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COPY NO. 71  
OCI NO. 0269/61  
2 March 1961

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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DOCUMENT NO. 4 25X1  
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED 25X1  
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S © 1990  
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: [Redacted]  
 AUTH: HR 70-2  
 DATE: 13/5/80 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

DIA, State Department review(s) completed.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

WEEKLY REVIEW

## CONGO

The incursion by Gizenga forces into the Luluabourg area of Kasai Province, which caused much apprehension in Leopoldville, has faded out this week. UN sources claim that Luluabourg is a "UN city"; nevertheless Congolese troops of Mobutu, according to press reports, have engaged in riots with the local populace which have resulted in more than 40 fatalities. The UN has confirmed that another Gizenga force estimated at two battalions is moving from Ikela in central Congo toward Coquilhatville, capital of Equateur Province, which the UN reports virtually unguarded by Leopoldville forces. Hammarskjold told Ambassador Stevenson on 28 February he did not think recent military operations in the Congo had changed the balance of power among the various factions.

For at least a month, Gizenga's forces have apparently operated with relative freedom in northern Kasai Province. The population there, which includes Lumumba's own tribe, either is politically apathetic or favors Gizenga's Stanleyville regime. The force that "took" Luluabourg apparently had reason to expect that Mobutu's troops would not resist.

The Gizengist withdrawal began on 27 February, the troops quitting Luluabourg "like a wave on sand," some disappearing into the bush after abandoning their weapons, and some withdrawing to the northeast toward Kivu Province. According to UN sources, all Congolese troops have been cleared from the city and the airport.

According to the Ghanaian UN commander on the scene, the

officers of the invading force did not have control of their men, and the force evidently dispersed rather than submit to a disarmament agreement which its leaders had negotiated with the local UN contingent. Gizengist officers involved in these negotiations and the commander of the pro-Mobutu garrison asked for and received UN protection, although there are indications that the Leopoldville government intends to take disciplinary action against its officers. This confusion in Luluabourg illustrates the dependence of Congolese military operations on the whims of individual units.

The Gizenga forces in Luluabourg, according to eyewitnesses, did not have even the most meager logistical support --and other Stanleyville columns operating in Kasai are probably in a similar condition. Gizenga's over-all supply problem appears to be precarious.

The expulsion of five Communist journalists from Stanleyville on 28 February--allegedly because Gizenga was piqued about not receiving aid from Communist countries--probably was intended by Gizenga to dramatize his supply situation.

The Sudanese UN delegate told an American official on 27 February that Khartoum does not intend to give way to Soviet and UAR pressure for transit rights. He said various devices were being tried, but would not succeed.

Gizenga apparently remains the dominant figure in Stanleyville and the city is

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reported calm. General Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, reportedly issued orders on 26 February that anyone molesting Europeans will be shot, and Gizenga had earlier decreed that only the central Stanleyville government can order the death sentence. Gizenga, who has little tribal support and has maintained his position largely through political manipulation, may have weakened it by defending Europeans.

However, he appears to have removed some potential rivals. Benard Salumu, formerly his representative in Cairo and more recently a leading figure in the Stanleyville regime, is reported to have fled, presumably as a result of a struggle for power.

In Leopoldville, the rioting by Congolese army elements appears to have resulted from fear both of an impending attack by Gizenga's columns and the possibility of attempts by UN forces to disarm Mobutu's troops. Kasavubu's radio address on 27 February in which he urged resistance to UN "tutelage" may worsen the already tense situation between UN personnel and the Congolese army, and further attacks on UN personnel could lead to retaliatory action by the UN force.

In late February, Congolese officials in Leopoldville were making frantic efforts to put together a force with which to oppose Gizenga's advance. In the event Gizenga's forces move on Leopoldville, they would be unlikely to meet effective opposition in eastern Leopoldville Province, where

most the the tribes supported Lumumba.

Acting Defense Minister Kazadi was trying to raise two battalions of volunteers in the Leopoldville area, and reportedly even asked Albert Kalonji, head of the South Kasai State, to send his two battalions of poorly trained troops against the Gizenga force in Lulua-bourg. When this request was reported to the UN command, Dayal protested, objecting to Kalonji's "aggressive posture." According to UN sources in New York, Kalonji's troops had taken up positions near Luluabourg by 27 February.

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General Mobutu, with approximately 1,500 troops, is in the vicinity of Bumba, possibly still hoping to advance into Orientale Province. UN sources estimate that, although he has some trucks brought up by river from Coquilhatville, he would not be able to carry out an attack on Stanleyville. Following a 21 February meeting with UN commander McKeown, Mobutu promised to take up only defensive positions to prevent infiltrations from Stanleyville, but he refused to meet with Lundula to discuss a ceasefire and establishment of a neutral zone. Hammarskjold thinks there is a chance that Mobutu and Lundula might join forces in a military alliance against all politicians.

Mobutu may be planning attempts to reassert Leopoldville's

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control in Kivu Province. The American consul in Usumbura reported on 23 February that Mobutu troops in plain clothes had appeared in Ruanda-Urundi, allegedly on a mission to buy off the garrisons now controlled by Gizenga across the Congo border in Bukavu. The consul comments that this operation has a better chance of succeeding than did Mobutu's abortive attempt on 1 January, also from Ruanda-Urundi, to take over Kivu Province. Belgium would be open to further severe censure should such an operation take place from Ruanda-Urundi, which it administers as a UN trust territory.


Gizenga's apparent military successes probably contributed to the 28 February agreement among Tshombé, Ileo, and Kalonji, which provides for a

pooling of military forces and continuing military and political consultations. By thus tacitly admitting the existence of Katanga as a separate entity, Ileo and Kasavubu may have undermined their claim to be the spokesmen for the entire Congo.

The agreement is unlikely to result in much direct military support for the Leopoldville regime. Tshombé is more likely to use his troops against dissident Baluba tribesmen to maintain his own position. Within the last two weeks he has reportedly issued Mauser rifles and ammunition to many members of his Conakat party in Elisabethville and the surrounding villages, but this action appears to be more an attempt to raise morale and to guard against an anti-Conakat uprising than to increase the fighting strength of the Katanga army. However, Tshombé on 28 February denounced his tacit cease-fire agreement with the UN and threatened for the first time to move his troops outside of Katanga.

UN Mandate

Secretary General Hammarskjold describes his new Congo mandate as "open ended" regarding what is to be done and "indefinite" regarding who is to carry it out. He remains cautious in his interpretation of provisions authorizing the use of force. He believes that UN troops could take positions to keep contending

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forces apart and use force to hold such positions against attack. However, in his view, UN forces could not initiate the use of force. Hammarskjold insists that he must abide by the limitations set by countries contributing troops and cites Tunisian, Ethiopian, and Sudanese demands that their troops not become parties to internal conflicts.

On the basis of this interpretation, UN advisers estimate that 25 battalions (23,000 men) are necessary to maintain law and order. They believe 19 battalions could prevent troop movements within the Congo. If Morocco and Indonesia comply with Hammarskjold's appeal to keep their troops there, the UN force in the Congo will remain at 19 battalions. Hammarskjold has requested African states to supply five or six additional battalions for use in Katanga, and apparently is hoping for three or more battalions from India. He regards an Indian contribution as the "key" to the situation at present.

Hammarskjold has held a series of meetings with his 18-member Congo Advisory Committee with the over-all objective of forcing the states represented on that body to take responsibility as a group for implementation of the resolution. He believes that the only way he can act is by some agreement among Africans which would offset Soviet pressure. By involving these states in executive decisions about UN Congo operations, Hammarskjold probably hopes to protect his office and the Secretariat from the inevitable attack by UN members should UN troops ever actually initiate the use of force.

Hammarskjold does not intend to replace Dayal immediately, although his contract expires in two weeks. Hammarskjold said that Dayal would have to stay until "we are around the corner" of the present crisis. Hammarskjold's reluctance to replace Dayal stems in part from the difficulty of finding a suitable replacement as well as to his fear of alienating India. His requests for several men from various Asian and African countries have been refused by the governments mainly on the ground that these men were needed at home.

Paris is sharply critical of UN efforts in the Congo and believes they have only weakened the prestige and strength of the legitimate government. Opposed to any expansion of the UN mandate, and to neutralization of the Congolese Army, Paris advocates strong and immediate support of Kasavubu and believes the US, Britain, France, Belgium, and friendly African countries should act in concert to build up Kasavubu so that he could serve as a lodestone around whom a moderate central government could be formed. Though Paris has ceased its initial direct aid to the Katanga forces, its extreme irritation with the UN, its dislike of US policy, and the serious threat to Kasavubu, suggest that Paris may consider direct aid is imperative.

Khrushchev Letters

Khrushchev's letters of 22 February to Nehru and other heads of government probably were intended as the USSR's response not only to Hammarskjold's new mandate but also

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to recent US warnings against unilateral intervention. Khrushchev sought to counter the Security Council resolution by insisting that the UN operation has failed and that if the present situation continues, Western forces may intervene "behind the facade of the UN."

The letters repeated most of the points contained in the Soviet Government's statement of 14 February on the Congo, with the addition of a renewed demand that Hammarskjold be replaced by a three-man executive organ representing the West, the Communist bloc, and the neutralists. Khrushchev charged, "It is Hammarskjold who killed Lumumba," and declared, "We cannot tolerate a UN secretary general branded with this abominable murder."

The Soviet premier avoided a direct attack on the United States, but he warned certain unnamed "statesmen in the West" that a "big stick" policy is "rife with mortal danger for those who pursue it." Khrushchev's proposal to replace the UN operation by a commission of African states is an attempt to align the pro-Gizenga Casablanca powers--Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR--with the USSR. Nkrumah had earlier proposed reconstituting the UN force into an African military command for the Congo and now intends to present his plan personally to the UN General Assembly session scheduled to reconvene on 7 March. A 22 February communiqué signed by the Casablanca powers meeting in Accra called for reorganization of the UN Congo forces and their subordination to an African command.

Khrushchev's proposed commission, which would deal only with the "legal government" of Gizenga, would have the tasks of supervising the removal of the "aggressors," ensuring the termination of "all forms of foreign intervention," and creating conditions for "normal activities by the Congolese Government and parliament."

By publishing Khrushchev's letter to Nehru, Moscow may hope to head off an Indian decision

to send combat troops to the Congo. Nehru and Defense Minister Menon are apparently thinking in terms of a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men).

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Efforts by Vientiane to reach a reconciliation with Souvanna Phouma probably will be resumed following his return to Phnom Penh on 1 March from a week of consultations with his "government" at Xieng Khouang and with other supporters in Laos. The evident hardening of Souvanna's attitude, however, is a complicating factor.

Souvanna has advanced three possible solutions to the Laotian crisis: creation of a coalition government including Pathet Lao representation, dependent on withdrawal of "American troops" from Laos; creation of a "neutral, nonpolitical" government, presumably composed of civil servants acting under the King; or the early convening of a 14-nation conference--as suggested by Sihanouk--to organize new general elections in Laos which would be supervised by a commission appointed by the conference.

Souvanna's determination to press the Laotian Government on this issue is reflected in the tough statements issued under his name during his stay in Xieng Khouang, including a call for the development and consolidation of a "powerful army to liberate all of Laos." Souvanna was also quoted as doubtful that the "Laotian people and Pathet Lao forces can accept a broadening of the

Boun Oum government. If there is any broadening, it can only be with the collaboration of the Pathet Lao of the government which I have set up."

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Vientiane's attitude will be influenced by its irritation over Souphannouvong's denunciation of King Savang's neutral nations proposal and Souphannouvong's claim that the King is a "prisoner of the imperialists." A government communiqué issued on Souphannouvong's statement --which Souvanna subsequently echoed--termed it "hostile to the King's spirit for neutrality and harmony which could have serious consequences for the Laotian Government's reconciliation policy."

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Burmese Premier U Nu, in rejecting the invitation for Burma to serve on a neutral nations commission, stated that "acceptance would imply recognition of the Boun Oum government, which Burma had not recognized." Nu reiterated Burma's doubts that Sihanouk's 14-nation proposal could bring about tangible results, and instead advocated free elections in Laos under the supervision of a neutral nations commission, on which Burma would be willing to serve. The Burmese premier noted the necessity for the big powers of both East and West to stay out of the Laotian dispute and for the leaders of opposing "factions" in Laos to agree on a modus vivendi to hold such elections.

Both Moscow and Peiping moved quickly to undercut King Savang's proposal. Their immediate response suggests concern lest favorable international reaction to the proposal deprive the bloc of the diplomatic initiative in Laos.

Soviet Ambassador Abramov in Phnom Penh may have been instrumental in persuading Souvanna to go to Xieng Khouang. While Souvanna had entertained the idea for some time, Abramov undoubtedly tried to impress him with the urgency of immediately identifying himself with the Xieng Khouang regime in order to

offset Savang's neutral nations proposal.

In the first authoritative commentary in over a month on Moscow's conditions for reaching a settlement in Laos, a Pravda article on 23 February stressed the need to convene an international conference before the International Control Commission (ICC) can resume its activity in Laos. The article commented obliquely on King Savang's declaration by charging that the Boun Oum government is "flouting the Geneva agreements, which provide the only foundation for peace and security in the Indochina area." The article claimed that the USSR's proposals for dealing with the crisis have "met with widespread international response," and contended that Britain, which together with the USSR chaired the 1954 Geneva Conference, has agreed in principle that any settlement should be based on the Geneva agreements.

Pravda also welcomed Britain's proposal of 21 January for reactivating the ICC in Laos as a "move toward a realistic approach." The article went even further than Moscow's earlier official reply--which suggested that the ICC could meet in New Delhi--by saying the ICC "must meet at once."

The bloc's insistence that any Laotian negotiations

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or settlement be based on the 1954 Geneva agreements stems from its conviction that this approach would guarantee a major bloc voice in any solution and provide the best device for obtaining strong Pathet Lao participation in any expanded government of "national unity" that might be recommended by an international conference.

The most comprehensive statement of the USSR's position regarding a Laotian settlement was made by Soviet Ambassador Menshikov to Secretary Rusk on 28 February. Menshikov called Sihanouk's proposal of "paramount importance" and said that the 14-nation conference proposed by the Cambodian leader could furnish the ICC with the additional powers necessary for its operation. The Soviet ambassador also noted that US support for the Laotian King's neutral nations proposal was actually an abandonment of the Geneva agreements and would lead to the creation of a new commission for which there is no legal ground.

Peiping propaganda treatment of the Laotian situation has contrasted with Moscow's avoidance of direct criticism of the US administration. People's Daily on 25 February charged that the US "has been stepping up aggression against Laos" while talking of a political settlement. It described the neutral nations proposal as "nothing but a US intrigue."

The editorial also drew attention to the presence of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Laos, and said the US was planning for "these brigands to join the civil war." About 3,000 of the irregulars have taken up residence in Namtha Province after being forced out of Burma under pressure from the Burmese Army assisted by Chinese Communist forces.

The irregulars issue was raised somewhat more stridently in another People's Daily article on 27 February. Here Peiping raised the implicit threat of intervention "if US imperialism dares to incite the Kuomintang bandits to join the Laotian rebel forces." People's Daily said such a move would "seriously menace the security of China's southwestern border"--a menace that "absolutely cannot be tolerated." The commentary also cited a recent statement by Kong Le warning that if the Nationalist irregulars are not withdrawn, "the Souvanna Phouma government will take measures similar to those adopted by the Burmese Government to eliminate them."

No Chinese Communist military personnel are known to be in Laos at the present time, but Peiping is using the presence of Nationalist irregulars there as a convenient excuse for linking Communist China's national interests more closely to the Laotian crisis. The irregulars could be used by Peiping to justify a military role in Laos, and the presence of an old enemy on "China's southwestern border" would become a likely issue for prolonging any international conference in which the Chinese Communists took part.

General Phoumi, in a press interview, has denied any intention of using the Nationalist irregulars in the government's military effort. He termed their

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presence "embarrassing" and said steps are being taken to resolve the problem. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nationalist China has indicated willingness to withdraw those irregulars "subject to its control," but a substantial number may not fall into this category.

The military situation in Laos continues generally quiet, but Phomui claims to have reports that the Pathet Lao high command worked out plans with Souvanna Phouma for a major surprise attack on Luang Prabang in hopes of capturing the King and installing the Souvanna regime in the

royal capital. Phoumi, however, is confident that government strength in the Luang Prabang area is sufficient to repel any attack.

There is no other information concerning such enemy intentions, but the logistical build-up by the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in the vicinity of the Phou Khoun road junction has reached a level sufficient to support a counterattack on government troops who remain bogged down a few miles east of the junction.

In the Tha Thom area, government strength is insufficient to take advantage of the orderly withdrawal of Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces northward toward Xieng Khouang. [REDACTED]

**FRANCE-ALGERIA**

The objective of the 27 February talks between De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba --to open the way for direct negotiations between France and the Algerian rebel leaders--has apparently been achieved. Official French statements on 1 March implicitly confirm that De Gaulle now is willing to negotiate without a prior cease-fire. He hopes to move fast enough to prevent consolidation of French rightist opponents of his policy; this opposition, together with resistance to negotiations among factions in the rebel

leadership, threatens an early settlement.

The 2 March communiqué issued jointly by rebel "premier" Ferhat Abbas, Bourguiba, and the new Moroccan King, referring to negotiations in the framework of a North African federation, suggests that Tunisia and Morocco intend to play a role in any Algerian negotiations.

Bourguiba's son told US officials on 1 March that De Gaulle and Bourguiba "hit it

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off admirably" and that Bourguiba was convinced De Gaulle "was on the right path." He said De Gaulle had personally changed the phrasing of the communiqué issued by the two Presidents from "early evolution" to read "rapid and positive evolution." The Tunisians believe De Gaulle will release the imprisoned rebel leaders, headed by Mohammed Ben Bella, and open Algerian concentration camps.

Bourguiba apparently refrained from pressing De Gaulle for a detailed timetable, but Bourguiba Jr. had the impression that a De Gaulle - Abbas meeting was a definite possibility. The younger Bourguiba thought secret contacts had already begun.

Originally De Gaulle made a cease-fire a precondition of political talks with the rebels, but he has increasingly blurred this demand. French Minister of Information Terrenoire's public statement on 1 March, following De Gaulle's report to the cabinet of his talks with Bourguiba, implicitly confirms that De Gaulle now has dropped the demand. Terrenoire omitted any reference to a cease-fire when he announced that the government was ready to discuss the conditions of a self-determination vote with the various Algerian political factions, particularly the rebels. Rebel leaders have maintained that they will not accept any form of cease-fire before negotiations are completed.

De Gaulle has also publicly maintained that the Algerian rebels are not representative of Algeria and that he could discuss Algeria's future only

with all factions there. According to Bourguiba, De Gaulle now admits that the rebels represent "nine tenths" of Algerian sentiment.

The first public reaction from the Algerian rebel side was an announcement by Abbas in Rabat, made in conjunction with Moroccan King Hassan II and Bourguiba, that "no obstacle should stand in the way of direct negotiations" between Paris and the rebel government. The three called for an independent Algeria within the framework of a North African federation, the so-called "Magreb" federation uniting Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

The Magreb idea is an old one among North African leaders. The idea of such a federation, linked to France, has appealed to De Gaulle and is probably viewed by him as a possible vehicle for "selling" Algerian independence to France. Competition between North African leaders, however, has heretofore prevented any serious progress toward attainment of a federation.

Bourguiba's son said De Gaulle was conducting a "one-man show" on Algeria and did not even fully inform Premier Debré or Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on the contents of his talks with Bourguiba. De Gaulle reportedly "silenced" Debré's various objections at Rambouillet.

An outstanding example of the obstacles to an early settlement is the question of control of the Sahara and recent French moves concerning the area. Debré, on a visit to the Sahara just prior to the De Gaulle - Bourguiba talks, stated publicly

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that France intended to remain there and that the Sahara belonged to none of the neighboring territories. Paris on 1 March announced a fourth nuclear test to be held there soon, and the French military headquarters for the Sahara is being moved from Algiers to Reggane, the nuclear test site.

In Algeria, European settler extremists have stepped up a campaign of bombings, and at

least 17 Europeans--veterans or reservists--have been arrested as members of a "French Algeria" maquis. Serious Moslem rioting has recently occurred in Oran. Further obstacles to negotiations are indicated by Bourguiba Jr.'s statement that he thought there was some resistance to them within the rebel leadership. Rebel leaders have claimed they are under heavy pressure from Moscow and Peiping and that they intend to be tough in negotiations.

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**MOROCCO**

The death on 26 February of King Mohamed V, who had been the only significant force for unity and stability in Morocco, seems certain to inaugurate a new period of political turmoil. Mohamed's 31-year-old son has moved speedily to solidify his rule as Hassan II. He immediately ordered military and security units to enforce order and already is reported seeking to form a government of "national union."

The principal challenge to Hassan's authority as a theoretically absolute monarch is the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), a strong, left-wing nationalist-labor group led by a collegium of young intellectuals who demand a constitution and government responsible to the people. Among its leaders are former Premier Abdallah Ibrahim; former Deputy Premier Abderrahim Bouabid, who now is serving as its organizing secretary general; former resistance

leader Mohamed el-Basri; Mehdi Ben Barka, student leader and self-exiled former tutor of the new King; and Mahjoub Ben Seddik, dynamic secretary general of Morocco's most powerful labor organization, the 600,000-member Moroccan Labor Union.

A predominantly urban organization, centered in Casablanca and Rabat, the UNFP has during the past nine months been strengthening its organization and seeking supporters in the army and in areas where it was weakest. That much organizational work remains to be done was implicit in comments by a member of the UNFP secretariat, who expressed the "left's universal dismay at the death of the King, which could not have occurred at a worse time." He told an American official that the opposition prefers to wait --suggesting some seven to ten days, or roughly the period of state mourning--rather than take immediate action against

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Hassan. He also stated that the UNFP will "invoke the name" of the dead king to try to counter Hassan's expected exploitation of the respect and affection Moroccans held for his father.

tional organizations to unify their ranks to work for the realization of the national objectives of Mohamed V," and urged the "wholehearted and widespread allegiance of the nation to King Hassan II." The palace-created and pro-monarchist Popular Movement will be the most likely vehicle for enlisting rural and tribal backing for Hassan, although it lacks dynamic leadership.

Morocco's foreign policy under Hassan probably will continue to be formal "nonalignment." Although Hassan was considered to be personally pro-French--in fact he was accused by his opposition of having "sold out" to France--he has sought contacts with Moscow and Cairo. Hassan solicited from the USSR the recent gift of Soviet jet aircraft and is reported to have initialed during Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Morocco last month an agreement for Soviet economic aid. He seems likely to make further arrangements with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Hassan will rely principally on the 30,500-man army, of which he has been chief of staff, but whose loyalty to him has yet to be tested. The army is undergoing an internal crisis caused by friction between nationalistic but disorganized young officers and senior officers--among whom are the new King's closest military advisers--who gained their experience in the French Army.

Hassan may also count on a measure of support, at least initially, from the conservative Istiqlal party, which on 28 February called on "all na-

At the same time he may press for new concessions from the US and France in connection with base arrangements made in 1959 and 1960 and probably will intensify pressure for the evacuation of the 3,000 Spanish troops remaining in northern Morocco.

**CUBA**

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Cuba's recent cabinet changes are aimed at organizing the economy more efficiently and paving the way for an announced one-billion-dollar five-year industrialization program. Plans announced on 24 February for the creation of three new ministries and the reorganization of other economic administrative bodies were reportedly fashioned by Cuban and Czech technicians in Prague. The new economic order conforms closely to the Com-

munist pattern for state control of the economy. The National Bank of Cuba, now to be headed by former Commerce Minister Cepero Bonilla, will issue all currency and function as the government's fiscal agent in all domestic and international financial affairs.

Che Guevara, former president of the National Bank and now chief of the new Ministry of Industry, has apparently strengthened his position as

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Cuba's chief economic administrator, since the national petroleum and mining institutes and the sugar mills have been transferred to his ministry. The 27 February attempt on his life--evidently the second such attempt within the last four months--underlines the importance with which anti-Castro elements regard him.

In an apparent change of tactics toward other Latin American governments, the Castro regime delivered a lengthy letter on 24 February to the remaining Latin American diplomatic missions in Havana insisting that Cuba harbors no intentions of exporting its revolution. Reiterating the familiar charges that the United States plans aggression against Cuba, the letter reportedly implied Castro's approval of the current Ecuadorean proposal for joint Latin American mediation of US-Cuban differences.

The note followed by only 12 days Castro's speech alleging US aid to anti-Castro elements and claiming Cuba's right to spread its revolution abroad. Cuba probably hopes to reduce the possibility of solid Latin American support for collective action against it.

The "first regional Latin American plantation workers' conference" in Havana, scheduled to begin on 3 March, is attracting delegates from other

Latin American Communist parties and Communist-front organizations as well as observers from Soviet bloc countries.

Anti-Castro forces are continuing their activities throughout Cuba, despite government claims that major resistance centers have been, or are about to be, eliminated. Government forces have claimed the capture of about 900 rebels in the Sierra Escambray area, where Havana previously estimated that fewer than 1,000 counter-revolutionaries were concentrated. Reports of new engagements with guerrillas indicate, however, that considerable numbers remain at large.

Unconfirmed reports of escapes and defections of prominent persons are circulating among opposition elements. According to recent press reports, former labor chief David Salvador--an opportunist who turned against Castro and was captured while seeking to leave the island in November 1960--has fled Cuba with a number of followers from his antigovernment "30 November Movement."

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
**SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE**

The over-all combat effectiveness of Soviet commands in East Germany (GSFG), Poland (NGF), and Hungary (SGF) has been increased during the first year of Khrushchev's "demobilization program." While military forces within the USSR have been reduced, manpower of the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe has been maintained at the approximate level of 1959. No line units were disbanded or transferred from these exterior commands. These forces have been strengthened by the continued introduction of

improved tanks, guns, and aircraft; in the GSFG, several conventional artillery and antiaircraft artillery units have probably been replaced by missile units.

Although these forces have a nuclear weapons delivery capability, there is no evidence of local stockpiling of nuclear warheads. Such warheads could be readily airlifted from the USSR.

Soviet units in Eastern Europe are highly trained,



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well-equipped forces, maintained at a higher level of combat capability than the Soviet average, and relatively immune to some of the short-term fluctuations in policy that affect Soviet forces elsewhere. The GSFG has been essentially an armored strike force with appropriate infantry, artillery, and tactical air components. It is well organized and equipped to conduct either offensive action into Western Europe or a mobile defense of its own area.

In Hungary, the recent conversion of a rifle division into a tank division suggests that the forces there are no longer serving primarily in an occupation capacity--their function since the 1956 revolt. This force, by its present composition and disposition, forms a southward extension of the GSFG and increases the Soviet capability for ground combat into or against Central Europe and the Mediterranean region. The force in Poland is organized to protect Soviet communication routes across that country.

The deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in East Germany, begun in 1959, was continued during 1960. Six 6-launcher Guideline SAM sites are believed operational now; four of these, however, have probably been transferred to East German Army control. The GSFG probably also acquired a short-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM) capability during the last 18 months. Reports of tank-borne "rockets," which may be either the 150-nautical-mile (n.m.) Scud SSM or the Frog unguided rocket

There is also evidence that the Soviets have longer range missiles--the 350-n.m.

or the 700-n.m. Shyster SSM-- in East Germany.

Equipment modernization in the three external commands appears to follow a common pattern. The best information of progress is from the GSFG, which now has replaced about 70 percent of its authorized number of medium tanks with the new T-54, has received about 4,400 of its 7,000 authorized armored personnel carriers (some of the newer tracked amphibious type), and has instituted a reorganization of artillery units (including emphasis on larger caliber antiaircraft guns). Rapid accretion of general-purpose vehicles in recent months is believed to have brought the command to full strength in this category.

Soviet tactical air elements in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary--particularly the 24th Tactical Air Army of the GSFG--have increased their combat capability through the acquisition of new classes of fighters and through improvements in support and weapons systems.

Training of both the ground and air elements in the three Eastern Europe commands is intense and realistic. In the GSFG, it culminates annually in combined maneuvers at high levels, during which simulated atomic strikes are employed by both sides. Displacement training for missile units appears to have taken place in 1960 for the first time. In field training, great stress is laid on the rapid crossing of water obstacles, for which new techniques and equipment have been introduced.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SOVIET AGRICULTURAL REORGANIZATION**

Moscow during the last week formalized the reorganization of agriculture agreed on at the January central committee plenum. According to a resolution of 20 February, the Ministry of Agriculture--already weakened by the abolition of Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) in 1958 and later the loss of its planning and supply functions--will lose most of its remaining functions. It will be chiefly responsible for carrying out practical research and disseminating the results. At the local level, the ministry will establish model farms in each rayon.

The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) will take over the ministry's responsibility for state farms, forestry, and irrigation projects and may in addition have some supervisory power over collective farms. Among its duties is "analysis of the implementation of current agricultural production plans and...of the financial affairs of state and collective farms." The Central Statistical Directorate will prepare the annual and quarterly accounts of the state and collective farms, a function formerly performed by the ministry.

A separate resolution approved the structure of the new Agricultural Machinery and Supply Union. This organization will supply equipment, spare parts, fertilizer, and other needs to the state and collective farms and will be responsible for the repair and testing of agricultural equipment. It will also handle some of the functions of the old MTSSs. The former MTS chief, P. S. Kuchumov, has been appointed chairman of this union.

On 25 February Moscow announced creation of a State Committee for Agricultural Procurements to be chaired by Deputy Premier N. G. Ignatov. This committee will control the collection of agricultural products through a system of "contracts" with state and collective farms. The regime undoubtedly hopes that the new system, by concentrating state procurement in a single agency with a widespread network of local agents, will give greater control over state purchases and reduce illegal practices at the local level. The former State Committee for the Procurement of Grain Products has been abolished.

Control over that portion of farm produce which is not procured by the state will also be tightened. According to a decree, also issued 25 February, consumer cooperatives will step up purchases of the "surplus" output of collective farms and collective farmers in order to sell it locally at prevailing prices. This will put greater pressure on collective farms to sell this surplus through quasi-official channels rather than directly on the collective farmers' free markets.

Another decree was issued on 22 February to increase the planned state allocations for rural electrification during 1961-65. This is in line with Khrushchev's January plenum statement calling for an increase in state agricultural investment over the original Seven-Year-Plan goals. This investment, which remained low in 1959 and 1960, is to be increased primarily in irrigation and electrification projects.

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According to the original Seven-Year-Plan directive, the major share of agricultural investment was to originate from collective farm funds rather than from state resources. Much of the irrigation and electrification construction was to be carried out by intercollective-farm enterprises without the aid of state funds. The excellent 1958 harvest swelled the income of collective farms and thus generated a high level of collective farm investment in 1959, but poor harvests in 1959 and 1960 undoubtedly led to lower investments in 1960, and the outlook for 1961 is not promising. Thus the regime may have turned to state resources to offset the probable underfulfillment of collective farm investment.

The adoption of a new wage system for state farm workers--a part of the over-all adjustment of wages, hours, and work norms throughout the state sector--follows considerable criticism during the past two years of the system adopted in 1958.

In the past, state farm workers were paid for fulfilling their daily work tasks without regard to quantity or quality of the end product. Under the new system wages will be computed on the basis of all three of these considerations.

The system of awards to workers has been improved and new wage scales set up for machine operators, who will receive bonuses for timeliness of field operations and for the proper care of machines.

Presumably, the new wage system will mean an over-all increase in the wages of the state farm worker since an additional 260,000,000 rubles have been allocated in 1961 for the readjustment in wages. The new system will require a more conscientious effort from the worker and may also divert his attention from his own private plot. [redacted]

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**COMMUNIST CHINA SLOWS INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM**

Recent statements from Peiping bear out previous indications that Communist China has been forced to reorient and slow down its industrialization program as a result of two consecutive years of bad harvests, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians last summer, and the economic dislocations created by the "leap forward." Another problem which probably contributed to the apparent retrench-

ment is the deterioration of China's balance of payments.

By 1960, the regime's preoccupation with increasing the volume of industrial output had created serious problems within industry. It is estimated that the gross national product was only about 8 percent higher than in 1959 as against an expected increase of about 13 percent, that

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industrial production was 8 percent below plan, and that industrial investment actually declined.

No details concerning a revised plan have been forthcoming, but statements on industrial construction policy in 1961 indicate that scheduled rates of growth have been sharply reduced. The first such statement was by economic planner Po I-po in Red Flag. The main effort in industrial construction "for the next two or three years," he wrote, will be to consolidate the gains already made, to reinforce lagging sectors, and to improve the quality of output of industry as a whole. The rate of investment in heavy industry is to be reduced, according to Po, so that agriculture, light industry, mining, and transportation can catch up. Industrial investment may in fact again decline in 1961 if this is done.

Po stated that, within heavy industry, efforts will be concentrated on "an all-out campaign to complete construction projects." He is probably alluding to projects on which work stopped when Soviet technicians were abruptly withdrawn. He said priority will be given to projects urgently needed, those easiest to finish, and those which will have an immediate effect on the economy. This suggests that Soviet technicians are not expected to return at least for the present, and that completion of Soviet aid projects already started--the core of Peiping's industrialization program--will occupy Chinese technicians for some time.

A People's Daily editorial on 11 February said that production of new prestige items, such as large turbogenerators and complex machine tools, prominently featured during the "leap forward," is to be delayed. This would enable Chinese industry to concentrate on the production of essential auxiliary equipment and spare parts which formerly were imported from the bloc.

A reduction of capital imports has been necessary because of shortages of exportable agricultural products. People's Daily implies, however, that Peiping is going beyond this necessary reduction. The regime appears to have re-oriented its industrialization program so as to rely more on its own resources and less on technological assistance from the bloc.

The new policies signal the end of China's efforts to industrialize at breakneck speed. Whether they constitute merely a tactical retreat remains to be seen. A top-level Soviet economic delegation is now in Peiping for negotiations on future trade and economic relations between the two countries. There are indications that some sort of preliminary agreement preceded the delegation's arrival in Peiping, and that both parties hope to stem the deterioration in economic relations which resulted from political differences between the two governments. The question now is whether Peiping's apparent retreat from some of its more unorthodox economic policies will elicit further Soviet financial or technical assistance.

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## NORTH VIETNAM CHANGES FOREIGN MINISTERS

Pham Van Dong, one of North Vietnam's top party leaders and a veteran diplomat, has resigned as foreign minister, a post he had held concurrently with the premiership for more than five years. Dong is still premier, however, and it is unlikely that the move signals any major shift in Hanoi's foreign policy in the immediate future. His successor, party central committee member Ung Van Khiem, had been deputy foreign minister for the past six years and probably has had an important voice in foreign affairs.

Khiem probably will give top priority to the regime's program for rapid reunification of Vietnam. One of the few prominent figures in the North Vietnamese regime to have been born in South Vietnam, he was a leader of Communist guerrilla activities in southern Indochina for over two decades. The 50-year-old Khiem has long been a close associate of party First Secretary Le Duan. The two went north together in 1954 after years of clandestine activities south of the 17th parallel. Both men have been linked with the current intensified campaign to unseat South Vietnam's President Diem.

During the past year, two others who served with Le Duan during his guerrilla days have moved up in the government and

party structure. Pham Hung and Le Duc Tho were named to the party secretariat last September and were the only two individuals elevated in the politburo order of precedence. Hung was placed in over-all charge of the government's agricultural programs last July, and Tho now may be responsible for party organization. Le Duan's success in elevating his old guerrilla colleagues to high office attests to his growing influence in the regime and bolsters his position as Ho Chi Minh's most likely successor.

Unlike Pham Van Dong, who led Hanoi's delegation to the Geneva and Bandung conferences and who has traveled widely throughout the bloc, Ung Van Khiem is known to have left Vietnam only twice since World War II. In the summer of 1955 he accompanied Ho Chi Minh to Moscow and Peiping, and in 1959 he attended Communist China's tenth anniversary celebrations.

Now, however, he is slated to lead a government delegation to Africa and, as foreign minister, will actively press Hanoi's campaign for closer ties with the new African countries. Guinea and Mali recognized North Vietnam last year, and Khiem is probably optimistic about his prospects for promoting further diplomatic exchanges.

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## RHODESIAN FEDERATION

In his address to the parliament of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 27 February, Prime Minister Roy Welensky belligerently thrust an olive branch at Britain.

Earlier he had threatened to call a special election on the issue of independence. In his speech he denounced Britain's plans to give the 2,400,00 Africans of Northern Rhodesia

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greater representation in that protectorate's territorial legislature--calling it a "half-baked scheme"--but offered to participate in new talks on enlarging that body. He warned that if London declines this offer, "it may be necessary to fight for what we have created during the last 70 years."

The Macmillan government has been deeply concerned that an impasse might develop and has been under pressure--albeit declining--from right-wing Conservative party backbenchers for some accommodation with the Rhodesian settlers. It reacted quickly to Welensky's suggestion inviting him to London for discussions. Welensky agreed to come on 3 March. Nevertheless, London has shown no inclination to abandon its pro-African proposals.

Officials in Salisbury announced on 28 February that they were demobilizing the national guardsmen and reservists called up during the past two weeks in anticipation of African violence, and were lifting the ban on leaves for some 5,000 police in Southern Rhodesia.

London's proposal is to give the Africans of Northern Rhodesia approximate legislative parity with the white settlers--a significant gain over their present status. The exact proportion of Africans and

whites in the legislature would be the subject of later discussions. The Africans have demanded a majority in the legislative and executive councils and are not satisfied with this approach. However, they have not resorted to violence, as had been widely feared.

Kenneth Kaunda of the leading United National Independence party and Harry Nkumbula of the African National Congress left London in late February, and are en route to Northern Rhodesia. With their arrival, African dissatisfaction--particularly if London interprets the proposal to suit Welensky--may be channeled into strong protest, possibly including violence against Europeans in the copper belt area of Northern Rhodesia.

The bulk of the Rhodesian settlers--the 230,000 in Southern Rhodesia and the 70,000 in Northern Rhodesia--apparently believe that the Northern Rhodesian constitutional talks will have a decisive impact on the future of white settlement in central Africa. Therefore, the settler-controlled federal parliament, as well as the settlers themselves, would probably give Welensky strong backing in threatening gestures to London.

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**COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE**

The conference of prime ministers of the British Commonwealth beginning in London on 8 March will be the second in about ten months, although such meetings usually are held every two or three years.

A major reason for a conference at this time is to decide whether South Africa can remain a member of the Commonwealth after it becomes a republic this spring. Other members--including India, Malaya, Ghana,

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Nigeria, Canada, and Ceylon--are cool to the idea because of South Africa's apartheid policy in racial matters.

Prime Minister Macmillan apparently intends to make a major conciliatory effort. He hopes to prevent formal discussion of apartheid and thus to avoid acrimonious exchanges which could result in South Africa's expulsion. Britain for some time has been seeking to persuade other members that retaining South Africa would make it easier to induce it to change its racial policies and that an expulsion--unprecedented in the grouping--would seriously undermine Commonwealth ties. Canada's Prime Minister Diefenbaker apparently is one of the strongest opponents of South Africa but has indicated he will reserve his position pending the outcome of discussions at the conference.

Apparently there is an increasing interest in obtaining Commonwealth-wide understanding--if not agreement--on London's position regarding major international questions such as disarmament and nuclear tests, and on critical areas such as the Congo and Laos, possibly in anticipation of a summit meeting later this year.

In view of the British position--stated publicly by Foreign Secretary Home on 8 February--that Communist China should be admitted to the UN, London is likely to want to consider tactics to bring this

**BACKGROUND**

Seven of the eleven independent members of the British Commonwealth recognize Queen Elizabeth as head of state and are governed in the name of the Crown. Three are republics with a president as chief of state, and acknowledge the Queen only as head of the Commonwealth. All three have become republics without altering their status as members. Malaya became an independent member as a federation with an elected Paramount Ruler as head of state. Approval for continued membership as a republic must be unanimous on the part of the other members; this approval has always been granted in the past. Members attaining independent membership in the Commonwealth since World War II are:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Head of State</u>	<u>Independence Date</u>
India	President Prasad (change approved 1949)	15 Aug 1947
Pakistan	President Ayub Khan (change approved 1955)	15 Aug 1947
Ceylon	Queen Elizabeth	4 Feb 1948
Ghana	President Nkrumah (change approved May 1960)	6 Mar 1957
Malaya	Tunku Syed Putra	31 Aug 1957
Nigeria	Queen Elizabeth	1 Oct 1960

about. It was the consensus of the prime ministers' conference last May that Peiping should be brought into disarmament discussions, and the Macmillan government would undoubtedly like to obtain Commonwealth views on the representation question for discussion with President Kennedy in April.

The application of Cyprus for Commonwealth membership for at least five years will probably be approved, as will the request of Sierra Leone for membership after becoming independent on 27 April. The future structure of the Commonwealth, particularly the status of the smaller territories gaining independence, is also scheduled for discussion. Further, Macmillan will presumably try to re-establish rapport with Nehru--London has been irritated with Indian diplomacy in regard to Laos, and Nehru is reported resentful of Macmillan's "partisan" support of Belgium in the Congo.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****BRAZIL'S FIRST MONTH UNDER QUADROS**

Janio Quadros in the first month of his five-year term of office has made a few moves toward closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc and has stressed the need for economy in domestic administration. The new Brazilian President has had to spend considerable time on filling sub-cabinet posts but is reported also to have devoted attention to the programs of each of his cabinet ministers.

Quadros has made initial moves in the "truly independent" foreign policy he proposed on 31 January in his inaugural address. His administration has recently announced that it will support inclusion of the Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly agenda at the next session, although it has not yet decided whether to recognize Communist China or support its admission to the United Nations.

The Foreign Ministry announced on 23 February that Brazil will establish relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Renewal of diplomatic relations with the USSR is also reported under active consideration. Czechoslovakia and Poland are the only bloc countries in which Brazil now has missions.

In addition, Foreign Minister Arinos on 24 February suggested a visit to Brazil by Marshal Tito in response to a question by a Yugoslav journalist in Brazil as to how the two countries could best expand relations.

With respect to Cuba, Quadros has taken no decisive position, despite his words of praise for the Castro regime during the campaign. He has, however, maintained his position of opposing collective measures against Castro. While Quadros has not as yet publicly outlined a policy for Africa, he has indicated his belief that Brazil could assume the role of a bridge between the West and Africa--a belief his predecessor expressed during 1960. Quadros proposed on 24 February, for instance, that a scholarship program to foster Brazilian relations with Africa be expanded, despite the country's need for austerity.

When Brazil refused to participate in this year's inter-American military exercises with the United States, a Brazilian diplomat commented to an American official that he believed the decision was based primarily on Quadros' desire to establish a neutral position for Brazil in foreign affairs. Press reports from Brazil state that the administration is hesitant about a \$100,000,000 loan offer from the United States and comment that the new President might prefer to pull the country out of its financial hole through increased business deals with both East and West.

Quadros has not yet publicly spelled out the drastic economic measures he apparently plans, but he has taken advantage of initial enthusiasm for his administration to lengthen

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government working hours and dismiss more than 10,000 politically appointed government workers--a step similar to his first moves as governor and mayor of Sao Paulo earlier in his career. Commissions have been appointed to draw up plans within the next several weeks for

solving specific problems, and the individual ministries are to report by 9 March on plans for 30-percent reductions in their budgets. Quadros probably hopes that leftists, who are likely to protest his economic measures, may be conciliated by his foreign policy.

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**SOVIET ITALIAN TRADE**

Soviet-Italian trade is scheduled to increase during the next five years as a result of negotiations recently held in Moscow. A protocol for 1961, the final year of the current four-year trade agreement, calls for a rise in commerce to about \$240,000,000--an increase of more than 20 percent over 1960. A new four-year agreement (1962-65) provides for further annual increases, with total trade possibly reaching as much as \$500,000,000 in 1965. One of the main benefits Moscow derives from these agreements is the acquisition of tankers and advanced technical equipment.

The USSR's trade with Italy has developed rapidly since 1958 and by the end of 1961 probably will exceed by more than \$100,000,000 the original over-all four-year target of some \$500,000,000. The trade has not remained balanced as planned under the 1958-61 agreement, however, largely because of Moscow's failure to import its share of commodities under the agreement. Apparently in order to stimulate Soviet buying and to balance trade, Italy agreed in 1960 to extend government-guaranteed five-year credits of up to \$100,000,000. Since the new four-year agreement also calls for balanced trade, similar financing arrangements may

also have been provided for under this pact.

During the next five years, in addition to supplying equipment for the USSR's chemical industry--in some instances complete installations--Italy will export 240,000 tons of steel pipe, "no less than" eight 35,000-ton oil tankers, synthetic rubber, rolled steel, machinery, and other goods. Soviet deliveries apparently will be limited to oil, coal, ores, pig iron, wheat, and lumber. The USSR has been guaranteed a market for 14 percent of Italy's annual oil imports through 1965. Thus, Moscow is scheduled to supply an average of over 4,000,000 tons of POL a year.

The new agreement includes the commodities covered by the \$200,000,000 special barter arrangement signed in Moscow last fall by Enrico Mattei, head of the Italian state fuels agency. In return for 12,000,000 tons of Soviet crude and fuel oil between 1960 and 1965, Mattei agreed to deliver steel pipeline equipment and synthetic rubber to the USSR.

Although trade with the Soviet Union accounts for only about 2 to 3 percent of Italy's total, the growing unfavorable balance of trade and some

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unemployment in certain industrial sectors presumably were instrumental in Rome's decision to increase its trade commitments with the USSR. Soviet readiness to purchase chemical plant equipment, large-diameter steel pipe, and modern tankers from other Western industrial countries probably was a further stimulus.

The Italian decision to construct tankers for the USSR is an important gain for Moscow,

which last fall embarked on an extensive effort to build up a modern tanker fleet through the acquisition of large Western vessels. Similarly, the supply of steel pipe will aid the USSR's program of constructing pipelines for the transportation of its oil to its European satellites. In addition, the imports of chemical plant equipment are in keeping with the goals of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-65).

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**NEW SOVIET PRESS AGENCY**

The Soviet agency Novosti (News), which was established on 21 February, combines the functions of a press agency supplementing the official wire service TASS and an information agency supplying materials about the USSR for distribution abroad. The draft charter states that Novosti aims, "by the wide circulation abroad of truthful information about the Soviet Union and by familiarizing the Soviet public with the life of people abroad, to promote in every way the strengthening of mutual understanding, trust, and friendship between peoples."

Official statements have stressed that Novosti is an "independent information organ of the mass public organizations of the USSR," apparently in the hope that foreign and domestic audiences will be more susceptible to pronouncements from seemingly nonofficial Soviet sources. Four of these so-called public organizations --through which the regime mobilizes support for its program --are sponsoring the new agency: the USSR Writers' and Journalists' Unions, the Union of So-

viet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and the All-Union Society for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.

Novosti will open branches in most foreign countries and have a "wide network" of foreign and domestic correspondents. It will conclude contracts with foreign press, radio, and television organizations and private individuals in accordance with the local laws on distributing Soviet materials. The branch to be opened soon in Sweden may replace the existing Soviet Information Bureau and its publication News From the Soviet Union.

The council which will run Novosti consists of the top officials of the four sponsoring organizations and of prominent writers and scientists who have been active in promoting Soviet propaganda in the past. Among the council members are Pavel Satyukov--editor of Pravda and president of the Journalists' Union--and Aleksey Adzhubey--

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Izvestia editor, Khrushchev's son-in-law, and co-author of books propagandizing Khrushchev's trips through America and Asia. Appointment to the council of an expert on underdeveloped areas, Anushavan Arzumanyan-- who is a member of the presid-

ium of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations-- is one indication that such areas will be a particular target of Novosti.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SPECIAL ARTICLES****WESTERN INFLUENCE IN WORLD ORGANIZED LABOR**

In the contest for influence in organized labor, the free world's largest labor organization--the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)--has been encountering substantial difficulties. This is particularly true in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where the ICFTU could be an influential instrument for initiating some of the important institutions of American and Western European society. In these countries, however, either the concept of organized free labor is failing to take root or emerging unions are often on the defensive against Communist infiltration or government controls.

Part of the ICFTU's difficulty in meeting these challenges stems from the internal frictions and organizational problems which have long afflicted international free labor. These will be principal topics of discussion at a meeting of the ICFTU's Executive Board in Brussels on 13 March. In addition, however, there is the continuing difficulty of finding meaningful applications of Western trade unionism to

pre-industrial societies, where the ICFTU is hampered by its own historical development. International cooperation among unions goes back more than a century, but has involved mainly unions with similar industrial backgrounds. Moreover, the dominant elements of the ICFTU today are still unions from the highly developed economies of the United States, Britain, and the Western European continent.

**Period Since World War II**

The ICFTU is a product of the cold war. In 1945, the major French and British trade unions and the American CIO joined with the Soviet trade unions to form the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). During its first two years, the organization expanded rapidly in the industrialized countries and gained world-wide influence. By 1948, however, Communist manipulation had provoked a crisis in the organization. Finally, in December 1949, the British Trade Unions Congress (TUC), the non-Communist unions on the Continent, and the American CIO and AFL withdrew to form the ICFTU.

**BACKGROUND****MAJOR FREE WORLD LABOR INTERNATIONALS**

*The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), by far the largest of the free labor internationals, claims some 138 affiliated national centers or federations representing about 57,000,000 workers in 103 countries. Next in importance are the International Trade Secretariats (ITS), now 20 in number with a total affiliated membership of more than 30,000,000 workers. The smallest of the major internationals is the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU or CISG) with about 5,000,000 affiliated workers. Most of these are West European, with a scattering of membership in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. IFCTU headquarters is in Brussels.*

**WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS**

*The Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) claims an affiliated membership of about 90,000,000 workers in more than 75 countries. About 90 percent of its members are drawn from the state-controlled labor organizations in the Sino-Soviet bloc, but there are important free world affiliates such as the principal national federations of France (CGT), Italy (CGIL), and Indonesia (SOBSI). Expelled from both Paris and Vienna, the WFTU presently has its headquarters in Prague.*

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Of the 57,000,000 workers which the ICFTU now claims to represent, roughly three fourths are still drawn from Western Europe and the western hemisphere. Its principal officers are also Western Europeans-- President Arne Geijer of Sweden and Secretary General Omer Becu of Belgium. Indigenous nationals predominate, however, in the ICFTU's four regional offices--European (ERO), Asian (ARO), Inter-American (ORIT), and African (AFRO). In recent years, labor leaders from developing areas have assumed a larger role in the Brussels secretariat.

The ICFTU is financed by affiliation fees and by a one-cent levy per member on affiliates able and willing to pay. Since 1956, however, "project" activities have been paid for by voluntary contributions to the so-called International Solidarity Fund, the present goal of which is \$10,000,000 for the period 1961-63. American unions have been asked to supply \$4,000,000 of this, British \$2,500,000, West German \$2,000,000, and Swedish \$1,000,000.

ICFTU Activities

While international Communism has a single labor instrument in addition to the party apparatus, the ICFTU has acquired no such monopoly in the free world. Allied with it in general objectives but often competing in practice is the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU or CISC)--like the ICFTU, an international organization of national labor federations. Much more important, however, are the International Trade Secretariats (ITS)--the 20 international associations of trade unions in a given craft or industry in different countries. They are linked with

the ICFTU vertically through the affiliation of their constituent unions with the various ICFTU national centers, and laterally through ICFTU-ITS liaison machinery.

Jurisdictional lines between the ITS and the ICFTU are blurred, but the ITS have traditionally leaned toward pragmatic trade unionism rather than political causes. Accordingly, they have lent assistance in organizing, particularly in underdeveloped countries, extended financial aid to strikers, and promoted improved labor legislation as a practical means of protecting international labor standards.

By comparison, the ICFTU is less restricted in its approach and has proclaimed as its aim "a free society based on free labor." Thus, during the past ten years, the ICFTU has undertaken propaganda campaigns against international Communism in general; has protested against the Franco and Salazar dictatorships, Castro, and French colonial policies in Algeria; and has lobbied against government restrictions on or intervention with the collective bargaining rights of labor in such countries as Japan and Greece.

However, on the practical side, the ICFTU has also attempted to represent labor in international organizations, such as the UN and OEEC, conducted training courses for budding union leaders, and voted funds to support the Poznan strikers and the Hungarian rebels.

ICFTU Problems

The extent of the ICFTU's interests is frequently at the root of the charge that it is relatively ineffectual. Adding to the impression of ineffectiveness, however, have

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been the chronic frictions which have historically afflicted the cooperative efforts of free labor.

Originating in the conflicting national, political, and economic interests, and in doctrinal differences, these frictions seem so deep-seated as to cast doubt at times on the basic assumption of the international labor movement--the community of workers' interests. Such conflicts have aborted the numerous efforts of recent years to amalgamate the ICFTU and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, are responsible for the uneasy working relationship between the ICFTU and the ITS, and are related to the continuing organizational problems of the ICFTU itself.

AFL-CIO leaders have frequently charged the ICFTU with being the preserve of bureaucrats oriented toward European interests and ineffective in dealing with the practical problems of trade unionism. These European leaders have in turn resented what they consider attempted domination by the Americans, who are comparative newcomers to the international labor scene. While the AFL in particular has criticized an alleged "Socialist orientation" of the Europeans, the latter are skeptical of the "excessive preoccupation" with anti-Communism on the part of the AFL. Asian, African, and Latin American affiliates have charged both sides with inattention to non-Western problems and mentalities.

As a result of such differences, a number of the national federations have often sponsored foreign promotional activities without reference to the ICFTU. In Africa, for example,

the operations of the AFL-CIO and the British TUC have been frequently uncoordinated, competitive, and even recriminatory.

The AFL-CIO has accused the TUC, with its program of "grass-roots gradualism," of restraining the development of unions which support nationalist independence movements. The TUC has charged the AFL-CIO of indiscriminate anticolonialism, of discouraging sound trade union development, and of "buying" and corrupting trade union leaders. Often public knowledge, these accusations have naturally been utilized by the USSR and by neutralist-inclined Africans to discredit the ICFTU as an "instrument of Western imperialism."

In large degree, these cross-currents were the source of the bitter struggle last summer which resulted in the forced retirement of former ICFTU Secretary General Oldenbroek, his replacement by Becu, and the agreement to reorganize the ICFTU headquarters. This reorganization has yet to be fully effected. However, it is to be discussed again at the 13 March ICFTU Executive Board meeting, and the effectiveness of the ICFTU as an instrument of free world labor solidarity may hinge on the meeting's outcome.

Asia and Latin America

The lack of unity and purpose has had especially deplorable consequences in those areas where industrialization is just beginning. Despite such achievements as the establishment of the Asian trade union college in Calcutta, the ICFTU and free labor as a whole have both lost ground

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in non-Communist Asia in the past few years. In areas where a market economy does not yet exist, unions are extremely weak; in Japan, India, and the Philippines, there is serious division in the ranks of free labor; in Indonesia and Japan, there are strong pro-Communist or neutralist unions; and in Pakistan and Indonesia, government restriction or manipulation of labor organizations is a growing threat.

ICFTU leaders themselves have recognized their problems, as evidenced by the remarks of Geijer and Becu when they attended the ICFTU-ARO Fifth Asian Regional Conference in Manila last fall. Becu bluntly declared that free trade unionism has failed to keep pace with Asian industrialization and population growth, that union membership has failed to increase, and that affiliated unions have accomplished little by way of concrete benefits for their members.

Becu placed much of the blame for this on the affiliated unions, but ARO has been poorly organized to give them help. Like the parent ICFTU, ARO has been troubled by petty internal frictions, and only recently has it moved to eliminate bureaucratic deadwood.

In Latin America, the situation of the ICFTU and its regional organization, ORIT, is comparably complicated, and the outlook in a number of areas for free trade unionism also bleak. Established in January 1951, ORIT is historically the successor to the AFL-sponsored Pan-American Federation of Labor, and AFL influence in ORIT has been correspondingly large. About 75 percent of ORIT's worker membership and a great portion of its funds come from its US and Canadian affiliates,

while most of its expenditures are in Latin America.

Immediately following its foundation, ORIT-ICFTU concentrated on informational and educational activities, in which fields it has had some success. More recently, it has undertaken more direct assistance to the local labor movements, and since 1957--in conjunction with the ITS--has turned more toward organizational programs. These efforts are still on a small scale--as of mid-1960, ORIT had in its direct employ five professional organizers.

Even these limited operations have been handicapped by conflicts and differences among the ICFTU, ORIT, and the AFL-CIO. Always claiming a high degree of autonomy, ORIT has strongly resisted "intervention" by the Brussels secretariat, and has charged that bypassing on the part of the ICFTU and ITS has hurt ORIT's prestige with its affiliated national centers. ICFTU leaders have responded to these charges by claiming ORIT is a "declining influence" in Latin America, in part because it is widely regarded there as a creature of the AFL-CIO--an allegation exploited by the "Communists, Peronistas, and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions."

Domination of ORIT by labor leaders in the United States and the organization's allegedly benign attitude toward dictators were the burden of Castro's complaints in taking the Cuban trade unions out of ORIT in November 1959. The same pretexts have been used for the efforts of the Communist-dominated and most important labor confederation of Chile to attempt to launch a single, unified hemisphere labor organization unaffiliated with either the ICFTU or WFTU.

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These proposals for a "neutralist" organization of Latin American labor have concerned ICFTU leaders almost as much as Communist infiltration efforts. President Geijer in a recent article speculated on the potential danger that unions outside the ICFTU, together with pro-Castro organizers and the "Peronist/Fascist movement," might be able to make common cause with the Communists on an anti-American platform.

Africa

Serious as these problems may be, however, many trade union leaders have recently come to regard Africa as their foremost challenge--where, until 1957, the ICFTU was largely inactive and where, since then, its internal conflicts have become most evident.

For the past several years, control of the emerging African trade unions--closely allied with nationalist and independence movements--has been a contest ostensibly among the ICFTU, the CISC, the WFTU, and a group of neutralist unions. This four-way struggle is more apparent than real, however, since the CISC--representing some 240,000 workers in French-speaking Africa--shares the general objectives of the ICFTU, and the two are moving toward a more cooperative approach. Moreover, while the neutralists, following the lead of the Ghanaian and Guinean unions, nominally oppose ties with either East or West, they have been tactically allied with the Communists in opposing the ICFTU.

International Communist labor's entry into Africa dates from 1945, when unions within Britain and in metropolitan France were still affiliated with the WFTU. Although those indirect ties between WFTU and

the African unions were broken in 1949, WFTU continued to operate within the various unions and gained great good will by supporting national and anti-colonialist union leaders. During the past year, WFTU and the bloc have sharply stepped up their work among African trade union leaders and, in the opinion of the AFL-CIO's Irving Brown, have also made noticeable progress at the grass-roots level.

Despite the WFTU foothold, the ICFTU has moved slowly and ponderously to strengthen its African organization. Its first African regional conference was not held until January 1957, and while it was agreed to establish three area offices as the basis for an African regional office (AFRO), only one of these was operative as late as March 1960--and that largely due to the efforts of Tom Mboya of Kenya. At the second ICFTU regional conference in Lagos in November 1959, AFRO's constitution was drawn up and a preparatory committee established. Nevertheless, not until the third regional conference in Tunis last November was the constitution finally ratified and the initial appointments made.

The establishment of AFRO was opposed at every step by the militant neutralists, inspired initially by the UAR-sponsored Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference of late December 1957 and early January 1958, and by the subsequent All-African People's Conference. Leadership of the neutralist movement has passed successively from the largely Egyptian International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions to Sekou Touré's UGTAN, based in Conakry, and then to Nkrumah's Ghanaian Trade Union Congress.

With the general line that the African unions should

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sever ties with both the ICFTU and the WFTU, the neutralists have held rival conferences and propagandized against the ICFTU as a mere tool of London and Washington. At the same time, the neutralists have accepted informal support and financial assistance from WFTU which, for example, is apparently underwriting Touré's new "African Workers' University" in Conakry.

While the neutralists thus far have failed to organize their All-African Trade Union Federation (a constituent conference is now scheduled for 8 May) and there are signs of disunity in the neutralist camp, the ICFTU's task in Africa is nonetheless a difficult one. There have been similar signs of competition and disunity within AFRO, and strenuous efforts are being made to discredit pro-ICFTU leaders like Mboya--who, under the pressure, has seemed lately to take a more equivocal stand. Moreover, AFRO seems likely to be judged both by what it can contribute in concrete support to its affiliated unions and by the recognition it can give to the emotional appeal of pan-Africanism. It is questionable whether it can give this recognition effectively, in view of the long-standing divisions in the ICFTU itself over colonial issues.

The General Outlook

That the ICFTU encounters these manifold problems is indicative in one sense of the significance of its operations and the importance of its occasional successes. As a private organization conducting a world-wide operation, it is

unique, and to its credit it has given practical assistance, training, assistance, and counsel to its affiliates. It has also reflected the aspirations of underdeveloped countries for economic advancement and political independence.

In important respects, moreover, the problems of the international free trade union movement--particularly in the world's developing areas--are a reflection of the problems of the free world itself--including the burden of the colonial past and the strength of the Communist competition.

