


SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/05/01 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004600100002-1



23 October 1964

OCI No. 0354/64A
Copy No. 57

SPECIAL REPORT

SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.

SECRET

23 October 1964

SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS

The relationship between Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has been one of mutual exploitation. Sukarno has used the party to help him preserve his own power, and the party has used Sukarno to increase its strength. In the process, the once considerable gap in power and apparent policy objectives between them has greatly diminished. The party continues to acknowledge Sukarno as the nation's supreme leader, and, under its chairman, D. N. Aidit, is following a policy of infiltrating the national government and consolidating the party's mass following.

Sukarno, seeking to maintain his own pre-eminent position, to preserve national unity, and to advance Indonesia internationally at the expense of the West, finds it totally inexpedient to challenge the PKI. His tactics, combined with Communist single-mindedness, seem likely ultimately to bring Indonesia under Communist control.

Background

The Indonesian Communist Party has grown from a membership of 12,000 in 1951 to a claimed strength in 1964 of three million members. It is the largest Communist party outside the Communist countries and is the most powerful and efficient political organization in Indonesia. The PKI's rapid growth has been made possible by Sukarno's original toleration and later encouragement of its activity in return for its strong support of him and his authoritarian "guided democracy"; by its successful identification with Sukarno particularly in eastern and central Java; and by its own good organization, resourcefulness and hard work.

Through the years, Sukarno has remained the focal point of Indonesia; as he moves he takes the national political structure with him. Since independence was achieved in 1949, he has consistently shifted to the left. In the last two years, this movement has accelerated.

Sukarno's attitude toward the PKI springs not only from his own emotional bias toward Marxism but also from his need for a strong mass organization to ensure popular acceptance of his policies. He seems to have repeatedly encouraged non-Communist leftist-nationalist groups or individuals to organize pro-Sukarno mass movements, but these elements have lacked the drive, the talent, and often the resources to follow up the lead offered

1

SECRET

SECRET

them by the president. At the same time, Sukarno has largely suppressed political opposition to himself. Because this opposition was invariably anti-Communist as well as anti-Sukarno, its suppression and the failure of non-Communist groups to come forward has had the effect of leaving the field to the Communists.

The army is the only organization that retains a capability and an inclination to obstruct the Communists. During the past two years, however, Sukarno has brought the army much more closely under his executive control. Army leaders, moreover, are loyal and normally can be expected to follow his directives. Local commanders occasionally offer temporary obstruction to the PKI, but the national trend favors the Communists.

Party Strength

In addition to the party's own membership, the PKI's principal front groups and their claimed membership are the Peasant Front (BTI)--eight and a half million; the Central Labor Organization (SOBSI)--three and a half million; People's Youth (Pemuda Rakjat)--two million; Women's Front (GERWANI)--almost two million; and a cultural organization (LEKRA)--half a million. Even with overlapping

membership and exaggerated figures the party could probably muster from 10 to 12 million persons susceptible to Communist direction. In 1963, the PKI set up a four-year plan which established the party membership goal for 1967 at six million and mass membership at 20 million.

Last July the party enlarged its central committee from 35 to 50 members, apparently to cope with increased PKI membership and activity. The PKI is organized and growing in each of Indonesia's twenty-five provinces. Its greatest strength, however, in terms both of numbers and effective organization, lies in eastern and central Java--areas of Indonesia's densest population--and in northern Sumatra.

Party Difficulties

Qualifications for party and party front membership apparently are relatively low, and this partially accounts for the large membership of the PKI and its front organizations. In a speech to the party conference last July, chairman Aidit cautioned that "a military unit which has a big number of soldiers but is not disciplined enough will certainly not be able to defeat the enemy." He called for "iron-hard discipline" and loyalty within all party units.

SECRET

SECRET

He frankly described the party's internal disagreements as a "struggle without principle," which if allowed to drag on, would only hamper party work and might develop into a "more critical issue" involving principles. He said it was difficult to decide among the factions because the comrades involved were known to be loyal to the party and the revolution. Settlement must be through "compromise, consultation and agreement.... Each one has to give and take."

