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13 July 1962

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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ARMY review(s)  
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State Dept. review  
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF  
(Information as of 1200 EDT 12 July)

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . Page 1

Moscow has continued to exploit tension in the Taiwan Strait area to demonstrate bloc solidarity and Sino-Soviet "friendship." There are no signs of Soviet apprehension regarding Peiping's military intentions.

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[Redacted]

Khrushchev has publicly alluded to "progress" in the US-Soviet talks on Berlin, and Radio Moscow has described President Kennedy's 5 July press conference remarks on the talks as a "realistic approach." Soviet propagandists, however, have said these remarks are in contrast with the President's proposal in his 4 July address to "widen the atomic club" through the formation of a European nuclear force.

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THE USSR AND THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE . . . . . Page 4

Khrushchev's routine restatement of the Soviet disarmament position in his 10 July speech to the World Congress for Disarmament and Peace in Moscow suggests that there will be no significant changes in the USSR's approach at the 17-nation talks in Geneva, resuming on 16 July after a one-month recess. Soviet actions during the first three months of the conference underscored Moscow's unwillingness to grant any meaningful concessions on disarmament as long as the Berlin problem remains unresolved. The Soviet delegation probably will continue its tactics which aimed primarily at discrediting the Western approach to disarmament, developing a justification for the eventual resumption of Soviet nuclear testing, and attracting the support of the eight nonaligned delegations.

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PUBLIC SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEASTERN CHINA . . . . . Page 6

Peiping's public security apparatus is facing a severe test. Unrest stemming from a variety of causes is general throughout the mainland but appears acute in the province of Kwangtung, historically a trouble spot for the central authorities.

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[Redacted]

Floods in the past few days to the north and west of Canton have left thousands destitute and will aggravate an already serious situation.

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CROP CONDITIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . Page 7

The 1962 crop year is apparently off to a poor start in Communist China. The early crops, which account for roughly 25 percent of total annual grain production, probably are no better than last year's below-normal harvests. Winter wheat is only slightly better than 1961's unusually poor crop, and the early rice harvest is less than last year's. There is little prospect for improvement in the tight food situation at least through early fall. [redacted] 25X1

SOVIET AGRICULTURAL TROUBLES . . . . . Page 10

Moscow is gradually conditioning the Soviet people not to expect too much of the 1962 harvest. An appeal exhorting the agricultural workers of Kazakhstan to greater efforts covered the entire front page of Pravda on 7 July. It reiterated Khrushchev's recent conservative predictions concerning prospects for the grain harvest in the Ukraine and, by implication, cast doubt on his optimistic forecast that the country's total harvest would be the greatest in Soviet history. [redacted] 25X1

SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS . . . . . Page 11

The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was considerably advanced in the past three weeks during visits to the USSR by high-level Yugoslav parliamentary and economic delegations. The desire of both sides to restore friendly relationships was particularly evident in economic negotiations in which Moscow appeared to meet all of Yugoslavia's requests. After the delegations had left Moscow, Soviet President Brezhnev accepted an invitation from Tito to visit Yugoslavia in the fall. [redacted] 25X1

ALGERIA . . . . . Page 12

Vice Premier Ben Bella made a triumphant entry into western Algeria on 11 July. Although his remarks at a rally in Tlemcen reaffirmed his support of the Evian accords and the principle of collective leadership for Algeria, there are indications that his talks in Rabat with emissaries of the provisional Algerian Government (PAG) did not resolve the split in the Algerian leadership. Ben Bella [redacted]

[redacted] will probably continue to insist that either the National Revolutionary Council or a special group of Algerian National Army commanders meet to resolve the quarrel. Meanwhile, Algerian Army units loyal to Ben Bella appear to be consolidating their control over Oran and much of the countryside. [redacted] 25X1

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LAOS . . . . . Page 14

At the Geneva conference the major powers have achieved substantive agreement on all outstanding issues; foreign ministers of the participating nations will probably meet soon to sign the accords. Thailand and South Vietnam, which had threatened to withhold their signatures, now appear to be adopting a more flexible attitude, but could still make trouble. Souvanna, wishing to avoid actions which could jeopardize the success of the conference, has instructed his coalition government to suspend the establishment of new diplomatic relations. The government has formed three token "integrated" battalions to be based in Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Xieng Khouang.

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CONGO . . . . . Page 15

After almost a year in office, Adoula has still not achieved his main objective--central government control over Katanga--and the prospects of his doing so appear dim. Tshombé, has successfully resisted pressures from within the Congo, from the UN, and from individual outside powers. He has conceded practically nothing in his negotiations with Adoula. The Leopoldville government is faced with another round of political maneuvering among its own members, a near collapse of its economy, and more difficulties in asserting its control even in those provinces which nominally admit its authority. UN officials and Western European and African leaders are concerned over the present drift, but there is little agreement over means to halt it.

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BURMA . . . . . Page 17

Ne Win's announcement of plans for a comprehensive authoritarian political organization has made evident his determination to establish a totalitarian regime in Burma. Student demonstrations in Rangoon on 7 July highlighted the increasing hostility aroused by his dictatorial tactics. The army's ruthless crushing of this protest will add to the discontent.

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PAKISTAN . . . . . Page 17

President Ayub has been encountering increasing defiance from the National Assembly since it convened in early June under the constitution he promulgated last March. A majority of the politicians apparently believe that the time is ripe to press Ayub for concessions and to clear the way for future political action. Ayub, however, is unlikely to tolerate for long what he regards as destructive opposition and may eventually re-establish martial law.

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
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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . Page 19

The Common Market (EEC) countries and Britain are working hard in a generally constructive and optimistic atmosphere to hammer out a broad agreement by the end of July on the terms for Britain's accession to the EEC. Ministerial-level talks at the end of June apparently settled in principle the problem of EEC association for African members of the Commonwealth. Two more such meetings on other problems are scheduled this month, and the pressure to reach a general accommodation by the July deadline is great. However, the sort of agreement now aimed for would leave important questions unresolved, and on-the-spot observers caution that the talks could still founder on London's demand for market guarantees for Commonwealth exports of temperate-zone farm products.



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BRITISH GUIANA . . . . . Page 21

Premier Jagan has asked the UN Committee of 17 on Decolonization to look into the British Guiana problem. This will prove troublesome to London, which has just postponed negotiations on setting a date for the colony's independence. Jagan's replacement of Minister of Home Affairs Rai with a probable Communist has cost him some support, but there is no cohesive opposition to the premier, and his own party is busy improving its organization. Jagan has had some success in developing trade with the Communist bloc.



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CUBAN MISSION IN MOSCOW . . . . . Page 22

The composition of the Cuban mission which has been in Moscow since 2 July strongly suggests that the primary purpose of the trip is to obtain additional military equipment for the Cuban armed forces. The 11-man group, led by Deputy Premier and Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro, was invited by the Soviet Defense Ministry. [redacted] 25X6

BRAZIL . . . . . Page 23

President Goulart has won several victories over Congress in the maneuverings of the past two weeks for a new prime minister and cabinet. Nationwide strike calls, although of varying effectiveness, gave him unexpected support in his insistence on dominating the new appointments. Goulart displayed new confidence in his own political power on 8 July with his nomination as prime minister of Francisco Brochado da Rocha--nationally unknown except as an ally of [redacted] Governor Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul. If Rocha succeeds in forming a government, increased Brazilian hostility to American private investment is in prospect. If he fails there will be a new period of tension. [redacted] 25X6 25X1

PERU . . . . . Page 24

Fernando Belaunde Terry still claims to be the legal winner of the 10 June presidential election. The armed forces have cooled in their support of his claim, however, partly because of Belaunde's obstreperousness and partly because of his growing cooperation with Communists. Political leaders are now attempting to form a coalition for control of congress, which is to select the next president after 28 July. [redacted] 25X1

SPECIAL ARTICLES

CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE STALIN'S DEATH . . . . . Page 1

The USSR's present leadership, with new methods of operation, has been able to build a much stronger and more viable economy than Stalin and to get a much larger segment of the Soviet population to identify itself with the Communist system. For these reasons, among others, it would seem that many of the trends since 1953 are likely to be enduring. [redacted] 25X1

THE LOCUST THREAT . . . . . Page 8

Unusually heavy infestations of locusts this year threaten crops over an area stretching from India to Syria and from the Soviet Turkmen Republic to Ethiopia. Supplemental food supplies from countries with agricultural surpluses will be needed to avert famine for many of the area's inhabitants. [redacted] 25X1

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WEEKLY REVIEW

## SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Far East

Moscow last week continued its efforts to exploit the tension in the Taiwan Strait area to demonstrate bloc solidarity and what a Moscow broadcast to China termed the "indestructibility of Soviet-Chinese friendship." Soviet media noted that the Chinese Communist press has given front-page prominence to Khrushchev's 2 July declaration of Soviet support for Peiping in defeating any Chinese Nationalist attack on the mainland. Pravda on 8 July highlighted an interview with Mao Tun, the Chinese delegate to the Moscow World Peace Congress, in which he stated that the Chinese people had received Khrushchev's speech "with great joy" and "are grateful to the Soviet people for their aid."

Mao represented the Soviet leader as stating that the USSR "is ready, if necessary, to come to the assistance of the Chinese people." Soviet commentaries on Khrushchev's speech, however, are more circumspect, restricted primarily to repeating the vague statement of support which he actually announced.

The USSR continued to show no signs of apprehension regarding Chinese Communist military intentions.

