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No. Pages 19 25X1

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Joint Photographic Intelligence Report

AIR-DEFENSE SYSTEM

ALBANIA

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ARMY

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
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PIC/JR-3/60

FEBRUARY 1960

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PREFACE

This joint photographic intelligence report has been prepared by the Army, Navy, and Central Intelligence Agency. It fulfills Army requirements DSRI-1-EL-12-59 and SRI 16-L-59, requesting information on the extent and capabilities of the Albanian air-defense system.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to correlate all available photography of Albania, including that of World War II, with existing [Redacted] data, collateral reports, and other existing information, in order to provide an over-all picture of the structure and capabilities of the Albanian air-defense system (ADS). This report covers three main aspects of the system: detection capabilities, communications and control, and active air-defense capabilities.

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The photography used in the report is dated from [Redacted]


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[Redacted] (All missions over the area were scanned, but the missions listed under Photo Data at the end of the report were considered the best for comparative cover.) The quality ranges from good to excellent, and all but the northeast section of the country is covered by photography taken within the last 3 years. It should be noted that no vertical photography of Albania has been taken since the end of [Redacted]. Since then, significant increases in military activity have been noted along the coastal area. It is highly probable that a similar build-up has been effected inland, but signs of this cannot be discerned on current oblique photography.

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
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None of the above-listed radar installations has been identified on aerial photography. Four possible EW sites have been located, two at Sazan and one each at Voskopoje (near Korce) and Vlone, but despite the size and complexity of Token or other sophisticated installations, no positive identification could be made. To date, therefore, no report locating EW radar sites in Albania can be confirmed from existing aerial photography.

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III. COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL

It seems likely that communications in the Albanian ADS are effected primarily by a wire net with a radiobackup, as in some other Soviet Satellites. The fact that no significant radio installations outside Tirane have been located on aerial photography indicates that communications within the ADS can be handled by small, unsophisticated voice or CW facilities utilizing whip or long-wire antennas which are invisible on the photography. There is a possibility that commercial facilities, such as those at Tirane, Shkoder, Durres, Vlone, Sarande, and Korce, could be tied into the ADS in times of emergency.

At Tirane, according to collateral sources, the ADS headquarters is located in a newly constructed military area containing a signal-battalion headquarters, which is probably staffed by the signal unit, and a small radio

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station. (Note: Several possible areas have been found on the photography, but no definite conclusions as to which is the ADS headquarters could be drawn.) In addition, the newly constructed Radio Tirane, 4.5 miles north-northwest of Tirane, may be capable of supplementing the ADS.

IV. ACTIVE AIR-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Capabilities for active air defense are provided by conventional anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and DP positions; many of which are radar-controlled, and fighter-interceptor aircraft. AAA, mostly radar-controlled, has been located on photography at Durres, Tirane, Berat-Kucove, Vlone, Sazan Island, Karaburun Peninsula, and Sarande. In addition, DP CD-AA positions are located at Shengjin, Durres, Sazan Island, Karaburun Peninsula, Himare, and Sarande. All these positions, the majority of which appear to be radar-controlled, are shown on specific location maps, Figures 2 through 8. Figure 1 is a key to these maps. It is significant that these sites have been constructed and/or improved recently, some of them within the past year. If collateral reports of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles are true, the improved CD positions constitute possible locations for these missiles. This possibility, however, has not been confirmed from the photography.

Latest air OB studies indicate the presence of two active Fagot-Fresco regiments, each consisting of 20 aircraft, stationed at the Berat-Kucove Airfield, and a cadre Frank (Yak-9) regiment, consisting of 10 aircraft, at Tirane Airfield. [redacted] third active Fagot-Fresco regiment at Preza Airfield. Aerial photography shows only four concrete-surfaced airfields in Albania, at Tirane, Preza, Vlone, and Berat-Kucove. Only Preza and Berat-Kucove appear to be capable of handling modern jet aircraft, and only Preza, with its 9,200-foot runway, is capable of handling multiengine jets. Aerial photography cannot confirm either the Frank regiment at Tirane or the Fagot-Fresco regiment at Preza. Thirteen Fagot-Fresco aircraft were located at Berat-Kucove Airfield on [redacted] and one transport aircraft each at the Preza and Tirane airfields.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

The most significant facet of the Albanian ADS is the apparent lack of emphasis placed on it by the USSR. While the photography cannot confirm the existence or location of the relatively few reported EW radar sites, the seeming absence of an active deterrent capability, other than that provided by conventional AAA, indicates that Albania has no extensive over-all air-defense system. (The table lists the locations of the possible and probable EW radar sites and the radar-controlled AAA positions which have been located from aerial photography.)

Active AA measures, utilizing conventional AA-DP weapons, appear to be adequate in individual locations but of no value in an area defense. The capital, Tirane, with eight visible, occupied, radar-controlled AA positions, and the Vlone-Karaburun area are the only two locations in Albania which appear to have an established area-defense system. The number of fighter-interceptor aircraft observed to date does not approach the reported number and could probably offer only token resistance to hostile aircraft. As stated previously, the probability of a build-up inland, comparable to that along the coastal areas, should not be discounted.

Photographic Radar Order of Battle

<u>Location</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
Tirane (Fig. 2)	GCA radar (probable)	41°23'20"N/19°45'40"E
	Fire-control radar	41°21'20"N/19°42'40"E
	Fire-control radar	41°18'25"N/19°43'40"E
	Fire-control radar	41°21'30"N/19°46'30"E
	Fire-control radar	41°17'50"N/19°48'35"E
	Fire-control radar	41°19'50"N/19°47'35"E
	Fire-control radar	41°21'20"N/19°50'40"E
	Fire-control radar (possible)	41°20'40"N/19°51'10"E
	Fire-control radar (probable)	41°17'25"N/19°52'06"E

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
Durrës Area, North (Fig. 3)	Fire-control radar (possible)	41°19'40"N/19°25'30"E
	Fire-control radar	41°19'05"N/19°27'35"E
	Fire-control radar	41°19'05"N/19°26'05"E
	Fire-control radar	41°18'50"N/19°26'25"E
	Fire-control radar	41°24'00"N/19°23'45"E
Durrës Area, South (Fig. 4)	Fire-control radar	41°14'00"N/19°31'30"E
Vlone Area (Fig. 5)	EW radar (possible)	40°20'07"N/19°22'28"E
	Fire-control radar	40°25'30"N/19°17'30"E
	Fire-control radar	40°22'50"N/19°21'40"E
	Fire-control radar	40°19'50"N/19°24'10"E
	Fire-control radar	40°19'40"N/19°21'10"E
	Fire-control radar	40°28'05"N/19°29'45"E
	Fire-control radar	40°28'48"N/19°28'48"E
Sazan Island (Fig. 6)	EW radar (possible)	40°30'19"N/19°16'15"E
	EW radar (possible)	40°29'52"N/19°16'33"E
	Fire-control radar	40°29'05"N/19°16'40"E
	Fire-control radar	40°28'55"N/19°17'00"E
	Fire-control radar	40°30'35"N/19°16'10"E
Sarandë (Fig. 7)	Fire-control radar (possible)	39°53'36"N/19°59'00"E
Berat-Kucove Area (Fig. 8)	Fire-control radar	40°49'55"N/19°53'05"E
	Fire-control radar	40°48'40"N/19°53'10"E
	Fire-control radar	40°48'20"N/19°55'40"E
Cape Rodonit (Fig. 9)	Fire-control radar	41°35'00"N/19°27'00"E
Skele Semanit (Fig. 9)	Fire-control radar	40°47'00"N/19°21'20"E
Voskopoje (Fig. 9)	EW radar (possible)	40°39'20"N/20°36'45"E

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


FIGURE 1. KEY TO SPECIFIC LOCATION MAPS

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


FIGURE 2. TIRANE

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


FIGURE 3. DURRES AREA, NORTH

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


FIGURE 4. DURRES AREA, SOUTH




FIGURE 5. VLONE AREA

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


FIGURE 6. SAZAN ISLAND

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


FIGURE 7. SARANDE

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


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NOTE: ⚡ INDICATES RADAR CONTROL

FIGURE 8. BERAT-KUCOVE AREA

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


FIGURE 9. RADAR NOT SHOWN ON OTHER MAPS

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