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23 April 1959

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . Page 1

The USSR is stepping up its effort to soften the Western position and set the stage for its own proposals at the forthcoming East-West negotiations. Moscow has charged in notes to Washington and Bonn that measures to equip West German forces with nuclear weapons are designed to confront the "conferences" with a fait accompli. The notes are aimed at placing the USSR in a position to blame the West for any failure of the talks and to claim that such failure would give Moscow no choice but to proceed with unilateral actions regarding Berlin and a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Moscow will probably use the 27 April conference of ministers of the Warsaw Pact and Communist China to demonstrate bloc strength and solidarity.

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MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . Page 4

Additional Communist-sponsored mass demonstrations in Iraq are maintaining the momentum of the local Communist effort toward full control of the country. There are persistent reports that avowed Communists will soon join the Iraqi cabinet. Additional anti-Communists have gone into exile or have been arrested. The Imam of Yemen is undergoing medical treatment in Italy; Crown Prince Badr is taking special security measures to prevent the overthrow of his regency. The persistence of tension and disagreement within the top army council which governs the Sudan appears to make further government changes almost inevitable.

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TIBET SITUATION . . . . . Page 7

Chou En-lai says that Tibet now is completely under Chinese control but that mopping-up operations continue. Peiping has abandoned its reticence to attack India directly and has accused "Indian officials" of abetting "vicious attacks on China." Nehru has criticized the Chinese as "brutal" and believes that Peiping's Tibetan policy has failed--with a profound effect on Indian and

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**PART I (continued)**

Asian opinion--but is unwilling to support the Dalai Lama's goal of Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama [redacted] is determined to establish a free Tibetan government and work for Tibetan independence, even if this means he must seek asylum outside India. [redacted]

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**PART II**

**NOTES AND COMMENTS**

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**KHRUSHCHEV REACHES SIXTY-FIVE . . . . . Page 2**

Praise for Khrushchev in a greeting sent him by the party presidium on his 65th birthday is reminiscent of the "cult of personality" adulation which surrounded Stalin. The Soviet premier apparently was not in good health during his visit to East Germany last month. [redacted]

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**KHRUSHCHEV LIEUTENANT APPARENTLY DEMOTED . . . . . Page 3**

Khrushchev appears to be carrying his quiet shake-up of Soviet officialdom into the highest levels of the party. Nikolay Ignatov, who had become a member of both the party presidium and secretariat since Khrushchev's rise to power, has been given the relatively inconsequential job of titular president of the Russian Republic, probably signifying a sharp setback in his high party career. This move follows closely the demotion of several high-ranking officials, including Soviet planning boss Iosif Kuzmin. [redacted]

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**PART II (continued)**

**PEIPING'S NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS . . . . . Page 4**

The Second National People's Congress and Peiping's new budget for 1959 have reaffirmed Communist China's intentions to continue the "leap forward" in economic development and social reorganization. Chou En-lai's foreign policy statements were moderate in tone but showed no yielding on substantive issues. The congress was presented with a picture of a booming economy, which had scored unprecedented advances last year and was bound to make bigger and better gains this year.

[Redacted]

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**NORTH KOREAN - JAPANESE REPATRIATION TALKS . . . . . Page 5**

Representatives of the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross societies have been engaged in talks since 13 April at Geneva on the Japanese plan to repatriate Koreans in Japan to North Korea. The major problem is to negotiate a formula which will overcome North Korean objections to screening repatriates to make sure they are returning of their own free will. The Kishi government has asserted that Koreans will not be sent back involuntarily.

[Redacted]

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**SOVIET TACTICS TOWARD JAPAN . . . . . Page 7**

The USSR is carrying on a campaign to convince the Japanese that a "neutral" policy would bring Tokyo substantial trade and fishing benefits and greater security against the threat of nuclear war. In a letter replying to questions by a Japanese newsman on 20 April, Khrushchev reiterated previous proposals for a denuclearized zone in the Far East and offered to "guarantee" Japan's neutrality. At the same time Ambassador Fedorenko, with an eye on the important elections impending in Japan, has energetically propagandized for Japanese neutrality in speeches throughout the country. The Kishi government does not intend at present to answer the Soviet proposals.

[Redacted]

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**TITO PREPARES FOR LONG SIEGE IN DISPUTE WITH BLOC . . . . . Page 8**

Yugoslavia is digging in for a long struggle with the bloc. Now that the opposing ideological positions have crystallized, Tito sees in the controversy many of the same irreconcilable differences and Stalinist methods that characterized the 1948 dispute. Belgrade is taking the initiative more frequently, and Tito is attempting to use the dispute to restore flagging party unity and enthusiasm. Tito has recently laid out the future course of the party, confidently assuring its members that their struggle with the bloc "will be recorded in history as a shining example of the party's obligations toward its own people and the international labor movement."

[Redacted]

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**PART II (continued)**

**OPENING OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT . . . . . Page 9**

French Premier Debré's government will face the test of parliamentary responsibility for the first time since De Gaulle came to power when the spring legislative session convenes on 28 April. Despite Debré's efforts to avert a strong resolution on Algerian integration, deputies from Algeria may force the issue by arguing that the current municipal elections there show the necessity for integration. Parliament is also expected to give Debré trouble on the economic austerity program. De Gaulle, however, has threatened to dissolve Parliament if it tries to reassert its previous dominant role.

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**BELGIAN POLITICAL CRISIS . . . . . Page 10**

King Baudouin last week took the unusual step of vetoing the Belgian cabinet's nominee for new governor general of the Congo. This move has undermined the prestige of generally progressive Congo Minister Maurice Van Hemelrijk and increased the problems of the Eyskens government in carrying out the policy announced last January for increasing the territory's autonomy by definite stages. The veto may also revive latent hostility toward the monarchy which has been dormant since King Leopold abdicated in 1950 because of his World War II record.

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**THE EUROPEAN COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY . . . . . Page 11**

A major test of the supranational powers of the Coal-Steel Community (CSC) may occur at the meeting of its council of government representatives on 4 May. In an effort to alleviate the present coal glut, the CSC High Authority--the executive body staffed by international civil servants--is determined to press for production quotas effective throughout the six-nation community, a plan which the council may reject. Defeat of the High Authority would be a blow to the prestige of the EURATOM and Common Market commissions and would encourage those critics who want to revise the CSC treaty.

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**RIGHTIST REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAK IN BOLIVIA . . . . . Page 13**

The revolutionary attempt on 19 April by Bolivia's perennially plotting rightists apparently was prompted by the division of the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement over the protracted economic crisis. The critical economic situation is likely to continue generating tensions which may be reflected in sudden new outbreaks of violence by either rightist or leftist elements. However, the government's swift defeat of the rebels and its declaration of a state of siege may enhance its prestige and improve its control of subversion.

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**PART II (continued)**

**NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE FORMED SOON IN NEPAL . . . . . Page 13**

Nepal's first government under the constitution proclaimed in February will be formed by the left-of-center Nepali Congress party, which won a two-thirds majority in the recently completed parliamentary elections. The new government, maintaining a close relationship with New Delhi, is likely to pursue modified socialist policies internally and to take a neutralist position in foreign affairs. [redacted]

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**INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY LOSES POPULAR SUPPORT . . . . . Page 14**

Prime Minister Nehru's Congress party apparently is losing popular support, despite the major economic advances India has achieved since 1951 under Congress leadership of its First and Second Five-Year Plans. Recent municipal elections in various parts of the country have shown a strong trend away from the party, notably in Madras and Punjab states, where the Congress party made a good showing in the national elections of 1957. [redacted]

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**INDONESIA . . . . . Page 16**

President Sukarno's departure on a two-month world tour has given rise to new rumors of political changes and maneuvers which would take advantage of his absence. Should significant opposition develop to Sukarno's call for readoption of the 1945 constitution, Sukarno with the army's backing may impose the constitution by executive decree. Meanwhile, Indonesian negotiations for Sino-Soviet bloc military and economic aid continue. [redacted]

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**PART II (continued)**



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**PART III**

**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES**


**SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-INCLINED PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA . . . . . Page 1**

Socialism has considerable appeal in Latin America, where widely supported national parties have made pro-labor legislation and extensive state participation in the economy a major part of their programs. In five countries, national revolutionary parties have gained the allegiance of almost all elements which the Communists seek to cultivate, and most of them have acquired a decided anti-Communist orientation.



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**CHANGES IN THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS . . . . . Page 9**

During the past six years the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been refurbished into a more effective agency for extending Soviet influence throughout the world. A drastic reshuffling of ministerial personnel has been carried out by the regime, and a large number of former high-level party and government careerists from other departments assigned to leading posts within the ministry. Efforts have also been made to expand diplomatic relations. Unlike his two predecessors, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko is a foreign policy technician rather than a policy maker. He is not a member of the party presidium and has apparently stayed aloof from factional politics.