Berlin and Germany

Moscow TASS promptly focused its attention on President Kennedy's 5 July press conference remarks on US-Soviet relations and gave its Soviet audience a positive impression on the US desire to continue searching for a peaceful solution to all outstanding East-West problems. TASS quoted the President's comment that although the US-Soviet talks were "very difficult," they would have to continue. A 7 July Moscow radio commentary, in "welcoming" these remarks of President Kennedy, declared that they "reflect a realistic approach to international problems."

Soviet propagandists, however, have contrasted the President's remarks on general East-West relations with his 4 July address in Philadelphia in which they allege he avowed the need for the formation of a European nuclear force. Izvestia on 6 July maintained that this suggestion to "widen the atomic club" did not correspond with the President's subsequent professions of the US desire to reduce the possibility of conflict with the Soviet Union.

West German officials have been informed by Ambassador Kroll in Moscow, following his

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recent conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, that the German question will be taken up by Secretary Rusk and Gromyko at Geneva during the proposed foreign ministers' meeting to sign the Geneva Accords on Laos. Kroll assured Bonn leaders that, although he found Gromyko "more annoyed than usual" over the lack of progress on the Berlin issue, there would be "no trouble" before the contemplated Geneva talks and that this situation would probably remain for some time.

Further evidence that the Soviets intend to maintain the relatively stable atmosphere in Berlin, at least for the time being, is provided in General Yakubovsky's request to return a courtesy call at the end of July on General Freeman, US commander in chief in Europe. Yakubovsky, commander of Soviet forces in East Germany, last met with General Freeman on 21 June. Although no matters of substance were discussed, their conversation took place in a cordial and relaxed atmosphere, with the Soviets reportedly going out of their way to extend hospitality.

The Soviets, meanwhile, are continuing their efforts to expand contacts in West Berlin circles. Moscow is anxious to assert its alleged prerogative to participate in West Berlin affairs in the event that the Communists obtain a "free city" agreement.

In recent weeks, the Soviets have issued a series of invitations to West Berlin

academic and cultural figures to visit the USSR for various conferences and meetings with Soviet personalities in their respective fields. In several instances, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to relax their policy of not permitting West Berliners to present West German passports for travel in bloc countries.

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Austrian Visit to Moscow


During the recent visit of Austrian leaders to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev and other Soviet officials expressed strong opposition to full Austrian membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Soviet leaders indicated, however, that they would not necessarily oppose some special Austrian relationship with the EEC designed to protect Austria's important trade with EEC countries. By not specifying what kind of relationship they had in mind, they maintained their freedom to attack whatever arrangements Austria may negotiate with the EEC.

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Prior to Chancellor Gorbach's visit, Soviet propagandists had generally maintained that any form of "association" between Austria and the EEC, even the loosest, would have extremely grave consequences for Vienna and would amount to a breach of Austrian neutrality commitments as assumed under the 1955 State Treaty.

Common Market

An authoritative Pravda "Observer" article on 9 July continued Moscow's campaign against the Common Market in its attack on President Kennedy's 4 July speech in Philadelphia. Observer alleged that one would need "a great gift of imagination" to perceive any freedom in the Common Market despite the President's attempt to compare the creation of an "integrated" Europe with the founding of the United States. Observer maintained that President Kennedy's appeal for the "new, united Europe to join an Atlantic community" was merely designed to reinforce the ideas of an "imperialist Europeanism put forward by De Gaulle and Adenauer."

Moscow continued this line in its attack on the recent visit of Adenauer to France. Moscow commentators pointed out that the joint communiqué issued on the com-

pletion of the West German leader's visit hopefully referred to the establishment by the Common Market members of a "political union." The USSR has contended that the US seeks a mutual partnership with the EEC in order to transform it into a NATO-dominated economic base in which West Germany plays the leading role.

Algeria

The Soviet Union has maintained a restrained attitude toward the events in Algeria since the struggle for power between the Ben Khedda and Ben Bella factions came into the open, and is pursuing a "correct" diplomatic course in order to avoid any appearance of interfering in this struggle. Moscow has characterized reports of this split as the product of Western anti-Algerian propaganda and has refrained from making any comment on this subject.

On 3 July Khrushchev sent a congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the Algerian self-determination referendum to Ben Khedda as head of the Provisional Algerian Government.

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The USSR, having granted the Provisional Algerian Government full recognition in March, can justify this action as normal diplomatic conduct with the legal government of the country. In its public statements and diplomatic activity, however, Moscow will probably continue to avoid identifying itself with any Algerian group, preferring to await the results of the present power struggle.

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## THE USSR AND THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Khrushchev's routine re-statement of the Soviet disarmament position in his 10 July speech to the Communist-sponsored World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow suggests that there will be no significant changes in the Soviet approach at the 17-nation talks in Geneva which resume on 16 July after a one-month recess. Khrushchev charged that the attitude of the Western powers at the conference shows that they are not interested in disarmament. He and other Soviet spokesmen have made it clear that there is no possibility of progress on the principal disarmament issues prior to an agreement on Berlin. Khrushchev reiterated this point in his 10 July speech.

Soviet actions during the March-June sessions of the Geneva conference underscored Moscow's unwillingness to engage in serious negotiations or grant any meaningful concessions in the disarmament field as long as the higher priority Berlin problem remains unresolved. The Soviet delegation probably will continue its first-round tactics--which were aimed primarily at discrediting the Western approach to disarmament, developing a justification for the eventual resumption of Soviet nuclear testing, and attracting the support of the eight nonaligned delegations.

Efforts for Neutralist Support

These tactics made it clear that Moscow continues to regard its slogan of general and complete disarmament as an effective political warfare weapon against the West and as a rallying point for neutralist and nationalist forces in the non-Communist world. On both the issues of general disarmament and a nuclear test ban, the Soviets sought to align the USSR with the neutralist delegations. Soviet delegate Zorin's first move was to endorse an Indian proposal for a moratorium on testing for the duration of the conference. He later announced Soviet acceptance of the eight neutralists' "compromise" proposal for a test ban control system as the basis for further negotiations. He interpreted this proposal, which provided for an inspection and control system based on existing national detection networks, as an endorsement of most of the USSR's position. -

The Soviets, however, failed in their attempts to persuade the neutralists to withdraw from or at least boycott the conference when the US resumed atmospheric tests in late April. The neutralists not only rebuffed these efforts but informed bloc delegates that they would remain at the conference table even if the bloc delegations staged a walkout. While they

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publicly expressed regret over the US test resumption, the neutralists carefully noted that it was the USSR that had first broken the three-year test moratorium last fall.

Outlook

In view of the present US test series and the likelihood of an eventual Soviet test resumption, there is little prospect for any significant movement in Moscow's position on a test ban control system. The Soviet delegation will adhere to its position of November 1961 that existing national detection systems are fully adequate to enforce a test ban agreement and that no international on-site inspection of Soviet territory could be permitted prior to a general disarmament agreement. The USSR will continue to oppose Western demands for international verification of suspected nuclear explosions with the charge that the West hopes to use an inspection system for gathering military intelligence.

The Soviets, however, may put forward a revised version of their test ban draft treaty of last November incorporating elements of the eight neutralists' "compromise" plan. They may also at some point in the negotiations indicate willingness to accept the US-UK proposal of September 1961, later

withdrawn, for a test ban confirmed to atmospheric tests.

Although there is no indication that Moscow is interested in reducing the areas of disagreement on a phased program of general disarmament, the Soviet delegation may give greater attention to proposals for so-called "confidence-building" partial measures, such as nuclear-free zones, nontransfer of nuclear weapons to other countries, and a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty. These measures, which have a direct bearing on European security and the German question, would be designed to support Moscow's broader political objectives of promoting the stability of the European satellites and de facto Western recognition of the East German regime.

Soviet tactics on these items, however, probably will be determined by the course of the US-Soviet talks on Berlin. If these talks show a favorable trend, the Soviet leaders may prefer to withhold such proposals as a nonaggression pact and nontransfer of nuclear weapons for use as bargaining counters on negotiating a Berlin agreement. If, on the other hand, the Berlin talks remain deadlocked, Moscow may decide to press for some agreement on these "partial" measures at Geneva in the hope of recording some progress on issues related to the German and Berlin questions.

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
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**PUBLIC SECURITY PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEASTERN CHINA**

The Peiping regime is facing a severe test of its public security apparatus. Unrest stemming from a variety of causes is probably general throughout the mainland but appears especially bad in Southeast China, and there is reason to believe that the recent troop deployment reflected--to a certain extent--the leadership's concern about public order in that area.

Kwangtung has a long history as a troublesome province, resentful of rule by northern Chinese who speak another language. This localist sentiment has manifested itself under the Communists. In 1958 two provincial party secretaries were harshly criticized for parochialism and for obstructing Peiping's orders. Late last year these same two men were reinstated as vice governors (but not as party secretaries) probably in an unsuccessful attempt to mollify local sentiments.

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The official explanation of the imposition of stringent security measures is that they have been made necessary by the danger of an attack launched by Chiang Kai-shek. Just as important, however, is the regime's apparent loss of faith in the loyalty of Kwangtungese. The mass exodus of refugees to Hong Kong in May very likely shocked the Peiping authorities.

In the past few days a new element has been injected into the Kwangtung situation. Serious flooding has occurred in the area to the north and west of Canton. Thousands of

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persons have been affected by the flood, and a large portion of these are almost certainly homeless and destitute. They place an additional burden on the provincial security apparatus.

