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30 March 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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T H E W E E K I N B R I E F

LAOS Page 1

Communist bloc propaganda suggests that the USSR will not agree unconditionally to the British proposals on Laos and that the Communists will try to avoid a commitment on a cease-fire before an international conference is convened. However, favorable references to the British proposals by Gromyko, together with the generally moderate tone of the Pravda "Observer" article on 27 March, reflect Moscow's desire not to exacerbate the critical situation in Laos. The Boun Oum government is holding back on adopting a political position pending the outcome of East-West deliberations on Laos, but cabinet discussions continue on possible courses of action. Recent Communist military activity in Laos has been limited to small-scale actions, possibly reflecting immediate political considerations, but the Communist forces are capable of stepped-up operations at any time against the dispirited Laotian Army. [redacted]

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CONGO Page 6

The UN is continuing its pressure on Leopoldville to allow the re-entry of UN troops into Matadi, but the Congolese are adamant that only civilians can be permitted in the port for the time being. The question of how Indian troops to be transported by sea--the bulk of those expected--will enter the country thus is still unsolved. Various Congolese officials apparently are making uncoordinated efforts at negotiations between the Leopoldville and Stanleyville regimes. Tshombé is sending 1,000 troops against Manono, capital of the secessionist "Lualaba state" in north Katanga. [redacted]

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NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS Page 9

The chief Soviet delegate has had little to say at the nuclear test ban negotiations in Geneva during the past week, but has indicated that he will present a comprehensive reply to the new Western proposals after the detailed explanations are completed. Outside the conference, Tsarapkin has used several press interviews to minimize the extent of Western concessions and to emphasize his warnings against further French testing. He has, however, stopped short of making cessation of French testing a precondition for further negotiations. He has also stressed the "paramount importance" of the Soviet proposal for a tripartite council to administer the control system. Ambassador Thompson believes that the tripartite concept proposed by Khrushchev for the UN Secretariat has become basic Soviet policy on questions of international administration and that Moscow, therefore, will probably maintain its position on the council for administering

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the nuclear control system even to the point of a breakdown of the Geneva talks. [redacted]

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CUBA Page 11

Announcement of the formation of the anti-Castro "Revolutionary Council" has evoked comparatively little hemisphere reaction thus far; an Argentine official at the UN has given it qualified endorsement. [redacted]

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[redacted] Increased difficulties in the sugar cane harvest--many of them involving suspected sabotage-- seem likely to reduce this year's crop below earlier estimates. [redacted]

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KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL SHAKE-UP CONTINUES. Page 12

Khrushchev's shake-up of Soviet officialdom has claimed another of his lieutenants, presidium candidate Pospelov, and is reaching into all levels of party and government. Corruption and deficiencies in the agricultural field continue to be the most frequent charges. Still other factors are involved, however, including political maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants in preparation for the party congress to be held in October. If the demotions and firings, now in their 13th week, continue at the present rate, they will be the most extensive housecleaning undertaken by Khrushchev. [redacted]

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SOVIET OFFICIAL VISITS ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA Page 13

The Soviet ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin, apparently failed to achieve the main objectives of his recent trip to South America. Of the countries which he proposed to visit, only Ecuador and Venezuela granted him visas, and neither of these would agree to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. President Betancourt of Venezuela complained to Bazykin of unfair Soviet competition in oil sales and described local Communists as agitators inspired by Moscow. Ecuador agreed to an exchange of trade delegations, however, and both countries may develop cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. Although Bazykin's official reception was cordial, the attitude of the public was cool and at times hostile. [redacted]

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DISSENSION IN ECUADOR OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA. Page 15

President Velasco's vacillation on policy toward Cuba and the bloc is contributing to a sharp division between pro- and anti-Castro forces in Ecuador. [redacted]

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[redacted] There are indications of an impending cabinet shake-up which may favor the pro-Castro group. Domestic unrest rising from the Castro

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issue may threaten prospects for holding the 11th Inter-American Conference, often postponed and now scheduled to begin in Quito on 24 May. [redacted]

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ARGENTINA. Page 16

The forced resignation of Argentine Army Commander in Chief Toranzo Montero has at least temporarily strengthened the Frondizi government. Most top military leaders, although they agreed with some of Toranzo Montero's complaints over Peronism and Communism, felt that his demands for stronger pressure on Frondizi constituted a threat to constitutional government. Toranzo Montero retains some influence within the armed forces, however, and has warned that he will be "active on the sidelines."

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MOROCCO. Page 16

Morocco intends to back its claims to Spain's Saharan territories and to recently independent Mauritania by armed action as well as by diplomatic pressure. [redacted]

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[redacted] Anticipating that the issue of Mauritania's UN membership would be brought up at the current General Assembly session, Morocco appears to be fomenting unrest in order to focus international attention on its claims.

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ISRAELI AID IN AFRICA. Page 18

Although three recipients of Israeli aid--Ghana, Guinea, and Mali--signed Nasir's anti-Israel resolution last January at the African "summit" conference in Casablanca, Tel Aviv has decided to continue to expand its aid program among new African states. The Israeli Government plans to send 400 experts to Africa and Asia during 1961; approximately 500 nongovernment technicians from Israel are already there. About 1,000 foreign trainees are to come to Israel this year. Other Arab states have joined Nasir in his propaganda campaign against the Israeli program. [redacted]

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BELGIAN GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS Page 20

The success of the Socialist party in the elections on 26 March has increased the likelihood that Belgium's next government will be a coalition of the Social Christian and Socialist parties, with Paul Henri Spaak, Socialist leader and former secretary general of NATO, playing a prominent role. While no major changes in foreign policy are anticipated, Spaak has been privately critical of some of his country's moves in the Congo and would probably bring about greater Belgian cooperation both there and in NATO matters.

[Redacted]

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INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS Page 21

Leaders at the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), at their recent high-level meeting in Brussels, made some progress toward overcoming the difficulties confronting the organization. Affiliated unions have pledged \$7,250,000 to the proposed \$10,000,000 solidarity fund to help finance free trade unionism in the developing areas of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and a start was made toward a more efficient organization of the ICFTU itself. Nevertheless, the confederation seems likely to continue to suffer from internal frictions and lack of complete support by its affiliates--as indicated by the refusal of the British unions to make further contributions to the fund.

[Redacted]

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SCIENCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA Page 22

The Chinese Communists are in the fifth year of a 12-year scientific program with the objective of reaching "world levels of achievement." Progress is being made in the 11 priority technological fields--including atomic energy and jet propulsion. China's small group of competent scientists is being slowly augmented by students trained in bloc countries. However, research and development are limited by a shortage of scientists and equipment. Further limitations arise from China's heavy dependence on Soviet technical assistance, sharply curtailed by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians last summer.

[Redacted]

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ROLE IN THE BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE Page 23

Czechoslovakia is providing economic and military assistance to 17 countries outside the bloc. Total aid extended thus far amounts to \$660,000,000, compared with a Soviet aid total of \$3.8 billion and a Chinese Communist aid total of \$350,000,000. About half of the Czech aid is being provided for economic development projects, the remainder for military equipment.

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS Page 1

Recent announcements by such key UN members as Britain and Brazil that they will not continue to support the moratorium on Chinese UN representation indicate that use of this procedural device will no longer preserve Taipei's position in the UN. The British Foreign Office believes that Taipei's supporters will not even be able to attach conditions-- such as UN membership for Nationalist China as "Taiwan" or "Formosa"--to the seating of Peiping. The growing opposition to the moratorium, which postpones discussion of either the seating of Peiping or the ouster of Taipei, reflects a belief among members that the UN must soon take action on the problem. [redacted]

[redacted]

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DE GAULLE'S PROGRAM FOR THE FRENCH ARMED SERVICES Page 5

De Gaulle is reorganizing the French armed forces to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. Most of his long-range objectives, including early achievement of a nuclear capability, are embodied in a law passed last fall which lays out a program for the development of the armed forces in the period 1960-65. Various aspects of this program, particularly the priority being given to nuclear weapons, are at variance with an earlier plan which called for a balanced development of all services. This has aroused sharp criticism, especially among senior army officers who are also critical of De Gaulle's Algerian and NATO policies.

[redacted]

T. D. LYSENKO Page 10

The recent revival of the influence of Trofim D. Lysenko, a power under Stalin in the fields of agriculture and biological research, is anomalous at a time when Khrushchev is calling for the best scientific methods to solve the USSR's agricultural problems. Lysenko's theories of genetics, based on Communist doctrine rather than science, are deplored by reputable scientists in the USSR. The current favor accorded by Khrushchev probably stems from Lysenko's willingness to promise fast practical results. Although Lysenko is far from regaining the authority he exercised under Stalin, he is in a position to exert significant influence over agricultural research.

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[redacted]

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
WEEKLY REVIEW

LAOS

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Bloc Diplomacy


On 24 March, the day following President Kennedy's statement on Laos, Gromyko told Ambassador Stevenson at the UN that he had a message from Khrushchev to deliver orally to the President and asked for a meeting as soon as possible. In his conversation with the President on 27 March, Gromyko said that, in the USSR's view, the latest British proposals--contained in a note delivered on 23 March--could serve as a basis for settlement in Laos. However, having offered this hopeful statement, Gromyko urged that both sides should show restraint and take steps to prevent the conflict from spreading. He did not clarify the Soviet Union's position on the question of a cease-fire and said that Moscow's reply to the British note would be forthcoming in the near future.



The favorable references to the British proposals by Gromyko, together with the generally moderate and positive tone of the authoritative Pravda "Observer" article on 27 March, appear to reflect the Soviet leaders' awareness that the recent military and diplomatic moves by the US and Britain have brought the contest over Laos to a new and more critical phase. Gromyko's remarks after the meeting with the President expressing hope for a peaceful settlement suggest that Moscow sought to forestall any decisions by the SEATO conferees which might raise the possibility of expanded military action.

At the same time, the Soviet Union had to maintain its own strong bargaining position in Laos. This was reflected in the Pravda warning that bloc policy would not be influenced by hints of "collective intervention by SEATO" and by movements of American naval and military forces. European satellite propaganda has also attempted to demonstrate that the US--not the Communists--has been guilty of intervention in Laos and must bear full responsibility for the crisis.

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The Pravda Commentary

The "Observer" article, which has received unprecedented publicity by Radio Moscow, represented a direct reply to President Kennedy's press conference remarks, which had previously been barely mentioned by Moscow media. The article sought to emphasize the fact that the USSR was the earliest and most consistent proponent of a negotiated settlement in Laos and followed the general line taken by Premier Khrushchev in his interview with Ambassador Thompson on 9 March, pointing out that the USSR and the US now agree that the objective should be a truly neutral and independent Laos. While Pravda took issue with the President's remarks regarding the origins of the Laotian crisis, the article welcomed his statement that the US wants peace and not war in Laos, a truly neutral government, and a settlement through negotiations.

Although the article avoided any direct comment on the British proposal for a cease-fire, it implied that the USSR would not agree to any approach which would indicate Soviet responsibility for and direction of the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces. Pravda characterized President Kennedy's call for a cessation of armed attacks by externally supported Communists as "tantamount to an ultimatum to the people of Laos." While Pravda's position would not necessarily preclude Soviet agreement to a joint appeal by the Geneva co-chairmen for a de facto cease-fire, recent bloc propaganda on this issue suggests an intention to evade any firm commitment on the timing of a formal cessation of hostilities prior to an international conference, on the grounds that this is a matter for the conference itself to decide.

The Asian Communists

A 23 March People's Daily editorial, Peiping's first press commentary on Laos in more than 10 days, called on all "peace-loving forces to firmly support the patriotic struggle of the Lao people" and proposed only that common efforts be made to convene a 14-nation conference-- a conference in which the Communists would try to ensure strong Pathet Lao participation in a coalition Laotian government.

Hanoi, in a 25 March editorial attacking the position President Kennedy took at his press conference, accused the US of endorsing an immediate cease-fire only to strengthen "rebel" forces. The concept that the ICC could actually be used to help bring about a cease-fire prior to the international conference was roundly castigated by the Pathet Lao, who, on 27 March, charged this would "serve US perfidious schemes." Even North Korea joined in to attack the President's press conference statement and depict the US as "driven to the corner."

Peiping broadcast a highly edited version of the Pravda "Observer" article, choosing to emphasize that portion which implied the use of force to counter any SEATO move in Laos. However, Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi, during a recent interview in Burma, carefully skirted a question on SEATO intervention in Laos which would have provided an opportunity for explicitly threatening to counter such a move with Chinese forces. Asked what would be the result if SEATO openly invaded Laos, Chen Yi replied in writing that "the civil war will be prolonged, the suffering of the Laotian people will be increased."

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The most precise threat to continue the war in Laos has come from the Pathet Lao, who on 28 March broadcast another statement warning of an appeal "to peace-loving countries for military help" unless the US ceases its "interference" and accepts the 14-nation conference.

Nehru

Prime Minister Nehru, more active than ever in his role as international broker, has been using his influence in several major capitals to move the crisis toward a negotiated solution. After exchanging messages with President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, Nehru contacted Khrushchev appealing for his support of the British proposals and expressing the hope that they would lead to a cease-fire, reconvening of the ICC, and later an international conference. The Indian leader had earlier indicated his readiness to recall the ICC, initially perhaps in New Delhi, if requested by the two Geneva co-chairmen.

Nehru continues in his public statements to underscore the gravity of the Laotian situation and to endorse the British-US approach as constructive and the best means of achieving what he feels is immediately required--an end to hostilities and the influx of arms.

Nehru also sent word to Souvanna Phouma in Paris

urging Souvanna to return to Phnom Penh for further talks with Phoumi. Nehru apparently feels continued efforts toward reconciling Laotian political elements must proceed without delay to ensure the success of international negotiations. New Delhi generally has taken the position that any national government not taking in all factions would be neither effective nor acceptable as a basis for international agreement.

Political Scene in Vientiane

Further political moves in Vientiane have been held in abeyance during the absence of King Savang and General Phoumi, who were in southern Laos until 29 March, and pending the outcome of East-West deliberations on the Laotian crisis. However, cabinet discussions are continuing on possible courses of action. Vientiane leaders continue to look to international support for the defense of Laotian territory.

Former Premier Phoui San-anikone, meanwhile, is working behind the scenes for a replacement of the present government, which he feels is "dictatorial" and only antagonizing the majority of the population. He proposes that the King persuade Boun Oum and Phoumi to step down and that he then take personal charge of a transitional government pending a general election. There is considerable support for this proposal among other conservative Laotian politicians, and Savang reportedly has taken it under advisement.

The Military Situation

There has been only minor skirmishing during the past week. While the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have the capability for renewed offensive action, they have been engaged primarily in consolidating their positions on the various fronts. The lull in the fighting may be a purely tactical measure on their part, but might also reflect Communist intent to allow the pattern of international negotiations to become established.

Army leaders, despite reduced enemy pressure along Route 13, remain fearful of an attack on Luang Prabang. Phoumi believes the enemy objective is complete domination of northern Laos, with Luang Prabang as an immediate target. The strength of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces north of the Phou Khoun road junction would appear to rule out a victory

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over the numerically superior government defenders, positioned about 25 miles south of Luang Prabang. However, the army's morale, which General Ouane describes as at "an all-time low," could be an overriding factor.

Laotian Army leaders are also concerned over recent movements by Pathet Lao troops north of Luang Prabang.

The situation in the Muong Sai - Nam Bac region is somewhat obscure

Government forces north of Vang Vieng on Route 13 have been making some progress in regaining lost ground, and have now reached a point about 15 miles north of that village. Their slow advance has been further held up in recent days by felled trees, mines, and mortar fire. In the area south of the Plaine des Jarres, enemy forces are still trying to crack the government's defensive position at Tha Thom. This effort is being hampered by Meo guerrilla operations throughout the Plaine des Jarres area, which are inflicting substantial casualties on isolated enemy units and hindering supply movements.

New enemy action in the Kam Keut area, some 70 miles southeast of Pak Sane, has been reported. Firm details are still lacking, but Vientiane is taking a serious view of the situation, fearing an enemy move to cut the country in half. The attacks in this area probably are intended primarily as

a diversionary move at this time, but the enemy's control of Kam Keut and Lak Sao to the east facilitates access to Laos from North Vietnam via the Vinh-Thakhek road.

North Vietnamese Involvement

There is an increasing number of reports concerning the presence of North Vietnamese units in Laos.

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Chinese Nationalist Irregulars

Although the withdrawal of the approximately 2,000 Chinese Nationalist irregulars from Laos has been proceeding, Chinese Nationalist officials report that the operation is being complicated by Laotian efforts to recruit from among these elements.

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CONGO

Leopoldville

The situation in the Congo continues to drift, and little progress has been made toward easing relations between the UN Command and the Congolese or between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. The Congolese still oppose a UN military presence in the lower Congo at the port of Matadi, although their relations with the UN Command have improved since UN representative Rajeshwar Dayal was temporarily replaced by Makki Abbas in mid-March.

Secretary General Hammarskjold wants to re-establish at least a minimal UN military force at Matadi--sufficient to protect the area containing the UN warehouses--and if the Congolese remain intransigent he may take the matter to the Security Council. The Congolese authorities, who are willing to permit UN technicians at Matadi but not military forces because of the effect on the populace, have charged that the UN is deliberately holding up needed food supplies at the port because of reluctance to recognize the Ileo government in Leopoldville. The position of the UN Command is that without UN supervisory personnel--and protecting troops--at the port it is unable to assume responsibility for the dispatch of supplies from the Matadi warehouses.

Hammarskjold's position is considerably strengthened by

Nehru's toughening attitude. On 27 March he stated in the Indian Parliament that the UN must occupy Matadi, by force if necessary. He warned that India could not send troops there if they are not assured of a safe landing. The departure from Bombay of a US naval transport with an estimated 2,300 Indian troops on board was postponed from 29 March to 1 April at the UN's request.

Various Congolese officials apparently are making uncoordinated efforts to improve their relations between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Minister of Information Bolikango and Leopoldville provincial President Kamitatu have not yet left for Stanleyville, even though Kamitatu is reported desirous of mediating and claims that Gizenga has expressed to him a desire to negotiate.

Premier-designate Ileo, however, has wavered on granting permission; he is concerned that Kamitatu, who was a strong Lumumba supporter, may defect to the Gizenga regime upon arrival in Stanleyville. Kamitatu states, however, that such fears are groundless because he is primarily interested in serving his constituents in Leopoldville Province and, moreover, has had serious differences with Gizenga in the past.


General Mobutu announced on 29 March that negotiations are in progress between his officers

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
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and military representatives of Stanleyville.



representatives might now be willing to attend a conference of Congolese leaders on some neutral ground if their security were assured by the UN.



Stanleyville


An official of the American Embassy in Leopoldville, commenting on his most recent trip to Stanleyville, reports that public order continues to improve there and that authorities are developing some sense of responsibility, with greater control over their armed forces. He believes that, although the principal leaders are still preoccupied with their own claims to legitimacy, Stanleyville rep-

Moreover, they seem increasingly disenchanted with the failure of the bloc and Afro-Asian nations to send aid or diplomatic representatives. Any inclination on the part of Gizenga to negotiate with Leopoldville may be inhibited by Mulele, his Cairo representative.

There has been no change in the position of the Sudan, which continues to bar supply shipments to Stanleyville. The African states supporting Gizenga continue to talk of ways to assist him, so far fruitlessly.

Katanga

Katanga's President Tshombé, who is seeking to gain support among moderate African states for his Congo federation plan, recently suffered a rebuff to his international prestige at the hands of Liberian President Tubman, who refused to agree to a Tshombé visit because of prevailing Lumumbist sympathies in Liberia. Meanwhile, Tshombé is likely to create a problem for the UN and the West if he carries out his military effort against the Baluba tribal stronghold at Manono held by pro-Gizenga troops.



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The Katanga force, which numbers about 1,000, apparently plans to make a gradual advance on Manono

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In addition there is considerable concern in the mining centers of Katanga that the large urban concentrations of Baluba tribesmen there may cause trouble.

The Belgian consul general in Elisabethville stated on 28 March that between 85 and 90 Belgians now serving with Tshombé's forces--military technicians under contract and volunteers for the "white legion"--would leave by mid-April. He hinted that Brussels might have to withdraw more Belgians as a result of international pressure, but he implied that the Belgian Foreign Ministry has little control over the Ministry of African Affairs, which apparently is continuing its assistance to Tshombé. The Katanga president has previously given his approval for the withdrawals but recently has become irritated over Belgian dealings with his Baluba rival, Jason Sendwe, and now is only reluctantly acquiescing in their departure.

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The UN is taking no military action to meet the threat to Manono, but UN military commander General McKeown has been in Elisabethville trying to persuade Tshombé--so far unsuccessfully--to call off the advance.

UN officials are particularly concerned that the 60 South African volunteers or some of the other white troops serving with Katanga may clash with the UN's Nigerian troops and give rise to an incident with racial repercussions.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS**

The Soviet delegation has maintained virtual silence in the Geneva conference but has indicated that Moscow will prepare a comprehensive reply to the new Western proposals. In private discussions on 22 and 23 March, chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin urged Ambassador Dean to be patient and await a Soviet response after the United States and Britain complete development of their proposals. He told the ambassador that he would continue to listen to the American plans with interest and that the USSR was anxious to bring about a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

In the conference session on 24 March, Tsarapkin reiterated the Soviet delegation's intention to wait until the end of the US and British presentation before commenting in detail. He claimed that since the US position appeared to be a "package" proposal, an analysis and evaluation of individual points could not be given until conclusion of the Western explanations.

During a private conversation with the chief British delegate on 27 March, Tsarapkin avoided any comment on the Western proposals but repeated his familiar line that the USSR had made all the concessions. He claimed that the Soviet proposals would be adequate to control a test ban; he characterized a ban as a measure of "extremely limited significance," stating that any treaty would be an experiment in international control, and should therefore begin with only a minimum of control features.

Tsarapkin agreed with the British suggestion that the end of May be a target date for concluding a treaty, but only if the Soviet terms were accepted. He made only brief mention of the Soviet proposal for a tripartite administrative

council to supervise the control system, and made no reference to French testing. The British delegate gained the impression that the Soviet delegation was prepared to continue negotiations through the summer.

The only substantive point raised by Tsarapkin at the conference concerned freedom of action of the three powers to resume small underground tests when the voluntary moratorium on these tests expired. Fore-shadowing the probable line of attack on this issue, he asked whether the American proposals admitted the possibility of resuming underground tests at that time. The USSR has previously insisted that the three powers should not be automatically free to do so.

A member of the Soviet delegation has also indicated privately that it will insist that there be only 15 control posts for the USSR, rather than the 19 proposed by the West, and will hold out for Soviet representation on the inspection teams. He stated that the Soviet delegation regarded the new American proposals as bargaining counters.

Outside the conference, Tsarapkin has continued his sharp criticism of the new American and British proposals. In an interview with a CBS correspondent on 23 March, he stated that the Western proposals contained little new and showed that the US continued to hold an unacceptable position on such questions as the number of on-site inspections, the staffing of control posts, and on-site inspection teams, and the scientific criteria for determining which detected seismic events qualified for on-site inspection. He applied the same term to the US position on the number of control posts in the USSR, the duration of the moratorium on small underground tests, and a "number of other questions."

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Tsarapkin took a similar line in an interview with a correspondent of the Italian Communist newspaper L'Unita on 24 March. In an interview with a representative of the Polish press service on 25 March, he subdivided the American plan into three parts: 1) questions on which the US takes the same attitude as in the past; 2) certain issues on which the West has made a short step forward, and 3) those points on which the West approached the Soviet compromise proposals. Without spelling out the specific issues, Tsarapkin declared that even the rare concession seemed "illusory" and qualified by numerous conditions and reservations.

the Soviet delegation pointed out, however, that these warnings did not pose any preconditions for further negotiations.

On the question of a three-member administrative council, Tsarapkin termed it a "fundamental problem" and "of paramount importance." Ambassador Thompson believes that the Soviet plan for a three-member secretariat to replace the UN Secretariat has become basic Soviet policy and that Moscow, therefore, will probably maintain its position on the three-member council to administer a test ban even to the point of a breakdown in the talks at Geneva.

The volume of Soviet propaganda commentary on the negotiations last week was higher than for any week since the negotiations began in the fall of 1958. Peiping has remained silent on the negotiations. The revised Western proposals were broadly characterized by Soviet propagandists as "nothing new," and a widely broadcast comment claimed they were intended as "psychological preparation for torpedoing" the talks. Moscow's commentators have also reported, however, that the Soviet delegation must await the explanation of the Western plan before appraising the individual proposals. Wide publicity has been given to the Soviet proposal for a tripartite administrator and to Tsarapkin's warnings against further French testing.

Although there is no explicit threat of a Soviet test resumption nor any demand that France join the negotiations, a broadcast to France on 27 March claimed that an "effective" international agreement is "hardly possible" so long as "one of the European great powers" continues testing. TASS on 28 March reported the Soviet delegation had pointed out that French testing complicates not only the Geneva talks but the whole disarmament problem. [redacted] (Concurred in by OSI)

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CUBA**

There has been only limited international comment so far on the 22 March announcement of the formation of the anti-Castro "Revolutionary Council" under Castro's former Premier Jose Miro Cardona. An Argentine representative in the UN gave as his immediate opinion that the creation of a Cuban government-in-exile would have a "favorable impact in Latin America," but added that the formal announcement should have been made in some Latin American country to avoid the charge that the new organization is a US "satellite" or "puppet." Radio Moscow charged the United States with violating several international agreements in allowing the anti-Castro group to organize a "government" on its soil.

Castro reacted by boasting in a 25 March speech of the resistance with which Cubans would meet any invasion attempt by "mercenaries" (i.e., anti-Castro Cuban exiles) or "marines." The "mercenary government" would last 24 hours or perhaps a little longer, he said, adding that "if they begin playing at local war, imperialism may meet with hemispheric war." He said that Cuba had many more arms than the Congo or Laos, and asserted that, in case of an attack on Cuba, "peasants and workers from many other American countries will march to war against imperialism."

Recent reports describing Cuba's internal economic situation are dominated by accounts of consumer-goods shortages, but most foreign observers in

Havana continue to feel that the regime is not threatened by such economic dislocations.

Sabotage and organized resistance activities evidently are continuing to increase throughout Cuba despite a presumably steady gain in the strength of the government's instruments of repression. Accounts of attempted sabotage of industrial and agricultural installations are becoming increasingly frequent, and anti-Castro terrorists are exploding bombs daily in Havana

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Recent reports indicate that sugar cane fires--allegedly set by saboteurs--may be increasing. A considerable portion of such fire-damaged cane normally can be salvaged by grinding it immediately, but the growing incidence of such reports implies some reduction in Cuba's estimated total 1961 sugar crop of 5,500,000-6,000,000 tons as well as the further erosion of support for Castro among the peasant groups on which his popularity rests. The present slowdown in Camaguey Province by sugar-mill workers protesting wage cuts provides a further illustration of disenchantment with Castro among lower income groups.

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KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICAL SHAKE-UP CONTINUES

Khrushchev's current shake-up of Soviet officialdom has claimed another of his lieutenants and has reached into all levels of the party and government bureaucracies. The poor results in agricultural production last year touched off the shake-up, and corruption and deficiencies in the agricultural field continue to be the most frequent charges leveled against the victims. Still other factors are involved, however, including political maneuvering among Khrushchev's lieutenants in preparation for the 22nd party congress, to be held in October. If demotions and firings continue much longer at the present rate, this will be the most extensive bureaucratic housecleaning since Khrushchev took over.

The most recent high-level victim is 62-year-old party presidium candidate Pospelov, who has lost his assignment as a member of the party central committee's bureau of the RSFSR --in charge of propaganda activities in the Russian Republic. He has been demoted to a position he held once before (1949-52)--director of the party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism. He replaces Gennady Obichkin, the institute's director since 1952. Pospelov remains a candidate member of the party presidium, but the lesser importance of his new assignment makes it doubtful that he will be re-elected to the presidium at the October congress.

Pospelov's removal from the RSFSR bureau is undoubtedly related to the replacement in late January of the deputy chairman of the bureau, presidium member Aristov. These actions appear likely to have resulted from competition among Khrushchev's lieutenants. The release of both these officials from the party secretariat in May 1960 "to devote full time" to their duties on the RSFSR bureau was presumably a prelude to their current demotions.

Pospelov's duties in the bureau have been taken over by Mikhail Yakovlev, ambassador to the Congo until expelled by the Mobutu regime in September 1960. Yakovlev assumed his new responsibilities sometime prior to 4 March when, as a member of the bureau, he gave a speech on the tasks of the press to a conference of RSFSR newspaper officials.

Yakovlev, 50 years old, had never held a top-ranking position. A minor party official during World War II, he had become deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan by 1956 and a year later deputy chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In mid-1958 he was promoted to deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, presumably in charge of cultural affairs, and later received the additional post of RSFSR minister of foreign

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affairs, holding both these two posts until his Congo assignment last August.

Now in its 13th week, the shake-up of government agricultural officials and the reorganization of agricultural agencies have involved the firing or reassignment of nine of the fifteen republic agriculture ministers in addition to USSR Agriculture Minister Vladimir Matskevich. Although most seem to have been made scapegoats for the agricultural deficiencies, a few apparently were moved to other responsible work to clear the way for administrators with the scientific and research experience needed to direct the ministries in

their new agricultural research functions.

In addition, 11 provincial party chiefs--over half of them central committee members--have been fired in the campaign and several others have been given lateral transfers, presumably to break up local cliques and friendships. Their current loss of standing probably forecasts their exclusion from the new central party bodies to be elected in October. At present almost half those elected to those bodies at the 20th party congress in February 1956 appear slated to be dropped; since the congress is still seven months away, many others will probably also lose out.

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SOVIET OFFICIAL VISITS ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA

The Soviet ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin, and his personal secretary, Vladimir Chernyshev, made an "unofficial" visit to Ecuador and Venezuela from 7 to 23 March. Bazykin had also sought visas from Panama, Colombia, Haiti, and Paraguay, planning to stay five to ten days in each country visited. Most were slow to reply, however, forcing him to postpone his trip for a month.

By early March, only Ecuador and Venezuela had granted visas, Colombia had refused, and the requests to Panama, Haiti, and Paraguay were still pending. In answer to Paraguay's demand to know the "true purpose" of the visit, Bazykin said it was merely a courtesy trip and that he would perhaps have a chat with the foreign minister.

During his stay in Ecuador, Bazykin met with the President, vice president, foreign minister, and two other cabinet ministers. He also contacted leftists in Quito and Guayaquil and called on one of Ecuador's top Communist leaders.

His official reception was cordial, but the attitude of the public was generally hostile. The government rejected six requests to hold demonstrations, but on the night of Bazykin's arrival a group of about 50 persons burned a Soviet flag outside his hotel. The Soviet visitors had strong police protection, as small groups of demonstrators, often joined by passers-by, dogged them throughout their stay. The Quito Chamber of Commerce refused to meet with Bazykin, despite

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pressure from Foreign Minister Chiriboga.

Chiriboga told US Ambassador Bernbaum that he had rejected Bazykin's feeler for diplomatic relations and emphasized to the press that the visit was solely for commercial purposes and was made at Soviet initiative. Bazykin, however, told the press that the USSR considers that relations with Ecuador already exist and that only an exchange of ambassadors is lacking.

Ecuador agreed in principle to send a commercial mission to the USSR to study the possibility of exporting bananas--Ecuador's chief product--and other agricultural produce in exchange for farm and highway machinery. Chiriboga asserted that "bananas have no ideology" and "to trade is not to acquiesce."

Chiriboga told Ambassador Bernbaum he believed Bazykin made a tempting loan offer to President Velasco. In his talk with the minister of education, Bazykin offered scientific and technical aid, and in his final press conference on 11 March, he hinted at a cultural exchange between the universities of Quito and Moscow.

On his arrival in Caracas on 12 March, Bazykin stated that his visit was unofficial but that he would like to confer with top government officials and businessmen. He claimed that his visit to Ecuador had been a great success and that Ecuador would send a trade delegation to the USSR in the latter half of April--a move which he characterized as "the first step toward the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations."

During his 11-day stay in Venezuela, Bazykin spent a good deal of time with Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Perez

Alfonso, who had met with him in Mexico last September. Perez announced that Venezuela was interested in establishing some form of relations with the Soviet Union, and also that he planned to go to Moscow, possibly during his scheduled August trip to Tehran for the third conference of petroleum exporting nations. Following his initial talk with the ambassador, Perez indicated to the press that the recent increase in Soviet petroleum sales outside the bloc is not a threat to world petroleum prices or to the development of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEP).

After persistent efforts to gain an interview, Bazykin was received by President Betancourt on 22 March. Betancourt told him that in Venezuela, Communists are considered "agitators and troublemakers" inspired directly from Moscow, and that Cuba now served as a bridgehead for spreading Communism throughout South America. In sharp contrast to Perez' remarks, the President also charged the USSR with unfair competition through the sale of its oil in Western markets. In reply to a question, Betancourt said the Venezuelan Government would be willing to sell to Cuba oil from its royalty share of production; it would, however, require payment in advance at a price equal to what it now receives from the oil companies.

In his final press conference Bazykin gave no indication that his overtures to Betancourt had been rebuffed and said that after conferring with the President, five cabinet ministers, and congressional, university, and trade union leaders, he had the impression that most Venezuelans consider the establishment of relations with the USSR "a question of time and of waiting for the most opportune moment." While re-emphasizing that

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his visit had not been official, he stated that he had discussed the establishment of relations with everyone with whom he talked.

Bazykin devoted many of his remarks to trade relations and asserted that as a result of his visit, which included a

tour of oil fields with Perez, he "better understood" Venezuela's position concerning petroleum and OPEP. He placed particular emphasis on the "benefits" Latin American republics could derive from relations with the Soviet Union, especially in barter. [REDACTED]

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DISSENSION IN ECUADOR OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA

President Velasco's vacillation on policy toward Cuba and the bloc is contributing to a sharp division between pro- and anti-Castro forces in Ecuador. The principal spearhead of the pro-Castro element is Manuel Araujo, a close friend of Velasco and a promoter of anti-US violence in Ecuador in late 1960. Araujo, who was minister of government until December, is strongly disliked by the military, and his resignation from that post was reportedly caused by military pressure. He is said to be organizing a clandestine group of Communists and other leftists to foment a Castro-style revolution; he may have coordinated his plans with top leaders in Cuba during his recent visit there.

In a speech shortly after his return in late February, Araujo openly called for a "revolution" patterned after Cuba's, to begin at the conclusion of Velasco's term in 1964. He has also waged a campaign to force the resignation of Foreign Minister Chiriboga-- leader of the anti-Castro faction in the government.

The anti-Castro forces-- which include moderate Socialists as well as Conservatives, Liberals, and the Catholic hierarchy--have been aroused by the pro-Communist tendencies in Ecuadorean policy and have

petitioned for a break in relations with Cuba. Some of these elements, led by former President Ponce, have been considering ousting Velasco. This group may have significant support from active and retired officers. The former army commander, an enemy of Velasco as well as of Araujo, was arrested on 23 March for involvement in the plotting.

Velasco has not only cultivated the good will of the Cuban regime, which is supporting Ecuador in its boundary dispute with Peru, but also has publicly expressed his confidence in Araujo since the latter's return from Cuba. Indications of an impending shake-up in the cabinet--probably including the removal of Chiriboga--and the reported reassignment of a number of anti-Communist officers suggest that Velasco is leaning toward the pro-Castro group and is concerned with the growing opposition of rightists.

This domestic unrest threatens the success of the 11th Inter-American Conference, scheduled to begin in Quito on 24 May. The prospect that Castro may attend and that Ecuador will insist on discussing its boundary dispute with Peru--a nationalistic issue which could touch off widespread violence--are other disruptive factors. [REDACTED]

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The resignation of Army Commander in Chief Toranzo Montero has at least temporarily strengthened the Frondizi government in Argentina, in that it underscores the armed forces' rejection of threats to constitutional government. The resignation resulted from a showdown with War Secretary Fraga over the long-standing issue of military pressure on President Frondizi's policies.

March of its good offices to ease US-Cuban tensions. Although he overplayed his hand, Toranzo Montero retains important support within the military and has warned that he will be "active on the sidelines."

The military in general share Toranzo Montero's concern over Peronista and Communist activities, which are extensive despite executive decrees outlawing political activity by both the Peronista-sponsored Justicialista party and the Communist party. The provinces have been reluctant to enforce these decrees, and the Communists and some Peronista groups have worked with legal leftist parties, thus stimulating military fears of a leftist united front. The Peronistas are split, and an increasing number are ignoring Peron's orders from his exile in Spain to cast a blank protest vote and to oppose the government through all available means.

Frondizi's party won an important victory in the municipal elections in Santa Fe Province on 19 March--after defeats in Buenos Aires and Mendoza in February. This new show of public confidence will further strengthen Frondizi in dealing with the military.

Toranzo Montero's formal letter of resignation, which he released to the press one hour after he sent it to Fraga on 25 March, was a virtual admission of his desire to overthrow Frondizi. It accused the administration of corruption and of softness toward Peronism and Communism, and made a critical reference to Argentina's offer on 4

Morocco's claims to a substantial portion of the western Sahara were dramatized when the so-called "Mauritanian Army of Liberation" on 11 March seized eleven oil prospectors--including three Americans--in the Saguia el-Hamra region of Spanish Sahara. Rabat had warned when Spain granted concessions to nine American firms in 1959 that it did not recognize Spanish sovereignty over the area and that concessionaires would later have to revalidate their claims with the Rabat Government.

Moroccan claims include the enclave of Ifni, to which

Moroccan irregulars laid siege in 1957; Spanish Sahara, governed as a province of Spain; the newly independent state of Mauritania; and the westernmost portion of the French Saharan department of Saoura.

Faced with the probability that supporters for Mauritania's application for membership in the United Nations would insist on raising the issue at the resumed session of the UN General Assembly, Rabat may well have used Mauritanian dissidents, who have pledged allegiance to the Moroccan King, to create incidents in the area again in order

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
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to focus international attention on Moroccan claims.

Rabat probably encouraged the formation of the "Mauritanian Army of Liberation," reported to number between 600 and 1,400 men, and its activities along the Moroccan - Spanish Saharan



Spain has reinforced its troops to nearly 6,000 men concentrated in the area of El Aiun.

Last week Spanish forces were reported to have surrounded and annihilated a group of irregulars; Spain claims to be prepared for an outbreak of hostilities with Morocco.



King Hassan II warned on 22 March, when the oilmen were released, that Morocco intended to press its territorial claims and that other prospectors might be seized. The palace-oriented Maghreb Arab press agency seems to be preparing Moroccan opinion for military action in southern Morocco.

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ISRAELI AID IN AFRICA

A recent speech by Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir indicates that Israel, despite the anti-Israel resolution adopted in January at the African "summit" conference in Casablanca, has decided to continue expanding its foreign aid program in Africa. Mrs. Meir discounted the Casablanca resolution, which was inspired by the UAR, as having been prompted by only a "temporary need" to support slogans harmful to Israel. She said it does not reflect "the entire political balance sheet" of Israel's relations with African states.

The resolution criticized Israel as "an instrument of imperialism and neocolonialism" in Africa as well as the Middle East. Its signatories included the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, each of which receives Israeli aid, as well as of the UAR and Morocco. Subsequent Israeli representations to the governments of the first three evoked reiterations of their support of the resolution, although Ghana's Nkrumah gave private assurances of continued good will toward Israel. The three, nevertheless, appear ready to accept aid from any source, and on that basis the Israelis have decided to continue assisting them.

Ghana is still the program's showcase. More than 100 Israeli experts in agriculture, marine navigation, and construction are serving there, while numerous Ghanaians are taking courses in Israel. Mali is one of the newest recipients of Israeli aid, having received small arms--subsequent to the Casablanca conference--under terms which made them virtually a gift.

About 1,000 foreign trainees are scheduled to attend courses in Israel this year. The training program includes academic studies at the Haifa Institute of Technology and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as well as a five-year medical course and a four-year curriculum in agricultural engineering. Military courses are also conducted; about 200 Ethiopian paratroopers recently were trained by the Israelis.

Seminars in various fields are held periodically. Last August, Israel was host to 126 delegates from 41 countries at an international conference on "Science in the Advancement of New States." The African and Asian delegations were urged to look to Israel as a training ground for technicians and for ideas and research facilities.

Another venture in Tel Aviv, the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies, is sponsored jointly by the Israel Federation of Labor (Histadrut) and the AFL-CIO. Sixty-four students from 31 African and Asian countries currently are attending the first of a series of six-month courses. The purpose of the school is to demonstrate Israel's rapid economic development under a democratic political system to labor leaders and members of cooperatives from underdeveloped areas.

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Mrs. Meir said Israel would send 400 government experts to Africa and Asia during 1961; approximately 500 nongovernmental technicians also have been sent. Israel maintains 160 missions in 35 countries in Africa and Asia.

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
Nasir recognizes Israel's aid program as a challenge to his own efforts to exert influence in Africa. UAR propaganda media regularly denounce Israeli activities in Africa as "imperialist" machinations. Other Arab states have supported the UAR campaign.

It remains to be seen whether, in the face of the

Arab countercampaign, the Israeli program will reap significant political advantages for Tel Aviv. Despite the Casablanca resolution, the Israelis apparently still feel that they can count on gaining diplomatic benefits, particularly when the Arabs press their perennial grievances on Palestine in the UN.

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
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS

The success of the Socialist party in the elections on 26 March has increased the likelihood that Belgium's next government will be a coalition of the Social Christian and Socialist parties, with Paul Henri Spaak, Socialist leader and former secretary general of NATO, playing a prominent role. While no major changes in foreign policy are anticipated, Spaak has been privately critical of some of his country's moves in the Congo and would probably bring about greater Belgian cooperation both there and in NATO matters.

The opposition Socialists, who had been generally expected to suffer marked losses as a result of the Socialist-led strikes in December and January, actually gained both in popular votes and Senate seats and held their own in the lower house. Some left-wing Socialists apparently defected to the Communists, who gained three additional seats in the lower house. The Social Christians, the leading partner in Premier Eyskens' coalition,

lost heavily--mainly to two right-wing groups which rallied support from conservative-minded voters dissatisfied with Eyskens' handling of the Congo crisis and the subsequent economic austerity law. The conservative Liberals, junior partners in the coalition, gained popular votes although they lost one of their 21 seats in the lower house.

Eyskens' government is continuing in a caretaker capacity until some agreement can be reached among the parties--none of which has a majority in either house. The chairman of the Social Christian party, Theo Lefevre, favors cooperation with the Socialists but faces strong opposition from the



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middle-class wing of his party, which wants instead to continue the coalition with the Liberals. The Labor elements in his party have for some time been more inclined toward an alliance with the Socialists, and moderate elements in both these parties believe that the difficult economic readjustments ahead require a coalition of Belgium's two largest parties.

Spaak would probably play a leading role--either as premier or foreign minister--in any such coalition. Having been out of Belgian party politics from 1957 until a few weeks ago, he is less committed than any other prominent leader to Belgium's past actions in the Congo, and on 13 March in a conversation with the American chargé in Brussels he voiced strong criticism of the Congo policies of the Belgian Government. Both on Congo questions and in any

effort to strengthen Belgium's support of NATO, Spaak would face strong opposition, even in his own party, to any major change in government policy, but he would be able to exercise more stringent control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reduce the free-wheeling activity of officials in the Ministries of Defense and African Affairs regarding the Congo.

The first task of any new government will be to put Belgium's fiscal house in order and stimulate the growth of the economy. Lefevre, in his effort to improve prospects for a coalition with the Socialists, has said that a new long-range financial and economic program should be substituted for the controversial "loi unique," which provoked the strikes and was finally adopted in February over Socialist opposition.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS

Measures to make the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) a more effective instrument for advancing free trade unionism, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the world, were the principal topic of discussion at an extraordinary session of the ICFTU's executive board in Brussels from 13 to 17 March. Some progress appears to have been made, but the constructive atmosphere which prevailed may have been achieved in part by agreement to avoid a showdown on several basic issues.

The major item on the agenda was a plan providing for the regrouping of primary ICFTU activities--such as education, training, and organizing support

--under three or four new assistant secretaries general. The ICFTU's bureaucratic inefficiency has long been decried by its affiliates, and Secretary General Becu's delay in proposing correctives caused a major quarrel at the executive board meeting last December.

How soon and how effectively Becu's new plan will be implemented remains to be seen. Only two of the new posts have been filled, and one of these by an appointee who encountered opposition from certain of the powerful International Trade Secretariats on which the ICFTU leans heavily for support in the organizing field.

Board discussion of financing for ICFTU support activities

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in the developing areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America also produced somewhat uncertain results. About three fourths of the \$10,000,000 sought by the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund for the next three years has now been pledged. Satisfaction over the AFL-CIO's offer of \$3,250,000 (\$750,000 less than had been asked for) is tempered, however, by the total default of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), already in arrears on past contributions. TUC delegate George Woodcock declared that the British unions "cannot afford" their proposed \$2,250,000, and would make no further contributions to the fund.

Although there is some hope that a TUC contribution will be forthcoming before the 1962 ICFTU congress, Becu and other leaders are nonetheless concerned over the British attitude. Woodcock not only questioned the ICFTU's need for "large amounts" of money, but added that the ICFTU should concern itself primarily with "economic and social matters."

By implication this would seem to indicate a lack of sympathy for the ICFTU's increasing emphasis on organizational activities--a program which other trade union leaders think essential if free trade unionism is to establish itself in areas now in the process of industrialization.

On the problem of uncoordinated, unilateral activities by affiliates in such areas--long a source of friction among the ICFTU, AFL-CIO, and TUC--the ICFTU appears to have beat a strategic retreat. Apparently reconciled to the continuation of such activities, Becu proposed only that they be undertaken in "consultation" with the ICFTU. Although probably a more realistic assessment of the ICFTU's relationship to its major affiliates, this stand leaves much to good faith and contrasts with past ICFTU predictions that an uncoordinated approach, particularly to the complicated trade union situation in Africa, is bound to fail.

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SCIENCE IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The Chinese Communists, determined to achieve status as a world power as quickly as possible, are giving high priority to science and technology. They now are in the fifth year of a 12-year scientific development program drawn up in 1956 under the aegis of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The program, which concentrates Chinese effort in 11 priority technological fields --including atomic energy and jet propulsion, is being executed in an orderly manner with much zeal and determination. Significant successes have been achieved, but the program's announced goal of attaining "world levels of achievement" by 1967 is beyond reach.

China's small nucleus of competent, Western-trained scientists is being slowly augmented by students trained in bloc countries. However, research and development are limited by a shortage of scientific manpower and by China's heavy dependence on Soviet technical assistance, sharply curtailed by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians last summer. Nevertheless, native capabilities are probably adequate to provide some spectacular results from a few high-priority projects in both the military and economic sectors.

In addition, China is acquiring the capability for

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development of most conventional armaments and for routine technological support in economic areas, but high-quality scientific resources are not expanding rapidly enough to meet all critical needs in agriculture and industry.

Achievements in public health have been impressive. Epidemic diseases have been reduced, and concepts of sanitation among the people have been widely established. General health practices are still poor, however, and the control of common diseases such as bacillary dysentery, tuberculosis, and schistosomiasis will be far from complete during the remainder of the program. A shortage of doctors trained in Western medicine forces the regime to continue to support and encourage traditional Chinese practitioners.

Research in physics, chemistry, and metallurgy remains relatively primitive, and the level of performance in these sectors is not expected to improve greatly in the next few years. Biological and agri-

cultural research and development programs have also been poor, especially in relation to the pressing demand in China to raise food production. Any tangible benefits to agriculture from this quarter during the plan will probably come from the application of known practices.

The entire program is hampered by a lack of adequate research facilities. These facilities are growing, especially in priority military and industrial areas, and are probably keeping pace with the growth in trained personnel in most fields of science and technology. As of the moment, however, only about 1,000 highly trained scientists are available to plan, supervise, and carry out activity that would be considered significant in Western scientific circles. Graduates of China's own scientific schools are not well trained by world standards and are not sufficiently numerous to give the regime reason to hope for an early escape from its dependence on the rest of the bloc in even this limited area.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ROLE IN THE BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

Czechoslovakia, second only to the USSR as a contributor to the bloc's foreign aid program, is providing economic and military assistance to 17 underdeveloped countries. Total Czech aid extended thus far amounts to \$660,000,000, compared with the Soviet aid total of \$3.8 billion and a Chinese Communist aid total of \$350,000,000. About half of the Czech aid is being provided for economic development projects, the remainder for

military equipment. Some of the major bloc arms agreements, particularly those signed with Middle Eastern countries in 1955-56, were negotiated by Czechoslovakia. In addition, Czechoslovakia is the bloc country most active in establishing and expanding trade relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Economic Aid

Unlike Soviet aid, Czech aid has for the most part been

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extended for single light industrial and consumer projects, to private companies as well as to governments. From 1954 to 1958 Czechoslovakia initiated the bloc economic aid program in six countries in Asia and Latin America with small short-term credits for such projects as cement plants, sugar refineries, and textile mills. Since 1959, however, there has been a trend toward providing longer term lines of credits to be used for public development projects; the largest single line of credit--\$48,500,000--was extended to India in 1959. With the exception of about \$4,000,000 in grant aid to Guinea, Cambodia, and Somalia, all Czech aid has been in the form of credits.

Total Czech economic aid to the underdeveloped countries since 1954 amounts to \$335,000,000, about a fourth of which has been used. India, Indonesia, the UAR, Iraq, and Cuba have been the principal recipients, but significant credits have been provided to Ethiopia and Guinea and a new credit of an unknown amount has been extended to Cambodia. The most recent Czech aid was a \$1.4 million grant to Somalia--the first bloc overture to that country.

Prague has undertaken its largest projects in India, where, in addition to the several cement plants and sugar refineries already constructed, a large foundry project, a heavy machine tool plant, and a heavy electrical machinery plant are planned for construction in the next few years. Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR have received significant Czech lines of credit for industrial development, and the first bloc aid extended to the Castro government was a Czech line of credit for \$20,000,000 in June 1960.

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In addition to the aid extended on its own account, the Czechs are participating in projects involving Soviet economic credits. In Egypt, for example, Czechoslovakia is providing under Soviet credits equipment for several industrial projects and the Aswan dam construction.

Significant Czech aid offers outstanding include a credit offer to Bolivia for mineral processing and an offer of both economic and military aid to Ecuador.

Military Assistance

Agreements covering a minimum of \$325,000,000 in military credits have been negotiated by Czechoslovakia with the UAR, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Guinea, and Cuba, although some

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of the equipment under these agreements probably was supplied by the USSR. Czechoslovakia was the first bloc country to extend military aid to a nonbloc country, concluding arms agreements with both Egypt in 1955 and Syria in 1956. Under these arrangements, Czechoslovakia provided the material and apparently assumed much of the financial burden.

In the 1956 agreement with Yemen, however, Czechoslovakia--though it negotiated the deal and provided some arms--probably fronted for the USSR.

In recent years, Czechoslovakia, although still used as the bloc's initial contact for arms deals, has acted mainly as a participant in agreements between the Soviet Union and nonbloc countries, supplying arms, equipment, and training often not available in the USSR.

The first Indonesian arms deal in 1958 apparently was an exception; Prague carried out the entire agreement, probably because of Djakarta's unwillingness at that time to become directly involved in an arms deal with Moscow.

Virtually all the military credits arranged by Czechoslovakia have been used.

Trade

Czechoslovakia's chief contribution to the bloc offensive to promote closer economic ties with the underdeveloped countries continues to be in the field of trade. In many areas the bloc has established economic ties solely through Czech commercial initiatives. In some countries, while other bloc states, particularly the USSR, are involved in an aid program, Czech activities have been restricted to increasing trade.

Czech activities in Mali, for example, have been concentrated on establishing commercial relations. Under an agreement with the USSR and Czechoslovakia, Mali will sell most of its peanut crop--its principal export--to the bloc during the next year. Both the USSR and Communist China have initiated an aid program in Mali.

Czechoslovakia's trade with the underdeveloped countries increased from \$175,000,000 in 1954 to an estimated \$415,000,000 in 1960.
(Prepared by ORR)

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Recent announcements by several key Western UN members that they will no longer support the moratorium on Chinese UN representation indicate that time has run out for Taipei in the United Nations. The growing opposition to postponing discussion of either the entry of Peiping or the ouster of Taipei does not necessarily imply support for Peiping's admission but does reflect a long-held belief among UN members that the organization must come to grips with the problem.

Moratorium

The General Assembly at each of the past ten sessions has voted a moratorium on consideration of the Chinese representation question. This procedural device for delaying a decision requires only a simple majority of votes. Any vote on the substance of the issue--ouster of Taipei or admission of Peiping--would presumably require a two-thirds majority.

In the first five of these sessions, over two thirds favored the moratorium. Since 1956, however, as new UN members have rapidly increased the size of the organization, the moratorium has mustered only a simple majority; in October 1960 it was approved by the smallest margin since 1951, when the issue first arose. This setback to Taipei's position was compounded by statements from various African delegates that their abstentions were grudgingly given and would not be repeated in the future. After the last ballot, the general mood of many supporters of the moratorium was that it would not pass again.

Since October, there has been increasing speculation about

the future of Nationalist China, sparked notably by statements from Britain and Brazil that they would no longer support the moratorium. Uncertainty among UN members about the position of the new US administration has also encouraged speculation.

Although the Chinese representation issue was postponed for the duration of the 15th General Assembly session--which resumed on 7 March after a two-month recess--Peiping's supporters could attempt to reopen the question at the current session, though it would require a two-thirds majority to reverse the previous decision.

Factors Affecting Peiping's Admission

Some UN members argue for Peiping's admission to the UN because they subscribe to the concept of the universality of UN membership. Members are also influenced by the desire to bind the Chinese Communists not only to the principles of the UN Charter but to any international agreement that may be reached on disarmament or the banning of nuclear tests--which they believe would be accepted by the United Nations as a whole.

Other members are eager to see Peiping exposed to the rough-and-tumble of UN debates and voting line-ups; they see in these encounters an opportunity to exploit any differences between Peiping and Moscow.

The gradual erosion of Taipei's position in the UN, moreover, has resulted in some uneasiness among its supporters, who by no means want to be the "last to recognize" Peiping.

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Probably the greatest obstacles to Peiping's admission are its belligerence and its opposition to any proposal that would accord some international status to the Nationalists--even as "Taiwan" or "Formosa." Many of Peiping's supporters are reluctant to scuttle Taipei completely. As a charter member, Nationalist China has contributed greatly to the development of the United Nations, and Dr. Tsiang, its permanent representative since 1947, is held in high esteem as a parliamentarian.

Strong resistance to Peiping's entry on the part of the United States has been a primary factor. In September 1959, however, Latin American irritation over the problem of Chinese UN representation was summed up by the Brazilian delegate when he stated that support for the moratorium was "the heaviest burden the Latin American countries had to bear in return for US friendship."

There remains on the UN books a 1951 resolution branding Communist China an aggressor in Korea; the UN embargo on strategic shipments to the mainland was a direct outgrowth of this resolution. However, a precedent favorable to Peiping's cause was set in 1955 when Spain was admitted to the UN despite a 1946 UN resolution condemning its conduct.

Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi was recently quoted as saying that Peiping will not enter the UN until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its forces

from the area. Many UN members which now support Peiping would probably not accept the idea that such a concession could be made a prerequisite for Communist China's entry in the UN.

Commonwealth and Europe

Certain Western European states and "old Commonwealth" members like Australia, while supporting the moratorium, have for many years believed that Peiping's recognition and its admission to the UN were inevitable but that it was not yet time for such action. They felt that in the meantime, closer de facto relations with Communist China would reduce the general tension and might make the act of eventual recognition easier. They looked on the gradual deterioration of the Nationalists' UN position as part of the process.

The statement by British Foreign Secretary Home on 8 February that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations has been subsequently amplified in a privately expressed view by the Foreign Office that Taipei's supporters would not even be able to attach conditions to the seating of Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose admitting the Chinese Communists if they insisted on UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to them or that the 1951 aggression charge against Communist China be expunged from UN records.

At the Commonwealth prime ministers' conference in London from 8 to 17 March, the majority apparently endorsed London's contention that Peiping should be seated--and Taipei presumably excluded. Australia and New Zealand--both with considerable public opinion favoring recognition of Peiping--appear reluctant to modify their opposition to its admission to the UN now, but they may go along with Britain if it refuses to support the moratorium again. Canada has

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consistently favored the moratorium in the past, and External Affairs Secretary Green told Ambassador Merchant on 20 March that he personally opposed Peiping's admission.

A French Foreign Ministry official stated on 21 February that the British attitude was unlikely to change the French Government's opposition to seating Peiping. He indicated, however, that Paris was going to restudy the question. He believed that the situation within the UN was changing, although he felt that Communist China would probably prejudice its chances of admission by posing unacceptable conditions.


Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky recently stated that there would be "no difficulty for Austria" in recognizing the Peiping regime, but that his government's future attitude in the UN--it now abstains on the moratorium--"would depend on circumstances."

The Scandinavian countries --with the exception of Iceland --all recognize Peiping and have opposed the moratorium for many years.

Afro-Asian Bloc

The 25 African UN members --16 of which were admitted in 1960--probably are the key to Nationalist China's position in the UN. Eight recognize Peiping. Of the 25, only Liberia supported the October 1960 moratorium; most others abstained but indicated that next time they would probably oppose. According to a French UN delegate, representatives of several new African states resented the tactics of the Chinese Nationalist delegate, and his efforts probably backfired. The American UN delegation believed at the time that more African states would vote against the moratorium in 1961, not from lack of understanding of the US position but basically from a feeling that neutrals must take a position midway between East and West.

Tunisia, which has been abstaining on the moratorium, will probably not do so in the future. Tunisian officials, particularly those on the UN delegation, are anxious to align themselves with the majority of the Afro-Asian bloc on this issue.



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Pakistan, which recognizes Communist China but has been a consistent supporter of the moratorium, has recently changed its position. In January a Pakistani official asked the US Embassy in Karachi whether the United States would be prepared in the future to have its allies "follow their own conscience" on the question or whether it considered support of the moratorium a test of friendship with the United States. Pakistan subsequently abstained on the issue of Chinese Communist representation at the World Health Organization's general conference in February in New Delhi; an official later explained that Pakistani support of the moratorium in the past had often been "embarrassing, and the government had decided to put an end to this embarrassment."

Japan's support for a moratorium proposal at the General Assembly session next fall is becoming doubtful. At the moment, Tokyo is hopeful that the proposal will not be put forth. Unconfirmed press reports indicate, however, that the Foreign Ministry is seriously considering abstaining unless a workable compromise proposal is forthcoming.

Japan is concerned about possible isolation from the Afro-Asian bloc [redacted]

[redacted] A decision probably will be deferred at least until Prime Minister Ikeda meets with President Kennedy in Washington during June.

Latin America

Although the Quadros administration in Brazil has said that henceforth it will support discussion of the issue of Chinese UN representation in the General Assembly, its announcement does not necessarily carry with it support for the entry of Peiping or the ouster of Taipei. This decision, moreover, does not extend to the specialized agencies

such as the World Health Organization and UNESCO, on the theory that the assembly is the primary body to discuss the issue. The statement has, however, caused other Latin American UN members to reflect on their continued support for the moratorium.

Outlook

Prospects for a favorable vote on the moratorium in 1961 are most uncertain. However, a vote against the moratorium is likely to be followed by one in favor of admitting Communist China and giving it a permanent seat on the Security Council. It is not so certain that the General Assembly would recommend the complete ouster of Taipei from the United Nations--although if the vote were confined to the question of which Chinese delegation's credentials were valid, this would be automatic.

Various compromise proposals are being considered, one of which is to have the General Assembly declare that the issue goes beyond mere credentials and as such requires a two-thirds majority vote. While such a decision would not assure defeat of Peiping's entry, it would probably mean that Taipei would be given some measure of UN recognition.

Many UN members believe that the issue is of such substantive importance to the UN that it goes beyond a mere decision on validity of credentials. Failure of the General Assembly to reach a decision of this question could result in referral of the issue to the International Court of Justice or to a study group appointed by the assembly--a tactic which might assure Taipei of a few more years as "China" in the United Nations. Taipei might also retain its seat by default if Peiping, as a condition for its entry, should demand concessions which UN members could not grant.

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DE GAULLE'S PROGRAM FOR THE FRENCH ARMED SERVICES

De Gaulle is reorganizing the French armed forces along new functional lines in an effort to adapt to the demands of modern warfare. Most of his long-range objectives, including early achievement of a nuclear capability, are embodied in the 1960-65 "program law" passed last fall, which in turn is based largely on a plan drawn up in 1957 by the Armed Forces Staff, then under General Paul Ely.

The 1957 Basic Plan

As far as its details are known, the 1957 plan assumes that France now faces a "many-sided" threat which includes "nuclear and ideological factors," rather than the preponderantly German threat which French military planners used to assume.

Ely, intent on reviving army morale after the loss of Indochina, consulted scores of officers who had been captured by the Viet Minh and had become fascinated with the idea of turning Communist guerrilla warfare techniques against France's enemies. Some of their ideas seem to be reflected in the plan, which anticipates subversive uprisings, perhaps in conjunction with a sudden initial nuclear attack coupled with guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations. Native nationalist uprisings in Asia and Africa are considered "subversive" insofar as they are Communist inspired and require counter action.

A French nuclear deterrent had a prominent role in the 1957 plan, which called

for a permanent defense force ready to cope with both attacks from abroad and domestic subversion. The plan divides the French armed services into a "first group"--ground, air, and naval forces--with a cadre of long-term professional soldiers ready to meet any immediate threat, anywhere in the world; and a "second group"--composed mainly of ground forces not all permanently available--primarily for internal defense, but also for possible reinforcement of the first group.

The New Program Law

According to estimates prepared by the National Assembly Defense Committee in connection with the 1960-65 program law, the army will ultimately be reduced from its present nineteen active divisions (including six reserve divisions) to five or six completely modernized divisions backed by a reserve force of 250,000 to 400,000 men who could be mobilized within a week. The active divisions would form a "battle corps" equipped with air-defense missiles and, eventually, tactical nuclear weapons; the reserve units would be assigned to internal defense. By 1965, the army would be able to furnish to a proposed interservice task force two divisions--one large but lightly equipped infantry unit and a second combined-arms unit formed of elements now scattered throughout the French Community.

The program law places a ceiling of \$6.4 billion for the five-year period on military equipment expenditures and earmarks \$2.4 billion for major end items and research projects.

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**ESTIMATED FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES
1960-65**

MILLION DOLLARS

	CONTRACTING AUTHORITY PROVIDED BY PROGRAM LAW	COMPLEMENTARY EXPENDITURES (PROGRAMED ANNUALLY)	TOTAL	ANNUAL AVERAGE	1959
Army	305	1,508	1813	363	365
Navy	314	675	989	198	138
Air Force	693	1,284	1,977	395	305
Inter- Service	1,094	486	1,580	316	186
	<u>2,406</u>	<u>3,953</u>	<u>6,359</u>	<u>1,272</u>	<u>994</u>

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The principal increases under the law go to the "interservice" category, which includes the nuclear weapons and missile programs, and to the air force. The equipment funds for the army and navy remain stabilized at about the 1959 level.

Nearly half of the research appropriation covers the development and production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.


**CONTRACTING AUTHORITY PROGRAMED UNDER
FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT LAW (1960-1965)
(MILLION DOLLARS)**

The Program Law does not itself commit funds or provide contracting authority, but obliges parliament to vote the programed funds in each annual military budget. The 1960 and 1961 portions of the program funds have been approved by parliament.

1. Special Research and Development		814	
2. Special Missiles			
Hawk	59		
Surface-to-surface missiles, strategic and tactical	157	216	
3. Aircraft			
Mirage IV	204		
Force			
Mirage III	361		
Training aircraft	12		
Light transport	37		
Navy			
Etendard IV	51		
Maritime patrol	94		
Tri- service			
Helicopters	63		
Over-all research and development	79	901	
4. Land Vehicles		306	
5. Principal Warships			
Missile Cruisers	105		
Submarines	64		
		<u>169</u>	
		<u>2,406</u>	

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Although the army continues to receive about 40 percent of the over-all military appropriations, its slice of the five-year program law covers only the cost of new vehicles, most of which will probably be simply replacements. Therefore, this will not permit complete modernization of the army in Germany

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The navy gets a

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modest construction program, including carrier aircraft and submarines.

The Defense Committee speculated, on the basis of Defense Ministry estimates, that long-range equipment needs would entail expenditures of nearly \$8.8 billion in a second five-year program to run through 1969. The missile program would get the largest increases in that period, when it will be at the production stage. The committee's concern over the emphasis on missiles at the expense of conventional-force modernization was reflected in its expression of hope that funds allocated for army and navy equipment categories would also be greatly increased.

De Gaulle's Modifications

While the main lines of the current reorganization and modernization antedate De Gaulle's return to power, he has provided the political stability and continuity which such a long-range program requires and has taken personal charge of its implementation. Thus he saw to it that the constitution of the Fifth Republic made his title of commander in chief more explicit than the nominal authority assigned to the presidents of the Fourth Republic.

A long-planned revision of the concept of "national defense" was effected with the drastic defense decree of early 1959 which gives the government practically unlimited control over civilians in time of emergency. He has modified the 1957 plan to accelerate the creation of a nuclear strike force at the expense of a more balanced program for all the services, and many of his

command changes and staff reorganizations have seemed designed as much to ensure military loyalty and responsiveness to himself and his policies as to modernize the French armed services.

It is also evident that he has modified or ignored some of the major political prerequisites postulated by the staff which framed the reorganization and modernization plan of 1957. These included "firm attachment to the Atlantic Pact" and a "long-term" solution in Algeria, implying "no abandonment."

For example, when De Gaulle was both premier and defense minister in 1958, he created the post of chief of the National Defense Staff as the "supreme military authority of the land," and installed the widely respected Ely in it. Ely took over the important coordinating functions of the former Permanent General Secretariat of Defense, which under the Fourth Republic had been headed by a civil servant, and also most of the functions of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, whose new chief was a lower-ranking general.

The latter's authority over individual service chiefs of staff was further reduced by dividing their responsibilities into administrative and operational categories and putting the administrative matters under a civilian "minister delegate" for each service. The effects of ill-defined and overlapping authority were compounded by De Gaulle's habit as president and commander in chief of issuing orders or making his wishes known without regard for regular channels.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****PROJECTED ALLOCATION OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES
1960-1965 1965-1970**

DETERRENT	COVER	INTERVENTION TASK FORCE
Nuclear Weapons	(External)	200 Mirage IIIs
IRBM's	190 Mirage III jet interceptors	I-2 Aircraft carriers
25 Mirage IVs (Mach 2 jet bombers with nuclear capability)	6 modernized brigades. Expanded to 6 modern divisions with tactical nuclear armament	I-2 Cruisers
50 Etendard IVs (carrier-based air- craft with nuclear capability)	27 maritime patrol aircraft	Amphibious force with helicopter carriers (Assault capability for debarking 1500-2000 men)
Several nuclear submarines	Antisubmarine warfare force (two aircraft carriers, one helicopter carrier)	Possibly tactical nuclear weapons
(missile equipped)	Conventional submarines and escorts	I Army division (20,000 lightly equipped men)
	(Internal)	I Interservice group equivalent to 2 divisions
	250,000 reserves (could be mobilized within one week). Expanded to 400,000 reserves (90,000 active duty)	

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The changes in top-level commands announced in February appear primarily intended to place absolutely loyal Gaullists in key positions and generally to strengthen De Gaulle's control over the services, particularly the army. Thus his former personal military adviser, General Jean Olie, who on 1 March succeeded Ely as chief of staff for national defense, is expected to work much more closely with De Gaulle than did Ely, who scrupulously respected the constitutional requirement that he report directly to the premier rather than to the president.

General Crepin has been succeeded by a more politically sophisticated officer, General Fernand Gambiez, as commander in chief in Algeria. In turn the designation of Crepin to be commander of French forces in Germany ensures that this major body of combat troops will remain responsive to De Gaulle. This evidently could not be guaranteed under its present commander, General Paul Allard, who is a proponent of "French Algeria."

A major reorganization of the National Defense Staff structure was approved in principle on 1 March. It will reportedly eliminate the three civilian minister delegates and will establish a Delegation for Armaments, directly subordinate to the minister of armed forces, which would have responsibility for all arms programs--both conventional and nuclear. Informed speculation on other aspects of the reorganization sees the French defense forces divided into three categories (deterrent, interior defense, intervention) which correspond to those foreseen when the program law was passed.

Military Reactions

Although the armed forces approved of many of De Gaulle's moves in the defense field, many officers have had increasing misgivings over the long-range effect on French security of his Algerian policy. Many, including Ely himself, are also concerned about the over-all wisdom of De Gaulle's coolness toward NATO.

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The 1960 program law's emphasis on the creation of a nuclear striking force was roundly criticized by a wide range of political and military leaders as wastefully expensive and absurd from the standpoint of realistic power relations--particularly after the US proposals to make NATO a "nuclear power." The nuclear strike force was also criticized by many who felt the army was being denied the new and replacement materiel and equipment it needed to win the Algerian war.

The recently approved plan for armaments centralization is already being criticized, particularly by the navy, which is jealous of its weapons and supply system and will probably be inclined to resist the army general who seems the most likely candidate for "delegate for armament."

For much of the army, the entire reorganization program is likely to be viewed sourly against the background of the unfulfilled conditions postulated when the original plan was formulated in 1957. Facing the prospect of leaving Algeria without a complete victory and feeling that the program law discriminates against the army, many officers are reportedly talking of leaving the service.

While a number of army officers will probably be released in any event as the post-Algerian demobilization and reorganization shapes up, the majority will undoubtedly remain. Nevertheless, for many whose military orientation in recent years has focused on guerrilla warfare and on retaining Algeria at all costs, the political and technical reorientation would be difficult. Students of the army's structure

have already pointed to the increasing opportunities of advancement which modernization will offer the comparatively few highly technically trained younger officers at the expense of their infantry-oriented seniors.

Many responsible military leaders also reportedly are apprehensive over the possible effect the condemnation of the Algerian war by many French intellectual and religious leaders may have on the morale of future conscripts. These officers complain that the army is being increasingly isolated from the nation by such activities.

Outlook

Those who for political or military reasons wish to arrest or modify the program must reckon with the fact that much of it is now several years old--particularly the nuclear weapons effort--and that the passage of time will increasingly consolidate it along lines marked out by De Gaulle. There also seems to be agreement that he has increasingly imposed his will on the armed forces--particularly the army--and can be expected to move skillfully to parry and overcome opposition elements.

Nevertheless, it is also apparent that De Gaulle--in simultaneously requiring the armed services to accept his version of the reorganization plan while he prepares what many will regard as an inglorious withdrawal from Algeria--still runs a considerable risk in defying entrenched interests in the armed forces and a gamut of political leaders with varying axes to grind on this issue.

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T. D. LYSENKO

Trofim D. Lysenko, the controversial Soviet scientist who in Stalin's time had wide influence in the fields of agriculture and biology, is regaining--at least in agriculture--some of the authority he lost after Stalin's death. His appearance at the January central committee plenum on agriculture and the appointment of his adherent M. A. Olshansky as minister of agriculture are evidence of the increase in Lysenko's political prestige.

Reputable scientists view Lysenko as a charlatan, and his rise at a time when Khrushchev is calling for the application of the best scientific effort to the solution of the USSR's agricultural problems appears something of an anomaly.

Khrushchev's personal evaluation of Lysenko, expressed privately to visiting Westerners in the spring of 1956 when Lysenko's career appeared to be in eclipse, suggests that the Soviet leader himself is the source of his reviving influence: "As to Lysenko, opinions about his theories vary. It is necessary to discuss and compare in order to evaluate correctly all theories. Lysenko is one of our prominent agronomists, but he has the character of a dog.... (Other) scientists fear his bad nature. Nevertheless, I repeat that he is a very prominent agronomist. Many pseudo-scientists who criticize him are not worth his little finger." At this point Mikoyan interjected: "You exaggerate."

The Soviet premier's public praise of Lysenko has emphasized his "close ties with life," a favorite Khrushchev theme in science and education programs. Khrushchev has often voiced suspicion of scientists concerned with basic theoretical research for their failure to contribute directly to the national economy; last year he recommended that all scientists be paid only

on the basis of the immediate applicability of their research in industry or agriculture.

Rising Political Prestige

In his speech to the plenum on 14 January, Lysenko sharply attacked the work of former Minister of Agriculture V. V. Matskevich and urged reorganization of the ministry itself. He charged that the ministry had ignored his cattle-breeding experiments and, in fact, thought so little of them that his breeding stock had been slaughtered for meat. He complained that his 20-page protest, addressed to the ministry six months earlier, had not been acknowledged until January. At this point Khrushchev commented caustically, "They read slowly in the Ministry of Agriculture."

Other high-ranking politician at the plenum took pains to make it clear that they did not share Matskevich's indifference to Lysenko's work. D. S. Polyansky, premier of the Russian Republic (RSFSR), stated, "We have all the requirements to obtain highly productive cows yielding milk with a high butterfat content--cows which are being developed under the direction of the outstanding scientist T. D. Lysenko."

T. I. Sokolov, party boss of the agriculturally important Tselinnyy (New Lands) Kray, linked Khrushchev and Lysenko in praise: "We are confident that the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture--carried out on the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev--the further consolidation and development of the Michurin trend in science--headed by the remarkable worker and outstanding scientist T. D. Lysenko--will secure the further development of all phases of agriculture on a correct scientific foundation." (I. V. Michurin, sometimes called the Burbank of Russia, preceded Lysenko in asserting that hereditary variation is the result

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of the effects of environmental changes.)

Lithuanian party boss A. Yu. Snehkus called attention to the fact that Lysenko's cattle would soon be introduced into the Lithuanian livestock program and that Lithuanian farms would apply mixtures of organic-chemical fertilizers as advocated by Lysenko.

Olshansky, whose appointment as minister of agriculture was announced on 29 December, has been described by other scientists as a close associate and "a true disciple" of Lysenko. Olshansky is to have fabricated research to prove Lysenko's theories and then believed what he had fabricated. Both Olshansky and Lysenko accompanied Khrushchev to Kiev in late January on the first leg of the premier's inspection tour of agricultural areas. Lysenko joined Khrushchev on the speakers' platform at the conference of RSFSR agricultural workers in Moscow in late February. Both Lysenko and Olshansky appeared with him at the meeting of agricultural workers in Akmolinsk in mid-March, and Olshansky also accompanied him to the Kazakh agricultural workers' meeting in Alma-Ata.

Khrushchev has continued to heap public praise on Lysenko. In Moscow on 23 February he commented: "It is a good thing to study with scientists who are closely connected with life, such as Academician Trofim D. Lysenko. I myself have listened a good deal to him and his pupils, and have several times visited his farm near Moscow, and the Odessa institute. I recall with gratitude the talks which I had with him."

With Olshansky heading the reorganized Ministry of Agriculture and with Khrushchev's admiration publicly expressed and echoed by other party leaders, Lysenko is clearly in a position to exert significant

influence in the programming of research in agricultural institutes.

Theory on Heredity

Lysenko's career began in the early 1930s, when he achieved some success in accelerating the maturation of plants by treating the seeds before planting. His experiments were not scientifically controlled, and the conclusions he drew went far beyond anything that could be supported by the results achieved.

Contradicting all other scientific work in genetics, he has insisted that genes and chromosomes are sinister bourgeois myths, and that the whole living organism draws inheritable characteristics from its environment. Hereditary changes can thus, in his view, be directed by man's changing the environment and need not depend on accidental mutations or on the limited changes possible through selective breeding.

These theories, although without demonstrated scientific basis, are compatible with Marxist doctrine and may even be taken seriously by their proponent, whose scientific education, received during the 1920s, was quite haphazard. In addition to being politically useful, his theories have always been attractive because they promise shortcuts to agricultural gains which more orthodox geneticists promise only over a long period of time. This, indeed, is probably the key to Lysenko's popularity with Khrushchev, who seems almost desperate for a quick improvement in the Soviet agricultural picture.

Lysenko's scientific opponents have thus been faced with the difficult task of convincing Soviet political leaders who want to believe his views that his "scientific discoveries" are either misinterpretations of evidence or in some cases deliberate falsification of results. To replace his attractive promises, they

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themselves can offer only the delay of further research before their own successes can be applied in agriculture. Moreover, their proof that Lysenko is wrong in his claims rests on scientific premises and techniques which look like hairsplitting to the nonspecialist.

Influence Under Stalin

To compensate, at least vis-a-vis political leaders, for his weak scientific background, Lysenko attributed his "successes" to the inspiration of Stalin and the socialist system, and charged scientists who questioned his claims with political treason. In Stalin's later years, Lysenko achieved control of both agricultural policies and biological research. Under his aegis, the campaign of the late 1940s to purify Soviet biology of "bourgeois-imperialist" opposition to his theories resulted in the closing of institutes, the re-writing of textbooks, and the arrest of scientists. Student books and pedigree records were abandoned; hybrid corn development was checked.

The Soviet afforestation program was saddled with instructions to plant seedlings in clusters, on the theory that competition would make each tree grow more lustily. All the plantings suffered from crowding, and the program was later condemned as a failure.

Basic biological research stagnated, since Lysenko's views on the exchange of characteristics between the whole living organism and its environment left no scope for proper laboratory research.

Loss of Influence

Even before Stalin's death, Lysenko's opponents, encouraged by hints of a general political thaw, renewed their efforts to remove his grip from the biological sciences. In the spring of 1955, the Academy

of Sciences' Botanical Journal summed up the results of a re-examination of Lysenko's claims: "It has now been conclusively demonstrated that the entire concept is factually unsound and theoretically and methodically erroneous, and that it is not of practical value..."

Having noted that in at least one instance the investigators had found clear evidence of falsification of results in order to support Lysenko's claims, the journal complained that "T. D. Lysenko is resurrecting in our science... the naive transformist beliefs that were widespread in the biology of antiquity and the Middle Ages." The journal referred bitterly to "the clearly theological nature" of Lysenko's belief in the ability of plants to select for themselves good qualities deriving from their environments.

In April 1956 Lysenko's critics finally achieved his resignation from his post as president of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences. He retained the directorship of the Institute of Genetics--under the USSR Academy of Sciences--but a number of competent geneticists established fruitful research programs outside the jurisdiction of this institute.

In July 1956, Matskevich, then minister of agriculture, complained publicly about the serious inadequacies in agricultural research. In only thinly veiled allusions to Lysenko, he attributed these shortcomings to the conceit of "certain scientific workers... based simply on ignorance," and stated, "A number of scientists, especially those who pride themselves on their remarkable discoveries which, at least in their own eyes, are causing a revolution in science, have properly studied neither the native nor the foreign literature on the subject under discussion, nor the practices of socialist agriculture."

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Current Position

Lysenko's recovery in political prestige since 1956 may not reach the heights he achieved under Stalin. Despite his success in 1959 in effecting the removal from their posts of a few individual opponents in biological theory, the main course of Soviet basic research in biological theory has not been deflected by Lysenkoism, nor has it been significantly weakened by the regime's increased emphasis on applied science.

There is some evidence that a deliberate effort is being made to restrict his influence to agriculture. In his speech at the January plenum Lysenko attacked A. N. Nesmeyanov, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, for a December article in Pravda on the prospects for the future of biological research. Referring to the "alleged" existence of genes, Lysenko declared: "This scientific doctrine, which does not correspond to reality, was long ago refuted by Michurinite biology and on the basis of experimental facts in agricultural practices." In December 1958, he had attacked Nesmeyanov for devotion to the cause of basic theoretical research as opposed to applied science.

At the January plenum he sharpened this attack to complain that biophysics and biochemistry, were lagging badly under the leadership of Nesmeyanov, who had cited these fields as the most promising for future research.

In contrast to the attention devoted to Lysenko's remarks on agriculture, the Soviet central press all but ignored this patent attempt to regain control of biological research. Izvestia noted tersely that he "devoted a considerable part of his speech to questions on Michurinite biology and the formation of species"; Pravda failed to print even this much information. The TASS account,

not carried in the central press, added Lysenko's dictum that the sole correct program for the reconstruction of the work of all biological and agricultural scientific research organizations is that based on dialectical materialism--in the interpretation of which he claims unique competence. The full text of the speech appeared only in the specialized Rural Life, a journal published by the party central committee and devoted to agricultural affairs.

Lysenko's tendency to promise fast results, when combined with Khrushchev's impatience, may lead to the adoption of panaceas and a misuse of resources in agriculture. Lysenko's special organic-chemical fertilizer mixture, while no less effective than other fertilizers, was condemned in 1957 by the USSR Academy of Agricultural Sciences as an unnecessarily complicated measure without scientific basis and entailing an uneconomic use of resources.

Lysenko's influence on agricultural research could in the long run undercut Soviet agricultural progress through the substitution of his pet theories for more potentially fruitful lines of investigation.

Lysenko is in a strong position politically, since, as under Stalin, he has influence without responsibility. When the Soviet shelter-belt program was declared a failure, the first deputy minister of forestry was fired, not Lysenko, whose advice the former had been forced to follow. If the USSR has another poor harvest in the near future, the blame can again be placed on mistakes of planning and procurement officials and of farm chairmen, on speculation and theft, or on unfavorable weather. The more widely Lysenko's theories are applied and publicly attributed to him, however, the more vulnerable he will become as a potential scapegoat for a future agricultural disaster.

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