


SECRET

Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6

10 May 1963

OCI No. 0279/63E

Copy No. 78



SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MORI/CDF Pages 1-7

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document **MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS**. If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the limitation so imposed.

SECRET

10 May 1963

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

In their struggle with the Soviet Union for leadership of the world Communist movement, the Chinese Communists have shown a keen appreciation of the opportunities that exist in underdeveloped countries. In Latin America, where change of government by violence is the rule, their radical solutions to economic and political difficulties find many a ready ear. Peiping can point to the Cuban revolution as a prime example of the efficacy of its revolutionary theories. At the governmental level, however, China has made few gains. Trade is minimal, and no diplomatic breakthrough has been made since Havana recognized Peiping in 1960.

Cuba

Last fall's Cuban crisis provided China with an opportunity to argue that no Communist party could count on the Soviet Union when the chips were down. Peiping did not hesitate to shout about another "Munich" or to publicize the Russian pull-back as dramatic confirmation of Chinese charges that the present Soviet leaders are timid and lack revolutionary fervor. The Chinese assiduously contrasted Moscow's unreliability with their own staunch support of revolutionary struggle.

Such innuendos found a ready audience in Cuba. Havana feels an instinctive sympathy for Peiping's more militant approach to world problems. In addition, both regimes are relatively

recent in origin, both came to power through a guerrilla struggle, and both see the US as their prime antagonist. Despite the similarity of outlook, however, Chinese support for Cuba is perforce primarily moral and technical.

Although Peiping will undoubtedly seek to increase its influence in Cuba, and delegations of Chinese are continually passing through, there are probably fewer than 250 Chinese Communists permanently stationed on the island. An estimated 50 Chinese serve in the embassy, and approximately 200 advisers and technicians-- primarily agricultural--are in outlying posts. There are, however, more than 30,000 ethnic Chinese--15,000 in Havana alone --and they have undoubtedly given rise to the refugee reports

SECRET

1

SECRET

of a substantially larger Chinese Communist presence. There is also a very small number of military advisers.

Chinese military aid to Cuba has been limited. Peiping is known to have provided small quantities of conventional infantry weapons and anti-aircraft machine guns. There are also reports that Cubans have received flight training in China.

Communist Parties

The Chinese campaign to influence Latin American Communist parties began in 1959. Twelve Latin American delegations that had attended the 21st Soviet party congress were invited to Peiping at Chinese expense. They were welcomed by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, and their hosts sought to impress them with the applicability of Chinese revolutionary tactics to their situation at home.

Although almost all the Latin American parties remain Moscow-oriented, there are

clear-cut splits in the ranks almost everywhere--splits between the cautious and the impetuous, between those in control and their younger critics. These divisions, rooted in local intra-party strife, have been widened by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the emergence of a Communist Cuba.

Peiping's exhortations to head-on struggle strike a sympathetic chord in the impatient splinter groups. They quote Peiping to make their case in party squabbles, and the vehemence of the Sino-Soviet polemic over strategy gives their own local heresies an air of respectability.

In Brazil, the party split has become formal. A year ago dissident Communists who were expelled from the Brazilian party set up their own rival political organization. They elected a central committee, issued a party platform, and established a party press. The splinter group, small in comparison with the orthodox party's membership, has party regulars

SECRET

SECRET

worried. Led by Joao Amazonas, the splinter group is pledged to establish a popular government by revolutionary means and has been encouraged by Communist China. Peiping accorded red-carpet tours of the mainland to Amazonas as well as orthodox party leaders it hopes to influence.

In Bolivia, it is reported the party has recently forbidden members from continuing on to Peiping after visiting Moscow. All previous travelers who visited both countries reportedly felt more admiration and affection for the Chinese than for the Soviets. Pro-Chinese sentiment is apparently growing among Bolivian party youth, and law students at the University of La Paz have recently formed a group to defend Peiping's ideological stand.