Reports from Kwangtung indicate that the regime is beginning to drop the relatively permissive attitude which characterized the period preceding and during the refugee exodus to Hong Kong. The authorities

are starting to crack down on even minor infractions

[redacted] 25X1  
and new restrictions have been placed on travel. In the past Peiping had seemed unwilling to resort to such measures, perhaps for fear of the consequences. Apparently the regime now believes that conditions in Kwangtung have deteriorated to the point where it must accept the risk. [redacted] 25X1

## CROP CONDITIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Weather data, press reports, and first-hand observations indicate that the 1962 crop year has gotten off to a poor start in Communist China. The major early crops--winter wheat and early rice--which are harvested in June and July and account for roughly 25 percent of total grain production for the year, probably are no better than the below-normal harvests of this time last year.

Weather conditions over most of the mainland since last fall have been characterized by extremes in rainfall and temperature. Compared with 1959/60 and 1960/61, rainfall this year was better in North and Northwest China, about the same in Southwest and Central China, and worse in Northeast, East, and South China. On balance, the nationwide precipitation pattern this year has been well below normal for the period November 1961 through May 1962.

Crop conditions in the northern wheat areas, although


better than last year, have not been especially good. Rain during the fall and winter improved soil moisture over most of the area, and yields should be up compared with the past two years. However, frost damage during late March and early April and a possible reduction in sown acreage probably offset the gains to some extent. Diplomats who traveled between Peiping and Shanghai in early June reported that the grain crop looked "scrappy" in most of Shantung and Anhwei and poor in many areas. Diplomatic sources reported in May that the wheat looked "thin and stunted" in Honan and Shantung, and that the crop in the Peiping area was "clearly not outstanding." There is not sufficient data to quantify even roughly the actual grain production, but the winter wheat crop--which accounts for 80 percent of total wheat production--probably was only slightly better than the unusually poor 1961 crop.

The early rice crop, which generally accounts for about 22.

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percent of total rice production, probably was less than last year's. Fukien had favorable weather, but bad weather hampered field work and crop growth in Kwangsi, most of Kwangtung, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Hupeh, and Anhwei. Dry weather during the spring caused the rice to yellow prematurely along border areas near Hong Kong. Plentiful rainfall since mid-May may have alleviated the effect of this dryness somewhat, but probably not enough to have resulted in as good an early rice crop as last year.

Peiping press reports have since spring complained of drought in areas of North, North-east, East, Central, and South-west China, and of sporadic dryness and flooding in Central, South, and Southeast China. The press may have overplayed somewhat the seriousness of localized drought and flood conditions, but the implications regarding crop output are probably generally accurate. The pessimistic tone of Peiping's comments probably reflects factors other than simply weather, such as shortages of seeds, tools, and fertilizer and continued problems with peasant health and morale.

Below-normal early harvests will prolong if not further aggravate the already critical food situation on the mainland.


for the period January-March 1962, Canton residents were getting 1,645 calories a day and rural Kwangtung residents 1,465 calories. Figures for May 1961 were 1,650 and 1,380 respectively. As May is normally a low-ration month in the food year, net rations in

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Precipitation in Communist China

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1 November 1961 Through 31 May 1962



Note: Monthly averages as percent above or below normal.

May 1962 were probably not much better than a year ago. The figures for Kwangtung are believed to be representative of other parts of China.

Arrival of the early harvests on the market in June and July will alleviate the more serious spring shortages, but there will be no easing of the basic food shortage. Rations will probably continue inadequate, at least through the early fall.

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## SOVIET AGRICULTURAL TROUBLES

Moscow, concerned about the progress of agricultural work this season, is gradually breaking the news to the population that prospects for the 1962 harvest are none too good. In an appeal to the agricultural workers of Kazakhstan--which covered the entire front page of Pravda on 7 July--the regime reiterated Khrushchev's recent conservative predictions concerning prospects for the grain harvest in the Ukraine. By implication the article cast doubt on his optimistic forecast that the country's total harvest would be the greatest in Soviet history.

The appeal was directed to the workers of the New Lands area--which produces over one third of all Soviet grain. Its purpose was to exhort them to great efforts during the harvest season, but it may well have the effect of further discouraging an already disgruntled population. The statement that "...one may hope that the gross grain harvest and the quantity of grain purchased this year will exceed those of previous years" will hardly cheer a public which has recently had to face a 30-percent rise in retail prices for livestock products. In addition, the statement clearly contradicts Khrushchev's estimate, made on 27 June at a regional agricultural conference in Moscow, that, barring unfavorable weather, the grain harvest would be between 150 and 160 million metric tons --well above the record 141.2 million claimed for 1958.

The appeal also reveals that the familiar problems of the New Lands region continue despite efforts in the past year to overcome them. The problem of maintaining a stable labor supply in this remote area, for example, apparently continues to plague the regime. The appeal scores Kazakh officials who sent a request to the party central committee for 70,000 machine operators, insisting that the expense involved does not warrant such a

move. On this point, there has been inconsistency over the years. While Khrushchev has often emphasized the importance of establishing permanent cadres, he has also castigated officials for not asking Moscow for emergency labor when they needed it. Former Kazakh party chief Belyayev, just before his downfall in 1960, was severely criticized by Khrushchev for just such a failing. Moreover, permanent cadres are difficult to establish so long as living conditions in the New Lands are as appalling as they now are. Khrushchev has recognized this, pointing out that "you can't treat people in such a heartless way," but there has been no substantial effort to remedy the situation.

In an attempt to relieve the tight labor situation, the appeal urges farmers to join two or three reapers together and thus enable one man to accomplish what normally requires three. The efficacy of this recommendation is questionable. While more area could presumably be covered, the quality of the work would probably be reduced.

The practice of neglecting and abusing farm machinery continues to be a problem throughout Soviet agriculture and last year was made a criminal offense, punishable by up to three years' imprisonment. The appeal nevertheless notes that "the state of preparation of harvesting machinery arouses grave concern this year as well. By 1 July, more than 35,000 combines and about 25,000 reapers still were not repaired" in one major region of the New Lands. The accusation does not mention one of the basic reasons for the condition of harvesting machinery--the failure of the government to provide spare parts.

Reference in the Kazakh appeal to the "carelessness" and "irresponsibility" of agricultural management does not bode well for the party leadership in the republic.

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## SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was considerably advanced in the past three weeks during visits to the USSR by high-level Yugoslav parliamentary and economic delegations. The desire of both sides to restore friendly relationships was particularly evident in economic negotiations in which Moscow appeared to meet all of Yugoslavia's requests. After the delegations had left Moscow, the Soviet chargé in Belgrade delivered to Tito Soviet President Brezhnev's acceptance of an invitation to visit Yugoslavia in the fall.

The Yugoslav parliamentarians, led by party politburo member Stambolic, were in the USSR from 19 June to 3 July on a good-will tour which featured interviews with Brezhnev and Khrushchev. Near the end of their stay, the Yugoslavs heard their escort, Ivan Spiridonov, president of the one of the two houses of the Soviet parliament, acknowledge that Yugoslavia is building socialism and intends to build Communism--a rare acknowledgment designed to play down extant ideological differences. While the Yugoslavs were the more conservative in mutual expressions of friendship, both sides effusively pledged their intention to continue the trend of improving Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

The economic delegation, headed by Vice President and politburo member Todorovic, was in the USSR from 3 to 6 July and was also received by Khrushchev. According to Yugoslav diplomats in Moscow, the Soviets agreed in principle to grant credits in 1963, but the overall amount was not set, pending consideration of individual Yugoslav requests. Yu-

goslav participation in some of the committees of the bloc's international economic organization (CEMA) was also apparently agreed upon in principle. The Yugoslavs, according to the diplomats, will "refine" their request, which will then be considered on its merit.

A new trade agreement for 1963-65 was also signed by Todorovic and Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan. This agreement will replace and extend a long-term trade agreement (1961-65) under which Yugoslav-Soviet trade was scheduled to grow about 17 percent in each of the five years but, in fact, fell off 22 percent in 1961. Whereas the old agreement called for \$800,000,000 worth of trade in five years, the new agreement calls for \$750,000,000 in 1963-65 alone.

Some progress was apparently made toward resolving the key problem in Yugoslav-Soviet trade--an unwillingness of both parties to offer the commodities desired by the other or to buy those proffered in existing trade agreements. On 8 July, for example, it was announced that a contract had been signed for Yugoslavia to build 14 ships for the USSR. The earlier agreement had called for sale of 25 ships, but the Soviets were not particularly interested in ships of small tonnage, and Yugoslav shipbuilders preferred to sell to hard-currency countries. In addition to indicating Soviet willingness to act on previous trade commitments, the later trade agreement either revised or supplemented the commodity lists of the previous pact.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****ALGERIA**

Vice Premier Ben Bella made a triumphant entry into western Algeria on 11 July. Although his remarks at a rally in Tlemcen reaffirmed his support of the Evian accords and the principle of collective leadership, there are indications that his talks in Rabat with emissaries of the provisional Algerian government (PAG) did not resolve the split among the Algerian leaders. Ben Bella

25X1 [redacted] will probably continue to insist that either the National Revolutionary Council (CNRA) or a special group of Algerian National Army (ALN) commanders meet to resolve the quarrel. Meanwhile, Algerian Army units loyal to Ben Bella appear to be consolidating their control over Oran and much of the countryside.

Ben Bella continues to insist that the only real issue is the PAG's dismissal of three ALN staff officers, although PAG Minister of State Mohamed Khider, who entered Algeria with Ben Bella, has demanded that the PAG cabinet be replaced. Abdelkadar Chanderli, the PAG representative to the UN, explained to US officials on 11 July that Ben Bella's quarrel with the PAG related largely to the role the ALN should play in Algeria. Ben Bella, he said, wanted the ALN

to have an important role in the administration of local government similar to that exercised by the Special Administrative Sections of the French Army during the later years of the rebellion. This desire is said to be particularly strong among the ALN units from Morocco and Tunisia, which are frustrated at having taken little direct part in the war of independence.

25X1 [redacted] According to Chanderli, however, who says he talked with PAG Foreign Minister Dahlab by telephone on 11 July, Yazid and Ben Bella had agreed that the PAG would reinstate the ALN staff officers, who would then publicly proclaim their loyalty to the PAG. After this, according to Chanderli, the CNRA would meet to nominate a committee to select a slate of candidates for the Algerian elections, now scheduled for 12 August.

Chanderli admitted, however, that it was on this issue that the last CNRA meeting in Tripoli broke up, with Ben Bella's followers, although in a majority, unable to muster


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

the necessary two-thirds vote. Should this deadlock within the CNRA continue, which seems likely, Ben Bella will probably resort to other means of curbing Ben Khedda and the PAG.

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Although the PAG was reshuffled on 6 July, apparently better to define the functions of the various ministers and to increase efficiency, its influence outside the Algiers area is tenuous. There is little indication that either the PAG or the Provisional Executive has made any significant progress in revitalizing the country's large administrative structure, which even before independence had been virtually paralyzed by Secret Army terrorism and French indifference.

Last week French Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe told a US Embassy officer that unless the central government established its authority quickly throughout the country, some form of federalism would very likely develop. Joxe's cabinet chief said on 10 July that he was less fearful of immediate violence resulting from the PAG-ALN quarrel than he was of the effects of administrative deterioration and post-independence disillusionment of Algerians.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## LAOS

At a 9 July plenary session of the Geneva Conference on Laos, all the Communist delegations accepted the terms of the drafted Laotian Declaration on Neutrality. They made no effort to modify the wording concerning SEATO; the draft adds the words "including SEATO" to the paragraph in which the Kingdom of Laos pledges not to recognize the protection of an alliance or military coalition. This phrase will be omitted if SEATO takes note of the declaration and indicates that is withdrawing the protection it has extended to Laos.

The Soviet and Chinese Communist delegates had previously demanded both that the declaration specifically disavow any tie with SEATO and that SEATO amend its protocol so as to drop any mention of Laos. Soviet delegate Pushkin has told Assistant Secretary Harriman that, if the SEATO governments accepted either Laotian proposal, there would be no further business before the conference. This indicates that the Communist delegates have in effect dropped their demand that SEATO members take a specific action which would then be recorded in the conference documents.

The Communists' apparent acceptance of the compromise formula on SEATO probably reflects their satisfaction with the decision not to make reference in the final agreements to the integration and demobilization of the rival Laotian forces. The Communist bloc has consistently opposed any reference which opens the way to international supervision of the dissolution of "private armies" in Laos. Both the Phoumi and the Souphannouvong factions opposed such a reference; Phoumi apparently feared that while his troops would be conspicuously subject to foreign observation and forced into early

demobilization, Pathet Lao forces could remain intact in mountain areas secure from foreign observation.

With these two issues resolved, the Communists appear ready to sign an agreement that will bring the 14-month-long conference to a close. Western delegations anticipate that the foreign ministers could gather in Geneva sometime between 19 and 23 July if agreement could be reached among SEATO members to accept the wording in the Neutrality Declaration concerning SEATO.

Vientiane's announcement early this month that Laos planned to recognize North Vietnam, Communist China, and East Germany has rekindled the "divided nations" issue and aroused widespread controversy. Souvanna, wishing to avoid actions which could jeopardize the success of the conference, has instructed his coalition government to suspend the establishment of new diplomatic relations. South Vietnam at one point threatened to withhold its signature of the Geneva agreements over this issue, but now appears to be less inflexible. Thailand, too, appears to be coming around after earlier threatening not to sign the accords, but both could still make trouble.

In Laos, meanwhile, three "integrated" battalions have been formed which will be stationed in Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Xieng Khouang. The battalions are composed of three 145-man companies--one from each of the rival forces. Command is to be rotated among representatives of the three factions. This appears to be merely token integration, designed to provide nominal security forces in the major administrative centers. Full integration and demobilization of 25X1 surplus military forces are likely only after long and difficult negotiations.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CONGO**

With the breakoff of his third round of talks with Katanga's Tshombé, Congolese Premier Adoula has indicated his bewilderment over what to do next. He told the US ambassador last week that Tshombé's idea of a settlement was completely different from his own and that he was "not going to have any more to do with it."

Adoula's frustrations arise out of the fact that he has neither forces nor finances to use against Tshombé, while the Katangan leader still has a 12,000-man, European-led gendarmerie and the tax revenues from the Belgian mining operations. The Congolese Army (ANC) is over twice as large as Tshombé's, but it continues to be undisciplined, without experienced leadership or sense of strategy, and utterly primitive in its logistics. UN efforts to retrain it have never gotten under way.

Adoula thus has been forced to depend on the multinational UN Command, whose actions are determined not in Leopoldville but in New York and which is subjected to a variety of international pressures. UN forces in two battles with the Katangans were bested in the first round by superior military capabilities; in the second, they were denied full victory by an international outcry against the fighting and Tshombé's announcement that he was willing to negotiate. Since then Tshombé has been assiduously cultivating international opinion favorable to Katanga, and UN military action against him has become an increasingly difficult step for the UN to take.

The predictably fatal effect on Adoula's leadership of continued failure in Katanga and the deepening economic crisis both in the Congo and in the UN lead even oppo-

nents of strong action like the British to admit that something must be done, but no consensus has appeared. It is very doubtful that Belgium or Britain--which have the main financial interests in Katanga--can be persuaded to apply effective economic pressure on Tshombé. The British in particular remain vehemently opposed to any move which would precipitate another round of fighting. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak says he is willing to withdraw Belgian technicians from Katanga, but he has failed to persuade Union Minière (UMHK) officials to deny Tshombé tax revenues. The mining companies argue that any such action by them would provoke Katangan retaliation against their installations.

UN Under Secretary Bunche believes that the next effort should be to convene the joint commissions agreed to by Adoula and Tshombé, after which the two leaders should meet again. If nothing comes of this, Bunche has said, the secretary general would present the problem to the UN's Congo Advisory Committee and tell it the time has come for economic sanctions, e.g., moves by the UN to collect Tshombé's mining revenues and to control his exports, together with Belgium's freezing UMHK assets in Brussels. U Thant, however, is concerned with the effects renewed fighting would have on the UN finances. He feels that he needs a new mandate from the Security Council for such moves, although he is aware of the difficulties of obtaining a tougher Security Council resolution in the face of probable British and French opposition.

Tshombé, meanwhile, maintains an appearance of reasonableness: he has offered \$2,000,000 in aid for the rest of the Congo and quickly appointed the

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

Katangan members of the joint commissions. At the same time, however, he is probably financing moves to undermine Adoula. He has publicly joined the attack on Foreign Minister Bomboko and has charged that Adoula no longer has the support of the Leopoldville parliament. Anti-Adoula groups from Leopoldville have been reported conferring with Katangan leaders in Elisabethville.

In Leopoldville, Adoula has tried to ward off the political attacks on his government by making another cabinet reorganization. The main attack has come from a coalition of extreme leftists led by Lumumbist Vice Premier Christophe Gbenye and "rightist" dissidents including Tshombé's Conakat deputies. The important Leopoldville Province party Abako, led by Congolese President Kasavubu, has also been antagonized by a bill which would make a federal district of Leopoldville city. Abako, normally pro-Adoula, now has joined the attack.

Preliminary reports on Adoula's reorganized cabinet state that Bomboko, a particular object of opposition assault, has been retained as foreign minister. Interior Minister Kamitatu, a former Gizengist who has become a stalwart of the Adoula regime, has also been kept on. Gbenye has been dropped, although six lesser lights of the moderate wing of his party were given posts. The anti-Tshombé Baluba tribal leader from northern Katanga, Jason Sendwe, is retained as the only vice premier.

Gizenga had been one of the three vice premiers, as had Equateur Province leader Jean Bolikango. Adoula, during his talks with Tshombé, offered to

establish a vice presidency for him and two other ministries for other Katangan leaders, but the offer was rejected. Gbenye, Bolikango, and their followers now are likely to move even closer to the Gizengists, and to the Conakat party.

Adoula has stayed in office in part because there have been no other leaders able and willing to take on the job. His opponents are clearly becoming bolder, however; they find ammunition in popular dissatisfactions over the high living of government officials in the face of unemployment and hunger among the masses. The Congo's foreign exchange reserves are again near exhaustion, and there is talk of another devaluation. The Congolese franc now is quoted in Brussels at 300 to the dollar; par is 64.

Adoula continues to have trouble in the provinces which nominally recognize his authority. Orientale, Kasai, and Kivu have been particularly troublesome, as pro- and anti-Adoula forces struggle for provincial power. In Orientale, Adoula has sought ever since the disintegration of the Gizenga regime there to establish a government more responsive to Leopoldville.

Even if the Katangan problem were miraculously solved, new difficulties thus would be likely to spring up. One of the dangers likely to face any central government is the growing demand for the creation of still more provinces--possibly as many as 18. These demands, reflecting tribal differences, are being taken up by a host of local political leaders who see themselves as future provincial presidents. The overall trend at present thus is toward greater fragmentation rather than toward unity.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****BURMA**

General Ne Win's determination to establish a totalitarian regime and disciplined society in Burma has been highlighted by his plan, published on 4 July, for an authoritarian political organization to carry out government policies. Disillusioned with the vacillations of former Premier Nu's civilian administrations, Ne Win has become convinced that Burmese voters are not ready for democracy.

He apparently intends to remodel Burma's political structure using the same techniques he applied in the development of his army: the selection of a small core of dedicated professionals personally loyal to him which, after it is trained, will train and lead an all-powerful national party. His plan borrows some features from Communist systems, but essentially it sets up a comprehensive politico-military organization intended to provide the leadership of Burma through an indefinite period of political tutelage.

Ne Win has warned that, while he will accept constructive criticism, "obstructionism" will be ruthlessly suppressed.

[REDACTED] This has left little outlet for the growing opposition aroused by his dictatorial tactics.

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The Rangoon University student demonstrations on 7 July were the sharpest manifestation of this hostility to his four-month-old regime. Ne Win reacted with brutal vigor. Army units, called in to restore order, dispersed the student mob by firing on it, killing 17 and wounding at least 60 others. The next day Ne Win closed all Burma's college-level and professional institutions indefinitely, and army demolition squads destroyed the student union building, for 25 years the center of radical student forces.

Ne Win undoubtedly intended this action to serve as a warning to potential opponents among civilian political organizations, the ethnic minorities, and critics within his army. His action is more likely to add to the discontent.

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**PAKISTAN**

Pakistani President Ayub has been encountering increasing defiance from the National Assembly since it convened in early June under the constitution he promulgated last March. A majority of the politicians apparently believe that now is the best time to establish the ground rules for future political action, and they have been preoccupied with increasing the opportunities for political gain. Many assembly members, and even some other politicians who have been barred by martial law tribunals from engaging in political activity for the next few

years, have been agitating for concessions from Ayub. They ask the release of all political prisoners, the re-establishment of political parties, and broader guarantees of civil rights. Most political leaders are aiming at a thorough revision of Ayub's constitution as a means of restoring their former predominance.

A few leaders, however, are showing more caution, probably feeling that they stand to lose more than they will gain if they push Ayub too hard too fast. Ayub has tried to work through these potentially cooperative

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

leaders--he was appointed seven of them to his cabinet--and to avoid a showdown in the hope that he can get some cooperation from the assemblies. His limited concessions to the politicians merely served to stimulate further agitation, however, thereby strengthening his conviction that they are irresponsible and self-centered.

On 6 July the Ayub government arrested Qayyum Khan, a prominent politician who, despite a ruling barring him from political activity, was publicly

attacking Ayub. This arrest was apparently intended as a warning to others to tone down their criticisms and agitation, but on the same day 90 of 156 National Assembly members walked out of the assembly in protest.

Ayub is unlikely to tolerate for long what he regards as destructive opposition. If he concludes that his personal position is being undermined or that the politicians are sabotaging his new constitutional government, he may re-establish martial law.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENTS

The negotiations on Britain's entry into the Common Market (EEC) have probably entered a decisive phase, but by no means the final one. The end-of-June meeting of EEC and UK ministers brought closer to solution several issues of considerable importance, and two more ministerial meetings are scheduled before the end of July--when London hopes the outlines of an agreement will have emerged. Despite the constructive attitude of all parties and the generally prevailing optimism, however, the remaining issues are exceedingly complex, and on-the-spot observers, including the US ambassador to the European community, continue to caution that one or more "crises" may precede a final agreement.

French agreement in principle that the African members of the Commonwealth and a number of British dependencies may be offered direct association with the EEC appears to have been the most specific achievement of the 28-30 June ministerial meeting. London has insisted from the beginning that the areas in question should obtain the same terms for association as the EEC offers the colonies or ex-colonies of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. The belated agreement among the EEC countries last month as to what those terms should be has made it possible to meet London's demand. Problems may still arise, however, over African dissatisfaction with the EEC developmental aid offer and the need to redistribute such aid if the association of the British-sponsored countries becomes a fact.

The major portion of the ministerial meeting was devoted to prolonged and indecisive discussion of the problem most likely to block an agreement: Canada's, Australia's, and New Zealand's exports of farm products. The Common Market appears willing during a transitional period ending in 1970 to share with Commonwealth producers certain of the preferences to be extended to its own farmers. The crux of the issue thus is the treatment Commonwealth exporters are to receive at the end of this period. The EEC shows few signs of accepting Britain's demands for permanent market guarantees. It has, however, of-

fered a general undertaking to pursue an internal EEC pricing policy which would not encourage excessive EEC farm production, and a promise to negotiate long-term agreements to stabilize commodity markets, probably at a higher price level. From London's point of view, the difficulty with the latter approach is that it would probably involve a substantial net increase in Britain's food imports bill.

Macmillan's plans for presenting to Parliament at the end of July an EEC-UK "agreement" thus depend on making substantial progress at the special meeting on agriculture set for 18-20 July, and at the regular ministerial meeting scheduled for 25-27 July. At best, any agreement achieved in the time remaining seems likely to be very general, and would neglect many important details and difficult questions which would require much more negotiation. Among the latter are likely to be the future relationship of Britain's Outer Seven partners to the EEC, the European political union treaty, Britain's membership in EURATOM and the Coal-Steel Community (CSC), and certain broad monetary questions. As an indication of the difficulty of these problems, Bonn has shown some concern that its coal surplus may be aggravated by UK accession to the CSC and that it might be committed to help "shore up" the pound sterling.

All parties at the Brussels talks, however, are convinced that the future of Europe is at stake, and the pressure to reach agreement is great. Adenauer has shown increased impatience with the deadlock on the political union treaty, and last week persuaded De Gaulle to go along with a new attempt to reach agreement prior to Britain's EEC entry. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who is largely responsible for having blocked the political treaty until the UK-EEC issue is decided, is also showing renewed interest in the problems of political integration in an enlarged community, and has invited about 40 prominent political figures to meet with him on 18 July to exchange ideas. Finally, speculation is increasing about the military implications of uniting Europe and about the policies a united Europe would adopt on missiles and nuclear armaments.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## BRITISH GUIANA

Britain faces fresh difficulties with the anticolonialists at the UN over the British Guiana problem. Premier Jagan has asked the UN's Committee of 17 on Decolonization to give urgent attention to the colony as a result of London's postponement, probably until October, of talks to set an independence date. The committee is delaying action pending receipt of an explanatory letter from Jagan, but its more anticolonialist members will probably push through an invitation to Jagan to present his case in New York.

Jagan is patently anxious that this be done, partly because the report of the Commonwealth committee of inquiry into the severe riots in the colony last February is due to appear late in August. This report will probably illuminate the Jagan government's incompetence, and the chairman of this committee has already indicated that Jagan's own testimony before the committee established him as a Communist "beyond peradventure."

The situation in the colony --still garrisoned by about 450 British troops of the East Anglia regiment sent to quell the February disturbances--will not be eased by Jagan's move. Former minister for home affairs Rai, who was removed from office by Jagan on 15 June, has a considerable following on both personal and ideological grounds, particularly among his fellow East Indians, and may in time become a rallying point for anti-Jagan elements at present badly disorganized. However, Rai's recent discussions with Forbes Burnham, opposition leader in the legislative council, about forming a coalition have apparently produced no result. Known as an anti-Communist, Rai would encounter rugged opposition from Jagan's Progressive People's party (PPP) ma-

chine if he were to attempt to form a new party.

Meanwhile, the PPP is concentrating on Communist indoctrination of its rank and file. Janet Jagan, the party's best tactician, has resumed the editorship of its weekly news paper, Thunder, and the party next month plans to put 500 of its members through a course in "socialist political education." Opposition sources report that the PPP has begun to train an East Indian militia as the nucleus of a national army. Jagan has asked several countries for military instructors.

The Communist element in the PPP has also strengthened its hold in the government by the appointment of Claude Christian--a probable Communist--as the new minister for home affairs. This puts a loyal Jagan man--of limited ability--in charge of the colony's police, with responsibility for dealing with any recurrence of disorders. As chairman of the PPP youth organization, Christian has been active in sending "students" to Cuba and to Soviet bloc countries--some presumably for paramilitary training. 25X1

The signing on 7 July of an agreement to sell 3,000 tons of rice to Czechoslovakia is the first fruit of Jagan's efforts to develop government-to-government trade relations with the bloc. Negotiations are also under way with Poland and East Germany. In his requests for UN technical assistance, Jagan has specified that he mainly wants advisers from Communist countries or from those with governments of known leftist views. 25X1

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## CUBAN MISSION IN MOSCOW

The composition of the Cuban mission which has been in Moscow since 2 July strongly suggests that the primary purpose of the trip is to obtain additional military equipment for the Cuban armed forces. The 11-man group, led by Deputy Premier and Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro, was invited by the Soviet Defense Ministry. Defense Minister Malinovsky and other ranking Soviet officers met Castro at the Moscow airport, and on 3 July Khrushchev granted him an audience.

Ten men accompanied Castro on his flight from Havana to Prague, the first leg of the journey.

