


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Release 2006/08/30 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090003-8

17 May 1963

OCI No. 0280/63A
Copy No. 75



SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG WORLD COMMUNISTS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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17 May 1963

GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG WORLD COMMUNISTS

Although the group which Communist China now leads is still a distinct minority in the international Communist movement, the Chinese party has taken long strides out of a position where it once stood its ground alone. Since the time of the first significant open Chinese challenge to Soviet policies--roughly, the beginning of 1959--the Chinese have gathered increasing strength in the movement. Each turn of the dispute has brought them new supporters, either whole parties or significant portions of other parties. Each new attempt by Khrushchev to force the Chinese into isolation has alienated more Communist leaders and more of the rank and file, either by the abrupt unilateral methods he has used or by forcing them to make a choice--a choice which was not always to Khrushchev's liking.

Peiping's Rationale

The meeting of international Communist leaders held in Moscow in late 1960 demonstrated the difficulties which face Khrushchev in his attempts to contain the challenge of intransigent Chinese views. After three weeks of hard bargaining, including persistent attempts by the Khrushchev faction to browbeat the Chinese and others into acceptance of its way of looking at the world, the statement which closed this round of the struggle was one which could be used by either side to support its own views. The document was more than something that the Chinese "could live with." It was one which they could use to good advantage in the future.

Up to 1960 the Chinese appear to have had limited aims with regard to the international Communist movement. They hoped

to gain enough support for their views to influence the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, policies which they regarded as inimical to their own interests. They believed that the Communist world should have a leader who establishes over-all policy, but who does so in consultation with the other important members of the Communist camp. They looked to the Soviet Union to be that leader and visualized for themselves a role as principal adviser and co-formulator of policies.

Since 1960, the Chinese have gradually given up any hope that they could influence the policies of the Soviet Union and thus the direction the international Communist movement takes, without themselves taking on the mantle of leadership. They are therefore now engaged in a deep and

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unremitting contest for doctrinal leadership--a conflict which they expect will be long and drawn out, whose present may appear uncertain but whose future is assured.

This is the rationale behind their insistence that they are only "temporarily a minority" as Lenin was only temporarily a minority in the Second International. The successes they have scored in the past four years in gaining adherents to their doctrinal programs must serve to strengthen their resolve while at the same time it creates new disquietude in Moscow.

The Asian Parties

The Chinese have made their greatest inroad into formerly Soviet-influenced areas in Asia. Part of their appeal is a racial one; despite their profession of doctrinal purity, they are not above using racist propaganda in their search for supporters. The support given by the New Zealand Communist Party, however, demonstrates that Peiping's appeal can transcend racial lines.

Today the Chinese can be considered the leaders of a regional Communist sector embracing all the important parties of Asia and Oceania. From India eastward, only the Indian, Australian, and Ceylonese parties are committed to the Soviet camp, and they each have a strong pro-Chinese minority. The early adherence of Albania to the Chinese camp, moreover, dramatically dem-

onstrated that Peiping's appeal is not merely a geographic one.

The two most important non-Chinese parties in the area are those now in power--the North Korean and the North Vietnamese parties.

The North Korean party now is clearly and deeply committed to Peiping. In the early days of the dispute, the North Koreans attempted to maintain an uneasy neutralism. Although attracted to the Chinese views on a number of issues either because of geographic and racial affinities or joint opposition to a common enemy--the US--the North Koreans were still tied to the Soviets through residual psychological pressures and economic and military aid programs.

As the opposing positions hardened, however, it was less and less possible for the Korean leadership to avoid a choice, and the choice they have made is to support Peiping. Soviet recognition of this has been apparent in the treatment accorded a North Korean military delegation to Moscow last fall and subsequent developments which suggest the Soviet Union is attempting to apply economic pressure through a refusal to supply new military aid.

The North Vietnamese party also moved carefully through the beginning months of the Sino-Soviet dispute in an attempt to maintain a delicate balance between the two major

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parties. More wary than the North Koreans of exchanging Soviet patronage for Chinese direction, and more adroit at picking a path down the middle, the North Vietnamese have continued throughout the dispute to display a cautious neutralism. Recently, however, particularly in the last two months, Vietnamese pronouncements have taken on a distinct Chinese cast and have been prominently reprinted by the Chinese.

The speech by First Secretary Le Duan on 13 March, a recent editorial in the party newspaper Nhan Dan, and the resolutions of a recently held central committee meeting all suggest that the North Vietnamese may be preparing to jump off their tightrope onto the Chinese side. It is still too early to tell, however, and the Vietnamese may well balance these statements with more pro-Soviet ones as they have in the past.

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is the largest in the non-Communist world and as such represents an important prize for each side. Before the 22nd Soviet party congress in late 1961, the leadership of the party, represented mostly by General Secretary Aidit, had been able to fight off the sentiment of the majority of the rank and file and of a number of politburo members, and had avoided giving clear support to Chinese views. With Khrushchev's unilateral attack on Albania, however, and his quickening rapprochement with

Yugoslavia, the pro-Peiping majority acquired better weapons with which to impose its views.

Aidit, in what appears to be a maneuver to maintain his leadership rather than a conversion, now has bowed to the pro-Chinese majority, and the PKI has taken up a position contrary to Moscow's on the issues of Albania, Yugoslavia, the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Cuban crisis, and the necessity for an international Communist meeting. On domestic affairs, however, the PKI continues to use tactics with which the Soviet Union agrees. Despite the generalized Chinese demands for more revolutionary militancy, there is no indication that the realistic Chinese do not also agree with the PKI's moderate domestic tactics.

The Japanese Communist Party likes to present itself as neutral in the dispute between the USSR and China and for some years was able to suppress discussion within the party and to avoid a clear choice in public pronouncements. Within the last year, however, while still giving the impression that it wishes there were no dispute to add to its own problems, it has swung into the Peiping camp. It has republished Chinese attacks on Nehru, endorsed the Chinese border claims, published Mao's collected works, reprinted Chinese speeches, refused to attack Albania, given no support

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for the Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis, refused to carry in the Japanese edition of the World Marxist Review articles attacking the Chinese point of view, and attacked Yugoslav "revisionism."

One of the reasons for the leadership's pose of "neutrality" is the existence within the party of a strong undercurrent of pro-Soviet thought among a significant number of the rank and file. Defections from the party have occurred recently, with its stand on the Chinese side cited as the reason. The leadership, therefore, is moving slowly and seeks to present itself as a possible mediator of the dispute. The evidence suggests, however, that as a mediator it would attempt to settle the dispute in Peiping's favor.

The Indian Communist Party is another deeply divided party, but in this case the majority of the present leadership are moderate nationalists, who have condemned the Chinese attitudes and support the Soviet Union. The party, however, has a strong minority whose leftist sectarian views are completely in line with those of Peiping. At the moment, many of this faction are still in Indian jails, put there by Nehru for opposing the government's line on the border issue. They will be out some day, however, and the prospect is that they will create a great deal of difficulty for the present leadership if it maintains its

present course. If they cannot move the party in the direction they wish, they may possibly move out of the party and form another which, within India, will mirror the Chinese.

Australia

The Australian party reflects the shifting nature of alliances and demonstrates that all changes of one view for another have not been in Peiping's favor. The leadership of the party, like that of the neighboring New Zealand party, was strongly pro-Chinese until late 1961. Since then, the dominant sentiment shifted to the Soviet side, while the New Zealand leadership has more firmly supported the Chinese.

In February 1962, an internal struggle over the Sino-Soviet question was resolved in the Australian party in favor of the USSR and led to the resignation of the leader of the pro-Peiping faction. The Soviet Union can count the outcome of the factional struggle in the Australian party as its only significant success in the Far East.

Africa and Near East

All important parties in the Arab world are firmly pro-Soviet. Communist parties in non-Moslem Africa are as yet weak, and they play little role in the international movement. Such parties as there are appear to be Soviet motivated, but there is significant sentiment for

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Chinese views among left-wing radicals in Africa. The predominance of Chinese influence in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), for example, reflects this sentiment.

Developments in the past year suggested that Chinese views had gained ground in the secretariat of AAPSO, and the direction taken by AAPSO's third conference in Tanganyika in February 1963 indicated that they now dominate it. This was driven home at the end of April when Soviet supporters at the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference were blocked by the Indonesian chairman in an attempt to seat the USSR as a working member rather than an observer.

Latin America

In Latin America, the majority of the Communist parties are overtly in the Soviet camp. Although the leadership remains pro-Soviet, however, there are clear-cut splits rising out of the rank and file almost everywhere--splits between the cautious and the impetuous, between those in control and their younger critics. These divisions, rooted in local intraparty strife, have been widened by the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Even the leaderships of the various parties are not identical in their backing of Moscow. Support varies from very strong in Guatemala, Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and others, to more lukewarm in

Honduras and Haiti, to doubtful in Ecuador and Venezuela.

And there are special cases, like that of the Brazilian party. Here the leadership of the official and more traditional Communist party is firmly pro-Soviet, but it must tread carefully because of the existence of a dissident Communist party whose policies of leftist revolution are close to the Peiping line.

In Mexico, the Communist Party (PCM) now is engaged in a factional quarrel over the Sino-Soviet question.

the recent postponement of the 14th Extraordinary Party Congress from July to October appears to reflect a concern on the part of the party leadership that a congress held now might break down over the Sino-Soviet issue.

In addition, as is occurring in many countries in Latin America, a Communist splinter group in Mexico consistently maintains a more militant outlook than the official PCM and is probably being supported from Peiping. Recent developments indicate that the controversy over the Sino-Soviet dispute within the Mexican Communist movement is probably

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growing more bitter rather than ameliorating.

Cuba has always been an enigma in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Within the Cuban regime there are a number of important figures who view the world much as the Chinese view it. Nevertheless, Cuba remains heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and political support. It suffered a serious blow to its pride in October, however, and therefore has a stake in attempting to appear independent of the Soviet Union. The result has been a distinct shift in the nature of Cuban discussions of the dispute within the Communist world.

The flavor of Cuban leaders' speeches after the missile crisis--although couched in what appears to be neutral language--was deliberately favorable to the Chinese. A reflection of the Soviet concern over this situation can be seen in Castro's present visit to the USSR. The Soviet leaders are clearly hoping to use this visit not only to emphasize their determination to protect Cuba against US pressures but to strengthen their position with Castro within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Western Europe

Within the Western European Communist parties, as well as within the US and Canadian parties, Moscow's writ generally continues to run. There is pro-

Chinese sentiment among some of the rank and file of most of the parties, most markedly in the British and Belgian parties, but the leadership of the Western European parties still fully supports Moscow in its dispute with the Chinese.

The Sino-Soviet dispute, however, has another effect here, which, while not disposing these parties to Chinese influence, yet stores up future difficulties for the Soviet Union. For, against the background of schism in the international Communist movement and a concomitant weakening of Soviet authority, an opportunity has arisen for various parties to assert their national individuality if they wish. In addition, Moscow's willingness to accept divergencies along the "road to socialism" in order to envelop Yugoslavia in a more loosely structured bloc allows strong parties elsewhere to oppose Soviet insistence that what is good for Moscow is also good for them.

The Italian party is the best example of the early development of this tendency to disregard Moscow on occasion, while supporting the Soviet party fully in the dispute with China. On the question of the Common Market, the Italian party has developed an approach which fits its needs better than the outright Soviet rejection. The Italian theory of "structural reform" is another deviation to fit the Italian scene; in

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absolute terms, it is far more revisionist a doctrine than anything the Yugoslavs are doing.

The Soviet Union is willing to permit this type of experimentation within the national parties, if these parties will fully support Soviet foreign policy aims and tactics. As the national parties become more and more accustomed to forming their own ideas on some policies, however, Soviet control is bound to become weaker and the structure of the Communist world increasingly loose.

Eastern Europe

This willingness to defy Moscow on vital issues of national interest while supporting Soviet foreign policy guides and an anti-Chinese line is not restricted to Communist parties outside the bloc. Rumania has recently stood up for its own economic development plans in the face of an attempt by the Soviet Union to promote joint planning through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

The Rumanian refusal to go along with CEMA plans was indicated in its central committee resolutions of early March. China, although realizing that Rumania is far from ready to

give it overt support, nevertheless has reprinted these resolutions in its party press, probably as an indication to the Rumanians that it stands ready to aid them if desired. Rumania has also expressed its dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's policies by returning its ambassador to Albania, and it is the only satellite regime to raise the level of its trade with China this year.

Although Rumania cannot soon be expected to shift its allegiance from Moscow to Peiping, it is the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute that allows room for regimes such as the Rumanian to exercise independent judgment in the face of Soviet disapproval.

Outlook

The Soviet Union still commands the support of the large majority of the international Communist movement. Only in Asia have the Chinese made significant inroads and developed a position of influence which could be translated into a following willing to form a new international. In other areas, with the exception of the Albanian party, the Chinese now can only boast of sentiment in their favor, of minority pro-Peiping factions in Communist parties otherwise oriented, and of future prospects.

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Moreover, no organizational ties are known to have developed between China and the parties now supporting it. China's appeal is based on its interpretation of the basic doctrine; at some future date those parties now supporting this interpretation might shift to a position of greater independence of both major centers or even back to the Soviet Union.

On balance, however, Khrushchev must be deeply concerned by the attraction of so many parties to the Chinese positions.

The development of new Communist parties is likely only in underdeveloped areas where Chinese influence now is greatest, and the result will probably therefore be more Chinese-oriented parties. In those areas where Soviet influence is greatest, the trend appears to be toward the assertion of ever more independence of view and action. It is with good reason that Khrushchev and his colleagues appear today more concerned with the problems within the Communist world than with any other single issue.


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
SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

KENYA MOVES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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17 May 1963

KENYA MOVES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Kenya's tribes this month will elect the African government that is to lead them to independence, possibly in 1964. Although the British will retain ultimate authority during a transitional period, the Kenyans will be responsible for all government functions except foreign affairs and internal security under a complex constitution which is a compromise between a strong central and a looser federal system. Mindful of the deep racial and tribal cleavages and anxious to reduce the chances of postindependence civil strife, the British have sought to provide a political framework in which no single authority, party, or tribe could control the rest. A solution must also be found to the problem of Kenya's Northeastern Region, whose Somali inhabitants are pressing, against the opposition of Kenya's politicians, for union with the neighboring Somali Republic.

Kenya's Political Alliances

The elections, which are to be held from 18 to 26 May, are being contested by two major political parties: the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU).

Their competition is intense--occasionally violent--as each appears to believe that whoever wins could control the government for a generation. Both parties are uncertain alliances of mutually distrustful tribes and self-seeking politicians.

KANU, the more radical of the two, is controlled almost completely by members of Kenya's two largest and politically most active tribes, the Kikuyu and Luo. It was formed in early 1960--when Kenya's governor

first allowed colony-wide parties--by mingling several local parties. KANU favors a strongly centralized government and talks of creating a socialist society, but it appears to be thinking in terms of joint participation by government and private investors rather than outright public ownership; it claims to favor foreign investment. KANU's leaders enjoy the friendship and support of the continent's pan-African leaders.

Jomo Kenyatta, who has been imprisoned as a Mau Mau leader, became KANU's president after his release in August 1961. He has spent most of his 65 years working for the Kikuyu cause, and is still the symbol of Kenyan nationalism. An orator and a man of great

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personal magnetism, he is the only Kenyan who might be able to instill in his divided countrymen some real sense of national unity. He reportedly joined the Communist Party in 1930 and later attended the Lenin Institute in Moscow, but his earlier extremist and violently antiwhite attitudes appear to have moderated. He is almost certain to be Kenya's first prime minister, but he is not a decisive leader and lacks organizational ability. After independence the younger politicians may attempt to relegate him to a largely ceremonial role, such as president of a republic in which real power would lie in the prime ministry.


The top contender for real leadership of KANU is Tom Mboya, its general secretary and a successful leader of his own local party in the 1957 elections and of KANU in the 1961 voting. Mboya is the only political leader, other than Kenyatta, who approaches national stature. Although a Luo, he finds his greatest strength among the new, urbanized African "proletariat." His labor union career--he was formerly head of the Kenya Federation of Labor and now is minister of labor--is the foundation for his political success. However, Mboya's Western connections expose him to charges of US-UK domination and, together with his driving ambition and arrogant manner, have earned him many personal enemies.

Mboya's relationship with Kenyatta is an alliance of convenience. Kenyatta needs Mboya's political brain and Mboya needs Kenyatta's prestige and the support of his Kikuyu tribe.

Mboya's bitterest opponent is Oginga Odinga, the Communist-tainted, strongly pro-Luo vice president of KANU. Most politicians would be happy to see Odinga's faction relegated to the periphery of Kenya politics. His future influence will depend largely on the outcome of his electoral battle with the Mboya faction in Luo-dominated Nyanza Region. There is no Communist party in Kenya, but a few pro-Communist Africans like Odinga are politically active. They are not influential on a colony-wide scale, and their sympathies for the bloc have probably not worked to their advantage. Thus far Sino-Soviet blandishments appear to have had little effect on the hard core of Kenya's educated elite.

KADU, a loose federation of political groups representing the smaller tribes, was formed largely as a reaction to KANU. Its organizers fear an independent Kenya dominated by the energetic, progressive Kikuyu. Under strong European influence and the able but unspectacular leadership of Ronald Ngala, it has doggedly fought to preserve the rights and identity of tribal and racial minorities against possible encroachment by the central government.

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The result of this struggle is the 300-page, overcomplicated constitution, which provides for a modified federal structure consisting of central, regional, and local governments. There are specified powers for the seven regions and other powers shared by both the regions and the center. All residual powers go to the central government.

The British commissions which defined the new regions and voting constituencies gave rural areas--often with sparse and ignorant populations--a heavy overweighting in representation, while the settled, educated, and politically conscious Kikuyu areas were short-changed. At one time it appeared that KADU and its electoral ally, the African People's Party (APP) might be able to form a coalition government. The APP is a Kamba tribal grouping formed by Paul Ngei, a former Mau Mau leader, whose defection from KANU was financially induced by KANU's opponents.

African Government

Some 2.5 million Kenyans have registered to vote on 715 candidates for the regional assemblies for the Senate and House of Representatives. Although the sizable number of independent candidates makes any predictions hazardous, it appears that KANU will win control of at least three regional assemblies and the Senate. In the all-important lower house it will almost certainly win a

majority, possibly two thirds of the 112 seats being contested.

The elections are likely to be followed by a large-scale political reshuffle, particularly if KANU wins an overwhelming victory. A number of independents will declare for KANU, and some candidates who ran as APP or KADU in order to get elected may switch allegiance to KANU.

KANU in any case will almost surely have the right to form a government. The size of KANU's victory will determine whether Kenya's two-party system will survive and whether the constitution will be changed to satisfy KANU's demands for a government with a strong executive.

Another question of great importance is whether the moderates in KANU eliminate some of the more violent, racist, ex - Mau Mau elements. Kenyatta's chances of forming a moderate government will be greatly enhanced if the racists can be excluded. Kenyatta also reportedly intends to include representatives of the smaller tribes and other races in his cabinet, a move which might reduce the strength of tribalism.

One of the stabilizing factors in the postelection period will be the realization by Kenyan leaders that they must make their government work or Britain is likely to delay independence. Considering the enormous number of technical and financial measures required under the new constitution, and

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given the fact that at least six months are needed to put the new regions on a going basis, most Kenyan leaders do not expect independence before early 1964.

A deteriorating economic situation will complicate the new government's task. The departure of thousands of Europeans--from a monetary economy essentially owned and managed by European and Asian immigrants and depending on them for consumption as well as production and investment capital--has caused serious unemployment and a gradual shrinking of economic activity. A stable African government would do much to restore economic confidence, but for some time to come Kenya will need British Government assistance (\$18 million this year) to meet its budgetary deficit.

Kenya enjoys a favorable balance of trade with Uganda and Tanganyika, and the new government can be expected to continue to participate in the regional organizations through which the currency and common services of these three states are jointly managed. Uganda and Tanganyika have discussed a joint diplomatic service and combined military establishment and only await the formation of an African government in Kenya before progressing further. The ultimate development of an East African federation may be slower, although KANU has publicly endorsed the idea.

The Somali Frontier Dispute

The most pressing political problem awaiting solution by the new Kenya government is the status of the Somali-inhabited Northeastern Region. This low-lying, hot, semidesert area--isolated from the rest of Kenya by distance and natural conditions--supports about 100,000 pastoral Moslem nomads (roughly two per square mile) whose forebears pushed westward from the Somali hinterland before 1900 in search of water and grazing land. British administrators have since been able to stem Somali expansion and prevent their domination of other tribes by restricting tribal movement within specified grazing boundaries--a policy that has kept the area of Somali concentration remote from Kenya's political and economic development.

Since 1960--when the neighboring Somali Republic attained independence--there has been a political awakening in northeast Kenya and an upsurge of party activity and propaganda on the future status of the area. The largest secessionist group has received guidance and material support from the Somali Government, which seeks to unite all Somalis under one flag.

Last November a British survey found that the people living within the Somali grazing area were almost unanimous in their desire to join the Somali Republic and to avoid participation in any preindependence constitutional

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development in Kenya. The western boundary of the new Northeastern Region follows the boundary of the grazing area and separates the Somalis from the other tribes of the former Northern Frontier District. In forming this region the British avoided a final decision on the Somalis' future--lest the repercussions delay Kenyan independence--but created an administrative unit whose eventual secession would not affect Kenya as a whole. Any final settlement is likely to be based on this boundary, although the Somali Government will publicly claim a greater area.

In the course of the current election campaign both KANU and KADU leaders have said they oppose giving up any part of Kenya--a position which most African leaders outside Kenya support in the realization that secession might set an undesirable precedent in their own countries, where boundaries are colonial creations cutting cross tribal areas. On the assumption that an independent Kenyan government will be less inclined to listen sympathetically to Somali claims, the Somali Government is urging the British to settle the issue in its favor before Kenyan independence.

In February, news that Kenyan security forces had taken action against prosecessionist Somali demonstrators provoked a riotous, government-sponsored demonstration in Mogadiscio, the Somali capital, and led Somalia to break relations with Britain a month later. In line with Mogadiscio's campaign for self-determination, 33 Somali chiefs in Kenya have resigned their administrative duties in protest against British policy, and no candidates

from the Northeastern Region are standing in Kenya's elections. This boycott is intended to persuade Kenyan leaders of the hopelessness of retaining the area without the consent of the people. As a consequence, direct British rule will probably have to be continued in the Somali region during Kenya's period of self-government.

London, anxious to avoid the active involvement of British troops, is putting pressure on Kenyan ministers not to take a rigid stand which might prejudice the position of the future Kenyan government and is trying to persuade them that secession would be in Kenya's best interest. British officials have emphasized that the determination of the Somalis to secede could--with a minimum of outside support--result in a prolonged guerrilla war and severe economic drain on independent Kenya.

Governor MacDonald is convinced that eventually the Northeastern Region will have to go to Somalia, but political circumstances in Kenya require that he move cautiously. Some of the country's moderate politicians recognize the need for an eventual accommodation with Somalia, but their public attitude is likely to remain uncompromising until after the elections. If the new government is unable to reach a settlement, Britain will have to decide by the time Kenya attains independence whether to retain the Northeastern Region and ultimately let it join the Somali Republic as a self-governing unit or whether to relinquish it to become a festering security problem within Kenya's borders.

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