In Mexico, the Communist Party is deeply split over the Sino-Soviet question. In February 1963, the Chinese Communist trade delegation then visiting Mexico reportedly offered financial aid to a splinter group in exchange for support of Peiping's policies. Since then, internal wrangling has continued, and the differences do not appear near reconciliation. In fact, the recent postponement of the party congress from July to October appears to reflect a concern among party leaders that a congress held

this summer might break down over the Sino-Soviet issue.

In Venezuela, young party activists--responsible for the current violence--are at odds with old-guard pro-Moscow leaders and are sympathetic to the Chinese. A number have traveled to China for paramilitary training.

Only in Chile, where the party is legal and enjoys some real prospects of eventually gaining power by parliamentary means, is there little evidence of attraction to Peiping's militant line.

Trade

Except for Cuba, where trade reached about \$200 million in 1962, Communist China has no significant commercial relations in Central or South America. China recently bought about \$20 million worth of Argentine wheat and corn as part of the program to relieve severe food shortages by grain purchases in the free world, but trade is usually very small. Peiping's only permanent "trade" office in the western hemisphere outside Cuba is in Chile.

A government trade delegation visited Brazil and Mexico last winter but was received by

SECRET

SECRET

minor officials and no discussions of substance are known to have occurred. Brazil's Goulart is cool, and Mexico's Lopez Mateos last fall publicly reiterated his government's unwillingness to establish diplomatic relations with Peiping.

"People's Diplomacy"

Peiping has sought to enhance its propaganda efforts by inviting influential Latin Americans to visit China. Such invitations are not confined to staunch pro-Communists. Among the more prominent political figures who have visited Peiping in recent years are Mexico's ex-president Portes Gil, Cuba's President Dorticos and industry chief Guevara, and Chile's Socialist presidential candidate Allende.

Last fall Chicago-born Janet Jagan, wife of British Guiana's premier, was received by Mao and accorded top-level attention throughout her visit. If, as seems likely, the Jagans are still in power when British Guiana is granted independence, Peiping can probably expect diplomatic recognition.

Brazil's Goulart, despite polite expressions of friendship during a 1961 tour, has moved Brasilia little closer to recognizing Peiping. His govern-

ment continues to oppose China's admission to international organizations.

Only two Chinese delegations, trade unionists and journalists, made extensive tours of Latin America last year. The vast majority of visiting Chinese still go only to Cuba--undoubtedly a result of difficulty in obtaining visas to countries with which Peiping has no diplomatic relations. Excluding Cuba, Chinese visits both to and from Latin America have declined slightly since the peak years of 1959-60. The drop roughly coincides with Peiping's severe economic difficulties at home and probably reflects a world-wide retrenchment effort. As the domestic crisis eases, Chinese "people's diplomacy" is likely to expand.

Propaganda

In the past two years the Chinese have beamed a vigorous radio propaganda effort at Latin America. Since 1962 Peiping has been broadcasting 28 hours of Spanish-language programs and about ten hours in Portuguese each week. Direct wireless communications were established with Havana two years ago, and Morse and radioteletype transmissions to the Americas now exceed 100 hours a week. The Chinese have long published Spanish-language

SECRET

SECRET

editions of the glossy propa-
ganda magazines China Pictorial
and China Reconstructs, and this
spring the more meaty ideolog-
ical fare in the Peking Review
was made available to Latin
American readers in Spanish.

The official New China
News Agency (NCNA)--working
primarily through local Com-
munist parties--has established
a network of correspondents in
Latin America. It has recruited
stringers in Argentina, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama,
Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Offices manned by Chinese corre-

spondents have been set up in
Cuba, Brazil, and Chile.

The Havana office of NCNA
is the funnel through which most
of Peiping's propaganda pours
into Latin America. Soon after
its establishment in 1959, NCNA's
Havana office set up close liai-
son with Castro's revamped Prensa
Latina news agency--giving it
advice and financial support--
and the NCNA chief was appointed
to negotiate all preparations
for the arrival of China's
first western hemisphere ambas-
sador in 1960. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET