment is in garrison, parked or stowed. A count of private planes can best be obtained on weekdays rather than weekends, because private planes are more frequently flown on weekends.

Iron and steel plants in normal operation are nearly always partially obscured by smoke, steam, and dust. The best time, therefore, to photograph such a plant is during a strike or when the plant is shut down for renovation or repair.

The movement of the tide can have a direct effect on what is seen or is not seen on photography. For example, a photograph taken at high tide of a boat repair facility in Hatou, North Vietnam, reveals two patrol boat combatants under repair. The exact number of boats the facility can handle cannot be determined from that photograph. However, photography taken at low tide reveals eight boat cradles (Figure 3).

SECRET



Figure 3. *Time and Tide*. On the upper, two motor torpedo boats are seen at high tide at this boat repair facility in North Vietnam. On the lower, low tide reveals that the facility has a total of eight cradles for repair purposes.

SECRET

Serendipity



Figure 4 Hit. An RF-4C aircraft is hit by an SA-2 missile near Haiphong. The crew members escaped and are now prisoners in North Vietnam.

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Figure 5. Miss. A drone caught this remarkable photograph of an exploded M-2 missile. The burst was some 400 feet from the camera, but the drone successfully completed its mission.

Instant of Exposure

The instant of exposure is that fraction of time when the shutter clicked or film moved to record an event on photography. If the event lasted long enough to be recorded on several frames of photography, then photogrammetric calculations taking account of elapsed time can yield technical data on the event that often is not obtainable from other sources. It may happen, moreover, that the reconnaissance vehicle is over a target at a particularly opportune time, or its very presence may elicit a reaction that its cameras catch on film.

Thus, attempts by the North Vietnamese to bring down US reconnaissance vehicles have provided unique information on the SA-2 missile system. Detailed studies of SA-2s in flight and their subsequent bursts have provided information on the type of explosion, number and speed of fragments, and warhead arming. This information has been used by the military to determine the probable size of the SA-2's lethal area (Figures 4 and 5). Trails of missiles fired at reconnaissance vehicles have been analyzed and have provided information on the SA-2's flight characteristics and performance. Limitations on its turn and climb characteristics have been noted, and this, along with other information, has made it possible to devise evasion maneuvers.

Periodic Coverage

Periodic coverage is a valuable tool in intelligence operations and countless examples could be cited where it has solved intelligence problems. Its full potential in the "peaceful uses" arena, however, has not been realized or exploited. Normally one thinks of periodic coverage as extending over a period of days, but it could just as well occur at various hours of a single day.

PI's of the British Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Center (JARIC), who are exchanging their techniques and experiences with NPIC personnel, have noted many serendipitous effects on RAF photography flown over Africa and Asia. Their photography of wildlife in Africa at different times on a single day illustrates the potential usefulness of periodic coverage.

The British were called upon by one of their former African colonies to produce a series of large-scale maps on areas of potential mineral resources. The contract stipulated that the British were to aid in training to conduct the necessary photographic missions, the photogrammetric efforts, the map compilations, and production efforts. To demonstrate that in each geographic area there is an optimum time of day and season

for conducting photographic mapping missions because of the effects of weather, shadows, foliage, and other variables, the British overflew a prescribed area every hour on the hour from shortly after daybreak until dusk.

Upon seeing the processed films, the host officials were duly impressed with the problems of shadows, clouds, and the like. The British officer in charge happened to have a degree in zoology, and was astonished at the catalogue of detail on wildlife that was found in the photography. He could inventory not only the wildlife, but could do it by age and sex. He could determine the ranging of various species, the plant life that supported them, their feeding and watering times, their nursing and rest periods, and the relationship of one species with others. He was able to observe several rare species of antelope and to observe elephant poachers in action.

The British officer filed a preliminary report on his findings, which was duly filed in Britain, suggesting among other things that such a study based on photography could allow naturalists to select the time and place to trap, snare, or tranquilize wildlife prior to their removal to safe havens in the event man wished to use the land inhabited by animals for other purposes. Had his findings and recommendations been heeded, the wildlife tragedy of gigantic proportions that occurred in Rhodesia in 1958-60 might have been averted.

There, it will be recalled, after completion of the Kariba dam on the mighty Zambesi River, a lake some 110 miles long formed behind it. Although the tribesmen who lived in the valleys were moved to higher ground, no consideration was given to the wildlife in what once was one of the world's richest game sanctuaries. As the seasonal floodwater hit the dam and the water level began to rise, hundreds of hills became islands, crowded with hungry and panic-stricken beasts.

When naturalists of the world learned that thousands of animals were doomed to starve or drown in a dammed-up lake, they censured the Rhodesian Government for its lack of concern for the animals. The Southern Rhodesians responded by sending three game wardens and eight native trackers to rescue the starving and dying animals. The Northern Rhodesian government sent one game warden who, upon seeing the conditions of the animals, slaughtered them at random. Although the Rhodesian government and the Royal Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals continued their feeble rescue effort for several months, only a tiny fraction of the valley wildlife was saved.

Increased Altitude

As the operating altitude of photographic vehicles has increased, the amount of land area that can be covered by a single exposure has also significantly increased, thus making it possible to observe larger ground patterns. As a result, military mapping and charting organizations have developed more efficient means of map compilation and production. The larger areas observed require fewer controls and the tedious process of making print mosaics is reduced to a minimum.

Experts have said that to open new lands for development, for mineral exploration, land cultivation, water resources, and so on, topographic maps at the scale of 1:100,000 are needed. A recent survey by the United Nations revealed, however, that only 15 to 20 percent of the world has been mapped at this scale. Present mapping methods used by civilian organizations are much too slow, cumbersome, and expensive. At the present rate of progress, the gigantic task of mapping the remaining 75 to 80 percent of the world at this scale would require 100 to 150 years. This estimate does not consider the revisions that will be necessary to update previously produced maps.

In less than 30 years, the world's population will double, and experts generally agree that urbanization will occur faster than the world can be mapped. It can be readily seen that the present cartographic effort is much too slow. Yet, by increasing the altitude of the photo taking vehicle, by improving the resolution of the system, and by using more modern automated techniques, map and chart production can be speeded up and this cartographic backlog substantially reduced.

The U-2 camera systems were designed for intelligence purposes, i.e., to achieve maximum coverage (horizon to horizon) and continuous coverage over the entire flight track. The cameras were also designed to use thin base film and permit complete stereoscopic overlap. These cameras were of a unique configuration, and the resultant photography presented horrendous problems of rectification, mosaicing, and computation required for map and chart production.

In late 1959, a requirement for reliable topographic maps at 1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000 scale of selected areas along and north of the Tibet-India border was levied on NPIC, the Cartographic Division of the then called Office of Research and Reports (ORR), at CIA and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC). The requirement called for four maps to be produced covering an area of 65,000 square miles with shaded relief delineating the topography, spot elevations, hydrography, roads, bridges, and place names. Existing maps of these areas were incomplete, unreliable, and badly out of date. They proved to

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contain gross errors, and there was little or no geodetic control. By combining the talents of the Center, the Cartographic Division, and ACIC, the four 1:1,000,000 maps were completed in a period of four months, a job which normally would have required one to two years.

Based on this effort, which employed some of the best talents in the US Government in photogrammetry, cartography, geodesy, and photographic science, recommendations were soon made for new methods, techniques, and equipment to exploit U-2 photography to produce much-needed maps and charts of denied areas. The traditional instruments and methods used in map compilation, including field surveys to establish geodetic control, elevations, and accuracy checks, could not be applied to this type of photography. Many new methods and techniques were developed and tested. Rigorous demands for both accuracy (essential in targeting) and speed (maps were also needed of vast areas in the USSR and China) inspired a major effort. As in many crisis situations, when the best talent is assembled and all-out effort put forth, technological advances occur in rapid succession that would normally take many years to evolve.

Probably the greatest assist came from the computer. NPIC was one of the first government agencies to utilize a computer (an ALWAC III-E vacuum tube first-generation computer) for computation and data processing services for photographic intelligence exploitation. From this initial experience, photogrammetric equipment was designed that revolutionized the exploitation of metrical intelligence from reconnaissance photography and permitted mass production of reliable maps and charts of denied areas.

Advances in equipment and techniques in map making resulting from these early efforts have greatly reduced map and chart production time. Instruments such as UNIMACE (Universal Automatic Map Compilation Equipment), developed by the US Army Topographic Command, produce orthophotos and topographic contour maps from stereo photos. The photographs are scanned electronically and the conjugated images are correlated. Ground positions are determined by a computer and photographically printed in their true position. Other instruments are being developed which promise even greater speed and efficiency.

The capabilities of some collection systems being studied go far beyond the talent and money presently available to exploit them completely. For example, it is well within present capabilities to produce "time lapse" or "cyclical" charts to show snow cover and melt, ice flows, river flows and floods, crop planting and harvest, and urban changes. It is now possible to view the traffic problems on the Eastern seaboard of

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the US in a near-synoptic manner. It is within the realm of possibility to prepare new types of graphics utilizing time lapse methods to show the movement of automobiles to and from metropolitan areas during work periods. Hundreds of other such ideas have been proposed. What the future will bring is open to the imagination, but one thing is certain—we have just begun to explore the possibilities.

Sun Glint

Sun glint is a word not recorded in ordinary dictionaries, but it can mean a great deal to a photo interpreter. Sun glint is the term photo interpreters give the phenomenon which occurs when sunlight or other light strikes a surface or object at such an angle that the surface or object takes on a new perspective. For example, sunlight striking a body of water at a relatively low angle gives the water a mirrorlike quality and mapping and charting becomes easier because the lines of the banks become more clearly delineated.

From an intelligence viewpoint, serendipity effects from sun glint have provided valuable information, for sun glint can make possible the identification of objects far smaller than would normally be visible on photography from a given system. Sun glint aided our photo interpreters in tracing a telephone line being constructed in Laos by the North Vietnamese to support their infiltrating troops (Figure 6). In this case, even the thin telephone wires and the insulators on the cross arms become visible because of this phenomena.

Similarly, sun glint made possible the detection of the so-called cable bridges in North Vietnam. In order to avoid new bombing of their bridges, the North Vietnamese replaced bombed out decks with cables which were covered at night with planking so they could carry traffic (Figure 7). Before dawn, the planking was removed and the bridge once again appeared destroyed.

Early morning or late evening sun reflecting off canvas or metal parts have often revealed ships or other objects carefully hidden to avoid detection (Figure 8).

Effect of Winds

Data on bottom contours under shallow waters, beach and river erosion, and harbor siltation are difficult to obtain. For the past nine years, the US Coast and Geodetic Survey has used color film in high-resolution cameras for water penetration in its shoreline mapping projects. Color and advanced photogrammetric techniques have




Figure 6. *Streak of Light*. A telephone wire reflecting the sun gives away yet another secret. Seeing a telephone wire is well beyond the design capabilities of camera system.



Figure 7. Every Day and Every Night During the Bombing of Vietnam, cable bridges were important targets and most bridges were destroyed. Through sunlight cable bridges were identified. Night photography shows planking which is removed at dawn.

Serendipity

SECRET



Figure 8. *Early in the Morning, Early in the Evening.* Low sun angles cause reflections which permit identification of North Vietnamese patrol boats hidden along streams north of Haiphong.

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permitted the portrayal of bottom features in many areas to depths of 20 feet. Color work, however, is tricky. Sun angle, clouds, turbulence, and haze can all affect results drastically. Color photography missions are normally flown at low or medium altitudes only under nearly ideal conditions. Even under ideal conditions, it is often difficult to determine the hydrography of certain areas because of the presence and motion of kelp and other subsurface sea plants.

The U-2's and SR-71's, however, can often fly high above areas experiencing gale winds. Consequently, the Center has noted a serendipitous effect recently that may aid in shoreline mapping projects. Flying over denied areas, we noted that high winds blowing across rivers and lakes exposed areas normally inundated. This, of course, permits better definition of islands, sand bars, and vegetation. High winds blowing away from shore at low tide have exposed as much as a mile of ocean shoreline. The kelp and other sea plants normally extended and moving are then prostrate, permitting detailed hydrography.

Perhaps hydrology studies could be aided and expedited by flying the U-2's or SR-71's with both color and black and white film over shoreline areas when gale-force winds are blowing at the surface. The resultant photography could then be correlated with existing photography, maps, charts, and hydrographic data to yield more accurate presentations than in many instances presently exist.

Sensor Discoveries

In January-February 1963, the Center and the US Geological Survey combined forces for an aerial infrared survey¹ of Hawaii. The Center's interest was to determine whether the system could detect heat emitting sources in caves. We hoped to use such a system in the reconnaissance of Cuba where, after the 1962 missile crisis, reports persisted that missiles had been hidden in caves scattered throughout the island.

The study of caves yielded some information, but none applicable to the missile/cave storage problem. The US Geological Survey wanted to study thermal patterns and structural features of active and inactive volcanoes. The infrared study of the active volcano Kilauea revealed the relative intensity of the thermal features of the *caldera*. Many of the anomalies present were correlated with the visible steaming and transfer of heat to the surface from subterranean sources. More important, however, the infrared missions allowed scientists to "take the

¹Infrared photography employs materials sensitive to the rays lying just beyond the red end of the visible spectrum.

temperature" (energy emission) of a volcano through successive days of coverage and to determine if the volcano was "running a fever." Continued increases in temperatures of the volcano were noted and this data gave more accurate warnings of impending eruptions than previous methods.²

The new Icelandic volcano "Surtsey,"³ which exploded out of the sea in 1963, was monitored from its inception with the IR techniques developed in Hawaii with outstanding results.

While scanning the infrared imagery for caves near the Hawaiian coastline, large images of pronouncedly cool areas adjacent to the shores were observed. IR imagery interpreters soon recognized the significance of these areas as discharges of cool, fresh ground water into the sea. This discovery led to an order for an IR aerial survey of the entire coastline of Hawaii. Infrared interpretation revealed 219 shore areas that had varying degrees of seepage of fresh water into the sea. The greatest area of ground water discharge was discovered at the outlet of Waiahea Pond, where more than 100 million gallons of fresh water per day flowed into Hilo Bay (Figure 9). The discovery of these sources of water was significant since 13 billion gallons of rain fell on Hawaii every day during the survey but only three percent of this rainfall was retained by the land. The remainder seeped rapidly through porous soils into the sea. Little was known as to how, when, or where this valuable source of water flowed to the sea.

The results of this survey, along with a map pinpointing the locations of the underground sources of water, were published by the US Geological Survey.⁴

As a result of the survey, wells were drilled and water found in several remote and previously uninhabited areas, and construction of communities commenced.

Considering that five percent of the world's fresh water runoff is under the seas, and therefore goes to waste, this discovery could go a long way in alleviating water shortages in water-hungry coastal areas. The infrared method of seeking fresh water in such areas is fast becoming a standard practice. The benefits derived from the Hawaiian coastline

²W. A. Fischer, R. A. Moxham, F. Polcyn, G. A. Landis. "Infrared Surveys of Hawaiian Volcanoes." *Science Magazine*, November 6, 1964, pp. 733-742.

³United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, "Infrared Techniques Help Probe Surtsey's Fiery Mantle." *Feature Material Release*, July 30, 1967.

⁴William A. Fischer, Dan A. Davis, and Theresa M. Sousa. Department of the Interior. "Fresh Water Springs of Hawaii from Infrared Images." Washington, U.S. Geological Survey, 1966. (Hydrological Investigations Atlas HA-218)

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DARK STREAKS REPRESENT DISCHARGE OF COOL GROUND WATER




Figure 9. Cool Clear Water. Thousands of gallons of fresh water is shown escaping into the ocean. Wells in this area could trap this precious source of water.

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survey alone has paid for the cost of the infrared experiment several hundred times over.

Thermal Pollution

Aerial photography, a by-product of the intelligence effort, is being used to monitor other changes in the environment. Much has been written about the pollution of our streams, rivers, and lakes by foreign substances such as sewage, refuse, detergents, and silt. An even greater threat, "thermal pollution," is emerging. Either willfully or inadvertently, man is changing the water/heat balance of our waterways. The increase in the use of fresh water sources for industrial cooling presents a real threat to fish and other organisms. Fish, which are cold blooded animals, are unable to regulate their body temperature and are particularly sensitive to changes in their thermal environment. Each one is conditioned to the temperature of the water in which it lives and cannot adjust to the shock of an abrupt change in temperature. If the temperature of the water increases excessively, the fish will die. The aquatic ecosystem generally is even more sensitive to temperature than the individual fish. Fish depend on a food chain system involving smaller fish, invertebrates, plants, and dissolved nutrients. Any change in the heat environment will seriously affect the proliferation of any link in the chain which in turn, can affect the harvest of fish.

The principal contributor of "thermal pollution" is at present the electric power industry. The present rate of heat discharge is now critical only in certain areas, but ecologists are showing great concern about the planned tenfold increase in electric power production in the near future. Most of the proposed plants will use water from rivers and lakes as coolants. The ecologists will use IR to monitor thermal pollution. This tool, as we have seen, was originally developed for intelligence purposes.

It was assumed prior to the existence of infrared imagery that the heated effluent from power plants was quickly dissipated and that its damage to aquatic life was therefore slight. Even though the resolving power of the early IR systems was poor, the large effluent plumes shown to ecologists sent them scurrying to check their "ground truth" data. The infrared data was correct and much of the "ground truth" data proved inadequate, poorly collected, or erroneous (Figure 10). Those who experimented with IR systems in the early days raised the possibility that two thermal power plants discharging effluents on opposite banks of the river could create a "thermal barrier" keeping fish and other river or sea life from reaching their spawning or feeding grounds. These and many more finds regarding thermal effluents have been passed to the US




Figure 10. Hot and Cold. This infrared imagery reveals the discharge of the effluent from the power plant into the Mississippi River. Hot effluent at about 93°F shows as white in the surrounding river water, dark grey, which has a temperature of about 75°F. The line across the imagery is a time marker for a series of absolute measurements.

Geological Survey's Water Resources Division. Prototype work performed by the military services and the CIA for reconnaissance purposes is now a valuable monitor for the temperature of our streams, lakes, rivers, and oceans.

Clouds and Weather

"An opportunist," said philosopher Elbert Hubbard, "is a man who takes the lemons fate has handed him and opens up a lemonade stand." The lemons of aerial photographic exploitation are clouds.

In the early days of aerial photographic exploitation, that which obscured the target area, such as heavy clouds, haze, darkness, was often removed from the original negative prior to duplication in quantity for dissemination.

In the 1955-1957 period, the U-2's were flying a number of test missions within the continental limits of the United States and in Europe. Photography from the test missions contained cloud formations from a vantage point never seen before by meteorologists. The latter were appalled, however, that frames of complete cloud cover (which to them displayed valuable meteorological information) were being removed before exploitation. Their complaints led to the establishment of a policy, still adhered to, that all original negatives be kept intact.

Cloud forms are the most obvious feature of weather, yet little was known in the early 1950's of the significance and climatic distribution of cloud forms. Most observations were from ground stations reported in a crude code, or from aircraft flying through cloud formations.

The meteorologists working at the Center prepared a study which revealed much about the bottom layer of the atmosphere—the interface of land-atmosphere, sea-atmosphere, vegetation-atmosphere, and cloud-top-atmosphere. Most importantly, the study showed that a single U-2 mission could cover large storm areas, and suggested using the U-2 as a hurricane hunter.

The first such mission was flown on 14 November 1956. The orders were relatively simple: Conduct reconnaissance from above and inside the eye of a storm. The storm selected was Typhoon Kit (Figure 11), and the photography which resulted from overflying it marked a significant advance in meteorology.⁵

For the first time in history a typhoon had been photographed. The bowl-shaped eye of Typhoon Kit, the first ever seen in its entirety, was approximately 30 miles in diameter. By photogrammetric methods, the


⁵Lt. Col. Robert C. Bungaard, "The First Flyover of a Tropical Cyclone," *Weatherwise*, June 1958.



Figure 11. *One of a Kind - The first photo of a typhoon.* The U 2 is vertically above the center of Typhoon Kit. Horizontal streamline analysis of Typhoon Kit revealed nine cyclonic swirls.

tops of the clouds in the upper middle of the picture were found to be 48,000 feet high. Photo interpretation and meteorological analysis revealed that Typhoon Kit contained nine cyclonic swirls (marked by C's in the sketch).

A survey of damage from Typhoon Kit revealed that the storm had claimed the lives of 39 persons, rendered over 58,000 persons homeless,



and caused over \$5,000,000 in property damage. To the men of the weather groups, a new means of tracking violent storms, and increasing our understanding of them, had been achieved.

The U-2's were to fly over more cyclones and hurricanes (Figure 12), and the findings in these experiments were published in professional journals.⁶

Data obtained from these experiments was used in planning the orbital parameters and specifying the cameras to be used for the Tiros and

⁶Robert D. Fletcher, James R. Smith, Robert C. Bungaard, "Superior Photographic Reconnaissance of Tropical Cyclones," *Weatherwise*, June 1961.




Figure 12. *Wound up Tight*. Typhoon Ida on 25 Sept 1968 had maximum surface winds of 240 knots with an average of 145 knots. This photograph was taken an hour after the record wind velocity was reached.

Nimbus satellites. The locating, tracking, and monitoring of storms from outer space is now a routine affair. The advance warning that can now be given has saved countless lives and millions of dollars in property.

Urban Planning

The foregoing examples invite the reflection that the essence of aerial imagery lies in its unique ability to record in minute detail the elements of broad natural and human processes, and that it may in time render a substantial contribution in the study of the latter. The case of the Santa Barbara oil problem in the spring of 1968 is illuminating in this respect.

It will be recalled that a leak in an offshore oil well in California's Santa Barbara channel unleashed an ecological disaster upon the bird and sea life of the area. On request, CIA conducted a special U-2 mission over the oil slick area. The U-2 has a two-camera system. For this mission, the forward camera contained black and white film; the aft, color. The proposed flight track was similar to that of an operational search mission: i.e., the track would overlap and be crisscrossed at right angles so that the resultant mission would look like a tick-tack-toe schematic. The Center was to do a preliminary assessment, attempt to track the movements of the oil, and check the damage being wrought on the beaches.

The initial scan was accomplished on the higher resolution black and white imagery. Although the oil rig, beaches, marinas, and coastal features were observed on this imagery of good interpretability, the damaged areas and the oil slick were not readily distinguishable from natural features such as kelp beds, normal beach clutter, and wind streaking in the channel.

Analysis of the color photography, with resolution considerably less than that of the black and white film, revealed the extent of the oil slick and showed the saturated beaches and marinas. The progress of the clean-up operation, involving the spreading of straw and powders on the affected areas, was easily determined. The slick was visible in feather-shaped patterns broken by the movement of the waves and wind. The damage from the slick was extensive in the marinas where the breakwaters trapped and kept the oil from flowing out to sea with the low tide. After preliminary assessment at NPIC, the mission photography was given to the US Geological Survey for further study and was used to make recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior.

More important than coverage of the slick, however, was the overview of the coastal areas of California. We were especially impressed by the damage done by the heavy rains which fell in January and February, and

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Secundipity




Figure 13 Oil and Mud Coverage of the oil slick off the California coast reveals an even greater problem of silting.

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by the heavy silting of streams, lakes, and reservoirs (Figure 13). Most of the silting and damage was caused by man's poor urban planning—gross land exploitation. By tracing the streams to the hills, we could see the reason for the disaster—new and old housing developments built on fill dirt taken from terraced hills. When the rains came, the fill dirt began to slide, damaging millions of dollars worth of property, and clogging streams, lakes, and reservoirs with silt. We were puzzled that the extremely poor urban planning in the hills was not noticed earlier by state and local authorities, or, even more curiously, by insurance companies. By looking at aerial photography, this damage could have been predicted. In an earlier case, in 1958, more than 100 homes slid toward the Pacific Ocean at Portuguese Bend, California. A geologist for the city's engineering department said that "every engineer and geologist in the state knew that the project was in a slide area and the developer did or should have known it too."⁷ In spite of this knowledge, the project was built.

The rapidly changing phenomenon of world urbanism is revealed on aerial photography. All too often, the myriad factors of urbanism—including road and highway construction, land use, home construction, water requirements, factories, power lines—are thought of as separate entities. The authority for control of these factors is vested with a department, often parochial in its views, certainly limited in budgetary resources, and concerned with a limited geographical area (such as a township, city, or county). This department usually cannot impose its views on its area, but rather must work through urban planners, budget officers, legislators, and other officials. In this process there are pitfalls which often deflect action into the path of least resistance, the most politically palatable, or the cheapest course. The problems associated with the increasing urbanization in some areas are acute, and the ability to create and maintain a reasonable degree of human comfort will depend significantly on actions taken in the future which may be unpopular with the populace. The relationship between the entities must be studied and understood in each city, and the interrelationships between cities must be considered.

By the end of this century, the population of the United States will have increased by an additional 100 million people. Most of this development will come in the nation's rapidly expanding urban areas. Unless urban planning is conducted carefully, considering the interplay of water, traffic, construction, and pollution, our hope of coming to grips with megalopolis will indeed be hampered.

⁷"Homebuyers Ignore Slides," *Washington Post*, June 7, 1969, p. E1.

The synoptic view of the coastal areas of California, the serendipity view of silting, and flying missions in both black and white and color were revelations to the US Geological Survey, which normally flies photographic missions at lower altitudes for specific purposes. Undoubtedly, there will be further requests to use the U-2 for disaster assessments. Possibly, the U-2 also may be used on a periodic or routine basis to note changes which could have considerable bearing upon future generations.

Conclusion and Plea

The prime purpose of the aerial photograph today is reconnaissance, but its greatest role in the future could be as the principal record of history. Even now, it could serve as a vital aid to historical accuracy and provide a dramatic, visual testimony of truth.

The technical and scientific revolution of the past 50 years has meant the destruction of countless visible remains of history, and the future portends even greater destruction. The US Government is seemingly unaware that it has become the possessor of the finest record of world history over the past 30 years, but that it is destroying this record at an unprecedented rate.

Most US Government agencies use and, therefore, must store aerial photography. The storage facilities are limited. The criteria for destruction of film for most organizations is the frequency of use rather than the historical value of the film. A variety of means, some of them crude, are used to control and record the use of film from manual means—such as date stamping a can of photography each time it is used—through machine control methods. One organization uses the “dust control” method, determining which cans of film are least used by the amount of dust collected on the tops of the cans. Periodically, at intervals set by records management personnel or whenever the vaults become full, orders are given to destroy some of the film. The film that is the oldest, is duplicative, or is the least used is generally destroyed. Little or no concern is shown for the content of the film. One should not be too harsh, however, on personnel who handle film. Management, generally, is too preoccupied with the present and the future to care about the past. There are no national film archives. Security considerations preclude giving the film to colleges or universities. Private research organizations have raised no clamor to receive it, and the national professional associations are oblivious to its potential use or prefer to remain with the traditional approaches to recording history. Yet, those of us who have

studied aerial photography over historically denied areas are amazed at what could be added to existing historical records.

The study of the past through photography is fascinating. Who has not seen the Civil War through the lens of Matthew Brady's camera or World War II through the film documentary "Victory at Sea"? Yet the records of nations and people on an immediate scale are frozen on today's aerial photography grows larger and the resolution becomes better, our ability to recognize the patterns of the past will become more acute. We will be able to compare these patterns with the present and the future and enjoy the intellectual pleasure of seeing ourselves in the vast perspective and panorama of history.

There is a great need, therefore, to compare observations in the same locations as much as several decades or centuries apart. The advantages of seeing life forms and tasks performed at a single point in time or as a background against which plot changes are obvious. We know, for instance, that many tasks are performed today in the same fashion as they have been for centuries. Periodic coverage of a relatively large area can provide an infinite number of details on a variety of subjects such as transhumance, migratory phenomena, and the routes and tracks man has taken through the years. On a large scale, it will show how and where man lived, his standard of living, and his cultural development. It will also record his spiritual resources as well as his divisions and destructiveness.

Hundreds of examples can be cited of historical facts gleaned or strengthened from aerial photography. At one time for example, our concern was focused on Lop Nor in Sinkiang for indications that China was building a nuclear weapons capability. The number of written descriptions of the area available to us was meager and most of the data was rather old. We compared, however, the data from the written record with what we observed on Genetrix balloon photography; it was amazing how we could confirm observations made decades and centuries ago.

In 1934, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin in his book, *The Wandering Lake*,⁸ described the Lop Nor area in detail. Through his descriptive text, sketches, and ground photography, we were able to follow his journey and pinpoint the areas of his archeological discoveries. Similarly, we could follow the travels of Sir Mark Aurel Stein⁹ through Central Asia and the Lop Desert in 1907. We saw not only the trail that he followed, but also hundreds of others that linked the centers of civilizations in Central Asia. Going back to the earliest traveler in the area on record,

⁸Hedin, Sven. *The Wandering Lake*. New York, Dutton, 1940.

⁹Stein, Sir Mark Aurel. *On Ancient Central Asian Tracks*. New York, Pantheon, 1964

Marco Polo, we find that his description¹⁰ "Of the city of Lop and the Great Desert" was amazingly accurate.

The Desert of Lop as it existed for Messrs. Polo, Stein, and Hedin remained unchanged for centuries. Then, abruptly, China entered the nuclear age, and Lop Nor began changing. Trails became roads, watering holes became towns, obstacles were bridged, and electricity and gasoline powered the tools that changed several large desert areas. Science and technology had changed an area and in the process had erased a number of identifiable points in a chapter of history and mankind. But we still have a record from photography as to how Lop Nor looked to Messrs. Polo, Stein, and Hedin. One dreads to think that some 25 years hence someone in search of film vault space will thoughtlessly destroy this priceless historical record.

Many questions are asked that could be answered from a historical record of photography: How was a country invaded? How does an invasion change the invaded country? What is the impact on the invaded country if there is a clash of cultures? The questions are endless.

Prior to our first coverage of Tibet, we asked our librarians to assemble all the books on this country that were in the Library of Congress. There was a total of 22 books, all of them written before the Chinese Communist invasion and occupation. U-2 photography revealed that the military invasion and occupation, making great use of motor and air transport, were carried out swiftly and efficiently. After the roads were constructed, land development, the construction of a military establishment, and the exploration for mineral resources began in earnest. All of these activities were new to Tibet and, therefore, easy to spot and identify. Subsequent coverage indicated further sinicization of the country. The few millions of the indigenous population that remained were faced with overwhelming and brutal power and by an ever-increasing influx of Chinese immigrants who dispossessed them of their land. Tibet as it existed for 13 centuries with its tiny, peaceful population and its geographical and cultural remoteness is fast disappearing (Figure 14). Authors who had written books subsequent to the invasion and occupation of Tibet have been hampered by the severe censorship imposed by the Chinese Communists, and the only information coming from the country is riddled with propaganda.

Obviously, aerial photography is a vital historical record. Unless we act now to preserve it, someone in the future on receiving newer photography of increased resolution and quality may thoughtlessly decide that

¹⁰Polo, Marco. *The Travels of Marco Polo*. New York, Modern Library, 1931.

the older photography is no longer of value and destroy it. This destruction would mean the loss of the most significant records of this period and it would be through serendipity!



Figure 14. *The Old and the New* The Lhasa that most of us know with the Dalai Lama's Place (The Potala) and the individual homes with walled courtyards are being surrounded by Chinese military installations.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Time, Change, and
Intelligence.*

THE AGENCY AND THE FUTURE

Charles D. Cremeans

The Central Intelligence Agency is twenty-two years old—old enough for Parkinson's law to have gone into operation and for its original missions to lose some of their crispness and relevance to the needs of the country and of its policy-makers.

It is clear that the world in which we operate today is strikingly different from that of the Second World War and the Korean war. The Soviet Union, China, and International Communism are much changed, and the threats and problems they pose are different from those of the late forties and early fifties. The character and dimensions of war have changed dramatically, as have the political uses of military power. A whole crowd of new nations has elbowed its way into international politics, an endeavor in which the great powers have been most cooperative. The world of science and technology has expanded vastly during this period, spreading affluence and expectation of greater affluence around the world, and making possible interaction—psychological, social, economic, and political—among countries on an entirely new scale.

Responsible Agency officers have, over the years, had reason to ask themselves whether we were not too often chasing Communists in situations where new forms of revolution were the problem, or concerning ourselves with the question of stability in countries in which change was inevitable and, in fact, desirable. Many thoughtful officers have asked themselves and their colleagues whether, indeed, the Agency has not been too busy fighting the last war and performing missions that were conceived in its aftermath to comprehend that our opponents, and indeed we ourselves, have changed out of all recognition.

The answers to these questions, important though it is that they be asked, are not gloomy. The Agency has changed almost continuously from the time of its inception and has taken on new areas of responsibility in response to the changes in the world situation as well as to technical developments that opened up new means of collecting and evaluating intelligence. One of the most dramatic areas of change has

been that of intelligence on strategic weapons and in the whole field of science and technology. Not quite so dramatic, but equally important as an indicator of the Agency's capacity to respond to new interests and needs of the policy-maker, has been the development of resources for collecting and evaluating intelligence on the Afro-Asian countries and Latin America. The Office of Economic Research was originally charged with economic research on Communist countries; for some time it has taken the rest of the world into its purview. The Office of Current Intelligence has put itself in a position to deal with developments in every country of the world and to consider the pertinence to American interest of social and economic change in these countries, as well as questions of Communist influence and political stability. National Intelligence Estimates have dealt with matters outside the context of great power confrontation with increasing frequency. Whereas in the early years of the Agency a substantial proportion of NIEs tended to be on the subject of Communist prospects in this or that country, or on the question of the chances for survival of the regime in power, more and more estimates deal with such matters as "The Potential for Revolution in Latin America" (NIE 80/90-1-69) and "Black Africa's Prospects for Modernization" (NIE 60/70-1-69).

Equally impressive has been the resourcefulness of the Agency in finding ways of doing its business more efficiently. The vast improvements in scientific means of collection of intelligence and in the evaluation of such intelligence are notable. The establishment of the Office of Computer Services, the use of computers to handle specialized problems throughout the Agency, and the assignment of a senior officer to study the long range prospects for the use of automatic data processing in the evaluation of intelligence, demonstrate a readiness to change and alertness to opportunity for useful change.

Before we over-indulge in self-congratulation, however, it might be useful to use the old question-asking technique again. The question this time is what kind of situation we are likely to have to operate in during the next twenty-one years and whether we might not need to think about ways in which to extend our capacity for flexibility and inventiveness. It may be that the proven disposition of the Agency to respond to new opportunities, even the systematic review by the Plans, Programs and Budgeting machinery of the relevance and effectiveness of our present efforts and projection of programs into the future, will prove inadequate to the conditions of the next generation.

Seeing the future as wildly different from the present, full of wonders and terrors, bearing little resemblance to the solid and known world of

the present, seems to be the natural tendency of those who these days try to look more than a year or two ahead. It is wise for one who contemplates the future to remind himself that one of the clearest lessons of history is the continuity of human ideas and institutions, the way in which change evolves out of that which already exists. It is also well to remind one's self that there has been a considerable amount of change in our own lifetime, not to mention that of the elders who have seen the world modified by the motor car, electronic communications, the airplane, antibiotics, nuclear fission, and space flight, to give an incomplete list. Like all older generations they have asked themselves what the world is coming to, but they—most of them—have adjusted nicely, thank you, and are basically more like their parents than unlike.

Still and all, there is something different about the future today. It probably always seemed to be rushing at one; today it seems to be rushing at an accelerating pace. Younger and younger people are asking what the world is coming to. The imminence of the year 2,000, magic millennial figure, probably has something to do with it. Still, there must be more reason than that for the tremendous growth of active interest in looking ahead. A European society for the study of the future—with Ford Foundation money—called "Futuribles," has been at work for some years now. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has set up a Commission on the Year 2,000 with an impressive array of talent among its membership. One of its members, Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute, a "think tank" that usually concerns itself with strategic weapons and the like, and a colleague, Anthony Wiener, have written a widely read book entitled *The Year 2,000, An Inquiry* . . . New books on the shape of the future appear at frequent intervals. There is somewhere an Institute for the Future. Studies of current situations and problems projected ten and twenty years ahead are now commonplace in government and in the many foundations and research organizations. At every learned society convention that met at the turn of the year, papers on the future, usually with a warning of impending disaster, filled a large part of the program.

Is all this interest and activity different in kind from the work of Edward Bellamy, who wrote *Looking Backward* in 1887, or H. G. Wells, who wrote *The War of the Worlds* in 1889? Perhaps not. Perhaps it is just a contemporary manifestation of the same natural human curiosity about what is around the corner. Each man must judge for himself. It is possible to argue impressively that the basic dimensions of change are much as they have been. One has only to try to sketch out what Herman Kahn calls a "surprise free" picture of the world a generation hence to provide

one's self plentiful food for thought. A "surprise free" world is, of course, one arrived at by projecting present trends. Each individual would choose different trends and find that he expected them to develop differently than his neighbor, but it is striking that it is quite difficult to carry out the exercise without positing a world very different from that in which we live today.

Just as a sample: it could be argued that people in their thirties today can look forward with some assurance to a world with twice the present population, with real time communications—with access to vast stores of information—which are likely not only to change the role of information in human life but to give those in command of the central machinery a kind of control over individuals never before exercised by anyone, a world in which the problems before the decision-makers in many countries are of such technical complexity as to make real public participation in their resolution impossible, and in which the majority of the world's people will not have real, i.e. productive, jobs to keep them occupied and out of mischief.

It is not the purpose of this paper to try to sketch out a scenario or scenarios for the future. What we want to do here is talk about what change is likely to mean to intelligence, and content ourselves with a "surprise free" projection rather than go into all the most likely alternatives and permutations.

In the military field, generally speaking, circumstances seem less likely to change in ways affecting in our present methods of collecting and analyzing intelligence than in other fields. Weapons seem likely to become more sophisticated and complex and to be developed for use in areas hitherto inviolate—the sea bed and outer space, but the problems for intelligence seem likely to remain essentially the same. The biggest change in the nature of the problem of military intelligence would come about in the event of the achievement of firm disarmament or arms limitation agreements among the larger powers. The problems of inspection and monitoring of development and test programs would become of paramount importance in such a situation. Whether disarmament or arms limitation becomes a reality or not, intelligence on the acquisition of sophisticated weapons by small countries, particularly the less stable and balanced small countries and those involved in bitter feuds, seem likely to become both more important and more difficult to acquire.

Recent experience has made it abundantly clear to intelligence officers that the traditional methods of collecting and presenting intelligence on conventional land warfare are of limited validity in situations like that in

Vietnam. The order of battle concept has been very difficult to apply meaningfully where organized combat units have played only one of several complementary roles. Collection and presentation of meaningful statistics on manpower gains and losses and assessments of enemy capabilities have evaded traditional methods and concepts. The impact of the Vietnam war on concepts of resistance and rebellion all over the world seems certain to be tremendous in coming years. The emergence of new patterns of rebellion among youth and student groups and in situations where the racial issue is important seems likely to give rise to new forms of insurgency that will require a major effort on the part of intelligence, first to comprehend what is going on in various revolutionary situations and then to develop means of collecting useful intelligence.

Another problem of military and defense-related intelligence that seems likely to demand more attention is that of anticipating and detecting methods of taking advantage of the complexities of advanced societies to provoke breakdowns of essential services or otherwise bring about chaotic situations. Interference with water supplies, the development of transmission of power, communications—including computer banks of records, personnel data, programs for use by the national automatic data system in the event of specific emergency situations, and the like—all provide kinds of opportunities for bringing a society to a standstill that did not exist when individuals and communities operated in a relatively independent fashion.

Scientific and technical not directly related to military intelligence is probably also likely to have a relatively easy problem of adjustment in a rapidly changing situation. S and T personnel and resources are already focussed on the future and on areas likely to be of continuing intelligence interest. It is intelligence with a focus on human beings and their institutions that is likely to face the most difficult problems, both with respect to determining what they should be collecting and how they should go about making what they collect meaningful to the decision makers.

In a world of unprecedentedly rapid change the essential mission of intelligence will remain the same: to tell the policymaker what is going on in the world and to warn him of specific threats to the safety and the interests of the United States. Performance of this mission requires, among other things, an agreed concept of the general pattern of international relations and its implications for the welfare of the United States. Even the most modest piece of intelligence collection depends upon some kind of judgment as to what is of interest to the intelligence

community, and ultimately to its customers. Many changes have been made in the simplistic concept of the Cold War once so widely used to determine what was relevant to the intelligence mission. One of the most important tasks that faces us now is that of adjusting our overall understanding of the world situation to take into account the effects of the major engines of change: population, communications, technology in general, and the breakdown of traditional social and political institutions.

One of the most important and difficult tasks of the intelligence analyst, as of the political analyst, has always been that of determining the real goals and priorities of foreign nations. Whether the leaders of a nation were willing to sacrifice domestic goals for military has in the past been generally determinable by examination of indicators as to what they were spending in each field. As lead times for the development and deployment of weapons systems have stretched out, however, and as government involvement in long-range domestic development has increased, it has become both easier and more difficult to determine the direction in which a given nation is going. On the one hand, the intelligence officer can see what another nation is doing in certain areas long before the activity in question produces an end result in its military capability or in its wealth and stability. On the other, as commitments become more complicated and longer-range, it will be increasingly difficult to determine just what their eventual consequence will be.

As in the past, one of the main questions before the intelligence officer will be that of the intentions of another country's leadership. Determining what another country's intentions are has always depended heavily upon understanding its governmental system as well as upon understanding the men who control it. One of the big problems for the intelligence officer over the next decade or two seems likely to be to comprehend changes in other political systems. All the newly independent countries in the period since World War II have gone through complicated, and usually agonizing, searches for forms of government suitable to their new situation. Intelligence officers like everybody else, have had a hard time understanding what was going on, politically, in Uganda, in Syria, and in Burma, for example. The problem has usually been approached by watching the man or men who seemed to wield authority, a method which would have been less satisfactory if what was happening in most of these countries—not China or India, of course—had been more important to the US.

Without making the estimate that it will be so, it seems worthwhile to consider that over the next generation it may be the advanced nations

and, in particular, the large and important nations that will be going through changes which will make it most difficult for the intelligence officer concerned with overall political analysis and estimates to determine what is going on and, indeed, who is in charge.

All the advanced nations are faced with problems that are the consequence of population growth and the advance of technology; problems which manifest themselves in urban crises, the breakdown of transportation and other services in the face of escalating demand, and pollution of the environment. These problems tend to confront governments with unprecedented requirements for investment of resources. All produce and are, in turn, stimulated by dissatisfactions, antagonisms, and demands that have, or develop, a strong political content and lead to aggressive action, eventually in some cases to rebellion, against the powers that be—the establishment.

All these factors have the effect of eroding the system—the social, economic, and political. Another factor, not noted above, is the role of technology, which is changing the lives of ordinary people at an unprecedented rate, with the ultimate effect of making the rules and inhibitions that once governed the conduct of most people seem less and less relevant. Perhaps the most important contribution of technology—including that of economic organization—has been to remove from over the heads of many people the once controlling certainty in their lives: the knowledge that their survival depended on their willingness to work—usually to work according to the rules of the system. Today, in every advanced country in the world, more and more people—mostly youths—are indicating that if given a choice between a job with its material rewards, but also with its obligations and disciplines, and an uninhibited, undisciplined life supported by handouts from society or parents, they will choose the latter—for a time, at least.

All governments in advanced nations face the problems of internal crises plus the breakdown of traditional attitudes and institutions. Democratic governments face still another kind of crisis which challenges the basic assumptions on which their system depends. The most advanced nations are already at a point at which it is extremely difficult even to keep up the appearance of free public discussion of many of the issues which face the policy-makers. This is particularly true where highly sophisticated technology is involved, as in decisions with respect to transportation systems, use of natural resources, and acceptance of public responsibility for the welfare of the individual. The essence of the point being made here is that many governments are likely in the next several years to face problems which cannot be solved by the political

methods of the past. Some will improvise for a long time; others may carry out quiet revolutions among the elite which will change the nature and the uses of power as much as democratic forms changed the absolutisms which they succeeded.

One thing that makes the concentration of power in the hands of small elite groups seem a likely development in some countries over the next decade or two is the fact that the instruments by which such an elite might exercise its control lie readily at hand.

As the machinery of life gets more and more complicated and centralized, opportunities for central control are multiplied. It can be argued that it is easier to control a closely knit urban community than a dispersed rural society, though history records many despotisms holding sway over peasant societies and failing to subdue the citizens of urbanized societies. Quite clearly, the kind of government a people has depends upon a great many factors, most of them rooted in the past. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile for the intelligence officer with an interest in the future to ponder the implications for government of the following:

(a) Centralized, interlinked, computerized banks containing all (repeat all) information in the country's libraries, government records (including intelligence, FBI, and police files), credit records, financial records, etc.

(b) A system whereby all funds, personal and corporate, are kept in a central, or inter-linked system, of repositories. Personal income would be paid into individual accounts by computer and drawn out by presentation of a credit cum identity card, cum passport, or, more likely, by pressing the thumb—with its unique print—against a sensitive plate.

A host of other science-fiction horrors could be postulated for the computerized world of twenty years, or less, from now. (For one, computer consoles could provide employment at home for a large part of the working population—which would mean that no one would know whether he was really working or simply being kept out of mischief. . . .) For our purposes the two developments sketched out above—computerized records and computerized money—carry enough implications to make the point that government may soon have means of control of the population quite unlike anything that has existed in the past.

First, let us look at a few of the implications of computerized storage and retrieval of information. Such a facility will, indeed, make it possible for Junior to do his homework without reference to books, his mother to do her family budget with astonishing ease and accuracy (maybe), and father to check the "facts" on almost anything. The question is, what

does it do for the people who control the selection, organization, and content of the information banks, as well as access to it, once stored? In the first place, everyone will have to have a security clearance rating his level of access—in itself a means of exercising control over the individual citizen. There is also the matter of access to credit and business information, a possible source of influence and profit.

Centralized personal records—scholastic, medical, credit policy, security, etc.—on each and every person also suggests possibilities for the exercise of controls over individuals of a sort never before possible. If you have to present your thumbprint every time you buy something—in order to assure that the proper sum is deducted from your central account—you will be querying the computer for a record of your personal file. What an opportunity for a solicitous, or venal, or sadistic, or managing government authority to tell the computer that certain individuals mustn't have cigarettes, alcohol, certain drugs or books, or go to certain places.

A proper reaction to all this is that it is farfetched—admittedly—and that human beings would never put up with this sort of thing. Maybe. On the other hand, we are talking about a new dimension of relations between men and society, and between the individual and those in charge. For the intelligence officer to understand and interpret what goes on in other nations, hostile or friendly, he must be prepared to anticipate the temptations that confront their governors and to spot the indicators if they do decide to try something outlandish.

Not at all outlandish is the prospect that Communist dictatorships and some of the authoritarian rulers in the less developed countries of Africa and Asia, will try to exploit the new ways of controlling and manipulating their people. It goes without saying that changes in the governmental system in Communist nations will be a matter of continuing concern to intelligence analysts. As in the past those countries seem likely to lag behind the more advanced countries of Europe and North America in their response to many of the major stimulants to change in the contemporary world. It is difficult, however, to contemplate the Communist states retaining their past degree of immunity to the outside world, particularly to the world that one projects on a surprise free trend over the next generation.

The intelligence analyst who is primarily concerned with the less developed countries can probably look forward to as exciting and demanding a time over the next several years as his colleagues who are assigned to the advanced countries. Most of the new states have gone through a post-independence period in which the veterans of the fight for

independence, most of them still much under the cultural and political influence of their former "imperialist" mentors, have tried and generally failed to realize the promises they believed were implicit in the fact of independence. Most have gone through a period of planned "development" in which they used up reserves left over from the colonial period, plus the generous foreign aid available from East and West during the period of their most active competition. Many of these new countries seem to be returning to the obscurity from whence they came. Many have accepted a less important place on the world stage than they thought their due when they became independent. There are reasons for believing that the Afro-Asian and Latin American world will be less important in world affairs and demand less of intelligence officers in the next decade or so than it has since World War II.

The Great Powers may, of course, be less concerned in the years ahead about instability and change in the Afro-Asian and Latin American states than they have been. It seems highly unlikely, however, that they can long consider it possible to remain indifferent to turmoil or human suffering on a large scale in places like India, Egypt, or Brazil. Afro-Asia and Latin America in general show no signs of greater stability over the coming years than they have in the past. With the accumulation of conventional weapons and the spread of sophisticated weapons, security problems are likely to continue to be of major importance to the intelligence officer concerned with these areas.

The development and application of technology seems likely to have a great influence on the future of the less developed countries. In many of them, technological backwardness has made local products—even when made with local materials and cheap local labor—more expensive than imported mass-produced products, dependence upon which not only creates critical balance of payments problems but also unemployment and the decline of local crafts and skills. In other ways technology and the worldwide spread of investment and enterprise by the larger companies in the more advanced countries links the economies of many less advanced states to the world economy. Whatever the scenario, the less developed states seem likely to be more a part of the world, its problems and its changes, than they have in the past and to require adjustments and new perceptions on the part of the intelligence analyst who would explain it to the policy-maker.

The traditional bureaucratic response to the kinds of challenges noted here would be to create an Office of Population Research, then, perhaps an Office of Revolutionary Intelligence. With two such important new offices in existence, the next step would naturally be a Directorate of

Long-Range Intelligence. Fortunately, we have generally been able to resist such devices and the Agency has avoided much tinkering with the division, direction, and organization of effort. The central importance of the man with the yellow pad—his quality, his preparation and training, his support—has been and should continue to be the main emphasis in the Agency's approach to its job.

But is the average intelligence officer, in present circumstances, able to do his day to day job and to prepare for the future as well? In many areas, given the support he gets from administration and planners, he probably is. This is particularly true of officers who are concerned with keeping up with the technology which will enable them to do present jobs faster and more efficient. It is also true of officers in Scientific and Technical areas where the emphasis is naturally on development and change. It is in the areas where intelligence is primarily concerned with men, their motives, and the consequences of their actions that the outlook seems less assured. If we can't solve these problems by setting up an Office of Development Research, or the like, what should we do?

This article proposes no solution, only a suggestion, and it is, indeed, the classic non-solution: a committee. The most important requirement here, it is submitted, is a heightened consciousness on the part of Agency officers of the impending problems for intelligence imposed by rapid, world-wide change. More discussion, more thought, more analysis, more attention to the problem of understanding the processes of change and their implications for intelligence cannot but be desirable for an Agency whose purpose in being is to tell the US Government not just what has happened and is happening, but what is likely to happen. A seminar run by the Office of Training, a Committee on the Future intended to coordinate and direct debate and discussion, these and other activities designed to concentrate our minds on what is surely going to be a bigger and bigger problem for the Agency would certainly be worth a try.

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EDITORIAL NOTES

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Holders of the *Studies in Intelligence* may wish to note that the Winter edition, 1970, was omitted because of a shortage of contributions deemed publishable at the time.

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE SUPER SPIES. By *Andrew Tully*. (New York, 1969)

In case you are curious as to just who the Super Spies are, they are the USIB agencies (including the three service intelligence organizations), less CIA. The Super Spy masters, as listed on one of the book's prefatory pages, are the chiefs of these agencies, less Mr. Helms. Four of the eight names on the list have changed since the printer set this page; and two more of the eight ought not to be represented as personally associated with the limited foreign intelligence operations of their agencies. Mr. Tully is thus only about 25 per cent correct within his own bizarre frame of reference. This score is, however, well above expectation.

In the main text itself there are lots of little pieces of a good many things; an alleged Damon-Pythias relationship between DIA and INR; things about NSA; about how Congress ought to watch intelligence more closely; about the Pueblo and the SAMOS; about the speculations of William Godell and the travels of Stokely Carmichael; about the defections, some eight-plus years back, of Martin and Mitchell; plus some spy fiction which we are supposed to accept as fact.

A great deal of all this is ill-informed or wrong. A good part of it (except Mr. Tully's new fabrications) is a further mutilation of what had already been bowdlerized in the public literature.

In short, this is another dismal Tully book about the intelligence business. One perceives but a single improvement over an earlier work:¹ this time, someone saw to the correct rendering of proper names. Otherwise, it is the same lengthy display of Mr. Tully's innocence, nay, towering ignorance, of intelligence and the world within which intelligence has its being. For example, behind the cover of its intelligence research mission, INR (the Bureau of Intelligence Research of the Department of State) is supposed to run one of the best espionage services there is (this outrageous allegation runs through the whole book); the Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system utilizes full orbit (although Mr. Tully knows what the "F" in FOBS stands for); mechanical translation is doing its job at 35,000 words per hour. Mr.

¹CIA, *The Inside Story* (N.Y., 1961).

Tully has not heard of changes in the attaché system made several years back, nor does he know the role of the service intelligence chiefs in the USIB; he thinks the headquarters of the Institute for Defense Analyses are on the Princeton campus (which they are not); he thinks Camelot was a G-2 enterprise (it was sponsored by the Army's operations division); he even thinks the US, which had no diplomatic relations with Cambodia at the time, had an operating embassy (with a safe house) in Phnom Penh in 1967.

This sort of error which reveals the incompetence of the author more than it may affront his audience is well within the Tully tradition. So is the threadbare dodge of reading something in the public domain and pretending that it was learned via a privileged interview. In the case of the quotations from Allen Evans, they came from Mr. Evans all right, but from an unclassified brochure he once wrote about intelligence in the State Department. Likewise the seeming quotations from Thomas Hughes are taken from the transcript of unclassified testimony that Mr. Hughes presented to a Congressional committee. Where Mr. Tully got the story about how INR was correct all along in its view that the Soviets were engaged in putting long range missiles within Cuba is anybody's guess. Elie Abel's remarkable book about the missile crisis and Roger Hilsman's both have the story straight. Yet Mr. Tully with a feigned inside source puts Hilsman in conflict with John McCone on the matter. It will not be forgotten, I hope, that Mr. McCone was the only USIB member, indeed probably the only senior intelligence officer in the US, who called Soviet intentions correctly in those tense weeks.

There are a number of other supposed live sources who are reputed to have told Mr. Tully how secret Soviet intentions to move into Czechoslovakia were penetrated, how espionage really laid bare the secrets of recent events in Greece and the coming of the Tet offensive in Vietnam. Whoever the source is in fact, if there ever was one, he would not now recognize his story; the author modestly states that he has to change names and scenes in the interests of security. In these instances Mr. Tully's observance of the security of his country's secrets is impeccable.

On NSA matters no one talked except the notorious defectors, Martin and Mitchell, and their talk to the Soviets was printed in *The New York Times* in 1961. What Tully did not get from this sort of source he seems to have borrowed—almost verbatim and without attribution—from David Kahn's book, *The Codebreakers*.

Throughout the book Tully studiously omits CIA except to dart waspishly at it now and then. This should not upset any devotee of the

CONFIDENTIAL

Agency which, after all, once basked solo in the full majesty of Mr. Tully's ineptitude. But serious outside critics may wonder why a book bearing this title is so reticent about the one agency of government popularly supposed to have a considerable capability in the spy business. A reason that is sure to leap to the mind of such a critical reader will derive from his realization that no CIA officer is cited as the source of any of Mr. Tully's allegations. Since CIA was obviously cool in its relations with him, he is endeavoring in his own inimitable way to square the account. With respect to this sort of tit for tat I perceive few moist eyes in the house.

Sherman Kent

THE GAME OF NATIONS, THE AMORALITY OF POWER
POLITICS. By *Miles Copeland*. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969)

Miles Copeland's book on the life and philosophy of a "crypto-diplomat," consultant to the mighty, and player in the "game of nations" quickly sold out its first printing in England and has prompted varied reactions.

The Arab press and radio and the "anti-imperialist" press and radio elsewhere have noted it, more or less hysterically, as another evidence of the deviousness of American methods and purposes.

C. L. Sulzberger, in the *New York Times* of 10 August 1969, wrote that "the degree of involvement" of the US in the Middle East plots and counterplots and the "specific details" are "now for the first time exposed."

The reviewer for *The Economist* (6-12 September 1969) observed that books like this must be "looked at warily," because "one has to wonder if there is, embedded in this elegant compound of reminiscence and didacticism, somewhere something that some higher personage than Mr. Copeland actually wants exposed to the light of day."

Indeed, there are things of which to be wary and things which cause one to wonder, even if one has some knowledge of the events described and long acquaintance with their narrator and interpreter. This review is not intended to set the record straight, a much too lengthy and complicated task, if not an impossible one. It is offered simply as an account and an evaluation of this book from the perspective of an intelligence professional.

CONFIDENTIAL

The reviewer must begin by stating that he thinks the book violates the confidences of a great many people who did not and do not look on politics or intelligence as a "game" and did not consider that they were playing games with Miles Copeland. The reviewer is aware that his harsh judgments on the book, which *pari passu* reflect inevitably on the character of the author of so personal a document, may, by some, be interpreted as a violation of confidence on his part. He can only say that Copeland, by writing the book, put it and himself up for public discussion, and certainly ought to have known that it would arouse interest and comment by former colleagues.

The Game of Nations is a readable, though often confused, and ultimately incomprehensible book. It reflects Miles Copeland's fabled charm and nimbleness of mind. It is also replete with his special brand of jargon which has so often beguiled and disarmed both colleagues and antagonists. Despite the many curious turns of language and thought, the book gives a memorable picture of the world of Miles Copeland.

There has seldom been so revealing a title: *The Game of Nations, The Amoralty of Power Politics*. The author means every word of it. His basic proposition is that international politics is a game in which morality and principle are stupidities and which only the devious and unprincipled can win.

He explains his own role in the game by quoting Edmund Wilson to the effect that F. Scott Fitzgerald was once inspired by Emily Post's *Etiquette* "to write a play wherein the dramatic conflict would arise from stalemates between Gentle People all trying to do the Right Thing. The conflict would only be resolved by the intervention of a cad who would bound on to the scene and set things right by behavior such as is totally outlawed by Mrs. Post." (p. 11). Miles is the cad, and proud of it—or at least so he insists almost but not quite to the last.

The villains of the piece are the "goo-goos," i.e., those "who believe that, even in a country like Syria, Good Government is not only desirable but possible." (p. 43) There are also harsh words for those who follow the "High Road of Statesmanship and Diplomacy," which Copeland informs us was known in the Pentagon and CIA as "HORSESHIP." (p. 126) Toward the end of the book Copeland expresses a growing disillusionment with those who make and influence US policy overseas. He refers to a distressing "distaste for violence" which became evident in the US business community and Government about the time of the Lebanese crisis of 1958 (p. 198) and says that the ability of the US to play the game was curtailed by the fact that "high morality" became the "in thing" in the State Department in the early sixties. (p. 222).

Throughout the book Copeland harps on the subject of amorality, which he advocates, and morality, which he regards as foolishness. Moralists in the State Department and elsewhere, he explains, are always thwarting the efforts of the hard-headed realists in international politics. However, he says in one of the most revealing passages of the book, we Americans can "sleep more easily at night from knowing that behind this front (of high morality) we are in fact capable of matching the Soviets perfidy for perfidy." We "do indeed believe in honesty," says Copeland, "although not so much as a great moral principle as because, as Benjamin Franklin said, it 'is the best policy'." (p. 13).

It is presumably to help Americans sleep more soundly that this book has been written, though this reviewer is uncertain whether the overall effect will be more sleep for Americans and their friends and less sleep for their enemies, or the other way around. Any reader who approaches this book cold is going to have a difficult time figuring out who the author is and how to evaluate what he says. His principal problem will be to decide whether the book itself is not a ploy in some game, the limits and rules of which are unknown to him.

It is worth noting briefly here how the author does represent himself. He says he "helped set up CIA." Later he was a "crypto-diplomat" in the US mission in Syria involved in activities which included bringing about a change of government. Except for these acknowledgements of an intelligence connection, an effort is made throughout the book to establish the author's identity as a private citizen with "companies" and business interests around the world. This private citizen is, however, said to have been in constant demand to play war games in Washington, and to serve on task forces and special committees set up by Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and others of their eminence. A number of diplomats—Jefferson Caffrey,¹ for example—are said to have called on him for advice and service from time to time. No mention is made of employment by CIA, and Allen Dulles is referred to only once; care is taken in the mention of names of active intelligence officers; and it is suggested that the CIA men the author worked with were on detached duty. The CIA and CIA attitudes, policies, etc., are, however, referred to with an insider's seeming familiarity, on almost every page.

What does all this add up to? The uninformed reader can assume that the author was a CIA officer who thinks his cover story will hold water, or that—as most of the Arab commentators and the reviewer in *The*

¹The book, incidentally, is dedicated to Caffrey, Hare, and Wadsworth, three "ambassadors of the old school" whom Copeland apparently believes were gamesmen, not moralists, a judgment which these gentlemen might not have considered complimentary.

CONFIDENTIAL

Recent Books: Miscellaneous

Economist appear to think—he is a CIA officer whose superiors have some devious purpose in allowing the book to see the light of day. Some uninformed readers have also demonstrated that it is possible to read this book and conclude that Copeland has explained his role exactly as it was, difficult though that seems to this reviewer. The explanation that Copeland wrote this book without official approval or collaboration seems unlikely to occur to many readers.

It is hard to say what the message of this book will be for most uninitiated but believing readers. One of the strongest impressions will probably be of a US Government straight out of science fiction and some of the wilder mail order courses on management. One gets an impression of foreign policy being made and implemented the way P & G makes and sells soap. One sees the Secretary of State and the President waiting with bated breath to find out what the oldest continuing floating war game in Washington has made of some new bit of intelligence before they order that formula so-and-so be fed into the computers, which will then tell them what to do.

There is a considerable amount of circumstantial detail cited to support this picture of the government. The first chapter begins with a colorful account of a Games Center in operation in Washington which fed its results directly into the policy-making process. There is also an account of a team set up to fight the Cold War which developed intelligence assets, decided that since it had them they ought to be used, and then, by a process of elimination, decided on Syria as the best available practice ground. (pp. 35-36). The same formula is repeated in account of a highly secret committee of specialists set up in 1951 by Dean Acheson to study the Arab world, which “when we thought ourselves ready for a major operation,” decided that “Egypt was the place to start.” (pp. 48-49).

Another strong impression on the reader is certain to be made by Copeland's solemn lucubrations on his political philosophy and his system for successful gamesmanships in a very restricted area of international politics. At the end of the first chapter he says he wants to “dispel any remaining notion that this is a book about Nasser. Rather it is a case history—hopefully teaching lessons of general applicability—of relations between the United States and a ‘non-Western’ leader of a particular kind which is likely to become increasingly prominent in international relations of the future. Although I have devoted much space to Nasser, I have tried to concentrate on aspects of his behavior which might be expected of any Afro-Asian leader, to the extent that he is the Nasser type. . . .” (pp. 26-27).

CONFIDENTIAL

It is just possible that if a reader discovered another non-Western leader who was enough of the Nasser type to suit Copeland's definition he might find something in the book that would further application, but only just.

Urgent insistence is made throughout the book that the reader is being given the most succinct and practical instructions for playing the game of nations. Rules of the game appear at the chapter heads. For example: "The first prerequisite for winning the game is to know that you're in on it; if you can't change the board, change the players . . . but settle for a true player, not a pawn; the strategy of the weak player is to play off the strong players against one another . . .," and so on. When Chairman Mao produced these sayings, or whether it was Chairman Mao or another, is not made clear, but the message to the reader is obviously intended to be that this is choice stuff and, more impressive, that this kind of stuff is taken seriously at high levels in Washington.

It is possible that a few readers will react as John Crosby did in his column in the *London Observer* (21 December 1969). His comment was: "I have always felt strongly that you can't beat a man at tennis by tying your shoelaces at crucial points. . . . I can't escape the conviction that if you *play* war . . . you are going to lose." They may, however, make this judgment on the validity of Copeland's approach to international politics and still, as Crosby apparently does, accept his picture of the way things are done in the US Government as an accurate one.

Miles Copeland's book will make a lot of serious and devoted US Government servants wince, particularly those who are already nervous about this kind of thing making headway in Washington. It will frighten a lot of outsiders, friends of the US and of the US Government, who have on occasion suspected that things inside the Government might be as weird as Copeland says they are.

On the other hand there may be some little consolation in the knowledge that Copeland's book is going to confuse the dickens out of the real enemies of the US. They will make some obvious propaganda use of it, but surely most of them will hold back, fearing that they are being put on, that some ingenious trap has been laid for them.

What must the professional intelligence officer's judgement on this book be? He cannot ignore the fact that the book is not an entirely fanciful description of Miles Copeland's world. One of the most interesting things about the book is Miles' acknowledgement of disillusion with the whole business of the intelligence game as he has played it.

One is reminded of something he says Nasser said to him: "The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only

complicated stupid moves. . . ." (p. 138) In the reviewer's opinion he was saying this to the right man. Not that Copeland isn't a man with a great natural talent for dealing with people, but, as *The Game of Nations* shows, he has tried to rationalize and solemnize his role and his formulae for international politics to the point that they became exactly as Nasser said, a complicated nonsense. Miles Copeland has dealt a mortal blow to the theory that gamesmanship is the key to success in international politics. And a good thing, too. For his own sake, and for the sake of those of his former associates who are still active intelligence officers, however, it would have been better if he had not written this book.

Charles D. Cremeans

DIE KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEIEN DER WELT. (The Communist Parties of the World.) Edited by *C. D. Kernig*. (Herder, Freiburg-Basel-Vienna, 1969. 583 pp.)

The old and respected Herder publishing house, whose reputation derives in part from its encyclopedias, is in the process of putting out an ambitious, five volume comparative encyclopedia entitled *Soviet System and Democratic Society*, two volumes of which have already appeared. The present book was prepared as part of that project, but has been issued to stand by itself. The publisher's consultants and editorial board listings contain a number of established authorities, e.g., Z. K. Brzezinski, M. Fainsod, A. Inkeles, A. Brumberg. This book is in two parts: general and specific. The general part treats the world movement as a whole, including the Comintern, Cominform, and international fronts. The specific part contains individual articles on each of the world CPs, including the CPSU; because of special situations, some areas are treated regionally rather than by country. Each article has been written by an authority with an established reputation. Not necessarily for the true specialist, this is nevertheless a useful and well done reference work for the generalist.

LA DEUXIEME MORT DE RAMON MERCADER. (The Second Death of Ramon Mercader.) By *Jorge Semprun*. (Gallimard Paris, 1969. 432 pp.)

This novel, which was awarded the 1969 *Prix Femina*, should be of some interest to intelligence officers for two reasons: its author, and its

plot. Jorge Semprun, until 1965, was a leading official of the Spanish Communist Party, under the *nom de guerre* Federico Sanchez; he was expelled from the Party in that year after a bitter dispute with Party leader Santiago Carrillo over policy. He did the film scenario for the controversial motion picture about Greece, "Z," and is presently at work on the scenario for a film to be made of Arthur London's book, "L'Aveu" (The Confession), the story of his arrest, trial, and imprisonment in the context of the Slansky purge in Czechoslovakia. "The Second Death" is the story of a Soviet KGB "illegal" who is placed in Spain under the identity of a Spanish "Nion" who died in the Soviet Union, whose career is haunted from the outset by his notorious namesake, the killer of Trotsky. He is pursued around Western Europe by CIA officers, one of whom in turn is being pursued by the East German State Security Service, who in turn are pursued by the Dutch police—all in all, one could probably call it an espionage western. Some idea of Semprun's style can be had from his prefatory note at the beginning of the book: "The events with which this tale is concerned are completely imaginary. Even more than that: any coincidence with reality would be not only fortuitous, but downright scandalous." Worth reading, if you have good French.

THE SECRET ROAD TO WORLD WAR TWO: SOVIET VERSUS WESTERN INTELLIGENCE, 1921-1939. By *Paul W. Blackstock*. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. 384 pp.)

This book has grave defects. For the most part they result from two of the author's characteristics. The first of these is that he is insufficiently grounded in intelligence, or insufficiently critical, to make discriminating judgments about his sources. The second is that he artificially equates the USSR and the democratic West in comparing their governments and their intelligence services.

The Secret Road to World War Two is really an amalgam of what might better have been two books, one dealing with clever and sinister deception and penetration operations conducted by Soviet intelligence against anti-Soviet Russian emigrés abroad, the other with the inept policies and miscalculations of the great powers, the blunders that led to the tragedy of the Second World War. The contrived joining of these two subjects contribute neither to lucidity nor to unity. This reader was left with the impression that Blackstock tried to make these dramatic spy stories more impressive through his references to the political and

historical dynamics of the time. His views as an historian are those of Robert Tucker, of John Erickson, and in part George F. Kennan.

Both the title and the sub-title are misleading. The word *road* implies that the contest between the secret services of East and West led to war; yet the author fails to produce any evidence supporting this view. As for the sub-title, "Moscow's Allegations about Soviet versus Western Intelligence" would have been more accurate. And the title itself might more appropriately have suggested Soviet ingenuity in such operational specialities as disinformation, provocation, and liquidation. The real struggle, moreover, was not a contest of equals, a hidden conflict between intelligence antagonists, but a ruthless campaign by the Soviet services to destroy the Russian emigré groups abroad, viewed by the Stalinists as a nuisance and potential threat, as well as the internal enemies, real and imaginary, of the Communist regime.

The work is divided into four major sections, each of which includes a string of episodes attributed by the author to a Soviet-Western war of wits between their services of intelligence and counterintelligence during the 1920's and 1930's. In each of the four parts Blackstock tries to bolster his thesis by data drawn from other Western writers and from official Soviet interpretations, with only an occasional note of skepticism about the latter. (This approach to the subject reminded this reader of the grossly disinformational book by Sayers and Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy*, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1946, in which the putative authors chose from a mass of Western documentation those accounts best suited to support and "prove" the Soviet version and justification of their operations.)

Blackstock has carried out extensive research, in the course of which he examined all the materials available in libraries of several countries and in the archives of anti-Soviet organizations that plotted indefatigably but ineptly the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. He personally interviewed some of the last surviving emigrés who participated in the confused, tumultuous events of the era, and he discovered hidden papers and diaries left behind by participants long since dead. But digging up facts is less important than understanding them and interpreting them correctly. Here Blackstock falls short. He does not know enough of the history of revolutionary Russia or of the realities of power in the USSR. He does not understand Russian psychology. He accepts uncritically both authorized Soviet versions of events and the opinions of emigrés who were completely disoriented by the crushing defeats inflicted on them.

The book also contains occasional distortions and half-truths that seem to have originated with the author, not his sources. For instance, Blackstock alleges that most of the roughly one million Russian refugees and emigrés bowed to the reality of the Bolshevik regime and began in their adopted lands the process of assimilation. A minority even joined the Communist Party. He finds that 75 per cent of the Party's membership in Chicago, for example, was of Russian origin, and creates an impression that these members were refugees from Bolshevism, whereas in fact they were predominantly pre-1917 Jewish immigrants from Russia, people who had never lived under Communist power.

Other less obvious inaccuracies result from the author's tendency to generalize and oversimplify. He says, for example, that after 1925 the "European world" (meaning the West) was polarized spiritually and politically into a Communist, anti-fascist left and a pro-fascist right that was ready to appease Hitler at almost any price in the hope that he could be turned against the Soviet state (p. 195). He argues that the free-floating political violence of right-wing and left-wing European mobs was matched in the United States by the cold-blooded violence of organized crime under gangster overlords (p. 196). He asserts that bloody purges in the Soviet Union in 1937 were paralleled by the epidemic of denunciations in the United States during the McCarthy period (p. 225).

This kind of recurring generalization awakens an impression that the writer wants to disarm any reader who may be skeptical of Soviet explanations of their secret operations and their excesses. After all, he argues, America had its corresponding hysteria. And the British reactionaries, responsible for the Arcos raid and the break in diplomatic relations, precipitated the war scare in the Soviet Union. The threat of war—whether in fact it was real or merely invented by the Kremlin for purposes of propaganda—was the basis for an abrupt increase in OGPU arrests of Western intelligence agents inside the USSR in the summer of 1927, as shown in Blackstock's table (p. 166). Of 192 spies arrested in that year, 167 were seized in May and June. Soviet propaganda denounced almost all of them as agents controlled by the British SIS (p. 166). Blackstock's conclusion is that the traumatic events of that year made the Soviets realize the urgency of doing battle with the Western intelligence services.

The author's failure to distinguish among the various Soviet services pitted against the West is a defect that is not uncommon among nonprofessional writers on the subject. David Dallin's *Soviet Espionage* (Yale University Press, 1955) talks almost exclusively about the GB

(*Gossudarstvennaia Bezopasnost*, or State Security), for example, whether in fact he meant the Cheka and its many successors, together with their branches and subdivisions, or the GRU and its military and positive intelligence subgroups and affiliates. Such lack of precision about the identities and structural positions of the Soviet agencies is disconcerting to a reader interested in counterintelligence. Blackstock either has nothing to tell such readers or he confuses the issues.

Much of Blackstock's account concerns aggressive Soviet operations against counterrevolutionary groups of emigrés abroad as well as real and imaginary traitors at home. Such activities were predominantly, if not exclusively, the responsibility of the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD. But Blackstock does not clarify or even suggest the role that the GRU or any other military intelligence element played in the contest or in the cooperation with the German military and the rapprochement with Hitler that Stalin avidly sought. Thus it is far from clear who the principals were and what units were engaged in the numerous operations. When the Trust operation collapsed in 1927, the OGPU foreign section speedily rebuilt networks of agents in all the capitals of Europe (p. 195). Walter Krivitsky, according to Blackstock, was among the OGPU professionals who directed the work. Yet it is known from Krivitsky's own depositions as well as other accounts that he was a GRU officer and had no dealings with OGPU until 1935. In one passage Blackstock expresses annoyance with writers who lump together the various Nazi intelligence services, labelling all of them as Gestapo. Here he commits the same offense.

The author quotes the dictum of Boris Nikolaevsky, by now almost a cliché, that to understand the real motives behind foreign policy one must study the battle of the secret services, a war waged constantly beneath the surface of history. In the prewar era of Stalin, however, the activities of the OGPU and the NKVD, at home and abroad, reflected Soviet domestic concerns rather than foreign policy, i.e., they were designed to support the conspiracy at the top that guaranteed the absolutism of Stalin's rule. Blackstock's entire book, despite its inaccurate title, is proof of the point.

The first of the four sections of the book takes up one hundred pages. It is the story of the Trust; the monumental exercise in deception and provocation contrived by the chiefs of OGPU counterintelligence and directed against the emigration abroad from 1922 to 1927. The legend contrived by the Soviet specialists was the story of a secret monarchist organization which, they claimed, had come into being in Petrograd by

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1921. This network had supposedly succeeded in banding together the patriotic elements of the old capital into units determined to liberate Mother Russia from Bolshevism. The OGPU ensured that the electrifying news reached the ears of the leaders of the White Russian emigration, which consisted of monarchists, former high officials of the Tsar, expropriated industrialists, and tens of thousands of exasperated tsarist officers. Most of these people lived in poverty and longed for the day when they, together with the armies of the great powers, would march into Russia, overthrow the regime and resume their rightful posts in a liberated homeland.

Alexander Yakushev had been a high official of the Tsar's Civil Service. An unprincipled and promiscuous man, he agreed to play the OGPU's game. He went to Germany and reported to the High Monarchist Council in Berlin about the development of the conspiracy by the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia, MOCR. He was well received by the leading emigrés and by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the pretender to the Russian throne. Later two more "conspirators" were sent abroad with the same tale. Both were well-known tsarist generals who had thrown in their lot with the red regime. Through Russian emigré channels, the Polish, French, and English services soon began to receive disinformation, fabricated by the OGPU. With the "help" of the Trust, the anti-Soviet organizations abroad began to send spies and terrorists into the USSR. Some were executed, but others were allowed to survive and leave the country for the purpose of maintaining the confidence of the emigrés and the Western services in the MOCR.

Blackstock is right when he says that the Trust was one of the OGPU's most successful foreign ventures, although he is by no means the first to recognize this fact. He disagrees with Richard Wraga and others who have maintained, correctly, that the MOCR was an OGPU hoax from the outset. Blackstock supports instead the official Soviet version, which maintains that the OGPU penetrated the MOCR, the Trust, after its establishment, and that the OGPU recruited key monarchists abroad, such as Yakushev and General Zayonchkovskiy. Blackstock admits that the official Soviet chronicler, Lev Nikulin (*Mertvaia Zyb*, Moscow, 1965, *The Deadly Swell*, usually translated in English as *The Swell of the Sea*) had to make radical revisions in each of his three consecutive editions, but he follows the Nikulin line nevertheless. The result is that the smell of provocation and deception is obliterated by the less acrid odor of penetration.

The ideology of the Soviet-controlled Trust operatives was tailored to please Western tastes. They were anti-interventionists. They propagated the deception that the Bolshevik regime was becoming more and more like the capitalistic West and added that it would soon collapse anyway. They opposed terror as an unproductive tactic potentially harmful to the Trust, which needed only moral and financial support to remain a steady and good source of intelligence, i.e., disinformation.

Blackstock's account tells us of the famous revolutionary Boris Savinkov, who before the revolution had organized the assassination of the Grand Duke Sergei, the uncle of the Tsar, and of Minister of the Interior Plehve, and who later, fighting against the Bolshevik revolution, seized three cities on the Volga in 1918. Savinkov was duped by the Trust and was persuaded in 1924 to cross into Russia illegally in the expectation of leading the secret army, which had never existed, against the Kremlin. Despite his entrapment and death, his co-conspirator, the British intelligence officer Sidney Reilly, who had been under a death sentence in the Soviet Union since 1918, let himself be lured in 1925 to Moscow, where he was executed.

Blackstock recognizes that neither Savinkov nor Reilly represented a serious threat to Soviet security and that their liquidation first cast doubt upon the Trust. The author expresses the opinion that the OGPU became overconfident because of its initial successes. "They thought they could deceive the Western intelligence agencies indefinitely." He appears unaware, however, of the study put out by the Soviets in 1967.¹

The author maintains that in 1927 the combined Western intelligence agencies conducted a major offensive against the USSR. To support this unconvincing assertion, he quotes largely from the Moscow press and reproduces its statistics on the arrests of Western spies. He provides practically no details about the alleged offensive except for the story of what he describes as "vest-pocket terrorist raids" conducted by the Combat Corps of General Kutypov. The general was supposedly suspicious of the Trust from the very beginning. In 1927, acting without the Trust's knowledge, he sponsored a few (and for the most part unsuccessful) teams that entered Russia for purposes of espionage and terrorism. By then, however, the Trust had collapsed, mainly because of the apparent defection of one of the principal OGPU agents, "Opperput," whose real name was Edward Ottovich Staunits.

¹Vasilij Ardamatsky, *Vozmezdiye* (Retribution), *Neva* Nos. 8-11 (August-November 1967). This material emerged later as a book. Extensive, accurate, and in many instances hitherto unpublished OGPU documentation is appended to each chapter.

While the Trust still inspired faith, it duped one Vassily Shulgin, who had been a conservative member of the Tsarist Duma. He was led to believe that his son, who had disappeared in tumultuous Russia, had been confined in an insane asylum in the Ukraine. Desperately eager to find the boy, Shulgin was helped by the men of the Trust to enter Russia secretly. They then told him that they had not been able to locate his son after all, but they enabled him to travel extensively. He "secretly" visited Kiev, Leningrad, and Moscow, each of which had been the nation's capital during one epoch or another. The OGPU also arranged for his untroubled exit. The Trust even helped Shulgin to publish in the West his famous book, *Three Capital Cities*. His experience in the USSR and the story of his meetings with the leaders of the internal "conspiracy" convinced most of the emigrés who had begun to doubt the Trust that its integrity had been vindicated.

Nikulin's novel, *The Swell of the Sea*, is a better source than many Soviet works; the author was given access to the OGPU files on the Trust case. Thus Blackstock, who, as indicated above, leans heavily on Nikulin, is closer to the mark in his treatment of the Trust than in other parts of his book. But there are distortions in Nikulin's story, and Blackstock seems to be unaware of them. As is well known, the Soviet intelligence services bitterly resent defections from their ranks, try to conceal them whenever possible, and attempt to distort them through disinformation when they cannot be concealed. Edward "Opperput" had been one of the most effective OGPU operatives inside the Trust. In 1927 he broke with the Trust and fled to Finland with Maria Zakharchenko. His sensational revelations appeared in the Latvian and Finnish press. He was interrogated by Finnish authorities by intelligence officers from other countries. The Trust lay in shambles. But the OGPU decided not to admit defeat. It portrayed Opperput as a "white guardist," an enemy, and did not admit that before his defection he had been used by them as a hatchet man against the Russian emigrés.

Lev Nikulin and the KGB have similarly concealed the true role of Maria Zakharchenko, the Joan of Arc of the Trust. The OGPU became interested in her because she was the niece of the anti-Soviet General Kutypov. (Blackstock says that Zakharchenko and Kutypov were not related (p. 49). Nikulin says (pp. 107 and 206) that they were cousins.) With the help of Zakharchenko's lover, a former cavalry officer, the OGPU recruited her in Yugoslavia. When she and Opperput broke with Soviet intelligence and fled to Finland, General Kutypov and the other anti-Soviet emigrés assembled in Helsinki demanded that Opperput prove his sincerity by returning to the Soviet Union and carrying out a

series of anti-Communist and terrorist operations there. Maria rebelled; but when the decision was not reversed, she joined Opperput on his fatal mission. The OGPU mobilized whole districts against the handful of men and the one woman who crossed from Finland into Russia with guns, bombs, and explosives. Opperput was killed near Smolensk. Maria ran into a cavalry squadron farther west, shot it out with them to the last bullet, and died of her wounds.

Blackstock also whitewashes another woman by following Nikulin too closely and uncritically. She was Liubov' Dehrental, the extremely beautiful young wife of the aide of Boris Savinkov. So great was the husband's devotion that he yielded her charms to his chief. Soviet sources try to conceal the fact, but Dehrental, like Zakharchenko, was a secret informer of the OGPU. While Savinkov vacillated about answering the call of the rebels and returning to Russia to lead the phantom army invented by the Trust, Liubov' Dehrental followed OGPU orders and exhorted him to accept his destiny as the savior of the motherland. When he agreed, she and her husband accompanied him. In Moscow she stayed with Savinkov in his beautifully furnished quarters in prison. Some months later he committed suicide. She was rewarded with a position on the *Woman's Journal*. Neither she nor her husband was prosecuted. Dikhoff Dehrental was given a responsible position on the VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

Although he accepts the Soviet-sponsored charge that the War Scare of 1927 was the result of the alleged intelligence offensive of the Western powers, Blackstock admits that Stalin used the issue for his primary purpose of expelling Trotsky and the old Bolsheviks and of destroying his internal enemies. By the end of the year Stalin had crushed the opposition, and the War Scare ended abruptly.

Quoting heavily from Soviet sources, Blackstock discusses at length the Kutypov offensive and Melgunov operations, which are described as integral parts of the operations of "combined Western intelligence." He says that Kutypov was too short of funds to mount forays into the USSR; yet he also frequently implies that he enjoyed bountiful Western financing. The author draws upon Melgunov's archive to assert that in 1928 Melgunov had a budget of \$1,705,000 for anti-Soviet activities and had the sum of \$250,000 to finance terrorism. Blackstock bases these calculations on Melgunov's figures in francs and an exchange rate of four francs to the dollar, a rate that never existed. (In 1928 the rate of exchange was more like eighteen to one.)