The problem of "nonapplicability" of free trade unionism to situations where mass poverty is the rule and a market economy does not yet exist is also a problem shared by other Western institutions. Finally, while union internationals have an important role to play in creating a climate in which unions can thrive, they are limited in the extent to which they can associate themselves with governmental programs to achieve this--if they are to remain "free" and are to preserve their right to oppose the WFTU on grounds it is government controlled.

Many observers would nonetheless conclude that the international free trade union movement has aggravated its own problems. It has tolerated inefficient and frequently divided bureaucracy; national rivalries have been magnified rather than moderated; petty personality conflicts have become major disputes; and even the richest of affiliates have seemed niggardly in their contributions to the common effort.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****15th UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

The UN General Assembly resumes its 15th session on 7 March beset by political crises and financial difficulties which some members believe endanger the organization's existence. The 99-member assembly now is dominated by groups of neutralist, underdeveloped, and politically immature states whose control of votes far exceeds their capability or willingness to implement the very peace and security operations they demand of the United Nations.

UN financial resources are strained by the costs of special operations such as those in Palestine and the Congo. The regular UN budget, together with the special operations, will total more than \$200,000,000 in 1961. The UN comptroller estimates that as of 31 March the UN will need an additional \$10,000,000 in cash to make necessary minimum disbursements.

Many UN members are in arrears on their regular assessments, and seven--Bolivia, Nationalist China, Ethiopia, Honduras, Hungary, Paraguay, and the UAR--may lose their right to vote at the resumed session because the amount each owes exceeds assessments for two full years. Other states--including France and those of the Soviet bloc--have refused to pay their assessed share of the special operations.

First Half of Session

More than 20 heads of government, including Khrushchev

and six European satellite leaders, attended the first half of the 15th General Assembly. This pressure led to a protracted general debate--a period at the opening of the assembly when chiefs of delegations present policy statements for their governments. This prevented the assembly from getting down to regular business until late in the session. Moreover, many members temporized because of the impending US elections. As a result, only a few items were disposed of by 21 December, when the session recessed.

The 17 new members, all former dependent territories, swelled the ranks of the Afro-Asian bloc and resulted in a voting imbalance that put the Western states on the defensive. The most significant instance was the assembly's endorsement on 28 October of an anticolonialist declaration by a vote of 89 for, none against, and nine abstentions--by Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, Britain, and the United States. Ambassador Stevenson reported on 11 February that recent conversations at UN headquarters showed that US influence and prestige, especially among Asian and African members, were severely damaged by a series of votes during the first half of the session which seemingly put the United States in the colonialist camp.

The 15th assembly has also recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence, called for negotiations between Italy

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and Austria over the South Tirol, and elected three new members to the Security Council. The assembly's economic and social committees completed their work, while the legal and budgetary committees have only a few items left. Items left over for the resumed session are primarily political in character, with anticolonial and East-West issues predominating.

There is growing speculation among UN members that such contentious issues as disarmament, Hungary, and Tibet might be postponed until the regular 16th session. Members argue that such action would shorten the 15th session and, by avoiding debate on cold-war items, also contribute to a favorable climate for any US-Soviet meeting. However, Khrushchev's recent letter to Nehru indicates Moscow intends to continue to attack Hammarskjold and the composition of the UN Secretariat.

Africa

Although the situation in the Congo has been heatedly debated, no resolution has been passed and the issue was left in abeyance when the current session recessed. The delegation of President Kasavubu, however, was seated in early December. The Security Council on 21 February issued a strong mandate for the UN operation in the Congo. Should the council not be able to carry this out effectively, the assembly would almost certainly take up the issue at once. UN operations in the Congo also will affect debate on other African and "colonial" issues.

On 20 December 1960 the General Assembly established

a three-member commission to go to Ruanda-Urundi--a UN trust territory administered by Belgium--to observe conditions in the territory and assess prospects for independence. To this end elections there were postponed by Belgium at the urging of its allies and the United Nations. Comments by a member of the commission indicate that its report to the General Assembly will be critical of Belgian administration.

In the plebiscite in the trust territory of British Cameroons on 11 and 12 February, Northern Cameroons voted to become part of Nigeria and Southern Cameroons chose to join the Republic of Cameroun, formerly under French administration. There probably will be a heated debate when the UN plebiscite commissioner makes his report to the General Assembly; Cameroun has lodged a vehement protest with the United Nations against the manner in which British authorities organized the plebiscite in the north, and Foreign Minister Okala intends to raise the issue at the resumed session.

Two items involving the Union of South Africa and its racial policies will give the anticolonialists a field day. Discussion of apartheid and the treatment of Indians in South Africa may well be vitriolic and lead South Africa to withdraw from this session, if not from the UN.

Just before the 15th session recessed, 11 African states submitted a resolution calling for General Assembly endorsement of Mauritania's application for admission to the UN. The

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application--strongly opposed by Morocco, which claims the territory--was vetoed by the USSR by linking the admission of Mongolia with Mauritania. Discussion of the issue could lead to strong pressures on the United States to concur in the admission of Mongolia and to exert influence on Nationalist China to forego its veto of Mongolia--a territory Taipei considers part of China.

Middle East

During the resumed session, the secretary general will make his fourth annual report on the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Palestine. Proposals to disband UNEF or reduce its size are likely to be raised, particularly in view of the UN's budgetary problems. Removal of the force could lead to renewed fighting between the UAR and Israel. The Soviet bloc and the countries in the Middle East which benefit from the presence of the force have refused to pay their assessed share of the costs.

Discussion of the report of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine refugees invariably turns into an Arab-Israeli debate on the Palestine problem as a whole. During the first part of the session the Arabs insisted on a resolution calling for a change in the composition of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and for the appointment of an administrator for refugee property in Israel. No agreement was reached with the Arabs, who will continue to press Western UN members for what they call a less pro-Israeli policy. Arab feeling is running high on this issue.

Arab members have raised the question of independence for Oman, a major interior area in the British-protected Sultanate of Muscat. Britain would prefer that the item not be discussed, but the Arab League at a 4 February meeting announced that the question would be pursued vigorously.

Asia

For the tenth consecutive year, the General Assembly will discuss the Korean question. The new government in Seoul is committed to the past policy of reunification of Korea through "genuinely free elections under UN supervision." However, renewed public interest in reunification following the April revolution has increased support in South Korea for limited contacts with North Korea. Such public speculation has led many neutrals to seek ways of getting the UN to establish these contacts and may lead to determined efforts to invite North Koreans to the debate as a first step.

The difficulty of keeping the Tibetan issue alive in the UN stems from the fact that discussion must be confined to Chinese Communist violation of human rights. Going beyond this aspect of the problem would raise juridical and political questions that would lessen support for Tibet's complaint and might prevent any action at all by the assembly. The Dalai Lama, however, would like to have the UN affirm the self-determination of the Tibetan people and even appoint an investigating committee.

Although the assembly decided in October to shelve the

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question of Chinese UN representation for the duration of the session, it did so by the slimmest margin since 1951. Peiping's supporters may therefore attempt to reopen the issue. Nationalist China, moreover, may lost its right to vote unless it makes a payment of more than \$1,000,000 toward its overdue assessments before the session resumes. The UN Charter provides that the General Assembly may permit a defaulting member to vote only if failure to pay is due to "conditions beyond the control of the member."

Taipei will almost certainly lose its seat on the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), although the five permanent members of the Security Council have traditionally been re-elected when their three-year terms expire. Thirteen ballots failed to break the deadlock between the leading candidates, India and Belgium, for the remaining vacant seat; the issue therefore was postponed until the resumed session. Nationalist China polled only eight votes on the last ballot thrown open to additional contenders.

East-West Issues

Nine disarmament resolutions remain on the table for the resumed session, although three relatively noncontentious resolutions were adopted in the first session (two calling for cessation of nuclear tests and one directed against dissemination of nuclear weapons). The establishment of a substitute for the ten-nation Disarmament Committee, which the Soviet bloc denounced after walking out of the Geneva negotiations last June, is one of the major problems to be solved before

negotiations can be resumed. On the broader question of formulating directives for the new forum, the Soviet Union will probably press for the adoption of the "compromise" Indian resolution, which endorses the Soviet proposal for a single treaty calling for "general and complete" disarmament.

It is also possible that the USSR will renew its call for a special session of the General Assembly to be attended by the heads of government to discuss disarmament.

The UN special representative on Hungary, Sir Leslie Munro, has submitted his report to the General Assembly, and it should provide the basis for discussion of the Hungarian question. However, the admission of new members to the UN with no great interest in this problem and the increasing tendency of many other members to attach little if any importance to the issue has eroded support for the West's position. In addition, Hammarskjold believes that "we have nothing to gain from debating Hungary" and that to help the Hungarian people we should "switch off the light."

Support is also dwindling on the question of the credentials of the Hungarian UN delegation. It has been seated only provisionally each year since 1956, but this does not affect the right to speak and vote.

The Soviet complaint on alleged US aggressive intentions--an aftermath of the U-2 and RB-47 incidents--has been dropped. Also remaining is the Cuban complaint about US intentions to attack the island.

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