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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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## EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS

Moscow is stepping up its effort both publicly and privately to soften the Western position and set the stage for its proposals at the forthcoming East-West negotiations. In similar notes to Washington and Bonn on 21 April, the Kremlin charged that measures to equip West German forces with nuclear weapons are designed to confront the "conferences" with a fait accompli. By focusing attention on this controversial issue, the Soviet leaders are seeking to sharpen differences among the Western Allies on the eve of the 11 May foreign ministers' conference.

The warning that negotiations will be doomed to failure if Bonn persists in its rearmament program is another step in Moscow's effort to establish in advance the rationale and justification for unilateral actions regarding Berlin and a separate peace treaty with East Germany in the event the talks fail.

Recent private statements by Soviet officials reflect the Kremlin leaders' continuing determination to gain Western acceptance of a summit conference regardless of the outcome of the foreign ministers' meeting.

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The Soviet counselor in Paris told an American official on 20 April that one possible solution of the Berlin problem would be to reaffirm the rights of the three Western powers to remain in West Berlin but to withdraw all foreign troops from the city or reduce them to token forces. Under this formula, the East Germans would exercise physical control of access routes, in accordance with a four-power guarantee of free access. This same Soviet diplomat made similar suggestions to French and American officials in January and February in which he minimized the changes that would occur after the USSR withdraws from East Berlin and implied that East German controls would not be far-reaching. He told an American official on 27 January that the Western powers could keep their troops in Berlin under an international control commission.

The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn attributed Adenauer's decision to seek the presidency to the chancellor's conviction that he could no longer impose his "inelastic" policy on his Western allies. This interpretation and the official's allusion to a relationship between Ger-

man Foreign Minister Brentano's return from Washington and Adenauer's decision to resign the chancellorship suggest Soviet confidence that the Western powers, under pressure of public opinion, will move toward an accommodation with Moscow on Berlin and Germany.

The announcement of Vice President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the USSR, according to the Soviet press, has been favorably received in the USSR. TASS commented that leading circles in the Soviet Union expect the visit to serve the further development of personal contacts between government heads and improve US-Soviet understanding.

Moscow has resumed propaganda attacks on the high-altitude American flights in the Berlin air corridor, calling them deliberately provocative violations of flight regulations and "blackmail aimed at aggravating the international situation" on the eve of the foreign ministers' conference. Pravda added that such acts will not be permitted to go unpunished.

In line with the Kremlin's professed desire to create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations, Soviet propaganda had refrained from exploiting the air corridor incidents in the two-week period following the Soviet note of protest of 4 April. The resumption of propaganda attacks and Pravda's implied warning constitute an attempt by Moscow to use this issue to exploit differences among the Western powers and may indicate an intention to claim credit if the flights are discontinued.

The USSR has announced that the foreign ministers of

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the Warsaw Pact powers and Communist China will meet in Warsaw on 27 April to review questions to be discussed at the East-West foreign ministers' conference. Moscow will probably use the conference to demonstrate bloc strength and solidarity with the aim of bolstering the Soviet position at the 11 May Geneva conference.

Nuclear Test-Cessation Talks

Moscow apparently wishes to avoid any developments in the nuclear test-cessation talks in Geneva which might affect adversely the Soviet posture of seeking to create a favorable atmosphere for forthcoming negotiations on the Berlin-German problem. The American chief delegate believes the Soviet delegation is attempting to create the impression of progress in the negotiations by gradual acceptance of noncontroversial articles introduced by the United States and Britain, while carefully skirting all the difficult issues. The conference now has agreed to ten draft articles and a draft preamble.

Moscow probably believes it can avoid detailed discussion of the American plan for an agreement limited to atmospheric and underwater tests, unequivocal rejection of which would detract from the Soviet posture of desiring compromise on East-West issues.

East Germany

Speaking to the East German parliament on 16 April, Premier Grotewohl categorically rejected any solution of the Berlin problem which would include East Berlin in a free city under international control. In line with previous Soviet and East German

official statements, he said acceptance of such proposals would violate the "sovereignty" of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Grotewohl's announcement that the GDR "representatives" at the foreign ministers' meeting in Geneva will include Foreign Minister Bolz is clearly intended to support the East German claim to full and equal participation in the conference. The large size and high level of the 50-man delegation which will reportedly accompany Bolz--including Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and Peter Florin, head of the party central committee's foreign policy department--underline the puppet regime's attempt to present an appearance of "sovereignty" at the meeting.

On 17 April the GDR Ministry of Transport requested its West German counterpart to authorize the transit of an East German train, presumably to carry its delegation to Geneva at the beginning and end of the conference. The East Germans also requested overflight rights for one GDR plane to fly daily between Geneva and Berlin-Schoenefeld airport during the conference. In conformity with quadripartite views on the matter, the West German Transport Ministry has approved both requests. The West Germans also intend to inform the East German airline, Interflug, that the Federal Republic will ask the three Allied powers for permission to authorize East German planes to fly the Berlin air corridor in view of the special circumstances.

Public criticism of the Soviet proposal to finalize the Oder-Neisse frontier has persisted in East Germany, both by the general public and party members.

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Britain

In the interest of achieving Western harmony, Britain is endeavoring to soften the clash between its own position and those of its allies. In the working group discussions in London, the British have sought principally to keep open the way for a pilot inspection plan in central Europe. British ideas on the controversial special security zone nevertheless remain unclear--presumably to allow for maximum Western flexibility in East-West negotiations.

West Berlin

Mayor Willy Brandt has informed American officials that he is satisfied with the general situation in West Berlin. He said that unemployment is considerably lower than last year

and that there has been no significant removal of people, capital, or industry from the city. He emphasized that morale is primarily dependent on belief in US firmness in retaining garrisons and free access, by force if necessary.

Adenauer's decision to run for president has had no visible effect on Berlin morale. Most Berliners doubt there will be any changes in Bonn's foreign policy, and some regard an anticipated introduction of "tactical flexibility" as a "positive" development. Berlin's political leaders do not expect Adenauer's successors to do less for Berlin than the chancellor--an attitude which reflects their belief that US policy is the determining factor in Berlin's future.

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**MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS**Iraq

Additional Communist-sponsored mass demonstrations are maintaining the momentum of the Iraqi Communist effort toward full control of the country. The end of the Peace Partisans meetings in Baghdad last week was marked by a well-controlled parade of an estimated half-million marchers, and another series of mass rallies in Baghdad and other centers has been called for 24 April to commemorate the "struggle against im-

perialism." These demonstrations are being organized in the first instance by the Communist-directed youth organizations, but the usual swarm of labor, women's, writers', and other groups is taking part.

The demonstrations are physically managed by individual organizers, each of whom directs a special segment of the marchers, while traffic and general crowd control is being handled largely by the Communist-dominated Poplar Resistance Force. The regular police and the army seem

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in many cases to have abdicated internal security functions.

Should these demonstrations result in any attacks on Westerners or their property, the action would almost certainly be deliberate on the part of the demonstrations' organizers rather than a by-product of excessive enthusiasm.

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Reports persist that a cabinet shake-up is imminent, involving both the replacement of some ministers and the appointment of new ones.

[Redacted]  
One of the prospective casualties is said to be Finance Minister Hadid, an intellectual Marxist but also a wealthy industrialist who has been at odds with Economics Minister Kubba, the cabinet's outstanding pro-Communist.

Another pro-Communist, Health Minister Shawwaf, announced last week that the USSR, rather than Western Europe, will henceforth be the locale for special medical treatment for Iraqis, and that private hospitals and clinics in Iraq will be nationalized. An American mission hospital was taken over some time ago by the government.

Baghdad has announced that Kamal Chadirchi, leader of the left-wing National Democratic party and until recently Prime Minister Qasim's principal civilian political adviser, will go to Moscow for medical treatment. 25X1

[Redacted]  
Chadirchi's departure from Iraq, for whatever reason, will remove the only non-Communist influence ever known to have really had Qasim's ear. 25X1

UAR-USSR

Nasir's latest propaganda attacks have continued to stress the anti-Communist theme rather than hit Qasim directly, and UAR propaganda officials now are seeking "hard" anti-Communist materials to use in their campaign.

Arab Petroleum Congress

No surprises thus far have come out of the Cairo-sponsored First Arab Petroleum Congress which began on 16 April. Most

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of the Arab papers presented have been versions of earlier proposals. Lebanon's Emil Bustani, for example, again submitted his plan for the oil-producing Arab countries to set aside 5 percent of their profits for the benefit of the "have-not" states. Besides Lebanon, the "have-nots" include the UAR and Jordan. Although Bustani claimed to have the support of Kuwait, the response to his speech was not warm.

A UAR delegate apparently made the only "political" speech aimed at the United States and charging Washington with trying to control the Middle East because of American oil companies. Other UAR addresses were noteworthy for their lack of recrimination and fairly businesslike character.

A mild stir and some concern was generated by Frank Hendrix, an American who is Saudi Arabia's top legal adviser on oil matters. Hendrix sought to lay a legal foundation for unilateral Arab modification or elimination of existing petroleum concession agreements. The presentation of his thesis, which was quickly challenged by both Arab and oil-company officials, appeared to be largely a Saudi skirmish with the Arabian-American Oil Company and was generally unwelcome to the congress as a whole.

Saudi Arabia's energetic director of Petroleum affairs, Abdulla Tariki, and Venezuela's minister of mines and hydrocarbons, Dr. Juan Pablo Perez Al-

fonzo, appear to have dominated the congress. Tariki pressed hard for a new, Arab-owned pipeline which would carry Persian Gulf oil, probably excepting Iraq and Iraq, to the Mediterranean by a route largely paralleling the existing Tapline. Tariki publicly agreed that there were "grounds" for an oil price and production agreement between the Middle East and Venezuela but did not think action could be taken during the congress.

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Yemen

The Imam of Yemen has arrived in Rome and is under treatment by Italian doctors for his various ailments,

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[redacted] Crown Prince Badr, who has been left in charge of the Yemeni Government as chairman of a four- or five-man council, has taken a number of unusual security precautions.

Considerable maneuvering almost certainly will develop in Yemen in the Imam's absence. A previous report that tribal leaders opposed to Badr had pledged that they would remain quiet has been denied, and unless the crown prince moves cautiously he could be faced with a revolt. In what may be an effort to reduce foreign influences--both Western and Soviet--the Yemeni Government reportedly intends to close diplomatic and consular establishments in Sana and Taiz and conduct all relations in Cairo. The long-dormant United Arab State--the year-old union of Yemen and the UAR--presumably would be used

as the technical vehicle to justify this move.

Sudan

Persistence of tension and disagreement within the top army council which governs the Sudan appear to make further government changes almost inevitable. Premier Abboud is again reported preparing to retire from the scene in the face of the restlessness of junior officers whose spokesman is the leader of the "semicoup" last March, Brigadier Shannan.

A Soviet economic delegation left Khartoum on 16 April without reaching any major agreements despite two months of negotiations. The Soviet delegation refused to deviate from the established pattern of Soviet aid programs, which the Sudanese rejected because of concern over the presence of bloc personnel in the Sudan. [redacted]

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## TIBET SITUATION

Premier Chou En-lai told the National People's Congress in Peiping that Tibet now is completely under Chinese control. He admitted, however, that mopping-up operations were continuing in "remote" areas. Peiping later reported that Chinese forces control the whole Tibetan frontier north of the Himalayas.

The Peiping press on 23 April dropped its reticence to attack New Delhi directly and accused "Indian officials" of abetting "vicious attacks on China" by releasing the Dalai Lama's first statement denying he had been abducted from Tibet.

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Although embarrassed and undoubtedly bitter over Nehru's sympathy for the Dalai Lama, the Chinese have so far avoided formal actions or statements which would further antagonize the Indians and to which Nehru would be forced to respond on a government-to-government basis. Chou En-lai, speaking before the congress, had toned down earlier charges that Kalimpong in India's West Bengal State was the Tibetan rebels' command center. He also hailed 2,000 years of friendship with India and said there was no reason why such friendship should be shaken by a "handful" of rebels.

free to conduct religious activities, but "political activities are not carried on from one country against another." 25X1



Nehru probably will put considerable pressure on the Dalai Lama to prevent him from carrying out political activities from within India, and is likely to ask him to seek asylum elsewhere if he persists in his present plans.

High-level committees are being set up in India and elsewhere to handle the expected flow of Tibetan refugees. Although insignificant thus far, the exodus probably will increase and pose further problems.

The Chinese Nationalists may become more determined than ever to demonstrate their ability to play an active role in the Tibetan revolt as a result of the Dalai Lama's failure to mention Nationalist China in his 18 April press statement or to respond to Chiang Kai-shek's offer of future "self-determination." Any increased support for the Tibetan revolt, however, would probably be limited primarily to a step-up in Nationalist propaganda efforts against the mainland, such as a resumption of leaflet air drops. 25X1

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Nehru is convinced Peiping will not reverse its policy of total repression in Tibet, and he believes the eventual return of the Dalai Lama is out of the question.

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India will try to keep the Dalai Lama relatively quiet. Nehru again told Parliament on 20 April that the Dalai Lama is

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
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**KHRUSHCHEV REACHES SIXTY-FIVE**

Khrushchev's 65th birthday on 17 April coincided with an unprecedented volume of reports and speculation on the state of his health, and with striking evidence that adulation of Khrushchev is beginning to resemble closely "the cult of personality" which surrounded Stalin.



ently also took time off for about two weeks in January of this year. A pattern seems to be developing of longer, more frequent and probably quieter, more restful vacations.

Khrushchev leadership aura was advanced markedly on 19 April when the Soviet press published an unprecedented birthday greeting sent to him by the party presidium. Soviet leaders'

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KHRUSHCHEV

65th birthdays are not normally noted with party greetings. Some of the words chosen for the congratulatory message were last used to describe Stalin at the height of the "cult of personality" period. The message was signed by all full and candidate members of the presidium except M. G. Pervukhin, ambassador to East Germany--probably signifying that he is no longer a candidate member.

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The presidium members called Khrushchev "elder comrade and friend" who "dedicates all your seething energy, wealth of political experience, wisdom, and daring initiative to the building of Communism and the consolidation of the might of the Soviet state...." They credited to Khrushchev's initiative and direction the major political and economic innovations taken by the central committee in recent years and acknowledged

Khrushchev has been on vacation, first in Sochi and later in Yalta, since about 25 March. Late last summer and early in the fall he was on vacation for six weeks; he appar-

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"the farsighted, flexible, and principled Soviet foreign policy, to which you dedicate so much energy and skill."

Perhaps for the benefit of the Chinese Communists, Khrushchev's speeches and re-

ports were credited with "displaying models of creative enrichment of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, especially on questions of building socialism and Communism." [redacted]

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**KHRUSHCHEV LIEUTENANT APPARENTLY DEMOTED**

The "election" on 16 April of Nikolay Ignatov, a member of both the party presidium and secretariat, as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) appears to be part of a general shake-up of Soviet party and government officials which has been going on for several months. Since last December, a number of high-ranking figures have lost their jobs. These include party and government leaders in the Turkmen, Uzbek, and Belorussian republics and Moscow Oblast, as well as Soviet planning chief Iosif Kuzmin.



IGNATOV

In "proposing" Ignatov for a heretofore largely ceremonial and politically insignificant post, party secretary and cadre specialist Averky Aristov stressed the "great tasks which the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR is called on to decide" and stated that the party central committee had recognized that it is "necessary for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to be headed by a member of the presidium of the Soviet party central committee." Ignatov thus appears certain to remain on the party presidium but will probably be released from the secretariat,

since his new post is a full-time job.

Aristov's remarks suggest some increase in the responsibilities of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. In addition, Ignatov will probably be called on to represent the Soviet Union in place of ailing President Voroshilov, and he will be in line to succeed Voroshilov when the latter dies or has to retire. Even so, Ignatov's new responsibilities do not appear commensurate with those he enjoyed as party secretary, and he has probably suffered a political reverse.

Ignatov, now 58, had held high party posts for many years. He did not enter the highest levels of the hierarchy until after Khrushchev's rise to power, however. He

was made a member of the party presidium in June 1957, following the ouster of the "antiparty" group, and was brought into the secretariat from an important provincial party post in December 1957. He apparently has been party secretary responsible for agriculture.

There had been no previous indications of a decline in Ignatov's standing, [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

There has been no indication of a new assignment for

Mikhail Tarasov, Ignatov's predecessor as RSFSR Presidium chairman and a candidate member of the party central committee.

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**PEIPING'S NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS**

Communist China's Second National People's Congress--which opened in Peiping on 18 April and is scheduled to meet for ten days--has heard a re-statement of current policy in the major report by Premier Chou En-lai and economic and budget plans for 1959. Chou's 30,000-word report reaffirms Peiping's intentions to continue its "leap forward" in economic development and social reorganization and moderates the tone of Peiping's foreign policy statements. The "election" of the new government--including Mao Tse-tung's successor--will probably not take place until the closing sessions of the congress. Mao, meanwhile, is receiving homage as the guiding spirit of the regime's past and present programs.

Foreign Relations

On the subject of China's foreign relations, Chou's grand display of forbearance--a sharp contrast with statements in 1958--was clearly intended to dispel the notion in the bloc as well as the West that the Chinese Communists are Stalinists of the East. He hoped the peace area "already formed" in Southeast Asia would last "forever" and noted that despite forays into China by Burma-based Nationalist irregulars, Peiping has done no more than guard the frontier and "remain patient," waiting for "friendly" Burma to handle the situation on its own. Chou's effort to quiet international

criticism of restrictions on freedom in China included a call for "hundred flowers" in science and art, but he added the significant qualification that the policy must "serve socialism."

Chou's moderate tone reflects no yielding on substantive issues dividing Communist China and the West. He applied to all countries a principle which recently appeared in Peiping's propaganda on Japan--that is, "so-called" diplomatic relations with Taipei must be severed before formal relations with Communist China can be established. He made it clear Peiping continues to regard the United States as its major enemy, citing a belligerent statement of Mao that "the enemy rots with each passing day."

Turning to Tibet, Chou told the congress that the area now is completely under Peiping's control but admitted that mopping-up operations were continuing in "remote" regions.

The Economy

The congress was presented with a picture of a booming economy, which had scored unprecedented advances last year and was bound to make bigger and better gains this year. The 1959 plan gives every indication of having been based on Peiping's questionable 1958 production claims. It is described as "both

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grand and arduous" but entirely capable of being fulfilled. It retains the high targets for steel, coal, food grains, and cotton first advanced last December and schedules an increase in total value of industrial and agricultural output larger in absolute terms than last year's.

Speakers at the congress have cautioned that many important materials, energy sources, and transport lag behind the demand, and that, despite the fact that efforts this year are to be concentrated on these shortages, it is impossible to bring about a quick and radical change.

Chou En-lai, directing his remarks to one extreme of party opinion, argues that it is "quite impractical" to expect that the percentage increase in output must be higher in each succeeding year. He warned that in the course of continuous leaps forward there might even be decreases in production, particularly in agriculture. He insisted, as far as the 1959 plan is concerned, that if every worker, peasant, and intellectual is mobilized "ideologically and politically," the 1959 plan will "certainly be fulfilled."

The 1959 budget, described as "bold and well founded" by Finance Minister Li Hsien-nien, schedules expenditures and revenues balanced at a record \$21.4 billion. Even so the increases do not appear to reflect fully the levels of production and construction said to have been achieved last year. Li said that most of the 24-percent increase in revenues would come out of increased profits and taxes on state enterprises. They will account for almost 90 percent of revenues this year.

Budget spending will go up 27 percent. Direct allocations for defense are to increase by only 16 percent but constitute 11.2 percent of total expenditures, the smallest percentage since the Chinese Communists came to power. Additional spending on defense is of course hidden in other budget categories. The largest increases in spending will be a 26-percent rise in construction investment, a near doubling of the budget outlay for bank credits, and an increase of more than 200 percent in allocations for foreign aid. The budget also sets aside some \$400,000,000 for investment in communes with "poorer economic conditions."

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**NORTH KOREAN - JAPANESE REPATRIATION TALKS**

Representatives of the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross societies have been engaged in talks since 13 April on the Japanese plan to repatriate Koreans in Japan to North Korea.

The Japanese Government on 13 February announced its decision to act on the

repatriation question, in response to mounting domestic political pressure and in view of lack of progress in normalizing relations with South Korea. Some 117,000 of the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan subsequently signed petitions stating their desire to go to North Korea, but the majority of signatures were apparently obtained by leftist coercion.

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The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), wary of Japan's initial proposal that the ICRC screen the Korean residents to confirm their wishes, invited representatives of the Japanese and North Korean societies to confer in Geneva. North Korea accepted, probably seeing in the talks an opportunity for enhanced international standing and a chance to exacerbate South Korean - Japanese relations. At the conference table, Pyongyang initially rejected the Japanese Red Cross proposal for even limited ICRC screening, and by 20 April a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman had decided that agreement was unlikely. Since then, however, the North Koreans have demonstrated a greater flexibility on the issues to be negotiated.

While it is probable that North Korea will eventually modify its position on ICRC screening, it may not seek an early settlement, since implementation of any agreement would reveal that contrary to Pyongyang's claims, only a small proportion of the Koreans in Japan wish repatriation to North Korea. It would also settle a grievance which North Korea has long used to berate the Kishi government.

For Tokyo, the crux of the matter apparently is to devise a formula which would overcome repeated North Korean objections to any screening procedure and yet not contravene the Kishi government's assertion that none of the Korean residents would be repatriated involuntarily. Kishi is anxious to demonstrate to the Japanese public prior to the upper-house elections in

June that progress is being made toward an agreement.

The Japanese public has long sought the removal of as many as possible of the Korean residents, who are considered an undesirable minority. Somewhat in contrast to the seeming flexibility of the Japanese Red Cross negotiators in Geneva, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yamada has reiterated that ICRC screening remains an "absolute condition" for a repatriation agreement and has indicated that Tokyo may break off the Geneva talks unless Pyongyang drops its opposition on this point.

South Korea claims that the status of Koreans in Japan can be resolved only through bilateral negotiation for an over-all settlement of outstanding differences between Seoul and Tokyo--negotiations which Seoul broke off when Tokyo announced it would permit the voluntary repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea. Seoul has called for a resumption of the talks, but it has since insisted that Tokyo first break off the Geneva talks. Should Tokyo permit the repatriation of Koreans to North Korea, Seoul might be provoked into rash counteraction.

Prime Minister Kishi has indicated that a way could be found to shelve the repatriation plan indefinitely, provided South Korea adopts a reasonable position on the problems of the "Rhee line" and detained Japanese fishermen, but President Rhee has given no indication that he is prepared to modify his conditions for an over-all settlement.

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**SOVIET TACTICS TOWARD JAPAN**

The USSR is carrying on a campaign to convince the Japanese that a "neutral" policy would bring Tokyo substantial trade and fishing benefits and greater security against the threat of nuclear war. Soviet Premier Khrushchev on 20 April reiterated earlier Soviet proposals for a denuclearized zone in the Far East and offered to "guarantee" Japan's neutrality. In a letter replying to questions by a Japanese newsman, he said an agreement to this effect could be negotiated by Communist China, Japan, and the USSR, and that the USSR would not oppose the entry of the United States into such an arrangement.

The Soviet premier's proposals, which support Soviet propaganda efforts to arouse concern in Japan over the current US-Japanese security treaty negotiations, are in line with Moscow's vague proposals over the past several years for a Far Eastern conference. Prime Minister Kishi commented on 21 April that he found "nothing new" in Khrushchev's statements, and Tokyo thus far is ignoring the proposals.

Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko, with a view to influencing the important elections impending in Japan, is attempting to build up Soviet prestige in Japan. In an effort to counter the unpopular effect new Soviet-imposed curbs on Japanese fishing would have, he is attempting to divert blame to the Kishi government. Fedorenko has sought every opportunity to extol the benefits of neutrality and has breathed new life into the Communist-dominated Japan-Soviet Society.

Soviet spokesmen have vigorously stressed the opportunities for trade expansion and have repeatedly held out the possibility of Japanese participation in the development of Siberia. Fedorenko stated on 27 March that the USSR is ready to sign a long-term trade agreement with Tokyo in order to place their trade relations on a more solid basis.

Fedorenko's personal campaign for "neutralization" was launched by a Soviet note of 2 December which advocated Japanese neutrality and warned that small countries with dense populations would be annihilated in case of atomic war, a warning repeated in Khrushchev's letter of 20 April to the Japanese newsman. His renewed references to this note are probably designed to provoke a reply which could be exploited by Communist propaganda during the current security negotiations with the United States. On 21 April, Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that for the time being Japan does not need to reply to the note.

Fedorenko's emphatic affirmation of the Kremlin's firm position on the territorial issue and a peace treaty, however, as well as his solicitude for the Japanese Socialist party, are clearly intended to illustrate that Soviet concessions to the pro-Western Kishi government will not be forthcoming. Moscow can be expected to follow Khrushchev's proposals with further moves designed to contrast Kishi's policies with the advantages of a neutral-ly oriented regime.

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**TITO PREPARES FOR LONG SIEGE IN DISPUTE WITH BLOC**

Yugoslavia is digging in for a long struggle with the bloc. In a recent speech to his central committee and in a press interview, both commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Yugoslav Communist party, President Tito laid out the future course of the party, confidently assuring its members that their struggle with the bloc "will be recorded in history as a shining example of the party's obligations toward its own people and the international labor movement."

