


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13 September 1963

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

State Dept. review completed

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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 12 September 1963)

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SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TIGHTENS CONTROL

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The junta has exiled one principal opponent and arrested another. Civilians have failed to agree on a candidate for next month's presidential election.

ARRESTS THREATEN TO UNDERMINE IVORY COAST STABILITY

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During the past two weeks President Houphouet-Boigny has arrested a variety of political figures, including six cabinet ministers.

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By granting some autonomy to Rio Muni and Fernando Poo, Madrid apparently hopes to head off criticism of its colonial policies in the UN.

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Italian-Austrian relations have deteriorated sharply because of recrudescent terrorism in Italy's German-speaking Alto Adige Province (South Tirol).

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HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA MOVE AGAINST GUERRILLAS

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Dense jungle and difficult terrain in the border area will impede efforts by both governments to eliminate the guerrillas--apparently members of a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported organization.

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Terrorists are striving to demonstrate government impotence before national elections are held. The government is trying to contain terrorism without incurring charges of unduly repressive measures.	
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This session, opening 17 September, seems likely to involve less East-West conflict than previous sessions and to be used by African members to assert a larger role for themselves.	

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The Communist World

NEW CHINESE COMMUNIST BLAST AT MOSCOW

Peiping's latest attack on the Soviet leadership, in a massive article by the editors of People's Daily and Red Flag, charges that Soviet actions since 14 July have brought Sino-Soviet relations to the "brink of a split." Khrushchev is the main target of the Chinese philippic, which is apparently addressed primarily to Communists outside the USSR, but perhaps also to the rank and file of the Soviet party.

Conflicts of National Interest

The Chinese article presses the ideological battle with unabated fury, repeating and amplifying previous denunciations of the Russians for "revisionism" and the anti-Marxist sins associated with it. Peiping's latest assault, however, puts increased emphasis on Moscow's misbehavior in state-to-state relations. It reveals details concerning hitherto closely guarded secret quarrels and thus shows up more clearly the conflicts in national interest which have been partially masked by open wrangling over doctrine.

Peiping's slashing public attack follows the line reportedly taken by Chou En-lai last spring

[redacted] that the dispute between China and the Soviet Union originated from a permanent and deep-rooted conflict of national interest and was not just a matter of ideological differences.

The Chinese now make the unprecedented accusation that

Moscow has "allied itself" with the US, India, and Yugoslavia "in flagrant violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance." The statement asserts that Moscow has been appeasing the US at China's expense. The evidence cited, however, suggests that the real grievance behind this charge is Russian refusal to run the risks entailed by Peiping's militant policy, and Russian insistence on firm control over the Chinese Communist military machine as a condition of Soviet support.

Test Ban Treaty

One of the sorest points is Moscow's acceptance of the test ban treaty. Leading up to this "betrayal," according to Peiping, were Soviet cancellation in June 1959 of an agreement to help China produce nuclear weapons--as a "present" to President Eisenhower--and a Russian decision to sign a treaty with the US for the prevention of nuclear proliferation which the Chinese say was formally announced to them in August 1962.

Support for India against China, first in September 1959 and later during the Sino-Indian war in the fall of 1962, is cited as another example of Soviet treachery. The Chinese note bitterly that two thirds of Moscow's economic assistance to New Delhi has been given since the fighting last year. At another point the article carefully explains that the slump in Sino-Soviet trade is a result of unilateral Russian cancellation of aid agreements

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The Communist World

and wholesale withdrawal of technicians after July 1960.

Taiwan, although it receives scant attention, is clearly another festering foreign policy issue between Peiping and Moscow. Chinese disgust with Moscow's reluctance to support Peiping's ambitions against Chiang Kai-shek's government is expressed by the charge that Khrushchev attempted to sell the "US two-Chinas plot" at the National Day celebrations in Peiping in 1959.

Internal Interference

An important part of the Chinese case against the USSR rests on charges that Moscow interfered in Chinese internal affairs. Khrushchev is accused of expressing "undisguised support for antiparty elements" in the Chinese Communist Party during conversations with the Chinese delegation to the Soviet 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. This, say the Chinese, is in line with Russian attempts to subvert the leadership of any party which opposes the USSR. Peiping also charges the Soviet Union with subversive activities at a lower level, asserting that in April and May 1962 "tens of thousands" of dissidents were enticed across the Sinkiang border into the USSR. Since then the Chinese have displayed increasing sensitivity regarding the long Sino-Soviet frontier (see next article).

In its catalogue of Russian sins, Peiping includes for the first time publicly the charge that in 1958 the USSR made "unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control." These demands


are not specified but the fact that the accusation is linked with Moscow's refusal to help the Chinese produce nuclear weapons suggests that insistence on Russian control over atomic installations in China may have been involved.

The increasing tempo and violence of the Chinese polemical attack on the Soviet Union appears to be part of an attempt to counter stepped-up Russian pressure without taking the initiative in a final break. Although the Chinese promise a series of articles with more details about the "sabotage" of Sino-Soviet relations by the Russian leaders, they still seek to maintain an outer shell of bloc unity, perhaps as a platform from which to continue the fight. They continue to profess their "deep affection" for the Russian people and the rank and file of the Soviet party.

Continued Soviet Restraint

Thus far the Russians are seeking to maintain a stance of lofty contempt regarding China's "shameless slanders" and "market-square swearing" and have not deigned to make a direct reply. However, Moscow's insulting note of 9 September protesting an alleged Chinese attempt to smuggle "banned publications" into the USSR on a Peiping-to-Moscow train reaches a new height of provocation. Moreover, Russian press treatment of an earthy incident stressing "uncultured and vulgar hooliganism" displayed by Chinese members of a train crew and student passengers puts the exchange of abuse with Peiping on a "people-to-people" basis for the first time.

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The Communist World

SINO-SOVIET BORDER PROBLEMS

With Sino-Soviet relations steadily worsening, both Communist China and the USSR have become increasingly sensitive about security along their 4,150-mile border.

Tensions probably will rise further as a result of the charge made by Peiping on 6 September that the USSR had created border troubles in 1960 and 1962 and that the situation remains "unsettled." No details of the 1960 incident were offered, but Peiping noted that in 1962 the USSR had enticed tens of thousands of "Chinese citizens" from the Ili area of Sinkiang across the border and given them asylum.

Chinese complaints that the USSR has refused to return the refugees, all of whom are Uighur and Kazakh herdsmen, suggest that Peiping believes at least some of them are being trained for future subversive missions in Sinkiang. Such fears would be justifiable in view of the long history of Soviet intervention and subversion in western Sinkiang.

Reports that the Chinese have been reinforcing regular

troop strength in Soviet border areas cannot be confirmed, but a drive to recruit students and unemployed youth for nonmilitary work in frontier areas, especially Sinkiang, was stepped up in August.

Peiping is apparently just as sensitive about border security in Manchuria as it is in Sinkiang.

Moscow Radio on 5 August twitted the Chinese about their increasingly unfriendly behavior on the northern Manchurian border. A dispatcher at the port of Blagoveshchensk was quoted as saying that "things have gone so far that Chinese ships sailing on the Amur do not even reply to the greetings of our ships when they pass. This seems to be the limit."

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The Soviet Union must annually conscript 800,000 to 850,000 men to maintain its present force of about 3.3 million in military service, or 600,000 to 650,000 for a force of 2.4 million, Khrushchev's 1960 demobilization goal. The normal functioning of the system allows only a remote possibility that all males available for service would actually be conscripted in peacetime. The following tabulation estimates the number of 19-year-olds available for military service between the years 1960 and 1965.

<u>Year of Birth</u>	<u>Year Reaching Age 19</u>	<u>Estimated Number (in thousands)</u>	
		<u>Reaching 19</u>	<u>Available for Service</u>
1941	1960	1,900	1,700
1942	1961	1,200	1,075
1943	1962	775	700
1944	1963	850	750
1945	1964	1,425	1,300
1946	1965	1,750	1,600

} Most of these
now serving
their three-
year tours of
service.

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The Communist World

USSR MAY INTEND TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES

The USSR may have started to cut back its military forces in line with Khrushchev's avowed intention to reduce military spending in favor of the civilian economy.

Earlier this year, when for the first time the draft registration included 18- as well as 19-year-olds, it was expected that both age groups would be called into service this fall. However, the annual draft call issued on 4 September covered as usual only the 19-year-olds (the class of 1944) and the normal release of three-year conscripts is to take place.

The 1944 class is one of the smallest of recent years because of the very low birth rates toward the end of World War II. Almost all its approximately 850,000 members would have to be drafted to maintain the present force level of 3.25-3.5 million. Past experience indicates that about 10 percent of any class is unfit or exempt for family reasons for military service. Also to draft all of the remainder in peacetime would be very unusual. The implication of this is that there is to be a resumption of the demobilization announced in 1960. Demobilization measures, designed to reduce the force level from 3.6 to 2.4 million, were suspended in 1961.

There is considerable justification for believing that

Khrushchev wants to resume such a course. He has privately told Western officials that he intends to curb military spending in 1964-65 to bring about a more rapid development of the chemical industry and to bolster lagging agriculture. The Soviet civilian labor market could readily utilize many additional workers at this time. In addition, a troop reduction would probably accord with Khrushchev's views on the need to modernize and streamline the armed forces. If a reduction is to occur, Khrushchev may hold off on the public announcement until November or December when he can give it a joint propaganda build-up with the 1964-65 economic plans to be announced at that time.

The evidence for demobilization implied in this year's draft call, however, is inconclusive. There is a possibility that combing the earlier classes for persons heretofore passed over could yield more than enough draftees to maintain present strength. Also, the general review of draft procedures which resulted in the concurrent registration of two classes this year has caused other changes which could affect the number of call-ups without its being readily apparent--the induction of some 18-year-olds without formal announcement, for instance.

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The Communist World

TITO'S TRIP TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Yugoslav press is describing Tito's good-will tour of Latin America--now set to begin on 18 September--as an important initiative aimed at increasing the activity and influence of the nonaligned states in international affairs. The trip has been an on-again, off-again proposition for almost three years, the primary problem being Tito's delicate relations with Castro--whom he will not now visit.

A shadow has been cast over the tour, even before it has started, by the adverse reaction of conservative political circles in Brazil. The refusal of two governors to receive Tito has apparently led to the removal of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro from his itinerary and a reduction of his stay in Brazil from eight to four days.

This blow to Yugoslav sensitivities will probably be offset by the announcement that President Kennedy has invited Tito to visit Washington after his tour of Latin America.

Preliminary negotiations have been concluded on a number of agreements for Tito to sign during his visits. In Brazil, he may formalize arrangements on economic cooperation, copyrights, consular matters, and extradition rights.

A credit and technical assistance agreement may be announced during Tito's stay in Bolivia.

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
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Asia-Africa

UNREST CONTINUES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Student demonstrations in South Vietnamese cities continue to plague the Diem regime, while the army has effectively countered increased Viet Cong military attacks in the delta area.



Following the progovernment demonstrations last week by civil servants and regime-sponsored organizations, the regime indicated that it would relax martial law. The apparently well-organized tactics of Saigon high school students, however, in disregarding emergency restrictions and their badgering of military authorities will probably serve to prolong present security conditions.


The regime's charge that Communist agents are responsible for student disturbances has not been substantiated.

Heavy Viet Cong attacks south of Saigon in recent days

--particularly in the Ca Mau Peninsula--suggests a possible attempt to exploit the uneasy political situation. Although Communist units have mounted three company and two battalion size operations in this area so far this week, government forces have responded effectively.


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In other parts of the country most aspects of the war effort still appear little changed. However, the fall season has usually been marked by some increase in Viet Cong activity.



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Asia-Africa

LAOTIAN SCENE CALM AS SOUVANNA GOES ABROAD

Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma's departure on 10 September for an extended trip to France and the US was preceded by a reshuffling of the leadership of his neutralist party. The changes include the removal of two of the most prominent proleftists from the party's provisional central committee. At the same time, in a move apparently prompted by General Khamouane's continued absence from Vientiane and his refusal to support the neutralist military effort on the Plaine des Jarres, Souvanna dropped the Phong Saly strong man from his positions on two key tripartite committees.

By the time Souvanna left, Vientiane had returned to a semblance of normalcy following a 9 September shooting fracas between members of General Phoumi Nosavan's right-wing forces and the small Pathet Lao guard force stationed there. A compromise agreement negotiated by the three factions after the incident called for the preservation of the status quo, with General Phoumi guaranteeing the security of two Pathet Lao cabinet members and the guard force numbering approximately 100 men.

Prior to the compromise talks, there had been indications that the rightists might seize upon the shooting incident to strengthen their grip on the capital. A right-wing general had stated that the Pathet Lao unit had been "requested" to leave Vientiane.

Low-level skirmishing and artillery exchanges continue near Nhommarath and in the Plaine des Jarres area. Meo units have maintained their pressure on Route 7 near Ban Ban, where road cuts have prevented any significant overland resupply of enemy forces on the Plaine des Jarres since early last month.

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Asia-Africa

MALAYSIA STILL TROUBLED ON EVE OF INAUGURATION

Internal and external problems continue to plague the Malaysia federation on the eve of its scheduled 16 September birth.

Top political leaders of Sarawak, Sabah (formerly North Borneo), and Singapore have concluded that Malayan Prime Minister Rahman has shown increased ineptitude since the heads-of-government meeting in Manila in July and will not play a decisive role in the independent Malaysia. In turn, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee's standing as a future national leader has risen greatly with the chief minister-designates of Sabah and Sarawak. Lee's "partnership" principle for allowing the components of Malaysia a large measure of autonomy has been warmly endorsed by the Borneo political leaders.

While the bitter war of words between Singapore and Malaya has quieted down, the underlying suspicions and policy differences remain. A dispute between Malaya and Sarawak over the nomination of Sarawak's first local governor caused UK Colonial Secretary Sandys to summon Sarawak leaders to Kuala Lumpur for a last-minute effort to secure agreement.

The UN team sent to Sarawak and Sabah to assess sentiment regarding the federation has concluded that a majority of the surveyed population favors Malaysia. U Thant has ordered the report to be issued by 14 September.

Regardless of the team's findings, Indonesia apparently will use the report as the basis for a renewed overt challenge of Malaysia. Foreign Minister Subandrio told Ambassador Jones on 10 September that although his government would probably not question the report regarding Sabah, if it were inconclusive as to the validity of pro-Malaysia sentiment in Sarawak, Indonesia would demand that the establishment of Malaysia again be deferred. Should the report claim that Sarawak clearly favors Malaysia, according to Subandrio, Indonesia would label the UN survey a "farce," and oppose the report on the basis of its own observers' accounts.

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Asia-Africa

SOUTH KOREAN REGIME TIGHTENS CONTROL

Hard-core followers of former South Korean security chief Kim Chong-pil have tightened their control of the government political apparatus. Fearful that junta leader Pak Chong-hui lacks the public support to win the 15 October presidential election fairly, Kim's group favors harsh measures to assure his victory. They are placing pressure on Pak to suppress all critics inside and outside the regime.

Within the junta, efforts to rally moderate elements into a practical alternative to Kim's group seem to have failed. Another former security chief, Kim Chae-chun, sparked these efforts and teamed up with former prime minister Song Yo-chan, an outspoken critic of Pak. Song, who had been arrested last month, was nominated for the presidency, apparently in the hope that this would help persuade Pak to break with Kim Chong-pil rather than risk exposure of past scandals during a hotly contested election campaign. Presumably the moderates intended that if Pak made the break, Song would withdraw from the race and they would throw their support to Pak.

Forewarned, the regime reacted sharply, and rearrested

Song. It also forced Kim Chae-chun into exile, and thereby virtually destroyed his political organization. Song is in the hapless position of a jailed candidate without a party.

Meanwhile, leading civilian opposition groups still have not succeeded in uniting behind a single presidential candidate. Three successive sessions of a joint convention of the parties ended in wild disorder, mainly because of the failure of the leading politicians to bury their factional differences and personal rivalries. Jolted by mounting public criticism of the spectacle, the convention on 8 September appointed a 10-man committee to select a candidate.

Public discontent with opposition bickering will make it easier for Pak to win, not because the public wants him but because it sees no attractive alternative to him. At the same time, the Kim Chong-pil group's desire to resort to harsh repressive measures could set off a chain reaction of public defiance and possibly violence in connection with the election.

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Asia-Africa

ARRESTS THREATEN TO UNDERMINE IVORY COAST STABILITY

A series of arrests and increased security measures in the past two weeks in Ivory Coast may usher in a period of political instability.

Following his return on 28 August from four and a half months' absence abroad, President Houphouet-Boigny arrested a variety of political figures. Among the 30 high-level government officials detained are the ministers of defense and agriculture and four other cabinet ministers, the vice president of the National Assembly, and a commandant of the gendarmerie. Most were suspected of complicity in an alleged plot against Houphouet during his absence in July. It appears that he is arresting all people against whom derogatory reports have been received, with the intention of sorting out the innocent later. In a cabinet reshuffle following the arrests, the President took control of four important ministries himself.

Although considerable malaise had developed in the country during Houphouet's absence, the extremity of the measures taken seems out of proportion to whatever threat had actually developed to his position. He has been the leading political figure in the country--relatively prosperous for West Africa--since long before its independence in 1960, and a major voice among all of France's former African colonies. While some of the detainees have opposed Houphouet in the past,

others have a long unbroken record of loyalty to his middle-of-the-road Democratic Party. Some had a record of leftist student activities, and others are moderates who failed to follow him during his 1946-50 alignment with the Communists.

Both foreign and domestic events this year apparently gave Houphouet a mounting sense of insecurity. In January the assassination of President Olympio in nearby Togo was followed by an abortive coup plot in Ivory Coast. Whatever the true nature of the July "plot," unrest was clearly growing among students and middle and lower level government workers in Abidjan. Houphouet's concern was heightened by the recent ouster of Congo President Youlou and by warnings from Paris that it was not prepared to go further to sustain a president against widespread dissatisfaction in Abidjan than it had done in Brazzaville.

Houphouet claimed that certain foreign elements were involved in the plot. Although he did not name any countries, he probably had in mind regional rivals Ghana and Mali. The President now has reportedly disarmed elements of the army and the gendarmerie and entrusted his own security to a personally picked presidential guard. The US Embassy in Abidjan fears that Houphouet's concern for his safety may in the future cause him to rely more on repressive security measures than on political controls as in the past.

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Asia-Africa

AREA NOTES


Syria: Dissension over policy issues is increasing among the leaders of the Syrian regime. Several basic problems are confronting the top Baathists and the National Council of the Revolutionary Command--the ruling junta composed of both civilian and military Baathists and certain other military leaders. Points of friction are how to conciliate a dissident Baathist faction, Syria's position vis-a-vis Nasir, the role of the Baathists paramilitary national guard, and economic policies.

Syrian strong man General Hafiz remains committed against rapprochement with Nasir, as are many Baathists. At the same time, he is resisting urgings by the more doctrinaire Baathists led by Prime Minister Bitar for more socialistic policies. The final arbiter of Syrian politics remains the army, and its general loyalty still appears to be with Hafiz.

India: The leadership of the Congress Party's newly beefed-up organizational wing is showing considerable initial energy. It has moved quickly to maintain the momentum in party affairs created by Nehru's recent shifts of influential politicians from ministerial posts to full-time party work.

Scarcely a day has passed since 1 September that the party's top body for organizational matters, the Central Congress Parliamentary Board, has not created news with its bustling activity. Nehru's presence at the board's first meeting under its new mandate and with its expanded membership has served to emphasize the importance of its new role. Its activities during the past two weeks have included intervention in state party elections, review of a variety of membership and candidate selections made by lesser party bodies, and the establishment of several high-powered subgroups charged with such matters as rewriting the party's constitution and probing corruption charges.

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Europe

SPANISH COLONIAL POLICY IN TRANSITION

The immediate motive behind Madrid's recent decision to grant administrative autonomy to its equatorial African territories of Rio Muni and Fernando Poo is to head off attacks on Spanish colonialism in the forthcoming UN General Assembly. Over the longer run, however, Spain may hope that this action will improve its international image and induce Morocco to abandon claims to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla at such time as it achieves a favorable settlement of its claims to Ifni and Spanish Sahara.

On 9 August the cabinet authorized the drafting of legislation to give Rio Muni and Fernando Poo a degree of self-government, largely at the insistence of Foreign Minister Castiella. Castiella asserted that Spain must make some dramatic gesture regarding these territories or else find itself isolated and on the defensive in the UN. The foreign minister also made the point that the two territories are an expense and contribute nothing to Spain. Another factor influencing the Spanish action may be the prospect of mounting pressure from nationalists from the two territories who are presumably based in neighboring Cameroon. At a 20-25 August meeting these nationalists agreed to form a common front with the objective of "unconditional independence in the very near future."


As presently outlined, Madrid's plan will provide for greater home rule at the local administration level and, eventually, the appointment of indigenous governors. It is expected that legislation to this effect will be approved by Parliament toward the end of this year and become effective 1 January 1964.

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On 4 September a member of the Spanish UN delegation, with an eye to reducing African attacks on Spain's overseas policy, told the US delegation that his country is not opposed to having the Committee of 24 on colonialism consider the two territories. He hinted, however, that Spain might counter by demanding that the committee also take up Gibraltar's colonial status.

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Europe

ROME AND VIENNA AGAIN AT ODDS OVER SOUTH TIROL

Italian-Austrian relations have deteriorated sharply because of recrudescant terrorism in Italy's German-speaking Alto Adige Province--the so-called South Tirol. The foreign ministers of the two countries were to have discussed the problem this month in Salzburg, but the meeting was canceled, at Italy's request, because of the rising tensions.

Until the acquittal two weeks ago of ten Italian policemen charged in 1961 with brutal treatment of Tirolean prisoners, Austria adopted a generally unruffled attitude toward the area. Both Chancellor Gorbach and Foreign Minister Kreisky condemned outbreaks of violence as inimical to the success of negotiations with Italy. Now, however, the Austrian press, as well as Kreisky, have become sharply critical of Italian justice, and Austrian politicians are increasingly inclined to express sympathy for extremist Austrian and South Tirol opinion. Rome sent a strongly worded protest to Vienna this week regarding Austrian criticism of Italian justice.

Before the police acquittal, Rome had suggested an "interim and informal" meeting between the foreign ministers in New York in connection with the opening of the UN General Assembly. There is some possibility this meeting may still take place


Italy feels Vienna is not doing enough to prevent terrorist use of Austrian territory for sanctuary and supply.

There has been speculation that the Italian Foreign Ministry is considering economic pressures against Austria.

Late this month Rome plans to release a long-awaited two-year study of the Tirolean problem, which may provide a basis for giving the province a larger measure of autonomy. Its proposals would require Italian parliamentary action, however, and this is unlikely to occur while Italy has only a caretaker government.

An estimated 1,500 young neo-Fascists held an anti-Austrian rally in the provincial capital of Bolzano on 8 September, and several hundred of them clashed with the police.

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Western Hemisphere

HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA MOVE AGAINST GUERRILLAS

The Honduran armed forces have begun to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. Probably less than 100 of the guerrillas are operating in Nicaragua, about 300 in Honduras.

In late July, Nicaraguan units made contact with the insurgents along the Coco River near the river towns of Raiti and Bocay. On 29 August, a Nicaraguan patrol was ambushed

by guerrillas near San Ramon, also on the Coco.

The Honduran armed forces plan to airlift about 300 troops to the Patuca River in an attempt to destroy a number of guerrilla camps that are said to be located along its banks. As of 6 September, 200 field-equipped troops had been deployed. These troops

plan to establish blockades at the junctures of the Cuyamel and Patuca and of the Guayape and Guayambre rivers and then make a sweep through the intervening area. Thus far no contact has been made with the guerrillas.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF TERRORISM

IN VENEZUELA, 1963

- January: Theft of five French paintings valued at \$660,000--later returned.
- February: Arson at American Chamber of Commerce in Caracas and Sears, Roebuck warehouse. Damage: \$2.5 million.
- Hijacking of freighter Anzoategui.
- March: Sabotage of two major petroleum pipelines with combined capacity exceeding a million barrels a day. Damage: at least \$100,000.
- April: Arson at Radio Tropical transmitter, Acams Chiclet plant, and Dougherty Cordage mill. Damage: \$410,000.
- May: Arson at warehouse of Armed Forces Social Welfare Institute and Union Grafica Company (jointly owned US-Venezuelan enterprise). Damage: \$540,000.
- Raid on courtroom where leader of group that stole French paintings was being tried. Raiders and prisoner escaped.
- June: Several cases of arson. Total damage: more than \$500,000.
- Unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Betancourt.
- Attack on US Military Mission and on home of US attaché.
- July: Arson and pipeline bombings. Damage: more than \$500,000.
- August: Several cases of arson, bombings, assaults on security personnel.
- Kidnaping of Spanish soccer star.
- September: Three daylight raids on units of security forces--air force headquarters in Caracas, police headquarters in Maracaibo, home of captain of Betancourt's personal bodyguard. Several casualties.
- Numerous instances of arson, bombings, and sabotage, directed mainly at US-owned enterprises.

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Western Hemisphere

CONTINUING DILEMMA OF VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT

Venezuelan terrorists belonging to the Castroite Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) in Caracas and Maracaibo, determined to undermine the government of President Romulo Betancourt, have intensified their activities since 1 September. Their avowed purpose is to demonstrate the impotence of the government before the national elections, which probably will be held on 1 December.

Terrorist strategy has a threefold objective. By weakening public confidence in democratic processes, the leftists hope to reduce popular participation in the election. Secondly, they hope to provoke the government into strong repressive measures, thereby giving substance to their claim that it is dictatorial.

Responsible military leaders recognize the need for continuing to uphold the constitution and to serve loyally under a civilian government. As a consequence, most officers will support the winner of the election, at least as long as the government remains free of Communist influence.

Betancourt's domestic policy is to walk a narrow line. He must attempt to contain the terrorist activities of the FALN without exposing his government to the charge of using unduly repressive measures. He must be sufficiently forceful in his dealings with the FALN to retain the confidence of the people and the loyalty of the military. Above all, as he sees it, he must conduct a free election late in 1963 and turn the government over to elected civilians in March 1964.

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International Organizations

THE 18TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

The 18th UN General Assembly, which opens on 17 September, seems likely to be marked by less East-West conflict than previous sessions. The spotlight this time will probably center on efforts by African members to assert a larger role for themselves.

Only a few heads of state or government plan as of now to participate this year, although slightly more than half the foreign ministers will attend. An earlier move for attendance by African chiefs of state has apparently been undercut by political worries at home.

Chief among issues the Africans are expected to press are Portuguese colonialism, apartheid in South Africa, the South-West Africa question, and perhaps Southern Rhodesia. Their moves might include walkouts, attempts to have South Africa and Portugal excluded from the work of the Assembly, and disruptive tactics they have used against these countries at other recent conferences.

The Africans, arguing that they now form the largest bloc in the UN, are also expected to renew pressure for expansion of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Such enlargement requires amendment of the Charter, an action the USSR has hitherto opposed.

Meanwhile, the Africans and their Asian allies have intensified their lobbying for the three non-permanent Security Council seats up for election this year. The present leading candidates are Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Malaya, and Czechoslovakia. There is a good

chance that once again the term of one of these seats will be divided as a compromise between an Asian-African representative and an East European.

While the USSR will miss no opportunity to exploit the colonialism issue, East-West polemics are likely to be less heated. Also, the nonaligned powers will probably use the limited nuclear test ban agreement to urge the great powers to work for a greater relaxation of tensions, notably through negotiations on a nonaggression pact or "partial" disarmament measures.

In view of the Sino-Soviet breach, the Sino-Indian dispute, and Peiping's attitude on the test ban agreement, the perennial Chinese representation issue will probably get less attention than usual. The USSR, in all likelihood, will inscribe the question on the agenda, but Soviet support for it will probably be even more perfunctory than in 1962.

The question of retaining UN forces in the Congo beyond the end of this year may arise early in the session. U Thant's report on this to the Security Council is expected on 16 September and will recommend withdrawal unless a minimum of 6,000 men can be retained. He has indicated that, in order to reopen the supply pipeline, which is already being shut down, it may be necessary to interrupt the Assembly's general debate to initiate the required committee action on funds and other arrangements.

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