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Asia-Africa

**CYPRUS CRISIS CONTINUES**

Intensive diplomatic maneuvering continues in an attempt to prevent the deadlock at the London conference from leading to new violence on Cyprus. The British hope that US willingness to participate in the proposed international force to police Cyprus will stimulate similar responses from other NATO countries. However, the conference participants disagree on the terms of reference for this force. The Turkish delegation has insisted that the 650-man Turkish military contingent on the island be increased. The Greek Cypriots have demanded that any international force be under UN command.

The island has been relatively quiet in the past week, but communication between the two communities has not increased. Turkish Cypriots have continued to leave mixed villages to congregate in purely Turkish villages or the Turkish sectors of major towns. New roadblocks have been set up on some major highways.

The Greek Cypriot leadership appears split between pro-Western nationalists and those who advocate closer reliance on the Soviet bloc. President Makarios apparently has not yet taken a decisive stand. The Greek Cypriot press, however, has almost unanimously condemned the West--particularly the US--for not issuing a public statement opposing Turkish military intervention on Cyprus. It has given the impression that Makarios and his acting foreign minis-

ter have sought active Soviet help to preserve Cyprus' independence. Official reports from Nicosia indicate that Makarios has been in contact with the Soviet ambassador and may have sought a statement opposing outside intervention in the dispute--such as that issued by TASS on 30 January. Turkish Cypriot Vice President Kuchuk and the government of Turkey have condemned Makarios for his "reliance" on the bloc.

Makarios has accused former terrorist leader George Grivas of being a divisive influence. Following a meeting of Greek Cypriots in Athens addressed by Grivas, the group issued a statement calling on the Greek Government to aid Cyprus in the present emergency, assuring the Turkish Cypriots that their rights would not be restricted, and proclaiming support for the principle of self-determination, i.e., union of the island with Greece.

Relations between Greece and Turkey have further deteriorated, and the feeling in both capitals seems to be one of accepting the inevitability of a military conflict. The Turks have further strengthened their forces concentrated in the area opposite Cyprus.

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Asia-Africa

**EAST AFRICAN INSTABILITY**

British troops have brought outward calm to Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda, but the unstable situation in Zanzibar may be leading to an outright Communist takeover.

No single individual or group in Zanzibar seems yet to exercise effective power, but the prevalent fear and uncertainty appears to be benefiting Foreign Minister "Babu's" pro-Communist element. His faction is limiting the influence of the African nationalists in the new Revolutionary Council. The power of "Field Marshal" Okello, whose sympathies remain unclear, appears undiminished. The cadre of 40-odd militants whom Babu had sent to Cuba for training has not been disarmed. The 300-man Tanganyikan police contingent on the island is reportedly confined to directing traffic.

The Communist world was quick to praise and recognize the new regime. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik is expected to visit the island this week end. The East Germans claim that Zanzibar has recognized their regime and has asked for an East German mission. Chinese Communist and Cuban embassies are expected to open shortly.

The neighboring East African regimes' requests for British help showed lack of confidence in their own ability to maintain order in the wake of the Zanzibar coup. Tanganyika's President Nyerere called in British troops when it became apparent he faced the threat of an outbreak of general lawlessness. A number of leftist labor leaders suspected of complicity in the army mutiny have been arrested.

The brief disturbances in Ugandan and Kenyan army camps were inspired by grievances similar to those in Tanganyika--low pay and the slowness of Africanization--but there does not seem to have been any coordinating element.


There is no firm evidence of outside involvement in any of the uprisings, but many East African leaders strongly suspect Chinese Communist complicity, especially in Zanzibar and Tanganyika. The three mainland countries have canceled Chou En-lai's scheduled visits and the Kenya Government apparently intends to restrict the activities of the Chinese Communist mission in Nairobi.

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Both Kenyatta and Uganda's Prime Minister Obote while dealing severely with the mutineers, are raising the pay of the police and army enlisted men and are likely to shift British officers from command positions to advisory status. To rebuild the Tanganyikan Army, Nyerere has called on his party's troublesome youth league to register for military service. Neither the police nor the army is likely to be trustworthy again without considerable weeding out of personnel and complete retraining. The continuous need for British troops may therefore become an irritant which the extremists will exploit.