Tito has claimed that no real efforts have been made by the bloc to discuss its theoretical differences with him. In fact, both sides have further justified their positions in terms of Marxism-Leninism, which has widened the breach even further. Khrushchev declared at the Soviet party's 21st congress that "socialism cannot be built" in a country outside the Communist bloc and that Yugoslavia's separation from the bloc endangers its socialist achievements. The Yugoslavs, who believe that all nations are moving toward socialism but away from blocs, aver that "socialism is nobody's monopoly," and that Moscow's anti-Yugoslav campaign damages only "the Communist camp."

The Yugoslavs do not, however, take a negative view toward everything in the bloc. They believe that all socialist countries are facing common problems of breaking away from the methods of state bureaucratism--Stalin's perversion of Marxism--"which have continued ... in other ... people's democracies." Thus they interpret Khrushchev's decentralization program as a positive step, but complain that the bloc has unjustly labeled

as "revisionism" Yugoslavia's solution of these same problems. While Belgrade denies it is proselyting, its position implies that the bloc countries should study Yugoslavia's road for solutions, to their own difficulties.

The Yugoslav leaders are using the bloc's anti-Yugoslav campaign and their own "principled positions" as a rallying point to bolster flagging party unity and enthusiasm. This tactic has been particularly evident in recent weeks at party congresses in the various republics, where party leaders have claimed that Yugoslavia's program "has thrown new coals into the ideological fire of Marxism which has been dying since Lenin's death." This theme probably will be emphasized further at the four other congresses scheduled between now and June, as well as in the various celebrations of the party's 40th anniversary which will take place throughout the year.

Tito pledged in early March merely to answer the bloc's attacks "blow for blow," but in recent weeks Belgrade has frequently been taking the initiative. Yugoslavia took Nasir's side in his dispute with the Arab Communist parties, and it charged Communist China with causing the Tibetan revolt and thus causing damage to the "cause of socialism." Tito himself reportedly urged Nehru to take a strong stand against Communist China's suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Belgrade also criticized Khrushchev's 21st congress thesis on economic competition between the two "camps" as a call for continuation of the cold war.

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
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**OPENING OF THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT**

The first legislative session of the new French Parliament, which convenes on 28 April, will confront Premier Debré with several major issues--particularly Algeria, economic austerity, and the church-school question. Any of these could disrupt several parties and imperil the premier's coalition. President de Gaulle's threat to dissolve the assembly if it threatens his program, however, will probably discourage any early move by the deputies to reassert parliament's traditionally dominant role.

Although assembly action on economic matters is limited both by constitutional restrictions and by President de Gaulle's recent warning that he would dissolve Parliament if any serious efforts to undermine his economic austerity program are made, the Socialists are planning a strong attack. The Popular Republicans are avowedly uneasy over the effects of austerity on labor and the peasants, while numerous vested interests hurt by the program--such as the winegrowers--are powerfully

Composition of the new Senate is still to be determined by elections scheduled for 26 April, and some regrouping of party alignments in the assembly is already being discussed. A number of deputies will probably shift affiliation as party positions on the major issues become clearer.

**FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

- \* "Administrative formations" (for purposes of participation on assembly committees).
- (1) Mostly Radical-Socialists and Democratic Resistance Union.
  - (2) Mostly conservative Radicals.
  - (3) Includes Georges Bidault (formerly in MRP) and overseas deputies.

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The Algerian issue may be posed early in the session if the deputies from Algeria and the Sahara disregard Debré's warning that his government cannot accept a strong resolution in favor of integration. Early returns of the Algerian municipal elections of 19-26 April are inconclusive, but whatever the final results, they will be interpreted by settler representatives and elements of the army as reinforcing their contention that the government's failure to adopt integration endangers France's ability to retain Algeria.

represented in the Independent party.

Debré may also introduce proposals designed to settle the church-school issue, the traditional left-right political divider in France. Even though a majority of the assembly now appears to favor state aid to church schools, a government bill on the subject would automatically alienate many otherwise conservative Radicals and drive them and the Socialists closer to the Communist party.

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**BELGIAN POLITICAL CRISIS**

King Baudouin last week took the unusual step of vetoing the Belgian cabinet's nominee for a new governor general of the Congo. This move has undermined the prestige of the generally progressive Congo minister, Maurice Van Hemelrijk, and increased the problems of the Eyskens government in carrying out the policy announced



BAUDOUIN

last January for increasing the territory's autonomy by definite stages.

Van Hemelrijk, who has had the strong personal support of the prime minister, has been pressing ahead with the new Congo policy--at times quite independently of the cabinet. Liberals within the coalition think he is going too far too fast, while the opposition Socialists attack the policy for not going far enough. His attempt to replace the present governor general was part of his effort to strengthen his own control over the Congo administration and expedite implementation of his program.

Van Hemelrijk's reform policies have stimulated wide-

spread political interest in the Congo: the white settler minority fears for its future position, while the Africans expect rapid evolution. If Brussels seems to waver in support of the new policy or if Hemelrijk is eventually forced to retire, it would convince the natives that the Belgian Government is incapable of living up to its promises and increase the danger of African nationalist disturbances. The first "African Political Congress," in fact, recently called for a Congolese government by late 1961.

A government usually resigns after a royal veto, but Eyskens did not do so in this case, and apparently persuaded Van Hemelrijk to withdraw his resignation. The antimonarchist



VAN HEMELRIJK

Liberals and the Socialists, however, may stir up further political controversy among cabinet members.

Former governor general and Congo Minister Petillon, a palace intimate, who was "dumped" last year and who has since been displeased with Van Hemelrijk's independent course, evidently

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persuaded ex-King Leopold to use his considerable influence on his son to intervene. Although constitutional, the royal veto in this case appears politically dangerous. Hostility toward the monarchy has been only slightly below the surface since

1950, when the Socialists and Liberals forced Leopold to abdicate because of his World War II record. They have remained suspicious of his influence over Baudouin.

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**THE EUROPEAN COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY**

A major test of the supranational powers of the Coal-Steel Community (CSC) may occur at the meeting of its council of government representatives on 4 May. The CSC High Authority--the executive body of international civil servants--is determined to press its plan for a community-wide solution to the present coal glut--a plan which requires majority approval by the council, including the vote of either France or West Germany. A defeat for the High Authority would encourage those critics wishing to revise the CSC treaty, and possibly reflect adversely on the EURATOM and Common Market commissions as well.

The High Authority's four-point program would cut community production by 3.5 percent, reduce imports by 45 percent, freeze stocks of unsold coal at existing levels, and support miners' wages during the current recession. The High Authority claims that otherwise member countries will act unilaterally, and that further import restrictions not linked

to production quotas would jeopardize the standing of the CSC in international trading circles. Critics of the plan contend that the problems of the coal industry are largely confined to Belgium and West Germany, and that less drastic remedies are provided for in the treaty.

In recent weeks, however, opposition to the High Authority's program has become increasingly nationalist and political. At the 10-16 April session of the European Parliamentary Assembly, one faction, spearheaded by the French Gaullists, introduced a resolution which recommended that the High Authority invoke only those provisions of the treaty which require unanimous consent of the council. Vigorously opposed by President Finet, this motion was defeated at the last minute by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists when it became apparent to the former that the Gaullists were attacking the supranational concept as a whole.

An inkling of what could happen if the High Authority's plan were rejected by the

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
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ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY



\*Performs similar functions in EURATOM and the European Economic Community.

Legend: Solid line = Selected by / Responsible to; Dashed line = Gives advice to / Acts as "watch-dog" over.

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council was contained in a speech during the assembly session by the French minister of industry. Referring to recent statements by Premier Debré on the "need for European unity transcending national states," he urged that the CSC treaty be revised to in-

clude escape clauses such as those in the Common Market treaty and to give the member states continuing jurisdiction over imports of non-CSC coal. Such changes would weaken the CSC.

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**RIGHTIST REVOLUTIONARY OUTBREAK IN BOLIVIA**

The revolutionary attempt on 19 April by Bolivia's perennially plotting rightists may have been prompted by the deep division of the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) over the protracted economic crisis. The rightists have tried repeatedly to overthrow the MNR government since it came to power in 1952. The 19 April attempt, which resulted in several dozen deaths including that of the rightist leader, appears to have been better organized than other recent efforts.

The group evidently hoped to profit from the split within the MNR caused by President Siles' efforts to carry out the economic reforms--particularly in the tin mines--which have been a prerequisite for further US aid. About half the armed miners had refused to accept the reform decree, and the situation became more serious on 16 April when government oil workers--employees of the only relatively solvent major economic enterprise in Bolivia--also defied the government and declared a strike.

The rightist threat tended to reunite the government party.

Oil workers called off their strike. Militias of factory workers, progovernment miners, and the La Paz party organization appear to have been the primary defenders of the government, but at least some of the uniformed forces--whose loyalties had been considered doubtful--were also used.

The coup attempt also permitted the government to declare a state of siege which gives it powers of summary arrest for a period of 90 days. Rightist plotting and leftist defiance of government decisions had increased notably since the expiration of the last state-of-siege decree on 19 January.

The critical economic situation, however, is likely to continue generating tensions which may be reflected in new outbreaks of violence. The Central Bank's foreign-exchange position shows a deficit of about \$2,800,000, while the country's export earnings on an annual basis are not running substantially above last year's \$65,000,000. Because of the virtual suspension of US aid during the past two months, the administration since 1 January has paid public employees only 80 percent of their salaries.

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**NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE FORMED SOON IN NEPAL**

Nepal's first government under the constitution proclaimed in February will soon be formed by the left-of-center Nepali Congress party, now greatly strengthened as a result of winning a two-thirds majority in the recently completed parliamentary elections. The new government, guided by the example of the Indian Congress party, is likely to pursue modi-

fied socialist policies internally and to take a neutralist position in foreign affairs.


The Nepali Congress has won 73 out of 108 seats in the new parliament, with only one seat remaining undecided. The country-wide support received by the Congress--Nepal's oldest, largest, and best-organized party--probably resulted from

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its reputation as leader of the 1950-51 rebellion which overthrew the autocratic Rana regime. The party's chief leader, B. P. Koirala, will most likely be called on by King Mahendra to form a government, although the King might nominate General



KOIRALA

Subarna Shumshere, Congress leader who headed the 1958-59 interim cabinet.

The parliamentary opposition will be dominated by the conservative Gurkha Parishad, which holds 19 seats. The Com-

munist party was able to secure only four seats and may concentrate its future efforts on infiltrating the Nepali Congress rather than operating independently.

King Mahendra probably will find the Congress government, with an overwhelming mandate from the people, more difficult to control than previous coalition cabinets. Party unity is likely to be weakened, however, by internal rivalries and policy conflicts. Moreover, the King retains ultimate authority under the new constitution.

Despite long-standing anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal, the new government probably will maintain a close and cooperative relationship with New Delhi. The Indians apparently backed the Nepali Congress in the elections. Furthermore, general reaction in Katmandu to events in Tibet continues to be highly critical of Peiping. Reports of border incursions by Chinese troops in pursuit of fleeing refugees are likely to intensify concern in Nepal over Peiping's intentions and to increase Katmandu's reliance on Indian support.

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**INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY LOSES POPULAR SUPPORT**

Prime Minister Nehru's ruling Congress party apparently is losing popular support, despite the major economic advances India has achieved since 1951 under Congress leadership of its First and Second Five-Year Plans. This trend, which appears in by-elections to the national Parliament and the

state assemblies, is best illustrated by the results of recent municipal elections in various parts of the country.

In March and early April, the Congress party lost control of Madras city and most large towns in Madras State, although the party organization in that

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
area is one of the most active and imaginative in India. Apathy on the part of the middle and upper classes apparently was the major factor which resulted in large gains by the Dravidian Progressive Federation, a Hindu communal party of the lower classes. This party opposes domination of South India by the "Aryan" north, attacks rule by the Brahmin class, resents imposition of Hindi as the national language, and reflects south-north racial friction.

In Punjab State, in northern India, where the Congress party had done well in the national elections of 1957, the party recently won less than a third of 391 seats at stake in municipal elections. During 1958 the Congress lost heavily to various opposition groups in municipal elections throughout Uttar Pradesh State, in Rajasthan State, and 16 of 18 municipalities in the northern part of Bombay State. The party now has lost control of three of the four largest cities in the country--New Delhi, Bombay, and Madras--and controls the fourth--Calcutta--by a bare majority.

Congress party leaders have been aware since 1956 of the need for rejuvenating the party organization and for restoring grass-roots contacts. Continued awareness of the problem is shown by the fact that, since the most recent elec-

tions, party president Indira Gandhi has postponed a scheduled trip to Mexico and declined an invitation to London. She reportedly intends to tour India on an urgent basis, presumably to urge an end to factionalism and apathy among party workers.

Despite the exhortations of the party leadership, however, the Congress rank and file is not yet "running scared." Neither is it capitalizing politically on the Nehru government's major achievements in economic development. In Madras State, where the trend toward the opposition was most recently illustrated, the Congress party government has the best record of any state in the country in implementing economic development plans.



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**INDONESIA**

President Sukarno's formal request on 22 April for a return to the "1945 constitution," which would increase executive powers and reduce those of parliament, may meet with obstructive tactics in the Constituent Assembly. Sukarno has departed on a two-month tour of Europe and Latin America, leaving the army to act as his watchdog. If significant assembly opposition to his plans develops, Sukarno with army backing may impose the constitution by executive decree.

Sukarno's departure has given rise to new rumors of political changes and maneuvers which would take advantage of his absence. Army Chief of Staff General Nasution has stated that although various groups may attempt action, he believes the army is sufficiently alert to prevent any developments. He strongly implied to American officials that he is still working closely with Sukarno and, although continuing controls on Communist activities, has no immediate plans for a decisive move against the Communists.

Indonesian purchases and aid programs from the Sino-Soviet bloc continue. An army purchasing mission, which has been shopping in the West and Yugoslavia since early March, is believed now in Czechoslovakia. Since the mission probably could not obtain in the West either the liberal credit terms or the quantities

of materiel it was instructed to request, the bulk of its purchases probably will come from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. 25X1

An Indonesian mission to Communist China left for Peiping on 21 April to discuss utilization of \$20,000,000 of a \$40,000,000 credit extended by China last year. Approximately \$1,500,000 of the loan has been spent for textiles, and the amount now under negotiation has also been earmarked for the textile industry. Prime Minister Djuanda plans to visit the Soviet Union in late June or early July at the invitation of Moscow. Although this appears to be primarily a courtesy visit, Djuanda is reported planning to discuss present and future aid programs.

In Sumatra, the Atjehnese rebels--a long-standing Moslem guerrilla group--are being wooed by both the army and the so-called Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), with both groups claiming to have extracted promises of cooperation from the Atjehnese. Complicating the situation for both the army and the PRRI is the fact that Atjehnese leaders are involved in a power struggle among themselves which makes an early decision on overall Atjehnese alignment unlikely. 25X1

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## PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

## SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-INCLINED PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Socialism has considerable appeal in Latin America, where widely supported national parties have made prolabor legislation and extensive state participation in the economy a major part of their programs. In five countries, national revolutionary parties have gained the allegiance of almost all elements which the Communists seek to cultivate, and most of them have acquired a decided anti-Communist orientation. Only a few small parties are formally designated Socialist, however, and these--unlike their European counterparts--are frequently Communist aligned.

Colorado and Radical Parties

In Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, there are important socialist-inclined parties which had for many years a generally laissez-faire attitude toward social and economic questions and adopted a socialist orientation only in this century. In part because of these parties' historic position, they have been accepted politically by the national armies, which have a conservative bias and tend in Latin America to be the arbiters of the political process.

Uruguay's Colorado party, which controlled the executive power for almost a century, is generally pro-West and anti-Communist but determinedly "independent" within this framework. The party advocates elaborate labor laws, generous pensions, and government ownership and operation of enterprises serving the public. Its failure to provide for rational economic development, however, caused a general deterioration of the country's finances, and the party was recently ousted by its conservative opponents.

The Radical parties in Argentina and Chile theoretically advocate a socialist policy but neither on reaching power has followed a strongly socialist program. The Chilean Radical party, the largest single party in Chile and dominant there from 1938 to 1952, has advocated evolutionary state socialism since 1931. These parties draw considerable support from the middle class, and their efforts to gain labor strength have been largely nullified by extremist groups, especially the Peronistas in Argentina and the Communists, who have effective parties in both countries.

The Radicals--like other long-established Latin American political parties--have accepted support from the Communists to win an election, but as victors have broken with them and cooperated with the United States. The Argentine Radical program, for instance, has since 1951 stressed nationalization of the petroleum and meat-packing industries and public utilities, and President Frondizi accepted Communist electoral support. Since his inauguration, however, he has turned on the Communists and stressed the need for private enterprise, increased foreign investment, and reduced state controls over the economy.

National Revolutionary Parties

The national revolutionary parties draw their support mainly from the lower urban and rural classes, although most party leaders come from the middle or upper classes. They are parties based in part on a body of principles and a program rather than exclusively on a "cult of leadership" which is often the case with Latin American political parties.

