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| KIQ Strategy Report (#48) | | | |
| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. | | | DATE |
| NIO/SSEA x6295 | | | 20 Nov |

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Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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(Security Classification)

November 20, 1975

KIQ 40

(FINAL)

FY 76 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 48: *What indications are there of internal and regional instability in South Asia?*

Pay special attention to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the roles of the USSR, China and Iran in the area.

I. COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION NEEDS

The principal areas on which reporting and analysis are required during the fiscal year are:

Target A: Information on the role, objectives, and prospects of the USSR, China, and Iran in South Asia. (Although KIQ #3 and KIQ #38 address the issue of Soviet and Chinese policies and activities in the South Asian area, this subject is also treated under this KIQ insofar as it relates to the stability or instability of South Asia.)

Target B: Information on regional developments in South Asia and their implications for the US; specifically India-Pakistan relations, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, Indian actions in the wake of the changes of government in Bangladesh, and regional reactions to US activities in the Indian Ocean.

Target C: Future nuclear plans of India and Pakistan and their implications for the US. (Although this subject is treated in part in KIQ #62 on nuclear proliferation, it is also included

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here since it clearly has a potential for causing instability in South Asia.)

Target D: Domestic political developments which may affect the internal stability of the nations of South Asia -- particularly India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh -- and their implications for the US.

Target E: Information on changes in the conventional military capabilities of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan as they relate to the regional disputes of the area, as well as foreign military assistance to these nations.

Target F: Economic conditions and trends in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and their implications for the US, including likely demands on the US for increased assistance.

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
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B. Production. Much of the production of intelligence on South Asia will be responsive in nature, and will be handled in the regular production vehicles of the respective intelligence producers. Beyond this, the intelligence community commits itself to the following national level intelligence products during FY 1976:

1. At least one assessment of India's political situation and prospects.
2. At least one assessment of the prospects for stability in South Asia.
3. At least two assessments of the military balance in South Asia.
4. A revision of "The South Asian Military Handbook".
5. At least one assessment of the role and objectives of outside powers in South Asia.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

The intelligence community reiterates the recommendation made in the FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Report that immediate consideration be given to creating a Defense Attache Office in Dacca. The absence of a DAO in the US Mission in Bangladesh continues to limit out intelligence coverage of military developments in that country. The need for such coverage has become even more critical with the increased role assumed by the military in recent months.