The disagreement apparently centers chiefly on the pace of party activity. Aidit seems to take a cautious approach, believing that the PKI must consolidate its membership and its political gains, strengthen its peasant base, and increase its influence within the government before taking large or rapid steps. He apparently is concerned that the party's large membership may lead some PKI officials to a false sense of strength and induce them to take premature action. Other members of the politburo and the central committee, led by second deputy party chairman Njoto, believe that the party should use its already considerable strength to press its own program, and that Aidit's caution is a waste of time. The argument of this group seems to be that although the party must continue to support Sukarno, it can extract significant concessions from him and need not fear retaliation. Even if retaliation should come, the argu-

ment runs, the party should still be more aggressive than it is.

The disagreement does not appear to have impaired party effectiveness, and both points of view are now represented among Communists who hold government posts. Aidit is the party's principal point of contact with Sukarno, but Njoto is probably more active within government circles. The militant faction which, logically, supports Peiping in the international Communist dispute, is reported to be larger than Aidit's group. A modus vivendi seems to have been reached, under which Aidit tolerates the openly pro-Peiping activities in the party in the international Communist movement while Njoto gives Aidit the lead in domestic affairs because of his relationship with Sukarno.

There seems little likelihood of a split in the PKI under present circumstances. The strength of the militant faction, however, and the growing influence of the party generally, make it likely that more militant tactics will emerge in the near future.

Present Party Strategy

Since 1951, the PKI has concentrated on peaceful infiltration and the formation of a united front. Its chief political demand is that it be given greater representation in the cabinet. This would facilitate what PKI officials refer to as "integration in the government."

SECRET

SECRET

The party's principal organizational target is the peasantry, and the BTI is the party's largest and most active front organization. At least 70 percent of Indonesia's population of 103 million is engaged in subsistence agriculture. Peasant support of the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch was a key factor in its success. With this example and that of the Chinese Communists before it, the PKI sees a sympathetic peasantry as a strategic requirement for the success of its own struggle, whether by peaceful or by forceful means. Moreover, the peasant is regarded emotionally, by both Communists and non-Communists, as the symbol of Indonesia. The PKI's identification with the peasantry could thus psychologically deter the army from using force against the party.

The PKI seems to recognize the possibility that--perhaps at Sukarno's death--it may have to resort to force either to defend itself or to make a bid for power. The party apparently does not feel that it is now ready for confrontation with the army, and it probably hopes to avoid it entirely through "government integration."

The PKI, although it no longer publicizes it, presumably also continues to try to infiltrate the armed forces. The party has considerable potential for disruptive activity

through its front organizations, but its paramilitary capabilities appear to be limited by lack of arms. As a means of acquiring military training and at least a minimum supply of arms, members of the peasant and youth fronts and of the large agricultural labor union have enlisted as village guards during periods of local security disturbances. They have also volunteered for military training during the struggle for western New Guinea, and now in the anti-Malaysia campaign.

The Communist labor federation, SOBSI, has long been the largest labor organization in Indonesia. It is less active today, however, than it was ten years ago, because the PKI has almost abandoned activity among wage earners to concentrate on gaining peasantry allegiance.

The PKI, to avoid conflict with Sukarno and the army, has made no significant effort, however, to exploit Indonesia's extensive economic problems, which include periodic food shortages. Instead, the party urges the people to increase production and to endure hardship in the interests of the anti-Malaysia campaign.

Party Accomplishments;
the Cabinet

Since the cabinet reshuffle in late August, three of Indonesia's 79 cabinet ministers

SECRET

SECRET

are Communist Party members, and three others are pro-Communist. Of the three party members, two --Aidit and first deputy party chairman Lukman--are ministers in name only and exert little influence through the cabinet relationship per se. However, the third Communist, Njoto, and one of the pro-Communists, Oei Tjoe Tat, are ministers attached to the Indonesian Government presidium.

The presidium consists of the three vice prime ministers, meets almost daily, and is chiefly responsible for administering the government. The relationship of Njoto and Oei to the presidium appears to give the Communists access to the full scope of government policy and an opportunity to exert influence on both formulation and implementation. The two men moreover, are said to be specifically assigned to Subandrio, who is first vice minister, minister of foreign affairs and foreign economic affairs, and-- in Sukarno's absence--acting president. Subandrio lacks any political following either in or out of the government. He has tried during the past 18 months to curry favor with the PKI, and the presidium arrangement makes him directly accessible to possible Communist manipulation.