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
**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

23 April 1959

Although they recognize affinity with one another, there is no common "party line," other than that elections should not be so fraudulent or the franchise so limited as to contradict the will of the great majority of the people. They seek to learn from each other's experience, but each is based on a strong sense of national identity and does not necessarily copy another's strategy or tactics. The national revolutionary parties, either by use of force or by threat of force, have compelled the army to accept civilian authority.

**Bolivia and Mexico:** The Bolivian revolution of 1952 and the Mexican revolution beginning in 1910 gave a virtual monopoly of political power to national revolutionary parties in these countries. Unlike the typical Latin American revolution, these upheavals altered the way of living of all classes in the country. In Mexico, civil war was almost constant for ten years, while in Bolivia the actual fighting was over in three days. In both, however, the leaders had the same object: to integrate the largely Indian rural population into the life of the nation by giving it land, education, and the vote.

In both countries, the single most important economic enterprise--tin in Bolivia, oil in Mexico--was expropriated as politically suspect private

**SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-INCLINED PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA**

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investment. Nationalization was limited in Bolivia but was far more inclusive in Mexico. Both foreign and domestic private investments have been encouraged in Mexico, however, since World War II and have played a large part in its recent rapid economic progress.

Both regimes have emphasized economic development, although economic expansion came in Mexico after virtually all the fundamental social transformation had been accomplished,

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whereas in Bolivia economic development activities have been carried on concurrently with the work of redistributing the land and rewriting the country's constitution.

Both the Bolivian and the Mexican revolutionary parties initially emphasized the dangers of rightist subversion far more than the dangers of Communism. The leaders of both parties have recently become alarmed, however, by the apparent success of Communist labor leaders in breaking government party domination of key labor unions. Both Bolivian and Mexican party leaders are as opposed to Soviet as to any other foreign intervention in domestic affairs.

Costa Rica, Peru, Venezuela: Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela have national revolutionary parties which play key roles in these countries but they have no monopoly of political power. The three parties are friendly to the United States, although all have criticized alleged US support for Latin American dictators. The Peruvian party in its initial program in 1924 was strongly opposed to the United States; this position was reversed during the 1930s, in part because of a common antipathy to the rise of Nazism in Germany.

Each of the three parties is hostile to the Communists and has defeated them for dominant control of organized labor. The Costa Rican and Peruvian parties have consistently refused to work with the Communists on any level and the Costa Rican party fought Communist-supported forces in the civil war of 1948. In Venezuela, students linked with the party cooperate with Communist students, but nevertheless the election of the party's chief, Romulo Betancourt, to the presidency last December has produced a significant stiffening against the Communists.

The parties believe that an underdeveloped country

requires substantial state guidance. Their basic concern for economic development shows itself in realistic modifications of socialist programs. In Peru, the party has long emphasized nationalization, but supported the 1952 petroleum law--which favors foreign investment--when conservative landholders opposed it for fear it would drive wages upward.

In Costa Rica, party promises to gain considerable control over the United Fruit Company were modified--after the party came to power--to increasing the government's income from the company. In Venezuela, the implementation of the national revolutionary party's plans to set up a government-owned oil company has been postponed until the economic drain caused by the government-owned enterprises set up by the preceding regime can be minimized.

Attitude Toward Communism

The national revolutionary parties have attracted most of those who were strongly dissatisfied with a semifeudal social and economic organization in their countries and who might otherwise have been attracted by Communism. Those parties which achieved a near political monopoly--as in Bolivia and Mexico--were so successful in this, at least until recently, that Communist parties were very small, and specifically anti-Communist activity appeared unnecessary to the national revolutionary governments.

In Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela, where the parties have been somewhat less successful, certain opponents of the national revolutionary parties look on the Communists as allies. The national revolutionary parties have, consequently, acquired a strong basic anti-Communist orientation through bitter infighting in such political groups as labor and student organizations.

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23 April 1959

The similar orientation of the parties in these three countries is highlighted by their cooperation in the Latin American drive against dictators which received new impetus with Fidel Castro's overthrow of Cuba's Batista on 1 January 1959. Their anti-Communist slant is indicated by the known concern of Costa Rican and Venezuelan party leaders--probably shared by the Peruvians--over Castro's demagoguery and his support for pro-Communist groups of anti-dictator revolutionaries.

Avowed Socialist Parties

In seven Latin American countries, there are political parties which are formally called Socialist and inscribed as such on national electoral registers. All are essentially European in ideological origin, and two of them are affiliated with the Socialist International. Except for the Chilean and Ecuadoran parties, they are of minor political importance.

In both Chile and Ecuador the Socialist parties, in coalition with other political parties including the Communists, backed the runner-up in the last presidential election and have significant congressional representation. In both countries Socialists and Communists together in recent years have dominated the country's only important national labor

organization. The small ineffective Socialist parties of Brazil and Peru also tend to be Communist-aligned in labor, student, and political affairs.

In Argentina, the Socialist party is anti-Communist. It has no congressional representation because of peculiarities in the Argentine electoral system. Socialist influence is strong among urban skilled workers, although the party's former dominance was reduced by the Peron regime's dictatorial labor practices. The Venezuelan Socialist party, which tends toward anti-Communism, polled less than 1 percent of the total vote in the December 1958 elections.

The Uruguayan Socialist party is badly split on the issue of cooperation with Communists in labor; it agrees in international affairs in advocating a "third-force" position, showing considerable hostility to the United States. The party tries to attract the Montevideo working classes, but a practical program to appeal to these groups has always been a monopoly of Uruguay's long-dominant Colorado party. Here as in most of the Latin American countries the political parties which owe their existence to European political trends seem likely to give way before parties able to emphasize a sense of national identity.

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
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**CHANGES IN THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Stalin's latter years was keyed to the negativism of cold war diplomacy and was a poor instrument for influencing nations and making friends for the Soviet Union.

The process of refurbishing the diplomatic machinery began almost immediately with the dictator's death. A drastic reshuffling of ministerial personnel was carried out, and a large number of former party

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**23 April 1959**

and government careerists from other departments were assigned to leading posts within the ministry. Efforts were also made to expand diplomatic relations with other countries. These measures have proved generally successful, and the ministry

has become an effective agency in extending Soviet influence throughout the world.

Organizational Structure


The headquarters staff of the ministry consists of 13

**USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

**1 MARCH 1953**

**15 APRIL 1959**

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  Top level ministry personnel at time of Stalin's death  
  Brought into ministry since Stalin's death  
  Presumed to exist  
 \* Acting head

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23 APRIL 1959


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**23 April 1959**

**SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY GEOGRAPHICAL DESK RESPONSIBILITIES - 15 APRIL 1959**  
(Countries with which the USSR has diplomatic relations)



**SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY GEOGRAPHICAL DESK RESPONSIBILITIES - 1 MARCH 1953**

U S A DESK E UNITED STATES	LATIN AMERICAN DESK E ARGENTINA E MEXICO L URUGUAY	FIRST EUROPEAN DESK E BELGIUM E FRANCE E ITALY L LUXEMBOURG E NETHERLANDS L SWITZERLAND	SECOND EUROPEAN DESK E AUSTRALIA E CANADA E GREAT BRITAIN L NEW ZEALAND	THIRD EUROPEAN DESK H&P AUSTRIA C&D EAST GERMANY	FOURTH EUROPEAN DESK E CZECHOSLOVAKIA E POLAND	FIFTH EUROPEAN DESK L DENMARK L FINLAND L ICELAND L NORWAY E SWEDEN	BALKAN DESK L ALBANIA E BULGARIA E GREECE E HUNGARY E RUMANIA E YUGOSLAVIA	NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST DESK E AFGHANISTAN L EGYPT L ETHIOPIA E IRAN L IRAQ L LEBANON L SYRIA	SOUTHEAST ASIAN DESK E BURMA E INDIA E PAKISTAN L THAILAND	FIRST FAR EASTERN DESK E CHINA E MONGOLIA E NORTH KOREA
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geographic divisions or desks with responsibility for specific groups of countries or international organizations; several functional divisions dealing with such matters as protocol, legal questions, and press relations; a secretariat; and the collegium, or directing staff of the ministry.

The collegium, chaired by the minister, includes all deputy ministers and a few of the more important division chiefs. Overall supervisory chores within the ministry presumably are divided among the deputy ministers, with the first deputy acting in a general capacity as the minister's right-hand man.

Specific responsibilities of the present deputy ministers, however, cannot be determined. In fact, the critical importance

of the Berlin crisis may have made the usual delegation of supervisory responsibilities relatively meaningless. At least three of the four deputy ministers are probably concentrating heavily on the German problem. Both Pushkin and Semenov have specialized on German affairs for many years, and Zorin has been ambassador to Bonn.

The few organizational changes that have taken place within the ministry since Stalin's death reflect for the most part the expansion of Soviet diplomatic interests. The only net contraction was the merger of the US and Latin American desks. A separate division was created for international economic organizations; Scandinavian affairs were separated from Austro-German affairs; responsibility for Near East and Middle East

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

23 April 1959

countries was divided; and there is a strong possibility that, with the recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Guinea and Ghana, a new African division has been created.

The Soviet Union now maintains 53 embassies, four legations, and permanent representation to the United Nations. The sharp increase in the number of foreign missions was the product of a coordinated campaign, instituted shortly after Stalin's death, to regularize, improve, and expand diplomatic relations. Ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary were appointed to countries where Soviet intransigence or strained relations had left the top diplomatic post vacant, and existing legations were upgraded to embassies wherever possible.

At the present time the only vacancies in top Soviet diplomatic posts are in New Zealand and Australia--a result of the defection of Vladimir Petrov in 1954. Relations with Australia have been re-established, however, and the appointment of an ambassador, probably to hold both the Australian and New Zealand posts simultaneously, may soon be made.

The Soviet Union has almost abandoned the legation form of diplomatic representation. Legations are now maintained only in New Zealand, Uruguay, Yemen, and Luxemburg, and these would probably be upgraded to embassies if agreement could be reached with the countries concerned.

During the past six years the Soviet Union has added 14 countries to those with which it exchanges diplomatic representation. Most of this expansion has been among the newly independent countries of Africa--Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Guinea, and Ghana--and in South-east Asia--Indonesia, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Nepal, and

Ceylon. Very little progress has been made in Latin America, where relations are maintained with only three countries--Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico. Soviet officials reportedly are expecting diplomatic recognition from Costa Rica and possibly several other Central American republics.

The Ministry in Politics

Basic foreign policy and the principal tactical moves in implementing that policy are determined by the party presidium. The Foreign Ministry is only the executor of the specific policy tasks assigned it, although it presumably has certain advisory functions as well. The intense personal interest of all members of the top party leadership in foreign relations has served to keep the ministry under close scrutiny and helped to isolate its operating personnel from factional pressures. Apparently few, if any, of the ministry's personnel became embroiled in the political maneuvers of either former Foreign Ministers Molotov and Shepilov.

Unlike his two predecessors, Andrey Gromyko is a foreign policy technician rather than a policy maker. He is not a member of the party presidium and has apparently stayed aloof from factional politics. His role in the formulation of basic foreign policy is probably limited to technical advice and information. In this connection, Gromyko is known sometimes to attend presidium meetings.

The average Soviet career diplomat not only has steered clear of top party politics, he has also been generally successful in adapting to the demands of the regime. Most of the important career diplomats displaced in the post-Stalin shake-up and subsequent reassignments have been appointed to other posts within the ministry without

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apparent loss of status. Career developments, routine reassignment, and the shifting locus of problems requiring depth of diplomatic experience appear to be among the most important reasons for these transfers of career personnel.

On the other hand, the influx of outsiders into high-level positions in the ministry which accompanied, and in some cases may have precipitated, the transfer of career diplomats, appears to have involved somewhat different reasons. During the past six years about 40 former high party officials and government administrators have been assigned to top diplomatic posts over the heads of career workers in the ministry. Some of these subsequently left the ministry for other work, died, or simply dropped out of sight. The 27 who remain, however, constitute a sizable bloc of the ministry's top personnel.

No single explanation covers all the cases of party or government careerist turned diplomatic. A few, undoubtedly victims of high-level internal power politics or policy differences, were assigned to the ministry to get them out of the way. On the other hand, revitalization of the foreign service probably demanded new blood.

The regime also appears to have re-evaluated its bloc diplomatic requirements and to have instituted a policy of assigning to bloc countries men with party or government administrative experience rather than men trained in the diplomatic service. In a number of cases the necessity to exile some party or government figure from the arena of power struggle and policy controversy coincided with a need within the ministry for someone with party or government experience.

Most of the "outsiders" were assigned to bloc countries or the headquarters staff of the ministry. A few, however, have been assigned to nonbloc countries, notably Menshikov to India, to the United States; Pegov to Iran; and Ryzhov to Turkey.

Revitalization of the ministry has been accompanied by an enhancement in the prestige of diplomatic service. To a certain extent this was a by-product of the assignment of high-level party officials to the ministry, but it has also been fostered as deliberate policy by the regime. In Stalin's time comparatively few Soviet diplomats were members of top party bodies. At the time of his death only eight were so honored, and of these only

**PARTY RANK OF OFFICIALS IN THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**Full Members of the Central Committee

1 MARCH 1953

A. Ya. Vyshinsky Minister

Candidate Members of the Central Committee

Ya. A. Malik Deputy Minister  
V. N. Pavlov Member of the Collegium and Chief of the 2nd European Desk  
A. S. Panyushkin Ambassador to China  
A. A. Gromyko Ambassador to Great Britain  
G. N. Zarubin Ambassador to United States

Auditing Commission Members

B. F. Podtserob Deputy Minister  
V. S. Semenov Political Advisor to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany

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Full Members of the Central Committee

15 APRIL 1959

A. A. Gromyko Minister  
V. V. Kuznetsov 1st Deputy Minister  
P. F. Yudin Ambassador to China  
I. T. Grishin Ambassador to Czechoslovakia  
M. G. Perukhin Ambassador to East Germany  
I. A. Benediktov Ambassador to India  
N. M. Pegov Ambassador to Iran  
A. M. Puzanov Ambassador to North Korea

Candidate Members of the Central Committee

N. P. Firyojin Deputy Minister  
V. A. Zorin Deputy Minister  
Ya. A. Malik Ambassador to Great Britain  
Ye. I. Gromov Ambassador to Hungary  
A. A. Yepshev Ambassador to Rumania  
M. A. Menshikov Ambassador to United States  
I. K. Zamchevsky Ambassador to Yugoslavia

Auditing Commission Members

G. M. Pushkin Deputy Minister  
V. S. Semenov Deputy Minister  
M. V. Zimyanin Member of the Collegium and chief of the Far East Desk  
S. A. Vinogradov Ambassador to France

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Vyshinsky was a full member of the central committee. At the 20th party congress in February 1956, six full members were named, and today 19 enjoy the prestige of high party rank, eight of them as full members of the central committee.

Personnel Policy

Major personnel assignments within the ministry are the prerogative, not of the ministry itself, but of the party, exercised by the foreign departments in the apparatus of the central committee. The most important assignments undoubtedly receive the direct attention of Khrushchev and the party presidium. The usual procedure is for the minister to propose a candidate to the central committee for consideration. If the candidate were unacceptable to the party department concerned, Gromyko could appeal the decision to the party presidium. Ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, since they are legal representatives of the Soviet state, are formally appointed by decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Decrees on other top assignments in the ministry are issued by the Council of Ministers.

The Soviet diplomatic service has apparently been divided into two parts--bloc and nonbloc. Personnel rotate within each service but seldom go from one to the other. All top positions in the bloc service are staffed by former party and government officials, and all but two of these--Molotov, ambassador to Mongolia, and Yury Prikhodov, ambassador to Bulgaria--entered the Foreign Ministry after Stalin's death.

Desk chiefs and in some cases deputy desk chiefs have

the same rank as foreign mission chiefs, and it appears to be a matter of policy to rotate top personnel from one position to the other. Soviet career diplomats are generally trained as area specialists, but an effort is made to broaden their experience. During the course of their careers they may expect assignments in several different parts of the world interspersed with varied headquarters responsibilities.

There does not seem to be any standard length of time for a tour of duty for top diplomats. Appointments terminated during the past six years ranged from a few months to nearly nine years. Ambassador Malik, who has been in London for six years, is the diplomat currently the longest in his post, but six others have been at their current posts over five years. Present Soviet policy, however, seems to call for somewhat shorter tours than was the case under Stalin.

Soviet diplomats carry their ranks with them and collectively form a pool of talent available for specific assignments as the need arises. Quite often a high-ranking diplomat will be reassigned to Moscow and not be indentified for many months or even several years, only to reappear subsequently in a new post with no apparent diminution in status. It may be assumed that their services have been utilized on special commissions, ad hoc committees, or in other ways which do not normally receive press attention. Ambassador Pushkin, for example, recalled from East Germany in February 1958 and appointed deputy foreign minister in March 1959, in the interim quite likely helped chart Soviet tactics on Berlin.

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