Other members of the mission are Cuban army and air force officers. They include Captain Victor Pina Cardozo, an air force officer engaged in arms-purchasing missions since 1959; he traveled to Czechoslovakia with a group of air force trainees in July 1960. Others are Major Calixto Garcia, commander of Cuba's Eastern Army; Captain Rogelio Acevedo, at least until recently commander of the Cuban militia; and Major Samuel Rodiles Planas, a police officer who may recently have been transferred to the air force.

This is Raul Castro's first visit to Moscow since June 1960, when he probably negotiated the initial agreement for Soviet military assistance to Cuba. Deliveries began less than three months after his return. Another agreement

was apparently concluded in the summer of 1961 for additional Soviet arms which have been delivered this year. Castro may be seeking additional equipment, including more advanced items such as missile-equipped MIG-21 jet fighters and surface-to-air missiles, which Moscow now is providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq.

Rumors that Raul Castro is to sign a "defense agreement" with the Soviet Union have been heard in Havana.

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While the Cubans would probably welcome--and may even be pleading for--a Soviet commitment to come to Cuba's defense militarily in the event of an attack, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Government is prepared to make such a commitment.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## BRAZIL

Brazilian President Goulart has won several victories over Congress in the maneuverings of the past two weeks for a new prime minister and cabinet, despite the constitutional amendment of September 1961 establishing a parliamentary system with implied legislative dominance. Confirmation of his latest nominee for the Prime Ministry, the little-known Francisco Brochado da Rocha, shows that for the moment at least Goulart has the upper hand.

Goulart's first nominee, the ambitious leftist San Thiago Dantas, was rejected by the legislature. The fact that some of Goulart's supporters did not vote for Dantas may indicate that the rejection was planned by Goulart as a way of blocking a potentially dangerous rival.

Goulart's second nominee, Senate President Moura Andrade, was confirmed in office by the Chamber of Deputies but resigned one day later because Goulart would not nominate the cabinet members Andrade had chosen. Goulart apparently believed he had a commitment from Andrade to push for the restoration of a strong presidential system and had not expected Andrade's effort to make himself an independent prime minister. Organized labor under considerable Communist influence called 24-hour strikes in major cities throughout Brazil in support of Goulart. The strikes were scattered but impressive by Brazilian standards and hence politically effective. Military leaders--who had been placed in their present posts by Goulart--also supported the President.

Goulart's nomination of Rocha on 8 July reflects the President's increased confidence in his own political power. Rocha is almost unknown nationally in Brazil except as an ally of Leonel Brizola, governor of Rio Grande do Sul, brother-in-law of Goulart, and a principal candidate for leadership of the leftist-nationalist forces in Brazil.

Rocha is a constitutional lawyer, born 8 August 1910 in Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul. He entered politics in 1930 as a supporter of Getulio Vargas, who took over the government in a coup in that year and ruled until 1945. Rocha's father and brother have both been mayors of Porto Alegre, but Francisco long preferred a background role. He was a special "unofficial" adviser to Brizola when Brizola was mayor from 1956 to 1958 and continued his advisory role after Brizola's election as governor in 1958. During this time he had a hand in the rejection of US aid to the police in Porto Alegre.

Rocha belonged at first to the heterogeneous but predominantly conservative Social Democratic party (PSD) but unofficially broke with it a few years ago to work in the leftist Labor party. He has recently been under consideration in Rio Grande do Sul for the Labor party's nomination for the Senate. Apparently, however, Rocha never enrolled as a member of the Labor party, and because he was largely unknown in Brasilia, Goulart was able to present him to congress as a member of the PSD, the largest party in congress. This may have been a major factor in his confirmation.

Rocha was described by the US consul in Porto Alegre as one of the cleverest lawyers in the southernmost part of Brazil in October 1961. At that time, Brizola had asked Rocha to investigate charges that certain elements in the state government favored Communist activities. The investigation was apparently intended to justify Brizola's regime.

Rocha was a key adviser in the expropriation of a subsidiary of the Electric Bond and Share Corporation in 1959 and was a Rio Grande do Sul secretary of interior and justice in early 1962 when a

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Company was expropriated by the state government. Rocha's few public statements suggest that he shares Brizola's resentment both of foreign capital and of capital from Brazil's key industrial state of Sao Paulo. Rocha's skill as a constitutional lawyer would be useful to Goulart both in moves against foreign-owned utility and mining

companies--which would enhance Goulart's popular appeal--and in maximizing Goulart's political power without overstepping the constitutional boundaries which the Brazilian military guard jealously.

Should Rocha fail to reach agreement with congress on cabinet appointments and resign, a new period of tension is likely.

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## PERU

Fernando Belaunde Terry, vociferous candidate of the leftist Accion Popular, still claims that he is Peru's president-elect. His claim is based on his allegations that he received more than one third of the legal votes cast on 10 June and that the ballots which gave APRA's Victor Raul Haya de la Torre a slim plurality are fraudulent and should be annulled. In spite of the report that an army spokesman assured Belaunde on 11 June that he would win by 40,000 votes, the official count by the National Elections Board and the unofficial counts by several press services, the navy and the candidates' representatives all showed Haya leading by about 14,000. Because no candidate received more than one third of the total vote, Congress must select the new president after it convenes on 28 July.

Belaunde has threatened to lead an "insurrection in the hills" if he does not become president. He was imprisoned for a short time for attempting a similar insurrection after his defeat in the 1956 presidential election, but was never brought to trial. The Communists have supported his claim through their various propaganda outlets, and they have threatened to call a general strike if the elections board "ignores" the charges of fraud.

Peruvian military leaders have become increasingly dis-

enchanted with Belaunde because of what one officer called his "electoral paranoia." Fear of a victory by Haya had led them to champion Belaunde, but they do not countenance Belaunde's extravagant claims and threats of violence.

An extraordinary national convention of APRA leaders last weekend rejected the army's ultimatum that Haya's name be withdrawn from the list of presidential candidates to be considered by Congress. Although the military leaders had threatened a military coup if their demands were not met by the weekend, they now appear resigned to letting Congress choose the next president in accordance with the constitution. However, they have not rescinded their pre-election threat to launch a coup "if necessary" to prevent Haya's taking office.

Conversations are continuing between APRA leaders and members of Manuel Odria's National Union (UNO). An APRA-UNO coalition would control both houses of congress and could select either Haya or Odria as president. Speculation in Lima is that such a coalition would select Odria--who is acceptable to the armed forces--as president even though he placed only third in the voting, and Manuel Seoane, an APRA leader, as vice president. Odria's poor health has led to popular speculation that Seoane will succeed to the presidency early in the six-year term. If so, APRA--but not Haya--will have finally captured the presidency.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SPECIAL ARTICLES

## CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE STALIN'S DEATH

The situation in the USSR at the time of Stalin's death in 1953 was such that important changes appeared inevitable no matter how the succession problem was solved. Some of the worst aberrations of Stalin's rule stemmed from the abnormality of the man himself and were bound to disappear. In addition, the country had already developed its productive forces in industry and technology, and the new leaders probably felt they could take a more effective approach to administration and control. Long-established priorities for industrial production had necessitated an expansion of education and training programs. This in turn brought about a significant increase in the economic wants of the population, and public pressures were beginning to force some deference to consumer needs.

The men who took over the direction of the country were badly split over various aspects of policy, but most were essentially optimistic--they thought that they knew far better than Stalin what the major problems were and that they could do a better job than he in solving them. Free of intimidation and able to put their own ideas into action, their mood--once the initial shock of Stalin's death had passed--was aggressive and spirited. This became an important factor in determining both the extent and the speed of change.

Stalin's heirs, however, were also afraid--of each other, of the secret police, and of the powers of Stalin's personal secretariat. Since no one individual was powerful enough to take complete control at the

outset, they acted in concert to purge Beria and his henchmen, to destroy Stalin's secretariat, and to break up the police network and set it back under party control. This action necessitated the development of new methods of administration and control. It paved the way for a new system of incentives and emoluments, and it permitted popular opinion to raise its head and be heard.

As for the changes which came about in the evolutionary process since that time, it is difficult to sort the permanent from the transitory, and it is always possible that at least some of the discarded techniques of Stalinism might be reimposed. The fact remains, however, that the present leadership with its new methods of operation has been able to build a much stronger and more viable economy and to get a much larger segment of the population to identify itself with the Communist system. For these reasons, if for no other, many of the trends since 1953 are likely to be enduring.

The Lifting of Terror

The new leaders' first policy decision--to put an end to rule by terror--involved grave risks. Their fears of each other and of Beria's omniscient secret police were compounded by fear of how the normally apathetic masses might react. The precipitate lifting of oppression might have given rise to a wide range of political troubles, including even the possibility of revolt. Yet the risks had to be run, because nearly 35 years of fear and insecurity had stifled initiative

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at all levels. It had created a pervasive and enduring sense of futility among the populace, and had fostered widespread apathy and inefficiency in the party and government bureaucracies. Furthermore, Stalin's penchant for smashing real or imagined opposition through the general purge had periodically deprived the nation of many of its ablest administrators.

The new leadership aspired to make the USSR a first-rate world power and the showplace of international Communism. To reach this goal the entire economy had to expand at a rate which was impossible to attain under prevailing conditions. To shake Soviet society out of its semiparalysis, the regime had first to provide the people with a modicum of individual security and with new incentives to replace the threat of bodily harm. So the new "collective leadership" moved quickly to demonstrate that terror had been relegated to the past and to establish firm control over the coercive organs of power. Three weeks after Stalin's death the Kremlin announced a sweeping amnesty for petty criminals which was both a bid for popular support and a trial balloon to test the mood of the masses.