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Asia-Africa

**CONGO TERRORIST OUTBREAKS SPREADING**

The terrorist outbreak in the Congo's Kwilu Province poses a potentially serious threat to the weak Adoula government at Leopoldville. The two-week-old revolt appears to be spreading north, south, and east of Kikwit, the provincial capital. After an initially sluggish response, Leopoldville is sending in a battalion of paracommandos from Katanga to reinforce the 350 Congo National Army (ANC) troops already there. Congolese authorities also have some AT-6 Harvard aircraft, equipped with machine guns and rockets, operating in the area.

The rebellion is led by Pierre Mulele, an extreme leftist who represented the former Stanleyville dissident leader Gizenga in Cairo and then sojourned in Peiping before returning to the Congo last fall. Mulele's "army" consists mostly of youths--some 1,000-2,000 in gangs of 20 to 400--armed with spears, bows and arrows, and machete-like knives. They have killed possibly 100 local officials, in addition to four Europeans.

The ANC appears to be in control of the principal Kwilu towns. However, because of the extent of the revolt, the local population's support of the

rebels and dislike for the ANC, and the hit-and-run tactics involved, it is doubtful that the rebellion will be put down soon.

Mulele's objectives are not yet clear. It seems, however, that his eventual aim, after securing a base of operations, is probably to topple the Adoula government.

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Europe

**PRESSURES ON BRITAIN'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT**

Britain's military manpower problem is under review as a result of the growing strain on its limited resources imposed by events in Africa, Cyprus, and Malaysia. For Malaysia, London has drawn mainly on ground forces stationed in Singapore. The dispatch of troops to Cyprus and now to East Africa, however, has seriously depleted Britain's Strategic Reserve--a force located in the UK which recently numbered about 18,000 men and which is kept in a high state of readiness for rapid deployment to troubled areas. The transfer scheduled in February of an infantry brigade to Malaysia will further drain available manpower, and additional troops may be required in Uganda if troubles with local troops continue.

To line up further reinforcements, the War Office was forced in mid-January to cancel the replacement of one of the two battalions in British Guiana and to alert an infantry brigade group in Germany for possible deployment elsewhere. A week later, in connection with the East African situation, further units in the UK, Malta, and Germany were alerted. The government now is studying the possible political reactions to calling up a portion of the 4,500-man Territorial Army emergency reserves--the "Ever-readies." However, even these expedients are generally recognized to be insufficient if

multiple crises continue to develop.

London therefore realizes that it must either shift some of the burden of its overseas commitments to others--as it is clearly seeking to do in Cyprus --or take measures to strengthen its own forces. Among the proposals put forward are a step up in recruiting for the British Army in the other Commonwealth countries, creation of a pool of Commonwealth servicemen for "brush-fire" emergencies, training of air and naval personnel for police roles, and withdrawal of all or part of the forces in Germany. Elements in both the Conservative and Labor parties have even suggested some form of selective service, although such an unpopular move is unlikely in an election year.

The pressures on the military establishment may have removed defense as an issue in the coming campaign. Labor has in the past spoken out aggressively on broad defense issues, but in early January Harold Wilson advocated the elimination of defense questions from partisan debate. Subsequently, the Home government cautiously accepted a proposal from Wilson for confidential talks on defense. At the first session it plans to discuss British manpower commitments, conventional weapons, and nuclear questions, including the multi-lateral force.

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
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Western Hemisphere


**PANAMANIAN IMPASSE CONTINUES**

The Chiari government in Panama, convinced that any retreat from its original demands for a new canal treaty would lead quickly to its overthrow, has remained inflexible. A surface calm prevails, but scattered incidents continue and the atmosphere is volatile and charged with anti-Americanism. A minor occurrence could cause a renewal of widespread violence.



The church hierarchy and other responsible elements in Panama are exhorting against further violence, while extremists continue to fan anti-US sentiment. They are apparently determined to destroy the Tivoli Guest House, a building at the edge of the Canal Zone opposite Panama City which nationalists have made a symbol of the US presence and which has been a major target of sniper and firebomb attacks since fighting broke out. The latest effort to burn it down occurred on 27 January.

This attempt and an apparent effort the next day to derail trains of the Panama Railroad, lead Canal Zone authorities to believe a sabotage campaign may be under way.