The book also suffers because the writer has accepted at face value the fantasies and, at times, the mass hysteria of the emigrés. For instance, he

reproduces verbatim a "plan to kill Stalin" written by one "N.M.," and winds up his comments on its feasibility by saying that he does not know whether it was ever tried or not. He seems not to grasp that the emigrés were completely disoriented by the bewildering defeat that the Trust had dealt them. Not even the wisest of them understood what had hit them. Seeking an explanation for Savinkov's ideological defection to Bolshevism at the time of his trial in Moscow, they began to invent absurd theories. One of these had it that Savinkov received from Trotsky and Kamenev an invitation to return to Russia and the promise that after undergoing a mock trial, he would be pardoned and given an important governmental post. In another version, also spun from moonlight, the OGPU investigators admitted to the arrested Savinkov that the Communist experiment was a dismal failure, yet appealed to him to help them fight the monarchists, claiming that they threatened the very existence of the Soviet regime. They were supposed to have promised Savinkov that if he embraced Sovietism at a public trial, his sentence would be quashed and his talents used in the struggle of the Communist Party against Zinoviev and the left opposition.

Such rumors spread among stunned and frustrated people. Between 1927 and the publication of Blackstock's book in 1969 more than forty years have passed, an interval long enough to permit historical perspective. But the author has not moved with the times. He concludes that "Savinkov, either before or after his return, had made some sort of deal with a *faction of the OGPU* and believed that he could continue his struggle inside the Soviet government as he had from without. The OGPU was a very large organization, and the experience of General Kutypov and his agents indicates that *there were factions* that could have been played against each other within the larger framework of the struggle for Lenin's succession, which was then going on behind the scenes. . . ." (p. 87) This quotation plainly shows that Blackstock does not understand the realities of the Soviet system and of power within that system. The OGPU was always subordinated to the dictator, the Secretary General of the party, and to him alone. Within it there never were (and never could have been) factions fighting for rival candidates for supreme power. When Savinkov fell into the OGPU's trap, he was totally bankrupt, a pitiful and totally discredited politician whom foreign services had stopped financing. When he collaborated with the White Russians and the Poles his guerrillas left behind them in Belorussia and the Ukraine a train of destruction and executions. It makes no sense to hold that Savinkov's hard-headed captors would plan, or even pretend to plan, to use this wreck in an intra-party struggle for Lenin's successor.

Part Three of this book comes closest to accuracy. In it Blackstock describes in detail the OGPU's preparations for the kidnapping of General Kutypov. The explanation of the roles of General Nikolai Skoblin and his wife, the singer Nadezhda Plevitskaya, is perhaps the best analysis to date of this precious pair, who worked among the tsarist emigrés while simultaneously serving the Soviets and the Nazis. The "Golden Age of Organized Mayhem," as the author calls this period, includes also an account of the kidnapping of General Miller. The chapters in this part of the book contain much that has been told by other writers (Orlov, Krivitsky, Besedovsky, Dewar, *et al*). But Blackstock has keenly noted the failure of the White Guards in exile to set up effective security measures against the OGPU or to weed out such suspected traitors as Skoblin and Plevitskaya, despite scores of warning signs, their notoriously suspect finances and associations, their past records, and their personalities.

Part Four, the last in the book, is the worst. Perhaps it would be too much to expect that an author who is not a Russian and who has no firsthand knowledge of Soviet bureaucracy could find his way through the maze of falsification that has been constructed around Marshal Tukhachevsky and other generals of the Red Army after their execution in June 1937.

This part of the book opens with a pro-Stalin version of events. Blackstock has it that Stalin began to make secret approaches to Hitler only after he had been unable to win French and English support for an alliance designed to put an end to the Nazi dictator's plans for expansion. Only after this failure did Stalin's policy of appeasement and his ambition for a working partnership with the Führer take form. A whole chapter is devoted to the Soviet relations with Germany and Hitler as a prelude to the story of the long and laborious preparations for the purge of the leadership of the Red Army.

Blackstock agrees with the view that the "Tukhachevsky plot" originated with Stalin himself, on whose behalf the NKVD launched an array of disinformation operations, first through gossip, then through documentary "evidence" channeled back to Stalin from reliable Western sources. The gossip was first spread in Paris in December 1936 by General Skoblin, who at that time was reporting to the chief of the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD), Reinhard Heydrich. When it reached Hitler, he supposedly developed with Heydrich and Himmler the idea of forging papers that would "prove" treasonable contacts between certain Soviet generals and their German counterparts. When the German intelligence officer Otto Jahnke warned that Skoblin's report was disinformation, he

was arrested; and Heydrich went ahead with the forgeries. Rumors about the alleged conspiracy against Stalin were then leaked so that they could be picked up by Czech intelligence and delivered to President Benes. He in turn passed the story to Leon Blum. Still another report supposedly reached Benes by the end of January 1937 from his ambassador in Berlin. This dispatch spoke of an "anti-Stalin plot in the USSR, Marshal Tukhachevsky, Rykov, and others." Benes is supposed to have passed to Stalin this deliberate leak from a high Nazi official. At the same time photocopies of the collection of the documents forged by the SD were transmitted through NKVD channels to Moscow, where the case against the generals was in preparation.

The proceedings of their trial have never been published. The general consensus at the time was that no trial of any kind was ever held. But nine months after the execution of the generals, some of the leading defendants in the third Moscow trial (Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky, Yagoda, Rosenholtz, and Grinko), who had confessed to treason, testified at the prompting of the state prosecutor that Marshal Tukhachevsky and his associates had been their accomplices. Stalin knew that the executioners were also waiting for Bukharin *et al*; he could feel reasonably sure that they could never recall their false testimony. In fact, had it not been for the dramatic revelations of Khrushchev in February 1956, history might have described the Red Generals as the traitors that Stalin wanted them to seem. His favorite security measure was the well-executed judicial frame-up, followed by the liquidation of witnesses.

Thus Blackstock is right in attributing to Stalin himself the first layer of falsification in this famous case. The second layer, however, was added after Tukhachevsky and his associates had been killed. This lie was the invention of petty and irresponsible minds seeking sensationalism. These writers of detective thrillers saw their chance when certain unscrupulous Nazis decided to grab the credit for a great coup by claiming that they had turned the generals into German spies. According to the legend that then emerged, Stalin feared that the world would not believe his charges. Therefore he decided to obtain documentary proof of espionage and treason from the SD itself. So he permitted the NKVD to instruct Skoblin to tell Heydrich that the Soviets had discovered a plot. Heydrich reported to Hitler, whose choices were to do nothing, help Tukhachevsky overthrow Stalin, or betray the general to the dictator.

The story is patently implausible. Would Stalin, contemplating the destruction of the leadership of the Red Army, direct that Hitler be told of the concocted plot in the nebulous hope that for some reason the Nazis would provide him with forged proof?

The legend has a number of variants. The documents are supposed to have reached the Soviets through Skoblin, through Benes, through a friend of Benes, etc. One version has it that the Russians paid 50,000 marks for them. Another says, "Stalin asked what price we had set on the material. Neither Hitler nor Heydrich had considered that there would be any financial prospects in the affair. However, to preserve appearances, Heydrich asked for three million gold rubles—which Stalin's emissary, after no more than a cursory examination of the documents, paid at once."²

The fable of the forged documents first appeared in a book³ by Walter Krivitsky, an NKVD officer who defected to the West. The fact is that forgeries are vulnerable to scientific analysis, and Stalin understood that they can become liabilities. Certainly not a single forged document was introduced by Stalin and his aides into the voluminous files of the three famous Moscow trials of 1936-1938. And no German originals or copies were, or have been, found in the voluminous archives of the Reich by the Allies entering Berlin. But Blackstock buys the legend completely. "The charges," he writes, "were supported by evidence from two sources, the internally prepared NKVD dossiers and the forged German documents. . . . The accused angrily denied the charges, but the documentary evidence was so convincing that Stalin never lost the confidence of those officers who survived the military purge which followed." (p. 338). And in summarizing the event, he says, "Viewed as a disinformation operation or provocation, the Tukhachevsky affair was certainly one of the most successful in modern history. It represented a major NKVD achievement, far exceeding reasonable results in comparable operations. Nevertheless, Artuzov,⁴ the brilliant head of the foreign department and his aides soon perished in the purge themselves." (p. 339).

²*The Labyrinth*, Walter Schellenberg, New York, 1957, p. 27.

³*In Stalin's Secret Service*, 1939, pp. 239-240.

⁴In fact, Artuzov had nothing to do with the Tukhachevsky affair. At the end of 1933 he had been transferred from the Foreign Department of the NKVD as a special aide (*Osobopopolnomochenny*) to Yagoda, then Chief of the Commissariat. In 1935 he was removed from the NKVD altogether and appointed deputy to Ian Berzin, Chief of the Fourth Department of the Red Army. Blackstock compounded this error by mistakenly assuming that Arthur Artuzov and Abram Slutsky were identical. He writes, "Under the talented direction of Artuzov (Abram Slutsky)" (p. 195) and ". . . suddenly a courier arrived from Spain with an urgent message on microfilm from A. A. Slutsky (Artuzov). . ." (p. 239). Actually Slutsky succeeded Artuzov in the NKVD's Foreign Department in 1935 and headed it until February 1938. That the names are those of two different men is documentable even from data in the public domain. Either Blackstock was duped by his sources or he sought to strengthen his erroneous view of the Tukhachevsky case. Blackstock is similarly confused when he writes (p. 94) that ". . . Starov was in fact OGPU Commissar Pillar." He was not; the two were different people.

There are some other mistakes and distortions that merit brief mention. On page 221 the author discusses a sensational article by V. Burtsev, an article allegedly based on information obtained by him from one Fekhner, the OGPU Resident in Europe. Fekhner allegedly admitted that he had taken part in the kidnapping of General Kutypov. To the best of our knowledge, however, there never was a Soviet Resident named Fekhner. On page 224 and at other points Blackstock says that Lev Helfand, the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was the OGPU Resident in France and that his assistant was Yanovich. It was in fact Yanovich who was the Resident. Helfand never had anything to do with the OGPU.⁵ To illustrate how much Stalin wanted to impress Hitler with the quality of the Soviet Air Force, Blackstock asserts (p. 297) that “. . . during the Spanish Civil War the latest Soviet fighter planes were permitted to fall by ‘mistake’ into German hands.” The author sources this statement to Alexander Orlov’s *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*.⁶ A check has shown, however, that Orlov did not make such a statement. He simply mentions that two Soviet fighter planes landed on an enemy air strip behind the Madrid sector as a result of an error in navigation. (p. 22). In fact, Soviet disinformation was employed in an action designed to impress the Germans with the quality of the air force of the USSR, but not as Blackstock says it was. On page 298 the author says that Kandelaki, the head of a Soviet Trade Delegation, “. . . left for Moscow accompanied by Friedrichson of the NKVD to report to Stalin.” Again he is wrong. We know that Friedrichson served in the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin for some eight years, but he had nothing to do with the NKVD.

Through the years a body of literature, both articles and books about Soviet intelligence in general and the Tukhachevsky case in particular, has mushroomed. Soviet publications are slanted as part of the Communists’ endless rewriting of history. Western authors like Blackstock tend to pile up and adopt uncritically as much as possible from what has been published before, in the East and the West. A characteristic example is *The Soviet High Command* by John Erickson, from which Blackstock has borrowed as profusely and recklessly as Erickson borrowed from others.

By now it will have been recognized that *The Secret Road to World War II* covers the same ground as that traversed by the pseudonymous

⁵Helfand, a regular Soviet Foreign service employee, defected to the US in Rome, in 1940.

⁶The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963.

Geoffrey Bailey in *The Conspirators*.⁷ But Blackstock has not written an authoritative or even an accurate book. His undiscerning eclecticism has resulted not in a factual record of Soviet disinformation but in its perpetuation. Our understanding of the philosophy and methods of Soviet deception is confused, not enhanced, by an account which depicts the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD as ten feet tall, the Western services as pygmies, and the anti-Soviet emigration as the victim of both.

THE RUSSIAN PROTESTANTS—EVANGELICALS IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1944-1964. By *Steve Durasoff*. (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, New Jersey, 1969.)

If the truth will hurt, what kind of deception should one practice? That, it seems to me, is the fundamental question posed by this interesting and informative book on the Russian Baptists and the Pentecostals. Except for what I have learned of him by reading his book, I know nothing about the author and may well be ascribing to him a deviousness in the pursuit of righteousness that is in fact entirely irrelevant to Mr. Durasoff's purpose in writing the book. Nevertheless, I must express my admiration for such a neat balance of what appears to be a deft intermingling of scholarship, propaganda and conviction. *The Russian Protestants* is an outstanding example of how to write a successful book about a sensitive cause and it is that aspect which justifies its being reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence*.

The problem that anyone writing about the Russian Baptists and their cohorts must face is that they are a cruelly persecuted group whose membership in the hundreds have been arrested and imprisoned in the last few years, and in the thousands subjected to the almost infinite variety of coercive and abusive measures that the Soviet regime is able to inflict upon the recalcitrant. How do you write about them without getting them in further trouble; how do you write about them to encourage the regime to reduce its repression; and how do you do justice to scholarship at the same time. To dwell only on the persecution of the militant Baptists and Pentecostals would probably not help either them or the Baptist cause in the Soviet Union generally. To overlook them and write only about the official Soviet Baptist Church, accepting its statements at face value, would be bad scholarship as well as morally deceitful, and would probably encourage the charlatans in the Church more than the believers. To condemn the official Baptist Church as

⁷Harpers. New York, 1960.

nothing but a creature of the regime would do no service for those believers both East and West who want somehow to strengthen the ties between them and to help the faithful in the Soviet Union survive and overcome their current difficulties. Bearing in mind all of the above, if one is concerned about strengthening the Church in Russia by writing a book to be read in the West, one must appeal not only to the converted, to those who already believe that the situation in the Soviet Union is oppressive, one must also try to reach those who are put off by "Cold War sloganeering" and whose own views on matters Soviet are much more accommodating.

To do all this, and I should emphasize I only presume it was the author's intent, Mr. Durasoff begins with a brief summary of the history of the Baptists in Russia and of the various sects that came to be grouped together as the Pentecostals. He pays careful attention to the opposition Baptist missionaries encountered from the Orthodox Church in the Czarist regime before the Revolution, while at the same time making clear that, by contrast, those were days of tolerance. The impressive history of the spread of Baptism and the growth of allied sects during the 1920s is recounted at some length as is the beginning of serious repression in 1929. Collectivization hit the Baptists and the Mennonites and similar religious groups with special force. Most of them were able, hard working farmers and consequently found themselves categorized as kulaks and treated accordingly. The ironic fate of the Mennonites, the only people in Russia ever to run successful collective farms, is well covered. The trouble with the Mennonites was that they weren't Communists and despite their pacifism and desire to live in isolation from the rest of the world, an inclination that might have encouraged the Soviets (as it did the Czars) to leave the Mennonites alone and simply profit from their highly productive agriculture, the existence of the Mennonite communities was intolerable to the Communists. All of their communities were dispersed as nests of kulak imperialist intrigue.

This tragic history serves essentially as a preface to Mr. Durasoff's treatment of the union of the Baptists and various Pentecostal groups, formed in October 1944. The story of this organization, the All Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (AUCECB), is where Mr. Durasoff's sensitivity, scholarship, and faith are tested and, I think, found fully adequate to the challenge. As Mr. Durasoff makes clear, the AUCECB was an invention of the Soviet regime designed to impose more organization and consequently supervision upon the Baptist Churches and at the same time provide useful window dressing for the campaign of

those years to portray the Soviet Union as enlightened, tolerant, democratic, etc. In this way, the Soviets built a useful platform for postwar front group activities in the international arena while at the same time enhancing their control over a dissident element within the Soviet population. The trouble was and remains that in order to have a religious organization that has any use at all in the international field, you need at least a few believers and sometimes these believers will take advantage of the organization for their own purposes rather than those of the state. Thus begins an elaborate game that is not quite cat and mouse. Mr. Durasoff's book conveys the sense of this game without ever spelling it out, which would of course be quite contrary to his purpose. He does not hide the major evidence of collaboration with the regime at the expense of the faithful on the part of some leaders of the AUCECB. Yet he also presents convincing evidence that many of these people are persons of genuine religious faith who are engaged in an endless bargaining game with the State, in which, essentially, they offer their services as international propagandists so that their Church may be allowed to survive in the Soviet Union.

Naturally, many believers possessing the zeal and firmness of faith traditional among the Baptists and the Pentecostals are unable to stomach the Machiavellianism that playing the game requires. They break away and in deeply righteous indignation condemn the compromisers as traitors to the faith. These are the dissidents from the All Union Council who have taken what they call "the initiative" in the last few years of leading the Church on a more Christian path. It is they, of course, who have suffered the most brutal repressions. Among the Baptists and Pentecostals in the Western world, something akin to the same problem exists, although in a very different context. Those among Western church leaders who would try to help the faithful in Russia by dealing with the All Union Council and other religious representatives from the Soviet Union can be effective at times in helping their oppressed brethren. At times they also fall into the Soviet trap of becoming nothing more than mouthpieces for Soviet propaganda and by their statements actually weaken the position of the true churches that, presumably, they seek to help.

Mr. Durasoff and his mentors, Oral Roberts and Billy Graham, appear to be among those who understand the game and play it well, taking advantage of such opportunities as are offered to them really to help the Baptists and the Pentecostals inside, but at the same time giving up little in exchange. There are others, such as the Reverend Carl McIntire, who condemn totally all official representatives of religion from the

Soviet Union as being nothing more than Communist agents. In order to get his message through, Durasoff has to deal with criticism from that side, as well as to try to overcome the sensibilities of American Christians who are inclined to be more benevolent toward the Soviets than he.

He does this in part by careful scholarship and in part by careful selection of his themes. The leaders of the AUCECB, particularly Iakov Zhidkov and his son Michael, provide an interesting example. The Zhidkov family was one of the earliest to become converted to the Baptist faith and Zhidkov himself became active in spreading it before the Revolution. During the 1930s he was apparently arrested and either imprisoned or exiled for some years before his reappearance in public in 1944, when the Baptists and other Evangelical Churches were united into the All Union Council. Michael has carried on his father's tradition and is at present one of the leaders of the Church. Durasoff presents what seems to be a sound, accurate, and understanding portrait of Zhidkov as a genuine believer who has been coerced into doing many things against the short-term interests of his faith, but perhaps at the same time helping significantly to keep it alive. Durasoff makes the Soviet exploitation of the Baptists and other religious groups for purposes of foreign propaganda very clear. He explains it as a necessary concession the religious leaders must make in order to keep their Churches alive, and indicates that in part there may be matters of genuine conviction involved also. Even in this difficult area, Durasoff succeeds in keeping his story accurate on the one hand, while not saying things that would render more difficult the continued attempts at strengthening the religious ties between the Soviet churches and those of the outside world. In sum, *The Russian Protestants* is a model of what a careful and subtle piece of propaganda should be in a context where great care is necessary and subtlety indispensable. To write such a work, an author must know his subject very well and at the same time understand the environments in which it will be read. I presume that Mr. Durasoff and his sponsors will show the same sensitivity and imagination in getting copies of this book into the right hands, East and West.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INTELLIGENCE

GESCHICHTE DES GEHEIMEN NACHRICHTENDIENSTES, LITERATURBERICHT UND BIBLIOGRAPHIE. (History of Secret Intelligence Services, A Survey of the Literature and a Bibliography.) By *Max Gunzenhäuser*, Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte. (Bernard Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt/Main, Germany, 1968. 436 pp.)

This book contains the most thorough single public catalogue of works published to date about clandestine groups and undertakings.

As yet little is known here about the author. He is termed an associate of the Library for Contemporary History, West Germany, which tries to provide guidelines for historical and contemporary topics. There is some reason to suspect, however, that Gunzenhäuser is a pseudonym for an individual or group conducting research that may be subsidized officially or quasi-officially.

The author's central thesis is that the 20th century has been the epoch of espionage, and he makes out a good case. Therefore this first¹ comprehensive bibliography of books and articles about the world of intelligence is a milestone.

Gunzenhäuser lists some 4,000 titles. The work opens with an essay of 82 pages on the bibliography that follows. The bibliography itself is divided into three parts. Part A deals with general works about espionage and military intelligence. Part B separates publications dealing with intelligence and security services under five major headings: Germany, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and other countries. Part C is organized chronologically in five phases: pre-1914, World War I, 1919-1939, World War II, and post-1945. The book also contains a valuable geographical index to states and sometimes to cities, so that materials dealing with smaller areas than the five listed in Part B are conveniently grouped for the intelligence researcher and historian. There is also a good index of authors, although Gunzenhäuser has not identified pseudonyms or provided known true names. Titles are repeated under these headings as appropriate.

¹Professor William R. Harris has prepared a bibliography entitled *Intelligence and National Security: A Bibliography with Selected Annotations*, which has appeared in multilithed form (Cambridge, Massachusetts, edition of June 1968, three volumes, xcii plus 838 pages) which has not yet been published but which is expected to appear under the imprimatur of the Harvard University Press.

All sections of the book are useful. The most valuable of these is Part C because here the author has been at pains to identify works and portions of works that deal with specific cases and agents. This section will be the most important to intelligence and counterintelligence researchers because all or almost all professional services suffer from a paucity of sound case histories.

Inevitably, and despite both gruelling effort and manifest scholarship, the book has some weaknesses. Its formalized structure, which is generally helpful, provides 25 headings in Part A, so that the placement of references becomes somewhat arbitrary. For example, pages 94-100 deal with *Feindnachrichtendienstes* (enemy intelligence services) and include articles on diverse subjects (tactical, strategic, technical intelligence). The excellence of organization in Part C does not fully compensate for the mediocrity of the index, inconveniently placed at pages 88-91. For example, a reader interested in KGB officer Conon Molodiy would not find him in the index; but if he knew that this was the Russian name of Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, he could find in the table of contents the reference to "Kroger-Lonsdale (Naval Secret Case)," which would lead him to Molodiy. To the extent that Gunzenhäuser's evaluations are qualitative, they tend to ignore bias and special interest. In addition, about nine-tenths of the books listed are in German or English. The author believes that this selection mirrors a corresponding preponderance of German, English, and American works on the subject, but readers of *Studies in Intelligence* will recall the relative recent outpouring of Slavic publications dealing with intelligence.

The dominant thesis of the book appears explicitly on pages 3 and 4: In the course of the centuries the importance of espionage has increased to avalanche proportions. . . . The 20th century could be called the Century of Espionage. . . . The founding of the OSS by the United States . . . led to a new and diabolical concept, to wit, that under some circumstances scientists could replace spies. . . . Accordingly the procurement of information has come to depend less on cloak and dagger methods and more on the systematic acquisition of data from essentially overt sources.

In the opinion of this reviewer Gunzenhäuser's concluding contention is debatable, if not wrong. The growing importance of technology in the collection and evaluation of intelligence has enhanced, not vitiated, the need for reliable human sources. Furthermore, the really new problem of the present century, which happens to be distinctively a counterintelligence problem, results from the growth of open societies.

That problem is the full reconciliation of the need for national security, and the organizations and methods required to meet the need, with the libertarian principles upon which an open society must rest.

On balance, however, the virtues of Gunzenhäuser's work considerably outweigh its shortcomings. It is the best overt bibliography on espionage and counterintelligence yet published.

CONFIDENTIAL

ESPIONAGE

WAR IN THE SHADOWS—ARAB ESPIONAGE IN ISRAEL. By *Heshayahu Levit*. In Hebrew. (Tel Aviv: Moked Publishing House, April 1969. 268 pp.)

As stated on its jacket, this book presents for the first time a history of Arab espionage in Israel from 1947 until 1969. It contains details of "the few successes and many failures of the Arab intelligence service."

As a rule, the authors of the few known books published in Hebrew dealing with intelligence are very security-conscious and refrain from disclosing any biographical data about themselves. In contrast, this publication displays on the jacket flap a picture of the author with some background information. From this we learn that the writer was born in Lithuania in 1929 and was brought to Israel as a child in 1936. He graduated from the gymnasium in Haifa and the College of Law and Economics in Tel Aviv. He served in the Israeli armed forces from 1948 to 1953. He worked as assistant editor and commentator on Arab affairs for the Army publication *Bamahane*. Since 1959 Mr. Levit has been engaged in the practice of law. Since 1963 he also has been a member of the editorial staff of the daily *Yediot Akhronot* and a contributor to the weekly supplement of the prestigious morning paper *Haaretz*. He is also editor of an Israeli Defense Department publication entitled "Concealed Records."

The author is no doubt intimately familiar with the Israeli intelligence service; however, as is usually the case with responsible Israelis, he is extremely careful not to make any unauthorized disclosures. It is quite apparent that he knows much more than he tells the reader (a good example for US writers on intelligence matters).

The writer evidently collected his material from published news reports, court records and declassified official data. When discussing some case histories he plainly states that some of the circumstances, or the names of persons involved, cannot yet be revealed.

In the preface the writer asserts that Israel is the most spied-upon country in the Near East, as it is not only the center of interest to the five Arab countries neighboring Israel, but also to the Eastern Bloc countries which "unreservedly" support the Arab cause. The many cases cited in

this book involving agents employed by all the above countries bears out this assertion.

The writer further indicates that his aim in writing the book was to increase the security consciousness of the people and to make them aware of the fact that vigilance on the part of the ordinary citizen sometimes accomplishes more than the best security man could.

The book is written in a light, entertaining tone, utilizing direct discourse, thus making the case histories sound more dramatic and enticing to the reader. Throughout the book implication is present to be drawn by the reader as to how stupid and immature the Arab intelligence services are and how clever and deft are the Israeli spy catchers. To a great extent this actually seems to be the truth.

In the 28 chapters of the book the author has compressed a multitude of case histories of Arab espionage and Israeli counter action covering roughly four periods in the Arab-Jewish struggle: 1) From shortly before the UN decision to partition Palestine into two states on 29 November 1947 to the establishment of Israel in May 1964; 2) from the 1948 War to the Sinai campaign in 1956; 3) from the victory after the second round to June 1967; 4) from the Six Day War to approximately April 1969.

Judging by the inordinately large number of cases discussed in this book, Israel can easily compare, with regard to intelligence activities, with countries many times her size.

The agents engaged in anti-Israel espionage can be divided into the following categories: 1) Jews of European or Middle Eastern origin; 2) Israeli Arabs; 3) Arabs infiltrated from the neighboring countries; 4) Non-Jewish tourists and temporary residents.

Motivation of the agents varied. Among the Arabs it was extreme nationalism, hatred of the Israeli State, pecuniary gain; among the Jews—disappointment with life in Israel and a desire to leave the country, pecuniary gains, family trouble, also idealistic reasons when engaged by a Communist country. A vivid illustration of the latter motivation is the famous case of the Austrian-born general, Israel Baer. He achieved great prominence in Israel and was finally discovered to be an agent of an "Eastern Bloc country" because he firmly believed that alliance with Communist countries is the only solution for Israel's survival. There were also agents that were forced into espionage through blackmail. Thus, the author relates the sad story of an engineer, an immigrant from an "Eastern European country," who was forced to report on Israel's industrial and military activities under threat of harm to his parents who remained behind. He finally confessed to the Israeli

authorities when his case officer demanded that he elicit information from his unwitting son, an officer in the Israeli air force.

The author attributes the poor results of Arab espionage to the following: the superior organization, training, and skill of the highly motivated Israeli security and intelligence services; the sloppy, unimaginative performance of the Arab services; and the willingness of apprehended Arab agents to "sing" and disclose all their contacts. Last, but not least, Israel had the good fortune to capture a great number of intelligence files of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian intelligence services after the wars of 1956 and 1967 which exposed their agents in Israel.


In the last chapter the author philosophizes about the goals and development of intelligence services throughout the world and in Israel. He mentions US intelligence briefly, and indicates that the CIA emphasizes intelligence gathering from open sources, employing computers and perfecting technological and electronic devices. He specifically mentions US advances in the use of satellites to photograph target areas and in perfecting audio and other surveillance devices. He believes that Israel in the seventies will also follow the general trend of utilizing electronics and technology in its intelligence activities, and that its espionage and counter-espionage services will remain superior to the Arab services.

On the whole, this is a well-written, informative book. Considering the interest Israel is evoking at the moment, it is quite likely to be translated into English.

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