The real business at hand then got under way; the key move was the arrest (and subsequent execution) of secret police overlord Lavrenty Beria, the sole member of the new hierarchy to whose personal command the secret police might respond. His removal signaled the beginning of the slow but steady process of de-Stalinization which, in essence, has meant the introduction of regularity and rationality into most aspects of Soviet life.

The police empire was the next target. In the months

following Beria's arrest, his leading henchmen were tried and executed, many lesser secret police officials were quietly replaced by men drawn from the party or the army, and in March 1954 the secret police organization was taken out of the Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) and re-formed into the Committee of State Security (KGB). The MVD was stripped of its vast economic holdings, and changes in the forced labor system followed: parole was reintroduced, discipline in the concentration camps was relaxed somewhat, and living conditions were improved; mass deportations were halted, and forced labor in general came to be recognized as fundamentally uneconomical. The steady attrition of MVD power continued until January 1960, when the central MVD in Moscow was abolished and control of the civil police and of the "corrective labor colonies" was placed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in each of the 15 union republics.

Next came a regularization of the Soviet judicial process. The most reprehensible features of Stalinist jurisprudence, such as the doctrine of "trial by confession," were abandoned, and the police and courts were made to function in relatively strict accordance with Soviet procedural law. These moves were accompanied by a steady barrage of propaganda designed to convince the people that "strengthened socialist legality" made a return to terror impossible.

Changes in the administration of justice have not been accompanied by corresponding liberalizations in the law itself. Soviet law has always been a tool for enforcing the Kremlin's will, and it was never the intent of Stalin's heirs to relinquish their prerogative to determine which activities are acceptable and which are not.

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

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A high degree of social discipline is still regarded as essential to meet the goals the Khrushchev administration has set for itself. Although broadened considerably since Stalin's death, the limits of permissible behavior are very clearly drawn, and the individual citizen who steps out of line is swiftly called to account under laws and regulations which by Western standards are still harsh.

By putting an end to indiscriminate terrorism, however, the new leadership created the internal stability on which its plans for the nation's development were predicted. In an atmosphere of growing popular confidence in the regime, Khrushchev and his cohorts lost no time in putting into effect their ideas of how the country should be run.

The Role of the Party and the New Style of Leadership

One of the major developments in the post-Stalin period was the reinstatement of the party as the dominant institution in Soviet life. Stalin had reduced the party machine to but one of several interacting and counterbalanced institutions of rule, which included also the government bureaucracy, the secret police, and the armed forces. In the power struggle following Stalin's death Khrushchev used the party machine as the basis for his bid for power.

In the course of the struggle and as a natural consequence of Khrushchev's victory, the party extended and consolidated its hold over the country to a greater extent than ever before. Party hegemony was re-established over the economic bureaucracy, the police, and the army; party organizations have been estab-

lished in all but a small number of minor economic and social institutions for on-the-spot control and supervision; and the party was given a wide range of responsibilities in industrial and agricultural administration. Managerial functions have, in fact, almost completely superseded the control function as the primary preoccupation of most professional party workers. The net effect is to make the party a nearly all-embracing and pervasive institution.

The most striking contrast between Khrushchev's era and Stalin's era is the change in the method of rule. Convinced of the basic loyalty of the people and alive to the stultifying effects of rule by fiat and coercion, Khrushchev has based his rule on the use of persuasion and incentives with a fairly rational intermixture of restrained discipline. In his relations with his top lieutenants, he has tolerated differences of opinion and has been willing to be influenced by points of view other than his own. Although there is little doubt that Khrushchev can get his way on a particular point if he really wants it, he exercises that power with restraint and depends heavily on his powers of persuasion--of which he is obviously proud.

The same approach can be seen in the tolerance of freer expression among the populace. Although the limits still are quite restricted by Western standards, the facade of centralized monolithic unity of thought which Stalin sought to project has been breached. Stalin kept aloof from the people, neither perceiving nor caring about their problems or desires; Khrushchev has cultivated close contacts with them--some observers have felt that he draws psychological strength

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from such contacts--and he has been responsive to their expressions of opinion. He seems implicitly to have recognized that techniques of persuasion, to be effective, must accord with the desires and aspirations of the people. He thus has opened the door for the development of true public opinion.

The third development is the change in the composition of the party itself. At the time of Stalin's last party congress in 1952, 58 out of every thousand of the party-age population (age 18 and over) were members. The figure had grown to 70 by the time of the 22nd party congress last October. More significantly, one out of every eight adult men now is a member (the proportion among women is only one in forty). This has meant a diffusion of party spirit and a blurring of the distinction between the party and the general population.

By the end of the Stalin era the party had already grown too large to constitute a conspiratorial elite with a sense of mission. The criteria used in selecting new members in the post-Stalin period, however, have resulted in the reconstitution of the party as a sort of natural elite--or aristocracy--in the sense that its membership is almost coincident with the upper 10 percent in Soviet society measured in terms of education, ability, and achievement.

The process of remaking the party has been especially rapid in the past few years. Although nearly 40 percent of the present members came in to the party after Stalin died, almost two thirds of these joined only within the past three or four years. If present trends continue, a majority of the members soon will have

no party connection with the Stalin era.

Many of the new members are older persons who had developed careers outside the party and joined it only after the post-Stalin thaw. The bulk, however, are young people, a new generation which can scarcely remember the war, was but little touched by the Stalin terror, and grew to maturity in a period of expanding contacts with the West and the beginnings of hesitant liberalization at home.

Changes in the Economy

The Soviet economy in the last years of Stalin's life had, in general, recovered from the destruction of World War II. Its national product was slightly over one third that of the US, although the Soviet population was 30 million greater. Soviet industry was overwhelmingly concentrated on the manufacture of producer goods. Light industry in contrast was deliberately neglected in the allocation of investment funds and was confined largely to textiles and shoes. In the whole of the Soviet Union in 1950, only 1,000 washing machines were built; series production of refrigerators did not begin until 1951. Foreign trade, although several times greater than during the 1930s, was not much above the level reached in the immediate prerevolutionary years and comprised a very small part of Soviet economic life.

Between 1950 and 1961 the output of goods and services increased 100 percent while the population increased about 20 percent, and in the latter year Soviet gross national product was slightly less than half that of the US. Industrial output by 1961 had more than tripled and the annual rate of increase was still high--although well

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below those of the late 1940s and early 1950s. A factor in this slowdown has been the growing competition between the civilian economy and the military and space programs for the most sophisticated resources of modern technology.

Between 1950 and 1961 light industry increased over 180 percent and, although it comprised an even smaller share of total production, had substantially improved the average citizen's standard of living. In contrast to 1950, for example, the USSR last year produced nearly 700,000 refrigerators and 1,250,000 washing machines. Foreign trade was nearly quadruple the 1950 level, and agricultural output had increased by about 60 percent.

Fundamental changes have also taken place in the economic environment. Stalin's view--that production could be advanced by applying even harsher penalties to the lagging worker--had worked fairly well when industrial processes were relatively simple and the economy could absorb nearly everything produced regardless of quality or timing. As the economy became more complex, however, the need for new approaches became more and more apparent.

Consequently, since 1953 there has been a fairly steady shift toward incentives and away from force. Since 1953 per capita consumption has increased at more than double the population growth rate. Through a series of price reductions, tax adjustments, and wage reforms, the real wages for the state worker have advanced by over 55 percent.

A major improvement in the consumer's situation was brought about by the reduction of compulsory bond purchases in 1957 and their abolishment in 1958;

less important were the gradual abolition of the income tax after 1957 and plans to eliminate it by 1965. A major housing program was undertaken in 1957, food processing has developed rapidly, and truck farms have been established to supply the cities. Programs have been adopted to correct gross underinvestment in light industry and to improve the quality and selection of consumer goods. The workweek was gradually reduced from 48 to 41 hours. Pensions have been increased and maternity leaves lengthened. The harsh labor laws of 1940 have been abolished, although the internal passport system is still in effect and a labor book which records work experience and reasons for previous job transfers is still required.

Khrushchev has realized that improvements in consumer welfare--basic to rapid industrial progress in the long run--must start with increased agricultural output. Prices paid by the state for agricultural products have been increased periodically since 1953, and agricultural taxes have been reduced. As a result the monetary income of the Soviet farmer has risen sharply.

The most dramatic agricultural innovation since Stalin's death was the development of a new grain base in Kazakhstan and Siberia, the so-called "New Lands." Since 1954 over 75 million acres of virgin and long-idle land have been plowed and seeded to grain; despite problems of management and marginal rainfall, the New Lands last year provided over half of all grain procured by the state.

Under Stalin, agriculture had a low priority for investment resources. Rural housing and cultural amenities were neglected, and the need for investments in livestock facilities

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and equipment for production of row crops was ignored. Agriculture still receives a relatively small share of total investment--about 17 percent last year--but the amount allocated in 1961 was over three times greater than during 1952.

In industry, the regime's interest in improving performance through the application of more modern technology is far greater than in Stalin's time. This has led to greatly increased trade with Western Europe as well as to greater emphasis on research and development and plans for faster replacement of old and obsolete equipment. In many sectors of the economy, this has led to open praise of Western methods and their adaptation to Soviet use--discouraged in Stalin's later years.

Organizational changes have been made to overcome the irrationality and inefficiency which characterized the economic system under Stalin. Various modifications in the industrial-ministerial system in the direction of greater local authority culminated in 1957 in the reorganization of industry on a territorial basis designed to give greater freedom to local managers in solving day-to-day problems while maintaining central control over the economy through the planning apparatus. In agriculture, the most important institutional change was the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations in 1958. This action, which Stalin had rejected as "ruinous," permitted the collective farms to own their own equipment.

There have also been improvements in planning. Difficulties are inherent in the system, but under Khrushchev the search for better methods is carried out in an atmosphere of new permissiveness and free-

dom. The economic effectiveness of capital, mathematical methods of planning, and the relative roles of light and heavy industry now are openly debated. While ultimate control over planning remains in the hands of the top leaders, increased planning authority has been delegated to subordinate administrations. To facilitate the planning process and administration of the increasingly complex economy, statistical "honesty" is emphasized, and recently promulgated laws against account padding and false reporting are stringently enforced.

Changes in the Cultural Scene

The most striking change in Soviet cultural life has been the gradual erosion of the monolithic facade of intellectual "unanimity." Under Stalin, the only intellectual or artistic activities were those directed by the Kremlin in support of its goals. The Khrushchev administration, however, has been unwilling to sacrifice its increased respectability by resorting to the harsh measures required to preserve this "unanimity," and the intelligentsia has shown an increasing tendency to resist the perversion of its skills in the interests of party dogma or propaganda. There have been successive "thaws" and "refreezes" in the regime's cultural policy since 1953, but each "thaw" has increased the number of non-conformist voices.

Under Stalin, the creative writer's sole function was to inspire popular enthusiasm for the regime by portraying life in the Soviet Union as one without flaws. Soon after Stalin's death a few daring writers began to portray life as they saw it and not as the party claimed it was. In the shock which followed the 1956 disorders in Eastern Europe, the

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regime demanded that the non-conformist minority publicly confess its "mistakes." A few recanted in grudging and ambiguous terms after six months of pressure which included a dramatic threat of the firing squad from Khrushchev in person. The majority remained silent, but no arrests ensued. The following year the regime, faced with a novelist whose forbidden work had been smuggled out of the USSR for publication in the West, expelled Boris Pasternak from the Writers' Union but again did not impose a prison sentence.

As a result of this leniency, Soviet writers now are openly divided into nonconformists and conformists, each side with its newspapers and magazines. The nonconformists' demand for truth in literature has produced some astonishingly frank pictures of venal party officials, uncommitted and cynical youth, class distinctions, poverty, and injustice in contemporary Soviet society, as well as revelations of Stalinist tyranny. They have also explored the world of emotions, which was forbidden under Stalin and is still frowned on as encouraging individualism instead of collectivism.

The regime now tolerates literary controversy, intervening only when the arguments encroach on overly sensitive areas of political life. The conformists continue to claim a monopoly on the "correct" interpretation of ideological purity and loyalty to Communism in literature, but their attacks on their opponents are no longer automatically backed up with disciplinary measures by the regime.

The attempts by the writers to substitute their personal visions for those of the party

have been paralleled in other intellectual fields. The rector of Leningrad University recently publicly criticized Soviet higher education on the grounds that it taught students to memorize facts but failed to teach them to think creatively. High-ranking Soviet scientists, as well as individual students, have taken a similar line.

Noted physicist Peter Kapitsa this spring warned that Marxist philosophy alone cannot solve scientific problems. He cited the Stalinist condemnation of Einstein's theory of relativity on ideological grounds, and commented that if Soviet scientists had listened to dogmatic philosophers during the past decade, Soviet achievements in space exploration would have been impossible.

The goal of the nonconformists since 1953 has been a limited one--freedom to work with, rather than under, the Communist party. They have not challenged the party's goal of building Communism or its right to demand their allegiance to that goal. They only wish to describe their socialist society accurately, not to reorganize it. Objectivity in description of the results of policies reflects criticism of the policies themselves, however, and independent thought cannot be quarantined in literature and science alone. So long as the regime is reluctant to reimpose Stalinist controls over intellectual activity, it will continue to face challenges to its claims of intellectual omniscience, and the areas in which it reserves to itself the exclusive right to discuss and criticize will continue to erode.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****THE LOCUST THREAT**

During the past several years locusts in combination with drought have damaged Middle Eastern crops so severely that large-scale emergency shipments of US grain have been necessary in order to avert famine conditions. The drought has broken this year, and crop prospects from the weather standpoint are believed good. The locust threat, however, is one of the most widespread in recent times, covering an area from India to Syria and from the Soviet Turkmen Republic to Ethiopia, populated by about 668,000,000 persons.


Extent of the Locust Problem

Although locusts are generally thought of as a plague of Africa and the Middle East, at times they also menace crops in Malaya, Borneo, and even the West Indies. The locust has exceptional mobility, and its mass migration makes it an international menace. Swarms produced in Ethiopia and Somaliland have moved 2,000 miles to breed along a belt extending from Jordan to Pakistan. Others originating in Saudi Arabia have flown 1,300 miles into Equatorial Africa.

Since a single fertile female locust can lay several egg pods annually, each containing up to a hundred eggs, the potential increase in numbers from one generation to the next may be several hundredfold, while as many as five generations may be produced in a single season. Fecundity depends to a large extent on weather conditions; low temperatures and dryness retard

reproduction. The spread of locusts has been facilitated rather than hindered by agricultural development; clearing of forests, irrigation projects, and overgrazing have tended to stimulate reproduction. Locusts hatch from eggs into "hoppers" without wings. After growing wings, the swarms take flight searching for forage.

A locust plague in 1952 provides a good example of how swarms from one point can threaten a wide area. At the end of 1951 swarms began to move northward from a breeding ground in Somalia over Ethiopia and Eritrea, across the Red Sea to Arabia; they reached the borders of Iraq in early February 1952 and then spread westward to Jordan and eastward to Iran, finally invading Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. In three months these locusts had flown some 3,000 miles, repeatedly stopping to lay eggs. By March, the eggs from the swarms had begun hatching and new bands of hoppers were eating crops. At the end of the monsoon season, these bands flew westward from India and Pakistan. By October they had reappeared in Arabia, spreading over Yemen, the Aden Protectorate, Jordan,



Desert Locusts in Flight in Kenya

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and thence back to Ethiopia and Somalia. Some swarms reached the Sudan and French West Africa.

Another plague, beginning in a restricted area of West Africa, within five years spread over most of the continent, from Senegal to the Somalilands and from Sudan to South Africa.


International Locust Control

While there has been some international cooperation on the locust problem since 1920, little real progress was made until 1951 when efforts were coordinated under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), with headquarters in Rome. Since then, limited UN funds have been available for locust control, and some funds have been provided by

the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries. Total expenditures have been relatively small--only about \$12,000,000 annually.

In addition to technical advice, the FAO coordinates and administers emergency campaigns of locust control in some 20 countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, each of which has its own control organization. The Anti-Locust Research Centre in London, sponsored by the FAO, gathers reports and disseminates locust intelligence. The Centre publishes a monthly bulletin entitled "The Desert Locust Situation" which describes the general situation, the situation in specific countries, and makes forecasts.

Because the Centre depends on each nation to report the



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locust situation in its jurisdiction, the Centre's information is frequently delayed. Some countries make no reports at all, and this results in an incomplete and understated picture much of the time. The Somali Republic's Desert Locust Agency, located in one of the principle locust breeding areas, is rapidly degenerating for lack of governmental and international support, and recently independent African and Asian states are likely to suffer similar administrative difficulties in the fight against the locust.

The 1962 Locust Threat

Breeding is widespread this year over a vast area from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq to India. It is particularly heavy in western and northwestern Iran and adjoining areas in Iraq, Afghanistan, and northwestern Pakistan. Laying swarms have reached the Turkmen SSR. India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are facing infestations of exceptional severity and length from July onward. Swarms have already invaded parts of India and damaged cotton, sugar cane, and fruits. There has been widespread infestation in West Pakistan and Baluchistan, where large numbers of eggs have been laid and where some have already hatched into new swarms. A severe threat to Afghan crops was averted in May by Soviet and American emergency antilocus measures.

In Iran swarms so great that they "darkened the sky" came from

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in late May. Soviet teams operating in northern Iran were able to save some crops, but in the south, where the United States teams were called in too late, nearly all crops were destroyed. US spray planes, however, have waged a successful campaign in the western part of the country. Swarms from Afghanistan have threatened the Khorassan area in eastern Iran.

Other swarms have threatened Iraq, eastern Syria, and southern Turkey, but little damage has been reported so far. However, additional swarms are expected. Jordan has been subjected to small swarms, and in the Persian Gulf area and Saudi Arabia swarms have been rather widespread. Infestation in northern Yemen has compelled the Yemeni Government to ask for 500 tons of prepared locust bait...poison-soaked brans ...from the US.

Locusts in all stages of maturity have been reported in northern Ethiopia, the Eritrean highlands, the Somali Republic, and may appear in the Sudan in July. Peasants in the Eritrean highlands are unable to pay taxes, since their crops have been destroyed for two years in succession. Kenya and Uganda have been subjected only to small swarms so far this season. Other local locust infestations have been reported from Mali and Portuguese Guinea.

Because of this year's unusually heavy infestations, supplemental food supplies from countries with agricultural surpluses will be needed to avert famine among the inhabitants of many of the areas affected. 25X1

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