Of the other two pro-Communists--Justice Minister Astrawinata appears more insidious than Labor Minister Sutomo. Although the minister of justice in Indonesia is not involved in

prosecution (this remains under the attorney general), he does control administration of the courts.

Astrawinata took office in November 1963. It soon became clear that he hoped to reorient Indonesia's Western-based legal system and to make law and the courts subservient to political policy. Basing his approach on Sukarno's dictum that the revolution is the true source of Indonesian law, Astrawinata says that judges must pronounce sentences according to the "demands of the people"; judges must know who are the friends and foes of the revolution before they can perform their tasks properly; and judges must be "cleansed" so that only those who do not deviate from the revolution occupy positions in the judiciary. At a refresher training conference for judges in mid-September Sukarno seemed to give his personal sanction to Astrawinata's approach.

Astrawinata has also pioneered in the creation of "land reform" courts. Initially these courts were advocated by the Peasant Front as a means of proceeding against landlords and government officials considered to be thwarting the land reform laws. Sukarno approved the courts in mid-August. Astrawinata earlier had announced that they would be staffed by "revolutionary peasants." In late September the minister of agrarian affairs announced that the land reform courts would open shortly with farmers as "member-judges."

SECRET

SECRET

The PKI almost certainly will seek to use the courts to advance its interest in the countryside through intimidation.

Labor Minister Sutomo's task may have been spelled out for him when Subandrio told the SOBSI conference in September that the government soon will "simplify" the pattern of Indonesian trade organization by dissolving the "spiritless" unions exploited by the imperialists. Sutomo has challenged one non-Communist labor federation for membership in the ICFTU, and that federation is considering withdrawal from the international organization. At a recent labor meeting in Java, Sutomo reportedly encouraged unions to seize foreign enterprises, cautioning, however, that the actions should not hurt production.

National Front
and Local Government

The National Front was introduced by Sukarno in 1960 in an effort to fuse all loyal political elements into a single state party. It has become, instead, largely a tool of the Communist Party.

The National Front is administered nationally by an executive council and is composed of subordinate councils at the provincial, subprovincial, and village levels. Eighty percent of the executive membership

is reported to be Communist controlled and most of the provincial councils are under similar influence. At the national level, the front serves in an advisory capacity and as an agit-prop (agitation-propaganda) organization.

At the provincial level, the National Front has been integrated into the government administration. Local administration, until recently, was based upon joint decisions of the Pantja Tunggal, a five-man body composed of the governor, the local army commander, the police chief, and representatives of the attorney general's office and of the National Front. Although a new system of provincial government was introduced in September, giving most army territorial commanders executive authority, the Communists are not likely to be contained to any significant degree. Njoto is one of several cabinet ministers appointed to coordinate central and local affairs under the new system.

The Communists are campaigning for the removal of non-Communist provincial and local officials and their replacement by PKI members or persons who would be susceptible to Communist direction. In areas of PKI strength, there have been several instances of conspicuous success.

SECRET

SECRETActivity Outside the
Government

Paralleling its support of the government since 1951, the PKI has engaged in probing tactics intended to advance its strategic position and to test government reaction. Instances of militancy have increased in number although not necessarily in intensity during the past year. In September 1963 a Communist-led mob gutted the British Embassy. In January 1964 groups apparently led by Communists seized the offices of British interests in Java and Sumatra; the government later took control of the premises. Sukarno probably would have seized British interests eventually anyway, but the Communists evidently forced the pace of these takeovers.

In May and June, the BTI conducted a series of unilateral land seizures in eastern and central Java. The seizures were justified on the grounds that the land reform and crop sharing laws were being violated by corrupt landlords. In mid-June, acting president Leimena (Sukarno and Subandrio were in Tokyo) denounced these "unilateral actions," ordered regional administrators to prevent further occurrences, and directed that complaints be referred to the local Pantja Tunggal for official settlement. In mid-August, however, President Sukarno stated in his independence day speech that the "unilateral action" of farmers was understandable in view of the slow

implementation of the land reform laws and announced that land reform courts would be established to punish those who were thwarting implementation of the law.

In mid-August a group, again apparently led by Communists, seized the USIS library in Jogjakarta, central Java. Although Subandrio promised the library would be returned in a week, no action has yet been taken. Postoffice employees, controlled by a Communist union, are refusing to disseminate a USIS publication.

Repeated demonstrations have occurred against both the UK and US consulates in Medan, northern Sumatra, and some violence has taken place. Communist-led unions have obstructed a land exchange agreement in northern Sumatra between the Goodyear Rubber Company and the government. Plantation personnel and installations of both Goodyear and US Rubber have been repeatedly harassed by demonstrations, threats, and minor incidents. A concentrated effort is under way to force Peace Corps personnel to leave northern Sumatra.

Since the institution of the new regional administrative system, the protection of US interests, both government and private, has improved slightly. The principal area of anti-American expression is currently in northern Sumatra.

SECRET

SECRETSukarno's 17 August Speech

Sukarno's independence day speech on 17 August confirmed his accelerated swing to the left during the previous 18 months and charted a course close to the immediate objectives of the Communist Party. He left no doubt that intensified anti-Americanism would continue and that his long-range intent was to get the US and Britain out of Southeast Asia.

On domestic policy, he emphasized that the "retooling of reactionaries would be carried on at all levels without letup. He reiterated his long-standing concept of NASAKOM--the fusion of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements in Indonesian society and government--and said that whoever opposes NASAKOM opposes the Indonesian revolution. Sukarno endorsed the Communist concept of two stages of revolution, noting that the present bourgeois democratic stage would be succeeded in due course by a socialist stage.

The PKI immediately identified itself with Sukarno's speech and prepared to exploit it in furthering its own program. Aidit issued a special statement on 18 August welcoming the speech as "fully in line" with the struggle of the Indonesian and Southeast Asian peoples "at present." He instructed PKI provin-

cial officials and party members to study the speech so that it may be used to "guide the Indonesian people in their activities."

Cabinet Reshuffle

Sukarno's 17 August speech promised a cabinet reshuffle, and the tenor of the address seemed to promise a major change favorable to the Communists. Such a change reportedly was in prospect but at the eleventh hour the three army territorial commanders in Java reportedly appealed directly to Sukarno to retain Defense Minister General Nasution, long a target of the PKI. Sukarno agreed, and apparently decided to keep several other moderates who had been slated for removal.

It was this reshuffle on 27 August that brought Njoto and Sutomo into the cabinet. General Nasution, although retained, has a considerably reduced role and is largely bypassed in terms of significant administrative and policymaking channels.

Rumors are circulating that the August reshuffle did not go far enough, and that Sukarno will make further changes when he returns home from his current tour.

SECRET

SECRETOutlook

Sukarno's major foreign policy goal is to rid Southeast Asia of Western influence. His domestic predilection is toward leftist totalitarianism.

He sees the Communist Party as the country's only efficient and dynamic organization which not only gives him its own support but can organize and deliver mass support as well. Sukarno can set out broad policy lines, but he needs a source of ideas to attack specific problems. Many Communist ideas apparently have become acceptable to him.

He has curbed army power --which once served to balance and contain Communist strength --presumably because he believed the army, if permitted to keep a significant political influence, would restrict his own role and his policies. Moreover, he foresaw that army obstruction of the Communists could lead to a polarization of forces in Indonesia which could disrupt national unity.

Looking abroad, Sukarno sees the Communist countries not only as natural partners in anti-Westernism but apparently as the ultimate predominant force in Southeast Asia. He has moved toward Peiping, as Moscow has followed a policy of relaxation toward the West.

Sukarno is 64 years old, but although suffering from a kidney complaint, remains remarkably active. If he lives a few more years, it is likely that he will eventually preside over a modified Communist regime.

The PKI still needs Sukarno to protect it while it consolidates its gains, and it probably hopes he will survive a few more years but no longer. Within that time, if present trends continue, PKI infiltration of national and local government and Communist organization of the peasantry will have become so effective that at Sukarno's death the party can make a bid for power with good chances of success. (SECRET)

* * *

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET