


SECRET



Release 2006/05/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050002-0

OCI No. 0312/63  
Copy No. 70

# SPECIAL REPORT

BREAKUP OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

25X



SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/05/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050002-0

Approved For Release 2006/05/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050002-0

**SECRET**

27 December 1963

**BREAKUP OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND**

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Britain's most complicated experiment in African constitutional development, is to be dissolved on 31 December after ten stormy years. The federation is breaking up because the leaders of its African population have persisted in viewing it mainly as a device to perpetuate white influence. Its demise ends British hopes for an economically integrated, multiracial state in central Africa. In two of the constituent territories--Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland--African-dominated governments are on the verge of independence. In the third--Southern Rhodesia--the white-dominated government is also demanding independence, presenting Britain with its thorniest decolonization problem to date. The Zambezi River will mark the frontier between African white and black nationalisms, and moderates on both sides are likely to have increasing difficulty making their influence felt.

Background to Dissolution

The federation was established in 1953 amid strenuous African objections. It associated the British-run protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia, a white-controlled colony which had had substantial internal autonomy (including control of its own defense forces) since 1923.

For the British and Southern Rhodesia's whites, federation promised to end a whole range of difficulties. Southern Rhodesian whites hoped that the federation would be granted the independence which had long eluded the colony and that white domination would thereby be preserved.

the local whites and the British thought that the combination of Northern Rhodesian copper, Southern Rhodesian manufacturing and agriculture, and Nyasaland labor would produce a strong, unified economy. The British also hoped that if poverty-stricken Nyasaland were included in the federation, its dependence on the Exchequer would be reduced; indeed, they compelled the whites to take on Nyasaland before they would sanction federation at all.

Hopes regarding the economy have been amply justified over the last ten years, but economic progress did not eradicate the African feeling that the federation had been set up for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia's whites. The African campaign against it got into

Both

**SECRET**

# Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland



**SECRET**

27 December 1963

**BREAKUP OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND**

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Britain's most complicated experiment in African constitutional development, is to be dissolved on 31 December after ten stormy years. The federation is breaking up because the leaders of its African population have persisted in viewing it mainly as a device to perpetuate white influence. Its demise ends British hopes for an economically integrated, multiracial state in central Africa. In two of the constituent territories--Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland--African-dominated governments are on the verge of independence. In the third--Southern Rhodesia--the white-dominated government is also demanding independence, presenting Britain with its thorniest decolonization problem to date. The Zambezi River will mark the frontier between African white and black nationalisms, and moderates on both sides are likely to have increasing difficulty making their influence felt.

Background to Dissolution

The federation was established in 1953 amid strenuous African objections. It associated the British-run protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia, a white-controlled colony which has had substantial internal autonomy (including control of its own defense forces) since 1923.

For the British and Southern Rhodesia's whites, federation promised to end a whole range of difficulties. Southern Rhodesian whites hoped that the federation would be granted the independence which had long eluded the colony and that white domination would thereby be preserved.

the local whites and the British thought that the combination of Northern Rhodesian copper, Southern Rhodesian manufacturing and agriculture, and Nyasaland labor would produce a strong, unified economy. The British also hoped that if poverty-stricken Nyasaland were included in the federation, its dependence on the Exchequer would be reduced; indeed, they compelled the whites to take on Nyasaland before they would sanction federation at all.

Hopes regarding the economy have been amply justified over the last ten years, but economic progress did not eradicate the African feeling that the federation had been set up for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia's whites. The African campaign against it got into

Both

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

stride in 1958, when Kamuzu Banda, calling for the death of the "stupid federation," returned to Nyasaland after 40 years abroad. Over the past five years riots, demonstrations, detentions, proscriptions of parties, emergency proclamations, and complex constitutions have followed each other pell-mell in all three territories. The end result, acknowledged by Britain in an announcement last April, satisfied Banda's demand. The federation is indeed dead, but it leaves a troublesome legacy.

#### The Dissolution Process

The federation's structure is extremely complex, and dismantling it has been an enormously difficult process. Most of the federal functions have already been handed back to the territories, but there remains one area in which the lines have not yet been drawn: the involved question of interterritorial economic relations.

Protective tariffs have given the nascent industries of Southern Rhodesia--whose gross output in 1959 was more than \$500 million--a guaranteed market in the two northern territories for the past ten years. Now, however, both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are threatening to set up tariff barriers and encourage their own industries. Neither territory is likely to move very rapidly toward economic self-sufficiency; nevertheless, the Southern Rhodesians will no longer have these markets to themselves.

Dissolution will also render at least two of the territories--Northern Rhodesia is a possible exception--financially weaker than they were while the federation existed. The aggregate borrowing power of the three will probably be less than the federation's, and Southern Rhodesia in particular will be saddled with a large part of the federation's debt of about \$800 million. There is also a good chance that, despite the expense, each territory will want its own currency and bank of issue, although Britain still hopes to get around this somehow.

One other unresolved question involves the future of the 36,000 officials of the federal government. Whites, of course, predominate in the upper levels of the civil service, and most of them want to work for Southern Rhodesia. Since that territory cannot absorb all of them, many will be faced with the choice of working for Africans in the other two territories or being declared redundant. Plans for employing these people--and for paying lump-sum compensation to those who elect to leave the service--are still being worked out; at any rate, it seems likely that good administrative talent will become increasingly scarce in the north.

None of these difficulties and concerns has had a significant effect on political developments, however. Nyasaland is scheduled to become the independent state of Malawi on 6 July 1964, and Northern

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Rhodesia--to be called Zambia--seems likely to follow before the end of the year. Prime Minister Winston Field's government in Southern Rhodesia has reacted by demanding independence for that territory as well.

Nyasaland (Malawi)

Nyasaland has been an embarrassment to Britain ever since missionary pressure in the late 19th century induced London to establish the protectorate. It is about the size of Indiana and is inhabited by three to four million people, almost all of them Africans living by subsistence agriculture. Aside from small quantities of tea, cotton, and tobacco, most of which are grown on the few European plantations, the territory's only resource is an industrious and adaptable labor force, which it must export in order to survive. Nyasas (or Malawians) working on farms in Southern Rhodesia and in South African mines are an important source of cash for Nyasaland; but even so, the Banda government's budget is so far out of balance that more than half of it is underwritten by direct or indirect British subsidies.

Banda and his lieutenants have some understanding of this situation, and they are cautioning their followers not to expect the millennium with independence. Nevertheless, they tend to assume too easily that the economic problem will work itself out, and in particular that their present strongly

pro-US attitude will automatically produce large quantities of American aid.

Malawi has a flavor of its own, much of it derived from Banda's own peculiar blend of [redacted] provincialism. Kamuzu Banda (Hastings, his "European" first name, has long since fallen out of use) spent several years in Ghana, and his Malawi Congress Party is modeled on the Nkrumah pattern. There are the usual party trappings --youth league, women's groups, and a party police answerable to Banda--which blanket the country. Just as there is the philosophy of "Nkrumaism" in Ghana, so in Nyasaland there is "Kamuzuism"--defined as "ideals of African personality, African Unity, World Peace, Social and Economic reconstruction of Malawi and Africa in particular and the World in general." So far, however, the

25X6



BANDA

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

"ideology" of Banda's movement appears devoid of the strong current of Marxism notable in Nkrumah's. But, like the Ghanaian leader, Banda himself is deified by his followers.

All this, however, has developed in a tiny territory which lacks the means and seems to lack the desire to export its nationalism: a territory, moreover, which depends on white-ruled Southern Rhodesia for a labor market and on white-ruled Mozambique for an outlet to the sea. Aside from hypersensitivity to alleged affronts to their dignity, Malawians show few typical symptoms of African nationalism. Banda tends to ignore the rest of Africa, Ghana always excepted. He has not been particularly helpful to Mozambique African nationalists, and he has not responded at all to suggestions that Nyasaland might join an East African federation. He does have a vague notion that "his people" in Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, and Mozambique should be brought into a "Greater Malawi," but he has shown no inclination to press such a pretentious scheme.

After Banda goes (he is 57 and not too well), Malawi may become a more active pan-Africanist center; the two lieutenants who are competing for the succession are both more radical than he is. The pressure of economic necessity will inhibit their support of anti-white movements, however. At any rate, it seems likely that the country will drift steadily



away from the other components of the federation. This will not be regretted on either side; Banda has always aimed his choicest invective at the federation government at Salisbury, and Sir Roy Welensky, the earthy federal prime minister, [redacted]

25X6

#### Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)

Economically, Northern Rhodesia has the greatest potential of the three territories. Not only does it contain a quarter of the world's known copper reserves, but it is the only one of the three which is underpopulated. Its 3.5 million people (all but 78,000 of them Africans) live in an area half as big as Alaska, and the territory has reasonable prospects of approaching agricultural self-sufficiency. As long as copper prices remain stable it

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

will have no trouble balancing its budget, and at present the chances of a relatively high rate of private investment are fairly good.

As with most underdeveloped countries, however, these prospects could be easily shattered. The territory's future depends on three interrelated factors: moderate African leadership; a competent, generally apolitical white colony; and income from copper production.

The government is nominally a coalition of two African parties, but one of these is bankrupt, divided, and almost leaderless. Elections in January are expected to confirm a fact which the coalition and a complex constitution have obscured: the dominance of Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda, an ascetic whose two models are Gandhi and Tanganyika's Julius Nyerere, is one of a tiny coterie of able moderates at the head of UNIP. There is a powerful element in the party which tends toward violence and racism, however; and white uneasiness would increase sharply if these elements displaced Kaunda.

Even under the present leadership, more whites are leaving Northern Rhodesia than either of the other territories. Many key Europeans in the mining industry are South Africans,

and they appear to be leaving now rather than run the risk of being thrown out later. If enough of them leave, copper production will be jeopardized.

Moderation is the only road to stability in Northern Rhodesia; yet, on the frontier of the confrontation between white and black territories, moderation is difficult to achieve. Economics link Kaunda's domain tightly with Southern Rhodesia. His country's copper smelters need the colony's coal; it shares the huge Kariba hydroelectric complex with Southern Rhodesia; and at present most of its copper is shipped out by railroad through Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. His dream of a rail link with Tanganyika is still far from fruition.

At the same time, Lusaka, the Northern Rhodesia capital,



**SECRET**

*SECRET*

is bound to become a center for African intrigue against the remaining white strongholds in southern Africa. Radicals will become increasingly numerous and vociferous; they will include Northern Rhodesian Africans now beginning to come back from studies in the Soviet bloc. Kaunda will be hard put to keep himself and his country from being squeezed between white and black nationalism.

Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)

In both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the target of African nationalism was London or Salisbury, and the fact that the opposing center of power was outside the territory made the transition to black rule relatively easy. Self-governing Southern Rhodesia, with 225,000 whites among 3,770,000 Africans, is a completely different case; the struggle is primarily a local one, and there is no outside deus ex machina to bring the Africans to power. The African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia have been generally inept and have not yet developed a strategy to fit this situation.

Britain has not formally interfered in the colony's internal affairs since it granted self-government 40 years ago. Behind-the-scenes influence there certainly has been, but on a government-to-government level Southern Rhodesia's au-

tonomy is complete. The territory's technical status as a colony notwithstanding, London is not likely to intervene against the wishes of its white-controlled government.

Britain has special reasons for not interfering at present. Last December the white Southern Rhodesian electorate turned out the paternalist but relatively moderate government of Sir Edgar Whitehead and replaced it with a more racist-minded administration headed by Winston Field. Field himself is not very far to the right of Whitehead on racial matters, but the white population as a whole is steadily becoming more reactionary. Heavy-handed treatment by Britain would probably drive Field out of office and might result in a unilateral declaration of independence by right-wing whites. For this reason the British are handling the whole problem with kid gloves.

Unfortunately for London, Field and his associates, who are well meaning but not very astute, have not acted with equal finesse. When it became obvious earlier this year that the Federation was headed for dissolution and the two northern territories were on the verge of independence, Field demanded independence for Southern Rhodesia as well. Otherwise, he said, his government would simply declare its own independence. He apparently thought he could bully

*SECRET*

*SECRET*

London into agreement, but the British temporized and eventually persuaded him that to carry out his threat would be suicidal.

By that time, however, he was firmly committed to the independence theme. In September his party's congress, in a move which pointed up the power of the conservative trend among the whites, directed him to seek independence "without strings attached." This mandate made Field's dilemma worse, since Prime Minister Douglas-Home countered by strongly implying for the first time that independence will be granted only when there is majority rule, albeit with minority guarantees. This statement, designed in part to ease pressures in the UN and in the Commonwealth, offers a prospect which frightens and enrages most whites.

Field thus has botched the independence campaign; clearly the best he can hope for now is the indefinite continuation of the present situation. He is a reasonable man, but he is not strong enough to lead the whites out of their cul-de-sac. As long as outside pressures are not too severe, he probably can control the wilder members of his party--those who want independence come what may and who believe, with no discernible justification, that South Africa will provide shelter for an independent Southern Rhodesia. He is not likely, however, to be the source of any constructive moves.



FIELD

From some points of view, Field's government has had considerable success. It has kept the nationalist movement under control through stringent legislation (including a mandatory death penalty for making or using a Molotov cocktail) and persistent chivvying of African leaders. Until mid-November, when there was some sabotage near Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia had been calm to a degree unprecedented in recent years.

The nationalist movement itself, which was always weak, has continued to decline. In addition to the effects of the government's harassment, it is currently suffering from a deep internal split. Last July a group which included most of the nationalist "intellectuals" broke away in protest against the incompetent leadership of Joshua Nkomo. Nkomo, however,

*SECRET*

**SECRET**

energetically stumped the African areas and preserved his position with the colony's African masses. As a result, Nkomo's People's Caretaker Council enjoys wide popular support, while Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union is strong in educated Africans and appears to have wider support from outside among independent African states. Both groups claim to have plans for subversion--the recent sabotage near Bulawayo was probably the work of Nkomo followers --but they are wasting much of their energy in conflicts with each other. There is little chance that they will soon be brought together, and Field reaps the benefits in the meantime.

There seems little prospect of an early end to the impasse in Southern Rhodesia. Britain is concentrating for the moment



on the federation's dissolution, but even after that it will take time--if indeed it is possible at all--for the whites and the Africans to work their way out of the dead-end streets into which they have maneuvered themselves.

In the meantime the current recession, which has caused mounting unemployment among the Africans, seems likely to continue. The Africans will probably become a little more effective in their antigovernment activities, and in turn the government will become even more repressive. As long as the whites retain their will to resist, Britain will have great difficulty breaking this vicious circle, but unless it can be broken, there certainly will be more extensive violence and racial bitterness.

25X1

25X1

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2006/05/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050002-0

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2006/05/24 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004300050002-0

~~SECRET~~