Worried business leaders are urging Chiari to settle the crisis quickly. Aside from the continuing flight of capital, the already weak economy will also suffer from the fall-off in tourist receipts and from other direct and indirect financial losses. The National Economic Council, an advisory group composed of both official and commercial representatives, has recommended that Panama seek commercial ties with "all countries" as one possible way to mitigate the economic downturn.

Panama has stepped up efforts to win international backing. Even during the US-Panamanian talks in Washington under the auspices of the OAS peace commission, the Chiari government

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was urgently requesting Latin American support for an emergency session of the OAS Council to hear Panamanian charges of US "aggression." Failing success on the OAS level, Panama can next be expected to renew efforts to have the UN Security Council hear its complaints. As for a special General As-

sembly session on the canal issue, the Panamanians probably could not muster the requisite majority vote to convoke such a session, and Secretary General Thant has moved to discourage them from pursuing this course. [REDACTED]

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#### CASTRO REPORTS ON TRIP TO USSR

Fidel Castro, in his 24 January report to the Cuban people on his ten-day visit in the USSR, sought to create the impression that the purpose of the trip was almost exclusively economic. His speech made no mention of the support he gave to Soviet positions on important points at issue with the Chinese Communists, and there is still no evidence as to the price Khrushchev may have paid for this support. The long-term sugar agreement concluded during the visit, which is advantageous to both parties, does not appear to be a Soviet concession to Cuba or to have required Castro's presence in Moscow.

Castro dwelt on the benefits to Cuba of the sugar agreement--stable prices and an assured market through 1970 for a major portion of the country's chief export. He challenged the US to do as well for its suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products. Seeking to exploit long-standing Latin American grievances over terms of trade with the US, he declared that the failure of the US to provide its Latin American suppliers with the kind of guarantees he has secured

from the USSR costs them "ten times" the amount they receive through the Alliance for Progress. He denounced the Alliance as a "swindle" and asserted that the Latin American countries want nothing more from the US than to sell their products at fair and stable prices.

Castro also hinted that Cuba intends to play a role at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva this March. He declared that "all the world's underdeveloped countries" will request the adoption of trade policies similar to those developed between the USSR and Cuba.

In an attempt to reap a propaganda advantage from events in Panama, Castro offered to contribute to a Latin American fund to supply that country with as much economic support as it now receives from the US. He added that Cuba would be willing to give unilateral aid to Panama with no strings attached--"not even the re-establishment of diplomatic relations"--if the nations of the area did not want to cooperate. [REDACTED]

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
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
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**MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA**

Preparations for transfer of the Soviet air defense system in Cuba to Cuban control are continuing.



tegic coastal areas against maritime raids. Installation of these radars is continuing, and the Cubans may intend to protect the entire coastline, supplementing the existing visual observation posts and coastal patrols.



Three SO-1-class subchasers recently delivered to Cuba by the USSR are at the Cuban naval base at Mariel. These subchasers are smaller but more modern than the six Kronshtadt-class delivered in 1962.

A number of coastal radar observation posts have been established in Cuba, most of them since last summer. These posts, employing the Soviet Low Sieve radar, are intended to protect vulnerable and stra-

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**MILITARY SHAKEUP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

The Dominican Republic's civilian triumvirate has taken a major step toward asserting its authority over the military by replacing the chiefs of the three service branches. These changes in command, completed on 26 January, were made possible only by the strong backing of the regime from Major General Victor Elby Vinas Roman, secretary of state for the armed forces, and from other principal leaders of the army, navy, and police. Resistance to the move was led by Brigadier Generals Miguel Atila Luna, ousted air force chief of staff, and Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander of the Armed Forces Training Center.

Luna and Wessin, who spearheaded the coup which ousted President Juan Bosch last September, had threatened similar action against the triumvirate they subsequently installed. During a stormy meeting of Dominican military leaders with US military attachés on 24 January, they charged that the regime was "soft on Communism" --a smoke screen for their objections to changes in military personnel and privileges. However, Luna could get no support outside the air force for his maneuver, and Wessin has apparently acquiesced for the time being in the changes the triumvirate ordered.

The army now is headed by Brigadier General Salvador Montas Guerrero, the air force by Brigadier General Ismael Roman Carbuccia, and the navy by Commodore Federico Betances Pierret. Montas and Roman are not regarded as particularly competent, but enjoy good relations with other ranking officers in their services. They may join the more qualified Betances in efforts to curb the widespread corruption which has seriously undermined morale in the armed forces.

As its next move the regime is considering issuance of an amnesty law which would in effect allow veteran officers to retire without fear of subsequent prosecution in civil courts for their association with the Trujillo dictatorship which ended in 1961. Their retirement would reduce the sizable "deadwood" in the overstaffed officer corps.

Although the regime claims that "the predominance of the civil power" has been established, such an assertion is premature. The armed forces remain the arbiters of power in the country, and support from principal military leaders is vital to any major policy decisions affecting their interests--as clearly demonstrated by the recent military shakeup.

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LEFTIST POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN BRAZIL

Leaders of the major extreme leftist groups in Brazil, including the Communists, are re-examining their policies and attempting to mobilize their forces to extract maximum concessions from the government. Any success in unifying their tactics would obviously increase their leverage on President Goulart. Goulart appears prepared to bargain for the support he needs to enact his reform program, for which ex-Finance Minister Dantas is currently seeking united leftist backing. Another possible rallying point could be the launching of a leftist presidential candidate, an idea that has received some support recently.

In the past two weeks Goulart has talked at some length with his brother-in-law Leonel Brizola, a principal leader of the radical Popular Mobilization Front (FMP), and with pro-Communist Governor Miguel Arraes of Pernambuco State. Arraes has also conferred with Communist Party (PCB) chief Luis Prestes and other extreme leftist leaders. Following his most recent meeting with Goulart, Arraes issued a strong demand for expropriation of certain business firms and other nationalistic measures and called for greater public pressure on Congress.

Brizola

is a main link between the Brazilian left and Cuba. He appears to be having some

success in organizing his followers into small units--known as "groups of 11"--for revolutionary action, and there is evidence that he is taking steps to arm them.

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For their part, the Communists are faced with a number of difficult policy problems which Prestes is undoubtedly discussing on his current mission to Moscow. The PCB's line has been to cooperate with Goulart but at the same time oppose his authoritarian inclinations. The US Embassy believes, however, that the PCB may be forced to choose between alternative possibilities in reshaping its political program. It might adopt a more revolutionary line in hopes of unifying the left, now divided between the "gradualists"--PCB and Arraes--and the "extremists"--Brizola and the dissident pro-Chinese Communist Party (CPB), whose own chief is now conferring in Peiping. On the other hand, the PCB might drop its opposition to Goulart's drive for greater powers in hopes of eventually gaining control for itself should he succeed in establishing an authoritarian regime.

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OUTLOOK FOR POLITICAL STABILITY IN BOLIVIA

The renomination of President Victor Paz Estenssoro by Bolivia's all-powerful Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR)--which virtually assures his re-election this June--marks the culmination of a protracted rift in the government party. Vice President Juan Lechin, leader of its pro-Communist left wing and himself a presidential aspirant, was expelled from the party at the nominating convention, along with ten of his most militantly pro-Communist followers, for publishing a statement that they would neither recognize nor honor the convention's decisions.

The decisions taken at the Paz-controlled convention represent a clear-cut victory for the President and his more moderate wing. Lechin received no votes at all for the presidential nomination and only one of 289 cast for vice president. However, the acrimonious contest among several competitors for second place on the MNR ticket--which went to long-time Paz supporter Federico Fortun--sug-

gests considerable disunity within the majority faction.

Lechin's next moves could bring new unrest and instability to Bolivia. He and his followers might formally bolt the MNR and form their own party organization, or remain nominally within the party and hold a "rump" convention within the next month. In either case, Lechin would probably be nominated for the presidency and then join forces with other opposition groups--Communists and other leftists--in an attempt to defeat the Paz-Fortun ticket. Such an effort at the moment has little prospect for success.

Alternatively, the Lechin forces might attempt to overthrow Paz with the help of the military, or to assassinate him.

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The armed forces, however, appear loyal to Paz at present, and the chances of wholesale military defections to Lechin are slim. The rejection of Air Force Commander Barrientos as Paz' running mate does not seem to have affected armed forces support of the government.

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