

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

OLC 72-0289

7 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Senator Symington re Radios  
and DDCI

1. Today the Director told me of a phone conversation he had this morning with Senator Symington, who called to say he thought Senator Fulbright and the Committee were being treated unfairly on the question of the Radios. He asked the Director whether the Agency had any connection with the Radios. The Director explained that the "umbilical cord" had been completely severed, and that we had had no Agency people in the Radios for several years. He expressed the personal view that it would be a pity to give up the Radios without getting something in return. Symington said he thought we ought to turn them over to the Europeans or

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2. The Director volunteered the remark that he was quite satisfied with the appointment of the new DDCI. He said he had had several talks with General Walters and was quite relieved to find that he was not a "stiff neck" military type but someone who was well qualified and had "been around" quite a bit.

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JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

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Distribution:

Original - Sen. Symington  
1 - O&M DDCI  
1 - Radios  
1 - Chrono

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foreclosure comes within a year, the company has an \$800 return on the \$9,200.)

The homeowner packs up her children and belongings and resumes her search for decent housing, disenchanted with the American dream of home ownership and minus her down payment, possible closing costs and a few dollars in equity.

And the public which finances the scheme through monthly mortgage insurance payments under some FHA programs is out another few thousand dollars.

Abuses in FHA programs are not new.

Ironically, publicity on irregularities in one program—Section 235—caused the federal government to suspend that program while the much larger Section 221(d)2 program continued unhampered on its abuse-filled way.

#### MAJOR FHA HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAMS

Here, briefly, are the major FHA home ownership programs:

Section 203—The largest of the programs, this is used to insure standard mortgages in stable neighborhoods. Application fees and mortgage insurance premiums paid by home buyers to the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund finance any foreclosures necessary under the program.

Section 221(d) (2)—This is the largest of the inner city home ownership programs. It provides for down payments as low as \$200 for persons displaced by governmental actions (urban renewal, highway building, etc.) and liberalizes credit requirements. Foreclosures are financed by the General Insurance Fund, funded through mortgage insurance premiums and fees from several FHA programs.

Section 223—A section used in combination with 221 or 203 which allows a house in a "reasonably viable" area to be insured for mortgage if one or more requirements of another section would preclude a mortgage under that section. Foreclosures are financed by the Special Risk Insurance Fund which is funded by premiums and fees from several FHA programs.

[From the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Mar. 6, 1972]

#### EIGHTY-FOUR VACANT HOMES; 84 VACANT LOTS; ABUSE OF PROGRAM DOOMS NEIGHBORHOOD

(By Robert H. Teuscher and Harry E. Wilson, Jr.)

Eighty-four vacant lots testify mutely here to the abuses in a federal program designed to rehabilitate neighborhoods and put poor families into their own homes.

The lots are the tail-end of what has become an all-too-common urban phenomenon—blockbusting, real estate speculation, foreclosed mortgages, and the federal wrecking ball.

They represent one-third of all the foreclosures in the federal Section 221(d) (2) mortgage insurance program.

The houses that once stood on these lots were certified for 25 to 30-year mortgages only three and four years ago by appraisers from the St. Louis area office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

According to HUD regulations, houses should not be approved for federally insured mortgages unless the HUD appraiser finds them sound enough to stand for at least three-fourths of the term of their mortgages.

Yet an average of only 18 months after appraisal and sale with the federally insured mortgages, these 84 houses were sold to HUD for their insured values in foreclosure proceedings.

HUD then decided that the houses were either structurally unsound or too expensive to repair and demolished them.

The Section 221(d) (2) program that once financed these houses allows low-income

families in the inner city to purchase homes by providing mortgage insurance similar to the FHA or GI home mortgages used by millions of American families.

The program differs from standard mortgage plans by permitting down-payments as low as \$200 and by requiring rehabilitation of the homes before sale.

The program's track record has not been good.

The foreclosure rate here now stands at 8.63%, the fourth highest in the nation, according to HUD Secretary George Romney. (The foreclosure rate for standard mortgages is less than one-half of one percent.)

Paying off the foreclosed 221(d) (2) mortgages in the City of St. Louis has cost the federal government more than \$2.7 million. Repairing foreclosed homes for resale has cost another \$600,000, and demolition of the 84 houses has cost \$80,000.

HUD has been able to recoup only \$1.15 million on the resale of repaired houses or vacant lots.

Real estate speculators and mortgage companies, however, have turned tidy, and sometimes immense, profits, records show.

In the meantime several stable neighborhoods have been ruined.

The Eads and St. Vincent avenue neighborhood, in the shadow of Firmin Desloge Hospital on the Near South Side, is an example of the blight that follows a combination of speculators and 221(d) (2) mortgage insurance.

As late as 1967, this was a blue-collar, middle-class area, made up of single and two-family brick homes that were nearing the end of their useful lives.

Norman Keathley, who lived at 2926 Eads since 1943, described the area as a "poor, but respectable neighborhood, with working class people."

But in early 1968, conditions, particularly crime, took a turn for the worse, according to former neighbors.

"They (vandals) tore the copper guttering right off my house in broad daylight," Francis Green, formerly of 2829 Eads said, "I figured it wasn't safe for the kids anymore."

Asked about the sale of houses in the area, Green said, "I figured blockbusting was what was going on. I hope they catch them (the speculators) at it so it won't happen here (at his new house in South St. Louis)."

At the same time that things turned bad on Eads and St. Vincent, a group of real estate companies moved in.

Between September, 1968, and June, 1970, 23 houses on Eads and St. Vincent were sold to real estate firms, who then resold the houses under the 221(d) (2) program.

The houses were bought by the realty firms for an average of \$5,000, with some going for as little as \$1,000.

When the real estate firms resold the houses several months later to 221(d) (2) families, the average going price was \$10,000.

Each of the houses had been appraised at an average of \$10,000, the sale price, by HUD appraisers, and the appraisers had also certified that the houses were good for 20-30 year mortgages.

Today every one of those houses is a vacant lot.

And there are 27 other vacant lots on Eads and St. Vincent, all of which were run through federal mortgage programs similar to the 221(d) (2) mortgage insurance.

HUD officials are not sure how the houses, which were old in the first place, ended up in such condition to require demolition.

The reason could have been mismanagement or abuse by the homeowner, or a faulty HUD appraisal, in the first place, according to George O. Hipps, director of HUD's Single Family and Land Development Division in Washington, D.C.

Who were the winners in this example of speculation and blight?

The original owners were forced to sell at rock bottom prices for fear of crime and speculation.

The 221(d) (2) families lost all of their equity in homes they could not afford, and most of them are now ineligible for any other federal housing programs.

The Record for Section 221(d) (2) in St. Louis Home mortgages insured (1967-June, 1971)	
Foreclosures (Jan. 1972)	265
Foreclosures (percentage)	8.63
Cost of mortgage payoffs	\$2,705,000
Repairs after foreclosure	\$662,474
Demolitions	\$80,610
HUD recoup from resales	\$1,155,700

#### RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Library of Congress has completed its reports on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The reports were delivered to the Committee on Foreign Relations on Friday, March 3, at 5 p.m.

In view of the controversy surrounding these reports and the allegations that I and members of the committee staff have tried to suppress this information or alter its presentation, I ask unanimous consent to have the reports, plus my correspondence with the Library, included in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The appendices to the reports, numbering several hundred additional pages, are in the committee's files and are available to the public, as are the draft versions of the reports.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this work is the result of a request which I sent to the Library on June 8, 1971. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Charles Gellner, Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, and Mr. James Price, analyst in National Defense, both of the Library of Congress, met with Mr. Robert Dockery of the committee staff for the purpose of discussing the request. Following this meeting, Mr. Dockery was informed by the Library that two studies would be prepared, one on each of the Radios, that Mr. Price would be responsible for the Radio Free Europe study and that Dr. Joseph Whelan, Specialist in Soviet and East European Affairs of the Library, would be responsible for the Radio Liberty study. At approximately the same time, Mr. Dockery was informed that, at Mr. Price's suggestion, an independent consultant, specialized in audience research analysis techniques, would be brought in to evaluate the Radios' audience-response claims.

At my request, the Library agreed to include in the final reports a résumé on each of the research participants.

The researchers completed their drafts during the first part of January and Mr. Gellner forwarded them to Mr. Dockery on January 14. In his transmittal memo, Mr. Gellner clearly identified the status of the reports by noting:

We will be happy to have your comments before we put the studies into final shape and formally transmit them. Our review of these drafts has not yet been completed and we too will wish to make some changes.

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Mr. Dockery reviewed the drafts and in preparation for the initial House-Senate Conference on S. 18, he prepared a background memorandum, dated January 21, for the Senate conferees in which he summed up the reports' findings in the following way:

Preliminary versions of the Library's studies are now completed and are complimentary to the Radios' efforts to breach the censorship imposed on the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The studies do make it clear, however, that the Eastern bloc countries and the U.S.S.R. are strongly opposed to these broadcast activities.

The same information was available to the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who were briefed by the Library's researchers prior to the House-Senate conference on January 26.

On February 2, Mr. Dockery met with Messrs. Gellner, Price, and Whelan to discuss the draft reports. His comments suggested that the draft reports were deficient in several key respects, such as neglecting the origins of and reasons for the Government's decision to establish and fund the Radios. Mr. Dockery also suggested that the researchers may have placed too much reliance on the public information handouts provided by the Radio organizations themselves—organizations which I might point out still refuse to acknowledge publicly any ties to the U.S. intelligence community.

The validity of these comments was, of course, a matter for the Library's staff to judge, and I wish to emphasize that at no time did I or anyone connected with the Committee on Foreign Relations attempt to direct the Library's research effort or to influence the findings and recommendations developed from it.

In this regard, I might point out that the final reports are substantially the same as the original drafts and, although the Library indicates that it is prepared to undertake two additional studies which will concentrate on the foreign policy aspects of the Radios and on alternative financing arrangements for them, I am inclined to think that this is little more than belated recognition of the foreign policy significance of these Radio operations.

I believe this significance is primary, as it must be with each and every program we conduct abroad. And in considering these reports and their generally favorable comments, I hope my colleagues and others will keep in mind the thoughts expressed only a couple of weeks ago following the President's dramatic trip to China. The culmination of the trip, the United States-China communique of February 27, states for example:

The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention.

In this same spirit, the communique goes on to read:

The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communications between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting per-

formance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good.

It is interesting to contrast these sentiments with the objectives of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The Radio Free Europe report states for example:

Radio Free Europe's policy in its political broadcasts is to press for reform within the prevailing Communist system in East Europe . . .

And the Radio Liberty study leaves no doubt as to the purpose of its broadcasts:

Assuming the stance of a "patriotic" Soviet communicator and acting on the democratic principle of a free press, Radio Liberty identifies with what it believes to be the best interests of the Soviet peoples and speaks in their behalf, hoping that in the long run this effort will contribute to those forces seeking to bring about a democratic transformation of Soviet society. For, Radio Liberty's ultimate goal is the peaceful democratization of the Soviet Union; and it holds to the belief that the best assurance for peace with Russia is through the diminution of Soviet totalitarianism and the growth of democracy.

Mr. President, if after 1 short week we can reach the kind of understanding with the People's Republic of China that would foreclose a "Radio Free China" aimed at reforming the Peking government, then I find it incomprehensible, after these years of direct contact with the Soviet Union, that we must continue to support a "Radio Liberty" whose objective is the "diminution of Soviet totalitarianism."

I regret that the Library's reports do not come to grips with this kind of issue. Nor do they see any contradiction between these radio operations and the administration's "low profile" policy. Nor is there any mention of the Nixon doctrine, the concept of "shared responsibility" and its possible application to Western European financial support for the radios.

Rather, what we are left with is two rather dreary commentaries on two very bureaucratic organizations whose common goal is to liberalize the governments of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by broadcasting "balanced news" to the peoples of these countries. The people, in turn, according to the theory, then pressure their respective governments for democratic reforms, and this, in turn, serves to create conditions for world peace.

Of course, the theory runs headlong into the brutal experiences of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and if there were any validity at all to the theory, I cannot believe that President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and Secretary of State Rogers would have agreed to discard it so gingerly in the case of China. But they did, as the joint communique of February 27 states. And they did it for good reason: Such a theory, I believe, is based on nothing more than an arrogant belief that people around the world will act like we want them to act if we only tell them how.

Mr. President, the proper perspective on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty was perhaps best stated in a letter which I received recently from a retired foreign service officer, who devoted more than

20 years of his professional career to Eastern European and Communist affairs. He asked that I not reveal his name, but I would like to quote from his letter for the benefit of my colleagues:

It seems clear to me, were there no RFE or Radio Liberty now in existence, that nobody would suggest that this would be the time to establish such a station. The pattern of our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe has evolved in such a manner, that no one would pretend to argue that our interests in that part of the world would be better served by setting up such a station now.

The main argument for continuance of the station, then, is now the bureaucratic one: a large organization with an expensive staff now exists, and so must presumably continue to exist, even though the need for it (if there ever was such) has long since disappeared. But the staffs can be taken care of much more economically, with generous severance pay, than by prolonging the life of an unneeded station.

I think this is a very perceptive observation and one which serves full consideration, particularly by those who, up to this point, may have been exposed to only one side of this issue. I, of course, am persuaded that the Radios ought to be liquidated, unless perhaps our European allies are willing to pick up their fair share of the financial burden that these Radios impose—a burden which the American taxpayer would otherwise have to continue to bear alone.

In this connection, it might be helpful to include at this point a copy of my recent letter to Senators PERCY and HUMPHREY, the three principal sponsors of Senate Resolution 272, and I ask unanimous consent to have the letter printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCH 1, 1972.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: From the press release which you and Senator Humphrey issued today, I understand that you plan tomorrow to introduce a resolution in support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. In this connection, I thought it might be helpful to you to have my views on the current legislative situation.

As Chairman of the Senate conferees, I am of course, duty-bound to uphold the legislation adopted by the Senate, which provides the Radios with an authorization of \$35 million for this fiscal year. The House version of this legislation extends the funding authority through fiscal 1973. On our side the Senate conferees have held firmly to the one-year authorization and on the other side the House conferees have held just as firmly to their two-year authorization. Despite all that has been said about the deadlock that has developed, I think it is fair to say that the House conferees' position has the practical effect of denying the Radios the funding that would otherwise be available at least for the remainder of this fiscal year. If the House conferees are as dedicated as they say they are to preserving the Radios, then I am at a loss to explain their refusal to accept the funding for this fiscal year and to consider fiscal 1973 funding in the course of the normal legislative processes.

Having said all of this, I should make clear my own serious doubts about funding these Radios beyond the current fiscal year. Of particular concern to me and to the other Senate conferees is the lack of any apparent

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interest on the part of our Western European allies to help share the financial burden imposed by the Radios.

Such sharing would certainly be consistent with the Nixon Doctrine and would serve to erase many of the doubts that I and others have about continuing U.S. support for these Radio operations. Accordingly, it seems to me that multilateral funding arrangements would provide a meaningful alternative to the present arrangement and this, of course, is something that could be fully explored in connection with any fiscal 1973 funding request.

I had not intended to go on quite so long, but I very much hope this letter helps to clarify the current legislative situation as well as my own position on this issue.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

Duplicate letter sent to Senator HUMPHREY.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Finally, Mr. President, I wish to bring to my colleagues' attention the fact that last year the Committee on Foreign Relations was able to obtain from the Department of State a brief description of the arrangements made and mechanisms used by the executive branch to maintain policy control and direction of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I invite Senators and Congressmen who are interested in this information to look at it in the committee's Capitol office, S-116. I regret to say that it is available on a classified basis only, a restriction insisted upon by the Department of State.

EXHIBIT 1

JUNE 8, 1971.

Mr. CHARLES R. GELLNER,  
*Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. GELLNER: The Committee on Foreign Relations is presently considering legislation that would authorize public funds for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

During its consideration of these proposals, the Committee came to the conclusion that it needed additional information on these two radio operations. The purpose, therefore, of this letter is to request that members of your staff prepare for the Committee an in-depth, background study on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I should hope that such a study would lead to some conclusions as to the effectiveness of these radio stations and whether or not it is in the public interest to support them with tax dollars.

I should appreciate this project receiving your earliest consideration. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact Mr. Robert Dockery of the Committee staff.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
*Chairman.*

AUGUST 6, 1971.

Mr. CHARLES R. GELLNER,  
*Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. GELLNER: In connection with my request of June 8 asking the Library of Congress to prepare a background study on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am enclosing a copy of the Committee's report on Senate Bill 18 (as amended), which the Senate passed on August 2.

You will note in the report that the Committee considers S. 18 as stopgap legislation for fiscal year 1972, and that it is divided in its opinion on the merits of Radio Free Eu-

rope and Radio Liberty. The report also notes that for fiscal year 1973 the Committee will place great emphasis on the studies being prepared by the GAO and the Library of Congress.

In view of the Committee's comments and its emphasis on these studies for next year, the urgency which I attached to my earlier request has subsided somewhat. Accordingly, I should hope that your efforts would be concentrated on the preparation of a full, complete report that would afford the Committee a solid basis for judging the two Radios in an overall manner.

For the Committee's purposes, I am hopeful that your study will be available no later than the end of this calendar year.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
*Chairman.*

FEBRUARY 25, 1972.

Mr. LESTER JAYSON,  
*Director, Legislative Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Mr. JAYSON: I am writing to you about the Library's reports on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

I understand that both reports are in the final stages of preparation and will probably be available within the next couple of weeks. In this connection, I wish to offer the suggestion that each study include a full and complete resume of the authors and of the consultant who worked on the audience research analysis portion of the reports.

I offer this suggestion in view of the controversy now surrounding these reports. This controversy has, quite naturally I think, generated a growing and legitimate interest in having the previous work experience and expertise of those responsible for the research placed on the public record. My suggestion serves to satisfy this interest and to place this additional information before the public.

I appreciate your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
*Chairman.*

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,  
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,  
Washington, D.C., March 3, 1972.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,  
*U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: The attached reports are forwarded in response to your letters of June 8 and August 6, 1971, requesting that CRS conduct in-depth background studies of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) and prepare full reports for the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The attached reports examine the history, organization, and operations of RFE and RL respectively. Two additional studies are being prepared discussing alternatives for possible administration of RFE and RL and analyzing the Radios' roles in the context of U.S. foreign policy. These will be forwarded at a later date.

The study on RFE was conducted by James R. Price and that on RL by Joseph G. Whelan, both of the staff of the Foreign Affairs Division. Annexes in the reports on the audience analysis operations of the two Radios were prepared by a consultant, Lorand B. Szalay of the American Institutes for Research. As a consultant, any recommendations he makes are made on his own responsibility and not that of CRS. Biographies of the authors, pursuant to your request, have been set forth in the Annexes of each report.

Sincerely,

LESTER S. JAYSON,  
*Director.*

RADIO FREE EUROPE—A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS—CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF STUDY

(By James R. Price, analyst in national defense Foreign Affairs Division, February 29, 1972)

[Footnotes at end of each chapter.]

BACKGROUND

In January, 1971, the Congress began to take under consideration the question of the funding and administration of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)—two radios beamed respectively at five East European Communist countries and the Soviet Union. Both radios had hitherto ostensibly been supported by private funds but had actually been largely funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The central questions to be considered by the Congress were whether continued federal support of the two radios was in the national interest and, if so, what form this support should take. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on these questions in May, 1971, following which the Chairman requested separate in-depth background studies on the two radios from the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office.<sup>1</sup>

This study is in partial response to the Committee request. It examines the history, organization, administration, and operations of Radio Free Europe. A similar but separate study has been prepared by the Congressional Research Service on Radio Liberty.

The present study does not examine the various alternatives for possible administration of RFE in the future as these have been proposed in the Congress and the Executive branch or which might otherwise be considered. Nor does it analyze what kind of role, if any, RFE might fulfill in the broadest context of U.S. foreign policy. These are being examined in separate reports to be submitted to the Committee in the future.

By illuminating in a factual way the history and present organization, purposes, and operations of RFE, it is hoped that this study will assist in an evaluation of its activities in the context of U.S. foreign policy and how it relates to currently declared purposes of that policy. It is also hoped that an in-depth research effort on this little-understood organization will assist a broader understanding of its mission and functions, will dispel possible knowledge gaps and misconceptions, and will provide useful information for those concerned with assessing its purposes and impact.

SOURCES AND METHOD OF APPROACH

Apart from occasional articles in the press, no serious evaluative or even descriptive material has been published on Radio Free Europe since 1963. Of the two works available until 1963, one, *Radio Free Europe*, by Robert T. Holt, was the outgrowth of graduate study and was based on field observation in Munich. The other, *Voices Through the Iron Curtain*, was written by RFE's former Deputy European Director, Allan A. Michie, and must therefore, be read with Mr. Michie's partisanship in mind. Neither of these books contains up to date material on RFE's current concepts and activities, although they were relied upon to provide the necessary background against which the current review was conducted.

The lack of published information about RFE posed a problem—how to obtain the data necessary for a study in sufficient detail to assist the Congress in its deliberations. The only practical alternative was to obtain this information directly from RFE, either in the form of RFE documentation, of interviews with RFE officials, and of direct observation of RFE facilities and operations. This was the course adopted. Information supplied by RFE is not, for the most part, susceptible to verification from independent



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information on as factual a basis as possible. When judgments, evaluations, and opinions of RFE officials are quoted or referred to in this study, the sources from which they came are clearly identified.

Radio Free Europe maintains complete files of its scripts, internal evaluation procedures, research products, and administrative history. These files were made freely available to the Congressional Research Service team, and several hundred scripts, research reports, and other documents were reviewed during the course of the study.

A key objective of the study was the rigorous evaluation of RFE audience and public opinion research methodologies and findings. Many of RFE's claims of listenership and effectiveness are based upon these findings. In addition, crucial programming decisions made by RFE management are increasingly based upon recommendations from the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department in Munich. Accordingly, an expert consultant in attitude and public opinion research, cross-cultural communication, and Eastern European affairs was retained to conduct an evaluation of RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research programs. The report of this consultant, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay of the American Institutes for Research, is appended as Annex A. Highlights of this report are discussed in Chapter VI.

By far the most important insights into RFE operations were gained from observation and interviews conducted in the field. The research team visited the Free Europe, Inc. corporate headquarters in New York on two occasions. Two weeks were spent at RFE headquarters in Munich, Germany, where the team interviewed key personnel in all RFE departments, observed the preparation, production, and broadcasting of program material in each of the country Broadcasting Departments, and attended the daily rounds of staff meetings where RFE policies are formulated. The insights gained during the field portion of the study were crucial to the proper evaluation and interpretation of the hundreds of RFE documents examined throughout the course of the study.

At all times and at all working levels, the research team received prompt, complete, and courteous cooperation from the RFE staff. This cooperation was essential to the efficient and prompt completion of the present study.

## FOOTNOTE

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., July 30, 1971. 27 p. 92nd Congress, 1st sess., S. Rep. 92-319. p. 3.

CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RADIO FREE EUROPE  
ORIGINS

Radio Free Europe owes its birth to the reaction of a number of prominent Americans—in and out of government—in the face of the Soviet Union's rapid post-war moves to establish complete hegemony over Eastern Europe. Imposition of the Berlin Blockade and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 were but two of the more sensational manifestations of Soviet policy which, in Eastern Europe, was characterized by a massive Soviet military presence and the shutting-off of the population (more than 100 million people) from outside contacts. The Iron Curtain was built of censorship, pervasive secret police systems, strictest border controls, and the monopoly of all means of public communication by Soviet-controlled Communist regimes. As a result, the population living behind the Iron Curtain at that time "heard only Communist ideas, listened only to Communist radios, read only Communist newspapers and books,

saw only Communist movies, and learned about the outside world only from material slanted for them by the Communist propaganda operators."<sup>1</sup>

In early February, 1949, State Department officer George Kennan met with former Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, to pass on the results of a number of discussions Mr. Kennan had conducted with people both in and out of government regarding an appropriate response to Soviet policy. Mr. Kennan's recommendations for action outside the realm of government were seconded by those of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who urged Grew to establish a private group to help deal with certain aspects of Eastern European exiles, who, having fled the Iron Curtain, were paying frequent visits to the State Department. Mr. Grew acceded to this request and, joined by his old friend and former Foreign Service colleague, Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, invited a number of prominent Americans to join in the founding of the National Committee for a Free Europe—which was formally incorporated in the state of New York on June 2, 1949.<sup>2</sup> At a press conference, Mr. Grew spoke of the necessity of finding suitable occupations for the "democratic exiles who have come to us from Eastern Europe," but he also spelled out the notion of an exile broadcasting operation:

Our second purpose will be to put the voices of these exiled leaders on the air, addressed to their own peoples back in Europe, in their own languages, in the familiar tones. We shall help them also, if we can, to get their messages back by printed word."<sup>3</sup>

By July of 1949, a Radio Committee within the overall organization had been established to develop broadcasting operations. In July, 1950, the Radio Committee went on the air as Radio Free Europe, a division of the National Committee for a Free Europe. By the end of the year, RFE's one 7.5-kilowatt short-wave transmitter in Germany was broadcasting one and a half hours daily to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Programs were taped in New York and flown to the transmitter in Germany.

By the end of 1951 RFE had in operation three powerful transmitters in Germany and one in Portugal. One of these transmitters was a 135 kilowatt medium wave unit broadcasting a full day's schedule to Czechoslovakia. The others provided strong short wave signals into Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. New headquarters facilities in Munich facilitated the preparation of more program material there instead of in New York, and total broadcast time increased considerably. By the mid 1950's, RFE operations reached a peak of some 18-20 hours per day of broadcasts through some 29 transmitters to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, with about half that quantity of material beamed to Bulgaria and Rumania.<sup>4</sup>

## CURRENT ACTIVITIES

Today, Radio Free Europe broadcasts average 15 hours per day to the five Eastern European countries concerned. Czechoslovakia is the target of more than 20 hours daily; Poland and Hungary receive about 19 hours every day, while Rumania and Bulgaria receive smaller amounts of attention, respectively 12 and 7½ hours of RFE programming per day.<sup>5</sup> This active broadcasting schedule is beamed over some 32 active and stand-by transmitters in West Germany and Portugal. According to RFE spokesmen, however, only four of these transmitters are modern, high-power (250 kilowatt) equipment, installed in Portugal in 1964. The remainder date from 1954 or earlier, and are said to be underpowered. While RFE has stood still in power transmission for the last 7 years, the proliferation of world-wide short-wave broadcasting operations by the USSR, governments in both East and West Europe,

Africa, the Middle East, and Asia has resulted in an increase in the number of higher-power (200 kilowatt or better) transmitters from a handful to nearly 250 in operation or on the way. Free Europe, Inc. President William F. Durkee has contended:

Both the jamming and a growing interference from neighboring broadcast frequencies operated by other international broadcasters has led to a steady erosion in the technical quality of RFE's signal . . .<sup>6</sup>

## NONBROADCAST OPERATIONS

Although broadcast operations have always been the largest and most important activity carried out by Free Europe, Inc.,<sup>7</sup> two other instrumentalities have also played a role in achievement of the broader purposes originally envisioned by Ambassador Grew and the other founders of the organization. These instrumentalities were (1) the Free Europe Press which, until the fall of 1956, engaged in balloon leaflet operations behind the Iron Curtain, and has also carried out various other publishing activities; and Free Europe Exile Relations, which was set up to maintain contact with and support of various exile political and professional organizations such as the Assembly of Captive European Nations and others. At the present time, however, Free Europe, Inc. has divested itself of all activities except the broadcasting and research programs of Radio Free Europe. Two staff members within the Free Europe, Inc. headquarters are responsible for tying up any loose ends remaining from the terminated exile relations program, and even these are being phased out.

## CORPORATE STRUCTURE

Radio Free Europe is the major, and soon-to-be-sole, activity of its parent organization, Free Europe, Inc. Free Europe, Inc.—the corporate successor to the original National Committee for a Free Europe—is a private, non-profit membership corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York. Overall direction is exercised by a Board of Directors of nineteen prominent U.S. citizens under the Chairmanship of retired General Lucius D. Clay. President of Free Europe, Inc., is Mr. William F. Durkee. Mr. Durkee is also a former Director of Radio Free Europe in Munich. Corporate headquarters are at 2 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

Fund-raising from the private sector is conducted through a sister corporation, Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc., of which Mr. Durkee is also President, and of which Mr. Stewart S. Cort, Chairman of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, is Chairman of the Board. Directors of Free Europe, Inc. and the RFE Fund, Inc. are the same persons, but the general membership of the two corporations is not identical.<sup>8</sup>

The RFE Fund, Inc., is an outgrowth of the Crusade for Freedom, organized in 1950 by General Clay to conduct public relations and fund-raising for the Free Europe Committee. In 1953, the Crusade became a project of the American Heritage Foundation, which it remained until July of 1955, when it again became independent. Among its other accomplishments, the Crusade for Freedom created the trademark for the entire broadcast operation. To symbolize the first Crusade in 1950, the Directors commissioned the casting in England of a ten-ton "Freedom Bell," which was rather obviously an international analog to the American Liberty Bell. The Freedom Bell was transported around the United States during the initial Crusade campaign (which reportedly resulted in attracting some \$1,317,000 in private contributions) and was then installed atop the tower of West Berlin's City Hall, where it rang each noon. The chiming of its tones were, for a time, used as the station-break for Radio Free Europe.<sup>9</sup>

The relative success—or lack of same—enjoyed by the RFE Fund, Inc.'s campaign is

a matter of some controversy. According to Senator Clifford P. Case, the annual returns from media campaigns donated by the Advertising Council and estimated to be worth between \$12 million and \$20 million in free media space, aggregate less than \$100 thousand, while supplementary solicitations from private industry add only a "small part" of the total RFE budget of approximately \$21-22 million annually.<sup>10</sup> In a letter sent to Senator J. William Fulbright on July 16, 1971, Free Europe, Inc. President William P. Durkee reported:

"As I can, however, appreciate and understand your interest. I can tell you that contributions to Radio Free Europe have amounted to \$17,007,883 from FY 1951 through FY 1971 so far. In FY 1970 there were 8,279 corporate contributors, and in FY 1971 there have been 4,462 corporate contributors as of now."

According to Mr. John Dunning, Assistant to the President, the total contributions over the entire period represented some 18.7 percent of RFE's total operating cost, including the cost of the fund-raising. Over the same period, fund-raising costs have approximated 37.5 of fund-raising receipts—a cost-income ratio which has recently been reduced to about 30 percent.<sup>11</sup>

#### FACILITIES AND STAFF

Although the corporate headquarters is in New York, and the President and Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. exercise ultimate control over the entire operation, most of the day-to-day activities of Radio Free Europe are carried out in a largely autonomous manner at the RFE headquarters in Munich. The Director of RFE, located in Munich, is responsible to the President of Free Europe, Inc., for the overall direction and management of all broadcasting and related operations, including the Munich headquarters and all field components. The latter include not only news bureaus in 10 major European cities, but the New York bureaus of each of the five Broadcasting Departments (Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian) which make up the Radio Free Europe network as well as the transmitting and monitoring sites in Germany and Portugal. Organization charts, depicting the structure and interrelationships of Free Europe, Inc., Radio Free Europe, and the RFE Fund, Inc., appear on the following two pages.

#### NEW YORK

In New York, the President of Free Europe, Inc. and his supporting management and fiscal control staff number some 29 persons, including 7 persons managing the affairs of the RFE Fund, Inc. In addition, five security guards bring the New York corporate headquarters staff up to 34 full-time personnel; overall total to 35.

This staff performs the normal functions of a corporate headquarters, i.e., various administrative and policy support functions. In addition, another 98 persons in New York work directly for Radio Free Europe. RFE employees in New York consists of:

Broadcasting Department employees (editors, writers, clerical)-----	37
Production Personnel-----	10
News (including special events and the library (1 half-time)-----	16
Support (wireroom, mailroom, reproduction, purchasing; switchboard) (1 half-time)-----	28
Engineering-----	3
PRE New York Director's Office-----	2
<b>Total plus 2=98-----</b>	<b>98</b>
Production Personnel News (including special events and the library) (1 half-time)-----	16

Each of RFE's five Broadcasting Departments has its own New York Bureau and, in

addition, about 15 percent of the total material used in broadcast programming is collected and put together in New York. The New York staff of RFE, however, reports directly to the Broadcasting Department Chiefs and the Director of RFE in Munich.

#### EUROPE

The operational headquarters of Radio Free Europe is located in Munich, where approximately 970 persons operate five separate broadcasting services to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and where a large research staff builds and maintains extensive political, economic, and biographical files on the East European countries concerned. Another 128 persons are employed at the RFE monitoring facility at Schleissheim and the two transmitting sites at Holzkirchen and Biblis. The transmitter at Gloria, near Lisbon, Portugal, is staffed by some 346 persons, while RFE news bureaus in Athens, Bonn, Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, and Vienna employ another 69 persons. All of the Broadcast Department personnel are former nationals of the countries to which they broadcast, and number as follows:

Bulgarian Broadcasting Department-----	41
Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department-----	100
Hungarian Broadcasting Department-----	85
Polish Broadcasting Department-----	101
Rumanian Broadcasting Department-----	45

Each of these Broadcasting Departments has a proportionate number of its own nationals in the New York Bureaus of the five Departments—a total of about 37 persons.

Except for the top engineering staff, most of the engineers at the Munich headquarters and at the transmitting and monitoring sites in Germany are German citizens. These number about 469 persons. Of the 346 employees at the Gloria transmitter, only five are U.S. citizens. Radio Free Europe, then, employs a total staff of about 1,611 persons, of whom only about 221 are Americans.<sup>12</sup> This is in addition to the Free Europe, Inc., and RFE Fund, Inc. staff mentioned earlier.

In Germany, Free Europe, Inc. is registered as a foreign non-profit corporation, holds long-term leases to the RFE headquarters in Munich, to two transmitter sites and two monitoring reception stations, and is licensed to operate transmitters by the German Federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

The transmitter operation in Portugal was established in 1951 to provide a more distant base from which higher short-wave frequencies would be effective and jamming partially overcome. The license for the operation is held by a Portuguese corporation, S.A. de Radio-Retransmissao, S.S.R.L., or "RARET." By Portuguese law, 60 percent of the RARET Board of Directors are Portuguese citizens and hold a majority of its voting stock. The remainder are connected with Free Europe, Inc., which supplies all the financing. Although the license permits either broadcasting or rebroadcasting, the sole function of RARET at the present time is to relay to Eastern Europe programs relayed from Munich to it by radio.

#### COSTS

According to estimates supplied by the General Accounting Office, the costs in Fiscal Year 1971 for operation of all aspects of Radio Free Europe were \$22,366,876.41. Another \$244,035.99 was invested in capital equipment, and \$501,072.65 was expended in support of the RFE Fund, Inc. operations.

#### EVOLUTION OF RFE PROGRAM PHILOSOPHY, ORGANIZATION, AND GOALS

In the 22 years which have elapsed since the National Committee for a Free Europe was established in December, 1949, a number of powerful forces have combined to bring about some fundamental changes in both the objectives sought and the techniques used by Radio Free Europe. These forces have been

manifest in the changing style of U.S. foreign policy as well as in the post-war history of Eastern Europe. Probably the most spectacular manifestation of these forces which directly affected RFE was the Hungarian rebellion of 1956. Indeed, most of the press and many of the RFE staff refer to 1956 as a "watershed" in RFE history. By this is meant a concept that until 1956 RFE activities had certain strong characteristics which, in the aftermath of the Hungarian tragedy, have been fundamentally altered.

As is usually the case with sweeping generalizations, the watershed theory is partially valid—but not completely so. Fundamental changes in RFE's approach to its basic purposes began to occur as early as 1952, and, despite the sensational and pervasive publicity about Hungary, RFE's current policies and programming philosophies can be more accurately described as the result of evolution and careful planning rather than of the trauma of the revolution of 1956. Knowledge of how and why this evolution occurred is a prerequisite to a realistic appreciation of what RFE has become and what it hopes to accomplish.

As noted earlier, Radio Free Europe originated in the early stages of the cold war—the aftermath of Soviet imposition of the Berlin Blockade and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and other countries in Eastern Europe. United States policy further hardened with the outbreak of a hot war in Korea, and reached a peak during the Eisenhower Administration when a policy of the "peaceful liberation of the captive countries" was enunciated as a major goal of United States foreign policy. Radio Free Europe's initial organization reflected the "liberation" philosophy later enunciated by Eisenhower and Dulles. After some experimentation (broadcasts to Albania were tried, but abandoned in view of the small number of radio sets in that country) RFE evolved into a network of five related but distinct stations broadcasting separate schedules and different program materials to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The basic purpose was to provide the populations of those countries with an alternative to the press and radio so closely controlled by the Communist regimes. Additionally—and this has remained consistently true throughout RFE's history—RFE was conceived of as "indigenous" to the target countries. This is in direct contrast to the Voice of America, the BBC, Deutsch Welle, Radio Madrid, and other foreign language services of various governments—all of which present a "foreign" viewpoint to their target audiences. RFE set out to provide a "home service" which would, to the greatest possible extent, compete directly with regime programming. To provide this "home service," RFE had perforce to rely largely upon "home talent"—exiles—few of whom were experienced in radio programming. The first years of operations, therefore, were fairly large-scale exercises in on-the-job training, marked, as could be expected, with a certain number of blunders and some clumsiness.

Following the "liberation" philosophy, the five broadcasting operations each bore the original title of a separate "Free Voice", i.e., the Polish broadcasts were called the "Voice of Free Poland," the Czechoslovak broadcasts emanated from the "Voice of Free Czechoslovakia," and so forth. Early scripts reflected this approach. They were, Michie asserts, "written by writers who were learning the business, lacked authenticity, and were overloaded with rhetoric, exhortations to the listeners and the opinions of the editors, who tended to speak as the conscience of the captive peoples."<sup>13</sup> RFE's Policy Handbook, written in 1950-51, illustrates the philosophical tone underlying the early RFE scripts. Four ways are listed by which RFE might "sustain the morale of the captive peoples and stimulate them in a spirit of noncooperation":<sup>14</sup>

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(a) by reminding [the] listeners constantly that they are governed by agents of a foreign power whose purpose is not to further the national interest but to carry out the imperialistic aims of the rulers of Soviet Russia; (b) by displaying the moral and spiritual emptiness of communism as an ideology and the material incapacity of communism, as an economic system, to provide an acceptable standard of living for the working class; (c) by inculcating hope of eventual liberation through a convincing display of the superiority of the skill, resources, and military strength of the West, and through reiteration of the promise that the West intends that [the] listeners shall be free; (d) by sowing dissension in each regime through exposing the ineptitude of its officials, and sowing fear among the officials by denouncing confirmed acts of oppression and cruelty, and threatening retribution.<sup>15</sup>

Despite these exhortations, however, as early as 1952 there was evidence that RFE policymakers had become wary of the "liberation" approach, and foresaw its possible consequences, which later materialized in the Hungarian uprising of 1956—an event which prompted widespread and, in the opinion of some observers, substantially unjustified criticism of the alleged role of RFE in inciting the uprisings. During the 1952 Presidential campaign, when debate included the issue of "containment" [of communism] vs. "liberation," RFE issued a "Special Guidance for Broadcasts on Liberation":

We of RFE . . . cannot comment upon these statements [on liberation by General Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles] with unqualified optimism, for to do so would be to deceive our listeners by inspiring in them exaggerated hope of Western intervention . . . not one word in these statements [on liberation] can be used to encourage militant anti-communists to go over from passive to active resistance in the expectation that such resistance will be supported by Western elements.<sup>16</sup>

The abortive uprising in East Berlin soon after the death of Stalin in 1953 suggested the futility of any expectation of Western military support of anti-communist uprisings in the Soviet Bloc. This led to RFE's own adaptation of its role as an exponent of "liberation" to "liberalization" instead. RFE began at that time to develop a technique of "chipping away" at Communist power structures, looking toward the day when gradual evolution within the Communist nations would bring them nearer to the freer societies in the West. "Peaceful liberation" through "liberalization" became the RFE strategy.<sup>17</sup> This new approach required intensive analysis of the internal events and trends in Eastern Europe—analysis which would indicate the kind of encouragement the audiences should be given. Frontal attacks against the Communist regimes were downgraded in favor of programs designed to encourage long-range and subtle attitudinal changes among the listeners. In an RFE staff report issued in January, 1957, this new policy was summarized:

RFE's broad role would appear to be to keep alive the pressure for freedom among our peoples, supplying them with the facts, the comprehension of free democratic methods, and the inspiration of free-world achievement which will enable them to chart effectively their own courses toward freedom.<sup>18</sup>

According to its spokesmen, the pattern of RFE programming since 1953 has been increasingly one of intensifying its competition with regime media in terms of providing the kind of accurate, quick, uncensored, and objective "voice of the opposition" which is found in most Western democratic societies. Virtually all of RFE's resources are focused on this goal. An extensive research and analysis service—whose reports are available to scholars the world over—provides

background material for programming and for policy planning. The Audience and Public Opinion Research Department takes advantage of increased travel abroad by East Europeans to study RFE's audiences. These studies provide continuing data to guide determination of needs for change in RFE's program content and format. RFE's Central Newsroom in Munich reportedly receives and processes "a million words a day—from RFE's own monitoring of 12 Communist news agencies and 40 Communist radio and television stations, from the Western news service, and from its own news bureaus in Washington, New York, the United Nations, and leading cities of Western Europe. Some 900 Soviet and East European publications are regularly screened for background information."<sup>19</sup>

The objective of this activity and the goal of this policy is the provision of a journalistically excellent, entertaining, and credible network of radio stations which can capture and hold the interest of the listening audiences in the five Eastern European nations concerned. RFE cites the research of its own Audience and Public Opinion Research Department as evidence that this goal is being achieved. According to RFE, by the end of 1970, RFE's listenership among persons over 14 years of age had reached these percentages of the total population:

Poland, 59 percent.  
Rumania, 57 percent.  
Hungary, 55 percent.  
Czechoslovakia, 50 percent.  
Bulgaria, 45 percent.

Source: William P. Durkee, "East Europe and Radio Free Europe in an Era of Negotiation," a statement submitted by Free Europe, Inc. to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 14, 1971. The statistics quoted above appear in Annex XI, p. 1.

In line with the policy of encouraging liberalization rather than liberation, the five individual broadcasting services are no longer known as the "Voice of Free Poland," etc. They are known instead as the "Polish Broadcasting Department," the "Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department," etc., of Radio Free Europe. Within the RFE structure, these country Broadcasting Departments are each headed by a chief who is a native of the target country, and each operates with considerable autonomy within a broad policy framework established by the Director of RFE in Europe, and subject to the approval of the President of Free Europe, Inc. in New York.

#### RFE AND THE POLISH AND HUNGARIAN UPRISINGS IN 1956

Radio Free Europe's stated policy of restraint on the question of East European "liberation" (as quoted above from the 1952 Special Guidance for Broadcasts on Liberation) was twice put to public test in the mid-1950's. On one well-publicized occasion—the Hungarian uprising of October–November 1956—the policy foundered, at least in part. In connection with the Poznan riots in Poland in June of that year, however, RFE conducted its operations in a manner that received virtually no criticism from responsible observers. A brief review of what happened in these two instances would permit events to be seen in context.

#### THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING OF 1956

Probably the most-publicized and still-lingering charge against RFE is that its broadcasts tended to incite the Hungarians to rise up against their Communist government and that RFE either promised or strongly implied that the Western powers would come to the direct aid of the Hungarian rebels.

The charge of incitement to rebellion has been dismissed by the German Government of Konrad Adenauer, which was involved because RFE broadcasts from its territory. The West German Government reviewed all the tapes of broadcasts from RFE to Hungary during the period in question, and concluded

that there had been no incitement and no promises of Western aid to the rebels. Adenauer added, however, that some of the broadcasts had contained "remarks . . . subject to misinterpretation."<sup>20</sup> According to a report dated April 27, 1957 on Radio Free Europe presented to and approved by the Council of Europe, the remarks considered by Mr. Adenauer to be subject to misinterpretation were probably contained in a broadcast (on November 4, 1956) which quoted the Observer, a responsible British publication. The broadcast ran as follows:

This morning the British *Observer* published a report of its Washington correspondent. This situation report was written before the Soviet attack early this morning. In spite of this the *Observer* correspondent writes that the Russians have probably decided to beat down the Hungarian revolution with arms. The article goes on: 'If the Soviet troops really attack Hungary, if this our apprehension should become true and the Hungarians will hold out for three or four days, then the pressure upon the government of the United States to send military help to the freedom fighters will become irresistible.' This is what the *Observer* writes in today's number. The paper observes that the American Congress cannot vote for war as long as the presidential elections have not been held. The article continues: 'If the Hungarians continue to fight until Wednesday, we shall be closer to a world war than at any time since 1939.'<sup>21</sup>

Allan A. Michie, Deputy Director of RFE, was in charge of coordinating RFE activities during the Hungarian affair. In his book, *Voices Through the Iron Curtain*, Michie reports that a detailed post-mortem of some 308 separate scripts broadcast during the uprising revealed that another three scripts, in addition to the one quoted above, were found to be "in clear violation" of RFE policy guidances, and that "only a further sixteen programs were found to involve some distortions of policies or failure to implement a policy guidance on a specific subject."<sup>22</sup> Michie attributed these three scripts to the misguided efforts of two RFE Hungarian editors to help the freedom fighters by giving them military advice and know-how. Both Michie and University of Minnesota scholar Robert T. Holt, however, reported another major broadcast which definitely was in accord with a policy directive cabled from New York. Perceiving its role as supportive of the program being advocated by the freedom fighters, RFE, on October 29, 1956, broadcast a compilation of major demands monitored from various illegal broadcasts from the rebels and which it felt to be the minimum conditions acceptable to the freedom fighters:<sup>23</sup>

1. Immediate and total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungarian soil.
2. Total dissolution of the AVH [security police] immediately, and placement of the direction of any new police or security forces and the army in the hands of a minister not associated with any previous cabinet or Central Communist body.
3. Full amnesty to all freedom fighters who participated in the uprisings.
4. Exclusion from the new temporary government of all persons associated in any way with the regime government or top party command since Imre Nagy's previous premiership.
5. The majority of the cabinet of the new temporary government to be drawn from the various patriot groups on a representative basis.
6. Immediate calling of a Constituent Assembly, selected by free secret popular vote, to frame a new charter of government and action program—this charter and program to be submitted to the people for free, secret voting on acceptance or rejection within a stated period, such as six months.
7. Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact of Hungary.

8. Continuation of local workers' and other councils and patriot committees which have been formed during the crisis and continuous communication between them, until all the above conditions have been achieved.

Since these eight points clearly added up to the complete overthrow of the Communist Hungarian regime and the total removal of Soviet influence from Hungary, their retransmission back to the Hungarian audiences by Radio Free Europe during the uprising in effect constituted active support of the armed rebellion once it had broken out. According to Holt, such support was not inconsistent with RFE policy, since "Radio Free Europe had always operated on the assumption that it could not lead the captive peoples to freedom; it could only assist them in the struggle they might initiate with policies they had devised."<sup>24</sup> Nor did Michie, who had coordinated RFE broadcasts during the uprising, consider RFE's endorsement of the eight-point program unusual or inflammatory:

In its broadcasts on October 29, the Voice of Free Hungary was able to stress these points as the common program of the rebellion. While associating itself with the demands of the patriots, at no time did RFE go beyond the specifics of the programs voiced by them; to have done so would have given the impression that RFE, as an "outsider," was trying to influence the course of the revolution.<sup>25</sup> II, by its active encouragement of armed attempts to dislodge the Soviet Union from an area it considered vital to its strategic interests, RFE was not "trying to influence the course of the revolution," the question remains unanswered as to exactly what RFE did hope to accomplish in the face of massive Soviet power and the virtually certain knowledge that Western intervention would not occur. The charges that RFE programming had incited the rebellion have been pretty well disproven (independent research conducted on Hungarian escapees indicates that few of the freedom fighters attributed the outbreak of the rebellion to the influence of any outside incitement). But it is clear that, after the rebellion was underway, RFE improvised its own policies, and found itself caught up in the emotions of the times. With the advantage of hindsight, it can be said that the results, at best, were unfortunate for all concerned.

#### THE POZNAN RIOTS

RFE's experience earlier that year, from June to November, with the Polish crisis sparked by the Poznan riots was a different one. In the first place, RFE's Polish analysts were convinced from the outset that violent uprisings would not drive the Russians out of the satellites. They wish to avoid useless bloodshed and severe reprisals. A policy guidance, issued soon after news of the first disturbances at Poznan, put it this way:<sup>26</sup>

We understand and appreciate the motivations which have driven the workers of Poznan to desperate measures. However, riots and revolts are not likely to improve matters in Poland, for the police may be given an opportunity for reprisals which only make things worse . . .

RFE broadcasts followed a dual policy of advocating calm and restraint, while delivering accurate accounts of events to the listening audience. This policy was, however, made easier by the fact that the "legitimate" Communist leader Gomulka soon emerged as a kind of "honest broker" between the workers and the Soviet Union. RFE cautiously backed Gomulka, in the belief that his program of mild reform within the system was receiving popular backing and represented the "only chance Poland has in the immediate future to obtain a measure of independence from Moscow."<sup>27</sup> RFE did not want to see Gomulka pushed into a position which would provoke the Russians into armed intervention. An RFE script

broadcaster on October 29, while the Khrushchev delegation was in Warsaw for talks with the Poles, illustrates the implementation of this policy:<sup>28</sup>

The Politburo delegation, having landed in Warsaw and taken up its quarters at the Belvedere in order to open its talks with the Politburo of the PZPR, knew very well that no one either in the Politburo nor in the party rank and file, nor even among the people, i.e., among the vast majority of Poles, can envisage for a moment a break with that political make-up in which our country found itself against its will and in which it must continue against its will until objective conditions favouring a radical change are established. The attitude of the people within the last twelve years has shown that it is a nation full of political wisdom, a nation which can subordinate its feelings to the existing situation without losing, at the same time, its ideological objectives from sight. Poles know very well that Soviet Russia has at its disposal both military and economic means which would enable it to interfere in Poland.

Although RFE support of Gomulka was tactical in nature, based upon a temporary congruence of interests, available evidence suggests that it was effective, and was appreciated by the regime. Michie quotes an unnamed Polish Communist Party official, a Gomulka supporter, as having commented to an RFE reporter in Stockholm, some weeks after the Polish events, that "Had RFE not told our people to be calm, I am not sure whether we alone would have managed to cope with the situation."<sup>29</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Michie, Allan A. *Voices Through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story*. New York, Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1963, pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Holt, Robert T. *Radio Free Europe*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958, pp. 9-11. On p. 233, footnote 8 to Chapter I lists membership of the original Committee, in addition to Mr. Grew and Mr. Poole, as Frank Altschul, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, A. S. Berle, Jr., Francis Biddle, Robert Woods Bliss, James B. Carey, Hugh A. Drum, Allen W. Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark F. Ethridge, William Green, Charles R. Hook, Arthur Bliss Lane, Henry R. Luce, Arthur W. Page, Charles M. Spofford, Charles P. Taft, DeWitt Wallace, Matthew Woll, James A. Farley. For a list of the current Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. (who are also Directors of the companion fund raising organization, RFE Fund, Inc.) see Annex B to this report.

<sup>3</sup> As quoted in Holt, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Holt, op. cit., pp. 14-16, *passim*.

<sup>5</sup> Durkee, William P. *East Europe and Radio Free Europe in an "Era of Negotiation,"* a statement submitted by Free Europe, Inc. to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 14, 1971. The hours quoted appeared in Annex VII, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Durkee, op. cit., p. 14, footnote (1).

<sup>7</sup> Free Europe, Inc., is the corporate successor to the old National Committee for a Free Europe.

<sup>8</sup> Annex B to this report lists the Officers, Directors, and Members of the two corporations.

<sup>9</sup> Michie, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, January 25, 1971, p. S130.

<sup>11</sup> A complete analysis of the RFE funding structure, including sources and related administrative costs, is being prepared by the General Accounting Office as part of its report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Presumably this report will contain information on funding by contributions.

<sup>12</sup> Biographic information about key staff of the Munich headquarters of RFE is included in Annex C.

<sup>13</sup> Michie, op. cit., p. 71. Allan A. Michie, a professional writer and journalist, was with

Radio Free Europe from 1952 through 1957 and, during most of that time, was Deputy Europe Director at Munich.

<sup>14</sup> Holt, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> *Radio Free Europe Policy Handbook*, quoted in Holt, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> *Special Guidance for Broadcasts on Liberation*, September 2, 1952, in Holt, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>17</sup> Michie, op. cit., p. 76.

<sup>18</sup> *Summary of Accomplishments and Findings*, RFE Staff Conference, January 3-5, 1957, p. 1, in Holt, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>19</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex VI, p. 2.

For a description of this department and its work see below, Chapter VI.

The percentage figures refer to respondents who stated explicitly that they were RFE listeners. As will be developed in more detail in Annex A, subsequent questions on frequency of listening showed in 1970, for example, that 52-98 percent listened once a week or more and 2-27 percent listened less frequently.

<sup>20</sup> *New York Times*, January 26, 1957.

<sup>21</sup> Holt, op. cit., p. 197.

<sup>22</sup> Michie, op. cit., p. 257.

<sup>23</sup> In Holt, op. cit., p. 191.

<sup>24</sup> Holt, op. cit., p. 190.

<sup>25</sup> Michie, op. cit., p. 226.

<sup>26</sup> Holt, op. cit., p. 175.

<sup>27</sup> Holt, op. cit., p. 182.

<sup>28</sup> Holt, op. cit., p. 182.

<sup>29</sup> Michie, op. cit., p. 191.

#### CHAPTER III: RFE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

##### *Policy objectives*

It has been noted that when Radio Free Europe went on the air in the early 1950's, its purposes were linked to U.S. Cold War Strategy. RFE engaged in continuous psychological warfare against Eastern European regimes and with the aim of keeping alive in the people the hope of eventual "liberation" from the Communist governments. RFE executives acknowledge that programming fifteen or twenty years ago was polemical and "addressed to an audience assumed to be uncritically receptive to anti-Communism."<sup>1</sup> Relaxation of the strict Stalinist controls in the mid-1950's however, resulted in somewhat greater tendencies toward pluralism in Eastern European societies, less rigidity in the Communist systems, and subsequently a bit more give-and-take between the people and the respective regimes. Though they remained strictly controlled and censored, regime media became somewhat less dogmatic.

RFE's response—accelerated though not solely motivated by the 1956 Hungarian affair—has been a near-total modification of its earlier approach. It has sought to stay ahead of its regime radio competition, to retain and expand its listenership. Above all, RFE has striven to (a) know its audiences and their preferences better and, (b) raise the level of professional expertise in all phases of RFE activity.

Polemics have been deemphasized in favor of more and better straight news coverage of world and local news events. The objective is to enhance audience appeal and to improve credibility by filling the "news gap" brought about by regime censorship policies. In the words of Free Europe, Inc. President Durkee, RFE "seeks to function much as a democratic, responsible, independent station would function within each of the five countries if the regimes permitted it."<sup>2</sup> In support of this thesis, Durkee quotes the following RFE standing broadcasting guidelines, calling for a policy of balanced commentary coupled with comprehensive, objective, and accurate news reporting:<sup>3</sup>

"It is essential that RFE, while making clear its dedication to freedom and the principles for which it stands, seek to engender



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among its listeners, even in the Communist hierarchy, a high degree of respect as a thoroughly responsible and reliable source of news, commentary, and other information. . . . Comment on internal affairs should be essentially constructive, calm and reasoned, avoiding a belligerent tone. Denunciation and personal attacks or ridicule can only serve to prejudice the achievement of RFE policy objectives. RFE will, however, condemn violations of human rights when these are of a nature and magnitude that demand public attention. In dealing with difficulties of which the people may be expected to be aware, care should be taken to clarify their origins and their deeper significance for the mass audience, avoiding polemical treatment of the kind which the audience is known to resent.

"Meaningful alleviations by the government will be noted as they occur, and professions of intent to make further improvements should be appropriately noted and welcomed. Comments on the internal scene must deal with important issues and be directed toward the attainment of specific aims. Criticism should be selective, never petty, and handled in such a way that it supports the people in striving for further reforms. Criticism of government policies and practices should be characterized whenever possible by positive treatment illustrating means for remedying the problem under discussion. "Attractive alternatives," including those of social democratic origin, which offer practical solutions to current and long-range problems should be presented."

This standing general instruction has been restated in specific language for each of the five Broadcasting Departments. The following text, obtained from the Director of RFE in Munich, is typical of the "restraints" imposed by RFE upon these Departments. It has been abridged and edited by the author of this report in order to remove country-specific references and mention of specific groups and people:

## RESTRAINTS

The correct tone is as important in adhering to RFE policy as correct content of broadcasts. The following restraints are therefore emphasized:

1. Avoidance of vituperation, vindictiveness, and polemics.
2. Avoidance of broadcast materials, the content or tone of which is or could be legitimately construed as inflammatory or inconsistent with [local] or international political realities. Even straight news can be inflammatory if improperly handled.
3. Avoidance of blatant, propagandistic argumentation.
4. Avoidance of sweeping generalizations and evaluations.
5. Avoidance of any action which would amount to or could be reasonably construed as incitement to open revolt or other violence.
6. Avoidance of tactical advice, by which is meant recommendations for specific action in particular cases, except in unusual circumstances, and then only by indirection. The people . . . provided they know the relevant facts, are usually better qualified to judge the efficacy and consequences of their action than anyone outside the country. Such advice is likely to be resented and, if acted upon, could cause regime reprisals and inflexibility.
7. Avoidance of patronizing or condescending positions or indulging in preaching.
8. Avoidance of narrow and parochial points of view . . .
9. Avoidance of tone or content which would give RFE the air of a voice of emigre opinion . . . the term "we" should not be used to suggest that the speakers are representing the views of any . . . emigre group, nor . . . as spokesmen or as the purported

voice of an opposition party . . . or of the . . . people as a whole.

10. Continued treatment of key themes is essential but monotonous or needless repetition should be avoided.

11. No programs should be broadcast which are based upon or use rumors or unsubstantiated information. If, under unusual circumstances, a constructive purpose will be served by calling attention to a rumor, it should clearly be identified as such.

12. RFE should not jump to conclusions, either by attaching undue weight to . . . government or other pronouncements which experience has shown the government may not carry out to the letter, or by unduly discounting them.

13. RFE should not encourage defections . . .

14. RFE should not lead the . . . people to believe that in the event of an uprising the West would intervene militarily. RFE must not . . . speculate about an uprising . . . nor contingencies arising therefrom.

15. Criticism of the . . . government should be to the fact and to the issues involved. Insofar as possible it should be subtle and indirect.

16. RFE should not broadcast any material which could be characterized as petty gossip, slander, or attacks on the personal lives or families of government or party figures, or on individuals as such . . .

## EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

In the event of emergency conditions . . . due to violent demonstrations, armed uprising and revolutions, or war, RFE will not assume any attitude toward such developments or participate in them in any way, except for straight and restrained news reporting, until it receives guidance from [Free Europe, Inc.] New York.

## POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

The mechanisms through which RFE policies are formulated and implemented are based upon RFE's founding concept—"a cooperative effort of free East Europeans broadcasting to their countrymen at home, under American management and supported by the professional expertise necessary to the operation of a radio station."<sup>4</sup> As previously noted, RFE's overall policies are under the direction and control of the President and Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. in New York. The Director of RFE in Munich is responsible to the President, and has primary responsibility, within the frame of reference of overall Free Europe, Inc., policy for all standing and ad hoc policies related to the management and operation of the radio stations. Thus there are two levels of policy: broad organizational and corporate policy, and the day-to-day considerations of running five radio stations which broadcast news, commentary, features, and music.

## FREE EUROPE, INC.

Annex B lists the officers and members of both Free Europe, Inc., and the RFE Fund, Inc. The Free Europe, Inc. Board of Directors is the highest legally-constituted governing body responsible for all activities of the organization. This Board of Directors is self-perpetuating, and has been from the outset.

A key function of the Board has been to supervise the liaison with outside backers which has been maintained by the principal officers of the corporation. Although the author of this report did not interview officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, it is a safe assumption that contact between that Agency and Free Europe, Inc. was probably a major function of the Free Europe, Inc. corporate headquarters.

The author did talk at length with President William P. Durkee of Free Europe, Inc., members of his staff, and with General Lucius D. Clay, Chairman of the Free Europe Board

of Directors. Each of these gentlemen was candid in referring to past connections with the "sponsor"—a euphemism for the CIA. All affirmed that those past connections have now been broken. According to these spokesmen, the nature of past connections corresponded more closely to the relationship between, say, a major Foundation and that Foundation's grantee than the kind of relationship which one might expect to exist between a government agency and one of its subordinate extensions. RFE officials would meet with the "sponsor" to discuss budgetary matters and to exchange views on the overall nature of Free Europe activities. Such exchanges of views were restricted to the broad generalities of policy, e.g., agreement that broadcasting operations would emphasize journalistic professionalism as a major objective.

The realities of the day-to-day problems of running the five stations in Munich precluded, as will be seen subsequently in this report, any attempts by the "sponsor" to "censor," dictate, or otherwise assume a chain of command role in RFE's daily activities. "Sponsor" support was renewed each year on the basis of "sponsor" assessment of RFE's existence as a professionally-independent disseminator of news and information as being in the interest of U.S. policy toward East Europe.

Within this context, it would appear that the corporate management structure has not—certainly in recent years—been a mere front through which the policies of the U.S. Government funding sources have been conveyed. To the contrary, the Officers and Board of the corporation make a persuasive case that corporate policies originate within the corporate policymaking structure, and that corporate autonomy from the funding source is a highly-prized and jealously-guarded possession. The Boards of the two corporations are comprised of citizens of considerable prominence—men who have ready access to leading business and political circles in the United States, and who do not hesitate to make use of this access when the interests of the corporations so demand. These individuals regard their business and professional acumen as well as publicly established and their devotion to and appreciation of the U.S. national interest as a basic assumption underlying their election to the Boards. They view the efficient and continued implementation of Free Europe, Inc.'s basic charter as their sole and freely-assumed obligation to the U.S. Government. Although they are willing to listen to and consider specific policy options, they do not consider themselves subject to the operational supervision or control of U.S. Government agencies.

The individuals consulted, including President Durkee and General Clay, were unanimous in (a) a conviction that day-to-day policy supervision and control by any single funding source cannot be exercised without destroying the timeliness, flexibility, and effectiveness of the broadcast operations and, (b) an unwillingness to continue participation in any enterprise so controlled and supervised. All affirmed that the organization had operated in accordance with this kind of responsible independence in the past, to the satisfaction of all concerned.

The minutes of meetings of the Free Europe, Inc. Board of Directors and the Board's Executive Committee illustrate the nature and level of policymaking which takes place in New York. The author examined the minutes of all meetings held between October 9, 1970 and April 8, 1971. Major items taken up by the Board and/or the Executive Committee during this sample period included the following:<sup>5</sup>

"a. Budgetary pressures and fund-raising problems. These were discussed at all except two meetings, as RFE was attempting to cope with the problems caused by inflation,

reevaluation of the German mark, and some reduction in funding from the "sponsor." A basic decision of the Board was to try to implement the urgently-needed \$4,750,000 transmitter modernization program through the results of fund-raising campaigns, thus leaving the reduced "sponsor" contributions free to meet operating expenses without any reduction in broadcast activities.

"b. The nature and degree of Communist-bloc attacks on RFE.

"c. A detailed discussion and analysis of the complaints against RFE programming made by the Polish Government. The Board heard a report from RFE outlining the measures in effect to prevent the inadvertent broadcast of materials which could prompt any legitimate protests. The Board was informed that the "sponsor" and a "high level interagency committee" were agreed that RFE should stand fast against outside pressure for fundamental changes in the character of its programming.

"d. Meetings in February and April, 1971, dealt primarily with the ramifications of Senator Case's proposed legislation and with the Board's cooperation with the Department of State in working out some of the legislative considerations which ultimately found their way into S. 1936."

#### ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT

Under the By-Laws of Free Europe, Inc., the Board of Directors has "full power in the management and control of the policies, activities, funds, and affairs of the corporation." The Board accordingly appoints officers and interim directors, approves budgets and auditors' reports, reviews periodic operational reports submitted by the President, and takes other actions it considers necessary in directing the organization.

The chief executive officer of Free Europe, Inc. is the President, who is appointed by and responsible to the Board. With the New York headquarters staff previously described, he carries out the following functions:

**Corporate:** Liaison with the Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, including the preparation of periodic meetings of the Board and Executive Committee, and consultation on major policy, organizational, and fiscal developments.

**Governmental relations:** Consultation and liaison with the executive and legislative branches and whatever departments, committees, or other bodies may be appropriate under present or future arrangements. Recently this has included the Department of State, for exchanges of information; committees and individual members of Congress, as to legislation and individual requests for information; the Office of Budget and Management, as to current financing; and the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research Service as to their respective studies.

**Policy and Program:** The President supervises and consults with the Director of RFE in Munich on broad questions of policy and programming, on organizational problems and key personnel actions, on relations with European governments and with RFE's West European Advisory Committee. The handling of such matters is facilitated by a daily flow of teletypes and mail, and by occasional visits by the President and Director and other executives in both directions.

**Fiscal and Budget:** General supervision of expenditures and of accounting and auditing, as well as final review and presentation of budgets. The Accounting Department in New York maintains central accounts of all overseas and U.S.-based elements.

**Public Information:** The RFE research product, as noted elsewhere, has widespread byproduct use among scholars, journalists, and others in the U.S. and abroad. The President's staff is responsible for meeting all requests in this country for information and documentation.

**Fund-raising:** Mr. Durkee and Mr. J. Allan

Hovey, as President and Executive Vice President respectively of RFE Fund, Inc., are responsible for organizing the annual national fund drive and for the public-information advertising campaign conducted through the Advertising Council. The Fund's activities include the organization of local volunteers; preparation and distribution of solicitation letters and printed materials, advertising copy, radio and television announcements; arrangement of speaking engagements; response to queries from the media and public; and the processing of contributions received.

#### RADIO FREE EUROPE

##### Role of the director

Within the broad framework of corporate policy established by the Board of Directors and the President in New York, Radio Free Europe in Munich enjoys a near-total autonomy in the conduct of its daily affairs. The director, Mr. Ralph E. Walter (who is also a Vice President of Free Europe, Inc.) is responsible to and personally in close contact with President Durkee, but Mr. Walter and his staff make all the daily decisions which are essential to a rapidly responsive broadcast operation. Editorial policies are developed in daily meetings between the Director, key elements of the Director's staff, and executives of the five country Broadcasting Departments. Numerous administrative procedures have been developed to assure adequate follow-through on implementation of approved policies, and it is the Director's responsibility to keep the President of Free Europe, Inc. promptly and fully informed. In the interest of speed and flexibility, RFE has ruled out any general policy of pre-broadcast review of programs or the use of centrally-prepared master scripts. Pre-broadcast reviews are, however, required in rare instances on certain designated sensitive topics. In emergency situations, such as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Director requires the pre-broadcast review of all commentaries as a double-check against the possibility of incitement or misunderstanding by the audience. In general, crisis situations call for a tightening-up of all review procedures.

It should be emphasized that the review procedures under discussion are those required solely by the Director of RFE, in Munich, from his own staff in Munich. There are no established procedures which require RFE to clear any scripts in advance with Free Europe, Inc., or with any "sponsor" representatives.

##### Broadcasting departments

The five Broadcasting Departments—the heart and soul of the entire operation—are each headed by a Director and deputy who are former nationals from their audience countries. These men are directly responsible to the Director of RFE. They direct both the preparation of broadcast materials and the production processes by which these materials are put on the air. Staffs of these departments range from 101 in the Polish Broadcasting Department to 41 in the Bulgarian Department, and are comprised of personnel of the variety of talents required to produce the broad spectrum of political, news, economic, cultural, and sports programming featured by the stations. All Broadcasting Departments are strongly supported by the Central News Room—linked to each Department by internal teletype circuits—and continuous post-broadcast checking of scripts for content and effectiveness is maintained for the Director by RFE's Broadcast Analysis Unit. During the course of the author's visit to Munich, Mr. Walter inaugurated a new procedure whereby the Director of each Broadcasting Department will have periodic joint meetings with specialists of the Broadcast Analysis Unit and the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department.

The purpose of these meetings is both a critique of effectiveness of materials broadcast, and a correlation of Broadcasting Department programming with the opinion and preferences of the listening audience, as revealed by Audience Research reports.

RFE executives maintain that the system of placing the primary responsibility for program content with the individual Broadcast Directors has worked very well, taking full advantage of the special skills of the experienced East European staff and preserving their interest and morale in a manner which would be impossible under a system of implementing orders and translating centrally-prepared scripts. At the same time, Director Walter assures that the final responsibility of American management is fully recognized.

RFE has had no Programming Department as such since 1967, and each Broadcasting Department has full responsibility for all program development. The Director of RFE is, in effect, the programming chief for the five-station combination. Mr. Walter, the present Director, makes maximum use of staff facilities to assist him in both programming and policy functions. A description of these staff facilities and the daily use made of them in policy formulation and program implementation follows.

##### The news department

Nathan Kingsley, Chief of RFE's News Department, describes the relationship of his Department to the five country Broadcasting Departments as one of a news and news features agency with five radio stations as clients. The dissemination of accurate, timely, and relevant news every hour on the hour is probably the single most important activity of Radio Free Europe. News broadcasts are, according to RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research reports, the most heavily listened-to of all RFE programming.

Mr. Kingsley and his 9 editorial colleagues in the news department are all experienced journalists who take considerable pride in the professionalism of their work. Kingsley, a veteran of more than 16 years with the New York Herald Tribune in Europe and the United States—his last assignment there was as National Editor—operates a brisk and bustling department. It reminds one of the news room of any large American metropolitan daily newspaper or wire service, but is unique in the nature and variety of its news sources and in the fact that it deals daily in 8 to 10 languages. The News Department consists of a Central News Room, a Monitoring Section, an Audio Section, and a number of RFE News Bureaus. A total of some 180 editorial, reportorial, technical, and language personnel make up the Department staff.

##### The Central News Room (CNR)

The Central News Room edits and produces a news-and-features file of about 100,000 words each day from a variety of sources. Standard western news agencies, received by teletype, are:

United Press International, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, and Deutsch Presse Agentur.

CNR also monitors the teletype output of the following eleven Communist news services:

Tass (Soviet), Hsinhua (People's Republic of China), CETEKA (Czechoslovakia), PAP (Polish), MTI (Hungarian), Agepres (Rumanian), BTA (Bulgarian), Tanjug (Yugoslav), ADN (East German), ATA (Albanian), and VNA (North Vietnamese).

Material from these sources, from the News Department's extensive radio monitoring services, and from RFE News Bureaus is edited and rewritten to produce the daily news-and-features file. News stories are transmitted via teletype to the newsrooms of the five Broadcasting Departments as they are written, for each Broadcast Department produces a ten-minute live newscast each hour.



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These hard-news stories, combined with additional feature material, are distributed in printed form, known as the "daily budget," to other key addressees within the Munich headquarters throughout the day. The overnight accumulation is picked up and distributed to the Chief of the News Department, the Director of RFE, Broadcasting Department chiefs, and selected members of the Director's staff at their homes at 0600 each morning. This not only provides these individuals with substantial breakfast reading material, it enables them to prepare themselves mentally for policy and programming decisions based on the news each morning.

Non-news feature materials produced by CNR include such items as information on the theater, music, books, art, science, medicine, travel, industry, education, fashion, cooking, and so forth. The *Week in Review* is a 3,000-word summary of each week's events, prepared in text-and-sound form but which is used as a model by individual Broadcasting Department editors in writing their own language adaptations of the material. Monitoring reports in English, consisting of about 60 pages of specialized East European news, are issued twice a day.

#### The monitoring section

The Monitoring Section regularly audits the output of some 40 Communist radio stations in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The result of approximately 300 hours of such monitoring per day is the selection for editorial handling and transcription of some 100,000 words. Most transcribing is done in the original languages. In this fashion, the Broadcasting Departments are kept informed about the output of their competition—the regime radios. Other material is rewritten into English-language bulletins and moved into the regular Central News Room news circuit. Thus the monitoring operation is an important source for news developments within Eastern Europe—developments which are then "cross-reported" by RFE to each of its listening audiences.

#### The audio section

The role of the Audio Section is the provision of sound to accompany news and feature programming. The Information Services Department of RFE describes his role as follows:

"These sounds, or 'actualities,' are selected from hours of taped material and made available for broadcasts on master tapes containing tight excerpts. Transcripts also are provided to support the sound excerpts so that each RFE Broadcasting Department may prepare native-language 'overlays' for its listeners or translate fully at the end of the actuality.

"Feature material issued by the Audio Section includes interviews with pop stars, sports figures, intellectuals, etc. Almost any story issued by CNR either on its news circuit or in the Program Topics can be supported by sound.

"Important sources of audio material are RFE's bureaus and the Monitoring Section. The latter often provides taped excerpts from major East European announcements and speeches to reinforce or illustrate a major development.

"In addition to the production of approximately 20 sound actualities a day, the Audio Section arranges program exchanges with other European radio stations and issues a monthly calendar events in Europe."

#### RFE Bureaus

Radio Free Europe maintains European bureaus in Athens, Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, and Vienna, and stringers elsewhere as needed. There is also a newsroom in New

York, and a fulltime correspondent in Washington, D.C.

Although the news bureaus often supply items faster than the commercial wire services, their primary role is to focus upon events of special interest to Eastern European audiences—events which are often passed over by the wire services. The activities of Communist Parties outside the Soviet Bloc is but one example of the kind of news given detailed treatment by RFE bureaus. Press reviews, sound actualities, and the production of a number of regularly-scheduled programs are other major bureau activities.

The importance placed by the RFE News Department on journalistic professionalism is reflected in the background and experience of the editorial and reportorial staff of the Department.<sup>20</sup>

#### Research and analysis

Research and Analysis plays a dual role at RFE. It provides direct support to the Broadcasting Departments in terms of background information and analysis as well as contemporary factual material, and it provides substantial staff assistance to the Director in the formulation of policy. As will be subsequently demonstrated, the Research and Analysis chiefs probably have quicker access to and bring more long-range influence to bear upon the RFE Director than do the Broadcasting Department chiefs. As the RFE organization chart indicates the two Research and Analysis Departments are staff elements of the Office of the Director—totally separated from the Broadcast Departments and hence totally independent of them.

#### The East Europe research and analysis department (EERA)

EERA is by far the larger of the two Departments, staffed by some 82 members, and dealing with the five countries to which RFE broadcasts—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The Director of EERA is Mr. James Brown, a holder of dual U.S.—U.K. citizenship and who has been with Radio Free Europe since 1957. The basic components of EERA are five research and analysis sections corresponding to RFE's audience countries. These vary in size just as do the Broadcasting Departments they were originally designed to serve. The research and analysis sections are staffed by East Europeans, many of whom have been with RFE since its inception. Each section has its own information analysis center consisting of hundreds of thousands of 5 x 8 inch cards containing biographic, social, cultural, economic, political, and historical information organized according to a modified Library of Congress classification system.

In addition to the experienced East European research staff, Mr. Brown has the assistance of five young Americans with advanced degrees in history or political science who serve as Brown's Policy Assistants for each country. The Policy Assistants work closely with the research and analysis sections, but have the main task of writing studies and memoranda of a broader, more policy-oriented type than the usual output of the country sections. The Policy Assistants also serve as a link between the American management team and the Broadcasting Departments, facilitating the smooth formulation and implementation of the Director's policy decisions. EERA also employs two economists who specialize in the economic problems of East Europe and whose contributions to broadcasting are considered quite valuable.

#### The Communist area analysis department (CAA)

CAA is much smaller than EERA, consisting of only 13 staff members. It is not therefore able to provide the same kind of detailed analysis as is needed on the five audience countries. Since news of the rest of

the Communist world, and of Communist Parties not in power, is of great interest to East European audiences, RFE makes an effort to maintain its expertise on these matters through the CAA staff. This staff includes three analysts on the Soviet Union, two on Yugoslavia, one on China, one on East Germany, one on Albania, and one on the non-ruling Communist Parties. Chief of the Department is Mr. Samuel Lyon.

#### Sources and methods

RFE considers the press, both printed and electronic, of the Communist countries themselves as by far the most important source of information. RFE analyzes every Communist newspaper, professional journal, periodical, and other publication of note produced in Eastern Europe. Most of the small or provincial newspapers are also examined, as these contain much of the kind of detailed and topical information overlooked by the metropolitan press. Much of the cross-reporting material, and information on developments within-country came from this kind of source. The News Department's extensive radio monitoring activity of metropolitan and local stations in East Europe and elsewhere is also a valuable source of information for research and analytical activities, as is the input derived from the Communist news and wire services. Finally, another good source of information is to be found in Western publications—the press, scholarly journals, and commercial publications.

Information from these varied sources is analyzed, categorized, and filed in the information analysis centers within each of the five Research and Analysis Sections. The card files in these information centers are carefully maintained, and even some of the hard copies—the newspapers and publications themselves—are preserved within the Sections for several years before being micro-filmed or assigned to warehouse storage.

The manually-operated file card system has worked well to date. The research analysts are thoroughly familiar with their files and are usually able to retrieve relevant information from the files very rapidly.

The accumulation of twenty years has, however, caused storage problems, and there is no way by which to test scientifically the responsiveness of the information retrieval operations as they are presently constituted. In other words, there is no way to tell exactly how much relevant information on a given topic is contained in the information bank and which was not retrieved in a given case. The best that can be said is that both the research analysts and their Broadcasting Department users appear reasonably satisfied with the results.

RFE research personnel on both management and working levels are aware that their operations could benefit from a greater utilization of automation, and that today's state-of-the-art in information storage and retrieval could provide some significant improvements in utilization of the RFE files. They are equally aware, however, that present and foreseeable budgetary constraints relegate any serious discussion of automation to the academic.

Both the files of the information analysis centers and the supporting library operation are unique in their quantity, scope, and comprehensiveness in East European lore, and it would be impossible to put a realistic price on their value to the scholars, governments, journalists, and others who regularly subscribe to the RFE research output.

In Europe, for example, RFE has a list of some 694 regular subscribers to research papers. These include educational institutions, individual scholars, research institutions, governmental agencies and employees, persons in business and the communication industries, and others. More than 200 similar subscribers are in the United States, bringing the total distribution list of RFE research reports to 900.

Indices of background studies, situation reports, press surveys, and other research products produced by RFE during the latter part of 1971 are included in Annex G.

#### *The broadcast analysis unit*

Originally organized primarily for the purpose of checking on the implementation of policy, the Broadcast Analysis Unit has evolved into a mechanism for quality control as well as policy control. Directed by Mr. Miloslav Kohak, the Broadcast Analysis Unit is staffed by seven country Broadcast Analysts, a number of translators who occasionally double as analysts, and appropriate support personnel bringing the total staff to 27 persons.

The Broadcast Analysis Unit has a formidable workload—possibly the heaviest per capita in RFE. Each day the major programs of each Broadcasting Department are monitored, summarized, and analyzed for adherence to RFE policy and for comprehensiveness of coverage. The Daily Summaries comprise a key management tool for keeping up with the voluminous programming of the Broadcast Departments. All programs are analyzed to chart coverage of special policy guidances and news themes deemed important by management, and a report on the extent of such coverage is delivered to the Director each week. Also each week, there is a meeting between the B.A. Unit and the Director (and occasional informal meetings with Broadcast Directors) for the purpose of assessing style, content, and delivery techniques of programming. Program changes and the correction of flaws often result from these meetings.

More recently—in October 1971—Director Walter instituted joint meetings between the Broadcasting Departments, the Broadcast Analysis Unit, and the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department. At these meetings, the Broadcasting Departments received the full benefit of correlations between B.A. Unit critiques and the audience preferences as estimated by audience research techniques. Indications to date are that these meetings are lively and spirited, but are received in a constructive spirit by the Broadcasting Department chiefs.

A management tool of crucial importance to RFE is the series of statistical reports on RFE programming produced each month by the Broadcast Analysis Unit.<sup>11</sup> These reports quantify the programming output for each Broadcasting Department in terms of program content, expressing the results in percentages of air time devoted to each type of programming. Statistical tabulations are accompanied by narratives which explain similarities and differences between the output of the different BD's and which enable management to remain well informed about trends in performance—strengths and weaknesses—in programming.

#### *The audience and public opinion research department*

The Audience and Public Opinion Research Department (APOR) is another staff element of growing importance. Its basic purpose is as its name implies: to attempt to conduct market research which will provide scientifically usable information to enable RFE to (a) know better the likes and dislikes of its potential audiences, (b) know accurately the impact of specific programming on those audiences, and, (c) keep track of the size and composition of RFE audiences. APOR activities are the subject of a separate annex (See Annex A) of this study, and will be described and evaluated in detail in Chapter VI.

#### *The West European Advisory Committee of Radio Free Europe*

Although it is not an integral part of the RFE organizational structure, nor does it participate directly in the formulation of RFE policy, a group known as the West European Advisory Committee of Radio Free

Europe does play an important indirect role in policymaking and deserves brief mention.

The West European Advisory Committee to Radio Free Europe is an informal group of eminent Europeans who meet about once a year with officers and directors of Free Europe, Inc. to discuss East-West relations, East European developments, and the work of RFE.

"The group was established in 1959; its fourteenth session was held in Monte Carlo October 24–25, 1970. In recent years its meetings have been enlarged by invitations to non-members. An advance written report is submitted to participants by RFE, which also covers the costs and provides the necessary conference services. Current Chairman is Dirk U. Stikker, of the Netherlands. His predecessors were Randolpho Paccardi and Paul van Zeeland . . .

"Radio Free Europe's meetings with the members and guests of WEAC have served RFE beneficially in three ways: they give RFE a range of current West European opinion on East European policy and prospects; they elicit specific recommendations with respect to RFE's broadcasting and its relations in West Europe; and they acquaint a new group of distinguished Europeans each year with the policy, analytical capacity, and impact of Radio Free Europe."<sup>12</sup>

#### *HOW POLICY IS MADE AT RFE*

Radio Free Europe's weekly broadcasting schedules call for 557 hours 42 minutes of broadcasting to the five audience countries. Of this total, some 292 hours and 27 minutes represent original programming, with the remainder being repeats at different times of day. Up to 15 percent of the original programming is prepared in New York; the remainder is prepared each day in Munich.

These figures graphically illustrate the speed and flexibility with which the individual policymaking components of RFE, described in the previous section, must work together every day. These figures, together with the disparate audiences of the five countries, also illustrate the impracticability of central scripting or the pre-broadcast review of scripts except in limited quantity and unusual circumstances. The question of "policy control," or "policy supervision," by any group external to RFE's Munich headquarters—even by the Free Europe, Inc. Board of Directors—becomes largely one of trust and confidence in RFE's management and procedures based on evaluated performance. RFE's internal procedures are designed to deliver the kind of performance justifying confidence.

#### *News evaluation*

The RFE format of 10-minute newcasts each hour on the hour by each of the five Broadcasting Departments requires the production of a tremendous amount of evaluated news each day. The process begins at 0600 hours each morning, when the overnight accumulation of the news budget is delivered to key RFE executives at their homes. This overnight accumulation is read with special care by Kingsley and his senior assistants in the News Department. At about 0900 hours Kingsley and his staff review the budget together, discussing any items of questionable authenticity or unusual importance. Plans are made to confirm or refute doubtful items or restrict the manner in which they can be used if at all.

Both at the early morning meeting and throughout the day the News Department is responsible for bringing questionable press reports to the Director's attention. A good deal of RFE's political programming is based upon reviews of both the Western and Eastern press. Such reviews are carried in the news budget along with the hard news items. To assure proper and objective handling of press review material, however, the Director's Office issues Recommended Lists twice daily. These lists provide guidelines

for the use of articles from the Eastern and Western press picked up and reported in RFE's internal news service. Highlighting key reports which are of greater than normal significance, either in a positive or negative way, the Recommended Lists evaluate news items in descending order of usefulness for broadcast as Especially Useful, Useful, Noteworthy, Background Information Only, or Clear Attribution Only. This latter evaluation means that the item may be used if a Broadcasting Department so desires, but its source must be clearly identified and not associated in any way with RFE. Especially Useful and Background Information Only classifications—along with Clear Attribution Only—are binding on the Broadcasting Departments who must follow the evaluations on the Lists. The Morning Recommended List for October 26, 1971 is attached as Annex J.

The Broadcast Analysis Unit has a continuing responsibility to report on the extent to which items evaluated as Especially Useful are utilized by the Broadcasting Departments.

Straight news items from the many sources available to RFE are evaluated by Kingsley and his staff, and only those items which meet high journalistic standards of authenticity are teletyped for newscast to the Broadcasting Department news rooms.

#### *The director's pre-meeting*

Each morning at 0930 hours a preliminary policy discussion takes place in the Director's office. Attendees include the Director, his deputy, the respective Eastern European and Communist Area research chiefs or their designees, the chief of the Broadcast Analysis Unit, and senior representatives of the News Department. Occasionally other executives, such as the chief of the Information Services Division (the RFE term for public relations), may be present. No representatives of the Broadcasting Departments attend the Director's pre-meeting. Usually the BD chiefs are conducting simultaneous staff meetings of their own; more importantly, the Director keeps the inputs from his research and policy assistants separate from those of his Broadcasting Department Directors.

The basic purpose of the pre-meeting is to take note of major events affecting world affairs or East Europe which have occurred since the previous day and to decide whether RFE needs to take a formal policy stance on any of them, or what kind of coverage, if any, RFE should air.

#### *Daily guidance summaries*

During the pre-meeting of October 26, 1971, for example, the major news event discussed was the previous night's vote at the United Nations which admitted the People's Republic of China and expelled the representatives of the Republic of China on Taiwan. The implications of this development to East Europe, the Soviet Union, and the United States were clearly far-reaching, and all participants at the meeting agreed that a Daily Guidance Summary (DGS) should be issued. Mr. J. F. Kun, China specialist of the Communist Area Analysis Department, was present at the meeting and offered his view that the basic RFE policy line should, as it addressed the expulsion of Taiwan, be couched in terms of "regret rather than anger." This was accepted by the group and Mr. Kun was directed to draft the guidance. The result was a DGS dated October 26, 1971 entitled PRC Admitted to UN on Basis of Albanian Resolution.

#### *ADMISSION OF THE PRC TO THE UN*

The DGS of October 26 was factual, moderate in tone, and based upon key points brought out during the UN debate. It summarized the history of the evolving U.S. position favoring admission of the PRC to the UN, and acknowledged that such admission was favored by the great majority of UN members. U.S. Ambassador Bush's statements

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during the debate were quoted in support of the principle that no UN member in good standing should be expelled without cause. RFE concluded that the expulsion tended to diminish the service the members of the UN had done by admitting the PRC, and that, although the PRC's future contribution to the UN could not be precisely predicted, it was to be hoped that that contribution would have a stabilizing effect on world affairs. It was suggested that the Broadcasting Departments make use of their New York bureaus in providing coverage along the suggested lines.

*Daily Guidance Summaries, the exception, not the rule*

The issuance of Daily Guidance Summaries as a result of the Director's pre-meeting or the subsequent broader policy meeting at 10 o'clock is, however, more the exception than the rule. On most days, the items in the news are routinely disposed of orally and no written guidances are required. Occasionally a "guidance note"—more informal than a DGS—is issued, but this too occurs only sporadically.

As a matter of fact, the term "guidance" is not precisely descriptive in terms of the function of a DGS. Most of these documents merely sum up the situation as accurately as possible, highlight the important points, call attention to possible pitfalls, and let the Broadcasting Departments take it from there.

With rare exceptions, the "guidance" provided by the Director—and which is binding on the Broadcasting Departments—is finalized during the 10 o'clock meetings. When written DGS are issued, it is usually later in the day, when BD programming is at a relatively advanced stage. But this programming is supposed to be in compliance with the Director's policy, and the written DGS provide a record of this policy by which specific scripts can later be checked.

During the period covered by the field study (October 23 through November 5, 1971) only four DGS were issued. In addition to the DGS on China and the UN, issued on October 26, a DGS on Britain's entry into the Common Market was published on October 29, and two DGS resulted from the November 2 pre-meeting. One of these dealt with some aspects of Hungary's "New Economic Mechanism," the other with the fact that the Albanian Communist Party Congress convened with the presence of a delegation from Communist China—an unprecedented occurrence.<sup>12</sup>

#### BRITAIN CHOOSES THE COMMON MARKET

This Daily Guidance Summary recounted the historical background leading up to Heath's parliamentary victory, took note of the fact that the pro-Common Market sentiments of political leaders in Britain do not yet, according to the polls, have a majority of popular support, but opined generally that what was good for Europe and Britain economically was unlikely to harm the United States. The heart of the DGS was expressed in the following paragraph:

"The enlargement of the Community should be seen as part of wider changes in the world picture—changes marked, among other things, by the implementation of West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, the entry of China into the United Nations, cautious moves toward a European Security conference and the emergence of Japan as a major economic power. The bipolar world of yesterday is giving way to something new—and many adaptations will be necessary by many nations."

The remainder of the DGS also took note of Comecon de jure opposition to enlargement of the Market but also of the fact that on a de facto basis many of the non-Soviet Comecon members had sought to further their own economic interests through bilateral agreements with individual EEC

states. The DGS also noted in passing that Communist China had welcomed West European integration as demonstrating resistance to control and interference by the "super-powers."

#### THE NEM AND ITS PROBLEMS

The DGS dealt with a number of technical economic aspects of the difficulties being encountered by the Hungarian Government in its progress toward greater efficiency under a plan known as the New Economic Mechanism. It summarized an October 22 speech of Premier Fock in which the Government point of view was presented, characterizing this presentation rather favorably as "... noteworthy not only for its comprehensive survey of all the economic troubles of national concern, but also for the regime's determination to come to grips with them in the very near future..." The DGS went on to evaluate certain aspects of the NEM:

"... The degree of pluralism that has emerged in Hungary has been one of the finest achievements of the NEM, and, aside from the freer atmosphere it has fostered, it probably represents the country's best potential for truly dynamic development in all sectors of national life..."

The BD's were advised to comment on the technical economic aspects of the situation along these generally positive lines. The Hungarian BD, however, received added advice focusing upon some of the shortcomings as well as the constructive aspects of Fock's policy. It was pointed out, for example, that there were contradictions between Fock's criticism of the "lenience allegedly shown toward 'undisciplined' workers by enterprise managers" and the Government's prior admissions that the growth in industrial output during the last two years had been achieved through higher labor productivity.

Too, it was pointed out that the Government's recommended intensive economic methods could not be implemented if needed machinery imports from the West were reduced in the campaign to eliminate Hungary's unfavorable balance of trade. Instead, the government should redouble its "efforts to increase Western exports through co-operation agreements with Western firms."

#### ALBANIAN CONGRESS MEETS WITHOUT CHINESE DELEGATION PRESENT

The DGS noted that Communist China's failure to send a delegation to the Party Congress of its closest ideological and political ally was an "unprecedented development, and one that was probably prompted by considerations of major significance." The DGS went on to speculate about some of the possible reasons for Chinese absence. Among these could be a leadership crisis in Peking or possible differences of views between the Albanian and Chinese leadership "over the recent Chinese efforts to normalize relations with the U.S." The guidance also called attention to Rumania's absence from the Congress, speculating that, in the light of China's absence, Rumania might have felt more conspicuously at odds with the USSR had she attended a Congress boycotted by the USSR-influenced Communist groups.

#### The policy meeting at 10 o'clock

At the conclusion of the Director's pre-meeting, the participants move to a large conference room where they are joined by the Broadcast Department Directors, key BD editors, research and analysis, and other staff members concerned with the daily formulation of broadcast materials.

In appearance, these daily 10 o'clock meetings resemble somewhat meetings of the UN Security Council, although they are characterized by an absence of the incentive which often permeates that august body. Key participants are seated around tables forming a hollow square. Their advisers and other participants occupy rows of chairs behind the tables.

The Director usually opens the meetings with a summation of the most important conclusions of the Director's pre-meeting. Often he will ask a specialist to elaborate upon some of the relevant factors. Mr. Brown, the EERA chief, may discourse upon the impact, say, of Britain's entry into the Common Market upon East European economics, or Mr. Kun may, as he did during the October 26 meeting, summarize the factors involved in that instance the writing of a DGS on China's admission to the UN. All Broadcasting Department Directors are thereby put on notice as to the Director's preliminary conclusions as to how major events should be treated in the day's programming.

Individual Broadcasting Department Directors then proceed to make individual presentations of major items to be treated in their own programs for the day. There is a good deal of give-and-take in these discussions, but the atmosphere is quite positive and the discussants are experienced and sophisticated individuals long accustomed to working out difficult problems together. Usually the outcome of a meeting is more an exchange of relevant ideas and information than a hammering-out of a difficult policy question. If there are any ambiguities in policy, however, these seem to be quickly resolved. Each Department is faced by a busy workday, and the participants are reluctant to waste time in extended discussion. This is well illustrated by the fact that some forty or fifty persons usually attend the ten o'clock meeting, yet it is a rare meeting that runs past eleven o'clock.

Five days a week a "country" meeting is held following the ten o'clock meeting. Participants are the Director, appropriate research specialist, and key individuals from the Broadcasting Department whose audience country is the subject of the particular meeting. In these meetings, both analytical and programming matters are reviewed in depth.

Minutes are kept of all the meetings, and the results are immediately teletyped to Free Europe, Inc. and Radio Free Europe in New York. These messages are in the form of notification, not requests for approval. By the time they are read at the beginning of the work day in New York, the Munich staff is already two-thirds through its daily program preparation and production because of the six-hour difference. By the end of the lunch hour in Munich, many of the programs for the day are already written; some are in production.

The broadcasts of original programs begin in the afternoon and are carried through the evening hours together with some afternoon repeats. Morning programs, except for the hourly live newscasts, are mostly repeats of the previous day's most important programs.

Since the Daily Guidance Summaries usually do not reach the Broadcasting Departments until the editors and writers are well into the day's work, the Broadcasting Department Directors take care to assure that their individual staffs are well and completely informed of the results of the daily policy meetings. This is usually done at brief but intense Departmental staff meetings immediately following adjournment of the ten o'clock meeting. Daily Guidance Summaries, then, become for all practical purposes more a means by which the Director's staff can evaluate subsequent programming for compliance with decisions taken at the 10 o'clock meetings than written directives to be followed verbatim by the five radio stations which make up RFE.

Copies of Munich's daily teletyped reports to New York for October 26, 27, 28, and 29, plus that of October 30 (sent on November 2) and those of November 2, 3, 4, and 5 are included in Annex L.

A "Radio Free Europe Program Flow Chart," illustrating the collaboration among management, Broadcasting Departments, the

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Central News Room, research and analysis staffs, production specialists, and technical support services in the production of RFE programs, appears on the following page.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex VII, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Durkee, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 6-7.

<sup>4</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex VI, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Without access to classified sources of information, there was no way for the author of this report to arrive at any defensible conclusion regarding the nature and purposes of contacts which may have occurred from time to time between individual RFE officials and "sponsor" representatives, and which involved subject matter not covered in minutes of Free Europe Board of Directors meetings.

<sup>6</sup> Biographic sketches of eight key executives in the New York Headquarters of Free Europe, Inc. are included in Annex C.

<sup>7</sup> The descriptive material on RFE internal procedures has been drawn by the author from RFE internal documents and from interviews conducted in Munich with RFE personnel during the period October 23-November 5, 1971.

<sup>8</sup> The script of the Week in Review for the week ending October 28, 1971 is attached as Annex E.

<sup>9</sup> Information Services Department, Radio Free Europe, undated pamphlet, Radio Free Europe's News Operation, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Biographical sketches of key members of the editorial staff are attached as Annex F.

<sup>11</sup> A sample statistical report for May, 1971, is attached as Annex H.

<sup>12</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex V., p. 1. A list of members and recent guest participants in WEAC is attached as Annex I.

<sup>13</sup> The full texts of all of these Daily Guidance summaries are contained in Annex K.

## CHAPTER IV: PROGRAM CONTENT

"Here at Radio Free Europe there are no illusions about sudden changes in governmental forms in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has convincingly demonstrated, most recently in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, that there continue to be limits to what will be tolerated. Communist regimes are likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future regardless of the wishes of East Europeans. But the pace of change in today's world will not bypass East Europe and modifications are taking place. Thus, within the framework of the Communist system, positive evolution can be encouraged, and we try to do this. At the same time, we try to discourage actions which could intensify trends toward greater repression."

These are the approximate words heard by the author of this report in varied forms from each of the Broadcasting Department Directors and from all responsible RFE executives interviewed. Another aspect of this basic philosophy had been stated in a broader context as early as September 10, 1966, when Ralph E. Walter, then Policy Director and now RFE Director, stated the following in a speech to the American Political Science Association:

"Of prime importance will be to encourage the return of Eastern Europe to Europe in the broadcast sense. The divorce of East and West has been unnatural and irrational except in terms of what the Soviets have considered their security interests. The growth of nationalism may lead Eastern European states to distance themselves from the Soviet Union, but it would be a tragedy if it led again to rekindling national hatreds. For if the past is in any sense prologue, the future will not then merely be that of Hungarian against Russian and Pole against Russian. Unhappily, it will in all likelihood also be Rumanian against Hungarian, Pole against German, and Czech against Pole.

No—Eastern Europe must be helped to broaden its horizons. Less subterfuge—political, economic, and ideological—to the USSR is essential to the creation of healthy societies. The future East European relationship to the USSR should be that of neighbor to neighbor. There is no reason to believe that the USSR will disappear; hence, every reason to work toward normal state to state relations between the Soviet Union and those countries on her western frontiers. It would be unwise and dangerous for Western radio to advocate enmity with the Soviet Union. An increased effort can usefully be devoted toward encouragement of longer range thinking that looks toward growing ties between East and West Europe, indeed between East and the Atlantic community. RFE has for a number of years advocated increased East-West exchange, freer tourism, additional trade, student tours, and participation in international conferences and discussions. Of course, this is a process that requires broad Western interest—something not always as evident as one might wish."

## AN ALTERNATIVE "HOME SERVICE"

It is in support of this pragmatic approach that the content of RFE programming is designed. The way this programming is packaged and how it is delivered to its audiences is, however, a function of quantity as well as quality of service. The variety of social, intellectual, and economic levels among the potential audience is a factor, as is the fact that an "alternative home service"—as RFE refers to itself—must be on the air at whatever time its listeners may be inclined to hear it. RFE's distinctiveness from "foreign" broadcasting services is illustrated by the following comparison of daily air time in hours on weekdays:<sup>1</sup>

	VOA	BBC	Deutsche Welle	RFE
Bulgaria.....	1:30	2:15	2:00	7:30
Czechoslovakia.....	2:00	3:30	2:00	20:20
Hungary.....	2:00	3:15	1:00	19:00
Poland.....	2:00	3:30	1:30	19:00
Rumania.....	1:30	2:30	2:00	12:00

## PROGRAM MAKEUP

Radio Free Europe reports that its five national services broadcast a total of over 557 hours per week, broken down as follows:<sup>2</sup>

	Percent
News.....	16.1
Politically-oriented programs (commentaries, round table discussions, press surveys, etc.).....	34.7
Music and entertainment.....	21.6
Cultural, scientific, and other non-political information and special-audience programs (youth, women, labor, sports, etc.).....	18.8
Religious.....	2.2
Miscellaneous.....	6.6

Although RFE maintains that this format is the result both of experience and careful study of audience attitudes and preferences, it also asserts that RFE tries to take full advantage of any opportunities to stimulate audience interest in all "subjects important to their understanding of their world."<sup>3</sup> One type of programming, which began as a manifestation of the latter category but which has become an important and popular element of RFE's format is called "cross-reporting." Regime censorship is applied across-the-board—i.e., East European regimes censor not only information media from the West, but media from the other Communist countries as well. In addition, events within neighboring East European countries had traditionally been of minimal interest. Cross-reporting was devised to spur local interest in the affairs of

East European neighbors. By concentrating on reporting to each country, developments in other East European countries, the USSR, and among Communist Parties in the rest of the world, RFE has sought to "introduce constructive ideas in a context which implies that they are ideologically defensible and politically practicable (at least in the eyes of one Communist leadership), to create hope and interest in the possibility of change, and to emphasize what East Europeans have in common apart from (and in contrast to) the Soviet Union."<sup>4</sup> RFE offers findings of its Audience and Public Opinion Research Department purporting to show that in 1968 this form of programming was considered "important" by large majorities of its five audiences.

RFE programming is centered around "news every hour on the hour," but tends in general toward what would be called in American broadcast parlance a "magazine" format. This consists of lively discussion and presentation of various aspects of life, without excessive political accents. This represents a change from RFE's earlier highly-structured schedule described in RFE documents as a schedule of special programs for workers, farmers, labor, youth, etc. It is not that these audiences are no longer sought; rather, the labels have been removed and the audience appeal lies in the way material is presented. Youth audiences, educated elites, professional and managerial personnel—these are specifically believed by RFE to have been the main generators of political pressure and change and hence are favored audiences. RFE also takes pride in its expertise in economics, and now broadcasts "wide-ranging discussion, expert as well as popular, of economic topics in place of the early negative criticism by non-experts."<sup>5</sup>

Popular music is extensively used, both to build audiences and to provide an attractive vehicle for commentaries to the audiences who tuned in for the music.

RFE also promptly broadcasts fast-breaking events, and accommodates unorthodox program ideas such as broadcasting verbatim the texts of major documents repressed by Communist regimes. In crisis situations, RFE is prepared to remain on the air for 24 hours per day for as many days as necessary, "both to keep audiences in all five countries aware of actual developments and to provide reassurance against wild rumors."<sup>6</sup>

RFE's Broadcast Analysis Unit has compiled a chart of its programming by subject category to all five of the countries of its jurisdiction. This chart appears on the following page.

Statistical analyses, charts, and even descriptive summaries and actual scripts do not, however, convey a full picture of the flavor, image, nor even the net content of RFE programs. To begin with, despite the authentic East European tone and style of the individual Broadcasting Departments, there is also a definite "American" flavor to overall RFE programming. This results from several factors. The use of certain types of musical themes and interludes, avoidance of "dead" air, quick and precise timing, and the tasteful use of light or humorous approaches, even to serious subjects—these are some of the factors. Disc jockey and "panorama" formats are others. The fact that virtually all of the popular music aimed at the youth audiences is Western carries its own, sometimes subtle, punch. The antiwar and protest songs of Joan Baez and John Lennon, for example, are said to have quite an impact on young East Europeans who face daily life under the constraints of an "establishment" of a very different type from the one to which Miss Baez resents the payment of taxes.<sup>7</sup>

Nor, in terms of ultimate impact, can the label "political" be restricted to those programs so described by RFE Broadcast Analysis procedures. The objective presentation of



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hard news without regard for topic, source, or any other factor save accuracy is considered a "political" act by East European governments whose censorship is punctured by RFE newscasts. In the words of one Communist official, Wlodzimierz Sokorski, Chairman, Polish Radio/Television:

"One must not forget that the very character of ideological struggle presupposes opposition to the notion of objective information."

There are times, however, when the "notion of objective information is not always viewed as hostile, even by a regime such as that of Ceausescu in Rumania—a regime placing considerable emphasis upon ideological conformity. Rumania has not jammed RFE since July 30, 1963—a date preceding Rumania's open declaration of April of 1964 that she intended to follow an independent course in foreign policy. In some respects the "relationship" of RFE with the Rumanian regime has touches of ambivalence. The Rumanian government—like its counterparts in the four other East European countries to which RFE broadcasts—squirms at criticism, no matter how mild, how objective, or how tactfully put. On the other hand, a look at the program patterns being broadcast by RFE to Rumania suggests that RFE often, for its own ends, serves certain purposes of the regime. RFE broadcasts are unlikely to criticize Rumanian foreign policy, which seems designed to abet purely national interests to a degree greater than seen elsewhere in East Europe.

The Rumanian Broadcasting Department's "relationship" with the Ceausescu government is not, however, entirely serendipitous. Repressive domestic policies—most recently the crusade for ideological purity which was launched by Ceausescu in the summer of 1971—draw consistent and reasoned criticism. And, some months ago, Cornel Chiriac, a leading figure among Rumanian disc jockeys in Bucharest, tired of the increasing restrictions placed by the government upon the music he could play and upon general curtailment of the freedom or artistic creativity, Chiriac slipped out of Rumania and turned up in a refugee camp not far from Munich. Noel Bernard, Director of RFE's Rumanian Broadcasting Department, heard about him and hired him at once. Today, Chiriac's popular musical program "Metronome" formerly one of Radio Bucharest's most listened-to shows—is again heard in Bucharest—but on Radio Free Europe instead. Chiriac's fan mail from Rumania and from other East European countries indicates that he has lost none of his popularity there through making the switch.<sup>9</sup>

Broadcasting schedules for each of the five Broadcasting Departments, together with thumbnail descriptions of each type of program on the schedule, are included in Annex M. Broadcast Analysis summaries for the period October 26–November 5, 1971 are contained in Annex N. *Implementation of Policy in Program Content* (politically-oriented programs).

As noted earlier, most of RFE's daily policy decisions affecting the content of programming are reached in Munich through oral consensus among the Director, his staff, and executives of the five Broadcasting Departments. Certain key topics, however, in the field of both news and commentary, rate special policy treatment in the form of written Recommended Lists (referring to the usage of articles from Eastern or Western press sources) and Daily Guidance Summaries (referring to RFE commentary upon important Eastern European or international developments). During the period of the field study in Munich, the author observed daily both the formulation of oral and written policy guidances and their implementation in each of the Broadcasting Departments. These observations were the basis for subsequent dis-

ussion with the Broadcast Analysis Department, which has the Director's mandate to check upon policy implementation as well as general program quality.

In Chapter III it was recorded that during the period of the field study in Munich (October 23–November 5, 1971) RFE management issued four Daily Guidance Summaries setting forth RFE policy for treatment of four major news events. In the following paragraphs, news and other sources used by RFE in carrying out this policy and the nature and degree of the content of the resulting programs are briefly summarized:

*Admission of Communist China to the U.N. and the expulsion of Taiwan*

The controversial U.N. vote admitting Communist China to the U.N. and expelling the Chiang regime was the major news story of the morning of October 26. The Daily Guidance Summary spelling out RFE's recommended treatment of this topic has been summarized on page 61, above, and the complete text of this DGS appears in Annex K.

Examination of RFE scripts and Broadcast Analysis summaries reveals that each of the Broadcast Departments gave this topic heavy coverage for several days, both in the form of individual political commentaries and in extensive reviews of the press in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds. *Press Review and Political Program No. 177*—the prime political program of the Rumanian Broadcasting Department for October 26, 1971—carried a commentary almost identical in language and tone with that of the DGS as the seventh of eight topics covered in the program.<sup>10</sup> The Bulgarian BD gave the topic similar, though not identical, treatment the same day in its political program *The World Today*. The Czechoslovak BD, with some emphasis on the tense atmosphere in the General Assembly, handled the story in its *International Block; Newsreel*, the major political program of the Hungarian BD, stressed the precedent set by the expulsion of Taiwan, but added more optimistic notes about possible moves away from world bipolarization in reports from its correspondents in London and Paris. The *Facts and Views* commentary of the Polish Broadcasting Department added some historical perspective to the issue, but otherwise followed the train of thought in the DGS fairly closely.

Commentary on the China-U.N. issue persisted for two or three days, with individual BD's both zeroing in on some of the specific points raised by the DGS, and taking advantage of later news breaks for new ideas. Nixon's reaction to the "undisguised glee" of some of the delegates, Rogers' reaffirmation of U.S. support of the U.N., and the view of both liberal and conservative U.S. politicians—all of these received ample coverage in RFE commentaries.

As the week progressed, coverage of China and the U.N. tended to move from the realm of RFE commentary to that of extensive reviews of the world press. Among the journals and news agency reports quoted were:

New York Times.  
London Times.  
London Daily Mail.  
Manchester Guardian.  
London Daily Telegraph.  
Sueddeutsche Zeitung.  
Le Figaro.  
L'Aurore.  
Paris Jour.  
Le Monde.  
Salzburger Nachrichten.  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.  
Toronto Globe and Mail.  
Agence France Presse.  
Deutsche Press Agentur.  
Dagens Nyheter.  
Helsingen Sanomat.  
Pravda.  
Rude Pravo.  
Stuttgarter Zeitung.

Die Welt.  
MTI (Hungarian news agency).  
Trybuna Ludu.  
Nepszabadsag.  
Baltimore Sun.  
Washington Post.  
Chicago Tribune.  
Financial Times.  
Messagero.  
Die Presse.  
Christian Science Monitor.  
Journal of Commerce.  
Montreal Star.  
Kornen-Zeitung.  
Svenska Dagbladet.  
Handelstidning.  
Suomen Sosialdemokraati.  
Washington Evening Star.  
Catholic News Review.

In the quotations excerpted from these newspapers and agencies, coverage was given to a broad spectrum of U.S. political opinion, Western European opinion, and the treatment afforded the topic by leading Communist journals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

*Admission of the United Kingdom to the Common Market*

The decision of the British Parliament to join the Common Market was the second major world development to take place during the period of the field study in Munich. RFE policy in handling coverage of this momentous event was outlined in a Daily Guidance Summary on November 29, 1971 entitled *Britain Chooses the Common Market*. This DGS was summarized on page 63, above, and its full text is to be found in Annex K.

RFE coverage of this event was thorough, but, except for press reviews which were sporadically aired over a period of a few days, was confined largely to reportage and commentary in anticipation of the vote and, afterwards, to interpretive reporting of the significance of the British move on October 29 and 30. On October 29 coverage along the lines of the DGS was carried in the Bulgarian *The World Today*, the Czechoslovak *International Block*—which dwelt at some length upon the broader impact on Europe as a whole and the world trend against bipolarization—and the Hungarian *Newsreel*, which pointed out that the expanded EEC will be a "more equal" partner of the U.S. but will also cause some headaches for the USSR and its East European allies. The Polish BD, in its *Facts and Views*, was somewhat more outspoken in that it pointed out that expansion of the Common Market was a blow to the Kremlin, which had opposed this turn of events. The Polish *Panorama* of October 29 also excerpted statements of a number of West European and British politicians, as well as mentioning the negative reaction of Moscow radio and of the East German press. The Rumanian *Political Program* closely followed the RFE policy as expressed in the DGS. It also paralleled Polish coverage in terms of excerpting the statements of prominent West European spokesmen and calling attention to negative reactions in Moscow and East Berlin.

Press reviews aired by the five Broadcasting Departments encompassed a somewhat narrower range than those devoted to the admission of China to the U.N.—a circumstance motivated, no doubt, by the fact that Britain's admission to the Common Market—important though it was—did not spark the danger of international controversy and extended interest of the China vote at the U.N. *Hungary—Some problems with the new economic mechanism*

The Daily Guidance Summary entitled *The NEM and its Problems*, summarized on page 64, above, was issued by RFE on November 2, 1971. This DGS is, however, a good example of DGS' being primarily the recording of a consensus rather than an actual directive.

Reason: the economic speech of Premier Fock on this subject was delivered on October 22, and most of the commentaries of the Hungarian Broadcasting Department had already been broadcast prior to the date of the DGS. Examination of the Broadcast Analysis summaries in Annex N reveals that many of the points enumerated in the DGS had already been covered—though with a more critical tone than that taken in the DGS—by the Hungarian BD prior to publication of the DGS. And, as indicated by RFE's Daily Report No. 246 of October 27 (see Annex L), the DGS itself was the product of a brainstorming session between management, research staff, and the Broadcasting Department on that date, tempered later by a background paper issued by the East European Research and Analysis Department. In its effects, therefore, the DGS merely summed up the thinking of RFE's Hungarian experts in all departments, primarily for the guidance of the non-Hungarian Broadcasting Departments. These Departments did, in fact, air broadcasts based on the DGS, but the Hungarian coverage was nearly all before the fact. On November 3, the Hungarian BD, in its Commentary program, did recapitulate the situation, giving some emphasis to the desirable aspects of the pluralism in the society, and speculating that Premier Fock might be well advised not to press too hard for a "consensus."

*Albanian Congress meets without Chinese delegation present*

In view of mainland China's admission to the U.N. on the basis of an Albanian resolution, and of the continuing tension between China and the USSR, the opening of the Albanian Communist Party Congress without the presence of a delegation from its chief ally and supporter was, to put it mildly, unprecedented. Analysis and speculation on this subject was, therefore, highly newsworthy to RFE's East European audiences (a summary of the contents of RFE's Daily Guidance Summary dated November 2 on this topic appears on page 65, above).

Coverage of this topic along the suggested guidelines of the DGS was complete, although not especially heavy. The tone of the DGS was anticipated on November 1 by the Czechoslovak BD which, in its *International Block*, speculated carefully that neither the Chinese nor the Rumanians would attend. All of the Broadcasting Departments except the Polish one aired feature commentaries on November 2. The Poles added their contribution on November 3. By November 5, however, except for brief here-and-there mention, the main thrust of the story had died. The Rumanian BD, though carefully including Rumania's absence from the Albanian Party Congress in its coverage, was circumspect in tone, handling the Rumanian angle of the DGS (i.e., Rumania probably did not want to appear too conspicuous in attending a Congress boycotted by the USSR at this time) in a low key.

*Other international themes*

Although the Broadcasting Departments were careful to include comprehensive coverage of the four items subjected to DGS treatment during the two-week period of the field study, only the major developments surrounding admission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N. and Britain's entry into the Common Market ranked very high in terms of emphasis and air time. The U.S. Senate's action in rejecting the foreign aid bill, for example, received much more attention than did the problems of either the Albanian Party Congress or Hungary's problems with the New Economic Mechanism. Coverage of the Senate action was factual and matter-of-fact, with considerable reliance on clearly attributed quotes from the Western press. Soviet Communist Party Chairman Brezhnev's visit to Paris was another item of major interest.

This visit, including a stopover in East Germany, and Kosygin's visit to Cuba had to compete for air time with other major events such as the Tito visit to Washington and the slow progress of inter-German negotiations over Berlin. The style of coverage of major international topics is one of low-key analysis buttressed by a wide selection of quotations of opinion from Western press sources, with an occasional Communist press quote included when pertinent. Other international topics covered in commentaries during the period under study were:

1. The current state of U.S.-Soviet cooperation—some optimism tempered by reflection upon the New York Times-reported Soviet nuclear build-up.
2. Soviet criticism of the price structure within COMECON.
3. The arrests of Jews in the Soviet Union and other manifestations of anti-semitism there.
4. The Czech arms shipments and other Communist interference in the problems of Northern Ireland.
5. The visit of Holland's Queen Juliana to West Germany.
6. Meetings of the NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels.
7. Evidence of ecumenism in West Germany.
8. Personnel changes in the Polish Government.
9. The foiling of a Soviet plot in Mexico.
10. The Soviet practice of the use of mental hospitals for the incarceration of political dissidents.
11. Resignation of the Turkish Government.
12. Kissinger's arrangements with Peking for President Nixon's scheduled visit.
13. The uncertain status of Lin Piao.
14. U.S. relations with Japan vis-à-vis Okinawa.
15. Foreign students in the U.S.
16. Ecological problems.
17. The Synod of Bishops in Rome.
18. World Monetary problems.
19. U.S. aid to the third world.
20. International status of the Taiwan government.
21. Chinese credits to Rumania.
22. Anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian revolution.
23. Visit of Indira Gandhi to London and the U.S.
24. Nuclear underground testing at Amchitka.
25. An orphanage project in Vienna.
26. Norwegian wage policies.
27. Differential concepts of Marxism.
28. Protestant youth centers in Bavaria.
29. The Arab-Israeli problem. (very neutral approach)
30. Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations over Macedonia.
31. Ukrainian Catholic Bishops and the Vatican.
32. Civil air defense in the Tadzhik SSR.
33. Problems of motorists in the USSR.
34. East German elections preview.
35. International Problems of the British Communist Party.
36. Increased tension between India and Pakistan.
37. Reviews of numerous books on ecology, international law, literature, etc.
38. Economic, social, and political problems in the USSR.
39. Split in Finnish Communist Party.
40. Various activities of Communist Parties in East Europe.
41. Nobel Prize awards in Physics and Chemistry.
42. Various *samizdat* excerpts.
43. Yugoslav military maneuvers.
44. General developments at the U.N.
45. Progress of Nixon's economic programs in the U.S.
46. Reverberations of Soviet spy affairs in Belgium and the U.K.

47. Franco-German relations.
48. Developments involving the Allende regime in Chile.
49. Ideological conformity in Rumania.
50. The round-table review of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia conducted by prominent European Marxists on Austrian television.
51. Developments involving Britain, the Irish Republican Army, and Northern Ireland.
52. Savings Cooperatives in West Germany.
53. Problems of Czechoslovak agriculture.
54. Women vote for the first time in the Swiss elections.
55. Special school for West German conscientious objectors.
56. South African Anglican Dean sentenced.
57. Defense Secretary Laird in Saigon, studying possibilities of more U.S. troop withdrawals.
58. Sino-Soviet rivalries.
59. Social and economic problems of American Negroes.
60. Rumanian-Hungarian negotiations to end polemics.
61. Western defectors in Moscow.
62. Cultural life in China.
63. Review of 1971-72 edition of *Jane's All the World Aircraft*.
64. The arrival of Cardinal Mindszenty in Vienna.
65. Protests of Catholic and Protestant clergy against conditions in Brazil.
66. Inauguration of President Thieu in Saigon.
67. Israeli technical assistance to Africa.
68. Twenty-third Congress of the European Agricultural Federation (CEA).
69. Italian CP publication of its "program for government."
70. Foreign operations of the Soviet KGB.
71. Proposed two-way barrier program between Australia and Rumania.
72. Agricultural reform in Poland.
73. East European economic growth.
74. Japanese Communists seek better relations with China.
75. Organized labor in Sweden.
76. Advantages and disadvantages of the Dnieper irrigation system in the Ukraine.
77. Benefits to Soviet consumers as result of Soviet leaders' taking the promises they have made seriously.
78. Diplomatic moves toward a European Security Conference.

The preceding list is comprehensive, but not all-inclusive. Many other items—especially involving cross-reporting—were also reported upon. The most consistent reporting technique used is that of introductory commentary of a descriptive type, followed by extensive quotations from broad spectrums of the world press. Even this partial list, however, illustrates clearly why written policy guidances can be prepared for only a tiny minority of the items covered—items involving extreme sensitivity or possible controversy.

*National themes*

Although international news is comprehensively reported, developments within the audience countries themselves receive a higher priority, for it is in the field of domestic affairs that the "newsgap" is most apparent. The following paragraphs capsule samples of political and editorial reporting broadcast to the five audience countries during the period covered by the field portion of the study—from October 26 through November 5, 1971. Illustrative scripts from each BD are included in Annex O. In addition, because the broadcasts of the Polish Broadcasting Department have been the subject of recent complaints by the Polish Government to the German Federal Republic, several Polish-language broadcasts aired by RFE in June and October of 1971—which illustrate RFE policy toward Poland and how this



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policy is implemented in typical political broadcasts—are included in Annex P.

*Bulgarian broadcasts*

During the period under review, broadcasts by the Bulgarian BD centered around the need for more freedom of information in Bulgaria, the need for less emphasis on ideological conformity and more on technical proficiency as job assignment and promotion criteria, the stultifying effects of bureaucratic inertia, and the frequent discrepancy between word and deed on the part of the Government. Sample programs:

Criticized the educational policies of the Bulgarian Government, noting that there are still no provisions for student self-government despite prior commitment by the Government to this end.

Quoted the West German press on the Central Committee's expulsion of former Minister of the Interior Solakov because of his alleged Stalinist methods.

Noted that the scheduled October 23-24 Congress of Bulgarian Journalists did not take place and that the Government had not informed the public of any reasons for postponement. Discoursed at some length on the public's "right to know."

Complained editorially about the regime's failure to complete the draft of a final five-year plan, with resultant disruption of normal economic activity.

Editorialized on the real reasons for persistence of the "gray stream" in Bulgarian literature (publication of books and tracts which the public will not buy and which clog the inventories of book stores). Concluded that ineptitude on the part of the publishing houses was less to blame than the Communist Party's requirement that literature be judged primarily on its ideological content and only secondarily on artistic merit.

Commented upon the continuing lack of adequate communication with the public despite the emphasis placed upon this need by Bulgarian representatives at the recent session of the International Organization of Radio Broadcasting and Television. Mentioned again the postponement of the Congress of Bulgarian Journalists.

Contrasted the emphasis placed upon the role of trade unions in helping the Communist Party mold a socialist society with Bulgarian Communist Party Chairman Todor Zhivkov's own criticism of the unions for inadequately defending the interests of the workers.

Compared conditions in Bulgaria now and as they were 20 years ago by "then and now" quotations of Bulgarian leaders—illustrating the principle that the more things change the more they remain the same.

Satirized communism as a system based on illusions.

Quoted the Washington Post on the removal of the chief editor of Anteni. The Post had speculated that editor Krumov's removal might have been a step toward reducing friction with Yugoslavia since Krumov was a spokesman for an assertive nationalist faction.

Criticized the Komsomols for interfering too much with the leisure time of young people.

Criticized Sofia University's pomp in celebrating the 60th birthday of its rector, Panтелей Zarev who received honors primarily because he followed the Party line.

Excerpted Danish press commentary on whether Bulgaria is a satellite or a rebel. The Danes had speculated that Bulgaria's anti-Yugoslav campaign might have been prompted by a desire to let Belgrade and Moscow know that the Bulgars can take an independent line on certain questions.

In its Youth Forum No. 68 of October 27, 1971, the Bulgarian BD broadcast an interview—part of a continuing series of interviews with prominent scholars—with Professor Hellmuth Buetow of the Free University

of West Berlin. Professor Buetow discussed some of the reasons underlying student unrest, primarily in the West. Buetow concluded that the questioning of the merits of existing institutions is a natural result of educating a population in the political and social sciences, and observed that the youth rebellion was primarily a rebellion of bourgeois youth, secondly a rebellion of students, and only in the third place a rebellion in the schools. Buetow also pointed out that working-class youth is, by and large, outside the revolutionary movement.

The full text of Professor Buetow's interview, along with the editorial commentary on the so-called "gray stream" in Bulgarian literature (broadcast respectively on October 27 and 29, 1971) is included in Annex O.

*Czechoslovak broadcasts*

Two major events provided most of the stimuli for Czechoslovak programming during the period of the field study. These were Czechoslovakia's Independence Day on October 28, and the national elections scheduled for November 28, 1971. In view of Czechoslovakia's postwar history—and especially its history since the spring of 1968—these events focused considerable attention upon the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty of the "socialist" countries and upon the charade-like nature of the Husak government's approach to the elections process. Failure of the Husak regime to give substance to the 1968 law providing for a genuine federal relationship between Czechs and Slovaks—a law which Husak, during the brief office of Dubcek, had strongly supported—also provided strong impetus to Czechoslovak programming. In tone, most of the scripts were quite critical of the regime, although they avoided personal invective. Sample programs:

Criticized Husak, a Slovak, for ignoring the forthcoming anniversary of the federation despite his earlier boasts, before coming to power, of his personal role in its achievement. The BD pointed out that federalism is now only a facade, but that Husak had previously linked the achievement of a federation in 1968 with the Czechoslovak rebirth under Dubcek—a fellow Slovak.

Quoted a book by a Yugoslav professor in Belgrade labeling Czechoslovak federalism a sham. The professor viewed current trends in Czechoslovakia as toward the strengthening of centralism and the restriction of nationalities.

Replayed tapes of Husak speeches promising greater popular freedom at the time he signed the federation law in 1968.

Quoted a *New York Times* account of President Johnson's memoirs recalling how the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had persuaded LBJ to call off his planned trip to Moscow.

Commented that the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia had brought about severe factionalism within many western Communist Parties.

Noted that the Soviet White Paper on the 1968 invasion, severely criticized by the Czechoslovak Communist Party—including Husak—in 1968, is now the Husak regime's "bible" against the Prague Spring.

Quoted the West German press commentary on a recent speech by Husak, in which the German press concluded that Husak had himself admitted that Smrkovsky and other reformers "certainly are not mere zeroes."

Commented upon the opportunism displayed by Communist superpowers in terms of subordinating ideology when power politics comes to the fore.

Recalled Moscow's 1956 "sovereignty and equality for all" declaration, noting that on that this demonstrated a sharp contrast between words and deeds in terms of the quelling of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Quoted Willy Brandt's interview with CBS Television, during which the West German

Chancellor reported the displeasure of Soviet leaders at the German reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and noted that the Soviets gave no guarantee that similar situations will not recur.

Commented upon the vacillating attitudes of the Communist Party toward October 28 as Czechoslovakia's Independence Day, beginning with the Comintern position that Czechoslovakia was established as an artificial unit by Anglo-French imperialism, going through the theme of the Gottwald regime which did recognize October 28 as the date of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, and concluding with the new renunciation of the program of national sovereignty after April 1969. RFE concluded that this vacillation was necessary to bring Czechoslovakia into line with Soviet interests.

Reviewed Czechoslovakia history under democratic and Communist regimes, with quotes from T. Masaryk on humanitarianism, democracy, independence, Marxism, and Bolshevism.

Focused attention on the forthcoming elections as a "ritual with the Czechoslovak people maneuvered into the position of passive voters with no real choice."

Criticized the increasing pre-election pressure on workers, especially by trade unions. Czechoslovak workers, unlike their counterparts in the West, lack the rights of collective bargaining and are not supported by their unions against the bureaucracy.

Criticized a government directive closing Czechoslovakia's borders to foreigners during pre-election and election days, wondering why the shutters will be closed on the world on the occasion of this "unique election opportunity."

Commented on the regime's pre-election statistical claims on electric power, steel production, and meat consumption as not in accord with the facts that Czechoslovakia has to import and regulate electric consumption, import Russian ore for steel production, and lags behind both Britain and France in meat production. RFE concluded that the regime fills technical jobs with party hacks instead of qualified experts, citing official government statistics showing that 20% of university graduates cannot use their education in adequate jobs.

Pointed out that the slate of candidates for the election was publicly announced only a few days before the election date—a circumstance showing how little importance the government places upon informing the people.

Summarized a Swiss press account of the happenings at the last Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee plenary meeting—an account which concluded that there were hints at the possibility of flexible negotiations between the German Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia. The same article, however, also noted that Czechoslovak foreign policy is determined by the fight between "socialism" and "imperialism."

Editorialized that Czechoslovakia's current anti-British campaign, following cancellation of the visit by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister to Britain because of the Dutch discovery of Czech arm-ships to the Irish Republican Army, was based also on the need for a new outside enemy after the regime had modified its position on West Germany.

Noted the importance of truth as a prerequisite to the proper practice of politics.

Commented upon Husak's speech on the mission of colleges and universities, raising the question as to why there is no open and public discussion in Czechoslovakia.

Reported a Deutsche Presse Agentur dispatch on the poor results of "normalization" in Czech culture, evidenced by the fact that there is still no Czech Writers' Union.

Contrasted Britain's positive move in joining the Common Market with the stalemated economies of the Comecon countries.

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Reported a television panel show in Austria featuring prominent reform Communists who concluded that humanistic Marxism is the sole alternative to Soviet-type communism.

Poked fun at Radio Prague's criticism of the purchase of horror films, commenting that it is ridiculous to take umbrage at thrillers in a state where horrible things are experienced daily.

Replied to official Czechoslovak propaganda on "U.S. fascism" in the Angela Davis case, pointing out the facts of the crime and indicating circumstances wherein the trial is open to the public, the USSR has been invited to send observers, experienced defense lawyers have been provided, the Court agreed to a change of venue, and Angela's sister remains free to travel and denounce the U.S. RFE asked whether such circumstances would be possible in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Included in Annex O are several typical commentaries broadcast on October 27, 1971, and emceed by Slava Volny, who until 1968 was a leading commentator of Radio Prague.

*Hungarian broadcasts*

Hungarian-language broadcasts were weighted heavily with economic subjects during the period under review, although the anniversary of the 1956 uprising also received considerable attention. Analysis of a major speech by Premier Fock on the state of the Hungarian economy, and the government's plans to achieve greater progress under the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) contained a number of points which were included in a Daily Guidance Summary on Hungary's economic problems. (See p. 64, above, and Annex K.) The Hungarian BD's critique of Fock's economic policies was somewhat sharper than the tone of the applicable DGS, but was well within the bounds of what would be considered legitimate—even moderate—journalistic license in the West. In illustrative broadcasts, the Hungarian BD:

Gave Premier Fock credit for an accurate analysis of Hungarian economic problems, but criticized him for unfairly passing the blame down to the individual enterprise managers.

Advocated abolition of privileges accorded state-owned farms in order to provide incentives to the agricultural cooperatives to stick to farming instead of branching out into other fields—an activity which the government said it would ban.

Praised farm workers and the regime for launching a contest to reduce the high accident rate in agriculture.

Agreed with the goals, but criticized the tactics employed by government economic regulators to get the NEM moving again. Suggested at least partially releasing some of the brakes on economic enterprises to stimulate movement rather than cutting back investments and increasing controls.

Urged the Communist Party hierarchy to force local Party functionaries to implement government decisions to provide more aid to private farm plot owners.

Defended the case of the leader of a cooperative who visited a western country to seek aid for an unfinished agricultural project and was criticized by the local press. The case was defended on its merits and with the argument that collectives do not get their fair share of investment allocations from the government.

Recommended that in the context of the NEM the twin problems of overinvestment and foreign trade deficits should be solved without either overexploitation of labor or curtailed productivity.

Trade balances are best solved by increasing exports rather than curtailing imports of capital machinery needed for increased production.

Emphasized the need to replace obsolete industrial machinery; thus deplored the gov-

ernment's tendency to cut back on such necessary investment as wasteful and profit-cutting.

Concluded that the growth of pluralism in the society was one of the best effects of the NEM, and recommended that the government not push too hard for consensus which, on vital issues, might "be unnatural and cause more problems."

Attributed to the shortage of pork in rural areas to a lack of cooperation between state purchasing agencies and rural cooperatives.

Noted the existence of small-scale foreign commerce along Hungary's borders with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and the Soviet Union. Deplored the lack of such commerce along the Austrian border, and suggested that introduction of same might help the small farmers purchase directly badly-needed small farm machinery.

Held out hopes for better Hungarian-Rumanian relations.

Observed that Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty has settled in Vienna.

Summarized highlights of two studies by Communist Party functionaries in the pre-1956 hierarchy showing that the 1956 uprising was not instigated from outside, but was a genuine expression of the nation's aspirations for justice and freedom.

Commented retrospectively that the Hungarian people, Communist Party, and the Soviet leaders had learned much from the experience of 1956. The people had learned that it was not wise to entertain romantic ideas about great powers of East or West; the Soviet leaders, that after 1956 and 1968 no ideological and social uniformity can be achieved in the satellites; the Party, that it must walk the tightrope between public apathy and the threat of Soviet intervention.

This ambiguous policy has its shortcomings, but it is no little achievement when one recalls the sense of absolute hopelessness of 15 years ago.

Called the attention of villagers to a new government decree stipulating that all owners of real estate must register their holdings with the local councils before June 30, 1972.

Welcomed the fact that the new cooperative law greatly expanded the scope of authority of the cooperative general assemblies.

Castigated the government for failure to repay promptly those peace bonds which the Rakosi regime had imposed on the population.

Cited a dispute between two Hungarian newspapers about whether Soviet poet Yevtushenko had ever been in Hungary before as illustrating the danger of allowing people to be misled by false information. RFE suggested this danger could be avoided by allowing greater freedom of the press.

Decried the lack of adult education programs for Hungarian farmers during winter evenings when weather conditions make farm work impractical. RFE promised to try to fill this gap with a weekly adult education course for farmers.

Welcomed Hungary's agreement with Yugoslavia to construct the long-delayed Andria pipeline. The BD found it curious that the decision was made on Soviet initiative, which suggests Soviet unwillingness or inability to meet Hungary's oil requirements. Also welcomed the news that much talked about, and oft-delayed, negotiations with Czechoslovakia on the Danube hydroelectric project would soon be resumed.

Commented favorably on the government's promises to increase support to Hungarian artisans and made several suggestions as to how the many problems of these craftsmen may be solved.

The full text of the Hungarian Broadcasting Department's major political program, *Newsreel*, of October 28, 1971, is in-

cluded in Annex O. On that date, *Newsreel* dealt primarily with international themes, but its commentary on freedom of the press, pegged to a dispute between *Esti Hirlap* and *Nepszabadsag*—two major publications—over the latter's rebuke of the former for quoting Yevtushenko "out of context" on Yehudi Menuhin's definition of freedom, is a good illustration of the general tone of domestic political broadcasts.

*Polish broadcasts*

Although RFE's earlier history tended to be dominated by the sensationalism surrounding its broadcasts to Hungary before and during the 1956 uprising, the most recent controversies have been prompted by Polish-German relations and Polish Government allegations of the inflammatory nature of broadcasts produced by RFE's Polish Broadcasting Department. Paradoxically, it was the Polish BD's cautious and moderate approach to the Poznan riots in 1956—to which the Gomulka regime paid private tribute<sup>11</sup>—which was overshadowed by the Hungarian affair. By the same token, much of the most recent sensationalism about Polish broadcasts will not withstand careful scrutiny—a conclusion reached by most of the Western press some time ago. As is evident from a compilation of U.S. and foreign press clippings submitted by RFE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its hearings, RFE currently is rated highly for objectivity by an overwhelming majority of those West European and U.S. newspapers which have published comments on the subject.<sup>12</sup>

The tenor of the continuing Polish Government attacks on RFE raises the question, however, of just what basic policies guide the programming of the Polish Broadcasting Department. Accordingly, the author selected sample scripts from the files of the Polish BD which dealt directly with the new Polish leadership and the direction being taken by the Polish United Workers' Party PUPW—the official title of the Communist Party in Poland. These scripts, entitled *The Situation Within the Party Before the 6th Congress*, (in four parts) and *New Generals in the PRL* were broadcast during the period October 12-15, 1971 by Jan Nowak, Director of the Polish Broadcasting Department, and by Mr. J. Ptaczek, one of the senior Polish Editors. An additional Nowak script selected was Mr. Nowak's three-part series on *The Role of RFE*, broadcast on June 22, 23, and 24, 1971. The complete texts of these scripts are contained in Annex P. Highlights of these scripts are summarized as follows:

*Self-perception of the role of the Polish Broadcasting Department*

Nowak began his series of broadcasts on the role of RFE by recalling a chance meeting in 1944 with a young Russian deported as a slave laborer to Nazi-occupied Poland. This young "Soviet man," as he described himself, conveyed the impression of a "gramophone record endlessly repeating *Pravda* and *Izvestia* articles." Thoroughly brainwashed as a result of the total Soviet monopoly on information during his formative years, the young man exhibited no trace of independent thinking or independent judgment. This experience evoked a gloomy image of a future Poland—already destined to be in the Soviet orbit—peopled with similar mental automatons reared under similarly sterile intellectual circumstances. That today's Poland does not conform to that gloomy image Nowak attributed to rapid advances in communications technology—advances which have made it possible to put an end to the information monopoly of totalitarian state structures.

Noting that RFE programs today constitute 86% of the broadcasting beamed into Poland by the three largest Western radio

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stations, Nowak commented that postwar experiences in Eastern Europe "teach us that well-informed nations, knowing the true state of affairs, aware of their aspirations, thinking independently, are a dynamic element, exerting an influence, not only on the group in power, but also on changes in the very system of government itself. Even when they are completely deprived of democratic freedoms." He added that under these circumstances "it is not difficult to understand the war to the death which the communist governments have declared on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty . . . conducted as if the survival and salvation of the communist system depended on victory."

Nowak acknowledged that RFE cannot abolish censorship, "but it certainly can put effective restraints on it." He questioned the efficacy of concealing facts if, "by simply turning on the radio, one can learn about everything from Radio Free Europe . . . the smallest gap through which the hidden truth can penetrate to the broad masses renders the entire effort of the censors ineffective."

Nowak defined RFE's role as a surrogate opposition, providing some aspects of the checks and balances at work in democratic systems. He cited the intensity of the technical (jamming), political, and diplomatic campaign to silence RFE as evidence that the Communist regimes understand this role only too well. He added that the disappearance of this major symbol of Western interest in the welfare of East European peoples—"the shutting down of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—would . . . finally clear the desired way to the goal which . . . has so far been impossible to achieve . . . the enslavement of minds." Nowak cited another major goal of RFE as to "demonstrate in practice the basic democratic principle, which is: to defend the right of every citizen to express his own view, irrespective of whether we agree with it or not."

Thus, concluded Nowak, the silencing of RFE or any window "wide open to a world very different from the one in which [the people] have to live" has become a question of the highest import to Communist leadership.

*RFE perception of and policy toward the contemporary situation in Poland*

During the four-day period from October 12-15, 1971, inclusive, the Polish Broadcasting Department presented a detailed analysis of the current political situation in Poland, with particular attention to the role of Edward Gierk and his new team and the pitfalls he faces in trying to implement his programs.

Polish BD Director Nowak described what he viewed as a power struggle taking place between the Party bureaucracy—especially its middle echelons—and Gierk's new leadership. He pointed out that at an important Party conference in September, "a practically open attack against the present leadership was made." This attack was couched in general terms and centered on the familiar theme that the "danger of revolutionism" was a greater danger to the Party than threats from any other source. According to Nowak, the terminology used made it unmistakably clear to Gierk that the whole policy of the post-December leadership was under attack. Motivation behind the attack was said to be the fact that the thousands of middle-echelon Party functionaries—not themselves in policymaking posts—see a threat in any changes or reforms—even the "timid and so far undefined economic reforms and changes of the system"—to their own positions of authority and privilege. Nowak hypothesized that for the moment the aim of these bureaucrats is not to oust Gierk, but to make a figure-head out of him, make him dependent upon the Party conservatives, and deprive him of freedom of movement. Nowak asserted that the people have not been informed of this power struggle

nor of the many ramifications its resolution could entail.

A substantial tactic used against Gierk by the Party conservatives is the deliberate spread of rumors and misinformation—mostly centering on the dangers of revisionism and the likelihood that revisionism carried too far will end where the Prague Spring of 1968 did. According to Nowak, the "opposition is counting that in order to pacify these moods Gierk will have to sharpen the course, to give up the plans of more considerable changes and reform, that he will have to return to the [repressive] road of his predecessor."

The broadcasts went on to specify that the presentation of the rationale and means being used by Party functionaries to attack Gierk should not be interpreted as an [RFE] recognition of "Gierk and his leadership as liberals or reformers consistently aiming at the modernization of the Polish economic-political system." Gierk is, according to the RFE analysis, merely a more practical Party man—a man who is unique among the leadership in having an authentic proletarian background. This pragmatism has convinced him that "following the December shock, something would simply have to change, certain conclusions will have to be drawn if the Party is to avoid another disaster." Gierk's major contribution was characterized as the fact that, "after December, he was able to subdue the revolutionary ferment without resorting to mass terror." Nowak pointed out that a number of the cautious emergency measures of the Gierk regime—removal of some of the most hated leaders, some concessions to the workers, some gestures to the intelligentsia, limited dialogue with the people, a *modus vivendi* with the Church—had won Gierk some "limited popularity." This was a far cry from the enthusiasm shown Gomulka after 1956, and is best described as a "wait and see" attitude—a short-term credit. The Polish BD gave Gierk credit for realizing that in order to consolidate and extend such a credit, some clear and visible improvement of material conditions must be achieved.

Nowak described the workers as now the "only great force in the community with whom the Party must seriously reckon." He speculated that should the workers' cautious hopes be again disappointed, the situation could rapidly deteriorate—an eventuality to be deplored by the USSR because of the high political cost of putting down a workers' uprising by force. Consequently, said Nowak, Gierk probably enjoys greater support from Moscow than is generally realized. But factional struggles are also welcome to Moscow, in that they facilitate Moscow's role as a balance wheel in the affairs of Poland. Thus, concluded Nowak, the conservative Party opposition, counting on Moscow's reluctance to see Gierk emerge as the unchallenged leader of the Party, is the most dangerous factor in the situation.

Against this background, the Polish BD presented an analysis of the Party's Directives for the 6th Party Congress—guidelines which are to become the Party's program for the future. Conceding that Gierk and his team realize the need for basic reforms and institutional changes in the Party to implement stated goals, especially economic ones, Nowak commented that the power struggle previously described as acted to make the Directives themselves ambiguous and uninformative. "The author's or authors' chief aim was, on the one hand, not to lose the limited credit of the people, and on the other not to get exposed to charges of revisionism and not to provide opportunities for attacks to the Party reaction." Thus there is no way for the Polish people to find in the wording of the Directives any real clues as to how present policies will develop in the forthcoming years.

The series concluded with a detailed com-

parison of the problems faced by Gierk with those faced in 1956 by Gomulka, and an exposition of the way conservative Party pressures, untempered by public exposure and discussion, served to force Gomulka away from the path of reform and back to the internal needs of the apparatus. According to Nowak, exactly the "same phenomena which accompanied Gomulka's rule from the very first months also appear now, in the first period of the exercise of authority by Gierk's team." But Nowak also pointed out that historical analogies should not lead to a false fatalism, and that it is by no means inevitable that Gierk will follow the road of his predecessor. To avoid this, however, Gierk must avoid Gomulka's mistakes—the prime one being the destruction of the counter-balance to the conservative wing of the Party. Nor can mere personnel shakeups in the Government and the Party constitute such a counter-balance, for it has been demonstrated that bureaucratic pressure can be skillfully and effectively employed to sabotage reform-from-above. "A counter-balance can only be created through the control of the social element over the bureaucracy, and thus by allowing greater freedom of public criticism and discussion . . . for freedom of the press, even limited, constitutes under the present system the only possible form of social control over the class of Party bureaucrats and the only effective brake on their . . . pushing Poland to the bottom and plunging the country in tragic stagnation. A return to the road which Gomulka followed for 14 years could only lead in one direction—to new conflicts and upheavals, concealing a big and dangerous unknown."

*Implementation of current policy in Polish domestic political programming*

Thus the examination of basic scripts produced by RFE's Polish Broadcasting Department indicates a self-perception of a general role as an opposition press working, for all practical purposes, within the context of Poland's present socio-political framework. The specific policy toward contemporary Poland is one of neither attack nor support of the regime *in toto*. Instead, the BD strives to keep the spotlight of publicity and reasoned discussion focused upon all major developments, with the hope that the Polish people, through being more fully informed, will independently bring the force of public opinion to bear upon all factions of the regime. Insofar as Polish BD broadcasts exhibit some optimism that Gierk may yet avoid knuckling under too completely to conservative Party functionaries, this policy may be described by some as supportive of Gierk. Inasmuch as these broadcasts are often critical of specific actions or omissions of the present regime, however, it is clear that this support is quite selective and, as has been demonstrated by the anti-RFE campaign of the Polish Government, is certainly not fully appreciated by the regime.

During the period of field observation in Munich, the Polish Broadcasting Department:

Commented upon a series of personnel changes in the Polish Government as generally positive in increasing the expertise brought to bear upon major problems.

Described the difficulties faced by Polish scholars in airing their grievances to the government.

Commented that the Polish October of 1956 proved that even in a dictatorial regime an opposition capable of enforcing a change in the governing team could arise.

Analyzed the new composition of the Planning Commission, rating its new chief as a "man who understands the needs of the contemporary countryside."

Commented that the pre-Congress Party Guidelines on Housing which dwelt upon whether to build less large or more small apartment houses constitute a "bad joke" il-

illustrating lack of knowledge about the construction industry.

Pointed out that the Congress of the PUWP merely rubber-stamps decisions already taken by a Party elite.

Praised Gierek's letter to a pre-Congress conference at Gdansk, but pointed out that positive statements alone are not enough: post-December improvements have been too slow, perhaps because of the opposition of retrogressive Party bureaucrats.

Commented upon the presence of Chancellor Brandt's representative at the beatification ceremonies for Father Kolbe, attributing this to the importance which the German Government attached to this symbolic occasion—an occasion which RFE felt could pave the way to understanding between Germans and Poles on both human and state levels.

Doubted the veracity of a statement by the Minister of the Interior welcoming publicity about the militia and security agencies. The BD pointed out that no findings on the militia-security responsibilities for bloodshed during the December disturbances have been published.

Reported the statement of Polish Vice-Minister Willman that he demanded the expulsion of RFE from Germany during an official visit to Bonn. BD commentary viewed these attacks as raising the importance of "this modest instrument of information," and quoted the *Frankfurter Rundschau's* refutation of charges of "subversion" against RFE. Elaborated upon the democratic approach to a free press, and denied that the present regime in Poland was identical to the state and the nation. Noted that the present attacks on RFE were proceeding along lines laid down by Gomulka three years ago—plans which envisaged main diplomatic pressure against RFE in Bonn and Washington. Also noted evidence of an even broader anti-RFE campaign, which creates popular impression that RFE is an extraordinarily powerful institution. Concluded that no one is forced to listen to RFE and that the one effective way of fighting RFE is to allow freedom of information and opinion in Poland.

Quoted West German opinion polls showing a majority of Germans favoring ratification of Bonn's treaties with Warsaw and Moscow. Said this confirmed earlier expressions of RFE opinion that the Germans were becoming reconciled to the Oder-Neisse frontier.

Criticized the inadequate and vague formulation of the pre-Congress guidelines on wages. Quoted critical comments from the Polish domestic press, and praised the Gierek regime for permitting more open criticism.

Welcomed democratization of Party nomination procedures for delegates to the Congress, hoping they would also apply to other Party elections.

Reported that both Germans and Poles were taking more steps toward the normalization of relations.

Commented on the scandalous conditions in Polish mental hospitals.

Praised Gierek for liberalizing the universities so as to give more freedom for students.

Welcomed the Italian license for production of a Polish Fiat Automobile.

Noted some improvements in Polish local press activities, but commented that the press as an expression of the public's right to full disclosure was still inadequate—largely because of the opposition of local Party organizations.

Reported on Party reactionary factions opposed to Gierek's technocratic approach in filling personnel vacancies, and commented that these factions are waging quiet warfare against Gierek.

Reported on the disclosures of large-scale illegal trade in gold and foreign currencies, commenting that the long impunity of swindlers and police inactivity indicated

high-level corruption, possibly including the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior.

Referred to an official Polish Press Agency (PAP) communique calling for the new definition of the role of trade unions as defenders and representatives of workers' interests. The BD commented that this was always supposed to be so, but under Party bureaucrats the trade unions had become tools of the establishment.

Reviewed the situation of Ukrainian Greco-Catholics in Poland and at the Synod of Bishops in Rome.

Commented on the proposed law, "Protecting Youth from Demoralization," agreeing that this serious problem needs determined action, but questioning whether the proposed additional bureaucratic bodies could do the job. Suggested that the problem would not be solved by new laws, but by the allocation of funds for needed educational, guidance, and corrective institutions.

On the question of the "dialogue" between the Party and the people, the BD commented that the limited freedom for public criticism was a step forward from Gomulka, but not yet adequate nor a real dialogue.

Reported evidence of continuing large-scale East German defections to the West.

Annex O contains the full texts of eight commentaries aired by the Polish Broadcasting Department on November 2, 1971 on its main political program, *Facts and Views*. These commentaries cover subject material ranging from the illegal traffic in gold and foreign currencies, in intraparty opposition to Gierek, to an account of the inauguration of South Vietnamese President Thieu.

#### Rumanian broadcasts

Diplomatic efforts on the part of both Hungary and Rumania to improve their relations—which for a time had been marked with unusual bitterness—provided subject matter for a number of commentaries during the period under review. These efforts were supported by the Rumanian BD as praiseworthy and constructive. On the negative side, the drive toward a greater degree of ideological "purity" launched by Ceausescu on July 6, 1971 has been viewed with considerable alarm by both groups of Rumanian intellectuals and by RFE's Rumanian Broadcasting Department. During the period covered by the field study, sample RFE broadcasts to Rumania:

Criticized the Grand National Assembly for being a year late in approving the five-year plan. This delay, said to be occasioned by disputes between Ceausescu and leading economists over the tempo of implication, was excessive. According to the BD, professional economists were cautious in their approach to implementation, feeling that haste must be avoided. The regime, on the other hand, was pushing for rapid results. The BD cautioned against the adverse impact on the workers if regime recommendations for speed took precedence over the approach of professional economists.

Commented that the Niculescu Mizil mission to Budapest was a significant step toward improved relations with Hungary.

Reported on Bavarian MP Essl's protest against the harsh competition of the Rumanian Aroconstruct firm with German companies—competition facilitated because the Rumanian firm, operating in Germany, was underpaying its employees and failing to comply with German labor legislation requiring the payment of certain social benefits.

Speculated that implementation of the ideological and educational program approved by the Party Executive Committee on July 6 may presage a "cultural revolution in Rumania."

Criticized draft legislation providing that management functions in state enterprises be assigned exclusively to graduates of the Central Institute for the Education of Leading Cadres in the Economy and State Administration. Pointed out that this proposed law

was discriminatory in that admission to the Institute was restricted to Party member—and that Party membership was shunned by qualified professionals because they considered the endless meetings and ideological training sessions involved as a sheer waste of time.

Commemorated the 20th anniversary of the Rumanian Broadcasting Department of RFE with the hope that things will improve enough in Rumania to preclude the necessity of two more decades of RFE broadcasting to Rumania.

Commented that Ceausescu's praiseworthy national policies have suffered a blow by his ideological drive which, in fact, rests on a narrow Soviet-style interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

Noted the fact that death sentences had been meted out to embezzlers of a state food store. The BD repudiated this medieval type of punishment and the obviously deficient control system which allowed embezzlement to continue for 12 years without being detected. Questioned the utility of exemplary sentences, and suggested that the cause of what seems to be an embezzlement epidemic be sought in the poverty of the citizens rather than in their dishonesty.

Reviewed commentary by the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* on Rumania's skillful and courageous foreign policies which the newspaper viewed as a possible forerunner of current East-West developments.

Noted that industrial safety in Rumania is still deficient despite Ceausescu's personal efforts to improve it. Recommended a public inquiry into the latest mine disaster and in an attempt to determine whether the over-ambitious goals of the five-year plan and the ideological campaign which might be distracting the attention of labor leaders from adequate safety standards might not be partly to blame.

Contrasted Ceausescu's professed democratic principles with his steady tactic of gaining personal control of all state and Party sectors.

Reviewed a broad sample of Western press commentary on Rumania's "small cultural revolution."

Editorialized on Ceausescu's address to the plenary meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee: the Rumanian leader is now aware that his dogmatic July theses are disapproved of by the intelligentsia. Although the people will welcome measures designed to eradicate corruption and abuses, why put the clock back in the cultural and educational fields—a policy which will only increase the present domestic chaos?

Commented that the kind of campaign for ideological purity now under way in Rumania has, in other socialist societies, always proven a hindrance to the improvement of living standards in keeping with the possibilities now available through technology.

Quoted a Western press report attributing Ceausescu's cultural revolution to his intention to demonstrate to the Soviets that he remains the vigilant guardian of Communist dogma, and that he intends to stem corruption. The Western writer was quoted as believing that Ceausescu will not succeed either in stemming corruption or improving Party morale since he cannot afford a purge of great proportions similar to that effected by the cultural revolution in China.

The complete text of the Rumanian Broadcasting Department's *Press Review and Political Program No. 177*—its major political program—broadcast on October 26, 1971 is included in Annex O. This program contains the day's treatment of eight topics:

The Five-Year Plan and the National Assembly.

High-Level Rumanian Party Delegation in Budapest.

*Frankfurter Rundschau* on Rumanian Workers in West Germany.

Brezhnev in Paris.



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The Times (London) on Soviet Group's Plea to Psychiatrists.

Jewish Problem in Russia.

Communist China Admitted to U.N.

Tito's Interview with the Washington Post.

#### Quality control

From the foregoing it can easily be seen that the substantial volume of politically-oriented material alone broadcast each day by RFE's five radio stations presents a formidable problem for RFE management in terms of assuring continued high quality in program content, production, and delivery. And, although the purposes of this study require some concentration upon political programming, it should be remembered that the high quality of the remaining "non-political" programs—constituting almost half of each day's output—is also of great importance to RFE's continued effectiveness.

First-line responsibility for the quality of the broadcast product lies, of course, in the hands of the five Broadcasting Department Directors. Ultimate responsibility is that of the Director of RFE. In between these two seats of responsibility are two important staff elements—the Broadcast Analysis Unit and the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department. Although these two entities are staff elements of the Director's Office, they in fact play a dual role. They serve as independent monitors of broadcast operations on behalf of the Director, and they also serve increasingly as impartial advisors directly to the Broadcasting Departments. In both roles, the BA Unit and the APOE Department strive to maintain the kind of detached, hard-nosed objectivity which will allow management decisions on programming to be made in an atmosphere of realism, and which will minimize the influence of such extraneous considerations as the personal dynamism of individual BD Directors or the subjective biases of both editorial and managerial personnel. This is a demanding task; one which, if properly carried out, is not conducive to the winning of popularity contests. It is also one which is essential to the successful continuance of so complex an enterprise as the operation of five highly individualistic multilingual radio stations broadcasting to five similar audiences whose governments are, by and large, hostile to the notion of unfettered communication from abroad.

The activities of the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department will be examined in some detail in another chapter. In the remainder of this chapter, the work of the Broadcast Analysis Unit will be described in sufficient detail to convey the essence of how it performs in both components of its dual role.

#### Daily broadcast analyses

RFE's basic tool in checking on the activities of the five Broadcasting Departments for compliance with RFE policy in political programming is the series of Daily Broadcast Analyses produced by the Broadcast Analysis Unit. These reports are issued each day on the activities of each BD. Special note is taken of usage of Especially Useful items on the Recommended Lists (see page 58, above) and of compliance with Daily Guidance Summaries or Guidance Notes when these have been issued (see pages 60, 61, above). In addition, each politically-oriented program dealing with either national or international affairs is summarized by a Broadcast Analyst, and the summary is supposed to be in sufficient detail to allow management to draw general conclusions about the nature and scope of any given program. A complete file of Daily Broadcast Analyses covering the period of the field study October 26–November 5, 1971) is contained in Annex N.

Extensive comparisons of original scripts with subsequent Broadcast Analysis summaries indicate that the Broadcast Analysis

Unit's limited staff performs its tasks reasonably well. Most of the summaries accurately reflect both the tone and content of broadcasts. In some cases, however, the system errs. The Broadcast Analysis summary for one of the BD's on a date in early September 1971, for example, summarizes a broadcast editorial as follows:

[name deleted]'s Birthday and his Responsibilities.—Editorial noted that [name of leader deleted] 60th birthday was preceded by one day by former party chief and premier [name deleted] 71st birthday. [former premier] belongs to the past while [present leader] is going high. Opinions on [present leader] personality vary between being very negative and somewhat positive. He may feel very content about his achievements. However, he ought to think also in terms of what his place in [name of country deleted] history would be. He should not forget that the darkest spot on his profile is his complete subjugation to the USSR, and one day historians will stress that during [leader]'s rule the star of [country] as an independent and sovereign state faded away, the BD concluded.

The original script being summarized, however, contained the following language: "The 'dictatorship of the proletariat' . . . 'permits only sympathetic references' to its leaders which is why an accurate description of the character, endowments, and shortcomings of [name of leader] is at present very difficult.

The London Observer . . . wrote . . . "evil eyes, cowardly, cruel, cold, haughty, stupid . . ."

A [country] observer states: "[deleted] is a good, generous, hospitable and sociable man but lacks the stature to head the government."

Another one says: "Everyone sees him as an extremely narrow-minded man. However much he may appear to be modest and calm, so much also is he cowardly and servile. He is not a Stalinist but a blind and obedient tool of the Russians."

And to end with a third description: "[deleted] is not a stupid and common man as he is generally considered to be."

When these documents were brought to the attention of the appropriate Broadcasting Director and the Chief of the Broadcast Analysis Unit in Munich, both gentlemen acknowledged that (a) the language and tone of, the script violated standing RFE policy against petty and personal attack and (b) these violations were not detected by the normal review machinery available for the purpose.

It is likely that human fallibility will result in such slips from time to time. On the other hand, the other review procedures utilized by the Broadcast Analysis Unit and the Director to keep familiar with all programming characteristics of each Broadcasting Department should keep such occurrences to a minimum.

#### Weekly reports

The Broadcast Analysis Unit maintains a log of the usage or lack of usage of Especially Useful items from the Recommended Lists, as well as a similar log on Daily Guidance Summaries and Guidance Notes. Each week a summary report is forwarded to the Director of RFE on the subject of coverage of these items by the five BD's. The Broadcast Analysis Weekly Report of November 4, 1971, covering the week of October 25 to October 31, 1971,<sup>13</sup> for example, lists each program of each Broadcasting Department covering the Especially Useful item for October 25, 1971 (*Reddaway in The Times on Soviet Group's Plea to Psychiatrists*) and the two DGS in force for that period, namely the one on admission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N. (see pages 61, 80, above), and Britain's entry into the Common Market (see pages 63, 83, above). The report also

concluded that there were no cases at that date wherein Especially Useful items or Daily Guidance Summary materials had not been fully covered.

#### Monthly information report

Another regularly-scheduled Broadcast Analysis report is issued monthly, covering innovations in programming carried out during the month, outstanding features common to more than one Broadcasting Department, and the highlights of major programming of each Broadcasting Department for the month. The report also records special meetings between Broadcast Analysis and BD personnel, and actions taken to improve programming or remedy deficiencies previously noted.

The Monthly Information Report for October 1971, for example, notes important changes in the religious programming of the Bulgarian Broadcasting Department, and new programming in the Polish Department focusing upon serialized excerpts of books banned by the Polish Government as well as some changes in the Polish BD's *Facts and Views* series to provide more pointed and noncommittal coverage of specific domestic events.

The report also noted the number of major international developments given prominent coverage in the programming of all Broadcasting Departments, observing that RFE coverage provided information to East European audiences of news subjects which were either distorted or unavailable for the applicable domestic information media services. In addition to the events covered by Daily Guidance Summaries (explained fully in other sections of this report), the Monthly Information Report called attention to coverage of the awarding of the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize to German Chancellor Brandt, commenting that the bulk of coverage consisted of extensive press reviews, including virtually all the major West German newspapers, as well as the *New York Times*, the *London Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, *Les Echos*, and the *Washington Post*. Special mention was made of a four-minute commentary on the Czechoslovak BD's popular *Compass*—a youth-oriented program—which stressed that Brandt's political creed demonstrates his understanding of the West German youth's aspirations for a rapprochement with East European youth. Kosygin's Canadian tour also received broad RFE coverage—an event which was marked by silence in the East European media in terms of the Jewish demonstrations and the tight security precautions in force during the visit. It was also noted that all the Broadcast Departments except the Rumanian one also began broadcasting regularly-scheduled material on problems of ecology.<sup>14</sup>

#### Broadcast analysis meetings

From the standpoint of control of programming quality, as opposed to control of compliance with policy, probably the most useful procedure employed by the Director is the convening of frequent meetings between Broadcast Analysis Unit personnel and top management staff to discuss the overall quality of the programming of specific Broadcasting Departments and their personnel. These meetings are held about once a week, with each meeting restricted to a discussion of the activities of a single BD. To facilitate candor and avoid unnecessary personal embarrassment, no Broadcast Department personnel attend these meetings. Careful minutes are kept and supplied to the Director. In some cases, the Director may then make these minutes available to the Broadcast Directors. In any case, the Director follows through on the recommendations which grow from these meetings, and maintains a continuing dialogue with his Broadcast Directors as to the critical points which may be raised. The minutes of a meeting held on March 19, 1971 to discuss the activities of the Czechoslovak

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Broadcasting Department struck the author of this report as especially useful in illustrating the broad scope and depth of these discussions. Too, this particular meeting reflected rather less than the normal amount of personally-embarrassing comments which naturally follow from objective critiques. Consequently, the text of this report, edited slightly to delete some specific remarks which could needlessly embarrass individuals, is attached as Annex E.

As could be expected, meetings called for the purpose of detecting and improving deficiencies in programming tend to focus more upon the bad than the good aspects of broadcasting. For example, the Broadcast Analyst reviewing some programming changes made by one BD to take advantage of the unique prime listening hours of the audience, praised the changes by noting an Audience and Public Opinion Research Department report reflecting a larger listening audience during the particular time block. On the other hand, the analyst also commented that the revamped program—

Sometimes falls short of the goals that the reform in 1970 had set for it. Thus, some . . . editors' personal contributions happen to be lengthy stories which are too tedious to produce the desired impact for which this type of programming is aiming. On the other hand, some of the editors limit their personal contributions to the announcement of the hour and other paltriness, thereby missing the purpose of their physical presence in the studio viz., a lively contact with the audience. . . .

Poor scheduling also came in for criticism at the same meeting. Noting that particular program went on the air just at a time when APOOR research indicated a drop in the percentage of listeners, the analyst noted that—

Precious time and energy are being wasted on this program that . . . described as a carefully prepared and unusually interesting combination of news and commentary, which would deserve a much wider and higher quality audience than the small number of housewives and retired people who listen to it. . . .

Evaluation of a program of political commentaries drew the following mix of comments:

The relative popularity of . . . is, I think, a tribute to its author and reader. . . .

Its greater popularity among older respondents . . . seems to confirm my earlier opinion that Mr. . . . has a good but old-fashioned 1930'ish polemical style.

It is of course risky to tamper with a successful formula, but I wonder whether an occasional commentary in this series by Mr. . . . —who also has an effective but more modern polemical approach—might not increase the popularity of this series still further.

The program's lesser popularity with educated listeners indicates, I think, the limitations of aggressive polemics.

Evaluation of a program intended for a youthful audience was related to APOOR findings that only a small percentage of youth actually listened to the program. The analyst added; in connection with these findings:

They also confirm my earlier opinion that the program is somehow misconceived: too didactic and propagandistic for the well-educated and too pretentiously intellectual . . . for the unsophisticated. Its middle-aged editor tries perhaps too hard for an idealistic youth appeal, but the effect is sometimes insincere or patronizing.

Among the Broadcast Analysts meeting reports reviewed by the author, the apogee in terms of scathing criticism was reached by the following evaluation of a program intended for an important economic interest group:

This is probably the most important group-oriented program in our broadcasting, and should therefore be one of the best.

Alas, it is undoubtedly one of the worst. The . . . findings . . . confirm my earlier opinion that this is a disastrously bad program . . . the editor of the series . . . is a conscientious, hard-working man, who diligently studies the domestic press, pinpoints . . . the shortcomings and advocates the right remedies and policies. Alas, he seems to be totally lacking in imagination and writing ability, and hence his offerings are painfully dull, uninspired, plodding, poorly phrased, somehow mechanical, couched in a language that is excessively influenced by domestic communist jargon . . .

Although excellence in programming is viewed as the norm and hence not necessarily to be singled out for undue comment, due note is taken of what the Broadcast Analysts consider the stronger aspects of RFE programming, e.g.:

All musical shows are straightforward musical presentation with no political content. However, this type of music does have a certain political connotation because for . . . youth it represents a purely Western type of beat entertainment. The . . . listeners' response shows enthusiasm for the programs. The disc jockeys are well experienced, and they do an outstanding job . . .

The editor in charge of writing this kind of political commentary is a young person who lived in . . . until 1967 and is familiar with prevailing conditions in his native country, and he deals skillfully with youth problems. . . .

According to private information, young listeners [to a satirical political commentary] tape . . . the shows for further circulation.

One original commentary by BD said that in all fairness [to an East European leader] he was striving for national independence under difficult circumstances. BD made it clear that it did not mean to defend . . . whose policies it always had criticized, but it must admit a truth now recognized by world public opinion. Of the latter commentary . . . said that it struck him as fair . . . and spoke highly of BD's objectivity. Mr. Cook said that he knew the program, and was highly appreciative of . . . statesmanlike approach.

Although, as noted earlier, the Broadcasting Department Directors do not attend these meetings, there is substantial feed-back to the Broadcasting Directors and their editors directly from individual Broadcast analysts. In addition, the meetings usually result in a number of follow-up recommendations which the Director and his staff take up with the Broadcasting Directors.

In October 1971, RFE Director Walter inaugurated a new series of country meetings to which Broadcasting Directors are invited. These meetings relate the evaluations of the Broadcast Analysis Unit, the findings of the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department, and the professional judgment and experience of the Broadcasting Directors in a continuing effort to improve programming and make it more timely and relevant to the needs of the audience.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Statistics submitted by RFE.

<sup>2</sup> These figures were calculated by RFE's Broadcast Analysis Unit and are based upon the kind of quantified content analysis of RFE programs illustrated in the statistical report contained in Annex H to this report.

<sup>3</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex VII, p. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> RFE disc jockeys in Munich report considerable mail from listeners to this effect.

<sup>8</sup> Monitored by RFE, June 17, 1968.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Noel Bernard, Munich, October 26, 1971.

<sup>10</sup> The full English translation of this program is included in Annex O—a compendium of typical political commentaries of each

Broadcasting Department covering the period October 26–November 5, 1971.

<sup>11</sup> See the section on the Poznan riots, p. 30, supra.

<sup>12</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex XIII. This is a compendium of several hundred representative clippings from the West German, West European, and U.S. press. Although there is some unfavorable commentary, the support for RFE is impressive. The liberal Munich daily *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*—a paper close to Chancellor Brandt and supportive of his *Ostpolitik*—on June 9, 1971 presented the complete and unabridged transcript of RFE Polish news programming for the entire day of June 1, 1971, and invited its readership to form its own opinions as to the accuracy and objectivity of RFE reporting.

<sup>13</sup> The Weekly Report of November 4, 1971, is included in Annex Q.

<sup>14</sup> The full text of the Monthly Information Report for October 1971, is included in Annex Q.

## CHAPTER V. RFE PERFORMANCE: COVERAGE OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS

In the preceding two chapters considerable attention was paid to how policies are made at Radio Free Europe, how these policies are reflected in current programming—especially in programs created and broadcast during the period covered by the field study in Munich—and what procedures are in effect to assure both compliance with policy and maximum excellence in program content. Several conclusions emerge from this analysis:

a. In the conduct of its daily broadcasts, Radio Free Europe management in Munich enjoys a near-total autonomy in decision-making.

b. The volume and immediacy of RFE programming together with the disparate audiences of RFE's five audience countries and the six-hour time difference between New York and Munich render impracticable either central scripting or the pre-broadcast review of scripts except in limited quantity and unusual circumstances.

c. The question of before-the-fact control or supervision of RFE broadcasting policy by any group external to RFE's Munich headquarters—even by the Free Europe, Inc. Board Directors—is largely one of trust and confidence in RFE's management and in a number of procedures intended to deliver the kind of performance justifying confidence.

d. Analysis of scripts and quality control procedures during a sample two-week period indicates that RFE programming is, despite occasional human errors, balanced, comprehensive, objective, and largely free of inflammatory polemics. On the other hand, RFE programs consistently prod East European governments, pointing out both their successes and their shortcomings, and urging courses of action to liberalize the socio-political systems of the area.

e. RFE management is conscientious and consistent in the design and application of increasingly sophisticated procedures to assess RFE operations objectively and to strive for continued improvement in program quality and timeliness.

The inside-out observation of RFE activities leading to these conclusions over a two-week sample period was in itself an interesting experience despite the obvious limitations inherent in such a brief field study. Of greater import to an overall examination of RFE, however, is some assessment of its performance, under varying conditions of stress, and over longer periods of time. To this end, attention will now be turned to the general nature of RFE broadcasts during four major recent historical events.

The rapid internal changes in Czechoslovakia which led to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of that country in 1968 is one of those events. The succession of developments



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in Poland, which began in November-December 1970 and which resulted in the replacement of Wladislaw Gomułka by Edward Gierek in the Party leadership is another. Publication by the New York Times of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" in the summer of 1971 is a third, though less important, major development. It is certainly an event providing a test of RFE's objectivity in handling an affair which caused great embarrassment to the U.S. Government—RFE's major sponsor. And finally, the release of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty from his 15-year sanctuary in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, his move to Rome, and his final settlement in Vienna put the final touches upon contemporary RFE treatment of the aftermath of the 1956 uprising in Hungary. The following summaries of RFE programming during the "Prague Spring" and the "Polish December" are based upon RFE's own compilations of broadcast material—compilations which were sent by RFE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the summer of 1971 (in the case of the Polish December) and to RFE's West European Advisory Committee in November 1968 (in the case of the "Prague Spring"). Files on RFE handling of the Pentagon Papers and the Mindszenty affair were compiled at the request of and in cooperation with the Congressional Research Service.

## THE "PRAGUE SPRING" OF 1968

The removal of Antonin Novotny in January 1968 from the top leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party signalled the end of an era in that country and presaged the beginning of a new, but what turned out to be a short-lived period of evolving freedom. During this period, when Czechoslovakia enjoyed a brief flirtation with a genuinely free press, RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research reports indicated a steady erosion of its listenership until the invasion by Warsaw Pact powers and the reimposition of censorship was reflected by a corresponding upsurge in the RFE listening audience in Czechoslovakia.

The chain of events was apparently set in motion by reaction of the Novotny regime to a Writers' Congress held in June of 1967 and during which a number of basic issues, deemed by the regime to be hostile, were raised. The regime took disciplinary action against rebel writers and shut off reportage of the events of the Congress. In October, 1967, a Slovak Communist Writers meeting produced criticism of regime behavior after the June conference, and indicated that only by listening to foreign broadcasts could one obtain adequate information.

RFE broadcasts during this period were aimed at airing the discussion of the basic arguments raised at the June Writers' Congress and extending the scope of discussion by bringing up related ideas expressed earlier in other quarters such as economists, jurists, scientists, and industrial managers. RFE also publicized the attention given abroad to the struggle for reforms in Czechoslovakia.

Throughout the closing months of 1967 dissatisfaction within the country accelerated and culminated with the dismissal of Novotny at a Central Committee session in early January. RFE welcomed this action, and pointed out, in its broadcasts, the opportunity available to the new leadership which had been brought to power by forces favoring reform.

An internal RFE guidance, covering its approach to the events in Czechoslovakia, was issued on February 29, 1968. The guidance stated, in part:

"The foremost tactical objective of RFE broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on the country's domestic affairs over the next several months must be to help maximize the existing and incipient social pressures which demand progress from debate to institutionalization, from piecemeal reform to a fundamental overhaul of the political system, from patchwork "democratization" to a more gen-

uinely democratic exercise of power and a system of government based on and responsive to the consent of the governed."

Censorship was abolished by law on June 26, 1968, and for the first time in a Communist country there existed a virtually free press, followed by a wave of open criticism of officials and individuals. By the end of April the Soviet Party Newspaper *Pravda* was showing signs of concern, although it did not yet attack Dubcek, Novotny's successor as Party chief. Publication at the end of June of a strong plea for continued reform, signed by 70 intellectuals, set off a virulent *Pravda* attack on the freedom of communications media in Czechoslovakia. In addition, Dubcek had rejected a call by the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact members for a summit meeting. Thus the pressures toward confrontation between Dubcek and the orthodox Communists began to snowball.

During this period—April-August 1968—the Czechoslovak public was well informed by their own communications media. Yet, reports RFE, despite the newly-acquired press freedom (and perhaps because that freedom, being newly-acquired, was of uncertain duration) Czechoslovaks were still anxious to gather information from all sources, including Western broadcasts.

RFE policy during this period was to urge support of the Dubcek leadership which was traveling cautiously along the road to greater democratization. The results of the continuous maneuvering between Dubcek and the Warsaw Pact powers, however, impelled RFE to continue some needling<sup>2</sup> whenever Czechoslovak government policies appeared to be backsliding too much.

On August 20, 1968, the Czechoslovak experiment with liberalization came to an abrupt end with the invasion of the country by Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops. In line with final broadcasts of Radio Prague, RFE adopted a policy of maximum dissemination of factual information. RFE also conveyed world-wide, Communist and non-Communist, reaction to the invasion and, in commentaries, stressed the peaceful nature of the Czechoslovak reform movement and the fact that at no time had this movement violated socialist norms nor jeopardized Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship. The RFE line was summed up in a broadcast on August 27—at the moment Dubcek returned from Moscow where he had been forced to agree to apply the brakes to the reform program:

"Sometimes it is the duty of statesmen to avert the worst possibilities in order to preserve better opportunities . . . What Czechoslovakia has now is less than what it had before August 21st; but it is more than it would have had if civil morale had crumbled under the weight of the occupation regime and the government had been assumed by a group of collaborators willing to comply with every foreign wish. There is no government of collaborators and traitors in Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakia has statesmen who had to give to a foreign power something which does not belong to it, lest they had to give this power everything . . ."

## THE "POLISH DECEMBER" OF 1970

There is ample evidence that within the Communist East European regimes there are few occasions on which public opinion is not severely inhibited, and that the controlled press in the five countries does not afford an outlet for more than one view on major subjects. The standard regime approach to RFE broadcasts, for example, is to denounce RFE as reactionary, imperialist, an espionage organization, and so on. At the same time, RFE commentators are discredited by the regimes as out of touch with the events, personalities, and popular sentiment in Eastern Europe.

RFE spokesmen acknowledge that for long periods of time these regime contentions—

especially those alleging that RFE is out of touch with the realities of Eastern Europe—are difficult to answer on an objective basis. So long as the lid remains firmly clamped down, "there is little to go on besides the contention of the cooks that the contents of the pot are as advertised—and that they are merely bubbling contentedly, not boiling."<sup>3</sup>

Periodically, according to RFE's analysis, the pressures in the pot either burst the clamps, or the clamps are loosened, and there is a swift upsurge of the pot's contents. At these times sentiments and passions long restrained are given voice, grievances aired, and demands made. Such moments afford opportunities to measure, with the objective yardstick of comparisons between positions espoused by RFE and concessions granted by the rulers, the degree to which RFE broadcasters in fact reflect accurate perceptions of the vital interests of their audiences.

An opportunity to test this yardstick was provided by the hundred and fifty days in Poland beginning on December 14, 1970, with the riots in the Baltic ports.

Although no one was able to predict the timing and the violence of the worker demonstrations, Radio Free Europe broadcasts for the preceding two years had been characterized by commentary on the "hesitancy and lack of imagination of the Polish regime in dealing with the stagnation of the country's economy and the discontents of the public."<sup>4</sup>

The build-up for the specific outbreaks, which began at Gdansk on the night of December 15-16, 1970, appears to have begun with the announcement by the Party plenum in May of a new wage and incentive system. RFE's analysis of this system concluded that it contained more controls than incentives, would intensify worker dissatisfaction, and that the Polish economy would continue to drift. A May 21 RFE broadcast commented that "the problem boils down to creating a direct link between greater work effort and the wages of the workers concerned." A May 31 broadcast stated that "the ruling elite no longer believes in the elementary honesty of either the economic apparatus or the working masses." By October 12, 1970, RFE broadcasts held that "the imagination of the world of labor does not reach out to 1971 when the beneficial effects of the 'incentive reform' are expected to materialize . . . one has to eat and live somewhere right now. Meanwhile, the prices of food and consumer goods for daily use are going up, there are shortages everywhere, and housing is becoming more expensive . . ."

Despite the fact that Polish economic problems were a concern of publicists inside Poland as well as of RFE analysts, Communist media reaction to RFE's commentary on the need for economic reforms was uniformly hostile, extending even to personal attacks on individual RFE commentators. In June 1970, a provincial Communist Party daily admitted shortcomings in the economy and deplored the efforts of the economic administration to hide them rather than blame the individuals concerned—a situation the daily said was exploited by "imperialist centers" like RFE.

On Saturday, December 12, 1970, the regime announced price increases on a wide range of necessities—food, clothing, and fuel—theoretically offset by reductions on other consumer goods, primarily household appliances. On December 14, RFE pointed out the fact that the household appliances in question were beyond the purchasing power of most workers, could not be bought even at the reduced prices, and represented over-produced and over-stocked items. Consequently, these price changes penalized lower and middle income groups. In an internal guidance paper, RFE predicted that the political consequences could be serious. On the night of December 15-16, news of the first

outbreaks at Gdansk, Gdynia, and Sopot was telephoned to RFE from Sweden, where a Polish refugee had picked up a local Gdansk radio broadcast. RFE monitors were then able to pick up signals from Radio Szczecin and Gdansk, began broadcasting the news, and supplied its taped monitoring of Polish broadcasts to all Western media requesting them. Meanwhile, Polish censorship had kept most of the population unaware of what was happening until, by the afternoon of December 16th when the news was pouring into Poland from Western broadcasts, the Polish news agency PAP and Radio Warsaw began carrying reports of the outbreaks. "Adventurers and hooligans" were blamed by the official media for exploiting the situation.

RFE broadcasts continued to feature Poland's deepening economic problems and the price increases as the real causes of the disturbances, labeling the official characterization of protesting workers as "hooligans" as merely a "well-known propaganda trick." Polish media then began to concede that workers as well as "hooligans" were on the streets in Gdansk and Gdynia, but shunted all possible blame to Radio Free Europe. In a commentary on December 18, the Polish United Workers Party (Communist Party) Central Committee's official daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, conceded the "difficult problems of our economy and living conditions of workers," but blamed the violence on "trouble-makers" who "... sow rumors and misinformation, incite to street demonstrations, provoke violence ... The subversive Radio Free Europe abets this. It calls for excesses and pushes [people] to irresponsible and harmful acts, the costs of which are to be paid for not by the hirelings in Munich but by all of us: the whole society ..."

The Western press generally credited RFE with accuracy and timeliness. The London *Daily Telegraph*, for example, reported from Bonn on December 17:

"With the outbreak of angry food rioting in Poland, part of the world's attention focuses once again on Radio Free Europe ... Without the station, few Poles outside the immediately affected area would have known until yesterday what was going on, for it was only then that Radio Warsaw and the official Polish news agency broke their silence on the street battles in the north."

On December 18, an RFE broadcast quoted an old speech by Gomulka himself as the best description of why the new disturbances had occurred—a speech delivered by the Polish Party leader after the Poznan riots of 1956, RFE said, in part:

"Fourteen years ago Gomulka condemned the previous Party leadership for having been afraid to tell the working people the truth ... He rejected the propaganda thesis that imperialists, agents, provocateurs, and enemies of People's Poland were responsible for the workers' revolt. The working class protested, it had resorted to strike because—as Gomulka said—its cup had run over ..."

Two days later, Gomulka was replaced by Edward Gierek, and the new Party leader and Polish media switched to language which was not really very different from RFE's. In a broadcast on December 20, Gierek said:

"The recent events have recalled to us in a painful way the basic truth that the Party must always maintain close bonds with the working class and the whole nation, that it cannot lose a common language with working people."

Gierek described the motives for work interruptions and protests as "mostly honest," although decrying their "exploitation" by "enemies of socialism and a-social and criminal elements." Gierek promised that the Politburo would concentrate on improving the situations of low-income families and problems of working women, youth, and housing. Other media took the cue. Even the Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* on December 22 blamed the crisis on "ill-conceived conceptions of economic policy."

In its own analysis of RFE's role in the "Polish December," RFE editors cited a lengthy series of broadcasts through February 1971, in which they described "19 points of substance, ranging from purely economic through political to cultural affairs, on which Polish popular demands, or concessions the new leadership felt obliged to grant, and the positions espoused by Radio Free Europe were in noteworthy accord." The editors also noted points on which Polish popular sentiment and RFE broadcasts did not coincide, attributing these to the concern at the reprisals which the actions of the coastal strikers might provoke. Thus RFE, going against popular sentiment, had repeatedly urged caution, and the necessity not to let things get out of hand.

More recently, RFE has prepared a more concise analysis of its role prior to the Gdansk strikes. Entitled *Fourteen Polish Points*, this analysis concentrates upon comparing what RFE had to say on major issues before the outbreaks took place with concessions made by the Gierek leadership to restore political stability and economic productivity. The positions espoused by RFE on these issues before December 20, 1970 are set out, by means of excerpts from RFE's Polish broadcasts. These positions are then followed, in each case, by an account of developments subsequent to December 20, 1970, with emphasis on the concessions made in response to revealed public opinion by the new leadership.

#### RADIO FREE EUROPE AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS

The brief but intense sensation occasioned by the *New York Times*' publication of a series of ten articles, beginning on June 13, 1971, based upon its own analysis of a multi-volume, highly-classified history of the U.S. role in Vietnam, presented RFE broadcasters with a variety of challenging and delicate situations. As a news dissemination agency, RFE could not fail to be comprehensive, accurate, and rapid in its coverage without severe loss of credibility. Though an organization sponsored by and financially largely beholden to the U.S. Government, RFE nonetheless had to face a decision to embarrass its sponsors further by intensifying the spread of information the Government was attempting court action to suppress to vast audiences ruled by regimes hostile, to say the least, to U.S. aims in Vietnam.

And, as a politically-oriented network of broadcasting stations, RFE had to consider the temptation to propagandize the many aspects of this issue which seemed ready-made for psychological exploitation—the relative degree of freedom of the press in the West compared to the East, for example.

RFE's decision was to refrain from propagandizing, largely to avoid editorial commentary, and to act primarily as the disseminator of news, providing its audiences with the broadest possible spectrum of published materials from the most highly-respected Western news sources. RFE sought to provide its listeners with the same array of facts, opinions, and analyses available to informed citizens in the West, thus enabling them to judge the many facets of the issues for themselves. In a memorandum sent to the Congressional Research Service, RFE summarized its philosophy:

"Implicitly, the case is a trenchant illustration of one of the fundamental differences between American-style democracy and the pervasive political control which characterizes the East European systems—that of a free versus a controlled press, a press which serves the broad interests of institutions and principle in a democratic society or the more narrowly defined and controlled interests of party policy in a communist state. On this issue as well the lines of opinion were drawn not by RFE, but by the station's accurate reflection of Western opinion."

Generally, RFE did not reply directly to polemics aired by East European media. When

replies were made, they did not associate RFE with any of the various controversial issues. Rather, they dwelt in a low key upon the issue of freedom of the press, allowing the East European listener to make his own comparisons with the controlled East European media. There were occasional exceptions. In a broadcast on June 25, 1971, the Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department broadcast a commentary described in the following terms by the broadcast Analysis Unit:

"In view of a Prague commentator's statement, in connection with the publication of the classified Pentagon papers, that 'there is no democracy in America,' CS BLOCK (Elias, M 5) depicted what would happen if *Rude Pravo* got hold of secret material revealing how the August 1968 intervention was prepared. In 1968 CS newspapers discussed the hitherto undisclosed circumstances of the national calamity, intent on pinpointing the people responsible for it. As a result tanks moved in, and normalized 'democracy' practically destroyed the CS press. The dispute in U.S. between the government and the press has been placed in the hands of the courts. If the whole affair offers any lesson about democracy, then the Radio Prague commentator apparently failed to notice it."

In presenting its coverage, RFE quoted the following press sources:

The New York Times.  
Washington Post.  
Christian Science Monitor.  
Chicago Tribune.  
Goteborg Handelstidning.  
Louisville Courier Journal.  
Time.  
Newsweek.  
Berlingske Tidene (Denmark).  
Washington Evening Star.  
Baltimore Sun.  
Arbetet (Sweden).  
Arbeiter Zeitung.  
Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munch).  
Stuttgarter Zeitung.  
La Croix.  
Le Monde.  
Figaro.  
The Times (London).  
Die Presse (Vienna).  
Kurier.  
Boston Globe.  
Politiken.  
Philadelphia Inquirer.  
Chicago Sun Times.  
Daily Telegraph (London).  
Wall Street Journal.  
Long Island Press.  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.  
Neue Zuercher Zeitung.  
Economist.  
The Australian.  
Los Angeles Times.  
International Herald Tribune.  
La Suisse.  
Dagens Nyheter.  
United Press International.  
Trybuna Ludu.  
New York Post.  
Daily Mail (London).  
Muenchner Merkur.  
Combat.  
St. Louis Post Dispatch.  
The Guardian.  
Kronenzeitung.

A collection of summaries prepared by RFE's Broadcast Analysis Unit in which each program containing references to the Pentagon Papers is described, is attached as Annex U. The full text of sample scripts from each Broadcasting Department is also included in the same Annex.

THE EXILE OF JOSEPH CARDINAL MINDSZENTY  
In the tumultuous history of Eastern Europe since the second World War, no succession of events so epitomizes this history of conflict and confrontation, of personal and political tragedy, and, more recently, of the profound changes wrought by time, as does the ordeal, the imprisonment, the asylum,

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and finally the release, of Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty.

In February of 1949 a Hungarian court had sentenced Mindszenty to life imprisonment for alleged crimes against the state—an act bringing into sharp focus the conflict between communism and the Catholic Church which for many years was waged with unrelenting bitterness. In October 1956, during the Hungarian uprising, Mindszenty was released from prison but was forced to seek refuge in the American Legation in Budapest when Soviet military force brought the regime of Janos Kadar to power. There he remained, having vowed never to leave until vindicated of all charges, until September 28, 1971, when the Vatican announced an agreement with the Hungarian Government providing for Mindszenty's permanent exile abroad.

On September 10, 1971, RFE's Rome Bureau advised Munich that an "authoritative informant" in the Vatican had indicated that the Holy See and the Hungarian Government were very close to an agreement providing for the safe conduct and permanent exile from Hungary of Cardinal Mindszenty. RFE-Munich notified Free Europe, Inc. of this development, adding that RFE planned no usage of the news tip until it could be verified.

When, on September 28, Mindszenty's arrival in Rome was announced by the Vatican, Munich and New York exchanged cables to the effect that broadcast coverage would initially confine itself to information obtained from statements made by the Vatican and the U.S. State Department. All Broadcast Departments reported the news, and followed up with background stories based upon RFE research. The Hungarian broadcast based its report on information published in *Osservatore Romano*, noting that Mindszenty's "ecclesiastic situation" would not be changed, and that the contents of the reported "agreement" between the Vatican and the Hungarian regime were not known. It also noted that MTI (the Hungarian news agency) had reported the event. The Polish Broadcasting Department reported the Cardinal's Vatican welcome, factually outlined his career, and noted his refusal to accept "amnesty" from the Hungarian government.

September 29th was by far the biggest broadcast day. On that date the results of the morning policy meeting in Munich were cabled to New York as follows: [regarding Hungary]

"Mindszenty's arrival in Rome is the main story of the day. In addition to materials sent DS, an EERA [East European Research and Analysis] paper will be telexed to you later today. The Hungarian BD in a commentary tonight will welcome the arrangement which was worked out and express the hope that more progress will now be made in church-state relations. The BD will criticize the regime for not annulling Mindszenty's trial and sentence, and express appreciation for Mindszenty's decision to accept the sacrifice of leaving his native land. Other coverage by the Hungarian and other BD's will be essentially reportorial and descriptive.

"UPI has just reported, quoting the Hungarian Official Gazette, that the Hungarian Presidential Council has decided to amnesty (Kegyelem in Hungarian) Cardinal Mindszenty considering his age and bad status of health.' According to information we received earlier the Cardinal and the Vatican were hoping that the regime would not take this step which signifies a re-statement of Mindszenty's original 'guilt.' We believe the Cardinal will reject this 'amnesty.'"

The Broadcast Departments—particularly the Hungarian BD—discussed in detail the ramifications of the event, using material supplied from RFE's research and analysis elements and following the lines of daily program recommendations and discussions in

morning policy meetings which were, as usual, teletyped to New York. Materials supporting script writing were also supplied by RFE's Rome Bureau, the New York newsroom, and press coverage from other areas wired in by RFE's European bureau's or reported by press agencies. On the 29th, the Hungarian BD covered the subject in seven broadcasts. The Bulgarian, Polish, and Rumanian BD's each aired two broadcasts on this subject, while the Czechoslovak coverage was spread over three.

Copies of key communications between RFE in Munich, Rome, and New York, lists of principal programs, and applicable Daily Broadcast Analyses of programs actually aired are included in Annex V. Also included in the Annex are two scripts—*Newsreel* No. 292 and *Commentary* No. 238—broadcast on September 29, 1971 by the Hungarian Broadcast Department.

As can be seen from the Daily Broadcast Analyses, the BD's went into exhaustive detail on the many facets of the event, from background on the Cardinal, descriptions of his trip to Rome, and background on the Esztergom Archdiocese, to general reviews of Vatican-Hungarian Government relations and the problems remaining between the two.

Coverage of the case continued on September 30 with a Hungarian Broadcasting Department description of Mindszenty celebrating Mass in Rome and the opening of the Third Synod; and the Bulgarian, Polish, and Rumanian BD's concentrating on reviews of the European and American press. On October 1, almost all coverage was based on press reviews. On October 2, there were further re-tellings of the story and more press reviews.

By October 4, the possibility of the Cardinal's moving to live in Vienna had arisen in the press, and was reported by RFE—but in the form of quotes from the world press, always giving clear attribution of the source.

After October 6, coverage of the Mindszenty story dwindled to an occasional press-review item. More recently, in the absence of new developments, coverage has virtually ceased.

## CONCLUSIONS

Both the intensive examination of RFE programming during the two-week period of the field study in Munich and the retrospective study of RFE scripts over longer periods of time and in connection with major historical events bear out a general observation that RFE coverage is thorough, objective, and reasonably dispassionate in its coverage of even highly controversial subjects. Quotations from the Western press are extensively employed as a programming device, and the selectivity of press sources is well balanced. Although partisan biases are hard to detect in RFE programming, it is the author's view that, by and large, RFE commentaries tend to lean slightly toward the "liberal" approach as this term is currently used in American policies.

The use of the terms "dispassionate" and "balanced" should not, however, be interpreted as descriptive of a bland quality to RFE programming. On the contrary, RFE scripts are lively and often quite hard-hitting. It is simply that commentary is aimed at the specifics of East European political systems and practices, not necessarily at the philosophy. Communism as a socio-economic system is, of course, the subject of frequent and even biting criticism by RFE broadcasters. But it is the practice, the implementation, of stated Communist ideals that usually receives the fire—not the ideals themselves. Nor is the criticism purely negative. Valid achievements are given due credit, and alternative approaches to stagnated courses of action are supplied in abundance.

The amount of research underlying script preparation deserves special mention. Con-

temporary life in East Europe is evaluated against an overwhelming amount of hard, evaluated data in RFE research files which are well-maintained and constantly expanding. The personal convictions of individual script-writers or announcers loom rather small unless they can be validated by RFE's substantial and scholarly expertise in East European affairs. It is likely that this factor, even more than careful management procedures, contributes the most toward RFE's stature of scholarship and objectivity, and serves as the greatest hindrance to free-wheeling editorialism.

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> West European Advisory Committee, Twelfth Session, Rome, November 18-19, 1968. Annex to the Political Report, Section 1, p. 4. The subsequent paragraphs are based upon this document, which is included in its entirety in Annex S.

<sup>2</sup> The needling was, however, tempered with caution lest the regime be prodded into untenable positions. RFE's Daily Guidance Summary for July 11, 1968 stated: "The Czechoslovak Broadcasting Department will see its role not in increasing such pressures but rather in providing all the relevant facts and information upon which the Czechoslovak citizen will be best able to form an intelligent judgment of the situation."

Broadcasts to the other four countries would stress the statements by Czechoslovak leaders "which attest to continuing Czechoslovak adherence to the Warsaw Pact and to principles of 'socialism' as adapted to unique Czechoslovak traditions and conditions."

<sup>3</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex IX, p. 1. This Annex to Mr. Durkee's submission to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is a lengthy and extremely detailed chronology and analysis of the events leading up to and following the overthrow of Gomulka and his replacement by Edward Gierk. The following paragraphs are based upon this RFE analysis.

<sup>4</sup> Durkee, op. cit., addendum to Annex VII, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> The full text of Fourteen Polish Points is included in Annex T.

## CHAPTER VI: THE IMPACT OF RADIO FREE EUROPE

Analysis of the extensive facilities and policy machinery utilized by RFE to formulate and implement its programs, and of the content of RFE's daily broadcasts, leads to a logical question. How effective are RFE's attempts to achieve its stated goal of disseminating objective information and "balanced commentary" to five East European countries for the purpose of encouraging positive evolution within the framework of the Communist system?

RFE broadcasts reach two overlapping but distinct audiences. These are comprised of government and Communist Party officials of five East European countries on the one hand, and five corresponding general populations on the other. RFE's total impact is the product of the reaction it arouses in both of these audiences and how that reaction affects U.S. foreign policy interests.

To break the measurement of RFE's impact upon these two audiences into researchable components, it is hypothesized that RFE's impact can be measured in three ways: (1) by direct audience interview techniques adapted to RFE's special circumstances; (2) indirectly by assessing the nature and intensity of Communist regime attacks upon RFE—in terms of propaganda, diplomatic action, and technical measures to inhibit listenership—and; (3) indirectly by observation of any policy changes which may be made by East European governments in response to RFE broadcasts.

Research under the first category attempts to provide information as to the size and composition of RFE listenership and whether RFE broadcasts are credible and persuasive on political and economic matters, and

whether they are entertaining and informative in the presentation of news and the other educational, social, and cultural subjects in the RFE repertory.

Research under the latter two categories attempts to measure whether and how RFE stimulates the Communist regimes—in terms either of direct hostile response or of even grudging approval as illustrated by the adoption of limited measures of reform. Observation of public pressures toward reform in these countries is also one indirect and circumstantial measure of whether people have not only been persuaded, but have been moved to action—presumably as a result, in at least some instances, of their having been supplied with sufficient information to enable them to assess the situation and take appropriate action.

In the remainder of this chapter an analysis will be made of each of these three approaches to estimating the net impact of RFE activities. Examination of the latter two is based upon East European broadcasts and publications and a variety of Western press sources as compiled by RFE research staff from their extensive research and monitoring files. Based upon rather extensive spot-checking of these files in Munich, it appears to the author that RFE's compilations are representative as well as comprehensive. In any case, constraints of time and resources precluded any effort to conduct a parallel independent examination of the original sources.

RFE's direct interview-survey methods of audience research were, however, subjected to independent evaluation and study by a special attitude and opinion research and in inter-cultural communication retained for this purpose by the Congressional Research Service. This evaluation was conducted in Europe by Dr. Lorand B. Szalay, a Senior Research Scientist with the American Institutes for Research office in Kensington, Maryland. The full text of Dr. Szalay's report, together with a description of his professional credentials, is contained in Annex A.

#### AUDIENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH AT RFE

Radio Free Europe claims to have acquired an audience of some 31 million persons in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania—about half of the population over the age of fourteen. The majority of these listeners reportedly tune in on RFE two or three times a week. Young people are said to be becoming a large part of the audience and to comprise a youthful listenership about twice the size of that of the Voice of America or the BBC.

These and other claims made by Radio Free Europe are based upon the findings of RFE's own Audience and Public Opinion Research Department in Munich. Its Director, Mr. Henry O. Hart, describes the five general functions of his Department as follows:

To ensure Radio Free Europe's achieving maximum effectiveness requires as a first step that Audience and Public Opinion Research acquaint all echelons of the organization at all times with the present status of performance. This is the all-important audit function . . . rendered so crucial because no other reliable means exist to measure performance.

Since this audit function also points to areas of strength . . . as well as weakness, it serves as a take-off point for helping Radio Free Europe toward ever better performance. This leads to the second and even more important function . . . which is to study and measure ways to increase Radio Free Europe's effectiveness. It is evident that the audit function and the dynamic guidance function are interrelated. At present much more time is devoted to the latter function, as it closely parallels the needs of the Broadcasting Departments.

The third general function of the department is public opinion research which furnishes a picture of changes in social and political conditions in the countries with which Radio Free Europe is concerned. . . public opinion research . . . provides the Broadcasting Departments with information regarding the climate in which RFE programs are received. Beyond this, published reports in this research area are, whenever appropriate, made available to scholars in the field of East European studies and empirical social research.

The fourth major function is psychological research which offers insight into such areas as motivation patterns, value systems, goals and needs of the audience and the potential audience, conflicts between traditional values and "communist values," adjustments to and rejection of the socio-political system, etc. . . .

The fifth general function lies in improvement of the measuring devices and research techniques themselves in order that the other four functions may be increasingly more accurately and reliably performed for the good of the organization as a whole . . .

Mr. Hart's APOR Department has developed its own methodology for assessing East European public opinion by interviewing East European nationals—some 6500 in an average year—who are traveling in Western Europe. These interviews are conducted by independent research organizations under contract to Radio Free Europe, and the respondents are said to be unaware of the RFE sponsorship of the interviews. RFE describes the nature of its methodology as follows:<sup>12</sup>

1. Each survey employs a number of local opinion-research institutes in different countries to draw independent samples. This minimizes chances of opinion bias due to location of interviews and interviewing techniques. No survey is published until at least six independent samples have been taken. Generally, a survey of any nationality takes in more than 1,000 interviewees, and is judged reliable only if all the results obtained from all the samples correlate highly . . .

2. RFE employs a procedure specially adapted to the nature of the sample: Called Continual and Comparative Sampling, it derives from the principle of repeated independent samples used in, for example, the biological sciences; it is designed to guard against untypical samples which can occur because different types of people may choose different Western countries to which to travel. Accordingly, many independent samples are drawn from among travelers in a wide variety of countries, at a wide variety of times . . .

3. Samples consist wholly or almost wholly of East European nationals visiting the West and planning to return to their native countries, rather than refugees or immigrants who have made a psychological break with the thinking of their compatriots.

4. To make sample results representative of the population at large, disproportions were corrected ex post facto by increasing the weight of opinions of underrepresented groups, and decreasing those of the over-represented.

Asked by Radio Free Europe to evaluate its research methodology, the New York firm of Oliver Quayle and Company submitted a report in October 1970, expressing the view that RFE's conduct and use of opinion research was fundamentally sound, and accurate within a five to six point error margin.<sup>3</sup>

RFE audience research reports list Radio Free Europe as outstripping by far all other Western broadcast operations in the five East European nations studied. The overwhelming majority of the respondents rate RFE as either *very* or *fairly* reliable. Survey reports consistently show that nearly all lis-

teners tune in to news and commentaries. Young people reportedly listen in great numbers to "beat" music and jazz; older persons to "standards," folk music, and operetta. Magazine formats—offering a mixture of on-the-spot reports, brief documentaries, and some analysis—are said to be popular with all groups.

Thus RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research findings depict the organization as one which attracts and holds a large and influential audience in one of the world's key areas; an organization whose activities are highly valued by this audience, and one which serves to hold open a window to the world through which pours information and entertainment not available from any other source. The basic question which arises is how valid are the data upon which RFE bases these findings? In Munich, as an integral part of the Congressional Research Service field study, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay conducted a detailed analysis of APOR procedures. Highlights and major findings are summarized in the following paragraphs:

#### Approach and Relevance

RFE's audience research has developed in response to conditions and situational characteristics which are exceptional in broadcasting. In the first place, the tight control of communications media maintained by East European Communist regimes precludes most of the common means of feedback such as a free press, free elections, and free research. Secondly, most East Europeans do feel poorly informed. Thus, they form large and receptive audiences for international communication. Finally, East Europeans may neither be fully identified with the ideological blueprints of the governments concerned, nor can they be considered to have remained entirely uninfluenced by the experiences of the last three decades. They may have aspirations similar in many ways to those of Western peoples; but they cannot be simply equated.

Audience analysis at RFE in its present form produces extensive and timely information by interviewing several thousand East Europeans each year. The survey data contain three major categories of information: Listenership data, program evaluation, and attitude studies. This research performs an important pioneering service as the scope of the indigenous audience and public opinion research in RFE's five Eastern European countries is modest and the publication of results is selective. In the social and political fields, the validity of data issued by the government is frequently questionable.

RFE's basic approach is to attempt to derive solid, objective information from large audience samples, which represent wide cross-sections of the populations. This is a large-scale effort to apply modern opinion survey methods in real life situations. It requires a careful adjustment of technical-scientific criteria to the special social, political, and psychological conditions which obtain in Eastern Europe.

This explains why the relevance of the RFE research is substantive not only in connection with the immediate use of the data in program planning and evaluation, but also in the broader context of introducing and applying social science research to this area. RFE research traces and evaluates social and political trends in five Communist-controlled Eastern European countries in which objective public opinion research efforts are seriously hampered by political conditions.<sup>4</sup>

#### Representatives of RFE samples

RFE interviews nearly 7,000 East European nationals traveling in Western Europe each year. Each national sample (excepting Bulgaria) includes over 1,000 cases. The interviews are conducted by independent public opinion research organizations in various



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large European cities where East Europeans travel (in numbers estimated to exceed 200,000 annually) as tourists, visitors, businessmen, or sportsmen.

As Annex A indicates in detail, RFE's use of large samples, numerous independent subsamples, and its attempts to reach visitors randomly to reduce the biases of selectivity are all sound measures which help to overcome the odds against success in a complex research task. Although RFE's optimism and confidence in the representativeness of the samples may not be readily proven merely by the adapted design or research method, and although some of RFE's statistical assumptions may be questioned, the results of the field study in Munich indicated a considerable body of empirical evidence in the results of AFOR research suggesting that such confidence is not unfounded. The CRS research findings also show that the samples include not only people from all walks of life but also from a broad and varied spectrum of political opinions.

#### Scope and Utilization of Information Obtained

The use of audience analysis data within Radio Free Europe is institutionally organized. The various Broadcasting Departments show a general and fairly uniform appreciation of the value of the listenership data. The program evaluation results are received occasionally with mixed feelings. This can be explained by the fact that when the evaluation indicates a decline in program popularity, the feedback, while useful and necessary, is not flattering. The attitude data and special studies information is of more recent origin and up to now has been used on a more sporadic basis. It probably deserves more special attention.

#### Validity of Results

RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research findings are not always easy to accept at full face value. The reaction of the AFOR Department has, understandably, been one of going to some extremes in order to overcome the credibility gap. The never-ending quest for full "documentation" of AFOR Department findings, while scientifically praiseworthy, has resulted in some denial of benefits to RFE which could be accrued by modification of certain sampling techniques to allow for much quicker feedback of research results into program planning. Details of this suggested modification are contained in Annex A.

Nonetheless it can be stated that Radio Free Europe has invested a great deal of ingenuity in planning and supervising its research effort. It undertook extensive research work to test the representativeness of the samples and to validate procedures. It is felt that the strategy of using tourist and visitor samples has proven itself to be sound and generally dependable.

The answer to the question of how valid may the RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research findings be considered is, therefore, that they may be considered as valid within a commonsense meaning of the term. Exact statistical projections may not be precisely evaluated—although Quayle estimates their accuracy to within a margin of five or six percent—but exact percentages are far less important than the general trends. It should be noted that, in addition to those who listen directly to RFE broadcasts, the additional percentage of those who receive RFE news indirectly by word of mouth is hard to estimate. The censorship of news media and the desire to receive reliable information produce a favorable climate for spreading information by word of mouth. The importance of these private channels in controlled societies has been emphasized by numerous accounts.<sup>2</sup>

#### NATURE OF COMMUNIST REGIME ATTACKS ON RFE

Another measure of RFE's impact is to be found in the reaction of Communist regimes

to RFE broadcasts. RFE files record a steady stream of regime attacks in all information media. In 1968, for example, well over 1,000 such instances were noted.

#### Ideological and polemical

That the regimes attack RFE is entirely to be expected in view of the importance Communist regimes attach to the control and censorship of information media. The changing nature of such attacks in recent years is, however, probably of greater significance than the quantity or frequency of such attacks. Since about 1965, RFE's influence has become increasingly the subject of serious, dispassionate, and even scholarly analysis by regime ideologists and propagandists. According to the Communist publications and monitored broadcasts in RFE files, these Communist analysts have acknowledged that in the contest of ideas, the Communist regimes are on the defensive. They realize fully the ideological risks of "peaceful coexistence" and evidence a new respect for the power of mass communication.

Since the Czechoslovak developments of 1968, the Soviet media have paid unprecedented attention to the susceptibility of East European audiences to RFE broadcasts. RFE analysts interpret this intensified concern as indicating recognition by Soviet leadership that East European peoples are far more attuned historically to Western ways of thinking and more susceptible to Western ideas than Soviet citizens are.

In years past the major thrust of Communist attacks against RFE was to denigrate RFE as a "remnant of the cold war" and an obstacle to "detente." More recently, the trend has been to portray RFE as an instrument of dangerous Western concepts of "peaceful coexistence." RFE is regarded as the West's "ideological tool" in a new "revisionist" strategy.

In short, says RFE's own analysis of the situation, "the regime's grievance about RFE is that today it reflects important sentiment within the country for reform, that its analyses are based on the realities of contemporary Communist society, and that RFE's cross-reporting is an effective technique for spreading the "infection" of reform ideas in East Europe."<sup>3</sup>

RFE's analysis is based upon the compilation of a considerable amount of material published in Communist countries. Some examples follow:

[From proceedings of the Cultural Committee of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, December 2, 1968]:

"People in the area [West Bohemia] rely almost exclusively on Radio Free Europe and West German Television programs for information about what is happening in Czechoslovakia. They pick up a lot of half-truths but also a lot of truth which they should get from our own mass media."

[Stanislaw Mialkowski (Polish party committee instructor) in *Gazeta Bialostocka* for August 31, 1968]:

"Our party organizations, particularly in villages, still feel there is not enough information. Hence, here and there, its members are influenced by the hostile programs of 'Free Europe.' We activists are not always able to adopt the right attitude to some matters. For instance we only learnt about the regulation of wages and prices very late, while people in the street talked about it several days before."

[from Prague's *Rude Pravo*, January 21, 1969]:

"Lack of information has another unfavorable consequence. The citizens, as under the Novotny regime show increased interest in information from Western sources, such as Radio Free Europe or Voice of America. And this is certainly not a good thing."

[W. Blenkowski, former Polish Minister of Education in "The Driving and Retarding Forces of Socialism," *Kultura*, Paris, 1969]:

"Communism's monopoly of information makes for a situation, I'm ashamed to admit,

in which foreign broadcasting stations, particularly Radio Free Europe, perform the vital role of a domestic opposition press, exercising enormous influence both on the population and even on the communist rulers. Not trusting their own leaders, the masses have no choice but to rely on information provided from abroad . . ."

[from *Trybuna Ludu* (Polish Communist Party daily, April 18, 1968):

"The complaints that Radio Free Europe, the anti-communist broadcasting station based in Munich, gave better coverage of the [Polish student riots] events than did the Polish mass media are justified . . ."

[Jacek Snopkiewicz: "The Lesson of Truth" in *Walka Mlodych* (Polish youth weekly) for April 28, 1968]:

"Maybe the disorders which took place in March in Wroclaw, Gdansk, Torun and Poznan would have taken a different course if the full information about the causes behind the student riots at Warsaw University had reached these communities on time. The information was not sufficient. The first articles on the subject appeared in the provincial press only on the 13th of March. The argumentation of these articles was too weak to stand up to the propagandist arguments of the so-called 'emissaries,' and to the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe."

The impact of RFE's "cross-reporting" activities is illustrated by the following two excerpts from Polish publications:

[Zdzislaw Niclanski, "Current Trends in anti-Communist Political Strategy and Ideological Subversion," *Sprawy Miedzynarodowe* (Warsaw), December 1968 issue]:

"The application in practice of the new propaganda strategy, consisting of a projection of the existing situation on one country to another country. While, until recently, almost the only methods used was the counterposing of solely bourgeois models to socialist models, at present the political concepts of one socialist state are opposed and given as an example to those of another socialist *Zycie Partii*, No. 1, 1966]:

[From an article in the Polish publication, *Zycie Partii*, No. 1, 1966]:

"[RFE suggests that] in the other socialist countries the changes are "more important, bolder, more independent" . . . [It] insinuates to listeners that their own party and government have fallen behind."

One manifestation of Communist regime reaction to the situation described in the preceding quotations has been to wage propaganda, and limited diplomatic campaigns designed to effect the eventual disbandment of both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Another manifestation has been the swallowing of some pride and the re-ordering of some media programming to make it more competitive with RFE. In Hungary, for example, "beat" musical programs broadcast by RFE became so popular that Radio Budapest has begun similar programming. In Czechoslovakia, an RFE program aimed at youthful audiences now has its counterpart on Radio Prague. The following quotes illustrate a growing appreciation of their dilemma by Communist spokesmen:

[from *Partelet* (Hungarian Communist theoretical monthly), July 1965]:

"We have to consider that if we fail to inform the public adequately, the audience of the hostile Hungarian-language radio stations will grow . . . the work of radio and television is disturbed in the highest degree by the frequent dogmatic reserve and timidity of authorities (whose responsibility is to inform the public and to deal with questions of interest to the public) . . . if we fail to talk about something, the enemy will do so; and thus reticence will mean a political defeat. We consider the demand for better information of party members and public as being merely bad, unjustified bourgeois curiosity . . ."

[from a Slovak trade union delegate's

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speech as reported by Radio Bratislava Domestic, November 30, 1968):

"[our press must] remain linked with the people, be truthful, open, and objective so our people need not depend on foreign information sources."

[from *Monitor*, Polish Television Program, December 26, 1970]:

"And too often, as we all know, the adult and critical people of Poland were talked to as if they were kindergarten pupils being lectured to instead of informed... information certainly is needed—we're all convinced of that—especially when we face a difficult situation. When information is lacking or delayed too long, the people get it from other sources and, what is worse, lose confidence in their own media..."

RFE's summary of the pattern of recent regime propaganda attacks on its activities during the period July-September 1971, together with a compendium of Western press commentary is attached at Annex W.

#### Diplomatic

Although there is scant information available as to the extent to which Communist regimes have made formal diplomatic representations in protest of RFE activities, a few aspects of such diplomatic activity have come to light.

On May 26, 1971, for example, the Polish Government delivered written protests to the German Federal Republic and the United States of America. A PPA (Polish Press Agency) dispatch of May 29 stated:

"The Government of the Polish Peoples Republic has addressed an aide-memoire to the Government of the U.S., expressing the conviction to liquidate sources of irritation in Polish-American relations, will put an end to the Cold War activity of RFE, which is directed against Poland.

"On May 26 this document was handed to the Ambassador of the U.S. to Poland, Walter Stoessel, by Polish Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jozef Winiowicz.

"At the same time the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Stefan Jedrychowski, has sent a letter on the same matter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG, Dr. Walter Scheel. The letter emphasizes the responsibility of the FRG Government for permitting the American station to carry out hostile activity, inter alia against Poland, from the territory of the FRG, and expressed the hope that the FRG Government will avail itself of its prerogatives of a sovereign state and will put an end to the activity of this foreign radio station which disturbs the process of normalization of relations between the two countries."

According to the U.S. Department of State, no reply to this aide-memoire was expected and none given. Comments were passed informally to Polish officials to the effect that, since every major nation engages in international broadcasting, it is not surprising that almost any program broadcast will offend someone, somewhere.

Germany's formal reply, if any, has not been made public. On June 9, 1971, however, a statement was issued in response to a parliamentary interpellation from Werner Marx, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Working Committee of the Christian Democratic Union. Marx asked whether the German Government had "made unmistakably clear to the Polish Government that it regards the demand by the Polish Foreign Minister to proceed against Radio Free Europe as an inadmissible interference in our affairs and as a not helpful contribution toward German-Polish understanding, and that it continues to be interested in letting the mentioned station broadcast news and commentaries for the peoples of Eastern Europe freely and without interference?" Karl Moersch, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, replied that a reply would be given the Poles in due course. He added that—

"The Polish side has been informed of our opinion on this question for a long time... The authority of the Federal Republic of Germany over radio stations located on its territory is limited constitutionally... This applies to German radio stations as well as to Radio Free Europe. This station as well is protected by the right to freedom of opinion. We have, however, declared ourselves willing to accept justified complaints about programs from Radio Free Europe and to discuss these with the authorities at the Munich Station."

On Jun 4, 1971, PAP reported that at Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski's press conference in Helsinki, he had answered a German correspondent's question about RFE's status in Germany as follows:

"The activity of RFE does not belong to the internal affairs of the FRG because the station interferes in the internal affairs of Poland and other socialist countries for at least 18 hours a day. That is why it is an international problem and is also of interest for us. Besides, it is commonly known that *Free Europe Radio* is a spying agency of the U.S. intelligence service. This is a problem which can properly be the subject of an exchange of views between us and the FRG Government.

"I would like to add that we have also made a demarche on this subject to the U.S. Government and the governments of states in which there are offices of the FE Radio. We consider that [RFE's] usurpation of the right to supplement our point of view. If the Americans say that the Polish society is not sufficiently informed on political matters, we are ready to suggest a public competition; selecting on the basis of statistics (i.e., representative sampling) several score citizens in each country to compete as to who is better informed on problems of world and internal politics."

RFE reports that in 1968 the Rumanian Ambassador in Bonn lodged a formal protest that RFE was "interfering in internal Rumanian affairs in a most massive and crude way." There is nothing in the public record indicating an official German reply, and RFE internal memoranda indicate that the lack of specificity of the Rumanian complaints resulted in the German Government's failing to pay serious attention to them.

There is nothing in the public record to indicate whether Poland or any other Communist government has presented official protests to either the Austrian, British, or other governments where RFE maintains news bureaus or audience and public opinion research activities.

The implication of what is known about Communist diplomatic representations about RFE is that since most Western governments have been accustomed to the "notion of objective information," Communist objections have been largely ignored. The regimes have not offered objective substantiation—other than in terms of their own ideological preoccupation with controlling sources of public information—to accusations against RFE.

No further evaluation is made here of the significance of such diplomatic activity since the present purpose is merely to indicate audience impact rather than to assess effects upon diplomatic relations or U.S. foreign policy.

#### Jamming

Jamming is another technique sometimes used by the USSR and the Communist regimes in East Europe to hinder the receptivity of RFE broadcasts. In a unique way, jamming by the regimes is a compliment to RFE's effectiveness. It is an admission that the regimes feel an inability to compete on logical or ideological grounds with foreign broadcasts. It is also a signal to the audience that there is something on the air which the government does not want them to hear—an added incentive for listening. Jamming

has been employed from time to time against RFE in varying degrees. At the present time the situation is as follows:

Bulgaria: Both domestic and foreign transmitters are used to jam western broadcasts.

Czechoslovakia: All RFE programs are jammed by domestic and foreign transmitters.

Hungary: No domestic jamming since 1964. Some weak interference comes from a Soviet jammer believed located in a Hungarian-speaking area of the USSR.

Poland: In March 1971 Poland resumed jamming of RFE Polish programs. They had stopped in 1956 and had started again briefly during the 1970 unrest. Also jammed from the USSR.

Rumania: No jamming since 1963. In view of the existence of jamming, one might wonder whether the scope of effort put into RFE research and programming is justified, if broadcasts can be denied an audience because of jamming. The answer is that jamming is far from being a sure way to keep RFE programs from being heard by an audience—even quite a large audience. The explanation lies in the nature of short-wave propagation.

Jamming is the propagation of a competing radio signal on the same frequency as the signal being jammed. The jamming signal can be merely another "normal" radio program or it can be pure noise. The intent of the jammer is to drown out all other signals on that frequency. The characteristic behavior of different wave-lengths of radio signals is a determinant of both jamming techniques and appropriate counter-measures.

Medium wave signals—the standard AM broadcast band—tend to follow the curvature of the earth. Such signals constitute what is known as a "ground wave." Short wave signals tend to travel in a straight line, moving out into space after a relatively short ground wave. These "sky wave" signals are then reflected back to earth by the ionosphere—a layer of ionized particles ranging from 50 to 300 miles above the earth's surface. Exactly where these signals return to earth is a function of the angle of incidence at which they hit the ionosphere and the permeability of the ionosphere. The sun's rays intensify the density of the ionized particles, and the layer is therefore an efficient reflector during daylight hours and an inefficient one at night.

Short wave broadcasting thus is primarily a technique of bouncing sky wave signals to the intended destination by controlling the angle at which signals are beamed and by taking advantage of the varying permeability and altitude of the ionosphere. The short wave jammer has precisely the same propagation problems, but his differing purpose introduces severe complications. In the case of short wave jamming, the jammer can count on the effectiveness of his ground wave signal for only a few miles, and must beam the jamming signal so as to be reflected into the intended area by the ionosphere.

Since the RFE transmitters are much further west than jamming transmitters in East Europe and the USSR, RFE can take advantage of a period of several hours each day in which there is still sunlight in the west but darkness in the east to beam its programs into East Europe. Potential jammers cannot usefully employ sky wave jamming during this period, and must rely on local ground wave jammers which are effective only within a relatively short radius around the jamming station.

In the case of the very high frequencies, for example, the waves tend to tilt forward and disappear into the earth within a radius of less than ten miles. Since ground wave jammers are located in the cities for optimum utilization, jamming can often be avoided by a determined listener simply by taking his portable radio outside the city, beyond the range of the ground wave jammers.



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Transmitters of sufficiently high power are effective against all but short range ground wave jammers. Another effective counter-jamming technique is to broadcast on many frequencies simultaneously, thus multiplying both the technical and the financial problems of the jammer. And, at least one RFE channel is always left unjammed by the regimes in order to permit their own monitoring of RFE broadcasts. The astute listener is aware of this and, he can usually scan the frequencies quickly and find the clear channel.

The result is that jamming is never fully effective. It merely makes listening more difficult for some people some of the time. And the expense to the jammer is considerable. The RFE Engineering Department recently estimated, on the basis of known technical data, that to jam RFE's Czechoslovak broadcasting, Czechoslovakia jammers alone expend some 182,000,000 kilowatt hours of power annually, compared to only 12,471,900 kilowatt hours needed to beam RFE programs into Czechoslovakia. This calculation did not take into account the approximately 1½ times as many jamming stations inside the USSR and elsewhere which also are used to jam RFE programming to Czechoslovakia (sky wave jammers must be located as far away from the target areas as the original broadcaster's transmitters in order to bounce the jamming signal into the intended destination). Total jamming costs for RFE's Czechoslovak broadcasts alone are roughly estimated at \$6,000,000 annually. Yet, the evidence from Audience and Public Opinion Research and from letters from listeners to RFE is that RFE broadcasts continue to be heard by large audiences in spite of jamming.

When the shortages of electric power in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere in East Europe are taken into account, it can be seen that the governments concerned do not hesitate to deprive their own economies of much-needed power in order to divert it to the totally destructive, but not fully effective, purpose of jamming foreign broadcasts. This is an impressive indicator of how important these governments consider it politically to deny their people access to RFE broadcasts. It also suggests something of what their attitude might be toward governments which sponsor such broadcasts.

#### Policy Changes by Communist Regimes

A third method of assessment of RFE's impact is to see what policy changes, if any, may be made by the government of an audience country following an extended period of RFE broadcasts which advocate certain courses of action based upon the analysis of social, political, and economic circumstances.

The accumulation of scripts and of research data based upon the analysis of Communist media at RFE contains rich information upon which to base many case studies of this nature. However, time factors precluded the possibility of independent analysis of this voluminous material. But, as a case in point, Radio Free Europe's research and analysis staff has prepared a complete and fully documented study of one of the most recent and most important examples of regime policy changes which followed an RFE broadcasting campaign.

#### Poland—a case in point

The RFE study in question deals with the events which led up to and followed the upheavals in Poland which began in December 1970, and resulted in the replacement of Gomulka by Edward Gierek as leader of the Polish United Workers' Party and thus of the regime. In this study, RFE analysts examine the issues which produced tensions leading toward change in Gomulka's Poland, and described the various concessions subsequently made by the Gierek regime in order to avoid further explosions and to re-

vive economic life. The result of this analysis is a list of fourteen major issues involved in Poland's internal tensions, RFE broadcasts, and concessions by the Gierek regime:

1. Incomes Policy
2. Price Increases
3. Housing
4. Problems of Women Workers
5. Animal Husbandry
6. The Polish Peasant
7. Economic Reform
8. Responsibility of the Leadership
9. Normalization of Church-State Relations
10. The Trade Unions and Workers' Council
11. "Dialogue"
12. The Media
13. Cultural Policy
14. National Sentiment: The Royal Castle in Warsaw

The RFE paper, *Fourteen Polish Points*, makes the following comments in the introduction:

"From these sources—workers' demands and public agitation and discussion—and from the concessions made by the new leadership, the major issues of life in Poland today, as experienced and felt by the vast majority of the population, and as recognized by the leadership in the need for concessions, can be identified. The question then becomes: What had Radio Free Europe to say on these issues before Polish popular feelings about them were so publicly and unequivocally revealed? That is to say, before the changes in Poland which began on December 1970? The answer to these questions affords grounds for an objective judgment of the extent to which RFE broadcasters to Poland reflected, or failed to reflect, the vital interests of their audience.

"This inquiry seeks to provide those answers. The chapters which follow examine the principal issues which came to the fore within Poland during the December upheaval and the six months that followed. The positions espoused by RFE on these various issues before December 20 are set out, by means of excerpts from RFE's Polish broadcasts. These positions are then followed, in each case, by an account of developments subsequent to December 20, 1970, with emphasis on the concessions made by the new leadership to restore political stability and economic productivity."

The analysis which followed, based on sources in the public domain, demonstrates a high degree of correlation between RFE broadcasts and Polish public opinion as manifested in the verbalization of the issues within the Polish society as the events progressed after December 1970. An equally positive correlation is shown between RFE's position on these "fourteen points" as expressed in broadcasts, and subsequent actions taken by the Gierek regime. Although no precise cause-and-effect relationship between these broadcasts and subsequent actions can be proven by the mere juxtaposition of scripts and events, the circumstances certainly support a presumption that the broadcasts had a significant impact.

The full text of the RFE paper, *Fourteen Polish Points*, has been included in Annex T.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The weight of the evidence is that RFE has a substantial and growing popular audience in five East European countries, and that considerable rapport has been established with this audience. RFE is ranked high by the popular audience in terms of objectivity and credibility. It is fiercely resented by the regimes whose systems of censorship it penetrates. The intensity of regime propaganda attacks on RFE strongly suggests that RFE broadcasts are a significant factor in the public information process in East Europe. In some cases, regimes have grudgingly

adopted reform measures desired by their publics and supported by RFE. In other cases, they have not. Moreover, it cannot be demonstrated what reforms East European governments might or might not have adopted if RFE had not existed. Diplomatic protests have not received affirmative responses by the U.S. or West German Governments.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> An undated memorandum submitted by Mr. Henry O. Hart, Director of RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Department.

<sup>2</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex XI, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> The Quayle report, contained as Annex XII to the Durkee statement previously cited, was extremely general in nature.

<sup>4</sup> It might be said parenthetically that the information gap in Eastern Europe is accentuated by a similar but still wider information gap—a nearly complete lack of solid social science research data on the Soviet society, on the Soviet citizen—his attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and world outlook. See Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). See also the testimony of Dr. Edward T. Hall in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 5, 19, and 20, 1969, pp. 19-20.

<sup>5</sup> Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

<sup>6</sup> Durkee, op. cit., Annex XX, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> According to monitoring records maintained by RFE, the total number of hours devoted each day to officially-acknowledged international broadcasting by Communist countries exceeds 900 hours daily. Projection of present trends in such broadcasting indicates that the total figure will surpass 1000 hours daily by the end of 1972. In addition, Communist countries (the USSR, East European, and Asian countries) are known to operate at least 19 "illegal" or "clandestine" stations which broadcast internationally about 80 hours per day. The importance of such broadcasting to the Communist regimes is highlighted by a comparison of international broadcasting schedules of West Germany and Albania. West Germany, one of Europe's more affluent nations, broadcasts 61½ hours daily to five continents. Albania, small and relatively poor country (which is held by many to be the European voice of Peking), broadcasts 74½ hours daily to 4 continents. See Durkee, op. cit., Annex XIV).

<sup>8</sup> Durkee, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>9</sup> Interview with Perry W. Esten, Director of Engineering, Radio Free Europe, in Munich, November 4, 1971.

#### CHAPTER VII: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

It has been suggested that the nature, scope, and effectiveness of RFE activities is only one of the several factors leading to a decision regarding its future. It could be argued that even if RFE were extraordinarily well-managed, efficient and accurate in its research, impeccable in its news reporting and analysis, balanced in its commentaries, and well-received by its audience, the U.S. national interest might yet require a change in control or the liquidation of the Radio. Such a requirement might be based upon an appraisal of RFE's net impact as one of embarrassment to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

There are numerous political and other factors that enter into national policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that are beyond the purview of this study. This study does not reach any conclusions as to what role, if any, RFE might play within the broad context of foreign policy.

This study does, however, address itself to two general observations about RFE. With regard to the observation that RFE seeks to

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keep alive "cold war" animosities, in the sense in which that term was used in the 1950's, the results of this study indicate that RFE does not now operate in this manner. RFE's policy in its political broadcasts is to press for reform within the prevailing Communist system in East Europe and to avoid petty or personal attack or criticism for its own sake. Examination of hundreds of scripts of RFE broadcasts reveals that, although there are occasional violations, RFE policy is generally supported by the broadcast and research staff and is effectively carried out.

The evaluation of RFE's probable impact upon progress toward better U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe will be considered in a separate report being prepared by the Congressional Research Service. There are, however, some factors brought out in this study which bear in part upon the overall problem.

The first of these is the fact that RFE broadcasts to two distinct but overlapping audiences. These are comprised of government and Communist Party officials of five East European countries on the one hand, and five corresponding general populations on the other.

The results of the examination of Radio Free Europe suggest that RFE is an effective mechanism for the widespread dissemination of political, economic, and cultural information to the peoples of Eastern Europe. There is considerable evidence that the people of East Europe are thirsty for news, information, and lively discussion, and that great numbers of them listen to RFE broadcasts. There is no doubt, however, that the dissemination of such information, however objective, is viewed with extreme hostility by most of the East European governments concerned. These governments generally share the views of the Chairman of the Polish Government's Radio and Television services:<sup>1</sup>

"... one must not forget that the very character of ideological struggle presupposes opposition to the notion of objective information..."

There is little evidence that many East European governments will become more friendly to the "notion of objective information" in the near future. The evidence of deeds, however, lends some credence to the thesis that none of the East European governments is likely to allow arguments about "propaganda" to interfere with objectives genuinely sought by them. For instance, despite the intense protests against RFE in Communist media and in diplomatic channels, the East European governments, after threats to do so, have not withdrawn their participation in the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. The Polish Government was not inhibited from negotiation of a normalization treaty with West Germany. Other negotiations on the questions of Berlin and abrogation of the Hitlerite Munich treaty, involving East Germany and Czechoslovakia, continue despite years of activity by RFE and by a host of both overt and clandestine Communist operations targeted at West Germany.

Thus the evidence suggests that although the activities of RFE probably have some adverse effects upon the quality of government-to-government relationships between the United States, West Germany, the USSR, and the five East European governments concerned, at least in the instances about which there is public knowledge these effects have not yet constituted significant obstacles to meaningful negotiations and agreements.

The interaction between RFE and its popular audience has been of a different nature. Mail to RFE from its listeners and other substantive evidence indicates that RFE broadcasts have contributed substan-

tially to preserving the reservoir of good will toward the United States originating from the events of W.W. II and the fact that many East Europeans have relatives living in the United States. RFE is apparently viewed by many in this audience as tangible evidence of American interest in East European peoples. The rationale for creating this interaction assumes that all governmental elites are transitory and, even in authoritarian regimes, are affected by the pressures of domestic public opinion; the people remain and the environments created by their perceptions, images and views are of constant importance. The evidence that RFE is an effective communicator of news and concepts to the East European people is persuasive.

Within this frame of reference, it would appear that the positive values resulting from RFE's rapport with mass audiences in East Europe can be evaluated in comparison with the costs of East European governmental hostility to foreign broadcasts in the context of evolving, overall East-West affairs.

There has been a general lack of public knowledge and understanding of RFE's purposes and the means by which it seeks to achieve them. The public has, however, and unwittingly in most cases, been supporting these activities financially since their inception. Had the public been kept regularly and accurately informed about RFE, it is doubtful that many misconceptions about RFE's role deriving, among other things, from the murky situation which surrounded the 1956 rebellion in Hungary, could have arisen. This report is an effort to help illuminate the situation and problem and to assist the Congress in resolving the problems of future financing and control in a manner that will best serve United States interests.

## ANNEX A

## AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH—RADIO FREE EUROPE

(Review and Comments by Lorand B. Szalay)

## BACKGROUND

Radio Free Europe's audience research has developed as a direct response to conditions and situational characteristics which are fairly exceptional in broadcasting. Three of these conditions appear to be especially significant.

a. The broadcasting is directed toward the people of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. These distant audiences are not readily accessible because of the strong social and political controls that block most of the common means of feedback: free reporting, public opinion surveys, free political elections. The people of these Central and Eastern European countries live under political systems which maintain a fairly close monopoly over all channels of mass and public communications, operated on the basis of Communist ideology.

b. The people of these countries generally feel poorly informed; they express a deep interest in receiving information that is timely and unbiased. Thus, there are large, highly receptive audiences in Eastern Europe, and they are distinguished by certain characteristics which deserve interest.

c. In respect to their frames of reference, beliefs, and opinions, these audiences cannot simply be identified with the ideological blueprints of the governments or official media. Nor can they be treated as if the experiences of the last three decades did not have any influence. Although in many aspirations the people of Eastern Europe are similar to people in the free neighboring countries, they cannot simply be equated. For example, they cannot be compared with Austria, on which public opinion survey data and free election results are readily available.

Thus, Radio Free Europe has as its major

audiences people that have specific information needs and whose audience reactions are not directly available to the radio station operating from abroad. This uncommon relationship between the station and its audience presents a situation which is delicate politically, complex and demanding from the angle of the communication task. This situation accounts for certain distinctive characteristics of Radio Free Europe in general and for the role assigned to the audience and public opinion research in particular.

Audience analysis at RFE passed through various stages during the past until recently it reached its present scope and orientation. In its present form the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department (APOR) produces extensive and timely information by interviews. These interviews are conducted on large samples of Visitors (N=1,000) representing Czech-Slovak, Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian audiences and also on sizable samples (N=800) of Bulgarian audiences. The survey data contain generally three major categories of information: Listenership data, program evaluation, and attitude studies.

Comparable information is generally available to Western broadcasting from a variety of different sources. However, the RFE audience research performs an important pioneering service as the scope of the audience and public opinion research in these five Eastern European countries is modest and the publication of opinion results is selective. In the social and political field, the validity of the officially released data is frequently questionable.

This explains why the relevance of the RFE research is substantive not only in connection with the immediate use of these data in program planning and evaluation but also in the broader context of introducing and applying social science research to this area. RFE research traces and evaluates social and political trends in the five Communist-controlled Eastern European countries in which objective public opinion research efforts are seriously hampered by political conditions. The resulting information gap on Eastern Europe is accentuated by a similar but still wider information gap—a nearly complete lack of solid social science research data on the Soviet society, on the Soviet citizen—his attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and world outlook.<sup>1</sup>

Against this background RFE audience analysis attempts to derive solid, objective information from large audience samples, which represent wide cross-sections of the populations. Based on information and observations personally accumulated in Munich and in Vienna, a few general conclusions may be formulated. To keep the report short, the actual procedures, designs, the technical and professional details, situational problems, and limitations are elaborated in separate appendices.

## THE INTERVIEW

In its present form audience analysis conducted by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Division is a most significant undertaking. It represents a large-scale research effort to apply public opinion survey methods in real life situations, which requires a careful adjustment of technical-scientific criteria to given social, political, and psychological conditions. After decades of nearly complete information blackout of valid, empirical survey data, at the present level of operation nearly 7,000 Eastern European nationals are interviewed every year. Each national sample (with the exception of Bulgaria) includes over 1,000 cases. The interviews are conducted in various large European cities—Vienna, London, Paris—where Eastern Europeans travel as tourists, visitors, businessmen, or sportsmen.

The fieldwork of interviewing is contracted out by Radio Free Europe to independent na-

<sup>1</sup> See page 78, *supra*.

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tional public opinion and market research organizations, which employ interviewers who speak the respective languages. The rules and quotas, as well as the guidelines for the interviewers, are specified by RFE's Audience and Public Opinion Research Department. Radio Free Europe also provides the questionnaire used by the interviewers in the process of the interview. The use of independent local organizations is an especially sound decision on more than one account. First, it makes the outcome of interviews and the research results independent of RFE, which is especially desirable because the results tell a great deal about RFE, its popularity, its impact, and its effectiveness.

Assigning this task to local public opinion research organizations is also important in that it makes it clear that the research involves open public opinion surveys of the type widely used in all democratic, open societies and therefore has nothing to do with clandestine intelligence work—an accusation frequently voiced by the Communist authorities.

Finally, working independently in different locations and using more than one interviewing organization give ample opportunities for internal control, for testing the internal consistency of the results.

The actual interviewing procedure is described in Appendix 1. This description elaborates on a few technical questions such as the procedure for contacting visitors, their cooperativeness, the frequency with which interviews are refused, and other details which were considered important from the viewpoint of effectiveness of the method and the quality of the results.

#### REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLES

The quality and information value of public opinion surveys are inseparable from the question of how generalizable are the results and how representative are the samples interviewed. This question of generalizability and representativeness acquires special importance in a situation where the parent population—the audiences at home—cannot be directly surveyed and inferences must be based on subpopulations such as the samples of travelers.

As elaborated in Appendix 2 in more detail, RFE's use of large samples, numerous independent subsamples, and its attempts to reach visitors randomly to reduce the biases of selectivity are all sound measures which help to fight the odds of a complex research task.

The designers of the survey work are unquestionably correct in asserting that developments in Eastern Europe during the last decade have produced certain welcome changes, such as extensive travel to the West and reduced anxiety to expressing personal opinions. The RFE Audience and Public Opinion Research Department is prompt and effective in the use of these changes for better obtaining research of higher quality and generalizable results. Although the optimism and confidence in the representativeness of the samples may not be readily proven merely by the adapted design or research method and some of the statistical assumptions may be questioned, a considerable body of empirical evidence suggests that this confidence in the samples is not unfounded. The research findings show that the samples include not only people from all walks of life but also from a broad and varied spectrum of political opinions (Appendix 2).

#### SCOPE AND UTILIZATION OF AUDIENCE INFORMATION OBTAINED

The information obtained by the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department covers a wide variety of topics and may be conveniently subdivided into three major problem areas:

1. *Listenership data.* This covers such technical information as listening habits,

preferred listening times, wave length, receptivity, and jamming. The data are collected with regard to the technical planning and scheduling of broadcastings.

2. *Program evaluation.* This portion of the survey aims to determine the popularity and use of existing programs. It involves assessing what is liked, what is not liked, why, and what would people like to have more of. These and similar questions produce feedback necessary for timely, audience-oriented programming, which is the aim of every broadcast.

3. *Attitude research and special studies.* These studies deal with diverse socially and politically relevant attitudes, opinions, and images. They constitute fairly extensive survey work focusing on important parameters of public opinions relevant to programming and broadcasting.

The main process of data collection involves the administration of the basic questionnaire which includes questions related to all three problem areas. Each year it is administered to new samples. The questionnaire is also updated yearly: some questions are kept to allow for comparability over time and others are substituted by new ones to reflect more timely concerns.

In addition to this basic questionnaire, some special questionnaires are used to cover unanticipated timely events such as Prague in the spring of 1968 and the Polish uprisings in 1970. Some additional "special studies" are occasionally conducted in order to provide timely audience information: for example, the Eastern European interpretation of some key concepts (socialism, capitalism) using new research techniques such as the Semantic Differential.

The use of audience analysis data within Radio Free Europe is institutionally organized. The various country desks show a general and fairly uniform appreciation of the value of the listenership data. The program evaluation results are received occasionally with mixed feelings. This can be explained by the fact that when the evaluation indicates a decline in program popularity, the feedback, while useful and necessary, is not flattering. The attitude data and special studies information is of more recent origin and up to now has been used on a more sporadic basis. I feel this area deserves more special attention (Appendix 3).

Generally, the relationship of the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department and the Country Broadcasting Departments cannot be entirely free from the common problems which naturally arise in those instances when people with different professional frames of reference must work out common solutions. The quantitatively oriented social scientist and the talented country expert charged with heavy responsibilities of daily output of high quality are naturally predisposed to look at the same problem from different angles. In the case of Radio Free Europe, however, there are clear signs of mutual appreciation and recognition of the complementary nature and shared interests of these two roles (Appendix 3).

The scope and results of audience research with its nearly 400 publications are broad and varied, and their discussion would go beyond the scope of the present report. However, some data on the role and image of Radio Free Europe may be of interest at this time of conflicting opinions, when the reactions of Eastern Europeans deserve special attention.

#### AUDIENCE DATA ON THE ROLE AND IMAGE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE

There are numerous categories of audience data which are informative on the role of Radio Free Europe. Perhaps the most significant are those data which estimate the size of its leadership. According to earlier (1967) and more recent findings (1971), about 50% of the populations listen to Radio Free Europe. The figures are somewhat higher

for Poles and Rumanians and lower for Hungarians and more recently for Czechs. In all the Eastern European countries Radio Free Europe was found to be the most listened-to foreign station, preceded only by the local national station. Although these local stations—Radio Budapest for Hungarians, Radio Prague for Czechs—generally show the highest number of listeners, the importance of Radio Free Europe is frequently rated higher than the domestic station in particular contexts, especially on foreign news (Poland, 1971; CSR, 1971).

A trend analysis (No. 221, No. 304) has found a slowly but generally increasing listenership for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. This trend is occasionally interrupted, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, by strict measures of control and heavy jamming in the post-invasion period (No. 304), but in the long range they usually prevail. While the figures on listening are high (Appendix 4, Table 1), the additional percentage of those who receive RFE news indirectly by word of mouth is hard to estimate. The censorship of news media and the desire to receive reliable information produce a favorable climate for spreading information by word of mouth. The importance of these private channels in controlled societies has been emphasized by numerous accounts.<sup>2</sup>

Although Radio Free Europe is right below the domestic station on the level of listening, in respect to such characteristics as reliability, truth value, and timeliness of information, Radio Free Europe is consistently in first place (No. 292, No. 292a, No. 182, No. 168, No. 177).

In contrast to the image of domestic broadcasting, which is generally criticized for suppression and distortion of information and described as "biased," "cold," and "obscure," Radio Free Europe is described primarily as "interesting," "skillful," "pleasant," "wide," and "quick" (No. 283, No. 284, No. 287, No. 288).

This emphasis on reliability and information value is consistent with the main task or function that Eastern European audiences assign to Radio Free Europe. To the question "Which do you consider the most important tasks of Radio Free Europe?" the most frequently chosen functions were "to inform about events," "to explain . . ." and "to entertain." The ambiguous function of "encouragement," which could simply mean to have faith that the situation will improve, or with more forcefulness might be interpreted to mean encouragement to revolt, figures only as a low choice of 10% (Appendix 4, Table 2). The most frequently given reasons for liking Radio Free Europe by Czech, Hungarian, and Polish listeners were that the programs were "interesting" and "informative" and that it provided information otherwise not available (Appendix 4, Table 3).

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the full cooperation of the RFE/APOR Department, the time available for this study was too short to pursue a broader variety of alternatives with all the desired circumspection and to arrive at recommendations in a categorical sense. Thus, the following suggestions are tentative, presenting alternatives for further thought and consideration.

Personally, I would welcome a closer cooperation between the APOR Department and the Broadcasting Departments. This could be promoted by offering the DB's greater opportunities for formulating requests and suggesting research topics. With more opportunity for initiating research, the Broadcasting Departments will increasingly recognize APOR as a unique source for obtaining highly

<sup>2</sup> Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); Klaus Mehnert, *Der Sowjetmensch* (Stuttgart: Deutscher Verlag, 1958), pp. 13-14.

desirable information, for updating their own area expertise, and for protecting themselves against criticism of getting outdated or losing touch.

To meet the more specific and detailed information needs articulated by individual nation Broadcasting Departments requires a faster return since the present method of data collection on large (N=1,000) national samples takes about a year. It also requires a research activity of wider scope that addresses a broader variety of themes and topics.

Accelerating the returns and widening the scope may be possible, even at the present funding level, by adopting a somewhat different research strategy.

It seems to be desirable to subdivide the data into two main categories: (1) information with long-range policy implications (for example, size and parameters of listenership) and (2) information on timely audience reactions (Nixon's trip to Peking, different images of the Soviet and Chinese communism, etc.). Accordingly, the process of data collection can be split. Everyone will be asked the first smaller part of the questionnaire, aiming at long-range information; it would address only a few important problems on which the large sample size is really necessary and useful. The second and longer part of the questionnaire can include changing sets of timely questions. This second part will be used only on smaller samples of 200 to 300 people who can be tested within a shorter one or two month period. In the following periods the second part would be replaced by new batteries of timely questions. Administered to the total national sample (N=1000-1500).

Part I: Stable 20 questions/Part II: Changing 40 questions.

Each battery administered to new subsamples of 200-300 subjects.

Such a strategy may be recommended on the basis of the following rationale:

1. It offers information on a much broader variety of topics as a fast response to timely questions raised by broadcasters.
2. It allows a broader and faster audience analysis without increasing the scope of the data collection and without a substantial reduction in the reliability of information produced.
3. With some adaptation, this strategy may also allow for a heavier focusing of the evaluation on important individual social groups such as the intelligentsia, workers, or farmers, which have specific audience characteristics, interests, program preferences addressed presently by specialized programs.
4. It offers effective and economical use of the research money. It preserves the advantage of large samples in contexts where documentation is an essential objective and at the same time multiplies the scope and increases the timeliness of the information on a still sufficiently solid foundation.

Perhaps is no time in RFE's history has it been more essential that the dimensions of its actual listenership and the parameters of its effective roles be documented on the basis of empirical facts. Evidence based on many thousands of systematically sampled opinions is naturally more weighty than uncontrollable responses obtained from a few.

This information is essential for RFE operations as well as for sound policy decisions. Radio Free Europe has invested a great deal of ingenuity in planning and supervising this research effort. It undertook extensive research work to test the representativeness of the samples and to validate procedures. I feel that the strategy of using tourist and visitor samples has proven itself to be sound and generally dependable.

Thus, presently Radio Free Europe may have reached the point when the "documentative" portion of the research effort may be reduced in order to allow an increase in the "public opinion" portion of the re-

search—with special focus on the needs and priorities suggested by the Broadcasting Departments.

#### APPENDIX 1

##### THE INTERVIEW

The experience of being questioned by an independent research organization as a part of a public opinion survey is generally an uncommon, novel experience for Eastern Europeans. Questioning about attitudes and opinions related to official, governmental interests, which might have undesirable personal consequences, may be a more commonly shared expectation. Furthermore, Communist authorities are heavily engaged in campaigns to discredit Western public opinion research in general and the polls conducted by Radio Free Europe in particular.

There are numerous indications that during recent years the adverse effects of this preconditioning have considerably decreased, that Eastern Europeans are less hampered by fear, and that they talk more freely. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the potential impact of unfamiliarity, anxiety, and various misconceptions of the interview, which could produce biased results.

In respect to the objectivity and information value of the results of RFE audience research interviews, the following steps appeared to be especially critical:

- a. Selection of the interviewee.
- b. Contacting the interviewee; his cooperativeness.
- c. Interview procedure.

To examine the procedure I questioned about a dozen INTORA (Vienna) interviewers about their work and experiences. I also had the opportunity to observe interviews in progress and to talk with the people interviewed. Based on these various impressions, I have come to the following general conclusions:

a. *Selection of the interviewee*—Ideally, the interviewer would interview every traveller he happens to meet on an entirely random basis, and these people, by their characteristics as a subsample, would approximate the parent populations (nontravellers in the country). There is naturally a discrepancy between the composition of the samples and the parent populations. In actuality, we know that the samples are not entirely representative, that the more educated strata are overrepresented, that peasants are generally underrepresented, and so on.

To help correct this discrepancy, quotas are calculated. The director of INTORA explained that two complementary measures have been developed. One is based on previous experiences with the interviewers, which give an idea about their characteristic preferences, what type of people they are predisposed to contact. Taking these predispositions into consideration, INTORA selects interviewers whose predispositions largely balance each other.

As a second measure INTORA issues guidelines on which category of traveller to focus on—young, less educated, etc. The combination of these two measures was described as generally effective in obtaining sizable, fairly proportionate representation for the expected quotas. As a means of reducing the discrepancy between the composition of the samples interviewed and the parent population, weighting scores are calculated, based on the relationship of the actual proportions of people interviewed and the desirable quota calculated on the basis of the national sample.

A second source of discrepancy may be the result of a more or less conscientious avoidance of the unpleasant experiences of rejection. Especially the more experienced interviewers may be suspected of having developed a certain sense for detecting those who may be cooperative and those who may not. For instance, they may have learned to

avoid hardcore party members, secret police, and the like. There are no safe controls against this type of bias. Nonetheless, the breakdown of the samples by occupation and party affiliation suggest that the effects of this selectivity are probably not too serious, or that they may be partially cancelled out by conflicting trends (for example, the above average participation of party favorites in foreign travel).

b. *Contact and Rejection Rate*—Contacting the prospective interviewee is naturally an important and delicate step since Eastern Europeans are not used to polls and have developed considerable suspicions. The adverse effects of these understandable reservations are apparently reduced by the fact that the interviewers are compatriots of the travellers who speak the same language. The interviewers also understand that they must first establish a rapport on the basis of neutral topics (finding places, articles, shopping). Next, the interviewers explain his survey and asks for cooperation.

As was stated by both the interviewers and Intora, the average rate of refusal is about 20%. This rate differs from nation to nation as well as over time. Presently, the rate of refusal is the highest from Czechs and Slovaks (about 35%) while Rumanians were characterized as the most readily communicative (15%). The 20-25% refusal rate is surprisingly low and requires repeated verification.

To maintain control over the work of the interviewers, the Audience and Public Opinion Research Department has set the condition that the interviewers are obliged to call in by phone in 80% of the time. They must state that they have an interview in progress and give the location and a brief description of the interviewee. These calls are then used for local spot checks.

c. *The Interview Procedure*—Once he has received an affirmative answer in respect to the interviewee's readiness to cooperate, the interviewer takes the questionnaire and poses one question after another. The interviewer reads from the questionnaire and notes the answers or places the checkmarks in the case of multiple choice items. The interviewee is fully aware that his responsibilities are being registered. Although this procedure could arouse some fears, the fear may be counteracted by certain other factors. Namely, the interviewee recognizes that the nature of this inquiry is schematic and mechanical, and the questions do not convey the idea of searching for personal or confidential information. Furthermore, he has been previously assured that his identity will not be retained and that the evaluation of the information will be group-oriented and statistical.

The questions belong to three major categories: (a) attitudes and opinions on timely social, and political topics, (b) information on listening and program preferences, and (c) data on the respondent's sociodemographic background. Part b is administered only to respondents who have stated previously that they regularly listen to Radio Free Europe. The administration of the questionnaire requires on the average 40-60 minutes.

The interviewers have stated that the interviewees generally have no problem in understanding or answering the questions. Occasionally, they ask for clarification on the use of certain terms such as "socialist party" and express the desire to offer more qualified answers than the forced choice alternatives provide for. There is a general tendency to tell more and elaborate on details beyond the scope of the questionnaire.

The interviewees are not paid for the interview but it is a common practice for the interviewer to offer coffee or beer to the interviewee if the questionnaire is administered in a coffeehouse or restaurant. The interviewers state that the interviewees gen-

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erally desire to talk and like that their opinions are asked.

The interviewers I met were mostly men; there were only two women in a group of twelve. Both male and female interviewers appeared well qualified and interested in the work. They usually have other full-time occupations and do the interviewing only on a part-time basis. They receive about a \$5.00 equivalent in Austrian schillings (135) for each questionnaire.

Since a large portion of the questionnaire deals with RFE performance, the claim that neither the interviewers nor the interviewee knows about the source of interest is somewhat doubtful. It is true only in the sense that they are not told this explicitly. The official explanation states that radio stations involved in broadcasting toward their country are being evaluated.

## APPENDIX 2

## THE SAMPLES

To derive up-to-date information on audience characteristics such as listening habits, program preferences, and attitudes of the people in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, travelers (visitors, tourists) arriving in Western European capitals are interviewed.

The institutes listed below are being used to conduct the field work. Not all of them will always work with all five national samples as there may be only a few travelers of a certain nationality in a certain area.

INTORA Opinion Research Institute, Vienna, Austria.

A.I.M. Market Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark.

A.I.M. Market Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden.

William Schlackman Psychological Research, London, England.

Sales Research Services, London, England.  
SOPRES Opinion Research Institute, Paris, France.

COFREMCA Opinion Research Institute, Paris, France.

Vandoros, Athens, Greece.

Since the native populations of these countries cannot be reached by Western surveys, the interviewing of visitors to the West from these otherwise inaccessible populations appears to be the best alternative for obtaining useful, generalizable information. Since the early 1960s travel restrictions have been considerably reduced and now several hundred thousand Eastern Europeans travel to the West every year, while the size of the travelling groups is unquestionably large enough to warrant sampling on a sufficiently broad foundation, the composition of the samples presents a more complex problem.

The ideal objective would be to use samples that precisely match the composition of home audiences in the respective Eastern European countries. However, a more realistic expectation is to approximate the composition of parent populations within acceptable limits, and there are indications that a fairly good approximation is reached. Before elaborating on these data, we should discuss the extent to which we can expect the samples of visitors to be representative of the parent population. Even if they closely approximate each other in the distribution of certain demographic variables (age, sex), this is not necessarily an indication that the visitor sample does not deviate from the parent population on some other parameters—political beliefs, level of politicalization, conformity, extroversion. If it does deviate, then

this deviation in turn may show significant correlation with attitudes and opinions expressed in the interview. To mention only a single example, let us take mobility. Mobility, the motivation and interest in travel, is not the same for those who travel and those who do not. To what extent mobility, on which travelers and non-travelers differ, actually interferes with the distribution of responses is in no way clear. If we assume that this mobility correlates with the level of interest in the external world, in international affairs, then it could produce biased results as a factor of selectivity. If this selectivity is assumed to be more apolitical in nature, then its effects on politically oriented questions is likely to be negligible.

Since we cannot clearly identify those factors which actually differentiate those who travel from those who do not, demographic quotas (educational, occupational) provided for sampling may not solve the problem.

Nor is this problem resolved by the method of "independent sampling." The rationale of interviewing independent samples of travelers in various European capitals in undoubtedly sound, and it provides a solid basis for testing the internal consistency of the results. Nonetheless, if there is a selectivity factor which differentiates travelers from non-travelers, the effects of this factor cannot be eliminated by this sampling procedure because in this sense the samples are not independent.

Nonetheless, there are research findings which suggest that the samples have a broad and varied composition which includes not only sizable groups of the main social and educational strata but also sizable percentages of people with diverse political orientations. Table 1 shows the composition of samples on the basis of occupation.

TABLE 1.—THE COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY OCCUPATION

(in percent)

	Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Poland			Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Poland	
	RFE sample	Population	RFE sample	Population	RFE sample	Population		RFE sample	Population	RFE sample	Population	RFE sample	Population
White-collar workers.....	23	29.8	23	27.8	26	27.0	Full-time housewives.....	6		9		10	
Technocrats.....	16		12		10		Shopkeepers.....	4		4		3	
Professionals.....	6		6		6		Others.....	2		2		2	
Artists, writers.....	4		4		1		Farmers.....	5	10.5	9	26.1	4	31.0
Students.....	7		4		12		Average.....	N=1,499		N=1,525		N=1,316	
Workers.....	31	59.7	27	46.1	26	42.0							

The disparity in categorization complicates direct comparisons. As an RFE publication on the "Occupational Background of the East European Populations" observes:

The statistical yearbooks, published under strictest regime supervision, tend to cover this area in summary fashion and, often, even this summary information is incomplete, or contradictory. Furthermore, employment figures are frequently presented for entire sectors of production (e.g., "transport" or "wood processing industry") but these figures include everybody from the enterprise managers and chief engineers to unskilled messengers inside the plant and cleaning personnel.

Another problem relates to the semantic ambiguity of certain categories, a confusion probably resulting from both practical and ideological differences. In a Socialist country everybody is a worker by definition. Nonetheless, as a second meaning worker is fre-

quently used in reference to "manual worker" as in the dichotomy of "workers" and "intelligentsia." In the summary statistics shown above, worker is used apparently in this second sense and the white collar category is largely coterminous with intelligentsia. Where the division line is drawn is impossible to tell.

The demarcation between workers and farmers is perhaps even more ambiguous. Agricultural workers—for example, peasants working on state farms—are frequently categorized as "workers" while peasants doing practically the same work on private or partially collectivized land are identified as farmers.

The "Population" columns of the above table rely on official statistics. The data on CSR from the statistical yearbook (1970), which contained a table on "the Social Structure of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." The Hungarian data are based on a publica-

tion of the Bureau of Statistics in a volume entitled "Employment and Income Ratios (1969 data), which shows the breakdown of the "vocationally active population" (4.46 million).

On Poland RFE has used the information provided by the State Telegraphic Agency (PAP) dated September 29, 1969—as the Statistical Yearbook did not provide this information. Discounting the apparent disparities between the social-occupational categories, the white collar stratum is somewhat overrepresented and the agricultural population underrepresented in the RFE sample.

The comparison between the RFE sample and the parent population is easier in terms of such demographic variables as sex, age, and education, as shown in Table 2. Again, as a general trend, males, middle-aged people, and the more educated strata are somewhat overrepresented in the RFE samples.



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TABLE 2.—COMPOSITION OF THE 1970 SAMPLE BY SEX, AGE, AND EDUCATION

[In percent]

	Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Poland		Czechoslovakia		Hungary		Poland	
	RFE	Popula- tion sample	RFE	Popula- tion sample	RFE	Popula- tion sample	RFE	Popula- tion sample	RFE	Popula- tion sample	RFE	Popula- tion sample
Sex:												
Male.....	59	49.0	50	48	57.5	50	36 to 50 years.....	31	25.0	29	25	27
Female.....	41	51.0	50	52	42.5	50	Over 50 years.....	20	37.0	31	37	16.8
Age:							Education:					
Up to 25 years.....	21	22.0	18	20	27.0	25	Elementary.....	37	66.5	42	70	31.7
26 to 35 years.....	28	16.0	22	18	29.9	19	Secondary.....	47	27.0	43	25	46.3
							University.....	16	6.5	15	5	22.0

Finally, the following table 3 shows the political orientation of the interviewed samples by expressed political party preference.

TABLE 3.—PARTY PREFERENCES IN A HYPOTHETICAL ELECTION, PARTY ALLEGIANCE, BY PERCENTAGES (1970)

	CSR	Hun- gary	Pol- land	Ru- mania
Communist Party.....	3	5	3	11
Democratic Socialist Party.....	41	40	35	37
Christian Democratic Party.....	26	27	36	23
Peasant Party.....	6	13	6	8
National Conservative Party.....	7	2	5	13
Other and no answer.....	17	13	15	8

APPENDIX 3

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT GEARED TO THE AUDIENCE'S FRAME OF REFERENCE

The modern discipline of intercultural communication is based on the realization that effective communication between various people and nations requires more than accurate translation. People and nations not only speak their own language but they have also their own characteristic concerns, priorities, concepts, and values—their cultural frames of reference. This frame of reference is really the critical factor determining whether a communication is listened to, whether it is accepted or rejected, much more so than the language that is the pronunciation of a name or the grammaticalness of a sentence.

As Edward Hall elaborated on this topic at a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee,\* effective communica-

\*Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy (U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1969).

tion requires more than learning the foreign language; it requires knowledge of the foreign culture. This observation has far-reaching implications for broadcasting to foreign nations. It is obviously not enough to translate programs originally designed for U.S. audiences into the language of a particular foreign audience. Such a translation may be understood word by word and sentence by sentence, but this does not mean that it will be grasped in its full meaning, that it will relate to the experiences and interests of the local audiences.

Adjusting programs to the interests of a particular foreign audience constitutes an especially demanding task for which Radio Free Europe, with its national desks, programs, and first class staff recruited from the literary and intellectual elites of the respective countries, has developed outstanding potential.

The institutional policy of Radio Free Europe not only allows for individual country-oriented, independent program development but actually demands it. This unique feature, which is supported by a corresponding organizational structure, differentiates Radio Free Europe from all other known broadcasting stations aiming at foreign audiences. It is probably the main factor responsible for the strong identification Eastern Europeans—Czechs, Hungarians, Poles—develop with the station and is also primarily responsible for its wide popularity.

The audience research has an important role in this performance, even if this role may presently be more potential than actual. In this role the following contributions require special recognition.

First of all, the audience research provides the only empirical evidence which is broadly based and convincing enough to demon-

strate that Eastern European audiences do have highly specific audience characteristics—concerns, interests, concepts, images—which differentiate them from other audiences and thus require full recognition and selective communications. For any interested citizen these findings should speak clearly enough to show the necessity of differentiated treatment of selective, audience-adjusted broadcasting.

Secondly, the audience research of Radio Free Europe is an important instrument, which enables the members of the national broadcasting staffs to keep up to date, to preserve the impression of timeliness, and to keep pace with the changes. Whether the staff members are new or old emigrants, they are in danger of getting more and more detached and losing contact with recent changes in the home audiences. Concerns and priorities change, new slogans and concepts develop (e.g., new economic mechanisms), and new social phenomena emerge (hippies). To keep pace with the changes and to update their approach, the broadcasters, script writers, and commentators can safely rely on the findings of audience analysis. To take full advantage of its potential, it is important that audience analysis be treated not as a threatening authority exerting criticism but as an important source of authentic information which can help to adjust to the latest changes and provide a basis for timely decisions not by speculations and arbitrariness but by empirical evidence.

Finally and most importantly, RFE audience analysis has the organizational, material, and personnel resources to provide up-to-date audience information and feedback on approximately 120 million Eastern Europeans—a knowledge presently not available from any other source.

TABLE 1.—RADIO LISTENING TRENDS OF RFE'S 5 MAIN EASTERN EUROPEAN AUDIENCES

Survey year	Size of audience in percentage of total population					Size of sample interviewed				
	CSR	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	Bulgaria	CSR	Hungary	Poland	Rumania	Bulgaria
1963 1.....	33	49	50	50	47	1,324	1,144	1,675	1,576	1,584
1964.....	38	50	53	53	38	425	1,570	859	1,576	407
1965.....	43	51	57	53	38	465	1,673	1,366	1,794	407
1966.....	47	53	53	53	50	326	1,247	1,095	494	248
1967.....	51	53	58	50	42	1,155	1,003	1,485	581	248
1968 2.....	37	55	63	60	42	668	1,166	1,485	581	248
1968 3.....	65	52	59	63	42	1,129	1,106	1,371	1,026	248
1969 4.....	66	52	59	63	42	1,706	1,106	1,371	1,026	248
1969 5.....	87	55	59	57	45	1,499	1,525	1,316	1,192	399
1970.....	50	55	59	57	45	1,499	1,525	1,316	1,192	399

1 Previous samples included many refugees, providing less solid basis for generalizations.  
 2 Period preceding Soviet invasion of CSR—period of "Prague Spring."  
 3 Postinvasion period.  
 4 Spring-early summer period.  
 5 Early fall period, resumption of heavy jamming.

Note: The percentage figures refer to respondents who stated explicitly that they listen to RFE. Subsequent questions on frequency of listening showed in 1970, for instance, that 52 to 98 percent listened once a week or more and 2 to 27 percent listened less frequently. The data are based on the following report numbers: CSR: 92, 118, 151, 164, 218, 230, 259, 304; Hungary: 104, 122, 157, 175, 222, 238, 263, 300; Poland: 107, 116, 133, 174, 219, 237, 269, 301; Rumania: 132, 204, 234, 270, 303; Bulgaria: 156, 186, 305.

TABLE 2.—"WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU CONSIDER MOST IMPORTANT TASKS OF RFE?"

[In percent]

	Poland	Hungary	CSR	Rumania	Bulgaria	Poland	Hungary	CSR	Rumania	Bulgaria
To inform about events.....	71	68	67	55	63					
To explain causes.....	46	29	35	33	60					
To educate.....	8	7	6	2	4					
To entertain.....	15	19	16	4	1					
To encourage.....	13	12	7	11	20					
Other tasks.....	5	1	2	2	4	5	1	2	2	4
No answer.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Number of cases.....	643	546	432	251	101	643	546	432	251	101

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TABLE 3.—“Why do you like Radio Free Europe?”

	Percent
Most interesting and varied programs	36
Best information on the own country	19
Supplies information otherwise not available	11
Broadcasts all day	10
Best informed Western station	10
Most objective and truthful	9
Has the best entertainment programs	7

## APPENDIX 5

## RADIO FREE EUROPE PUBLICATIONS USED

318. The Major Information Sources of Polish Respondents on Important Foreign and Domestic Issues, October 1971.
315. The Major Information Sources of Hungarian Respondents on Important Foreign and Domestic Issues, September 1971.
314. An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Czechoslovak Programs, September 1971.
313. An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Rumanian Programs, September 1971.
312. An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Polish Programs, August 1971.
311. An Audience Evaluation of RFE's Hungarian Programs, August 1971.
309. Party Preference Trends in Hypothetical Free Elections in East Europe, July 1971.
305. Listening to Western Radio in Bulgaria Before and After the “Polish Events” (April 1970–March 1971), May 1971.
303. Rumanian Listening Patterns Before and After the “Polish Events” (April 1970–March 1971), May 1971.
304. Audience Trends in Czechoslovakia (1967–1970), May 1971.
301. Listening to Western Radio in Hungary Before and After the “Polish Events” (May 1970–March 1971), April 1971.
300. Listening to Western Radio in Poland Before and After the “December Events” (May 1970–March 1971), April 1971.
292. The Reliability of Radio Free Europe, December 1970.
288. The Images of Radio Free Europe and Radio Bucharest Among Rumanian Respondents, November 1970.
287. The Images of Radio Free Europe and Radio Budapest Among Hungarians, November 1970.
284. The Image of Radio Free Europe and of the Domestic Station Among Poles, October 1970.
283. The Image Among Czechs and Slovaks of Radio Free Europe and the Domestic Radio Stations, October 1970.
280. Identifying with Radio Free Europe, August 1970.
270. Rumanian Listening Patterns, May 1969–March 1970, May 1970.
269. Listening to Western Radio in Poland—1969, May 1970.
263. Listening to Western Radio Stations in Hungary in 1969, February 1970.
259. Listening to RFE in Czechoslovakia in 1969 (A Preliminary Report), December 1969.
256. Attitudes Toward Key Political Concepts in East Europe (An Exercise in the Measurement of Meaning), BOUND STUDY, December 1969.
245. Listening to Western Radio in East Europe (Joints.), BOUND STUDY, July 1969.
239. Listening to RFE Programs in Czechoslovakia Before and After August 21, April 1969.
238. Listening to Western Radio in Hungary in 1968, April 1969.
237. Listening to Western Radio in Poland—1968, April 1969.
235. Audience Mail in 1968, March 1969.
234. Rumanian Listening Patterns 1968–69, March 1969.
230. Listening to Western Broadcasts in Czechoslovakia Before and After the Invasion, January 1969.
223. The Program Preferences of RFE's Hungarian Listeners (A Technical Report), December 1968.

222. Listening to Western Radio in Hungary 1967–1968, November 1968.

221. Radio Free Europe's Listenership Trends, 1962–1968, October 1968.

219. Listening to Western Radio in Poland, October 1968.

218. RFE's Audience in Czechoslovakia After the Invasion (A Preliminary Report) (Strictly Confidential), October 1968.

206. RFE's Audience in Czechoslovakia (1963–1968), April 1968.

204. Rumanian Listening Patterns 1967, March 1968.

186. Listening to Western Radio in Bulgaria, September 1967.

185. The Image of RFE in Bulgaria, September 1967.

181. The Image of RFE in Poland, August 1967.

177. The Image of RFE in Hungary, July 1967.

175. Listening to Western Radio in Hungary, 1966/1967, July 1967.

174. Listening to Western Radio in Poland, July 1967.

168. The Image of RFE in Czechoslovakia, February 1967.

164. Listening to Western Radio Stations in Czechoslovakia, February 1967.

157. Hungarian Listening Patterns, 1965/1966, August 1966.

156. Bulgarian Listening Patterns, 1964/1966, August 1966.

151. Listening to Western Stations in Czechoslovakia III, June 1966.

133. Listening to Western Radio in Poland, December 1965.

132. Rumanian Listening Patterns III, December 1965.

122. Hungarian Listening Patterns 1964–1965, August 1965.

118. The Audience of Western Broadcasters to Czechoslovakia—II, March 1965.

116. Radio Listening Patterns and Program Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE (With Special Reference to Certain Age and Occupation Factors), January 1965.

115. Hungarian Attitudes Toward Other Nations, December 1964.

107. Radio Listening Patterns and Program Preferences of Polish Listeners to RFE, August 1964.

104. Hungarian Listening Patterns Prior to the Cessation of Jamming, April 1964.

92. Agitation or Information? East Europeans Mistrust Their Mass Media (An Illustrative Report), August 1963.

## JAMES ROBERT PRICE

James Robert Price, presently a member of the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, was born on January 3, 1927, in Montgomery, Alabama, and educated in the public schools there and at the University of Alabama and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science and history from the University of Alabama (1949) and a master's degree from Johns Hopkins (1950). His academic record won him membership in Phi Beta Kappa.

From 1950–1957, he was employed by the U.S. Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. He served on the Indonesian Desk until October 1951. From October 1951 through November 1953, he was assigned as Vice Consul at the American Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia. His duties included political and economic reporting, as well as administrative supervision of local Chinese and Indonesian employees. He then returned to the Indonesian Desk in Washington. In addition to his other duties, he served on the Indonesian working group of the National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Board.

In March 1957, he was assigned to Madrid, Spain, as general assistant to the president of Jani'at al Islam, Inc., Mr. Ahmad Kamal, and to supervise and develop relationships

between the Moslem foundation and all non-Moslem governmental and private organizations. He traveled extensively in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, conducting negotiations with private, governmental, and United Nations agencies relative to the establishment of programs for refugee relief and rehabilitation in Austria, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the United Arab Republic. He supervised negotiation of contracts between Jani'at al Islam, Inc. and the U.S. Department of State and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In May of 1959, he was transferred from Europe to Washington, D.C., to serve as the foundation's representative on the Eastern coast of the United States. His duties included the supervision of contractual relationships with the U.S. Government, maintenance of liaison with the Moslem diplomatic corps in Washington and New York, and general liaison with legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government.

From 1957 through December of 1962, he was Washington, D.C. Representative and Executive Director, Jani'at al Islam, Inc., P.O. Box 347, San Francisco, California. (An international Moslem humanitarian and educational foundation.)

From December 1962, to October 1970, he was Manager, Cultural Information Analysis Center, Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) of the American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Maryland, where he was responsible for the development, administration, and supervision of an organization of 29 professional social science research and information specialists and related personnel. The organization developed and maintained an information storage and retrieval activity in the fields of cross-cultural information and communication and internal defense and development. CINFAC also provided a rapid response information analysis service to government agencies and to private research and academic organizations performing government-sponsored work. Mr. Price also served as co-chairman of a social science research team preparing an intercultural communications study of the Republic of Vietnam.

From October 1970, to April 1971, he was technical director, National Media Analysis, Inc., 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. National Media Analysis provides, for a private clientele, research reports on public opinion in the United States. As is implied by its name, National Media Analysis reports are based upon a specialized content analysis of U.S. mass media according to techniques developed in collaboration with the late Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger of the Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Price has served as a consultant Technical Director of this firm since 1960 and continues to serve in this capacity on a part-time basis.

Mr. Price was appointed an analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, in April of 1971.

Some of Mr. Price's published studies are the following:

1. “Algeria (1954–1962),” in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict (by D. M. Condit, et al.). CRESS, 1968.
2. Attitudes of Selected Audiences in the Republic of Vietnam (U) (S) (with W. C. Maneo and C. B. Brooks). CRESS, 1966.
3. CRESS Research on Vietnam: A Bibliographic Essay (with Skaldrite Fallah). CRESS, 1968.
4. Giving Credit to the Republic of Vietnam (U) (C). CRESS, 1964.
5. Intercultural Communications Guide for the Republic of Vietnam (U) (C) (with F. A. Munson, et al.). CRESS, 1967.
6. Irrigation as a Factor in the Economic Development of Thailand. CRESS, 1967.
7. Research Notes on Communist Strategy and Tactics in Negotiating Situations (J. R. Price, et al.). CRESS, 1968.

8. Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic, and Other Psychological Phenomena and Their Implications on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo. (co-author, with Paul A. Jureldini), CRESS, 1964.

His linguistic attainments are a fair knowledge of spoken Japanese and of written and spoken Spanish, and an acquaintance with Indonesian Malay.

#### LORAND BERTALAN SZALAY

Lorand Bertalan Szalay was born in Budapest, Hungary, on June 28, 1921. He graduated from the Academy for Foreign Trade and Languages, Budapest, in 1950, with two degrees in Foreign Languages, and secured his Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Vienna in 1961. He has engaged in post-doctoral studies in Social Psychology and Psycholinguistics, at the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

From 1959 to 1960, Dr. Szalay performed research in the field of social psychology and communication, content analysis of mass media output, assertion analysis, and semantic measurements, at the Psychological Institute of the University of Vienna, Austria. In 1961-1962 he concentrated on small-group research, intra- and inter-group communication, and group creativity as a function task and communication structure, at the University of Illinois, Group Effectiveness Research Library. He served as an instructor at the University of Vienna, from 1951 to 1961 at the University of Illinois from 1961 to 1962. He next performed field research on word-of-mouth communication in Thailand, as a co-investigator for SORO. The American University of Washington, D.C. In 1964-1965, he was principal investigator in the development of a research technique (Associative Group Analysis) designed for the quantitative analysis of group or culture-specific memory content. He also served in 1965 as an instructor at Prince George's Community College. As a project director, in 1965-1966, he conducted research in intercultural communication, with special emphasis on factors influencing communication success with foreign audiences, especially in the matter of attitude measurement and value analysis. During the same period, he was employed by the Center for Research in Social Systems of The American University and as an instructor by George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

From 1967 to 1969, Dr. Szalay was engaged as project director in a comparative study of cultural groups, analyzing psycho-cultural variables. Field service was performed in Korea. Since 1970, he has engaged in a comparative study of the American and Yugoslav psycho-cultures, in collaboration with Professor Pecjak of the University of Ljubljana. The study is supported by the American Philosophical Society. Dr. Szalay also is serving at the present time in the capacity of Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Maryland.

Dr. Szalay is a member of the American Psychological Association, the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, and the American Sociological Association. His publications are listed below:

Doctoral Dissertation: "Eine psychologisch-semantische Untersuchung von Zietworten". Vienna, 1961.

"The Semantic Structure of Verbs," *Zeitschrift für Experimentelle und Angewandte Psychologie*, IX (1962), 140-163.

The Study of Communication in Thailand, with co-author, M. Jacobs. Washington, D.C.: SORO, the American University, 1964. 150 pp.

Cultural Meanings and Values: A Method of Empirical Assessment, Lorand B. Szalay with J. Brent. Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office (SORO) [now Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS)], The American University, 1965.

"Research Requirements Posed by Tasks

of Intercultural Communication," paper read at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles, Calif., September 1964. Printed in *Psychological Research in National Defense Today*, Lorand B. Szalay, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, 1967.

"The Analysis of Cultural Meanings Through Free Verbal Associations," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Lorand B. Szalay, LXXII (1967), 161-187.

Persuasion Overseas, senior author with R. Walker, G. Schueller, J. Brent. Washington, D.C.: SORO, The American University, 1965. 120 pp.

"Use of Word Associations in Foreign Area Study," *Proceedings, 75th Annual Convention*, Lorand B. Szalay, American Psychological Association, 1967, pp. 373-374.

Variables Affecting Cultural Meanings Assessed by Associative Group Analysis, Lorand B. Szalay, with C. Windle and J. Brent. Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), The American University, 1968.

"Relative Influence of Linguistic Versus Cultural Factors on Free Verbal Associations," *Psychological Reports*, Lorand B. Szalay with C. Windle, XXII (1968), 43-51.

"The Use of Word Associations for Value Analysis," *Proceedings, 75th Annual Convention*, Lorand B. Szalay, with J. Brent and D. A. Lysne. American Psychological Association, 1968, pp. 634-644.

Attitude Measurement and Value Analysis by the Method of Associative Group Analysis, Lorand B. Szalay, D. A. Lysne, and J. E. Brent, Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1970.

"Attitude Measurement by Free Verbal Associations," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Lorand B. Szalay, Charles Windle, and Dale A. Lysne, LXXXII (1970), pp. 43-55.

"Attitude Research in Intercultural Communication," *Journal of Communication*, Lorand B. Szalay, XX (1970), pp. 180-200.

"The Impact of the American Environment on Foreign Students: The Case of the South Koreans," a paper prepared for the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Rita M. Kelly and Lorand B. Szalay, Los Angeles, California, September 1970. To be printed in *Studies in International Political Communication*, ed. R. L. Merritt, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1971.

"Verbal Associations in the Analysis of Subjective Culture," *Current Anthropology* Lorand B. Szalay and Bela C. Maday, in press.

A Lexicon of Selected U.S.-Korean Communication Themes, senior author. Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1971. 220 pp.

Communication Lexicon on Three South Korean Audiences—Social, National and Motivational Domains, senior author. Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, in press.

#### RADIO LIBERTY—A STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, POLICY PROGRAMING AND EFFECTIVENESS—SUMMARY OF STUDY

(By Joseph G. Whelan, Specialist in Soviet and East European Affairs, Foreign Affairs Division, February 29, 1972)

##### I. BASIC INFORMATION ON RADIO LIBERTY (RL)

The operations of Radio Liberty (RL) have remained almost completely unpublished since its inception nearly two decades ago. Except for Soviet specialists, relatively few Americans know of RL's existence. The purpose of this study is to examine the history, organization, administration, and operations of RL. It is hoped that this study will assist in an evaluation of RL's activities in the context of United States foreign policy and how it relates to currently declared purposes of that policy. It is also hoped that an in-depth research effort of this organization will assist a broader understanding of its purposes and functions, dispel possible in-

formational gaps and misconceptions, and provide useful data for those concerned with assessing its purposes and impact. The implications of the Radio for U.S. foreign policy and considerations on the organizational aspects of RL will be examined in separate reports to be prepared in the future.

RL was formally conceived, at least organizationally, in the State of Delaware on January 18, 1951, with the incorporation of the "American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the USSR, Inc." This organization was the forerunner of the present Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. One of the purposes of the committee was to sponsor shortwave broadcasts to the Soviet Union by former Soviet citizens. Broadcasts began on March 1, 1953, on a very small scale. Basic policy of the committee called for the "liberation" of Soviet Russia from the "tyranny of Bolshevism." This policy reflected the theme of "liberation" in American foreign policy during the early years of the Eisenhower Administration. However, in the later years RL policy changed from "liberation" to "liberalization" as conditions within the Soviet Union improved under the impact of de-Stalinization. Ever since the late 1950's RL has been committed to a policy of peaceful liberalization of Soviet society, and its broadcasts have been structured accordingly.

Administrative headquarters for RL are in New York City. Mr. Howard H. Sargeant is President. In addition, RL maintains administrative offices, broadcast headquarters and research facilities in Munich, Germany. Offices, studios and other facilities are located in Barcelona, Lampertheim (Germany), London, Madrid, Paris, Playa del Pals (Spain), and Taipei. All of these facilities together with the U.S. Division in New York come under the administrative direction of Mr. W. Kenneth Scott, RL's Executive Director in Munich. Operations at Munich are broken down into four major subdivisions: the Program Policy Division, the Network Division, the Administrative Division and the Program Operations Division.

An important aspect to the organizational side of RL is the prevailing administrative style. This style encourages flexibility and informality, and fosters a type of fluidity that allows the widest permissible range of individual creativity and initiative, yet within a closely administered and carefully structured system of policy. Such flexibility, however, creates certain organizational risks.

What specific relations have existed between RL and the Executive Branch and the extent of RL's independence were matters that could not be fully explored during this study. However, as an outsider viewing RL's current operations through documentation, extensive interviews, and actual on-site visits to facilities, certain aspects of RL's activities are apparent and it is possible to make the following generalizations: (1) that RL is clearly a United States Government operation and an integral part of this Nation's foreign policy apparatus; (2) that it seems to have a wide range of independence from the Executive Branch in its broadcasting operations; and (3) that its operating policies seem to be generated within the organization and not necessarily dictated by an outside authority.

Staff of RL has numbered around 1000 in recent years. As a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people, the staff, in keeping with the multinational character of the Soviet Union, is itself multinational. However, the major broadcasting effort of RL is directed at the Russian-speaking audience. The top administrative posts in policy making, policy control, and in key operations are held by Americans. The staff is regarded as being highly professional. It is multifunctional, and ideally, RL strives for a staff that represents the combined skills of a scholar, writer, journalist and radio performer. In-house training for RL is an organizational

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function created by necessity. Staff attrition due to advancing age and retirements, along with difficulties in recruiting newcomers from the Slavic areas of the Soviet Union, pose a potentially serious personnel problem for the future. The professionalism of staff is apparent in the quality of their research product, their multilingual facility, the unique combination of American and Western scholarship with the native talents of former Soviet citizens, and finally the existence of an organizational spirit that seems to arise from a conviction of participating in creating positive change within the Soviet Union. In addition, RL maintains close connections with the Western scholarly community as a complementing force to their research and broadcasting operations.

On the technical side of its operations, RL has transmitters at Lampertheim, Germany, Pals, Spain, and Taipei, Taiwan. A total of 1,350,000 watts of power enables RL to transmit its signal to the Soviet audience. Jamming is serious but by no means an insurmountable obstacle. Frequencies are allocated according to regulations of the International Telecommunications Union, and transmitters are licensed by host countries upon whose territories RL's facilities are installed. Continuation of such licenses rests solely upon the will of the host country, thus injecting a precarious quality of dependency on others in RL's operations.

RL's broadcasting operations are supported by a research effort that is impressive in both quality and in quantity. To keep abreast of internal developments in the Soviet Union and to know what gaps to fill in their programming, RL staff in New York and Munich have at their disposal a vast collection of newspapers, journals, books, microfilms, along with monitored reports of Soviet radio, access to wire services of the world, and the daily output of Radio Free Europe's (RFE) news budget.

The research effort is further backed up by RL's library facilities and the extensive resources of The Institute for the Study of the USSR, also in Munich. Owing to budgetary restrictions, the Institute was terminated at the end of 1971. RL's research facilities are open to scholars, and RL makes many of its research products available to specialists in academia, the government, and the mass media who are concerned with contemporary Soviet affairs. The quality of research done by RL, which has been highly commended by leading Western scholars, is vital to its broadcasting operations since it must fill the gaps of knowledge and information created within its Soviet audience by regime censorship.

## II. RL'S GOALS, POLICIES, AND POLICY FORMULATIONS

The primary objective of RL is to encourage those forces of liberalization within Soviet society that will bring an eventual peaceful evolution of the USSR from Communist totalitarianism to a genuine democratic form of government. The ultimate goal is democratization of Soviet society in the expectation that within such internal forces of liberalization lies the greatest hope of world peace.

RL's is a commitment to peaceful change from within. It rejects confrontation as an instrumentality in achieving its goals. RL encourages Soviet peoples to work together as a first step in instilling the habit of democracy. It broadcasts truthful information, to enable the Soviet peoples to make their own judgments on developments in the Soviet Union, to fill in the gaps of missing information caused by Soviet censorship, and to correct distortions of propaganda.

Within the larger framework of goals and purposes RL pursues immediate objectives that focus on such practical themes as democratic political alternatives, economic reform, peaceful intentions of the democratic world, ideological irrelevance of Marxism-

Leninism, and the virtue of cultural diversity and political pluralism.

To achieve its objectives, RL seeks to promote public opinion formation in the Soviet Union, and it does this principally through its radio broadcasting operations. RL operates on the principle of the right of a free press; it "upholds the right of the whole Soviet public to know the whole truth about any question"; it is committed to the principle, affirmed in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, that the Soviet people, like all other peoples, have a universal right to be informed.

The general philosophical approach of RL is one that appeals to rationalism. It attempts to "substitute reason for emotion, and a calm voice for stridency." It begins from the premise that "the most convincing presentation is one that tells all sides of a story." In resorting to the rational approach, RL strives to break the monopoly over communications which the regime tries to impose in the expectation that the first step in the erosion of a totalitarian dictatorship is the development of individual thought.

In general, RL's policy guidelines are a reflection of a moderate, rational approach to the politics of the Soviet Union.

These guidelines and the philosophy that produced them are contained in RL's Policy Manual. The Manual is RL's operating charter. It is "the mainspring for all other policy determinations, the central authority determining audience priorities, program content and the nature of Radio Liberty's approaches in program structure, style and tone."

In formulating broadcast policy and designing radio programming, RL makes certain general assumptions about its own role, the situation in the Soviet Union and its Soviet audience. The function of these assumptions is to give some rational direction to thought and planning.

With regard to its role, RL perceives it in general as that of a participant in bringing about positive evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union; it adheres to the principle of self-determination to the extent that the Soviet people themselves are to bring about changes from within and according to their own interests and requirements; it acts as a conduit for the flow of objective information into the Soviet Union and acts also as a forum for debate of views that are denied by the regime; it rejects violence as a political solution and is committed to the belief in a long term process of change for the better; it denies support for individuals or groups, but gives general support to democratic principles and to those who exercise their human and constitutional rights; it is convinced, finally, that the process of democratization will continue despite momentary setbacks.

RL's second assumption is based upon an objective analysis of the situation in the Soviet Union. In general, RL perceives the situation as follows: the Soviet Union is a great power but suffers from serious institutional and ideological inadequacies; positive changes have occurred but totalitarianism has become institutionalized and its continuation is insured still further by the existence of a phlegmatic, Stalinist-bred leadership; serious economic problems, arising from contending forces of modernization and orthodoxy, plague the nation, the most serious being the allocation of resources; problems of defense and foreign policy press upon the ruling elite, dividing it into competing forces—those seeking cooperation and those adhering to a hardline stance; forces of dissent and reformism continue to divided the country into polar opposites, one seeking reform while the other is committed to a static society and is resistant to change; the dissident movement is reformist and not revolutionary; a trend toward conservatism, as understood in the Soviet context and not in the Western sense, is perceived within the current leadership; and while immediate

prospects for democratization are not bright, still over a long period the climate could be propitious; RL perceives in this situation a "challenging opportunity" for stimulating internal pressures for positive change. The RL statement, essentially cautious and well-reasoned, seems to reflect the consensus of leading Western scholars in Soviet studies on the current Soviet reality and what the prospects are for the future. However, some scholars, who have a realist's cast to their thought, would probably be less sanguine about the ultimate achievement of democracy.

The third area of assumptions concerns RL's Soviet audience. In general, RL's approach is elitist, in that it directs its attention mainly to the power elite, either existing or in potential. RL believes that this group will more likely influence political decisions in the future. Moreover, persons in this group are more likely to have access to shortwave radio and thus receive RL's signal.

On the basis of the foregoing assumptions, RL proceeds toward its long-range goal and immediate objectives by maintaining an effective overall image. It does this by applying certain basic radio broadcasting methods, utilizing a number of basic themes in all its presentations, and maintaining a style that is both appealing and effective. The guide words in this effort are friendliness, enlightenment and dignity. In brief, RL takes the stance of a "patriotic internal communicator": it seeks to adapt itself to the interests and style, the feelings and sensitivities of the Soviet citizen; it envisions itself as a genuine uncensored "Home Service", thus making it essential that the tone of broadcasting and style of presentation convey the feeling to the listener that RL is really one of them. In its basic methods, RL provides facts, balanced discussion in the style of a democratic system, genuine criticism, and a portrayal of the Soviet reality, based on its own research facilities, in contrast to the regime media's propaganda image of that reality.

In pursuing its objectives RL lays down a set of specific guiding principles. By and large the principles are commonsense: they appeal to reason, moderation and good judgment.

Other policy requirements are imposed upon RL that arise from the fact that its transmitters are located on territories of foreign governments. Material cannot be used in broadcasts, therefore, that would harm the interests of the host governments and embarrass RL's relation with them.

The Policy Manual is RL's charter for operations. In an effort to keep the Manual current, RL periodically reconsiders certain relevant questions and synthesizes its conclusions into more current formal policy statements and guidances, namely, Broadcast Position Statements, Broadcast Guidances, Monthly Guidelines and Daily Guidance Notes.

The primary function of RL policy is to make sure that programming provides the Soviet audience with objective, accurate and meaningful information; that it reflects the growth and plurality of views outside the Soviet Union; and that it corrects significant omissions and distortions in Soviet media. All members of RL staff contribute to policy-making and policy application, but the main role is played by President Sargeant and Executive Director Scott. They direct and review the formation of all policy and oversee policy operations at all levels.

The next level of responsibility lies within the Program Policy Division (PPD) and rests upon its Director in Munich. Through his policy staff, the Director exercises the chief operational responsibility for policy formulation and application. In New York, the Policy Coordinator actively participates in the formulation of current policy. Responsibility for carrying out all policy by the U.S. Division rests upon him. A Special Ad-

visor assists the President in the formulation and coordination of basic policy. A final organizational mechanism in the policy process is the Council of Editors in Munich.

When a fully agreed policy draft is finally concurred in by the Council, it is passed on to the Executive Director for his approval and then to the President.

Policy formulations are divided into two major categories, those dealing with long-term with short-term guidances. The Policy Manual, National Language Annexes, Broadcast Position Statements and Broadcast Guidances are long-term. These are supplemented by short-term Monthly Guidelines and Daily Guidance Notes which are intended to relate larger policy to specific current developments. On occasion an immediate policy guidance is given in the form of a Special Memorandum. All statements of policy, along with the Policy Manual and National Language Annexes, are inserted in a loose-leaf notebook called, the Policy Handbook.

RL is, therefore, a policy-oriented organization, and its staff is policy-minded. While questions may be raised whether there is a surfeit or sufficiency in policy, such questions are no doubt moderated by an awareness of risks of too loose a policy structure in dealing with a configuration of power of such awesomeness as the Soviet Union. Yet, the policy structure is there for achieving the proper balance if indeed this is a relevant question.

### III. CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE RECEPTION OF RL'S BROADCASTS

Certain conditions exist within the Soviet Union that affect the reception of RL's broadcasts. The first is the technical capability of the Soviet people to receive RL's shortwave radio signal; the second is their willingness to listen to RL's message.

In 1969, there were an estimated 50 million radios in the Soviet Union; between 28-30 million of these were believed to be shortwave receivers. At the same time RL has transmission facilities to cover the vast Soviet population.

Less exacting are estimates on the number of tape recorders. Tape recorders can be used for program propagation and for producing "magnitizdat," that is, self-recording of dissident material. For the six-year period 1957-1962, 701,400 tape recorders were produced. A projected annual production of some 500,000 by 1973 not taking into account certain qualifications, would indicate a total accumulation of over 4.5 million in use in 1973. Tape recorders are, therefore, available, perhaps in increasing numbers.

The rumor network, that is, person-to-person oral communication, is the third means of internal communication that broadens the potentiality of RL's audience appeal. This form of communication, vital in the days of Stalin, still plays a very important part in the transmission of officially unsponsored information.

There seems little doubt that RL has a wide appeal among a very specialized and potentially powerful audience in the dissenting Soviet intellectuals. Dissent within this elite sector can be explained mainly by the fact that they are the most affected by the regime's restrictions on intellectual freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and other democratic rights. What makes their role so important in the Soviet setting is that they represent a quasi-political force contesting the monopoly of power by the regime. The growth of a full-scale movement of intellectual dissent has created for RL a very special audience that has in turn attributed to the radio a very special appeal.

What creates RL's greatest potential appeal, and this opportunity, is no doubt the role of censorship. The totality of Soviet censorship compels the Soviet citizen to look elsewhere for alternative sources of informa-

tion; many find this in international radio broadcasters.

### IV. RL'S PROGRAMMING: AUDIENCE CHARACTERISTICS, PROCEDURES SUMMARIZED, AND PHENOMENON OF SAMIZDAT

A first principle in effective communications is to know one's audience. RL has to make certain assumptions about its audience, and in so doing it takes into account the attitudes not only of social, occupational, and intellectual groups in all the republics and oblasts of the Soviet Union, but also those of the various nationalities to which RL broadcasts and certain differing psychological categories within these groups.

RL tries to reach as broad an audience as possible, but its approach is essentially elitist: it aims at the top. Accordingly, RL regards its audience priorities in this descending order. Within the social, occupational, and intellectual groups fall the younger generation, CPSU members, the scientific intelligentsia, the literary-artistic intelligentsia, lower-level party and government officials and elected members of legislative organs, skilled workers and their immediate supervisors, Soviet personnel abroad, collective farmers and unskilled workers. The next major category is the Soviet nationalities, followed by special psychological categories that include "regime patriots" (ardent supporters) and the committed opponents; the "seekers" (loyalists who seek improvement); and the "reformers" (committed to the regime but seek positive changes). RL approaches all these categories with a view to encouraging internal transformation by peaceful means.

In structuring its programming as a "Home Service", RL must begin with an awareness that its audience's perception is like a fragmented mosaic in which many important pieces are missing. RL programmers must know what those pieces are; they must supply them; and, in addition, they must correct the distorted images created in the mind of the Soviet audience by propaganda. In communicating with the Soviet audience, RL assumes a "patriotic stance"; it regards itself as "a Guest in the Home"; and it speaks in the many languages of the Soviet peoples.

To reach its audience, RL has established practical procedures in programming. What is significant in these procedures is the extent to which policy is integrated into programming operations. In the programming process there are four daily morning meetings: the Research Meeting, News Meeting, Nationalities Service Meeting, and the Russian Service Meeting. The morning meetings take on the character of academic seminars. Key personnel are invited to comment on important problems in their areas of competence. These morning conferences provide a meeting ground for policy and program planning. The final step in the programming process is the actual production of news, features and other programs.

One of the most extraordinary developments in recent years within the Soviet Union has been the emergence of samizdat, that is, the private publication and circulation of one's own works. RL has become a main depository for samizdat, and, accordingly, samizdat has made a major contribution to RL's programming. What is most significant about samizdat for RL is that it comes from within the Soviet people themselves. As the principal source for disseminating samizdat, RL acts as an "echo chamber" or "sounding board", sending back to the Soviet Union the ideas generated by its own intellectual elite. As a result, RL has become a means of internalizing samizdat and also a means of communication among all Soviet peoples.

### V. RL'S PROGRAMMING: PREPARATION AND OPERATIONS, POLICY AND QUALITY CONTROL

In program planning the Program Operations Division operates on the principle of an

inverted pyramid where the first appeal is to universality of interest, and this is the news, with the expectation of a declining listener interest for the rest of the hour. News is the most important attraction for listeners, and it is programmed every hour on the hour for 24 hours. Thus, in RL's four-part concept in programming, news takes first priority, news features second. Then, the remainder of the hour contains internal Soviet subject matter, for example, a review of samizdat, and finally a political or cultural show directed toward a more specialized audience. The key organizational elements in programming are the Central News Service, Russian Service, and the Nationalities Service. RL has extensive internal and external environmental aids to support programming.

Policy envelopes RL's operations, and its application begins with the writers; the next level of "screening" for policy is the editors. What enables RL to screen its programs carefully is the time sequence allowed in production. It takes approximately three to ten days for the production of a show. Tape makes it possible to have careful screening procedures. There are pre-broadcast auditions, spot-checks by the Program Policy Division, review by the various services, and an "as broadcast" check made at the transmitters as the programs are being aired. What errors and policy violations are caught in this screening (except at the transmitters) are corrected immediately by deletions and the actual "pulling" of shows. Policy violations and errors are compiled in a monthly report.

RL has many instrumentalities for policy control, but policy control cannot be total; policy violations are always possible; at best, control mechanisms can only reduce the probabilities. The heart of the matter is, therefore, trust and rationality: trust in the individual, for policy control must begin and end with the individual; and rationality in the wisdom of the policy constructed and of the people who are to carry it out.

A test of RL's ability to maintain control over its broadcasting operations in crisis conditions through the mechanism of policy is the case of the Czechoslovak crisis of August 1968. A review of selected materials (Appendix 23) during the crisis has revealed that RL exercised a great deal of caution, moderation and restraint.

Policy control and quality control overlap to a considerable extent. Pre-broadcast and post-broadcast auditioning provide in-house evaluations on both the quality of programming as well as judgments on policy matters. Beyond this, no other formal institutional mechanism for quality control seems to exist, except for the important tasks performed by Mr. Will Klumpf, administrative assistant to the Executive Director. His main responsibility is to check programming in pre-broadcast auditioning for quality, effectiveness, policy, and overall excellence in production. As a means of maintaining quality, RL has a grading system on ratings of voices and ratings on shows. Speakers are taken off the air and shows ruled "dead" if ratings dip below 3.0 (A theoretically perfect score is 5.0.)

RL's Audience Research Division plays an important role in quality control. On the basis of extensive testing of opinions through postbroadcast audition panel of substitute listeners and outside specialists in addition to direct interviews with Soviet citizens, it prepares reports evaluating programs. These reports are circulated throughout RL for the information and guidance of staff. Panel evaluations have shortcomings but they seem to have the virtue of at least providing some evidence of probable listener response and reaction without which there would be none. However narrow the sampling for evaluating programs, the panel approach, nevertheless, provides some basis upon which to maintain at least a measure of quality control.



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## VI. RL'S AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

RL operates at a serious disadvantage as a "Home Service" to the Soviet population: it has only very limited access to the Soviet people and, therefore, has great difficulty in evaluating in any systematic or scientific way its impact on the Soviet audience or its overall effectiveness as a broadcaster. The Soviet Union is a closed society; it is not possible to take public opinion polls or engage in public opinion research procedures normal to an open society.

Despite known disadvantages, RL attempts to establish some positive basis for judging audience impact. It does this by collecting evidence on audience reaction: (1) in interviews with Soviet listeners in such categories as visitors to the West, legal Soviet expatriates, and Soviet defectors; and (2) from letters received from Soviet listeners through the indirect method of a mail drop in the West. Through these efforts RL's Audience Research Division (ARD) attempts to fill the gap between speaker and audience, to get an accurate image of the listener, and the listener's image of RL, and to build the foundations for a continuing dialogue.

Interviews are regarded as a prime indicator of audience response. During FY 1971 interviews were conducted with hundreds of Soviet citizens, of whom well over one-half were foreign radio listeners. But interviews are very difficult to conduct, owing to native suspicion of polling as instruments of the KGB and to the climate of suspicion that impedes a free exchange of views. RL approaches analysis of audience research data conservatively. ARD does not claim to have enough data from interviews to speak about a "sample" in the statistical sense; rather it claims to have only "bits and pieces of samples" that even then could be indicative of only certain groups.

Yet, the accumulated data can give RL programmers some perception of their audiences' image, scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness, preferences for listening time, age spread, and class distribution. The intellectual professions dominate among RL's listeners. Thus, ARD data, though limited, by and large confirms RL's judgment on audience structure, policy content and program design.

Despite ARD's admittedly limited success in these matters, the question arises whether or not it has been too cautious. On the basis of an examination of audience research operations in both RFE and RL, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay, an American specialist in the field of communications research and psycholinguistics, has made the tentative judgment that RL could perhaps do more with its audience research data drawn from interviews, and he suggests alternative methods in measuring impact.

Interviews are supplemented by letters from Soviet listeners. Such letters are regarded as documentary evidence upon which judgments can be made on Soviet listening behavior and on Soviet attitudes toward RL programming. According to RL, audience feedback through mail has increased considerably in the past decade. Except for a momentary decline in early 1971, apparently, the general trend continues upward. Actual numbers of letters received are not available for publication; percentages are. In an attempt to flesh out its profile of listeners, RL categorizes listener mail according to "friendly" and "hostile/critical"; language; substantive or inconsequential; geographical distribution (RFSFR predominates); repeat or first-time writers; and sex. Thus, listener mail, despite acknowledged imperfections, provides RL with another important input of data to give some perception of its audience and to measure its effectiveness. Whether pro or con, listener mail represents an affirmation of RL's purposes in at least one sense, namely, to provoke the Soviet people to think critically and inde-

pendently and to contemplate alternative solutions to problems on the basis of more complete information.

The frame of reference for evaluating effectiveness could be broadened to include comments in Soviet literature (not regime attacks) on RL and other foreign broadcasters, and also to include general evaluations on RL's activities by Western authorities either private scholars or government officials. There has been a steady growth of evidence to demonstrate the value of RL in the eyes of many Soviet listeners. Frequent references have been made to Western broadcasts in Soviet literature, particularly in samizdat, and appeals have been voiced urging that such broadcasts be continued. The upper echelons of the Soviet ruling elite also draw upon foreign broadcasters like RL as sources of information. It has long been known that the Soviet leadership has available for review daily monitored news from abroad. Former Soviet citizens now living in Israel and the West who had been listeners and also Western authorities who have specialized knowledge of the area have expressed favorable judgments on RL's effectiveness.

RL also determines impact and effectiveness in essentially a negative way, namely, by the number of attacks in regime media and Soviet persistency in jamming. Regime attacks have increased "immeasurably" in recent years. The peak period was recorded between January and the end of September 1971 when 357 attacks were made in printed matter with an estimated circulation of 174 million. This acceleration of attacks was designed to force RL out of West Germany. It coincided with the buildup of Soviet pressure on West Germany at a time when preparations were being made for the Olympic Games in Munich, when the renewal of licenses for both RL and RFE were being negotiated, and when Congress was reconsidering not only funding and new sponsorship but even the existence of the radios. The convergence of all these developments created an inviting opportunity for the Soviets. Moscow found in the license renewal issue a pressure point that could be used against West Germany to terminate the radios. But, the Soviets failed; the West Germans resisted Soviet pressures and renewed the radio licenses.

An equally important measurement of RL's impact and effectiveness is the Soviet practice of jamming RL's signal. RL is jammed round-the-clock. Soviet jammers use two methods: sky-wave jamming and groundwave jamming; the former covers large geographic areas, the latter covers restricted areas within urban communities. Jamming impedes audibility of RL's signal, and while it lessens RL's impact, it can also frustrate listeners and build up a greater desire to hear the denied signal.

But Soviet jamming is only partially successful. By taking advantage of the phenomenon called twilight immunity, listeners can hear RL from 2 to 3 hours daily at sunrise and sundown. Jamming can also be penetrated by increasing RL's output; this is done in times of crises by combining the power of two or three transmitters. Moreover, there are other anti-jamming measures: listeners can build an efficient selector that refines the process of tuning; they can avoid groundwave jamming by going to the suburbs and listening; they can patiently wait for "ulls" in jamming.

It is not possible to determine the effectiveness of Soviet jamming, but responsible observers believe that a significant proportion of RL's broadcasts penetrate jamming. However, what is most important in correlating jamming with RL's effectiveness is the high value the Soviet Union places on RL by investing millions of dollars in resources needed elsewhere into preventing RL's signal from reaching the Soviet audience. This is a real measure not only of regime reaction but of the value that Moscow places on RL's effec-

tiveness as a competing "Home Service" and a "loyal opposition" in the tradition of a free press.

Assessment of regime media attacks and calculations of Soviet investment in time, resources, and energy into jamming provide essentially negative inputs in judging RL's audience impact and effectiveness. Yet, they, at least, have the virtue of creating greater certainty in a very uncertain area of human judgment.

Commonsense seems to dictate that the positive inputs of interviews and listener mail can at best give RL only a hazy image of its audience and an uncertain estimate of its effectiveness. However, this judgment might possibly be modified by the following factors: (1) the increase in the number of interviews, especially from the scientific intelligentsia; and (2) the expertise of RL's staff, the quality of research, and particularly the emergence of samizdat which provides new insights into Soviet society enabling RL to assess its audience, programming needs, and probable effectiveness perhaps with somewhat greater, but still far from sufficient, clarity.

## VII. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON RL

There seems little doubt that RL is what it claims to be, namely, a surrogate "Home Service" to the Soviet people, but its effectiveness in the Soviet environment can only be a matter of conjecture. To achieve its goal of liberalization of Soviet society it has established an impressive and, apparently, effective organization. Yet, it has organizational imperfections. It is caught in a scissors of an aging staff and an inability to recruit young, new blood in the Slavic areas. The non-Russian nationalities are allotted perhaps an unfair disproportion of the organization's resources, though the situation appears to be improving. It also appears that RL's Board of Trustees has failed in its organizational responsibilities by playing a passive role. If RL is to continue, particularly under proposals now being discussed, the Board will have to be strengthened and its role as an active participant more sharply defined.

The reality of RL conflicts with its popular image: it is neither a "Cold War operation" nor is its staff "a group of cold warriors" in the sense that the terms were used in the 1950's. On the contrary, as a matter of policy RL accepts all Soviet institutions, though not its ideology, and seeks to bring about peaceful democratic change from within. Nor does RL slander the Soviet Union, its people or its leaders. To do so would be to defeat its main purpose as a "Home Service" broadcaster.

In brief, RL acts as a responsible instrumentality of the United States Government and operates within a larger and generally acceptable consensus of American national interests.

## CHAPTER I: BASIC INFORMATION ON RADIO LIBERTY (RL)

(NOTE.—Figures referred to are not printed in the Record.)

[Footnotes at end of each chapter]

## I. INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE STUDY, FRAME OF REFERENCE, AND SOURCES

## A. Purpose of study

## 1. RL's Isolation From American Environment

The operations of Radio Liberty (RL) have remained almost completely unpublicized since its inception nearly two decades ago. Except for specialists in Soviet affairs who use RL's research products and often participate as consultants on program evaluation panels and in conferences on specialized subjects for programming, few people in the United States outside the government have been aware of RL's existence.

Thus, the American people have not been familiar with the operations of RL. Nor has the Congress. Owing to indirect financing within the Executive Branch, it did not have normal opportunities to pass on appropriate

tions. As Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said, "at no time was Congress asked to or permitted to carry out its traditional Constitutional role of approving the expenditure."<sup>1</sup>

That so little has been known about RL in the United States stems largely from three factors. In the first place, RL has been isolated physically from the American environment. As a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people located in West Germany, it has been geared to satisfy the listening requirements of its Soviet audience. Since RL's broadcasts were not directed at an audience in the United States, the latter knew little about it. Secondly, RL was protected from the public limelight by avoiding the normal Congressional procedures for funding. And finally, RL had long ago purposely adopted a low profile in matters of public exposure and only recently decided to meet public criticism openly.

## 2. Purpose of Study: Examine History, Organization, Administration and Operations

The purpose of this study is to examine the history, organization, administration, and operations of Radio Liberty. It does not examine the various alternatives for possible administration of RL in the future as these have been proposed in the Congress and the Executive Branch or which might otherwise be considered. Nor does it analyze what kind of role, if any, RL might fulfill in the broadcast context of American foreign policy. These are being examined in separate reports to be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the future.

By illuminating in a factual way the history and present organization, purposes, and operations of RL, it is hoped that this study will assist in an evaluation of its activities in the context of United States foreign policy and how it relates to currently declared purposes of that policy. It is also hoped that an in-depth research effort on this organization will assist a broader understanding of its purposes and functions; that it will close possible informational gaps and dispel misconceptions; and that it will provide useful data for those concerned with assessing its purposes and impact.

### B. Frame of reference

#### 1. Basic Approach

The frame of reference for this study had to be designed in such a way so that a single researcher could find out maximum information on RL within a minimum period of time. With economy of time and efficiency of research method in mind, the basic approach, therefore, was to take a broad overview of RL's organizational structure, its staffing, its research facilities, and its operations in Munich; to analyze RL's operating policies and the processes of policy formation; to examine procedures for policy execution and policy maintenance in programming and production; to observe actual operations in policy-making, programming, and broadcasting; and to evaluate overall audience impact and effectiveness. The time-frame for the study is the period 1970-71, except for the case study of RL policy execution and broadcasting behavior during the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis.

#### 2. Sources

In pursuing this research task, it was necessary to rely heavily on documentation furnished by RL. Published sources on RL are virtually non-existent. No books have ever been written on its operations, and the few articles in the periodical literature are by and large flavored with excessive praise on one side or equally excessive criticism on the other. Except for recent Congressional hearings and reports, information for this study has necessarily had to come from RL itself. Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, President of the Radio Liberty Committee, Mr. W. K. Scott, Executive Director of RL's operations

in Munich, West Germany, and their staff have been very cooperative in providing not only requested material but also in responding to requests that they exercise their judgment in providing additional relevant documentation.<sup>2</sup>

Only in the area of audience research was there any reticence manifested on the part of RL staff. The documentary material in audience research is based on direct person-to-person interviews, which discloses the names and professions of persons still living in the Soviet Union. Many of these interviewees are highly placed scientists and scholars within the Soviet academic community; others are university students; still others are ordinary Soviet citizens. Audience research staff was especially concerned that these persons might be endangered by an inadvertent revelation of their names in a public document. Even with this understandable restriction sufficient material was made available for the purposes of this study.

This documentation was illuminating and vital for this study; it revealed the inner workings of RL, its basic policies and policy procedures; it contained actual scripts (and some tapes) in the original languages and in translation; it contained also examples of reports on research activities, broadcasting, and policy maintenance, and, among other things, materials on audience research. All of this documentation was examined; much of it was actually used in the preparation of this study; some has been inserted in the appendix.

Original documentation was supplemented by a field trip to both RL's New York headquarters (2 days) and Munich headquarters (2 weeks) for a first-hand view of operations, at which time further valuable information was gathered from interviews with top executives, leading administrators, and key staff personnel. These interviews were both extensive and intensive, and the voluminous notes that resulted have been integrated into this study.

In providing documentation and in the interviews, RL staff from the President in New York and the Executive Director in Munich to lower echelon personnel was extremely cooperative and most generous.

#### 3. Certain Assumptions

In this research effort certain assumptions had to be made. The first is that the documentation represents an authentic basis upon which to judge RL. On the other hand, no documentation of any extent was available from any other source.

The second assumption is that the best way to determine RL's performance as a surrogate "Home Service" broadcaster to the Soviet Union and to determine whether or not this performance falls within the larger limits of American foreign policy interests was through a study of RL's policy, that is, a study of organizational policy, policy formation, policy procedures, and policy control.

The third assumption is that RL personnel who provided documentation and interviews upon which this study is based (and could only be based) attempted to give a reasonably objective and fair-minded appraisal of their organization, its policies, its operations, its effectiveness. A pledge of full cooperation was given by President Sargeant to Dr. L. Quincy Mumford, the Librarian of Congress in his letter of July 26, 1971, on the occasion of the public announcement of the Senate requested study. There is no evidence that full cooperation was not given.

#### 4. Selectivity of Research Materials

By necessity, some of the research materials for this study had to be selective: the criterion was qualitative, not quantitative. Thus, randomly selected translated scripts, policy guidances, pre-broadcast and post-broadcast review auditions, and audience research reports were used and some repro-

duced as illustrative examples of procedures and performance.

Review of hundreds of thousands of hours of RL's multi-lingual broadcasting (assuming it were physically possible) might conceivably reveal certain discrepancies that were missed in editing, pre-broadcast reviews and spotchecks; but, given the strictly enforced policy requirements in programming and broadcasting and the policy orientation of its staff, the margin of error would, in all probability, be slight.

This is a commonsense judgment that cannot be proved with absolute certainty. Nevertheless, the qualitative random selection of some materials is a rational approach, and the analysis of those materials within the context of RL's policies creates a reasonable basis for measuring performance. Again, what makes this approach possible is RL's strict policy structure.<sup>3</sup>

### II. CONCEPTION OF RL

#### A. In the Beginning: "Liberation"

##### 1. Founding of American Committee

What is now called Radio Liberty was formally conceived, at least organizationally, in the State of Delaware on January 18, 1951, with the incorporation of the "American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the USSR, Inc." This organization was a forerunner of the present Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. One of the purposes of this committee was to sponsor shortwave broadcasts to the Soviet Union by former Soviet citizens living in the West. But, two years were to pass before actual broadcasts to the Soviet Union were initiated.<sup>4</sup>

An anti-Communist organization called the "Coordinating Center of the Anti-Bolshevik Struggle" was apparently the seminal force in early broadcast planning. The ideological coloration of the entire organization and its operation was "liberation." In November 1952, a draft policy statement was issued, declaring that the organ of the Coordinating Center charged with radio matters would have "overall responsibility for setting the political and propaganda line of the Radio Station." The only limitation imposed on the broadcasts of the Coordinating Center was insistence on broad adherence to a "Joint Agreement on Principles" adopted by the Coordinating Center and the American Committee.

But this agreement was hardly restrictive. In fact, the permissible limits of political action appear in retrospect to have been very broadly drawn. The basic political line of the radio was to be identical with the political platform of the Coordinating Center, namely: "Implacable struggle against the Communist dictatorship until its complete destruction. . . ." According to this declaration of principles, the "radio's main theme will be liberation—liberation from the tyranny of Bolshevism and one party rule, from poverty and suffering forced upon the people by the Bolshevik regime, and from the threat of war imposed by Bolshevik foreign policy and ideology. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

##### 2. RL's Political Line: "Liberation"

Broadcasts of "Radio Liberation from Bolshevism" began on March 1, 1953, just 5 days before Stalin's death. The name was changed to simply Radio Liberation in October 1956, and to Radio Liberty in December 1963.

A small-scale operation, it had in the beginning only two antennas and two 10,000-watt transmitters located in Lanpertheim, West Germany. By this time the Coordinating Center had collapsed from internal stresses. Hopes of reviving it, however, persisted. Nonetheless, the commitment of the radio to the principles of the now defunct "Joint Agreement," that is to say, "liberation," was implicit in the initial broadcasts. The same general line of "implacable struggle against Communist dictatorship until its

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complete destruction" was perpetuated in Radio Liberation Basic Guidance #1 of December 10, 1953 and Radio Liberation Basic Guidance #2 of January 8, 1954.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. "Liberation": Reflected Theme of American Foreign Policy

In an article appearing in *The New Leader* on October 6, 1958—an article sympathetic with the purposes of RL, Enno Hobbing of *Life Magazine* referred to RL as a "cold war operation." Mr. Hobbing did not use this term in a pejorative sense, for this was RL's *raison d'être*: it was a "cold war operation," conceived amid dangerously escalating East-West tensions and "christened," one scholar put it, "Liberation."<sup>7</sup> This term seemed quite appropriate at that time since it reflected the foreign policy coloration of the first years of the Eisenhower Administration.<sup>8</sup>

For over five years after World War II it seemed to the West that Soviet Russia had been committed to a policy of political and even military aggression. Its foreign policy, in Western eyes, admitted no genuine accommodation of interests. Stalin's policy seemed to conform completely to the ideological principle of unremitting conflict with world capitalism. Thrust had to be met with counter-thrust, it was believed in the West. The Communist invasion of South Korea in June, 1950 was universally regarded among the Western powers as the most serious manifestation of Moscow's outward thrust since it directly challenged the world position of the United States and its Western allies. This threat to vital interests and the response to it inevitably quickened the pace of the Cold War, raising the level of East-West tension to new and dangerous heights.

This was the climate within which RL was conceived. It was a creation of the Cold War, designed to satisfy U.S. foreign policy requirements of that time. RL was one of the many weapons of psychological warfare intended to meet Soviet Russia and its Communist allies on their terms.

### B. From "Liberation" to "Liberalization"

#### 1. The Changing Soviet Reality

In the first year and a half after its inception, RL remained committed to the basic policy of "implacable struggle against the Communist dictatorship until its complete destruction." But Stalin had died and in the next three years powerful forces of change were unleashed within the Soviet Union that were in the course of time to transform the Soviet state and society from its Stalinist form to one of modified Soviet totalitarianism. "Peaceful coexistence," defined to suit Soviet ideological needs but differently understood in the West, was the all-embracing term used by the leadership that seemed best to describe what was to take place in the next few years.

On the international scene tensions were momentarily eased as the Soviet Union advocated something of a peaceful respite in world tensions: the Korean war was brought to an end; the Stalinist policy of continentalism was replaced by a broader and more politically oriented commitment to globalism; an era of negotiation was launched with the West in which a measure of success was to be achieved.

Internally, winds of change were admitted to the Soviet Union as the post-Stalinist leadership under Khrushchev attempted to replace Stalinism and ease internal tensions by reconciling the political system of Soviet totalitarianism with the human needs of a much deprived Soviet people.

#### 2. RL Adjusts to Changing Soviet Reality;

RL adjusted to these changes within the Soviet Union. The basic policy of "implacable struggle" and "liberation" came to be increasingly questioned on practical grounds. As early as September 1, 1954, Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, President of the American Committee, circulated a confiden-

tial memorandum to his executive staff defining the overall purposes of the Committee in more moderate terms. Such positive concepts as these were cited in the "Operating Objectives" of the memorandum: "Encourage reliance on traditional indigenous spiritual concepts; stimulate independent thinking and a spirit of free inquiry; present specific democratic political, economic, and social processes as an attainable and attractive alternative to the communist dictatorship; develop basic concepts of justice and human rights for the protection of the individual against the power of the State; present realistic and practical alternatives to passive submission to the Soviet system."<sup>9</sup>

RL's policy was further moderated with the publication of its first Policy Manual on June 29, 1956. The goal of "implacable struggle" was reiterated, but no longer was there insistence on the "complete destruction" of the Communist dictatorship. Increasingly the direction of RL's policy was toward presenting a democratic alternative for internal progress by stimulating independent political thought among the Soviet people.<sup>10</sup>

Restraint and moderation in policy were apparently reflected in RL's programming during the critical months of 1956. For RL was not subjected to the controversy that surrounded RFE after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. (RFE had been charged with unnecessarily raising the hopes of Western intervention in the revolution.)<sup>11</sup> In fact, during these years RL had been criticized for broadcasting material far too bland and moderate in political content.<sup>12</sup>

By 1958, the pace of de-Stalinization and other changes in Soviet society had made it necessary to revise RL's basic Policy Manual. The new document, issued on November 15, of that year, made it clear that evolution, not revolution, was the main direction of political change within the Soviet Union. The new Policy Manual placed special emphasis on the need for adjusting to the changing Soviet reality. The principle of freely elected government as a means for political transformation in the Soviet Union was asserted. Such change was to be achieved "through the will and endeavors of the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves."<sup>13</sup>

According to the Manual, RL would neither directly nor indirectly attempt to urge any particular political platform or promote directly any line of action. RL would make it clear that the democratic West did not seek to impose any particular form of government on the Soviet peoples. Moderation and restraint were restated as principles to be followed in broadcasting.<sup>14</sup>

What seemed most significant in this new Policy Manual was a commitment to a policy of peaceful liberalization of Soviet society. Moreover, it seemed clear by the implications of this Policy Manual that RL was seeking to complement its basic image as a station of former Soviet citizens with the highest standards of professional journalistic objectivity.<sup>14</sup>

Not until May 1965 did RL issue another Policy Manual. Issued as a guideline for radio programming in the post-Khrushchev period, the new Manual was even more explicit than its predecessor in stressing the principle of evolutionary change. As a "free voice of former Soviet citizens," RL attempted "to express, encourage, and develop tendencies within the Soviet Union that can contribute to the fulfillment of the best aspirations and needs of all the peoples of the USSR." RL was dedicated, it said, "to helping all citizens of the USSR achieve freedom and responsible government. . . ." RL defined its role as seeking "to stimulate individual thinking, not to incite group action." Friendliness of tone was given particular emphasis in the 1965 Policy Manual, and programmers were encouraged to think of RL

as a "guest" in the home of each individual listener.<sup>15</sup>

RL's policy underwent another transformation with the publication of a new Policy Manual in March 1971. The commitment to evolutionary liberalization was further deepened and guidelines for encouraging those positive forces of change within Soviet society were spelled out. This Policy Manual, setting forth the aims, principles and policies of RL, will be discussed in Chapter II of the study.

### 3. Significance of RL's policy change

Two points seem most significant about the changes in RL's basic policy from "Liberation" to "Liberalization." One is the fact that this change has been recognized by officials in the United States Government and by the Soviets themselves.

In 1971 Senate hearings, Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.) asked about the policy orientation of RFE/RL. "Has their policy orientation changed over the years? Has it, shall I say, mellowed? What is their objective?" he asked.

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand replied: "I think one can say looking over the broadcasts over the years, that there has been a gradual shift away from the intensity of the confrontation which existed during the height of the cold war period to a more, let us say, equitable facing of the news on a day-to-day basis. This we anticipate would continue on into the future." "I would anticipate that the dissemination of accurate information about conditions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere," he added, would continue to be the primary function of the radios in the future."<sup>16</sup>

The Soviets have also admitted a basic change in the policies and approach of both radios. Speaking generally of the changing character of all American radio broadcasting to the Soviet bloc, Artem R. Panflov observed in his book entitled, "U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare":

"In practice, propaganda for the overthrow of the 'Communist regime' has almost disappeared from all American broadcasts to the socialist countries of Europe. Even 'Radio Free Europe' no longer broadcasts such propaganda, or in any event restricts itself to sentences which allege that 'in your country Communism is an experiment condemned to failure.' The tone of the radio broadcasts has changed significantly: the crude insinuations and profanities have disappeared. Direct interference in the internal affairs of one country or another in the form of all sorts of advice to radio listeners has almost ceased, and undercover propaganda has left the scene."<sup>17</sup>

The other significant point in the changes in RL's style, policies and general approach from "Liberation" to "Liberalization" is the character of the Policy Manual itself. This will be discussed in more detail below; but suffice it to say that the Policy Manual is not a static document but rather a "living" document which in the form of supplementary guidances is updated and thus undergoes continuing changes as Policy Planning Staff contemplate future developments in the Soviet Union. The Policy Manual seeks therefore a continuing adjustment of policy and operations to the ever-changing Soviet reality. But it should be remembered that this manual is based on RL assumptions and reflects its own perception of the Soviet Union.

### III. PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

#### A. Administrative Headquarters in New York

When RL began broadcasting in March 1953, it did so with only modest facilities and limited power output. However, in the next 18 years its resources for broadcasting and research have multiplied many fold. Administrative headquarters for RL are in New York City at 30 East 42nd Street, Mr. How-

land H. Sargeant, a former Under Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, is president. (See Appendix I for biographic sketch). Represented on the Board of Trustees are leaders in the American business community, former government officials and military leaders, educators and publicists.<sup>19</sup>

Former President Harry S. Truman is an Honorary Chairman. Former Presidents Herbert H. Hoover and Dwight D. Eisenhower had served in a similar capacity before their deaths in 1964 and 1969 respectively. By its charter the Board of Trustees has considerable power, but over the years it has played a passive role towards its responsibilities. Consequently, by default the President, formally the leading executive, has assured a far more predominant position within the organization than what seems to have been initially intended.

In this respect RL's Board of Trustees has failed in its responsibilities to the organization. In contrast to RFE's Board of Directors which has actively participated in the affairs of the Radio, RL's Board of Trustees has played a very passive role, seeming to defer to the President. Apparently, the strength of Mr. Sargeant as an administrator has compensated for any organizational deficiencies that might have resulted.

The chart reproduced on the adjoining page (see Figure 1) describes the overall organizational structure of RL. Staff of Radio Liberty Committee are located in New York. These include the Office of the President, Information Division, Comptroller and Administration, The Audience Research Division and Program Evaluation in Paris and Munich, along with the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, respond directly to the President. Their functions will be described in other parts of this study. The operations of the U.S. Division and those of Munich (which constitute the heart of RL's activities) fall within the administrative purview of the Executive Director located in Munich.

#### B. RL's Operations in Munich

In addition to its New York headquarters, RL maintains administrative offices, broadcast headquarters and research facilities in Munich, Germany. Offices, studios and other facilities are located in Barcelona, Lampertheim (Germany), London, Madrid, Paris, Play del Pals (Spain), and Taipei.<sup>10</sup> All of these facilities together with the U.S. Division come under the administrative direction of RL's Executive Director in Munich.

RL's Munich headquarters is located at Arabellastrasse 18, on the fringe of the old city of Munich and in the area of extensive new construction of modern buildings. (RL had to abandon its former site to make way for the Olympic grounds.) This is a new building, constructed less than five years ago. RL occupies about one-half of the site. Highly functional and with generally modest interior appointments, it provides ideal facilities for carrying on research and broadcasting operations.

The chart produced on the adjoining page (see Figure 2) describes the major subdivisions of RL's operations in Munich. Mr. Walter K. Scott, a former State Department official, is Executive Director of RL's Munich headquarters. His deputy is Francis S. Ronalds, formerly of USIA and a RL staffer of some years ago. (See Appendix 1 for biographic sketches.) In their hands rests overall executive authority and responsibility in Munich.

Operations at Munich are broken down into four major subdivisions: the Program Policy Division; the Network Division; the Administrative Division; and the Program Operations Division. All four divisions are closely interrelated.

The Program Policy Division (PPD) plays a vital role in RL's operation: it is responsible for the formulation of policy and, along

with other components, the oversight of its execution. The extent to which these functions are efficiently carried out determines in large measure the effectiveness of RL's operations. The Research Department operates directly under PPD, the purpose being to integrate as closely as possible research with policy.

The Program Operations Division (POD) is responsible for the production of programs that are to be beamed to the Soviet Union. The Central News Service, drawing from the major wire services in the world and having daily access to RFE's news budget, provides the source of news for the other major subunits within POD, namely the Russian Service and the Nationalities Service.

Since Russians constitute the dominant ethnic group within the USSR and since their language is the lingua franca of the Soviet state, the major thrust of RL's effort in programming is in the Russian Service; it broadcasts 24 hours a day. The Nationalities Service is broken down into subunits representing the various languages, that is, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Belorussian, Georgian, North Caucasian, Tatar-Bashkir, Turkic, and Ukrainian. Over the years its programming effort has been placed at a much lower priority than that of the Russian, even though the non-Russian peoples now constitute nearly one-half the total population.

However, this imbalance is, apparently, now being somewhat corrected. RL's bureau in London, Paris, Taipei, are important sources of news inflow and other forms of programming; they fall operationally under the administrative direction of the Director, POD.

The Production Department within POD has the responsibility for getting the programs on the air. This is both a creative and a technical task; creative in that it is concerned with the style and form of production, that is, the staging, the voicing by performers, and in general the theatrics of a show; and technical in that it actually tapes the programs for later transmission.

Tied closely to the production end of the operation is the Director of the Network Division who has the responsibility of getting the program on the air and transmitted to the Soviet Union. This task is made exceedingly difficult by the Soviet practice of jamming RL broadcasts 24 hours a day.

Finally, the Director of the Administration Division has responsibility for the functioning of the strictly administrative side of RL's operations in Munich.

#### C. U.S. Division

The U.S. Division of RL, though housed in New York headquarters of the Radio Liberty Committee, falls administratively under the direction of the Executive Director in Munich. (See Figure 3.) This seeming organizational anomaly was more or less a creature of necessity and accident.

For safety's sake many RL employees in Munich who were former Soviet citizens wanted to live in the United States, far away from the Communist border which was only some 80 miles to the east. Accommodations were accordingly made to resolve this problem in the form of the U.S. Division.

Moreover, large-scale migration of refugees to New York from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the postwar period had already created in this country a potential source of talent for RL. Accordingly, efforts were made to recruit staff from among them. As early as 1952 scripts were being prepared in New York, and by 1955 a Radio Programming Support Division was being organized in the United States; this was the beginning of the U.S. Division.

In the next decade and a half the U.S. Division developed into a programming operation for Russian and 10 other Soviet languages, utilizing talent available in the United States either on a fulltime or "free

lance" basis. Presently, the U.S. Division complements the Munich operations by producing programming which is planned, researched, written, edited, recorded on tape in the three New York studios, timed, dubbed and shipped by air to Munich in finished form ready to go on the air. However, the Munich headquarters exercises the final word on policy and program structure. By and large the U.S. Division focuses on reporting on the American scene, not from the American point of view but rather from the point of view of former Soviet citizens who are aware of their fellow countrymen's interests.

RL has benefited by the existence of this U.S. Division. It has been able, first of all, to draw upon the multiple talents of former Soviet citizens living in the United States. It has also had the advantage of close proximity to such news producing centers as the United Nations, New York, and Washington. Moreover, it has been able to draw upon talent within the American scholarly community, especially from those who specialize in Soviet affairs. Finally, through the U.S. Division, RL has been in a position to maintain productive connections with the community of former Soviet citizens in the United States and Canada.<sup>20</sup>

#### D. Administrative style of RL

An important aspect of the organization of RL is what might be called administrative style. In brief, the administrative style of RL seems to be one that encourages flexibility and informality, and fosters a type of organizational fluidity that allows the widest permissible, range of individual creativity and initiative, yet within a closely administered and carefully structured system of policy.

This style radiates from the top executive echelon through the lower levels of the organization. Mr. Sargeant observed that he believed in the principle of organizational autonomy. He explained this in terms of, (1) having a staff of experts and professionals of the highest caliber, then (2) laying out effective guidelines of policy for the organization, and (3) allowing the staff to interpret policy and function within a wide range of latitude. This style emanates not only from a personal preference, but also from the practical necessity of administering an essentially news-oriented, deadline-conscious radio operation under conditions of a 6-hour time lag between New York headquarters and Munich.

In Munich, Mr. Scott reflected the same administrative style. He said that RL operates at "the peak of allowable creative freedom" within the context of carefully defined policy, and that he sees this development as a continuing organizational trend. There was, he said, a remarkable degree of agreement within the organization on this larger administrative style; however, he stressed that control was tighter at the closer operating level.

Other members of RL staff voiced similar views; particularly the script writers, regarding autonomy and allowance of individual creativity at the lower working level.

At the strictly operational level, notably in the Production Department, the requirements are essentially technical and thus the exercise of administrative control is by necessity tight. But this is not the case in programming, script writing, research, and in news processing. In the last-named function the concept of administrative autonomy is especially relevant. News processing requires a climate of freedom and less dependency among staff. New emergencies do occur, and an effective functioning of staff requires not only a high sense of journalistic professionalism but also a feeling of self-confidence, independence and self-reliance that is fostered by the concept of administrative autonomy.

This administrative style helps to foster a spirit of intellectual creativity and the exer-



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cise of initiative within fairly wide parameters of policy. For an organization like RL this is perhaps vital if it is to achieve its purposes for, it is not just a radio per se, in the American conception, but rather an institution combining many functions and requiring above all intellectualism, linguistic skill, professional journalism, and a sense of theatrics, all of which can only thrive within a climate of allowable creativity.

On the other hand, administrative flexibility, too widely conceived, can create conditions for mistakes. This is an important qualifier in an organization that is dealing directly with one of the world's superpowers.

#### E. RL's position in executive branch

The specific relations which have existed between RL and the CIA or other agencies in the Executive Branch and the extent of RL's independence on or freedom from direction by the Executive Branch could not be fully explored during this study. Thus, it cannot be said categorically that it is not free-from direction. However, as an outsider viewing RL's current operations through documentation, extensive interviews with staff, and actual on-site visits to facilities, certain aspects of RL's activities are apparent, and it is possible to make some reasonable generalizations.

First of all, RL is clearly a United States Government operation. It is, indeed, an integral part of this Nation's foreign policy apparatus. Secondly, the organization seems to have a wide range of independence from the Executive Branch in its broadcasting operations. This is apparent in its policy structure and policy content. And thirdly, RL's organizational policies, as set forth in the Policy Manual and augmented by periodic guidances, seem to be generated within the organization itself and not necessarily dictated by an outside authority. A careful study of RL's policies in the past few years indicates that they seem to be fairly "commonsense statements" that fall within and observe the larger consensus of American foreign policy. The reader can judge for himself by reviewing the material presented in Chapter II on policy formation and other materials reproduced in the Appendix.

#### IV. STAFFING

##### A. Size of staff

In recent years RL's staff has numbered around 1,000. According to figures published in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on RFE/RL, there were 953 employees in 1970, 932 in 1971 and 967 projected for 1972.<sup>21</sup> According to information provided from the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1971, RL has a total of 1,067 employees. In its T/O, RL numbers its employees at 1,004, but the actual number on board, is 932.

Personnel within RL are allocated in accordance with the Strength Report of June 1971 reproduced as Figure 4.

##### B. National Characteristics of Staff

The unique purposes of RL as a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people require staffing that is multi-national, for if RL is to communicate effectively it must do so in the many languages of the Soviet peoples. The Soviet Union is a multi-national state, having in its population of 241,784,000 ethnic groups numbering more than 170, speaking some 125 different languages and dialects, and practicing 40 different religions that embrace in substantial numbers the major faiths of the world.

Within RL (as within the Soviet Union), Russian is the lingua franca, but broadcasts are made in as many as 20 languages. In the Slavic languages there are broadcasts in Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian. And in the non-Slavic languages there are broadcasts in Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian; in the North Caucasian languages, that is Adige, Avar, Chechen, Karachai, Ossetian, and Tatar-Bashkir; and in the Turkestani

languages, Crimean-Tatar, Karakalpak, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uighur, and Uzbek.<sup>22</sup> Staff requirements are high in matters of linguistic skills, for the broadcaster, speaking as a friend and fellow countryman from abroad, must do so in the language, the accent, and the style of his audience.

FIG. 4.—RADIO LIBERTY COMMITTEE STRENGTH REPORT, JULY 1, 1971

	T/O	Actual
<b>General management:</b>		
Office of the president.....	11	11
Information division.....	7	4
Administration division, N.Y.....	16	15
Comptroller's office.....	11	9
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>RL management:</b>		
Office of executive director.....	17	14
Administration, Munich.....	129	117
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>RL programming:</b>		
Program policy division.....	54	47
Program operations division.....	261	235
U.S. division.....	69	68
London bureau.....	5	5
Paris bureau.....	7	7
Audience research division.....	16	13
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>412</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>RL network:</b>		
New York office.....	12	12
Munich office.....	62	57
Lampartheim Transmitter Station.....	66	65
Pals Transmitter Station.....	194	193
Pa Li Transmitter Station.....	17	16
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>343</b>
<b>Institute:</b>		
Institute division.....	9	9
German corporation.....	41	35
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Grand total.....</b>	<b>1,004</b>	<b>932</b>

\* ARD: 1 London; 3 Paris; 9 Munich.

Thus, the overwhelming majority of RL's programmers are former Soviet citizens. Most of the remainder have common roots and native identity with RL's audience because either they or their parents were born on the territories that now comprise the USSR. Of the 182 writers, editors, producers and broadcasters, 1.1 percent are from the prerevolutionary emigration; 13.2 percent are second generation; 4.4 percent fall in other categories; while 81.3 percent are former Soviet citizens.<sup>23</sup> Newcomers from the Soviet Union do augment RL's staff, infusing it with new blood and providing a fresh Soviet perspective. But their number, especially from among the Slavic peoples of European Russia, is nowhere sufficient to insure stable staff conditions in the future.

Owing to the uniqueness of RL's role in broadcasting, native Soviet peoples by and large hold many of the operational posts in the organization, such as area desks for broadcasting and script writing. However, as an examination of Appendix 1 and Figure 2 will reveal, top administrative posts in RL policymaking, policy control, and in key operations are held by Americans.

##### C. Professionalism of staff

When in the spring of 1971 David Binder of *The New York Times* visited both RL and RFE headquarters in Munich, he found that both organizations "are staffed by specialists who take pride in their professionalism." Analysts like Keith Bush of RL and James Brown of RFE, he continued, "are well regarded among historians and other professional students of Soviet-bloc affairs."<sup>24</sup> Leading Western scholars on Soviet affairs have commented favorably on the high quality of work produced by RL's staff. (For examples of RL's research products, see Appendix 22.)

A review of the biographic sketches in Appendix 1 provides some indication of the professionalism of RL's staff. A total of 19 RL staffers hold doctoral degrees, 41 have other advanced degrees, while many others are currently working for post-graduate degrees.<sup>25</sup> Years of research experience in the Soviet field and experience in the practical world of journalism and network broadcasting have further strengthened RL staff capabilities.

Ideally, an RL staffer must have a combination of expertise: he must have substantive knowledge in Soviet affairs; he must be knowledgeable in communications technique; he must have complete competence in Russian and in the case of other nationalities, their particular languages; he must be trained in the American requirements of scholarly research; he must have, in brief, the combined skills of a scholar, writer, journalist, and radio performer. When any of these requirements are lacking, RL seeks to correct the deficiency through training.

An asset in RL is the multi-functional roles that staff often plays. It is not exceptional that one staffer will do the research for a program, prepare the script for broadcast, produce the program, and finally participate in the actual broadcasting. Every effort is made in the Program Operations Division to have staff deliver their own scripts. As one RL staffer said, RL tries to overcome the "one man for one job approach" and attempts to develop a staff that has multiple-functional capabilities.

To enhance the professionalism of staff, RL maintains an in-house training program. A staffer schooled in the American legitimate theater will work with raw newcomers from the Soviet Union training their voices and preparing them to be effective announcers. The Production Department is constantly engaged in developing and training new talent—persons, for example, who have excellent Russian but have no knowledge of radio techniques. The Central News Department trains personnel from the inside. "Where do you find a Russian journalist?" one staffer said. In some instances RL will finance further study for personnel, as in the case of a young, talented Soviet seaman who had defected and is now studying at the University of Glasgow under a special arrangement with RL.<sup>26</sup>

##### D. Continuity and change in staff

In-house training for RL is a necessity. For RL faces the difficult problem of adequate staffing in an enterprise where the inflow of new personnel is extraordinarily limited. Being a "Home Service" for the Soviet Union imposes, among other things, special linguistic requirements that are filled only by newcomers from the Soviet Union. (Nothing will "turn off a Soviet listener quicker," said one staffer, "than a broadcaster speaking heavily accented and poorly articulated Russian.") But in recent years such newcomers have been few. More often than not RL cannot compete with offers coming from other quarters, such as the universities and government services. However, Turkey has offered some opportunities for recruiting for Soviet Central Asians, some going there directly from the Soviet Union, others being first and second generation Tatars, Kazakhs or other nationalities.

Personnel replacement is thus a potentially serious problem facing RL; for, it is caught in a scissors of an aging staff and difficulties in recruitment. The reservoir of former Soviet citizens that was once available in Germany and upon whose skills RL was constructed is no longer available. And those staffers who have been with RL since its beginning are approaching (and some have passed) retirement age. Efforts are made to continue staff, normally reaching retirement, in a status of "extended" service. Presently, there are 17 Russians, two Ukrainians and one Georgian (in the category of "prime language") that are in that status. Under the



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normal patterns of anticipated retirement, there will be a total of 82 by 1976, 47 of whom fall within the Russian category.<sup>27</sup>

Though the average age of RL's staff is lower than RFE's average of 45, still RL cannot escape the reality of staff attrition by retirement and difficulties in recruiting.<sup>28</sup> The age factor would seem to be important both in terms of organizational efficiency and continuity, and in dealing with the universal problem of the generation gap. Effective communication between the Soviet people and former Soviet citizens is not only a matter of linguistic facility but also one of speaking the language of the generation that will be the dominant force in Soviet Russia's future.

#### E. Organization commitment and general attitude

A final point to be made in the matter of staff concerns the rather intangible, yet important, idea of organizational commitment and general attitude towards the goals and purposes of RL.

The positive assessment of David Binder on the sense of professionalism pervading RL's staff appears justified. Adherence to the general rubrics of scholarly research and writings are reflected not only in published works and in other research efforts but also in staff papers and memoranda intended for strictly internal use. (This was not the case, however, in RL's public presentation to Congress in 1971 which had more the flavor of a public relations effort than a serious attempt at scholarship.) Even to the casual observer the care taken in policy formulation, programming, production, policy control, and program evaluation indicates a high sense of professional concern. The multilingual facility of staff reveals, moreover, a level of linguistic professionalism that is impressive to the outsider.

Evident also in RL's staff, especially in research, is the unique combination of American and Western scholarship with that of the native talents of former Soviet citizens who are deeply immersed in their own native Soviet environment both through the written word and their own experience. In the view of one senior American analyst in RL this combination has resulted in a good research product; while to a senior commentator, a Russian by birth, the combination provided the possibility in broadcasting of bridging the gap of misunderstanding between the Soviet peoples and those of the West and imparting the values and traditions of the West into the Soviet environment.

What seems most significant, however, is the apparent spirit of the organization. It is a spirit that seems to arise from an inner conviction of participating in some form of positive change within the Soviet Union. One senior programming official, Morris Diakowski, an American of Ukrainian-Canadian extraction, described the feeling of staff as one of being caught up in an important activity and being deeply involved individually as an active participant. "An attitude of total commitment in what is being done exists within the organization," he said—"not in an extreme sense, but rather in the sense of doing something positive by participating in bringing about changes for moderation in the Soviet Union." The accent, he said, is on the positive in this work, and the prevailing spirit is one of idealistic expectation of a hopefully better world. "If not," he declared, "one would be lost as an individual"; for, "without an inner belief in the regenerative qualities of Soviet society, one would lose his mental balance."

#### F. Connections with western scholarly community

The professionalism of RL's staff is given further support by the practice of seeking advice from outside specialists in such matters as programming, policy, and program evaluation. Outside specialists even participate in actual broadcasting. RL's formal

statement put it this way: "... the advice—and creative contribution—of the outside academic specialists in Soviet affairs and communications have played a major part" in RL's work.<sup>29</sup>

Perhaps, one of the most recent illustrations of this practice was the panel broadcast discussion held in London, England on April 28, 1971. Participants on this panel were some of the Western world's leading Soviet specialists, namely: Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway of the London School of Economics; Max Hayward, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University; Rev. Michael Bourdeaux, Director, Center for the Study of Religion and Communism; David Floyd, Soviet specialist for the *London Daily Telegraph*; Martin Dewhurst, Faculty of Slavonic Studies at Glasgow University; Leo Labeledz, editor of *Survey*, one of the leading scholarly journals in the West on Soviet bloc affairs; and Abe Brumberg, long-time editor of *Problems of Communism*, the publication of USIA. Edward Van Der Rhoer, Policy Director of RL, and Albert Bolter, head of RL's Research Department, were the only representatives of RL on the panel.

The discussion centered on the practical matter of RL's policy on the use of samizdat (that is, self-publishing of material not authorized by the Soviet regime) in its broadcasting. The printed text of this stimulating and authoritative discussion amounted to approximately 30,000 words, that is to say, a small book.

An example of the type of subject matter discussed for future RL policy formulation was the suggestion of Prof. Schapiro to use samizdat material relating to civil rights in the Soviet Union. Prof. Schapiro, a trained lawyer and one of England's leading Soviet specialists who is widely known in the United States and throughout the West, discounted appeals on the international level, but urged the use of material that would be of practical use to the Soviet citizen. He cited the "remarkable" Yesenin-Volpin document which told what to do when being interrogated by Soviet authorities, and urged: "There is a thing to broadcast again and again. It is wonderful, practical information. This tells what you legally can do and what you cannot do."<sup>30</sup>

This panel discussion provided the basis for the adoption of future policy on the use of samizdat.

### V. BROADCASTING AND RESEARCH FACILITIES

#### A. Broadcasting Facilities

##### 1. Power and Transmitter Locations

In the beginning RL had only one transmitter station; it was located at Lampertheim, Germany, and had a very low power output (10,000 watts).<sup>31</sup> But the Soviets initiated around-the-clock jamming of RL, RL's signal was, therefore, able to penetrate Soviet sky-wave jamming only at times when ionospheric conditions were favorable. Such conditions occurred in the transition hours during the morning and evening twilight—the condition was called "twilight immunity." (This phenomenon will be discussed in detail in Chapter VI.) RL's technical effectiveness was reduced in this period because it had lower power and because the Soviets augmented their jamming activities during RL during twilight. To increase its effectiveness, RL began to increase its power. The Lampertheim station was improved by adding modern 50,000 watt transmitters and by redesigning and rebuilding its complement of antennas.

Presently, RL has two other transmitter bases besides the Lampertheim complex: one at Pals, Spain, and one on Taiwan. The most significant increase in power was accomplished at the Costa Brava station in Spain. Five modern and extremely efficient 250,000 watt and one 100,000 watt transmitters were installed during the years 1959-1964. Four groups of high gain antenna curtains were designed, engineered and constructed during the same period in order to carry the total

transmitting power of 1,350,000 watts to the Soviet audience. Four of the large transmitters have been combined to provide two signals of 500,000 watts each or one signal 1,000,000 watts strong.

In addition, the Pals transmitter has the advantage of "over-the-water reflection." With the antennas located directly on the beach, the Mediterranean Sea provides the nearly perfect flat reflecting surface so important in overcoming jamming through sky-wave shortwave transmissions. The geographical placement of the Pals site also allows maximum benefit from the phenomenon of twilight immunity. Thus, RL's megawatt transmitter is believed to be the most powerful shortwave radio transmitter in international broadcasting: it can deliver a signal, effective in the presence of jamming, to most areas in European USSR from its Western borders to the Urals and from the Baltic to the Black Seas. (For commentary on the range of coverage, and estimated population in the areas covered, see Chapter III, pp. 122-123.)

RL's transmitter station on Taiwan was made more efficient in two ways: first, by modernizing and strengthening its technical plant, and, secondly, by relocating it in an area free from obstruction and providing over-the-water reflection for its signals. Broadcasts emanating from RL's Taiwan station go out over three 50,000 watt transmitters and are directed to the Soviet Far East.

The maps reproduced in Figure 5-8 show the coverage contours of RL's main transmitters.

The main studio facilities for RL are located in Munich, Germany. The studio and master control complex (8 studios in all) are among the most modern in the shortwave field. The master control function is responsible for feeding program material in 17 languages to the Pals and Lampertheim transmitter sites on an around-the-clock basis. In addition to this coverage, it reproduces these program materials for repeat transmissions and for further dissemination to the Taipei station, as well as for distribution to area experts for analysis and criticism. Live newscasts are transmitted to Taipei via satellite; tapes of programs are flown to Taipei in sufficient time to meet programming deadlines. RL also maintains bureaus with studios in New York, Paris, London, and Taipei. The use of tape enables the Munich headquarters to maintain policy and quality control, along with program coordination.

##### 2. Frequency Allocation and Transmitter Licensing

RL has an average of 33 internationally approved frequencies used in the 75, 49, 41, 31, 30, 25, 19 and 16 meter bands. As a member of the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva, it is assigned its broadcasting frequencies on a seasonal basis. To avoid inadvertent interference or duplication of broadcasting frequencies, RL participates in regularly scheduled international conferences designed to coordinate the various broadcasting schedules.<sup>32</sup>

RL operates in Germany, Spain and Taiwan under a franchise issued by the host governments. This franchise is, in fact, a license to operate certain facilities and to conduct certain broadcasting operations. The franchise contains conditions relating to the material to be broadcast. Spain, for example, requires summaries of broadcast materials on specified subjects.

But the franchise becomes extremely specific when dealing with the technical operations. Jurisdiction over the operations of the technical facilities is established by the telecommunications authority of the host government. This authority is concerned with such matters as power and frequency assignment and technical performance of the facilities. Do they, for example, conform to good engineering practice, that is, harmonics? RL is obliged to file its frequency re-

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quirements for broadcasting through the appropriate telecommunications authority in the host country for notification to the ITU.

What is important about this arrangement is that the frequencies are registered with the ITU in the name of the country filing the notification, that is, the host country. This action neither confers nor implies any vested rights to the individual franchised user of that frequency but only priority rights granted by the country of notification, that is, the host country.<sup>32</sup> Dependency of RL on the host country for its license to transmit is, therefore, great, and as RL's network chief George Herrick said in commenting on the precarious nature of licensing and frequency allocation, "the loss of frequency and license is an irreversible loss; it can't be negotiated as an economic matter; the right to operate and the right to frequencies can't be bought." The matter of licensing became a serious question for RL in the spring of 1971 when its license to transmit in Germany came up for renewal. The Soviet bloc exerted great pressure on the West German Government not to renew the license, but the West Germans resisted, and RL was given a new lease on life in Munich and Lampertheim.

### B. Research facilities

#### 1. Overview of Resources

RL's broadcasting operations are supported by a research effort that is impressive both in quality and in quantity. To keep abreast of internal developments in the Soviet Union and to know what gaps to fill in their programming, RL researchers, programmers and other staff read and process more than 250 Soviet newspapers and journals in addition to an equal number from the West. The annotated bibliographic notes prepared on the basis of this press screening have furnished vast and unique archives containing more than one million separate items of information.

In addition to this, RL monitors listen to, tape, and partially or fully reproduce the texts of from 80 to 120 hours of Soviet broadcasting a day, including the gist of the columns which Soviet citizens are reading in their daily newspapers.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, RL libraries in New York and Munich provide extensive coverage of recent periods of Soviet history and up-to-date information on current Soviet affairs. The library collection in New York consists of 14,000 books, subscriptions to 200 Western and 220 Soviet periodicals and dailies, 2,500 microfilms, and extensive files of archival material as well as a record and tape library. In Munich, researchers and programmers have available a library collection of 65,000 books, subscriptions to 291 Soviet periodicals, including 59 newspapers and 232 magazines and scholarly journals. The library also contains documents, reports, pamphlets and microfilms. Published materials are supplemented by a large archive of in-house mimeographed research materials dating back to 1951.<sup>35</sup>

Presently, RL has under consideration the problem of maintaining a vast samizdat collection which increases with each passing week. Scholars regard RL as the largest archive for this valuable raw research material.<sup>36</sup> In collecting samizdat, and in reproducing an extra copy for broadcasters, RL has found itself performing a major service to a small circle of Western specialists; but now it is faced with the problem of whether a similar service should be performed for a larger outside circle.<sup>37</sup> Recently a decision was reached on releasing samizdat, and the mechanism for making it available to the scholarly world is now being explored. Negotiations are underway to have duplicate copies of the material deposited in the Library of Congress so that scholars will have ready access to this rich bank of research material.

#### 2. Research Resources at RL's Munich Headquarters

Both New York and Munich maintain separate research facilities to support their own individual programming operations. The main research effort is, however, in Munich. There, the division of labor and allocation of research resources seem to be structured generally to suit the particular needs of the organization as it has taken shape over the years. Dispersion, therefore, characterizes the informational side of RL's operations.

Formally, the primary research base within RL is the Research Department. Efforts have been made to integrate policy and research so that policy can have the assurance and support of solid underpinnings of data and analysis. Thus, the Research Department falls administratively within the responsibility of the Director of the Program Policy Division. The Research Department also acts as an informational conduit for programmers through which up-to-date information is channeled. In brief, the Research Department seeks to establish an inter-relationship with both policy and programming.

In large measure it is one of the principal support units of RL's broadcasting operations. Research staff maintain individual sources of information. A remarkable bank of data on the Soviet Union called "the Red Archives" is at their disposal. Since the Research Department has become the primary depository in RL for the processing of samizdat and feeding it into programming, researchers have this wealth of new material to enrich their research product.

The library acts as a broad base archival support for RL's operations. In addition to the general services that a library renders to a research organization, library staff provides RL researchers and programmers with bibliographic information on such matter as new acquisitions and on projected subjects for broadcasting set forth in the Monthly Guidance. Library staff also maintain a close "inter-library loan" relationship with the Bavarian State Library in Munich where they can draw on its highly commended "East European Collection."

Programmers also have their own independent sources of information, in addition to what is available in the Research Department. This is especially the case with the Nationalities Service. Owing to their specialized interest in the non-Russian Soviet nationalities and to the heavy emphasis on strictly Russian materials in RL's research resources, staff of the Nationalities Service have had to develop their own sources of information. In fact, the programmers in both the Russian and Nationalities Services, specialists themselves in their own fields, have acquired a finger-tip sensitivity to developing events and thus often rely upon their own resources rather than the lengthy, scholarly-oriented studies from the Research Department, sometimes too indigestible to suit their immediate needs. The programming effort is essentially a journalistic operation; it is "history in a hurry", as one senior staffer said; it is an "integrating process" of past knowledge with unfolding contemporary history in which speed is vital. Hence, the need for this special source of information within immediate reach and in a readily useable form.

Other sources of data are available in the Information Center and Music Library which are administratively under the Program Operations Division. The Information Center maintains ready-reference material such as reviews and periodical literature, along with a 10-day deposit of RFE daily news budgets. The Music Library maintains an extensive record and tape collection.

Thus, RL has substantial resources of information and research data available for staff; but it is widely dispersed throughout the organization. This development seems to

have been dictated by the special requirements of the various departments in research and programming. As a result, the library seems to have taken on the form of an archival center rather than that of a nerve center for a research organization, at least in the American sense. Whether or not dispersal or centralization of research resources into a central library is the most effective and efficient mechanism of organizing RL's informational data may well be a question for future consideration.

#### 3. The Institute for the Study of the USSR

The Institute for the Study of the USSR was, until recently,<sup>38</sup> another support service available for RL staff in research and programming. The Institute was an entirely separate operation from RL's broadcasting functions, and administratively it was responsible directly to the President of the RL Committee. However, the Institute was located in Munich, and its research resources were available to RL.

The Institute's library of 75,000 volumes constituted one of the richest specialized collections on the Soviet Union in Europe. It concentrated on the acquisition of Soviet materials, particularly current periodicals and newspapers. It also contained a large number of books and periodicals not now available. Such basic research materials as the complete sets of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* since 1917 were available on microfilm. In addition, the Institute maintained an extensive biographic file of more than 130,000 leading Soviet personalities. One of its many publications was the standard reference work, "Who's Who in the USSR."<sup>39</sup>

The main effort of the Institute was in the realm of publications, notably of periodical literature which focused mainly on Soviet interest in the underdeveloped areas of the world. However, the Institute also published books based on conferences and symposia in which leading Soviet specialists in the West participated. A recent book in this series is, "The Military-Technical Revolution", published by Praeger, edited by John Erickson, and containing chapters on Soviet defense matters by leading specialists in the West. In addition, the Institute sponsored a 6-week Soviet Area and Russian Language Summer School conducted by the University of Oklahoma.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, the Institute served various purposes for RL staff: it provided library materials that supplemented collections in their own library, it brought together specialists on Soviet affairs in conferences and symposia, thus enabling RL staff through consultations and informal associations to gain other perspectives on the Soviet reality; and finally it published data that was available for immediate staff use in research.

#### 4. Availability of RL's Research Resources and Output to Scholars

RL's research facilities are open to scholars and researchers. Moreover, RL makes many of its research products available to a wide range of specialists on Soviet affairs. Thus, RL is able to serve two functions: it is able to maintain its important connection with specialists in the scholarly community in the West to whom it often turns for advice and counsel on programming and policy it is also able to infuse up-to-date information and important emerging ideas into the mainstream of Western thought on developments in the Soviet Union.

A major effort is made by RL to keep Soviet specialists informed on current happenings in the USSR. It does this by distributing free-of-charge its publications to 650 specialists in North America who have regularly asked to receive the material.

RL publications include RL Dispatches on current affairs analysis, issued several times a week; RL Research Papers, providing more extensive background information; and RL

translations of significant articles from the Soviet press. (For examples of RL's publications, see Appendix 22.) The latter two publications are issued on an ad hoc basis.<sup>11</sup>

RL research facilities have, therefore, not only provided support for RL programmers and broadcasters, but, as a spin-off of its primary activity, namely, broadcasting, it has also provided an important service to specialists in academia, the government, and the mass media who are concerned with contemporary Soviet affairs.

A measure of the value of RL's research materials to Western scholarship can be seen in the appraisal by Prof. Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics. Prof. Schapiro wrote that he has followed the work of RL "very closely" for over 15 years and that "the products of the research in which it engages, and on which it broadcasts are founded, have been closely studied by me, and by my colleagues in my department for many years." "I have no hesitation in stating," Prof. Schapiro went on, "that the quality of this research has been consistently high and that it has proved of inestimable value to those who, like ourselves, are concerned with the study of the Soviet Union."<sup>12</sup>

The tone of this endorsement of RL's research products along with others reproduced in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and in RL's statement to Congress have the flavor of excessive testimonials; but this judgment must be balanced by an awareness that the writers are eminent scholars in the field of Soviet studies, and speak with some authority.

##### 5. Importance of Research in RL's Operations

The quality of research done by RL, whether it be in the Research Department or among programmers, and the availability of input source material, whether it be in the form of books, periodical literature, the press, radio monitoring or even word of mouth, is vital to RL's broadcasting operations. For the quality of information derived from research sources, along with the daily input of news (which is essentially part of the research process), determines in large measure the degree to which RL is achieving its stated goals and purposes as a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people. By the nature of things RL must operate from the premise that its audience suffers from large informational gaps which it seeks to fill.

RL tries to give the Soviet audience a reasonably complete picture of reality as any Soviet citizen would perceive it had he access to free information as in the West. And this can be done only by research, analysis, and a highly rational selection of news—in brief, only by hard intellectual effort.

##### VI. FUNDING: SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY

In recent years RL's annual budget has ranged between \$12 to \$14 million. According to Senator Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), the operating cost of RL for FY 1969 was \$12,887,401.<sup>13</sup> According to a GAO estimate, RL's budget for 1971 was about \$13,700,000.<sup>14</sup>

Formally, these funds were apparently supposed to have been provided by private sources in RFE/RL's capacity, in the State Department's words, as "private broadcasters."<sup>15</sup> However, according to the SFRC report, the "gap between private contributions and actual budget expenditures . . . has been filled by funds from the Central Intelligence Agency . . ." According to the State Department, RL has no program for corporate funding, such as that for RFE.<sup>16</sup> (During the decade 1962-1971, RL received about \$20,000 in unsolicited funds.) The SFRC report stated that the ". . . Executive Branch officials refuse publicly to acknowledge the [Central Intelligence Agency's] participation or role in maintaining and operating the two Radios."

Accordingly, "the Department declined to supply additional financial data for this report on Government funding of RFE and RL."<sup>17</sup>

##### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Public financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Hearings. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971, p. 6. Hereafter cited as, "SFRC, RFE/RL Hearings."

<sup>2</sup> When the press reported that the Library of Congress and General Accounting Office were going to prepare studies on RFE/RL for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, President of Radio Liberty Committee, wrote Dr. L. Quincy Mumford, the Librarian of Congress: "Radio Liberty is now completing its second decade of uninterrupted broadcasting to the Soviet Union. I would like to assure you that Radio Liberty programs and documentation relating to these broadcasts are freely available to the Library of Congress in carrying out its assignment from the Foreign Relations Committee. I offer our fullest cooperation and look forward to hearing from those in charge of the studies as to how we may be most helpful." (Sargeant to Mumford, Radio Liberty Committee, July 26, 1971.)

<sup>3</sup> Documentary material provided by RL is deposited temporarily in the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Citations to sources refer to particular documents as filed according to volume. For the most part material drawn from interviews is not cited in the footnotes.

<sup>4</sup> Radio Liberty: An Historical Sketch, September 2, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. IV, pt. 1)

<sup>5</sup> Evolution of Radio Liberty Policy: 1952-1971, p. 1. (RL, v. IV, pt. 2)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Hobbing, Enno. Radio Liberation Speaks for the Silent. The New Leader, v. 41, Oct. 6, 1958: 21-22, and Petrov, Vladimir. Radio Liberation. The Russian Review, v. 17, April 1958: 110.

<sup>8</sup> In a critical appraisal of RL, Erik Barnow observed in his history of American broadcasting that RL had begun broadcasting two months after the inauguration of President Eisenhower, and he went on to say: "Although plans for it had been made earlier, Radio Liberation became the epitome of the foreign policy of the following years, a policy dominated by John Foster Dulles of the Department of State and Allen W. Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency—two remarkable and complex men, differing yet working in harmony. They made a fateful impress not only on American diplomacy but also on its broadcasting—at home and abroad." (The Image Empire: a History of Broadcasting in the United States. New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, v. III, p. 92)

<sup>9</sup> Evolution of Radio Liberty Policy: 1952-1971, p. 2-3. (RL, v. IV, pt. 2)

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>11</sup> Dr. Petrov made these observations on RL's conduct during this critical time: "This lack of clarity in political matters [in RL's policy] is an obvious shortcoming. It was clearly demonstrated during the Hungarian crisis in November 1956, when RL didn't know what to say. Actually, some foolish things were said. For example, appeals were made to the Soviet soldiers not to shoot the Hungarians because they also were building socialism; regrets were expressed because 'our' brave soldiers murdered Hungarian women and children; appeals were made to the members of the Communist Party and to the 'politrabotniki' of the Army to stop the mass slaughter of the population." (Petrov, op. cit., pp. 112-113)

<sup>12</sup> Writing in 1958, Dr. Petrov commented: "Since most of the policies of RL consist of 'don'ts' and since the writers and editors are reduced to platitudes, RL suffers from a distinct lack of character." (Petrov, op. cit., pp. 110-111). However, in a commentary on the effects of the Hungarian crisis on RFE/RL, David Binder of *The New York Times* recently observed: "The crushing of the Hungarian

uprising in 1956 by Soviet armor also led to the crushing of cold-war agitation by Radio Free Europe and, in less dramatic form, at the Munich station aimed at the Soviet Union and then called Radio Liberation. At Radio Free Europe commentators and policy advisers were dismissed or shifted to innocuous jobs. Radio Liberation changed its name to Radio Liberty and gradually toned down its more aggressive commentators." (Binder, David. Embattled Radio Free Europe defends role. *The New York Times*, March 15, 1971, p. 10)

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 5-7. The moderation of RL and its commitment to the principle of evolutionary liberalization were evident in the following six "immediate objectives" cited in the 1965 Policy Manual:

"1. to encourage practical, democratic political alternatives to Soviet practices;

"2. to encourage more rapid social and economic reforms and allocation of more economic resources for the benefit of Soviet consumers;

"3. to reassure listeners that democratic powers want peace and eschew aggression, but will defend themselves against aggression;

"4. to encourage the view that the Soviet Government should abandon world revolutionary aims and work more actively for peace and international cooperation;

"5. to undermine Communist ideology, showing that it does not promote the welfare of the peoples of the USSR, and to show that history points toward progress in freedom of all peoples;

"6. to encourage cultural diversity and freedom of exchange of ideas and travel."

<sup>16</sup> CFRC, RFE/RL Hearings, p. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Panfilov, Artem F. U.S. Radio in psychological warfare. Moscow, International Relations Publishing House, 1967. (Excerpts and bibliography translated by Radio Liberty)

<sup>18</sup> A recent pamphlet published by RL listed the following as members of the Board of Trustees: Henry V Poor, Assistant Dean, Yale College of Law; Howland H. Sargeant, President, Radio Liberty Committee and former Assistant Secretary of State; Whitney N. Seymour, Chairman of the Board, Carnegie Endowment and former President, American Bar Association; John W. Studebaker, former U.S. Commissioner of Education; Reginald T. Townsend, Vice President, Radio Liberty Committee; William L. White, Editor and Publisher, *Emporia Gazette*, and Philip L. Wilkie, Attorney; Mrs. Oscar Ahlgren, former President, General Federation of Women's Clubs; John R. Burton, Chairman of the Board, National Bank of Far Rockaway; J. Peter Grace, President, W. R. Grace & Company; Allen Grover, former Vice President, Time-Life, Inc.; Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, U.S.A. (Ret.), former Allied Commander in Europe (NATO); Hon. John S. Hays, Communications Specialist and former U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland; H. J. Heinz II, Chairman of the Board, H. J. Heinz Company; Isaac Don Levine, Author and Specialist on Soviet Affairs.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Report. 92d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., July 30, 1971. Report No. 92-319, p. 2. Hereafter cited as "SFRC, RFE/RL Report."

<sup>20</sup> The special role of RL's New York operation. Oct. 1971, pp. 1-3. (RL, v. XII, pt. 3)

<sup>21</sup> SFRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Radio Liberty. Guests in the Soviet home, 1970, p. 10. And, RL letter and telex, Nov. 12, 1971.

<sup>23</sup> Radio Liberty Visual Exhibits, Illustration 24. (RL, v. V, pt. 11.)

<sup>24</sup> Binder, David. Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role. *The New York Times*, March 15, 1971, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> Radio Liberty: An uncensored information medium for Soviet citizens, June 14,

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1971, p. 11. (RL, v. I.) Hereafter cited as, Radio Liberty Statement, June 14, 1971.

<sup>20</sup> In FY 1971, RL expended \$50,900 for training purposes. (Chart XVII, Training Expenditures, RL, v. V, pt. 12, p. 16)

<sup>21</sup> RL: Programming-language personnel. Total staff by prime language vs. current extended personnel plus retirement 1972-76, October 1971. The present strength of the Russians is 168; Ukrainians, 20, Belorussians, 12; Armenians, 7; Azerbaijanians, 7; Georgians, 8; Karachay, 1; and Tatar-Bashkir, 8. The anticipated percentage loss from retirement during the period 1972-76 is 27.9 percent for the Russians; 20.0 percent, Ukrainians; 33.3 percent, Belorussians; 14.3 percent, Armenians; 14.3 percent Azerbaijanians; 37.6 percent, Georgians; 100 percent, Karachay; and 12.5 percent, Tatar-Bashkir.

<sup>22</sup> According to David Binder, "the average age of the Radio Free Europe employees is 45. It is perhaps a bit lower at Radio Liberty, where the director, Kenneth Scott, has recently hired several colorful Soviet defectors." (The New York Times, March 15, 1971, p. 10)

<sup>23</sup> Radio Liberty Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 11. (RL, v. I)

<sup>24</sup> The future of Samizdat; Significance and Prospects, p. 29. (RL, v. II, D1)

<sup>25</sup> This section of the study is based upon, RL's technical facilities, pp. 1-3. (RL, v. III, pt. K)

<sup>26</sup> RL Basic briefing outline, p. 7. (RL, v. V, pt. 10)

<sup>27</sup> Frequency usage and facility occupation, Aug. 6, 1971. (RL, v. XI, pt. 8)

<sup>28</sup> RL, Guest in the Soviet home, p. 9.

<sup>29</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 17-18. (RL, v. I)

<sup>30</sup> The future of samizdat, pp. 37-38. (RL, v. II, D1)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>32</sup> Because of a sharp budget cut RL terminated the Institute at end of 1971.

<sup>33</sup> Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, Carl Gerber, 1969, p. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 17-18. (RL, v. I.) See also part L, RL Research Bulletin, 1970 Index.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 25. Dr. Frederick C. Barghoorn, a leading American specialist on Soviet affairs and a Professor of Political Science at Yale University, commented: "As a scholar I have long admired and I have found most useful the research and publication activities of Radio Liberty. These information activities are very important to scholars, journalists, and other communicators not only in the United States but in Europe, Asia, South Africa, and other parts of the world." (SFRG, RFE/RL Hearings, p. 172.)

<sup>37</sup> SFRG, RFE/RL Report, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> Figures, provided by GAO.

<sup>39</sup> SFRG, RFE/RL Report, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 2. The refusal of the Executive Branch to acknowledge publicly its role in funding RFE/RL was revealed in David Binder's report on both radios. Asked about the disclosure that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were financed by CIA, Mr. Binder said that Mr. Ralph Walter, the Munich director of RFE, declared: "Our broadcasting policies are made here in this house and are not guided by anyone in Washington. We are nobody's mouthpiece." An RL official concurred. (The New York Times, March 15, 1971, p. 10.)

## CHAPTER II: RL'S GOALS, POLICIES, AND POLICY FORMULATION

### I. RL'S OBJECTIVES

#### A. Ultimate goal: Democratization of Soviet Society

The primary objective of RL is very simply to encourage those forces of liberalization within Soviet society that will bring about an eventual peaceful evolution of the USSR

from its present form of Communist totalitarianism to a more tolerable and humane form of democracy. The ultimate goal is democratization of Soviet society in the expectation that within such liberalization lies the greatest hope for world peace.

Perhaps, this general objective was most succinctly and yet comprehensively set forth in RL's formal statement to Congress. It said: "Radio Liberty is a communications channel for Soviet citizens concerned about their country's future, and its place in the world community. It is dedicated to human rights, to peaceful evolution of Soviet society and to harmony in international relations."<sup>1</sup>

As an ultimate goal in broadcasting, RL directs its energies towards achieving the democratization of Soviet society. The Policy Manual of 1971 defined RL's ultimate goal in these terms: "to see all the peoples of the USSR acquire the opportunity to live in freedom with truly democratic political institutions, based on free election processes and guaranteed observance of human rights, and which represent the best interests of all citizens and assure for their country a normal, cooperative and constructive role within the comity of modern states."<sup>2</sup>

#### B. Commitment to peaceful change

RL's is, however, a commitment to peaceful change from within. It seeks to encourage liberal and progressive elements within Soviet society, seeing in these forces the greatest possibility for a Soviet Russia regenerated by the liberating spirit of genuine democracy. It rejects confrontation as an instrumentality in achieving its goals and fosters an approach to policy formulation and policy execution that is essentially benign in spirit, positive in direction, and pacifistic in its rejection of solutions by force.

Thus, RL is not now a Cold War operation in the sense that this term was used and understood in the 1950s and which well described its functions at that time. On the contrary, RL accepts Soviet institutions, though not its ideology, and seeks to bring about peaceful transformation within the system as it now exists.

#### C. RL's purposes

In seeking its ultimate goal of democratization, RL has a rather precise perception of how this should be done. It encourages the Soviet peoples to work together as a first step in instilling the habit of democracy. The expectation is that by mutual cooperation the Soviet peoples themselves can establish a democratic system that will not only be representative of and responsible to the will and aspirations of all, but also will be capable of sustaining their national interests and maintaining a viable economic structure.<sup>3</sup>

In assisting the Soviet people to achieve this goal, RL broadcasts to its listeners truthful information which will enable them to make up their own minds, form their own judgments, and reach their own independent conclusions on developments within their country. RL seeks, therefore, to relieve the Soviet people from their total dependency upon the regime as a source of information. Having monopolistic control over information and publicly expressed opinion, the ruling elite deprives Soviet citizens of access to information that would give them a more complete and truthful picture of reality. RL seeks to fill in these blank spaces of calculated omissions and correct distortions of official Soviet propaganda. Finally, RL urges the Soviet people to develop a sense of common cause and recognize that their concerns and vital interests are shared concerns and interests of many other Soviet citizens.<sup>4</sup>

In speaking for the genuine needs and best aspirations of its listeners, both Russian and non-Russian, RL emphasizes the importance of both historical continuity and the relevance of contemporary problems. For all Soviet peoples it assumes the obligation of

linking their past to the present and future in an effort to maintain the vigor of their historical and cultural legacies in the face of regime attempts to exploit them for propaganda purposes. Attuned to the requirements of history, RL thus relates the past to the present and future while concentrating on contemporary problems in Soviet society.<sup>5</sup>

#### D. RL's Immediate Objectives

Within this larger framework of goals and purposes, RL pursues immediate objectives that focus on such practical and positive themes as democratic political alternatives, economic reform, peaceful intentions of the democratic world, ideological irrelevance of Marxism-Leninism, and the virtue of cultural diversity and political pluralism.

As a primary immediate objective, RL tries to convince Soviet listeners that practical, democratic political alternatives to their present system do exist. It encourages them to work toward these alternatives in their own interest by asking questions, by seeking more information, by finding practical solutions to specific problems, and by uniting in common efforts to create internal pressures for change.<sup>6</sup> In brief, RL seeks to destroy the prevailing, officially-induced myth of a political system preordained by history and suggest pragmatic means for transformation.

RL also encourages among its listeners the belief that more rapid and equitable solutions are possible to their domestic economic and social problems, and to the problems of the nationalities. RL persuades them to press for basic economic reform and allocation of more economic resources for the benefit of the consumer. It also persuades the Soviet listener to press for the cultural needs of the various nationalities, including the Russian.<sup>7</sup>

In the realm of international relations, RL assures its listeners that the democratic powers of the world are pursuing foreign policies that are designed to achieve world peace and stability. It tries to convince the listener that, notwithstanding the constant claims of Soviet propaganda, none of these states has any intention of committing armed aggression against the USSR. Defense establishments are maintained, RL points out, in order to resist aggression by other world powers.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, RL tries to convince its listeners that by abandoning world revolutionary aspirations, moderating its aggressive foreign policies, and instituting a policy of more active international cooperation within the United Nations, the Soviet Government would do much to lessen the danger of thermonuclear war and to assure world peace.<sup>9</sup> Or said another way, adherence to the ideological principle of "struggle" and the advocacy of the conquest of power that flows from this belief, enhance the possibility of thermonuclear war, and only through Soviet moderation and cooperation in the United Nations will peace be assured.

In ideological matters, RL challenges the faith of Communist believers—both sincere and opportunistic—in their obsolescent ideology which as Marxism-Leninism contains the seeds of Soviet dictatorship. It tries to convince believers that Marxist philosophy as it has taken shape in the USSR has been perverted and in the course of time reduced to a collection of primitive dogmas. RL tries to show believers that the "revolutionary struggle" in the world today, so seminal to the concepts of Marxism-Leninism, does not coincide with their views or their interests. These would be better served, RL stresses, by the peaceful pluralistic development of societies under the rule of law, and in freedom for all peoples everywhere, including the peoples of the USSR.<sup>10</sup> In brief, RL challenges the faith of Marxist-Leninists as being outdated, irrelevant and contrary to the real interests of the Soviet people; it



re-affirms the principle of democratic pluralism and rule of law.

Relating the concepts of societal pluralism and rule of law to the Soviet scene, RL tries to encourage trends toward cultural diversity and freedom among all peoples of the Soviet Union. It encourages also trends toward a truly free exchange of information and ideas, and freedom to travel between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries. In pursuing this immediate objective, RL tries to gain the attention of Soviet listeners by showing in its full dimension the range of political and cultural diversity and freedom of thought in the non-Communist world.<sup>12</sup>

In international affairs, therefore, RL encourages detente, amelioration of differences through diplomacy, strengthening the United Nations as an instrument of peace, and creation of a world system based on political pluralism and the rule of law. RL represents an ideological challenge to the regime and thus may be an irritant in East-West relations, and accordingly may adversely affect the modalities of relations. But it is unlikely that it would impair East-West detente which rests upon more deeply rooted power realities. RL directs its energies mainly toward the Soviet people; it attempts to establish a dialogue with them; it assumes that by encouraging the forces of internal liberalization, natural and Soviet-generated pressures exerted from below upon the regime will make it more responsible to the interests of the people and accordingly create more favorable conditions for continuing peace.

## II. GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH OF RL

### A. Basic operating principle: Rights of free press

To achieve its objectives, RL seeks to promote opinion formation in the Soviet Union, and it does this principally through its radio broadcasting operations. As a surrogate "Home Service," it attempts to communicate directly to the Soviet people and establish the basis for a lasting dialogue. RL operates on the belief that the Soviet leaders, if confronted by a truly informed public opinion, "will tend to behave more moderately and sensibly."<sup>13</sup>

RL claims that the validity of its rights as an international broadcaster rests upon the principle set forth in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration, adopted unanimously in the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, provides that, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."<sup>14</sup>

RL operates, therefore, on the principle of the right of a free press, as sanctioned by the United Nations and imbedded in the larger American belief in the inalienable rights of man. RL "upholds the basic right of the whole Soviet public to know the whole truth about any question."<sup>15</sup> It is committed to the principle, affirmed in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, that the Soviet people have a right to be informed, that is to say, to have the democratic right of free press; it operates on the further assumption that the exercise of this right will encourage peaceful political evolution in the Soviet Union. As RL policymakers have written: "Radio Liberty is founded on the premise that freedom of information and discussion are essential to the processes of democracy and the creation of a peaceful and cooperative world."<sup>16</sup>

Assumed in this libertarian view held by RL is the belief that all men have, among certain inalienable rights, a right to freedom of individual and collective expression. Assumed also is the further belief that those enjoying such a right have the obligation to assist those denied in correcting the inequities.

### B. Basic philosophical assumptions of RL: Appeals to rationalism

The general philosophical approach of RL in seeking its goals and purposes is one which appeals to rationalism. It is an approach that attempts to "substitute reason for emotion, and a calm voice for stridency." It is an approach that begins from the premise of objective rationalism, namely, that "the most convincing presentation is one that tells all sides of the story."<sup>17</sup> Accordingly, RL "has no built-in commitment to continued tension"; rather it thrives on an improving environment that will increase the opportunities for dialogue and the interplay of ideas.<sup>17</sup>

Rejecting the politics of confrontation and "appeals for action," RL directs its energies toward developing rational thought among its listeners. Essentially cerebral rather than visceral, "it seeks merely to help in forming an enlightened Soviet public opinion."<sup>18</sup> It is RL's expectation, in the word of Dr. Gene Sosin, one of its leading staffmen in New York, that "in time . . . through an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process, the Soviet people may not only think about how to fulfill their deep desire for peace, a more abundant life and greater freedom of self-expression—they may begin to act."<sup>19</sup> RL operates on the assumption that given truthful information about developments in the Soviet Union and the world beyond its frontiers the Soviet citizen has within himself the natural capability of eventually shaping his country's destiny.

## III. GENERAL POLICY GUIDELINES

### A. RL's policy manual: Its function

RL's policy guidelines in general are a reflection of a moderate approach to the politics of the Soviet Union. These guidelines and the philosophy that produced them are contained in RL's Policy Manual.

The Policy Manual is the key element in RL's policy formation and policy guidance. It is RL's operating charter. It sets forth the basic rationale and purpose of RL's activities, defines RL's specific role in relation to its audience, contains estimates of the situation and direction of trends in the Soviet Union, projects long-range and immediate informational objectives, and sets forth the essential methods and techniques by which these goals are to be achieved.

In brief, the Policy Manual is, in the words of RL's policymakers, "the mainspring for all other policy determinations, the central authority determining audience priorities, program content and the nature of Radio Liberty's approaches in program structure, style and tone."<sup>20</sup>

## B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF RL

### 1. Formulation of assumptions

In formulating broadcast policy and designing radio programming, RL makes certain general assumptions about its own role, the situation in the Soviet Union, and its Soviet audience. These assumptions are based on continuing research and analysis, (1) on available evidence revealing the basic outlook and attitudes of RL's Soviet listeners, and (2), on objectively assessed long-term developments inside the Soviet Union and in the world at large, as well as the Soviet listener's knowledge and ideas about these developments, and their perception of the Soviet reality. Some of these assumptions are up-dated and changed; they are included in such special guidances as Broadcast Position Statements.<sup>21</sup>

The function of these assumptions is to give some rational direction to thought and planning. They are intended to establish a reasonably solid foundation upon which policy can be structured and programming operations designed.

### 2. RL'S ROLE

#### a. Catalyst for Peaceful Democratic Change

In general, RL perceives its role as that of a participant in bringing about positive,

evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union. Since its main concern is for the general welfare of the Soviet peoples, it places "basic emphasis", not so much on being anti-Soviet or anti-Communist (though disagreeing with Communist ideology), but on "promoting constructive change."<sup>22</sup>

#### b. Soviet Generated Change

In seeking this goal of constructive change, RL does not claim to advocate any specific system of ideology in the USSR. RL believes its role is to stimulate independent thinking, to provide the Soviet peoples with information and ideas which will enable them, individually or collectively, to solve their common problems and ultimately assist them in "achieving a democratic transformation of the present regime."<sup>23</sup> Peaceful change can only come about, RL feels, when the Soviet people themselves, having access to solid objective information, seek solutions to the broad problems of Soviet society. Increasingly, the Soviet people are becoming more actively concerned about correcting abuses and improving their system. RL encourages independent thinking by such people and supplies them with specific and relevant information and ideas as a basis for finding their own solutions.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, RL sees its main function as serving "as an independent and reliable source of foreign and domestic news and information on matters of specific concern to the Soviet citizens, in their own language." Accordingly, RL gives Soviet listeners access to "impartial and objective information"; it assists them in trying to understand more clearly the events at home and abroad, and the effect of current developments on their lives. RL also fills in gaps of knowledge by providing less current materials of significance and interest.<sup>25</sup>

#### c. RL's Impact

In its role as an uncensored "Home Service," RL believes that it exerts political influence affecting "to some degree" the evolution of Soviet society. It seeks to exert this influence "responsibility" and, accordingly, "does not espouse any specific political proposals or any concrete program." RL does, however, strive to aid those elements working for positive improvement by "serving as a channel of communication, providing a free forum for discussion and exchange of ideas, and encouraging listeners to recognize that their concerns are shared by many other Soviet citizens." RL attempts to keep Soviet citizens informed on important domestic developments which are unpublicized, distorted or inadequately discussed by official media. In its role of broadcasting texts of documents and literary works written in the Soviet Union but denied publication (that is, samizdat), RL serves "as an important means of disseminating and cross-fertilizing non-conformist and unorthodox views."<sup>26</sup>

#### d. Rejection of Violent and Illegal Actions

According to RL's estimate, the evolution of Soviet society will be a "long-term process." In seeking to promote peaceful progressive change, RL "scrupulously avoids inciting, or appearing to incite, actions which could bring reprisals, including particularly illegal and violent actions, since they are likely to bring harm to their perpetrators without serving a constructive purpose." RL believes that specific methods, programs and proposals for peaceful change must be worked out within Soviet society and must be determined by the Soviet citizens themselves.<sup>27</sup>

In matters of human rights and constitutional rights, RL upholds the right of all Soviet citizens to achieve their human rights as defined in the United Nations Declaration and to exercise constitutional rights guaranteed under the Soviet Constitution. RL gives general support to citizens choosing to exercise these rights, consistent, however, with Constitutional guarantees. While RL provides information that would develop



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understanding and implementation of democratic principles and concepts, it does not specifically endorse individuals, groups, or proposals. This would create difficulties for those involved, RL believes. The ultimate judgments, it maintains, must be made by the Soviet citizens themselves. RL's approach to this difficult problem is to report on and discuss all political developments and proposals in the Soviet Union in terms of democratic principles and concepts and from the point of view of their potential effect on Soviet society.<sup>28</sup>

## e. Hopes for democratization despite setbacks

Finally, RL asumes that the demands of a technological society can lead the Soviet Union to greater democratization and that the leaders may be able to delay, but not stop, this process. Though recognizing present setbacks in democratization, RL does not, however, permit this to obscure "the very real possibility" of a long term reversal of those trends of repression. To do otherwise, RL concludes, "would be to deprive many listeners of whatever hopes they have for the future."<sup>29</sup>

## f. Summing up

To sum up, RL perceives itself as a catalyst for constructive peaceful change in the Soviet Union; it adheres to the principle of self-determination to the extent that the Soviet people themselves are to bring about changes from within and according to their own interest and requirements; it acts as a conduit for the flow of objective information into the Soviet Union and acts also as a forum for debate of views that are denied by the regime; it rejects violence as a political solution, and is committed to the belief in a long term process of change for the better; it denies support for individuals or groups, but gives general support to democratic principles and to those who exercise their human and constitutional rights; it is convinced, finally, that the process of democratization will continue despite momentary setbacks.

## 3. SITUATION IN THE USSR: RL'S ASSESSMENT SUMMARIZED

## a. Realities of power, institutional inadequacy, outdated ideology

In a dispassionate, tightly reasoned and compressed analytical commentary, RL has set forth in the Manual its perception of the situation in the Soviet Union as a second assumption upon which policy is based and programs are designed.<sup>30</sup>

According to RL's analysis, two primary features condition the Soviet outlook for the future, one a source of strength, the other a source of weakness. It is an acknowledged fact that the Soviet Union has become the world's second largest power, having an enormous industrial and military capacity and the capability of solving the most complex technological and scientific problems. Yet, despite this power, serious institutional inadequacies exist, for the political and economic institutions of the Soviet state are ill-suited to cope with future economic and technological developments and the innumerable complex problems inherent in a modern industrial society. These institutions, moreover, depend for their legitimacy upon an outdated ideology, one that had been designed originally as a response to the needs of the 19th Century and whose basic premises have been eroded by rapid economic, political, social and technological changes of the 20th Century.<sup>31</sup>

## b. Totalitarianism Institutionalized and Phlegmatic Leadership

Significant changes have occurred in the Soviet Union, some positive; but, the RL analysis continues, the totalitarian system created by Stalin has not changed in any essential aspect, and none of the changes that have occurred guarantee Soviet society against a resurgence of Stalinism. The ap-

paratus of police power is maintained, and no institutional safeguards have been introduced to check the rise of one-man rule.

Moreover, the future prospects of the Soviet Union are affected by the phlegmatic character of the present leadership, a group of aging apparatchiks, products of the party bureaucracy that matured in and survived the Stalin era, who no doubt find it difficult to cope with some of the more sophisticated aspects of contemporary problems. Their actions betray a collective lack of decisiveness, a tendency to temporize, and finally a habit of making decisions, agonizing and full of compromise.<sup>32</sup>

## c. Problems in the Economic Sector

In the economic sphere, the RL analysis states, the most fundamental problems exist. Lagging growth rates, the need to incorporate technological and scientific advances and close the widening gap in technology between the Soviet Union and the advanced capitalist countries, involve questions of modernizing the command economy, centralized vs. decentralized planning and management, choices in use of resources among regions, price reform, improving labor productivity and providing management incentives. Problems in agriculture and increasing pressures for a decent standard of living and a higher level of social welfare add to the regime's problems in the economic sector. The main area of acute conflict, however, is in the allocation of resources.<sup>33</sup>

## d. Problems of Defense and Foreign Policy

Interrelated with the economic problems and dependent on their successful resolution, the RL analysis continues, are problems of defense and foreign policy. These problems turn on such matters as how the USSR can best maintain its control over Eastern Europe, regain its leadership over the international Communist Movement, and cope with the centrifugal forces of disunity; the extent of Soviet commitments abroad, especially in the Middle East, the degree of rapprochement with the United States and Europe, the level of disarmament needed to maintain adequate defense. These problems in international relations and those related to China and Germany present choices to competing forces within the Soviet elite, those advocating a hard-line, aggressive stance and those more flexible who seek cooperation in international affairs and assurances of stability that will enable concentration on domestic development.<sup>34</sup>

## e. Emergency Forces of Dissent and Reformism

On the domestic scene, according to the RL analysis, the limited steps taken toward removing the excesses of the Stalin era have prepared the ground for emerging new issues and the evolution of additional pressures for greater liberalization both within and outside the Soviet establishment. This has created new dilemmas for the leadership. Initially, the issues involved setting the boundaries of social criticism and freedom of artistic expression, but they have expanded to encompass freedom of inquiry, freedom of information, observance of legality, abolition of censorship, and openness in policy-making and reporting on administrative actions. Various specific reforms have been proposed and discussed. Dissent has arisen among religious groups, notably the Orthodox and Baptist churches, and the national question is reemerging in a more acute form.<sup>35</sup>

## f. Alignment and Character of Dissenting Forces

The Communist Party (CPSU) is one of the most central and sensitive areas in the need of reform, according to RL. Various party issues have emerged as a result of revelations in the destalinization period and the need for management reforms. Voices within the party have been raised, questioning as-

pects of policy and structure and calling for democratization of party procedures. However, no clear-cut factions within Soviet society and the establishment have emerged, either progressive or reactionary in nature, but in general alignments of groups and individuals have shifted issue to issue.<sup>36</sup>

Sympathy for the reform movement is spread among many of the Soviet intellectuals, especially the scientific intelligentsia and the youth.

RL states that the most salient characteristic of the dissident movement is that it is a reformist and not a revolutionary movement. Individuals cast themselves by and large in the role of a "loyal" opposition, whether seeking limited or extensive changes. Even the more radical in the movement reject violent revolution and advocate gradual transition to more democratic forms through peaceful evolution.

Between these poles of potential power is a third group that seeks modernization of Soviet society without political liberalization.<sup>37</sup>

## g. Future prospects for democratization

According to RL, the future prospects for progress toward more democratic forms would seem to depend on the top CPSU leadership. The initiative of any extensive process of liberalization would have to come from the Politburo so long as it retains the monopoly of power and a capacity to destroy any opposition. The leaders can be expected to continue as a reasonably stable collective, RL believes. Individual shifts would not affect the character of that body since new leaders would be products of the same apparatus. Whatever its composition, the leadership continues to be confronted by the same central dilemma which RL defines in these words: maximum use of resources requires major economic and social reform with the attendant risk of losing control (to a greater or lesser degree), yet to go on without change, for fear of losing control, means to brake social and economic progress and to lag further and further behind the level of development in the rest of the industrialized world.<sup>38</sup>

In general, RL perceives a trend toward conservatism in the current leadership. Moreover, the present essentially static situation has been hardened by adherence to an outdated ideology and by the nature of the decision-making apparatus. Collective decision-making tends to prevent formulation of innovative policies which are needed to solve Soviet dilemmas and introduce comprehensive reforms. Thus, the present leadership is caught between competing pressures of reformism and conservatism, and it attempts to avoid open confrontation or extremes in either direction.

Immediate prospects for democratization of the Soviet Union are not bright, according to RL's analysis; yet it is conceivable that over a long period the climate could become more propitious. Decentralization and flexibility needed to operate a more complex society and economy, emergence of a new generation of leaders not schooled in the Stalinist tradition, the cumulative effect of various decisions taken to resolve issues on the domestic and international scene—all could possibly, but not necessarily, work toward creating an environment in which peaceful change toward democratic reform could take place.<sup>39</sup>

## h. RL's perceived role: A "challenging opportunity"

The RL analysis concludes with a restatement of RL's commitment to basic policy on the expectation of a peaceful evolution of Soviet society and on its conviction that the development toward a democratic order must come from within the dynamics of Soviet society itself and from the combined effort of the Soviet peoples. Soviet society, it said,

has undergone significant changes that cannot be completely nullified in the present period of retrogression without endangering the leaders themselves.

Accordingly, RL sees here a "challenging opportunity" to continue to stimulate more internal pressure for change, expand an awareness of alternatives to the present system, assist in the growth of a democratic climate of opinion, promote wider understanding of democratic concepts, facilitate emergence of pluralism, spur decentralization, and encourage cooperation among reformist elements.<sup>40</sup>

#### 1. Validity and Quality of RL's Estimate

What makes RL's assessment of the situation in the USSR significant is that it represents RL's perception of the Soviet reality and accordingly provides the fundamental assumptions upon which future policy and thus future programming will be based.

The most important question that arises is the matter of validity and quality of this assessment. In general, this can be judged only by analogy, that is, by comparisons with parallel evaluations of current Soviet developments by specialists in the field of Soviet bloc studies. Surveys of such evaluations of the Soviet scene made in recent years will probably reveal no sharp variations between the judgments contained in RL's statement and those generally accepted within the academic community of the West and in the confraternity of Soviet bloc specialists in the United States Government. The RL statement, essentially cautious, conservative, well reasoned, and carefully qualified, seems to reflect the consensus of leading Western scholars in Soviet studies on the current Soviet reality and what the prospects are for the future. However, some scholars, who have a realist's cast to their thought, would probably be less sanguine than RL about the ultimate achievement of democracy.

#### 4. RL'S AUDIENCE

The third area of assumptions in RL's policy formation and programming concerns the Soviet audience. As a broadcaster to an audience that generally cannot be measured and analyzed with the precision that is possible in a free Western society, RL must make certain assumptions not only about social, occupational and intellectual groups in all the republics and oblasts of the USSR, but also those of the various nationalities to which RL broadcasts and certain differing psychological categories within these groups.

This matter, along with RL's policy relating to the nationalities, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV on programming. Suffice it to say at this point, however, that RL directs its attention mainly to the power elite within the Soviet Union, either existing or in potential. As a broadcaster with certain clearly defined political purposes, it must direct its energies primarily to those elements in Soviet society which now or in the future may exercise political influence and pressure. They represent the opinion makers and opinion leaders in the country and thus are more likely to influence the broad base of mass opinion in Soviet society. These "politically alert" groups of listeners and potential decision-makers are also more likely to possess or have access to shortwave radio sets capable of receiving RL's signal than are the masses of unskilled workers and collective farm peasants. Thus, RL must make certain assumptions about the structure and characteristics of its audience, hoping that through correct analysis based upon these assumptions, it can achieve maximum effectiveness.<sup>41</sup>

#### C. Accomplishing RL's Objectives

##### 1. RL's Broadcasting Style: Friendliness, Enlightenment, Dignity

On the basis of the foregoing assumptions about the situation in the Soviet Union and about its variegated, multi-national, complexly structured audience, RL proceeds

toward its long-range goals and immediate objectives by maintaining an effective overall image. It does this by applying certain basic themes in all its presentations, and trying to maintain a style that is both appealing and effective. The guide words in this effort are friendliness, enlightenment and dignity.

RL's Policy Manual takes the position that if RL is to attain its immediate objectives, it is "vital" that a "tone of goodwill" be maintained at all times. Bluntness is sometimes required in speaking about Soviet matters, but no doubt should be left in the minds of the listeners that RL is on their side. Expressions of such views should not be "personally insulting" to the listener, the Policy Manual warns, and it should be made clear that criticism is directed at the regime and the system, not the Soviet peoples.<sup>42</sup>

RL also avoids generalized, vituperative and undocumented attacks against the Soviet leaders and "wholesale condemnation" of Soviet policies, domestic and international. Rather, it concentrates on what it believes to be well-reasoned critiques of specific problems and weaknesses. These are accompanied by discussions of various positive recommendations and possible solutions.

RL wants the listener to make up his own mind and reach his own conclusions about problems in Soviet life. Thus, RL relies primarily on factual information, suggestion inferred through the presentation of material, and on indirection as a means of stimulating thought. In discussions on Soviet affairs and world politics, RL provides factual information, interpretation and constructive ideas, but it furnishes no conclusions, preferring to leave this to the listener. In order to provide listeners with a comparative basis on which to judge their own society, RL informs its audience of political, economic, social and cultural developments in other countries, especially Communist dominated countries of Eastern Europe. This technique is called cross-reporting.

Moreover, RL passes along to its audience any positive social and political programs or proposals devised by Soviet citizens (for example, protest samizdat documents) and evaluates them in terms of RL's goals and principles.<sup>43</sup>

In broadcasting RL tries to avoid adopting a condescending tone or presenting material that implies an assumption of political naivete. According to the Policy Manual, RL also avoids conveying any impression that it encourages listeners to undertake specific overt actions or acts of terror or violence against the regime. In matters of peaceful group actions, RL takes the position that within the structure of law the Soviet citizens themselves must decide what forms such actions should take.

In covering world events, RL tries to take the stance of "an enlightened native of the Soviet Union concerned primarily with the interests of his fellow countrymen at home." Since RL may imply support for institutions and efforts of non-Communist governments, care must be taken, the Manual warns, to avoid creating the impression that RL represents the interests of Western countries or is the voice of any foreign government or interest. Moreover, RL never takes the position of speaking for any political organization of former Soviet citizens; the Manual warns against the identification of RL with any such groups.

A final point made by the Policy Manual is the tone of broadcasting and choice of words. Broadcasting must be maintained on a dignified level, according to RL. "Sensationalism, frivolous or vulgar satire or humor, flamboyant language, are therefore to be avoided"; for RL's objective is to maintain an attitude of goodwill toward the audience and thus hopefully win its confidence and insure the radio's effectiveness.<sup>44</sup>

In brief, RL must take the stance, as Mr.

Scott said, of a "patriotic internal communicator"; it must adapt itself to the interests and style, the feelings and sensitivities of the Soviet citizen; it must envision itself as a genuine uncensored "Home Service," not as a foreign broadcaster, thus making it essential, even vital, that the tone of broadcasting and the style of presentation convey the feeling to the Soviet listener that RL is really one of them.

##### 2. RL's Basic Methods: Provide Facts, Balanced Discussion, Genuine Criticism, Soviet Reality

RL's effectiveness as a communicator depends largely upon the extent to which it can maintain its identification with the interests of the listeners. To maintain a high level of sustained interest, RL seeks to make the content of its broadcasts, in the words of the Policy Manual, "consistently dynamic, interesting, and competitive with all other radio stations broadcasting to the USSR, inside the Soviet Union and from abroad."<sup>45</sup> In an effort to build a wider audience, RL believes that it has to make its criticism of the Soviet system more constructive and effective and help the listeners more effectively work together for constructive change.

Accordingly, the Policy Manual establishes 5 basic methods for achieving RL's goals. The main offering to the Soviet listener, it says, is "accurate, reliable and interesting information." This is vital for the station in order to achieve credibility. Program structure is to be designed to provide a maximum number of cogent, factual news stories, reviews of the world press, and features which provide broad coverage in depth of domestic and foreign trends that would be helpful to listeners.<sup>46</sup>

Issues are also to be discussed in a balanced manner, thus enabling the audience to become familiar with the techniques of a free discussion of basic issues. Having a broad spectrum of conflicting ideas presented to them (which is denied in the Soviet Union), the listeners would be exposed to the give-and-take of debate that could be learned and used in discussions with their fellow citizens.<sup>47</sup>

According to the Policy Manual, stress is to be placed on internal Soviet affairs and the "internalization" of democratic alternatives in broadcasting. By staying abreast of domestic affairs, RL can report and comment regularly and constructively for its listeners on development inside the Soviet Union. Because of the strict limitations on freedom of speech in the Soviet Union, it is RL's duty, the Manual declared, to "serve as a free voice from abroad." A major function of this is to induce the Soviet leaders to provide Soviet citizens with more and objective information about developments of Soviet interest. In addition, RL "internalizes" developments in other countries for its Soviet audiences, that is, it engages in cross-reporting of internal developments elsewhere, especially in Eastern Europe, and shows how common problems are being solved there. Trends toward cultural freedom, economic decentralization, and political democratization in Eastern Europe, being more relevant and having greater possibilities of being carried out in the Soviet Union, imposes upon RL, the Policy Manual declares, a special necessity for cross-reporting "at every opportunity."<sup>48</sup>

Another basic method RL uses in seeking its objectives is criticism of Soviet policy in the interests of the Soviet citizens. The Policy Manual states that RL's criticism must be directed always toward constructive change and not simply consisting of recounting the negative aspects of Soviet life. Weaknesses organically connected with the system should be pointed out and stressed; but, RL was to refrain from giving the impression that it seeks to exploit positive internal developments for its own purposes by portraying them as essentially anti-Soviet.

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Finally, RL should discuss Soviet reality itself rather than the Soviet media's projection of that reality. Accordingly, RL is to exploit its own "formidable research capabilities," the Manual said, in order to create a more reliable picture of Soviet reality than what is portrayed in Soviet media. Every effort should be made, it said, to utilize RL research to discuss conditions existing in Soviet society: they become more meaningful against the background of the system's structural defects.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, RL tries to convey to staff through the guidelines of its Policy Manual, the importance of building a reputation of credibility with its listeners and projecting an image of a constructive critic of the Soviet system. It attempts also to convey to the Soviet people themselves through its basic methods the value of free speech as a principle in political life.

### 3. RL'S BASIC TECHNIQUES: APPEALS TO REASON, MODERATION, GOOD JUDGMENT

In pursuing its objectives RL lays down a set of specific guiding principles that are intended to assist staff in script writing, programming and broadcasting. By and large, the principles are common sense: they appeal to reason, moderation, and good judgment.<sup>50</sup>

"The truth, hard fact and cold analysis" are the first requirement, the RL Policy Manual states, in effective broadcasting that has certain political goals in view. Facts of any political event, economic or cultural development must be "coherently and skillfully" organized, moreover, so that they lead to a reasoned conclusion. This technique is more effective than personal opinion, unsupported assertions or statements questionable on grounds of accuracy.

RL also attempts to make the listener reach his own conclusions after the facts are presented. Seeking to stimulate thought, RL finds it effective technique to end scripts with a question mark, challenging, thereby, the listeners to think for themselves.

Direct comparisons, especially in areas of wages, goods and service, in RL's judgment, can only be counterproductive, and are, therefore, avoided. However, selective comparisons in areas not normally known in the Soviet Union, especially industrial output and general economic indicators, foreign economic and military aid, are essential in conveying RL's message. General comparisons, using the technique of cross-reporting, are also useful in areas dealing with everyday economic matters, discussion of human rights, individual freedom of travel, exchange of information and ideas, and the welfare of citizens in democratic countries.<sup>51</sup>

RL also believes in the principle of responding to situations in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the issue, or, as RL succinctly put it, "The more brutal the facts, the less emotional should be the presentation." Understatement is the most effective technique, RL believes; excessive emotionalism must be depressed in writing and voicing, especially in treating situations of hardship and oppression, lest the sympathetic listener detect a spirit of anti-Sovietism—this is self-defeating. Respect for officials is also urged on grounds that they may have the respect of certain categories of listeners which RL would not want to alienate.

A corollary to this advice on understatement is the principal urging staff to avoid polemics with Soviet media. Such polemics are counterproductive; they divert attention from the central issue. Good technique, RL believes, requires discussion of problems on their own merits and focusing the attention of listeners on intrinsic matters and constructive solutions or proposals. Replies to attacks on RL from Soviet media should be kept at a minimum, RL feels; this too, is a diversion from essential broadcasting purposes. RL's regular output should be suffi-

ent defense of its positions, it says, and faith must be maintained in the ability of Soviet listeners to discriminate between Soviet propaganda and truth, and to perceive underlying realities and motivations. RL maintains strict policy control over replies to attack. Such replies must have approval.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, RL avoids using terms or phraseology in a pejorative manner that are considered acceptable to the Soviet listeners; it also avoids obsolete terminology. Large numbers of Soviet listeners maintain a positive view toward the distant goals of "Communism" and similarly regard the "October Revolution" as a progressive event. Pejorative use of such terms could antagonize certain listeners, RL feels, and thus ruin an otherwise effective script. RL, therefore, avoids such terms or carefully and factually explains their usage. Outmoded words are also avoided—words such as "Communist monolith" (which no longer exists), "Communist Satellite countries (the East European states are no longer "slavish satellites"), and such imprecise, ill-defined expressions as "capitalism vs. Communist," "East vs. West," "Free World" (all of which, RL feels, fail to take into account the extent of diversity in the world).<sup>53</sup>

What RL is presenting in these basic techniques is essentially common sense rules of good salesmanship. RL has a special "product" and a special "consumer": its appeal must be low pressure, reasonable, non-offensive, constructive; and its stance must be that of a helpful, tolerant, solicitous friend.

#### D. Other policy considerations

##### 1. Policy requirements relating to host countries

RL has transmitting installations in West Germany, Spain, and Taiwan. This is vital for RL in order to transmit its signal to the Soviet Union. But, this technical necessity imposes certain policy obligations on RL in its relationships with the host countries. One primary requirement is the assurance that RL will not include material in its broadcasts which could be harmful to the interests of the host governments and might embarrass RL in the conduct of its relations with those governments.

As a special requirement, RL also provides Spain with summaries of scripts on certain stipulated subject matter; it also maintains for a specified number of weeks tapes of broadcasts as they were actually being transmitted. This enables RL to maintain its own post-broadcast check but also to have tapes available for review by a host government.<sup>54</sup>

##### 2. Policy guidances on specific issues

RL's Policy Manual is the organization's basic statement of policy; it is RL's charter for operations. As such, it is a "living" document in that it attempts to capture a certain time-frame of the Soviet reality and then proceeds to address itself to the problems existing within that reality. In attempting to make this charter a continuing "living" document, RL periodically reconsiders certain relevant questions from a policy point of view and synthesizes its conclusions into more current formal policy statements and guidances. For longer range guidances, the end product takes on the form of Broadcast Position Statements; for others more immediate in nature they take the form of Broadcast Guidelines and Daily Guidance Notes. These important policy documents will be discussed in the next section on policymaking; their importance will be made further evident in Chapter IV on programming.

#### IV. Process of policy formulation

##### A. Responsibility for RL policy

##### 1. Role of President and Executive Director

The primary function of RL policy is to make sure that the programming produced by the radio systematically provides the So-

viet audience with objective, accurate and meaningful information in areas of importance to them; that it reflects the growth and plurality of views outside the Soviet Union; and that it corrects significant omissions and distortions in Soviet media.<sup>55</sup>

All members of RL staff contribute to policymaking and policy application, but the main role is played by President Sargeant and Executive Director Scott. From their offices in New York and Munich respectively they direct and review the formation of all policy and oversee policy operations on all levels. Both executives continually review the functioning of the policy process and examine RL's needs in a ever changing Soviet reality and world environment. On the basis of this review they provide whatever direction is needed to assure that RL is equipped with sound and comprehensive policy guidance.<sup>56</sup>

In exercising their executive responsibilities, Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Scott are kept regularly informed and systematically participate in the formulation of policy documents, reviewing draft documents at each stage of development, and maintaining close contacts with policy staff. A variety of regular reporting systems also serve to keep them informed of different aspects of the policy process and matters affecting it: daily telexed reports on RL programming production and Soviet media output pre-broadcast and post-broadcast additions, policy reviews, reviews by individuals and Soviet defectors, memoranda, schedules and other materials relating to RL's program planning, post-broadcast studies of program output and special reports prepared as circumstances warrant. In this way, therefore, Mr. Sargeant and Mr. Scott are able to give substantive direction to policy operations wherever indicated.<sup>57</sup> As the principal officers exercising executive authority over RL, they assume full responsibility for policy formation, policy execution, programming and overall effectiveness of RL's operations.

##### 2. Policy staff

The next level of responsibility in policy formulation lies within the Program Policy Division (PP) in Munich. This division includes a policy staff under Director Edward Van der Rhoer, the Research Department under Assistant Director Dr. Albert Bolter, the Library under Roy de Lon, and other supporting facilities. The rationale underlying this organizational structure is to integrate research and policy as closely as possible, the purpose being to enrich policy and insure its validity with continuing input of new research data. (For biographic sketches of Mr. Van der Rhoer and Dr. Bolter, see Appendix 1.)

In Munich, the Director of PPD, through his policy staff of about 10, exercises the chief operational responsibility for policy formulation and application. In New York, the Policy Coordinator actively participates in the formulation of current policy. Responsibility for carrying out all policy by the U.S. Division rests upon him. A Special Advisor assists the President in the formulation and coordination of basic policy. They act as the President's representatives for immediate and long-range policies, respectively.

RL's policy staff is made up of professionals, trained in Soviet affairs and generally having long experience in the field of international communication with the Soviet Union.<sup>58</sup> (See Appendix 1 for biographic sketches.) The importance of this staff in trying to realize the purposes of RL cannot be underestimated, for they must combine knowledge of Soviet affairs with an understanding of communications and an ability to project into the future policy and programming requirements of RL. Upon this group rests the responsibility not only of policy formation but policy maintenance, that is, to insure the creativeness and rele-

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stance of policy so that its viability as a composite of living ideas will continue and not fall into a state of static immobility.

A case in point are the suggestions Jon S. Lodeesen, a Policy Officer in Munich, made informally to Director Van der Rhoer on September 27, 1971. In a lengthy internal memorandum discussing revisions of the Policy Manual, Mr. Lodeesen suggested that RL get rid of its "vocabulary of various bits of combative terminology." He proposed that RL respond to a new incarnation with a different philosophy "which will draw attention to our positive value without making us seem more of an irritant than necessary." According to Mr. Lodeesen, this shift in policy emphasis required that RL get away from present cause and effect reasoning and description of its role and switch to one more nearly accurate in which "we describe change with all its random chance and problematical factors as the normal situation in the Soviet Union as elsewhere and our role not as a causative but as an influence on the parameters and probabilities of that change." In refining this point Mr. Lodeesen declared that RL should "seek to enhance the probability that change in the Soviet Union will move toward something compatible with the interests" of the Soviet audience and those of RL's supporters "and we seek to reduce the probability that changes can be introduced in the Soviet Union which would work against those interests." Mr. Lodeesen cautioned that RL should avoid the image of causing pressures or doing things likely to convince the Soviet people that RL does not understand.

The Director of PPD operates at all levels. This enables him to keep in close touch with policy as it takes shape and proceeds through the final broadcasting operations. He maintains a continuing close rapport with programmers, writers, news personnel and producers. The Director is present at all morning meetings, that is to say, the Research Meeting (which he chairs), the News Meeting, the Nationalities and Russian Services Meetings. At all meetings the Director plays an active policy role, for he has the authority to introduce policy guidances and raise questions of policy on the subject matter of programming under discussion.

An example of policy formulation in a news-breaking situation was the occasion of Communist China's admission to the United Nations on October 26, 1971 and the expulsion of Taiwan. The Director and his staff had already formulated a working paper of a policy guidance in a rough draft handwritten copy on the basis of early news reports and prior to the Research Meeting. The Director introduced it at the Research Meeting, and it was formally adopted as a Daily Guidance of policy. Notification of the guidance was made by the Director at subsequent morning meetings and copies were circulated to all writers, programmers and other interested staff. Briefly, the position taken by RL was one of expressing approval of Peking's admission as a step toward ending its isolation and improving conditions for peace, yet deploring the expulsion of Taiwan, a faithful and responsible member, as a violation of the universality principle upon which the United Nations is based. (For a copy of this policy guidance, see Appendix 5.)

To the outside observer, Mr. Lodeesen's concern seems somewhat exaggerated. Claims for credit in bringing about internal changes within the Soviet Union are only modestly stated in the Manual.<sup>60</sup> To discussions with leading RL staff both in New York and Munich, the response to questions on the extent of RL's impact on these changes was one of more identification with other larger internal forces of change. Still, the important point to be made here is that the Lodee-

sen memorandum reveals the extent to which RL's policy staff are consciously aware of the need for a constant rethinking of their assumptions and their formally stated policy positions.

## B. POLICY FORMULATION

### 1. Role of Director PPD

The primary operational responsibility for policy formulation rests upon Mr. Van der Rhoer in his capacity as Director of PPD. The Director plays a vital role in the formulation and application of policy. His primary responsibility in RL is to formulate and initiate policy, and oversee its implementation in programming and broadcasting. He must draw on many sources in policy formation: the Research Department, RL staff, outside specialists and many other available sources of expertise. He is essentially the synthesizer of all policy developed within RL from the larger long-range policy of the Policy Manual to the Monthly and Daily Guidances.

The role of RL should not be inferred as "causing" change, Mr. Lodeesen concluded, but rather in abetting the forces of change.<sup>60</sup>

On another occasion, the Policy Director intervened to raise a question of policy at a meeting of the Nationalities Services. The issue concerned a feature commemorating the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The script, as described, did not take into account the positive changes made in Hungary in recent years. The Director instructed the Nationalities Service Program Manager to have the script re-written, giving it this positive emphasis in keeping with RL policy.

On the occasion of the Russian Services meeting a question was raised about inaccuracies and possible policy violations in a script. The Director considered pulling the script, but with the aid of the Russian Services Program Manager, he made sufficient editorial changes to satisfy policy requirements and permit its use.

These few instances are cited merely to demonstrate the all-encompassing authority of the Director of PPD, for his is a key role not only in formulating policy but in introducing it in programming and ultimately broadcasting operations. Moreover, the morning meetings (to be discussed in detail in Chapter IV), take on a special importance in the policy process: they provide the Director of PPD with the opportunity to draw upon multiple sources of expertise for information and insights having a bearing on policy. These meetings, especially the Research Meetings, create an occasion for the generation of seminal thought and for its flow through the Director into policy and programming. This is a vital step in the policy process: it is creative, intellectual and essential for sound formation and effective programming.

### 2. Role of RL Staff

Policy planning is an integrated, shared activity; it is a continuing process in which all areas of RL are utilized and to which all major staff make a contribution. The central focus of operational authority may be the Director of PPD and his policy staff, but others in RL have roles to play and pressure to exert in the policy process. Such roles can be either formal or informal.

When the Director of PPD initiates a policy (usually of a longer range variety), a draft of the policy document is circulated for comments and criticism throughout RL to all key staff, namely, the heads of departments, senior researchers, and programmers. They all participate in policy formation; the extent of participation and influence depends upon the subject under consideration.

If, for example, a policy bears on the functions of news operations, then Mr. Lennart L. Savemark, head of the Central News Service, will, in consultation with his senior news staffers, play an important role in the final

formulation by providing observations and suggestions for improving the draft document. (For biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.)

If the policy statement under consideration relates to West Germany, as in the case of RL's recent policy on West German-Soviet relations, then Mr. Robert Redlich, RL's Information Advisor, will play an important role since one of his prime functions concerns RL's relations with the Bonn Government and the West German press.

And then, if policy deals with a specialized subject in the nationalities area, that staff, under the direction of Mr. Zbigniew S. Sztumpf, will play a key operational role. (For biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) As Mr. Sztumpf remarked, policy development is in large measure one of an interlocking relationship between PPD and staff specialists. Points of view are sought in the process of policy formation, he said, and in this way knowledgeable specialists have an opportunity to influence the shape and direction of policy.

Among other areas of lateral intake in the policy process is the Audience Research Department. According to Mr. Max Ralls, head of ARD, and Mr. George Perry, his assistant in Munich, ARD feeds data into the mainstream of RL thinking by circulating its audience research reports and program evaluations. (This will be discussed in Chapter VI.) In this way ARD provides one means for measuring audience feedback and programming effectiveness. Accordingly, they too contribute indirectly to the complex process of policy formation.

Moreover, many informal means exist in which staff enters into the policy process. Informality is a marked characteristic of RL's administrative style. This stimulates initiatives and fosters exchanges of ideas and information on an unstructured basis. As Mr. Diakowski, Program Manager of the Russian Services, observed, some policy guidances come from informal conversations with the PPD Director. (See Appendix 1 for biographic sketch.) Often times, Mr. Diakowski recounted, he will see a problem arising, then talk it over informally with Mr. Van der Rhoer, and from this informal exchange of views, a policy change will eventually take place and a guidance issued. Occasions for policy guidances usually occur, he said, in the usage of words in a policy area and the treatment of a particular subject, for example, admission of Peking to the U.N.

Policy advice is seriously sought from staff; this not a matter of top policymakers and executive staff appealing personnel by giving them an opportunity to speak with no intention on their part of listening much less acting. According to Mr. Victor Frank, one of RL's senior Russian commentators, there were times when staff did not agree with policy, took issue, and in some instances won. (See Appendix 1 for biographic sketch.) He cited the case of a samizdat document from multiple groups in the Soviet Union that had a strong fascist flavor. PPD felt that this document should be broadcast, in keeping with RL's principle of giving all views. However, some RL staff argued against using it because of the profound negative feelings among the Soviet people arising from their wartime experiences. To broadcast such extremist views, they felt, would be counterproductive.<sup>61</sup> PPD conceded, and the idea of using the document was shelved.

A final organizational mechanism in the policy process is the Council of Editors in Munich. Constituting the chief editors of the 11 desks, the Council confers every week or so in a formal meeting and reviews and discusses drafts of policy declarations. When a fully agreed draft is finally concurred in by the Council of Editors, it is passed on to the Executive Director for his approval and then to the President in New York.



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## C. TYPES OF POLICY FORMULATIONS

## 1. Long-Term Guidance

## a. Policy Manual and National Language Annexes

The basic framework of RL program policy is set forth and recorded in a series of different types of policy statements and on successive levels of significance. They are designed to assure consistency in program output, to provide broad approaches which give RL the initiative in projecting information to the audience beyond just responding to Soviet media and world development on a daily basis, and to give staff direct and personal guidance as they pursue their efforts to achieve the purposes of RL.

Policy formulations are divided into two major categories, those dealing with long-term guidance, and those that focus on immediate or short-term guidance. In the realm of long-term guidance, the RL Policy Manual is the major policy document. As noted above, the Policy Manual is RL's operational charter. It sets forth the basic rationale and purpose of RL's broadcasting activities and defines RL's specific role in relation to the audience, its long-range and immediate informational objectives, and further sets forth the essential methods and techniques by which these goals are to be achieved. The Policy Manual is, in brief, the mainspring for all policy formulation, the central authority determining audience priorities, program content, and the nature of RL's approaches in program structure, style and tone.<sup>63</sup>

Appended to the Policy Manual is a series of National Language Annexes for each language service. They supplement the Policy Manual with specific commentaries on the unique aspects of broadcasts in the given language. These annexes determine for each nationality any special goals or emphasis, specific policy lines, and distinctive audience characteristics. The annexes also state RL's policy lines on any territorial questions and historical topics of particular importance only to the given national audience.<sup>64</sup>

The following excerpt from the National Language Annex relating to Armenian broadcasts suggests the special value of these annexes in dealing with all the nationalities. Linguistic Russification is one device the Soviets have used in attempting to erode the sense of national consciousness among the Soviet nationalities. This statement sets forth RL policy on this issue:

"RL's Armenian broadcasts recognize that language is a strong indicator of national sentiment and that the language question constitutes one of the principal grievances of many Armenians concerning Soviet policy toward Armenia. These broadcasts are aimed at encouraging the Armenian people to preserve their language as a prime element of their culture and to evolve their own language patterns and expand the use of Armenian, while resisting Soviet attempts to assimilate them. The Armenian Service attempts to encourage and sustain indigenous pressures on behalf of the Armenian language by reporting back and cross-reporting significant or parallel developments affecting language and policies, and by its own broadcasts of Armenian literary texts. While following closely any evolutionary trends in the Armenian language, the Armenian Service does not attempt to set itself up as arbiter of good Armenian language or to lead the campaign for purification of the Armenian language. It does not support Russification and sympathizes with indigenous efforts for purification of the language, but at the same time it recognizes that all languages incorporate words from other languages as part of a natural process. By its own output, the Armenian Service reflects an awareness of this distinction between such natural changes and unnatural, arbitrary consequences of official policies. The main emphasis of the Ar-

menian Service is on the right of the Armenian people to use and develop their language. The Armenian people themselves must, through changes in accepted usage, determine the kind of Armenian language they prefer.<sup>65</sup>

## b. Broadcast Position Statements

In a series of thematic papers RL tries to make more specific the central elements, intentions and appraisals spelled out in the Policy Manual. Where the Manual is generalized, these papers are more specific. Called Broadcast Position Statements, they provide a general overview of the major issues within the Soviet Union, the world at large and specific areas of the world where RL has some concern in its programming output.

The formulation of these statements are preceded by the preparation of background studies on each topic by an authority or competent specialist on the subject. In these studies the specialist deals with the basic trends and salient factors regarding the given issue which should be taken into account in designing RL broadcasts:

Upon these background studies are based RL Broadcast Position Statements. They determine RL's position on each issue, the broadcasting objectives and the significant approaches and treatment for RL programming output. They take into account the needs of the Soviet audience and their understanding of the subject matter; they determine what informational gaps are to be filled, distortions corrected and new information and ideas provided.<sup>66</sup>

On April 5, 1971, an important RL Broadcast Position Statement was prepared on the issue of, "European Security." This paper is appended to this study as Appendix 2.<sup>67</sup>

## c. Broadcast Guidances

A third category of long-term guidances is the Broadcast Guidances. These policy papers treat certain major but more limited topics which have particularly immediate importance to programming. They signal opportunities to RL staff, provide a basic stance, and determine objectives and treatment on current broadcast subjects.

Among the recent issues for such treatment are the 24th Congress of the CPSU, Anti-Semitism in the USSR, Rule of Law, Landing on the Moon, Sino-Soviet Conflict, United Nations Human Rights Documents, and certain special contingencies such as on the occasion of Khrushchev's death. Broadcast Guidances are also produced on operational questions where consistency of practice is required, for example, in programs dealing with listener mail or the use of samizdat.<sup>68</sup>

On May 27, 1969, RL produced a Broadcast Guidance relating to the "Landing on the Moon" that was to occur on or about July 18, 1969. Two of the main points emphasized in this guidance were: (1) that the successful landing was an achievement for all mankind not just for the United States; and (2) that the landing pointed out again the necessity of space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union as a step forward creating mutual understanding, improving relations, and lessening the dangers of war. This Broadcast Guidance is appended to this study as Appendix 3.<sup>69</sup>

## 2. Immediate guidance

## a. Monthly guidelines

Long-term guidances are supplemented by current policy guidance on a day-to-day basis. They take the form of Monthly Guidelines and Daily Guidance Notes. Both are intended to relate larger policy to specific current developments and provide policy guidance to meet the operational requirements of RL staff.

Monthly Guidelines are based on an assessment of major news trends and are prepared in Munich, with contributions from New York. They represent an effort to apply

existing long-range guidance by incorporating it into programming suggestions. They are based on research about events likely to be suitable for broadcast treatment during the coming month. An outgrowth of regular discussions with desk chiefs and programmers, these guidelines form the basis for specific plans for feature programs.<sup>70</sup>

An example of RL's Monthly Guidelines for November 1971 is appended to the study as Appendix 4. This Guideline is divided into three major parts. Part I deals with general matters such as the 35th Anniversary of the "Stalin Constitution"; the first anniversary since the trial of Valentin Moroz, the Ukrainian historian and author of several samizdat works; the first anniversary on November 15 when the Committee on Rights of Man was established by Sakharov, Chaldize, and Tverdokhlebov; the 150th Anniversary of Dostoyevsky's Birth; and finally the first anniversary (November 12th) of Rostropovich's letter in defense of Solzhenitsyn. Part II of the Guidelines deals particularly with the Nationalities Services and calls attention to staff of significant developments and anniversaries. Part III of the Guidelines is a Bibliographical Supplement prepared by RL's Library Staff, citing numerous sources in the Library's collection on the "Stalin Constitution." The purpose of this bibliographical effort is to assist researchers, writers and programmers in the preparation of materials for broadcast dealing with this anniversary.<sup>71</sup>

## b. Daily guidance notes

The second form of short-term guidance is the Daily Guidance Notes. This guidance is formulated in Munich, usually on a daily basis, or whenever the need arises, and provides policy guidance on current, fast-breaking news topics. This guidance is based on an assessment of current news and Soviet media output as interpreted within RL's objectives. Its purpose is to identify areas of immediate interest or importance to RL programming and make suggestions for treatment. Daily Guidance Notes are telexed in time for a review at the opening of business in the New York headquarters. New York staff forward any comments, suggestions or contributions by telex for inclusion in the next day's guidance.<sup>72</sup>

An example of RL's use of a Daily Guidance Note is that of October 26, 1971, concerning the admission of Peking to the U.N. Appended to this study as Appendix 5 is a copy of Daily Guidance Note #18, giving the guideline on China's admission to the United Nations and a script in the original Russian and translated into English, showing the form in which the guideline was incorporated into a script and broadcast to the Soviet Union.

## c. Special memoranda

A final form of immediate policy guidance is the Special Memoranda. Whenever specific aspects of policy implementations suggest a need, the Director of PFD issues memoranda dealing with general matters of tone, treatment or balance affecting news operations and the preparation of program features.<sup>73</sup>

## D. RL: A POLICY-ORIENTED ORGANIZATION

## 1. RL's Policy Handbook

RL's Policy Handbook is at once the organization's "bible" and "biblical commentary": it provides the visible structure for policy within which the organization operates; it contains the final word on what can be done and not done, written and not written, said and not said, in RL's broadcasting operations.

A covering memorandum by Director of PFD Van der Rhoer introduces the reader to the Handbook, giving instructions on its use. A prominent place is set aside at the beginning for the Policy Manual, followed by the Nationalities Annexes, Broadcast Position Statements and Broadcast Guidances.

Key executive staff have personal copies of the Handbook; a floating copy is made available for staff consultation.

#### 2. RL Policy: Surety or Sufficiency?

However, the Handbook really represents only the physical reality of what exists in a less tangible form throughout RL, and that is, the spirit of policy that permeates the organization. RL is a policy-oriented organization in which, as one staffman put it, staff absorbs policy through osmosis—its mandate and rules for operations from script writing through programming to production. RL staff cannot escape policy; it is a vital part of their organizational livelihood.

Total dependence—indeed, interdependence—on policy generates a consultative and cooperative spirit that permeates the entire organization. For, policy formulation, as shown above, is a shared experience of staff, and this in turn generates what Director Van der Rhoer referred to as a "continuing rapport" and a "genuine cooperative element" within the organization that has developed over the years. In large measure, the existence of this positive attitude justifies faith in an administrative style that fosters individual independence and stresses reliance upon staff professionalism in policy formulation and policy execution.

Thus, RL staffers are policy-minded; the habit is deeply engrained. And no doubt policy imparts an inner organizational discipline that insures effective programming and protects against error. Yet, the question must always be present: Is there too much policy? Are the controls too tight? Is it not possible that creativity and staff initiative are inadvertently being stifled? Is it not possible, as one senior staffman suggested, that the time has come for a loosening up of policy control and allowing even greater individual independence?

These are important, perhaps vital questions, but no doubt they are counterbalanced by an awareness of the inherent risks of too loose a policy structure in dealing with a configuration of power of such awesomeness as the Soviet Union. Yet, the policy structure is there for achieving the proper balance if indeed this is a relevant question.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 2. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>2</sup> Radio Liberty Policy Manual, March 1971, p. 29. (RL, v. IV, pt. 4.)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. 30-31.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 11. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in, RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 21. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> RL policy, June 8, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>16</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 11. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Sosin, Gene. *The role of Radio Liberty. In, Propaganda and the cold war: a Princeton University symposium.* John Boardman Whitton, ed. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs press, 1963. p. 96.

<sup>20</sup> RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 5. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>21</sup> RL Policy Manual, March 1971, p. 2 (RL, v. IV, pt. 4.)

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> RL Policy Manual, March 1971, p. 7 (RL, v. IV, pt. 4.)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pp. 10-11.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 11-12.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>41</sup> RL Policy Manual, March 1971, p. 13. (RL, v. IV, pt. 4.)

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-40.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>55</sup> RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>59</sup> In defining RL's role, the Manual states: "... Radio Liberty exerts a political influence affecting to some degree the evolution of Soviet society..." (Policy Manual, March 1971, p. 4. RL, v. IV, pt. 4.)

<sup>60</sup> Lodeesen to Van der Rhoer, RL memorandum, September 27, 1971. Mr. Lodeesen urged that RL refrain from giving the simple answer to the simple question: "What are you trying to do?"; but rather should respond along the following line:

"The Soviet Union's efforts to compete with the West have led to a great many changes in the structure of their society. A higher level of education, professional requirements for scientists to maintain contact with developments in the West, a higher priority on the capacity for original thinking are some of the more obvious factors. In the West we deal with such changes through a variety of institutions guaranteed to us by law or which crop up in response to emerging situations. Press, courts, demonstrations, community clubs are all part of this. Sometimes they work well and sometimes they don't. In the Soviet Union the regime denies the populace access to these instruments of change so that compared with our mixed record they have virtually no record of introducing change as a result of spontaneous reaction. In the past the system survived because the regime exercised a total monopoly over all institutions and could resort to random secret terror as a demonstration of its resolve. Today the regime still holds tightly to all the instruments within its reach. The combination no longer works, however, since at least one instrument is now beyond their reach, the dissemination of information. Terror cannot be secret. People cannot be made to believe.

"RL's function is to assure the maximum possible effectiveness of this instrument for change by preventing it from again becoming in any regard a monopoly of the regime. We go beyond the role of the national voices such as VOA or BBC which introduce information from the outside and do everything we can to disseminate that information which a free press or free radio would disseminate, discuss, debate within the Soviet Union if such institution existed there. We believe that if such institutions did exist in the Soviet Union the resultant political developments, whatever they might be, would

be an improvement for the citizens of the Soviet Union and for other nations. Willingly the various forces trying for controlled change, spontaneous change, regressive change, violent change, peaceful change, change through compromise will continue to function in the Soviet Union. RL will not be the cause of the changes which finally result. Our role—and it is a very important one—is to contribute to the chances that those seeking democratic solutions to the problems facing the USSR will be able to exert a beneficial influence. To this end we seek to popularize the ideas and contribute to discussion on the issues which confront those who are interested or could become interested in democratic solutions."

<sup>61</sup> An incipient issue began to emerge in October over the handling of Solzhenitsyn's new novel, "August 1914." Some staff did not share the enthusiasm of some Western observers over the high literary quality of this work compared with the brilliance of his earlier works. At an informal discussion the issue arose in the form of a question as to how RL should report these mixed views. One group felt that negative observations should be reported; another group, including a Russian who only recently emigrated to the West, felt this would be unfair to Solzhenitsyn since this new work constitutes only one piece of a much larger historical mosaic that he is preparing and to judge the work on the basis of this one piece would be unfair. Moreover, it was pointed out that it would be counterproductive to RL's purposes to report sharp criticism of a man of Solzhenitsyn's stature in the eyes of the Soviet people when the evidence upon which a just judgment can be made is still inconclusive.

<sup>62</sup> RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 5. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>64</sup> RL Policy Manual, Annex., Armenian broadcasts, January 19, 1970, p. 6. (RL, v. XIII, pt. 2.)

<sup>65</sup> RL policy formulation, June 1971, p. 6. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>66</sup> RL Program Policy Division. European security. Broadcast Position Statement, April 5, 1971, 6 p. (RL, v. XIII, pt. 3.)

<sup>67</sup> RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>68</sup> RL Program Policy Division. Landing on the Moon. Broadcast Guidance, May 27, 1969. 2 p. (RL, v. XIII, pt. 4.)

<sup>69</sup> RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>70</sup> RL Monthly Guidelines for November 1971, Parts I, II, and III.

<sup>71</sup> RL Daily Guidance Note #18, October 26, 1971, with script in Russian and English, "The Acceptance of the Chinese Peoples Republic in the UN." (RL, v. XIII, pt. 5.)

<sup>72</sup> RL policy formulation, June 18, 1971, p. 3. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

#### CHAPTER III: CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE RECEPTION OF RL'S BROADCASTS

##### I. COMMUNICATIONS FACTORS

###### A. Number of shortwave sets

Certain conditions exist within the Soviet Union that affect the reception of RL's broadcasts. These conditions include, first of all, the technical capability of the Soviet people to receive RL's shortwave radio signal, and, secondly, their willingness to listen to RL's message.

The number of radios available to the Soviet people is considerable. In 1969, there were an estimated 50 million radio receivers in the Soviet Union. Statistics on shortwave receivers are not published by the Government, but between 28-30 million of the 50 million were believed to be shortwave receivers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Census, there are approximately 55 million households in the USSR. (The total population is nearly 244 million.) Thus, RL calculates that roughly one out of every two Soviet households has a shortwave receiver.<sup>1</sup>

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In the Soviet Union, unlike in the United States where shortwave is not widely used in public broadcasting, shortwave transmission is a necessity to cover vast distances in domestic broadcasting. Moreover, the broadcasting system is state operated. There are no local stations in the sense that they exist in the United States. Hence, the utility and popularity of shortwave transmission.

Apparently, purchasing a radio in the Soviet Union offers no great problem. In 1967, an RL staffer reported at a conference, "... our information suggests that anyone in the Soviet Union who wants a shortwave set can get it." A recent newcomer from the Soviet Union commented in Munich that there are many transistor radios available that are imported from Japan and West Germany. They are expensive, and they can be purchased on the open market.

Radios with a shortwave capability are much in demand, and the few models of transistor sets receiving shortwave, the Spidola and the Transistor-10, quickly disappear from the stores.<sup>8</sup> The Spidola is the most popular receiver in the Soviet Union today. Demands for this set are considerable; it has 7 bands, long wave, medium wave and 5 shortwave bands, being down to 25 meters. Soviet domestic broadcasts go as low as the 25 meter band, but sets on the market go no lower than that. This is sufficient, however, for international reception, though the best reception is from still shorter waves. Since 1958, the production of commercially available shortwave ranges below 25 meters has been discontinued—presumably, in an effort to curb listening to foreign broadcasts. Soviet citizens wanting to listen to foreign radio broadcasts, get around this restriction by "doctoring" their sets. It is a common practice to buy a radio with a wave length down to 25 meters and rewind the condenser to make it capable of receiving shorter waves.<sup>4</sup>

RL has, therefore, a sizeable potential audience in the Soviet Union that has the technical capability of getting its signal. Lewis S. Feuer, Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, observed that, "Even allowing for exaggeration and defective equipment, we may still estimate that millions of Russians have access to Western broadcasts."<sup>5</sup>

Equally important as the availability of shortwave receivers in the Soviet Union is the capability of RL transmitters to reach those receivers. Since the Soviet population is not uniformly distributed over its more than 8 million square miles of land mass but is predominately concentrated in the Western portions, RL's task of reaching its listening audience from its European transmitter bases is made considerably easier. The Lampertheim station, because of its relatively close proximity to Soviet borders, is best suited for covering the areas deep within European Russia, while the Pals station is best suited for covering the more westerly regions. The transmitter at Taiwan covers the population centers of the Soviet Far East. It is estimated that audible signals reaching the Soviet Union from the Spanish site at Pals cover areas containing 200 million Soviet inhabitants. (For the coverage of the Pals transmitters, see figures 6 and 7.) Transmissions from the Lampertheim base are audible to an estimated 140 million Soviet inhabitants. (See Figure 5.) RL's transmitter on Taiwan covers the extreme eastern portions of the Soviet Union, producing audible signals in areas containing approximately three million Soviet inhabitants. (See Figure 8).<sup>6</sup>

#### B. Tape Recorders for Magnitizdat and Program Propagation

Less exact than estimates of shortwave radios in the Soviet Union are estimates on the number of tape recorders. The importance of tape recorders in RL's broadcasting operations arises from the new form of samizdat called, "magnitizdat." This new phe-

nomenon in the Soviet dissident movement will be discussed in Chapter IV, but suffice it to say at this point that it is a technique of tape recording of protest songs and other dissident material and circulating it within a circle of friends. Magnitizdat has reached the West, and RL broadcasts it back to the Soviet Union, thus expanding the potential range of its audience. But, equally important, tape recorders could be used to record RL's programs for later listening and circulation among friends. Conceivably, RL's reading of Solzhenitsyn's "First Circle" would be the type of program that would be taped.

In this way, therefore, tape recording contributes to conditions broadening the potential audience for RL's broadcasts. But, unfortunately, the potential of RL's influence through the use of tape recorders cannot be accurately measured because recent statistics on Soviet production figures are not available. The 1964 edition of *Promyshlennost SSSR: statistichesky sbornik* gives the following gross production figures: 1957, 59,000 units; 1958, 70,800; 1959, 99,700; 1960, 127,600; 1961, 149,300; and 1962, 195,000.<sup>7</sup> This amounts to a total gross production of 701,400 during the six-year period, 1957-1962.

Projecting into the future the available production figures for 1957-1962 and their growth trend, a level of annual production of approximately 500,000 units would be reached by 1973. This projection would indicate a total accumulation of over 4.5 million units in use in 1973. However, this projection does not take into consideration a range of essentially unaccountable factors among which are, the rate of depreciation of the units which are low in industrial priority and low in quality, the level of Soviet exports, the number of tape recorders imported, and the durability of those produced.<sup>8</sup>

That the Soviet Government has been aware of the need to improve production of tape recorders was indicated in an *Izvestia* article of April 4, 1967. The article referred to a resolution accepted by the Soviet Ministers of the USSR, calling attention to the fact that the volume of production of tape recorders "does not satisfy the growing population needs"; that the quality of those manufactured was "inferior to those from abroad"; that the assortment was "inadequate"; that there were none available for foreign language study; that there were no miniature tape recorders; and finally, that the production of tapes was "in very poor condition." The article went on to say that the Government instructed the interested ministries to prepare and approve before May 1, 1967, a plan for the improvement of tape recorders. It declared that the responsible ministries "must take action to satisfy the needs of sales organizations and repair shops for spare parts for tape recorders." The Ministry of Chemical Industry, it concluded, "is urgently responsible for preparing a plan to increase the production of tapes and the improvement of their quality."<sup>9</sup>

Apparently, improvements in the Soviet supply of tape recorders have occurred during the insular years. A recent newcomer from the Soviet Union observed that there was no problem in getting a tape recorder in the USSR, though they are expensive. It is just a matter of going to a store and buying one. Many are imported from Germany and Japan. What is difficult to get, however, is the tape.<sup>10</sup>

Another imponderable in estimating the number of tape recorders in the Soviet Union is the extent to which Soviet citizens themselves build their own sets. Skilled technicians in the broadcasting field could build a serviceable set, despite the difficulty of constructing a good recording head. That the Soviet people engage in this type of activity is indicated by the fact that Soviet hobby magazines like *Radio* (circulation, how to build a home tape recorder.)<sup>11</sup>

It is apparent, therefore, that while it may be difficult to ascertain the number of tape recorders in the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to assume, nonetheless, that recorders are available, perhaps even in increasing numbers, and accordingly contributes a small but significant part to those internal Soviet conditions that are favorable to RL's broadcasting operations.

#### C. Rumor Network

The rumor network, that is, person-to-person word-of-mouth communication, is the third means of internal communication within the Soviet Union that broadens the potential of RL's audience.

To a great extent the existence of an unofficial network of oral communication has been the result of the Soviet regime's communications policy and its principles of propaganda. Thus, the regime itself is responsible for elevating what would ordinarily be an incidental source of information to the status of a parallel system of communications beyond official control. According to Raymond A. Bauer and David B. Gleicher, long time specialists on Soviet public opinion and communications policy, thanks to this independent system, apparently well established over the years, "the initial audience or readership gets multiplied much more rapidly than it would in another society." What makes this especially relevant to the goals and purposes of RL, which directs its energies at the nation's elite as a prime audience, is that in the judgment of these scholars, "the most highly placed groups in the system are most convinced of the reliability of word-of-mouth information." They concluded, therefore, that unofficial word-of-mouth communication must be considered "a major channel" for the transmission of news and other information in the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup>

During the Stalinist period the rumor network was especially strong, effective, and reliable. The classic illustration to prove this point is the report of M. Kasenkina's so-called "leap to freedom" in 1948 through the window of the Soviet consulate in New York. No Soviet media carried the story, yet it was known by alert people throughout the Soviet Union in 48 hours.<sup>13</sup> According to Dr. Ethel de Sola Pool, a leading American specialist on Soviet communications and audience research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the rumor network is still an important means of interpersonal communications. Writing in 1965 and commenting particularly on the diffusive and self-corrective aspects of the rumor network, he said: "In the present situation where one person in two or three has access to direct foreign news, in any small circle of friends or co-workers there will typically be several who have heard any major item, can diffuse, discuss, or correct it."<sup>14</sup>

A current appraisal, similarly positive in its judgment on the value of word-of-mouth communication, was made by Max Ralis, RL's Director of Audience Research. (For a biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) He expressed the view that the Soviet rumor network is still a "vigorous operation." "It works," he said; it is a "personal type of communication, and this is important." He described a typical situation in which unsponsored news and information are transmitted in the Soviet Union: "When people get together at work in what is the equivalent of the American coffee break, they ask each other, 'What's new?' and from there the transmission of information begins." Mr. Ralis left no doubt that this type of interpersonal exchange continues to be a valuable means of communicating officially unsponsored information within the Soviet Union.

For foreign broadcasters like RL, the network of "word-of-mouth" communication performs an important service: it is an effective instrumentality for multiple trans-

mission, and thus magnifies the propagation of officially restricted news and information transmitted by radio. It enables the Soviet citizen to find out things and form opinions that the regime does not want circulated. It is, therefore, at once an addition to, a substitute for and a corrective of the official media. Moreover, the experience of RL reinforces the judgments of Bauer and Gleicher that the Soviet "populace itself values the unofficial network highly."<sup>15</sup>

## II. DISSENTING SOVIET INTELLECTUALS

### A. Demands for freedom of thought

Judging by the content of samizdat (to be discussed in Chapter IV) and the testimony of former Soviet citizens and Western scholars close to the Soviet scene, there seems little doubt that RL has a wide audience among a very specialized but potentially powerful Soviet group, namely, the dissenting Soviet intellectuals.

The reason for dissent within this elite sector of Soviet society can be explained largely by the fact that many Soviet intellectuals, that is, the writers, scientists and other professionals among the creative intelligentsia, are most affected by the regime's effective methods of thought control. Intellectuals thrive on the exchange of ideas. Their creative nature, and the practical necessity, especially in the sciences, of building upon efforts and achievements of others, compels them to seek other sources of thought and data. When frustrated in these efforts, they dissent and as their frustration grows, their attention is directed progressively to other areas of inequity within Soviet society, namely, shortcomings of the regime in economic affairs, abuse of civil rights, and the oppression of national minorities and religious freedom. And so, the movement of dissent, feeding upon an accumulation of grievances, grows and spreads throughout Soviet society. "It is no accident," says the RL statement describing this process of evolving dissent, that the intellectuals "have been in forefront of the Soviet Union's burgeoning movement for human rights."<sup>16</sup>

### B. Appeals of RL for Soviet intellectuals

The growth of a full-scale movement of intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union has created for RL an audience of importance which it has cultivated in a special way. RL has become the prime broadcaster of works by these intellectual dissenters. Acting as a public forum of free discussion, RL broadcasts their thoughts and their works back to the Soviet Union, thus enlarging in geometric proportions the potential area of internal circulation and enlarging as well the potential appeal of RL among the Soviet audience.

"No longer do the devices of a police state successfully keep the Soviet citizens in the dark," wrote Dr. Pool a few years ago.<sup>17</sup> And today, this is especially true for the creative intelligentsia. The appeal of RL is evident in observations by audience research specialists who affirm that many Soviet university educators are known to listen regularly to Russian language foreign broadcasts. And within the intelligentsia, RL's commitment to political gradualism within the Soviet Union has struck a responsive chord. This was apparent in an appraisal of foreign radio broadcasting by a member of the Soviet scientific intelligentsia who regarded foreign broadcasts as necessary to pave the way for changes in Soviet society. Many things have yet to be changed, he observed, but it is a slow process, and at this juncture the Soviet people are not yet politically mature.<sup>18</sup>

## III. SOVIET CENSORSHIP: RL'S OPPORTUNITY

### A. Totality of Censorship

What creates RL's greatest potential audience appeal, and thus opportunity, is no doubt the role of censorship in the Soviet Union. Soviet censorship is near total; its

effects are far-reaching, for censorship leaves the Soviet citizen with a mental image of reality that is like a fragmented mosaic where half the pieces are missing. Perhaps, the totality of Soviet censorship was best described by the former Soviet journalist Leonid Vladimirov, now a full-time RL staffer:

Not a single thing can be printed in the Soviet Union, whether it be a book or a postage stamp, a newspaper or a label for a bottle, a magazine or a candy-wrapper, unless it has been approved by the censor. No radio transmission is beamed, no public exhibition is opened for public view until an official stamp has approved it.<sup>19</sup>

Censorship is more than strictly an administrative technique in running the Soviet state; it is an all-pervading force of intellectual oppression. As one of the principal weapons of the Soviet regime in maintaining its monopoly of power, it has far-reaching political and ideological ramifications. The survival of the party and preservation of the political position of the ruling elite depend upon success in maintaining this monopoly of power and information; and it is the primary instrumentality for ideological control over the Soviet people. Censorship represents a determined effort by the regime to isolate the Soviet people from independent sources of knowledge and information. It attempts thereby to mold the Soviet citizen according to the requirements of Soviet ideology.

In describing the elaborate system of Soviet censorship, the RL statement declares: "In the Soviet Union words are the chief articles of contraband."<sup>20</sup> Indeed they are, for oppositional messages are banned; only approved ideas are permitted to flow into the public domain; deviations, ever so slight, are not tolerated. Communist communications theory places a higher value on the social function of communication than it does on the value of truth.<sup>21</sup> In a closed society like the Soviet Union's, those in power invariably try to limit ideas and information that reach its citizens and pass on only as much outside information through the distorting prism of Communist ideology as they believe suitable for their purposes.

Soviet censorship is so intense that the regime attempts not only to determine what information and ideas shall pass through regime media but also determine who shall have access to what information and ideas. And as Bauer and Gleicher wrote: "It even makes serious efforts to deprive the Soviet citizen of the sacred privilege of not reading and not listening."<sup>22</sup>

In brief, communications in the Soviet Union is an adjunct of political organization and censorship the principal instrumentality for control.

### B. Effects of censorship on RL's appeal

No doubt RL's appeal, and that of other foreign broadcasts, is magnified by the totality of Soviet censorship; for in seeking to give an alternative view of reality, RL offers an opportunity that is denied the Soviet people, namely, to exercise and to satisfy the human instinct for knowledge and information.<sup>23</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The shortwave audience, p. 1. (RL, v. III, Annex J.)

<sup>2</sup> RL, Communicating with Soviet Youth. A Conference Sponsored Jointly by New York University and Radio Liberty, March 10-11, 1967, New York, RL Information Division, 1967, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ithiel de Sola Pool, Opportunities for change: communications with the U.S.S.R. Paper delivered at the Workshop on Communications with the Peoples of the U.S.S.R. Radio Liberty-New York University, November 20, 1965, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Feuer, Lewis S. The intelligentsia in opposition, Problems of communism, v. 19, Nov.-

Dec. 1970:10, quoted in, RL statement, June 14, 1971, p. 9a. (RL, v. I.) Prof. Feuer writes that according to Soviet statistics there are 86,500,000 radio sets in the Soviet Union and of these an estimated 27,000,000 are believed to be capable of receiving shortwave broadcasts from abroad.

<sup>6</sup> The Soviet shortwave audience, p. 1. (RL, v. III, Annex J.)

<sup>7</sup> The information in this section on tape recorders was provided by Mr. Roy De Lon of RL. (De Lon to Klump, Interoffice Memorandum, RL, Munich Office, Oct. 14, 1971, with appendices. In, RL, v. XVII, pt. 2.)

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> An indication of the problem of getting tape at an earlier time was evident in the report in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* of December 1966 (p. 33) which said in part: "It is rumored that magnetic tape recorders will soon be sold in furniture stores. Magnetic tape is very hard to get; without it, however, the tape recorder is only useful as a piece of furniture. At present, statistics indicate that the distribution of tapes in relation to machines is one half a reel per recorder. Even this small amount of magnetic tape available for purchase cannot be bought just like that." The article continues with a satirical commentary on the shortage of tape. (Quoted in, De Lon Memorandum, Oct. 14, 1971.)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Bauer, Raymond A. and David B. Gleicher. Word-of-mouth Communication in the Soviet Union. In, Dexter, Lewis Anthony and David Manning White. People, Society, and Mass Communications. New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 426 and 417.

<sup>13</sup> Poole, Opportunities for Change: Communications with the U.S.S.R., p. 3. Dr. Poole made this comment on the essence of rumor and its plausibility: "Rumor may thus be a reasonably reliable source as Russians themselves rated it in Bauer's study."

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>15</sup> Bauer and Gleicher, op. cit., p. 426.

<sup>16</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 10. (RL, V. I.)

<sup>17</sup> Pool, Opportunities for change: communications with the U.S.S.R., RL-NYU Conference, 1965, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> Nikita Struve, Professor of Russian Literature at Nanterre, wrote: "That Radio Liberty is listened to by many, many people in the Soviet Union, and especially the intellectuals, is proved by the reactions that I myself have always had from any interview which I have given to this station. These reactions are not only numerous, but also perceptive and well reasoned." Other scholars have made similar statements. (RL statement, June 14, 1971, p. 35, v. I.)

<sup>19</sup> RL statement, June 14, 1971, p. 6. (RL, v. I.) For a full discussion of Soviet censorship, see the symposium, The Soviet Censorship. Studies on the Soviet Union. Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, v. 11, no. 2, 1971, 148 p. See also, Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union, pp. 123-133.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>21</sup> Pool, Ithiel de Sola. The Mass Media and Their Interpersonal Social Functions in the Process of Modernization. In, Dexter and White, People, Society, and mass communications, p. 433.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 414.

<sup>23</sup> Quotations from Samizdat, p. 10. (RL, v. II, pt. D 4.) Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, gave the following explanation of censorship in the Soviet bloc and its effect on public policy: "Domestic media in the USSR and Eastern Europe speak with a single voice, commonly omitting or distorting coverage of events about which the public has every need to know. In place of full news accounts, questioning editorials, and independent commentary, the daily fare never challenges policies or goals set by the governments nor asks



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how wisely the public's money is being spent. A public so deprived of essential information has difficulty in finding ways to promote its own interests with respect either to domestic or to foreign issues." The supporters of RFE/RL argue that these radios fill that information gap created by censorship. (SFRG, RFE/RL Report, p. 19.)

#### CHAPTER IV: RL'S PROGRAMMING: AUDIENCE CHARACTERISTICS, PROCEDURES SUMMARIZED, AND PHENOMENON OF SAMIZDAT

##### I. AUDIENCE CHARACTERISTICS

#### A. RL's Assumptions Regarding Its Audience

##### 1. Elitist Approach to Public Opinion Formation

In trying to communicate by the spoken word with the near 244 million Soviet people who themselves speak some 107 separate languages, RL has an especially difficult task, and expectations of success must be fraught with uncertainty, even with the knowledge that its signal can reach 82% of the total Soviet population.<sup>1</sup> In rationalizing its tasks in order to maximize its effectiveness, RL makes certain assumptions about its audience. These assumptions take into account the attitudes not only of social, occupational, and intellectual groups in all the republics and oblasts of the Soviet Union, but also the attitudes of the various nationalities to which RL broadcasts and certain differing psychological categories within these groups.

RL tries to reach as broad an audience as possible, but as a communicator with political purposes in mind (and having limited resources), it must direct its broadcasting energies primarily at those elements in Soviet society which now or in the future may exercise political influence. More likely than the lower orders of Soviet society these politically alert groups will be the potential decision-makers of the future and more likely will also have access to shortwave radios.<sup>2</sup>

RL's approach is, therefore, elitist: it aims at the top.

##### 2. Social, Occupational, and Intellectual Groups

###### a. The younger generation

On the basis of political and sociological studies and audience research data, RL visualizes its potential audience as being divided into three major categories: (1) social, occupational and intellectual groups; (2) the Nationalities; and (3) a psychological category of listeners.

Of primary importance in the first category is the youth. This group matured after the Stalin era. Many will eventually achieve positions of responsibility. Many are now seeking greater freedom, demanding a better life for the Soviet people. They are skeptical about Marxist-Leninist ideology and its promises of a future "good life" and Communism. A generational conflict plagues this group, disenchanted with their parents who were cowed by Stalinist terror: here is one of the chief problems of the post-Stalin regimes.

The younger generation is divided, however, between the political activists, those careerists taking the Komsomol-CPSU route, and the political passivists, those who are disinterested in politics and seek safe professions and material well-being. RL gives top priority to the first group, realizing their genuine thirst for knowledge about the outside world, their desire to know about philosophy and religion and other concepts that could fill the vacuum left by the inadequacies of Communist ideology, and their resentment at the regime's restrictions on freedom of information and ideas. RL regards this category of listener as "a present and long-term priority for RL programmers."<sup>3</sup>

###### b. CPSU members

Thinking members of the CPSU, especially those under 40, constitute another elite group that RL seeks to influence. Bureau-

crats belonging to the permanent party apparatus are not excluded in this audience category, but it is assumed that their personal stake in the system and the desire to maintain the status quo outweigh their interests in reform and liberalization.

What creates a special opportunity for RL is the fact that more than half the membership entered the party after Stalin's death, and thus their attitudes and outlook have presumably not been warped by the Stalinist experience. By virtue of their middle-level positions, it is further assumed that they represent the aging party bureaucrats who cling to power at the upper echelons. As members of the ruling elite at various levels of Soviet society, it is also assumed that they could play a constructive political role if motivated by appeals to their own self-interest or to their sense of moral obligation as a "leading force" in Soviet society, should future developments in the party make this possible.

RL regards this group as a top priority. As an objective, it seeks to facilitate the evolution of democratic attitudes among thinking members of the CPSU. It encourages this elite group, therefore, to demand political democracy and decentralization of decision-making processes within the CPSU. RL operates on the assumption that as this is increasingly achieved, then it will be possible for democratic practices to spread more rapidly into government and throughout the nation's social institutions.<sup>4</sup>

###### c. The scientific intelligentsia

Probably the most influential group among Soviet Russia's intellectuals is the scientific intelligentsia. Though numerically small (about one million), they offer the greatest possibility, in RL's opinion, for influencing the whole of Soviet society.

It is the Soviet scientific intelligentsia, lionized in the Soviet press, that is the pacesetter of Soviet trends, sponsoring the more liberal elements of the literary-artistic intelligentsia, influencing those within their fields of specialization, even beyond into the managerial areas, university thinking, and student life. The regime has granted great privileges to this group, yet many within it, like Sakharov, have a strong sense of responsibility for the future direction of Soviet society and hence are consciously aware of the regime's narrowness and inflexibility in coping with pressing social and political problems. Having inquiring minds, the scientific intelligentsia tends to take the long perspective, recognizing the need for a broad programmatic approach to social and political problems in answer to present and future needs. Many are engaged in important work for the regime, and as a group, though not necessarily individually, they are indispensable to the regime.

RL looks upon this scientific elite as a fertile field for the propagation of unorthodox ideas and dissemination of officially unsponsored information. As a prime elite group within the country, they are one of the gatekeepers through whom influence flows as it filters down from the top hopefully to permeate the whole of Soviet society.<sup>5</sup>

###### d. The literary-artistic intelligentsia

The literary-artistic intelligentsia, though small numerically, numbering probably less than one million plays, nonetheless, a key role in Soviet communications. In this group are the writers, journalists, poets, artists, sculptors, actors, directors and many others active in the Soviet film industry. Owing to the character of their professional careers, they are especially vulnerable to reprisals from the regime—a writer, for example, has not the built-in bargaining power with the regime as does the much needed scientist.

As shown in a preceding chapter, the literary-artistic intelligentsia are sensitive to the abuses and shortcomings of the regime, but more importantly, they resent the re-

strictions on intellectual freedom that prevent the exchange of ideas and their access to new information. This is the principal motivating factor in explaining their leadership in opposing oppression and seeking reform of the system. They are also increasingly inclined to protest the regime's refusal to recognize the artistic merit of their work because it fails to meet the stultifying ideological requirements of "socialist realism," the regime's measure of literary and artistic merit.

Harboring these grievances, the literary-artistic intelligentsia strives toward a goal of freedom of expression and seeks to extend the scope of what Soviet society feels and thinks about itself and the purposes and goals of Soviet life. It actively seeks information and ideas from the non-Communist world, such as that provided by international radio broadcasts. It also wields a moral influence in Soviet society disproportionate to its small numbers. Increasingly, this group has been able to rely on support from the scientific and other groups within the intelligentsia among which there exists an interchange of influence.

Accordingly, RL regards the literary-artistic intelligentsia as a prime audience and a seminal source for broader influence throughout Soviet society. RL believes that it seeks to provide information and ideas to this group that will be useful in establishing a broader basis for cooperative efforts against the regime's repressive measures. By broadening its focus, RL attempts to interest this group in the problems of the workers and others in Soviet society, including the nationalities, and conversely attempts to win more support and understanding for them among fellow citizens, especially among students and workers.<sup>6</sup>

###### e. Other groups of the intelligentsia

The remaining groups of the intelligentsia in which RL has varying degrees of interests embrace other educated elements in Soviet society, including, social, economic, technical, rural, military, party and police intelligentsia. Some are essential to running the country; others, like the military, party and police intelligentsia, are "pillars of the regime" and, accordingly, continuation of the regime's stability depends upon their unimpaired loyalty. Some within these groups, however, have made common cause with the dissenters.

Owing to their importance in Soviet society, RL believes that they should be considered within their audience spectrum, to be differentiated according to their special interests and their susceptibility to influence in the direction of liberalization of Soviet society.<sup>7</sup>

###### f. Lower-level party and government officials and elected members of legislative organs

RL's interest in this politically elite audience arises from the expectation that if Soviet society is to be democratized, it must come about in part by strengthening the forces of de-centralization at the grass roots. In effect, it is an attempt to apply the democratic principles inherent in the "New England town meeting" to the Soviet environment wherein the local officials will be made to feel a greater sense of responsibility to their "constituency" than to the upper echelons of authority in Moscow, and conversely that the people will increasingly look upon local officials as their representatives having certain responsibilities to them.

RL believes that officials of the party and government at the oblast, city, and rayon level, including Sovhoz and kolhoz chairmen, are in the difficult position of carrying out the will of the centralized regime in their areas and at the same time having to bear the brunt of popular resentment resulting from political arbitrariness and economic shortages. Though admittedly they are not inclined to oppose regime policies directly, still they do at times have some latitude in

carrying out decisions and in establishing local policies, notably when disagreement exists at the top or a vacuum envelopes the decision-making process.

RL sees a great potentiality in this audience and regards it a special task to persuade these officials to exercise their responsibility in such a way so as to represent their "constituency" and to defend their interests against the centralized regime (including national and local interests versus the all-union regime). RL's expectation is that this will strengthen their own position within the population. Moreover, RL believes that lower level officials should be encouraged to work for human rights and individual freedom, and conversely, RL encourages Soviet citizens to view these officials, for whom they are required to vote in local and government "elections", as being responsible to them and attempt to influence those officials to fulfill their responsibilities.<sup>8</sup>

#### g. Skilled workers and their immediate supervisors

RL operates on the further assumption that skilled workers and their immediate supervisors represent a potential audience. Grievances in the economic sphere are the bond of unity within this group, that is, common concern for poor housing, economic shortages, special privileges to the party and government hierarchy, and mutual awareness of the true nature of Soviet trade unionism as an instrumentality of regime control. RL believes that the immediate supervisors are bound to be influenced by the grievances of the workers, since production depends on high worker morale, and, accordingly, whenever possible they try to improve the situation.

Moreover, RL tries to establish a bond of understanding between the worker and the intelligentsia. In broadcasting about the intelligentsia, RL tries to give the workers a better understanding of their motives and aims, and similarly in broadcasting about working conditions, attempts to make the intelligentsia aware of the problems and attitudes of the workers. In this way RL attempts to unite all groups who are trying to improve the system rather than allowing them to remain atomized as presently is the case.

Finally, RL believes a real opportunity exists in giving information and ideas to working class listeners especially on material relating to their needs, for example, descriptions of workers councils in Yugoslavia, free unionism, economic strikes, working and living conditions in other countries.<sup>9</sup>

#### h. Soviet personnel abroad

A specialized audience that RL regards as "important" is Soviet overseas personnel, that is, troops stationed in Eastern Europe, and crews on Soviet ships at sea. What makes this audience attractive is the fact that they are often in good locations for receiving RL's signal and that the information and ideas transmitted by RL coupled with their own observations overseas (for example, seeing better economic conditions in the West, observing firsthand reformism in Eastern Europe, and witnessing Soviet repressive policies as in Czechoslovakia) can be an important force for future changes in the Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

#### 1. Collective farmers and unskilled workers

At the base of the pyramid in RL's conception of its Soviet audience are the masses, that is, the collective farmers and unskilled workers. Representing the largest part of the Soviet population, they are the most subjugated by the regime and least enjoy any economic benefits or political rights. Widespread passivity is the main characteristic of this group. Unlike the upper strata intelligentsia, their political influence is not normally direct and active. The majority is educationally and intellectually backward, apa-

thetic, and especially meaningful for RL's purposes, lack access to shortwave radio.

RL does not, however, regard this group as unimportant. Indications exist of anti-regime feelings and even outright political activity involving direct participation. Moreover, owing to ignorance in foreign languages and thus access to foreign broadcasts, books, and publications, and the near total inability of this group to travel abroad, RL provides a unique channel of comprehensive information about realities and actual development both inside and outside of the U.S.S.R. The youth within this category are known to have a great interest in the outside world and are enthusiastic radio listeners. Moreover, they are less apathetic and less resigned than older workers and farmers. Accordingly the youth within this substantial subgroup represent a unique opportunity, in RL's estimation.

RL assumes that the bulk of ordinary workers and peasants have less opportunity and interest in listening to foreign broadcasts. But, owing to their great numbers, RL includes them among its listenership and believes that it reaches many more indirectly through word-of-mouth communications. RL realizes, furthermore, that attitude formation within his group is most likely to be affected by views of individuals whom they regard as informed and authoritative, that is, local intelligentsia such as teachers, librarians, and specialists, known to be motivated to get outside information. Accordingly, RL looks upon such intermediaries as a significant sub-audience, along with young people, for conveying its message.

RL's message to these groups is directed to their local situation, living and working conditions, as well as material possibilities. Abstract and political discussions are related to concrete effects where possible in terms of whether proposals under review will yield advantages and improvements to the population. Comparisons are made with economic situations in highly developed countries. Emphasis on material describing democracy at work and life of similarly situated persons elsewhere is believed to stimulate Soviet listeners to make demands on their leaders for similar improvements. Information of this nature, RL believes, will increasingly activate "comparative thinking" among the various classes within Soviet society. The workers and peasants are aware of the great economic vulnerabilities in the Soviet system and the great economic advantages in Western democratic forms. Moreover, the gap between Soviet economic promise and reality is a decisive factor in shaping attitudes of the Soviet urban and rural working class as well as the local and rural intelligentsia and other groups in close touch with them.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, while RL's major effort may be directed at the upper strata intelligentsia, still it does not ignore the lower orders of Soviet society.

#### 3. The Soviet Nationalities

The second major category in RL's audience structure are the various nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. RL regards the nationality question as one that "is and will continue to be a critical and potentially divisive problem of the Soviet system until all the peoples of the USSR have an opportunity to exercise their democratic right of self-determination."<sup>12</sup> Eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict involving the border regions and peoples of Turkestan, as well as the general historical trend toward de-colonization in the non-Communist world, has underscored the importance of this problem for the Soviet regime.

Officially, Soviet nationality policy purports to give the nationalities certain rights, such as the right of succession, and a genuine form of republican government. But in practice the regime has denied the peoples the exercise of their proclaimed political and con-

stitutional rights. It has prevented the nationalities from making common cause with each other outside the framework of official Soviet policy. It has attempted to impose the Russian language on the non-Russian nationalities at the expense of their own language and culture. It has in general attempted to denationalize all nationalities and unite them by creating a single "Soviet people."

The non-Russian nationalities have resisted the regime's de-nationalization policy; and at times even some Russians within the intelligentsia have expressed sympathy for the interests of the nationalities, recognizing the connection between their desire for human rights and those rights of the other Soviet peoples.

In broadcasting, RL supports and attempts to spread such sympathies among the Russian listeners, while at the same time stressing the need for common cause with Russian dissenters and other oppositional elements in its non-Russian broadcasts. All Soviet nationalities, Russians included, share many problems in common, such as, the erosion of customs, traditions and cultures, under the impact of Communist ideology, and the pressure of overcentralization of state power at the expense of the regions.

In its broadcasts RL, as a matter of policy, avoids taking positions on the pre-determination of the nationalities. Rather, it concentrates on the immediate task of encouraging the nationalities separately and all Soviet peoples collectively to work for freedom by lawful and constitutional means against the centralized regime and for the right of self-determination for all peoples, inside the Soviet Union and throughout the world. Understanding the correlation between decentralization and the development of grassroots democracy, RL encourages rational steps to increase local authority in all spheres. Moreover, it avoids stimulating antagonism among the Soviet peoples whatever the nationality, advocates intra-national cooperation, and encourages those inner-directed forces striving for self-determination by peaceful, constitutional means.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4. Psychological Categories of Listeners

The third and final segment of RL's audience structure are those listeners that fall within various psychological categories. One of the characteristics of this segment is that it represents a commingling and overlapping of the social, occupational, intellectual and national groups.<sup>14</sup>

The psychological categories are defined broadly in terms of commitment to the regime. The "regime patriots" are at one extreme. For reasons largely of their own vested interests and personal involvement or their primitive political concepts, they defend the system against any criticism, especially external. Identifying the present regime with the nation as an historic unity, the "regime patriots" become "super-patriotic." At the other extreme are the committed opponents. They are equally patriotic in their allegiance to the nation, but are disenchanted with the regime and see no solution short of its complete overthrow.

According to RL's estimate, the bulk of the Soviet population falls between these extremes. A large number are apathetic and indifferent to political problems. But, RL believes that there are many, which it describes as "seekers," who are loyal to the system, have political concerns, are aware of existing strong dissatisfactions, and have serious reservations about the many policies and actions of the regime. But, they have not yet formulated distinct views on what changes are needed, and how they are to be achieved.

Then, there is a smaller group that RL calls "reformers." They have a strong personal commitment against certain aspects of the regime, and they have begun to develop views

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and approaches on how to bring about changes. They do not seek to overthrow the system, but rather act as a loyal opposition which could promote progressive change within the system and avoid revolutionary chaos.

In selecting the most desirable audience within this pattern, RL operates on the principle that it wants to expand its audience as much as possible and to increase the flow of information and ideas. Accordingly, it downgrades the importance of reaching the committed opponents of the regime, who probably are listening anyway, and the "regime patriots", who would be least receptive. Rather, the audience RL is most anxious to reach are the "apathetic", the "seekers" and the "reformers." From its point of view, the "apathetic" must be stimulated to become involved and perceive opportunities for social improvement. The "seekers" must be made more conscious of new ideas and alternatives for changing the Soviet system in their interests and ultimately in the interests of all Soviet citizens. The "reformers" must be sustained in their search for these new instrumentalities.

RL refines this category still further, not wishing to give up on the "irreconcilables." The committed opponents, it says, must be encouraged to work in their own interests and to work with the system to change it, not exposing themselves in any vain attempt to overthrow it by force. "Moreover, RL believes the 'regime patriots' should be encouraged to question the system and the acts of the regime, and try to gain their receptivity to ideas and practical alternatives which RL might suggest.

However, RL views its main effort as being directed not toward convincing the already convinced, but to influence "the large middle group which comprises the majority of Soviet citizens to think independently and consider alternatives to present principles and practices with the Soviet system."<sup>12</sup>

#### C. On relating to the Soviet audience

##### 1. AUDIENCE PERCEPTIVE: A FRAGMENTED MOSAIC

It is one thing to structure an audience in a rational and efficient way to insure effectiveness; it is quite another to relate to that audience. For RL, this is a special problem, mainly because it seeks to be a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet listener. It must, therefore, structure its programming not only so that it will appeal to its audience, but more importantly, so that the audience will understand what is being conveyed.

This is not easy to do. The difficulty stems from the fact that RL must deal with vast lacunae of information on the Soviet side. It must conceive of its audience's perception of reality as that of a fragmented mosaic in which many important pieces are missing. RL programmers must know what pieces are there; they must also know what pieces are missing and need to be provided.

This problem was very acutely posed by a Soviet scientist who recently said that "nobody would want to listen to foreign broadcasts if they were sure that our own information is complete; but as it is, half of what happens in the world is simply concealed from us, facts, not comments or opinions."<sup>13</sup>

Thus, one of the great problems RL faces is the need for a constant awareness of the extent to which their audience does not share a common informational frame of reference. The programmer and broadcaster can never be absolutely sure that his listener will have sufficient knowledge of other facts and information to understand what is being presented.<sup>14</sup>

Still another problem of perception arises from the warped image Soviet propaganda creates within the Soviet public mind. Upon the RL programmer and researcher rests the responsibility of knowing not only that distorted image but how to correct it. In seek-

ing to portray the truth of living reality, at least to a degree that is humanly possible, RL must correct the refracted light of Communist propaganda, adding substance to shadows and giving a fuller picture of the Soviet reality and international life around it.

#### 2. Style, Content, Language

Success in communications of the sort that RL programmers are engaged in depends to a great extent upon style, content and language—style in the sense of projecting a positive and dignified image; content, in shaping programs to meet the unique requirements of the audience and to achieve the goals sought; language, in perfecting the only available mechanism for communicating by the spoken word.

RL policy requires a "Guest in the Home" style in communicating with the Soviet audience. Good sense and the basic rules of salesmanship dictate adopting a "patriotic stance" in seeking RL's goals and purposes. RL programmers must, therefore, try to establish a lasting dialogue on essentially Soviet terms. To do so, they must be immersed in the Soviet milieu to the extent that they can provide corrective insights into Soviet problems and do so with credibility and understanding. This is a most delicate operation, one requiring great care, sophistication and toleration.

But the burden of communication for RL programmers is lessened considerably by the fact that RL broadcasts to the bulk of the Soviet peoples in their own native languages (20 in all). For RL, the lingua franca is Russian. Not only are broadcasts for the Russian Service made in Russian but equally important the scripts are actually written in the Russian language. Some foreign broadcasters, as in the case of RFE, first write the scripts in the language of the broadcaster and then translate them into the language of the audience. In translation much can be lost, and the connecting link to the audience can be defective. RL program chiefs are of one mind on the value of writing in the original language. Mr. Diakowski described RL's approach as, "a direct continuum of communication from the writer's mind, through the structure of words, to the ear of the listener." "The subtleties and nuances, often lost in translation," he said, "remain intact."

Mr. Alexander Backerac, Managing Editor in the Russian Service, took a strong view on this question. (For a biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) Quoting the Italian proverb, "Traduttori, traditori" (equating translators with treason), he said that in translations one puts a heavy screen, not just a veil or scrim, between the writer and the audience. This was especially true of Russian. He told of a leading British scholar who had just prepared a script on the 150th anniversary of Dostoevsky that had to be translated into Russian, but according to Mr. Backerac, "English just doesn't go into Russian, much of the essence of the meaning is lost, all the tastes, the nuances. One can't maintain optimum effectiveness," he said, "by using the translation process. Russian is essential; it is vital."

The Nationalities Service also has the advantage of writing scripts in the original language without resorting to translations. Only in the case of newscasts is the material translated from the Russian; but even in this instance, according to the Nationalities Program Manager Z. Sztumpf, the script writers and programmers work from original source materials in the native languages, adapt the news by using these sources, with the result that nothing is lost in the process. Moreover, newscasts are ordinarily straight declarative statements without the nuances and shadings in feature writing.

That broadcasting in the native language by native speaking broadcasters has a particular appeal and effectiveness with the

audience is evident by reports from the audience area. One member of the Soviet scientific intelligentsia expressed the view that other foreign broadcasters did not understand how to communicate effectively to the Soviet listener. "They speak to us the same way they would to an Italian or an Englishman," he said, "and that's wrong because we have a different life." Another listener, a former Soviet citizen, put it more succinctly. He said of Vladimirov, RL's commentator in the London Bureau: "The Soviet listener will say that he is talking about us, this is for us and he is our own."<sup>15</sup>

Developing a capacity to communicate to this particular audience and do so on its terms and within its perception of the world is clearly an important asset in RL's operations.

#### II. PROCEDURES IN PROGRAMMING SUMMARIZED

##### A. Policy in program planning process

To reach its audience, RL has established practical procedures in programming. What is significant in these procedures is the extent to which policy is integrated into programming operations. Indeed, the main impulse of RL policy operations rests upon the necessity of designing policy into programming. The function of policy guidance is to establish a foundation which determines the total design of programming, and to set forth a set of criteria for all programmers, writers, editors, and desk chiefs in the selection of themes and subject matter, and in prescribing the treatment and tone of programs. Still, despite this appearance of close supervision, considerable latitude is allowed for initiatives in developing program design and selecting materials and specific subject matter.<sup>16</sup>

The starting point for developing general program themes and broad program planning is, as noted above, the definition of thematic and audience priorities in the Policy Manual. These guide the distribution of attention to various subjects and the types of treatment in the programs. In working out specific program series, programmers begin from a "show plan" which defines the specific purposes of the series and its component programs in relation to RL's objectives as expressed in the Manual and other policy papers. Conferences for reviewing overall direction, structure of programming, The Monthly Guidelines, weekly schedules and memoranda reflecting advance program planning—all provide further recurring occasions to formulate, review and improve plans for the constructive execution of policy.<sup>17</sup>

##### B. Daily morning meetings

###### 1. Research meeting

In a sense programming formally begins at the morning meetings held daily from Monday through Friday. It is here where policy and programming merge. The Research Meeting at 0945 CET is the first in a series of four morning meetings. The Director of PPD is the chairman of this meeting. Participants include the Assistant Director for Research, a policy officer, senior research analysts in economics, politics, sociology, foreign affairs, and cultural affairs, along with the Media Analyst, the Head of Sanizdat, the Head Librarian, and the Head of the Information Center.

At the opening of the meeting a "News List," citing all important developments up to that time, is passed around. Then, all participants give an oral report on the most significant developments affecting their fields. This is based on a review of the press and other information sources, notably their own accumulated knowledge. The first to speak, however, is the Soviet Media Analyst who reports on Soviet media output, presumably for the previous twenty-four hour period. This report enables researchers and programmers to identify areas of interest and importance. It also lets them know the gaps and distortions in Soviet news coverage that

have to be filled and corrected in programming. A Daily Policy Guidance Note is issued at this meeting if warranted. The first item on the Guidance Note, which is circulated among staff, is the report on Soviet media output. Usually at this meeting if any important event emerges in discussion that is judged to have significance, the Director of PPD will interrupt with the remark, as was the case on October 27, 1971, "let's program this," and immediately arrange to have the information passed along to the Program Department with recommendations for its use.

What makes the Research Meeting important is the fact that it represents the point in RL's operations where, except for long-term research, the results of research can be formally and immediately brought into the programming and policy process. Staff at this meeting conveyed to this outside observer the impression that they are "on top of the news," and possessing analytical skills, are able to interpret it within a larger framework of accumulated knowledge. Thus, it is here where the discipline of scholarship is brought to bear on the rapidly unfolding events of contemporary history.

#### 2. News meeting

At 1030 CET the daily morning News Meeting is convened. Chairman of the meeting is Lennart Savemark, Program Manager, Central News Service (CNS). Also present from CNS are the News Evaluator on duty and the Chief Editor. Other participants in this meeting are: the Director of PPD, Director of Program Operations Division, Program Manager of the Nationalities Service, Assistant Program Managers of the Nationalities Service's Caucasian Department and Ukrainian-Belorussian Department, Senior Staff Commentator, Staff Commentators of CNS and Russian Features, Policy Coordinators from PPD, and a representative from RL's Information Office.

The main purpose of the News Meeting is to review the important events occurring in the world and in the Soviet Union up to that time, discuss the treatment of certain of these items, and introduce any policy requirements if appropriate. The morning News List, a compilation of priority news events, is circulated among participants of the meeting. (For an example of a News List, see Appendix 6.) At the meeting on October 26, 1971, Mr. Savemark went down the list of news items, and the participants discussed key items.

At these meetings the Director of PPD, as the guardian of policy, plays a key role. At the October 26 meeting, the world press, in reporting on Kosygin's trip to Cuba, indicated that there was a rumor of Castro's illness. Immediately, Mr. Van der Rhoer indicated that RL could not report this because it was speculation and might prove to be incorrect. Castro might appear at the airport to meet Kosygin, he said, and thus embarrass RL. (The implication was clear that such an unsubstantiated report might have a negative effect on RL's credibility with its audience. But, more importantly, broadcasting a rumor of this nature runs counter to RL's policy of reporting only truthful, factual news information.) Mr. Van der Rhoer introduced the guidance on how RL would treat Peking's admission to the U.N. At this point there was an interplay of discussion on this question, with staff reaffirming Mr. Van der Rhoer's judgment.

As the meeting progressed, the Chairman commented on the scheduling for the day, indicating the news features that were going to be treated, notably commentary on Peking's admission to the U.N. After discussion of other matters of RL interest, the meeting adjourned.

In programming procedures, the morning News Meeting is important, and for two reasons: (1) it alerts staff on the priorities in

news and news features; and (2) it provides a formal occasion for the Director of PPD to introduce policy guidance.

#### 3. Nationalities service meeting

The next morning meeting is that of the Nationalities Service which begins daily at 1045 CET in the same general conference room. (A brief meeting is held on Saturdays between the Director of POD and the Program Manager.) Chairman of this meeting is Mr. Sztumpf, Program Manager of the Nationalities Service, who also reports on Tatar-Turkestan programs Dr. David Nissman, Assistant Program Manager of the Caucasian Department, is present and reports on the Caucasian programs. Also attending is Mr. Mykola Herus, Assistant Program Manager of the Ukrainian-Belorussian Department, who reports on the Ukrainian-Belorussian programs. Other participants at this meeting are Mr. Robert Tuck, Director of the Program Operations Division, Mr. Van der Rhoer, Director of PPD, and the Chief Editors and Commentators from the various desks of different departments in the Nationalities Service on an ad hoc basis. (For biographic sketches of these staffmen, see Appendix 1.)

The purpose of this meeting is, (1) to give the heads of the various departments in the Nationalities Service an opportunity to report on what they intend to cover in their daily programming; and also at the same time, (2) to provide the Directors of the Program Operations and Program Policy Divisions an opportunity to give counsel and guidance on program content and on policy as it is integrated into programming.

The procedure operates this way. The various department heads review the content and form of programs within their respective responsibilities. For example, in the meeting on October 26, Mr. Herus of the Ukrainian-Belorussian Department discussed the general content of programs within his responsibility, indicating that two main themes would be stressed, namely, Brezhnev's visit to France, and a script that would point out how the regime has allowed pre-1917 national monuments in Belorussia to fall into disrepair, while allocating resources into preserving those of the Bolshevik period. Samizdat would also be included in the day's programming, Mr. Bolshevik said.

At this point in the programming procedure the Director of Program Operations Mr. Robert Tuck is formally and directly brought into contact with his top programming staff and, accordingly, is able to introduce both in a general and detailed way programming guidance. At the meeting on the 26th, Mr. Tuck called attention to a number of items from previous meetings and noted in particular those dealing with Ukrainian affairs that appeared in the press review, material in Ukrainian-Russian samizdat publications, and items in Russian samizdat. He urged upon the programmers the importance of creating an environment of cross-fertilization in using samizdat. Matters of specific interest in Russian samizdat, he noted, had also special interest for the nationalities and should be used. At the meeting on October 27, Mr. Tuck, performing the same advisory function, called Dr. Nissman's attention to a recent report of an old Georgian Bolshevik who had just died, and who, having been released from prison, had been brought before Stalin still dressed in his prison clothes. Stalin put him in the foreign ministry, and eventually he became an ambassador. Mr. Tuck directed that this story be used in a script for a Georgian broadcast.

The Policy Director also plays an important role in this meeting. As the various programming plans are being presented, he must introduce into the discussion any considerations on policy. This occurred twice at the meeting on October 27. In reporting on programming for the Tatar-Turkestan Depart-

ment, Mr. Sztumpf noted that a commemoration on the anniversary of Turkestan was being scheduled. Mr. Van der Rhoer raised the possibility of a policy violation in the form of a statement in the script calling for the restoration of a united Turkestan. (RL adheres strictly to a policy of no predetermination.) Mr. Sztumpf assured the Director that there were no such intimations but indicated that the division of Turkestan had generated deep feelings of local nationalism in the area. Mr. Van der Rhoer underscored the policy point that the script should have no suggestion of political reunification, but should stress the growth of national feeling and the sense of common concern—in brief, to stress the positive.

At the same meeting Mr. Van der Rhoer raised a policy question in a discussion of the Ukrainian program. Mr. Herus described a script that was going to be used that dealt with developments in Hungary, focusing on the anniversary of the 1956 revolution and Soviet intervention. Both Mr. Van der Rhoer and Mr. Tuck urged that the script be brought up to date, accenting positive developments in Hungary under Kadar as well as the intervention of 1956. Mr. Van der Rhoer directed that the script be reconsidered. At the meeting on November 3, Mr. Sztumpf reported that the script was revised to include the positive side of developments since the revolution as directed and that it was acceptable to the editor.

Again, the important point to be observed here is the review character of the meeting by leading programming and policy staff. Both the Directors of programming and policy have formally the opportunity of advising and giving directions on program content as well as checking for policy. The accent is on policy adherence and program quality. The meetings also give the heads of the various departments within the Nationalities Service opportunities to exchange ideas on policy and programming with those to whom they are directly responsible.

#### 4. Russian Service Meeting

The fourth and final morning meeting is that of the Russian Service at 1110 CET. The meeting takes place in the office of the Director of POD. Chairman of the meeting is the Program Manager of the Russian Service. Participants include the Managing Editor of Russian Features, Senior Editors or Commentators from the Russian Features Department on an ad hoc basis, Director of POD, and the Director of PPD.

Discussions at the Russian Service meeting parallel form those at the meeting of the Nationalities Service. In the meeting on October 26, Mr. Diakowski, the Program Manager, and Mr. Bacherac, the Managing Editor of Russian Features, discussed their programming plans for the day.

Only two issues came to the fore at this meeting, relating not to the programming then under discussion but rather to the samizdat works of the dissident Medvedev brothers which were about to be published in the West, and the manner of broadcasting book-size samizdat. RL tried unsuccessfully to get the rights to broadcast the contents of the Medvedev books back to the Soviet Union. As a matter of policy, RL does not use published copyrighted books unless it has specific authority. Even having this authority, it carefully indicates that the broadcast is done without the knowledge of the writer. This policy is designed to protect the writers of samizdat from reprisals of the regime.

The other issue for discussion revolved around the manner of presenting samizdat over RL. In commenting on the problem of broadcasting the Medvedev books, Mr. Tuck suggested that books of this nature should be analyzed, discussed and reviewed extensively in broadcasts rather than being read in toto. He emphasized that production-wise



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this would be useful, especially owing to the overwhelming amount of samizdat now available for Russian programming. Among all present there was particular stress on the importance of the book-review approach now that Western commercial publishers are publishing samizdat.

Policy questions did not arise at this meeting. In the meeting on the 27th, however, the question of policy violations in a script did come up for discussion. The violation was one involving language. The question arose on whether the script should be scrapped. After reviewing the script, Mr. Van der Rhoor felt that with further editorial changes the script could be used. Accordingly, the script was turned over to Mr. Diakowski for further work.

Again, what is important about meetings such as this is not so much what took place on a particular day but rather that the mechanism itself exists, providing opportunities for discussion, exchange of ideas, policy and programming guidance.

#### 5. Observations on the Morning Meetings

RL's morning meetings are models of informality. Administratively, they are efficient, tightly scheduled, and well organized; but in format, style and mood, they are simple, informal, relaxed. This overly casual environment produces a mood that allows the fullest exchange of ideas and no doubt would encourage even the most difficult person to engage the most articulate and over-confident staffman in heated discussion. Yet beneath this patina of informality there lies an awareness of being involved in a very serious business, and no doubt these meetings are scenes of hard-hitting verbal combat as the dialectic of interacting ideas come into conflict.

In many respects the morning meetings take on the character of academic seminars within a restricted time-frame. Key personnel are invited to comment on important problems in their areas of competence. Exchanges of views and ideas and an integrating process of news-gathering, research and policy are allowed to take place. The morning meetings provide staff from researchers to programmers the opportunity for cross-reporting each other's knowledge. They provide a point of contact in a formally structured way for all key staff to come together in formal, but personal, communication.

The entire process is creative and is vital to the effective operations of the organization. Perhaps, Dr. David Nissman, an American Orientalist and Assistant Program Manager of RL's Caucasian Department, best described the morning meetings when he said, "The morning meeting is a marketplace where ideas are bought, sold, and rejected. It is a free interacting mechanism allowing for maximum exchange of views."

Yet, for the purposes of this study, perhaps the most important aspect of the morning meetings is the role played by the Director of FPD. By his presence and that of other policy staff at every level of formal discussion, he is able to give policy guidance and inject into the entire programming process an awareness of policy in an authoritative and commanding way. But, what is most significant about his role, in addition to this, is the authority he has to establish the permissible limits of what can and what cannot be programmed.

#### C. Production in Programming Process

The final step in the programming process is the actual production of news, features and other programs. RL's broadcasting day begins at 1700 Moscow time, two hours behind Munich. Thus, decisions taken at the morning meetings have sufficient time to be integrated into programming.

Edward F. Noeiser is Chief of the Production Department. (For a biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) It is his prime responsibility, working with producers, broadcasting staff,

script writers, engineers and others, to see that RL's output gets into its final form for transmission to the Soviet audience. One of the key links in this process is the Continuity Team which ties the programs together for presentation to the listener. At this essentially technical level the strictest obedience to procedures is required, and the degree of personal initiative is severely restricted.

RL has impressive studio facilities, far better, one senior staffman said, than VOA. In the taping process, the producer of the program is in one room with the engineer, the performer is in another sound-proof studio. On signal from the producer, the program begins and is taped. If error occurs, the process can be terminated and redone until the tape is satisfactory. In some shows the producer is also the speaker, and thus he has multiple functions to perform. From the view of an uninitiated outside observer, the operation appears to be technically impressive, highly professional, and most efficient.

Usually there is a 2-to-3 day spread between the time when a script has been approved and when it is aired. Except for newscasts which are initially given "live," programs are taped, and the 2-to-3 day lag before actual broadcast provides an abundance of opportunity for a careful prebroadcast review. However, a bulletin can be aired at any time, merely by pulling out a time-slot of one feature and replacing it at a moment's notice. Thus, RL can be kept up-to-date if events change the content of taped programs. Taped program material to be used at the Taiwan transmitter is packaged and sent via air mail to Taiwan in sufficient time for airing. Newscasts go to Taiwan via telex and satellite.

### III. PHENOMENON OF SAMIZDAT

#### A. Development of Samizdat

##### 1. Beginning of Samizdat

One of the most extraordinary developments in recent years within the Soviet Union has been the emergence of samizdat, that is, the private publication and circulation of one's own works. To circumvent censorship, dissenting Soviet intellectuals have resorted to this device. As a new phenomenon in Soviet intellectual and political protest, though a long and revered tradition in Russian history, it has provided RL with a wealth of material varying in quality for programming. As far as can be judged by specialists in the field, samizdat has an assured future, and will no doubt increase in quantity and improve in quality.

Samizdat, as an embryonic expression of freely expressed public opinion in the Soviet Union, had its inception within the movement of political dissent that emerged in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies.<sup>21</sup> The establishment of safeguards against the resurgence of police terror and administrative arbitrariness, and the decline of fear and the feeling of political impotence nurtured by Stalinism, led to a type of internal emancipation, especially among the younger Soviet intelligentsia who had been untainted by the guilt of the past. The official exposure of the "cult of personality" also led to an erosion of faith in the party's collective infallibility and in the efficacy of its ideology. Failure of the de-Stalinization process to proceed further than criticism of the past and the inability of Khrushchev's policies to satisfy the expected promise they held out at first, intensified among the young a growing feeling of alienation, and it stimulated a search for political alternatives to policies, and for some, alternatives to the political system and its ideology. A powerful stimulus to this rising dissent came from the return of survivors from the slave labor camps. It was these survivors, the Solzhenitsyns, that gave courage to the younger members of the intelligentsia in their search

for wider political freedom and more genuine forms of legality.

Taking advantage of the relaxation in control over literature, the literary intelligentsia began to circulate among themselves and to foreign channels of communication (the press and radio), copies of manuscripts, appeals, open letters, and other protest literature. These channels of communication helped to disseminate this uncensored information and accordingly contributed to molding critical opinions into a nascent public opinion that frustrated the regime's attempts to suppress or distort facts about the growing unity among the dissenting intelligentsia. The shift to these unofficial vehicles of communication became more pronounced as the regime began to tighten censorship, especially since 1964.

Politicization of dissent, as it emerged, centered on demands for civil liberties guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and those guaranteed under the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, it spread to the spheres of political and cultural-linguistic rights of the non-Russian nationalities, and then to the area of religious freedom. This had been set off by Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign of 1959-1964 which generated a believer's protest movement, especially among the Evangelical Christian Baptists. By the late 1960's, specifically in the summer of 1968, the parameters of dissent expanded as the movement entered a new phase with the publication of criticisms by Sakharov. This was the first programmatic document that brought into question some of the basic tenets of the Soviet system. Thus, the protest movement now enveloped not only the creative and literary intelligentsia, many within the nationalities and among believers, but also the scientific intelligentsia.

##### 2. Spreading Influence of Samizdat

RL, as prime beneficiary of samizdat, has called it "an exciting collection of painstakingly copied, unpublished manuscripts."<sup>22</sup> Much of it is reproduced on a typewriter, with multiple carbons. It is known to be typed sometimes even in large Soviet offices. The first two copies are often destroyed to prevent the possibility of a typewriter being traced. Samizdat participants risk arrest and imprisonment. Their material is circulated through a network of like-minded persons. Other samizdat material is handwritten. Samizdat items reaching the West is fast approaching 1,000 and include everything from book length works to articles, appeals and protests consisting of only a page or two. Contents of samizdat vary: there are major literary writings, some by noted Soviet authors; thoughtful essays by leading specialists dealing with political, social and economic problems; "transcripts" of courtroom trials from which the public is barred (for example, the proceedings of the Sinlavsky-Daniel trials and the recent Leningrad trials); individual or group petitions by Soviet citizens seeking redress of grievances or demanding respect for constitutional rights.<sup>23</sup>

Samizdat is also emerging with considerable force among the nationalities, notably the Ukrainians who have been becoming progressively aware of the erosion of the Ukrainian language and culture under the impact of Russification. Religious samizdat has been given a strong impetus under the regime's campaigns of persecution. The Western press has recorded in the past year numerous protests by Soviet Jews on various forms of religious discrimination. Included in this study as Appendix 7 is a handwritten appeal from a Jewish father to the 26th Party Congress, seeking freedom for his daughter and two sons.<sup>24</sup> According to Peter Reddaway, a Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics and an expert on samizdat, the Roman Catholics in Lithuania, the Meskhetians in Georgia, and the Uniates in

the Ukraine, and many others are becoming active participants in samizdat. Rev. Michael Bordeaux, Director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Communism, and a specialist on Soviet affairs, particularly religion in the Soviet Union, observed that religious samizdat is widespread over the whole of the Soviet Union, notably among the Baptists.<sup>20</sup> Appendix 8 of this study contains a few pages of Baptist samizdat. It is from a hand-printed book of 400 pages, deposited in RL's samizdat collection, containing documentation of a 4-year unsuccessful effort by the Baptists to convoke an All-Union Congress of their church.<sup>21</sup> Denied a printing press by the regime (they have since constructed their own), the Soviet Baptists resorted to the practice of the Medieval monks who carefully and patiently transcribed by hand the Bible and other liturgical manuscripts.

Samizdat also produces an unofficial free press, the typewritten Chronicle of Events. Already 19 issues have appeared in monthly intervals. Very little of samizdat is revolutionary in tone; by and large the stresses are on reform, the tone nearly always is restrained, responsible and serious minded.<sup>27</sup>

Geographically, the "mainstream" of samizdat is confined, with few exceptions like Solzhenitsyn's work, to a relatively few areas within the country's urban, intellectual, scientific centers—cities like Moscow, Leningrad, and the large cities in the Ukraine and Baltic, and scientific centers like those at Obninsk, Pushchino and Kaluga. "These are the places," said Peter Reddaway, "that originate it and where samizdat is widely used."<sup>28</sup> Yet, according to Mr. Reddaway, who has devoted great scholarly attention to this problem, caution should temper thoughts about the widespread circulation of samizdat documents. Usually, the people reading samizdat are in a particular network where certain types of material are passed around.<sup>29</sup> As Martin Dewhirst, another British specialist on Soviet affairs who is on the Faculty of Slavonic Studies at Glasgow University, remarked on the matter of religious samizdat, "Arkady Belinkov, a widely read man if ever there was one, did not seem even to have heard of it, let alone to have read it."<sup>30</sup> Yet, Mr. Dewhirst believed that in potential, the "dissent movement is much bigger than it might appear to be" from samizdat literature, but "the hard core of the dissent movement seems to me limited. . . ."<sup>31</sup>

### 3. On the quality of samizdat

According to the judgment of leading Western specialists on Soviet affairs, the quality of samizdat is mixed. A lot of it is "very mediocre", said Leonard Schapiro, "some if it has been rather outstanding"; but it "is clean; it's decent; it's honest."<sup>32</sup> According to Max Hayward of St. Anthony's College, Oxford, "A lot of samizdat is very unsophisticated, particularly when it is reproduced outside its context. But on the other hand I think a lot of it is of very high class and the percentage of high class material has noticeably increased in recent years."<sup>33</sup> After commenting on the high value of works by Pomerants, Medvedev, Chaldtze, Tsukerman, Ivanov, and Volpin, he said by way of generalizing: "We are beginning to get longer, more solid works on [economics] sociological and political matters as well. So I think the value, the worth, the intellectual level is already higher than one might think."<sup>34</sup>

Not only is the quality improving, but the quantity is increasing. According to David Floyd, Soviet specialist on the *London Daily Telegraph*, "I would have thought that the important thing that one could say with certainty . . . is that it is almost certainly going to increase in quantity, in variety and in the size of particular documents."<sup>35</sup>

### 4. Future of samizdat

Moreover, judging by the estimates of these Western specialists, the future of samizdat

seems to be assured. Peter Reddaway sees the production of samizdat getting stronger in the future, though weakening in the short term. This weakness arises from arrests of participants, emigration (for example, Jewish intellectuals to Israel), and pressure on foreign correspondents, which, he said, "threatens one of the major channels of the flow." The factors in favor are, however, impressive. Many engaged in samizdat are scientists, especially the physicists and mathematicians. Having a feeling of "corporate identity" and being "quick to engage in mutual self-defense," they cannot be taken lightly by the regime. They are the "backbone" of this movement, he said. Secondly, during the past three years, a "remarkable network obviously has grown up" of samizdat correspondents. This network is "a strong one" and made up of people who are willing to run "great risks" to keep the network operating. Finally, he believed the present leadership in the Soviet Union did not have "the resolve to crack down hard enough to seriously stamp it out." This is a movement that is "extremely difficult to control . . . under any circumstances." A resort to Stalinist measures, he observed, would involve "the arrest of one or two thousand people, including some of the leading scientists, and I don't see the present leadership or any leadership in the foreseeable future doing that."<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, what seemed most impressive, was the judgment of other specialists that samizdat, "in a curious way," as Mr. Hayward put it, "has been almost legitimized in recent years . . ."<sup>37</sup> Abe Brumberg, former editor of *USIA's Problems of Communism* and now a specialist in samizdat, recalled a conversation in Brussels with Svetchensky who said, in Mr. Brumberg's words, "every small step becomes somehow legitimized. Every small achievement is considered legitimized, whereas three years ago the very existence of samizdat was considered to be subversive. Now the authorities make distinctions between what kind of samizdat," some is acceptable, some is not.<sup>38</sup>

### B. RL's Use of Samizdat

#### 1. Main depository of samizdat

For RL, samizdat is the beginning of a harvest after years of labor sowing the seeds of democracy in the Soviet Union. Though it claims no special credit beyond that of being one of the many forces contributing to internal changes toward liberalization within the Soviet Union, still there seems little doubt that RL's role has been most significant. According to Mr. Van der Rhoer, "samizdat has opened up a new dimension to RL's activity. It represents as welling up of a generation of new ideas from within the country." "RL has always believed," he continued, "that it could not impose views of one country upon another. Now it sees these new ideas coming forth and see also the need to disseminate them among the Soviet people."

RL has the largest deposit of samizdat in the world to draw upon for its programming, and its archives are growing daily. In its central registry, it has listed over 600 documents, according to an estimate published in June 1971.<sup>39</sup> Six months later Mr. Van der Rhoer indicated that on the basis of 600 pages representing a standard volume, there were at that time 15 volumes. In April 1971, RL's Research Department prepared a bibliographic reference handbook entitled, "Five Years of Samizdat," a companion volume to an earlier RL "Register of Samizdat." This latest reference work, according to Dr. Boiter, its compiler, "attempts to catalog all the documents which have come into our possession in thematic categories for purposes of speedy retrieval and reference."<sup>40</sup> Subdivided into 18 major categories, ranging from Stalinism, through law, anti-Semitism, to science and the nationalities, and arranged chronologically within each category, the handbook is an impressive effort in librari-

ship and itself a short history of samizdat-at-a-glance.

Normally, samizdat comes to RL from diverse sources; documents are not sent specifically to RL from the Soviet Union. RL staffers, knowledgeable in their field, know what is available through their own reading and by other means of communications. Most documents have been publicized elsewhere before RL gets them. Some documents are acquired through private sources. Perhaps one of the most famous pieces of samizdat is Andrei Sakharov's, "Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" A full text of Sakharov's essay was published in *The New York Times* on July 22, 1968. RL draws heavily from the publications of Sakharov in its programming. (Excerpts from his, "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom", are reproduced in Appendix 28.)

RL's greatest problem in dealing with samizdat has centered on the organization of this mass of enormously important primary source material on contemporary Soviet history; the matter of sharing this bounty with others in the Western scholarly community; the task of integrating samizdat into RL's programming; and finally, the need to establish internal policy governing its use in order to protect the authors, preserve RL's organizational principles, and maximize the use of the documents in achieving RL's goals and purposes.

#### 2. London Conference on Samizdat

In an effort to get further guidance from Western scholars, RL held a conference in London in April 1971 and gave it the title, "The Future of Samizdat: Significance and Prospect."<sup>41</sup> Attending this conference were leading British and American scholars in Soviet studies, most of whom have already been identified in this study. The agenda of the conference and the subsequent discussion centered on the matter of samizdat's future in the next two to five years and the proper role for RL, other foreign broadcasters, and publishers in regard to samizdat. Among the points discussed at this conference were: the need for broadcasting without delay documents relating to specific abuses, specific trials, and especially forth-coming trials;<sup>42</sup> the importance of broadcasting legal material of practical use such as the Yezanin-Volpin document advising what can be legally done and not done when being interrogated;<sup>43</sup> the importance of broadcasting all documents, whatever their points of advocacy;<sup>44</sup> the inherent shortcomings of self-censorship;<sup>45</sup> and the need for tolerance in dealing with conflicting points of view expressed in samizdat.<sup>46</sup> The problem of establishing a *modus operandi* for making the documents available to scholars was also discussed. Mr. Brumberg expressed the view that copies should be deposited in the Library of Congress for use by American scholars.<sup>47</sup> Arrangements were subsequently made to do this.<sup>48</sup>

#### 3. Broadcast Guidance on Samizdat

One of the important results of the samizdat conference was the final formulation of an RL Broadcast Guidance on the use of samizdat documents. (A draft copy of the guidance had been circulated at the conference.) The text of the policy guidance is reproduced in Appendix 9. In spelling out principles and procedures in reporting on samizdat documents, the guidance made the following general points: RL "will not knowingly broadcast a fabrication; it will not knowingly broadcast genuine works, or versions of them, distributed in the West by agencies of the regime with the intention of harming the authors; RL will exert every effort to assure that its broadcasts of genuine texts or excerpts are identified or attributed on the air to reputable Western media.

In planning broadcasts on samizdat, RL set down the following principles: RL will relay the direct verbatim text in full whenever possible; it will always disassociate the

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author from RL's use of his text of excerpts; RL's presentation of readings will reflect views of the author and his text and not those of RL; commentary is to be made only after the text or excerpts have been broadcast; RL will not be timing or content of its broadcasts endanger an author whose position seems precarious; and, finally, the guidance reemphasized the point that RL broadcasts in all languages the appearance of genuine documents in any language of the USSR, employing the technique of cross-reporting.<sup>60</sup>

#### 4. Internalizing Samizdat

RL has gone to great lengths to internalize the texts of samizdat documents, and in the past two years the amount of programming devoted to samizdat has increased substantially. In April 1971, RL reported that its Russian language services devoted 6 hours per week of its 36 hours of original program time to readings and discussion of samizdat materials. During the first quarter of 1969, those readings and discussions, including repeats, averaged 4 hours per month; in the first quarter of 1971, the average increased to 58 hours per month.<sup>61</sup> According to Mr. Van der Rhoer, RL broadcast nearly 80 hours in March 1971.<sup>62</sup> Some broadcasts are made at dictation speed to enable the listener to record what is being said for later reading and dissemination.

Since the fall of 1968, RL has been broadcasting straight readings without comment of samizdat materials in a show entitled, "Letters and Documents." These materials are mainly on political and social themes. "Unpublished Works of Soviet Authors" is another show which brings the listener straight readings of belles-lettres materials. This series, running since May 1969, has included works by Marchenko, Bulgakov, Platanov, Pasternak, Solzhenitsyn, and N. Ya. Mandelstam. One day a week the "Samizdat Review" show discusses a samizdat document or some aspect of the dissent movement in the USSR. The objective of the show is to demonstrate to listeners that their fellow citizens who contribute to samizdat have many constructive ideas and alternatives to regime practices and should be supported actively in their efforts to bring about positive institutional changes. Other RL shows which sometimes use samizdat material and related topics are, "Soviet Daily Commentary," "CPSU Affairs," "USSR This Week," "Contemporary Thought," and "From the Other Shore."

Perhaps most illustrative of RL's efforts to make unpublished works of noted Soviet authors known within their own country, are the broadcast of works most familiar to Americans. During February 19-24, RL read in six parts Andrei Amalrik's, "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?" From March to July 1970, it read in 16 parts Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago." From July to December 1970, it read in 62 parts Solzhenitsyn's "The First Circle."<sup>63</sup> In recent months, Solzhenitsyn's, "August 1914" has been aired.

In addition to broadcasting the works of Russia's Nobel prize winning authors, RL also transmits to its Soviet audience letters, protests, and other documents from religious groups and those relating to the nationalities. In the last year protests and appeals by Soviet Jews have been programmed.

Increased attention has been given to the broadcasting of samizdat materials in the Nationalities Service. In August 1971, for example, the Ukrainian Service broadcast virtually daily materials from *Ukrainskyy Visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald), the organ of Ukrainian samizdat. From August 23-31, it broadcast "Chronicle of Resistance" by Valentin Moroz. Another example is the broadcast in the North Caucasian Service of Sakharov's pamphlet, "Reflections on Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," from August 5-13 in the Russian, Karachai, Ossetian and Avar languages.<sup>64</sup>

#### 5. Magnitizdat, Another Form of Samizdat

Another form of samizdat that has appeared in the Soviet Union is called, "magnitizdat," that is "tape publishing." The tape recorder, now in fairly common use, enables the listener to preserve samizdat broadcasts on tape for later listening and circulation. Magnitizdat has even appeared on the black market. According to one RL listener, RL's broadcasts of Svetlana Alliluyeva's (Stalin's daughter) book, "Twenty Letters to a Friend," were selling from 70 to 120 rubles (\$77 to \$132), the price depending upon reception.<sup>65</sup>

RL is able to benefit from magnitizdat in other ways than by the multiple dissemination of its broadcasts, and that is by broadcasting directly to the Soviet Union magnitizdat of songs not played over the state radio or released in record form by the state pressing plants. These are songs by the "mintsrels" or "troubadours," as they have come to be known, that is, professional singers or amateurs whose songs express their personal feelings and concerns and not the sterile official optimism sponsored by the regime. Since these songs, coming from within the Soviet people themselves, express what the Soviet people think and feel, RL believes that its listeners will be interested in hearing them.

Accordingly on July 1, 1971, RL established a new show entitled, "To the Sound of Guitars," to be hosted by Galina Zotova. The songs of the "troubadours" were to speak for themselves; there would be no RL commentary beyond an introduction.<sup>66</sup>

Appended to this study as Appendix 10 is the text and translation of an example of magnitizdat. It is a song based on a poem entitled, "Francols Villon" and sung by Bulat Okudzhava who had sung this song for the first time when in Paris a few years ago. Expressing themes of humanity and God, the song is sung in the style of traditional American folk music yet with a Russian flavor; and while it cannot be fully appreciated unless heard, still it can be a moving experience to the listener, especially to young people who in recent years have regenerated this form of American folk art.<sup>67</sup>

#### C. Significance of Samizdat for RL

##### 1. Soviet Generated Thoughts and Ideas

What is most significant about samizdat for RL is that it comes from within the Soviet people themselves. It is not something imposed from outside; it is rather their own response to their own internal problems, formulated according to their own requirements, capabilities, and experience. Samizdat is a form of self-liberalization whose major function is, as Leopold Labedz said, "to call a spade a spade, to break the taboos which otherwise permeate the horizon of thinking."<sup>68</sup> Samizdat encourages rational thought, the enemy of Stalinism, and extending the "horizon of thinking," represents the maturation of democratic ideas within the context of the Soviet system.

As a stimulant to independent thinking, samizdat is the nascent expression of a genuine democratically formed public opinion, however diverse and unstructured. It must be looked upon, therefore, in the words of Mr. Labedz, as "preparing the ground for some future possible trans-substantiation, so to say"—possibly a long-term expectation of internal reform in the tradition of the Decembrists of 1825.<sup>69</sup> In samizdat, basic questions are being asked; its momentum is forward; and according to Dmitri Pospolevsky of RL, evidence is gathering that it is even entering a new phase of development with the emergency of different ideological camps (for example, resumption of the historic conflict between the Slavophiles and Westernizers), suggesting that many people are, indeed, thinking about political alternatives.

##### 2. Permanence of Samizdat

The permanence of samizdat is another significant element for RL. Samizdat has an assured future by virtue of the prestige and power of many of its participants and by the unwillingness or inability of the regime to stamp it out. In an expanding environment where fear has diminished, participants will and do take their chances. And as the body of samizdat magnifies in number and subject matter, embracing the multi-concerns of this multi-national people, the regime has found itself inferentially legitimizing it, giving in to pressure on the one hand to discriminate between degrees and kinds, and being paralyzed by a sense of inaction on the other not wishing to revert to Stalinism.

Caught between these pressures and influenced by other deep-rooted forces, the regime has had to acquiesce in many demands by the dissenters and, perforce, has had to moderate in some respects its arbitrary style of administration. This is another significant aspect of samizdat where the role of RL, as a prime disseminator of samizdat, has been most important. Publication of samizdat material spelling out the legal rights of the Soviet citizens, according to a recent arrival from the Soviet Union, has contributed to moderating the arbitrary conduct of the KGB and making them act more responsibly. Knowledge and respect for the procedures of arrest and law enforcement are growing. More conscious of their rights under law, the Soviet people are increasingly insisting that these rights be recognized. As Mr. Van der Rhoer remarked, "the Soviet people do not regard law as a mockery; they see it as an important element in Soviet life and insist upon its enforcement." What RL is engaged in, he said, "is a law and order campaign for human rights."<sup>70</sup>

##### 3. From the Intelligentsia

For the most part, samizdat is produced by the intellectual elite of the nation, the prime audience that RL seeks to influence. This is a fact of greatest significance for RL. Among Western specialists in Soviet affairs, RL has been called an "echo chamber" and a "sounding board" which, according to Mr. Labedz, "makes it possible to have samizdat bouncing back and providing, in effect a means of communication between Soviet citizens."<sup>71</sup> "If it does no more than that," according to Max Hayward, "it will perform an invaluable historical role;" for its role "is defined by what has happened in Russia. It is part of the process, in fact, and is there providentially to transmit this material back and give it wider dissemination."<sup>72</sup>

##### 4. RL as a "Voice of the Soviet People"

This sums up the importance of samizdat for RL; for RL has become the principal source for disseminating samizdat throughout the Soviet Union. And it does so without risk to the individual. As a recent newcomer from the Soviet Union said, "If one listens over the radio, it is a beautiful thing," and "there are no documents that could cause trouble."

What RL does is to magnify the audience from what would ordinarily be a small network to embrace a national constituency. In so doing, RL has become a prime source for uniting the disparate elements of Soviet samizdat producers. As a disseminator of all forms of samizdat from both the Russians and the nationalities, it has given national currency to ideas and concepts that would have been restricted regionally and within a small group. Thus, by becoming a prime transmitter of samizdat RL has contributed substantially to this self-generating phenomenon within the Soviet Union.

According to Mr. Francis S. Ronalds, Deputy to the Executive Director, there is "no question that RL is playing an essential role in giving the publicity that samizdat needs and that the democratic forces need."

"What is happening," he said "is that themes plugged for the past 3 years are now turning up in samizdat. The process continues; and what takes place is a process of increase by geometric proportions."

#### 5. Enrichment of RL's Research and Programming

Finally, samizdat has had the effect of increasing RL's research resources and its programming "staff", for researchers and programmers now have original materials from which to draw in designing programs, and they have, in effect, ready-made scripts from writers within the Soviet Union itself. RL benefits, therefore, not only from an enrichment of its research materials, but perhaps even more importantly, by having the most effective "voices", speaking directly to the Soviet people the thoughts of the Soviet people themselves and not having been filtered essentially through the minds of outsiders. The "purity" of thoughtful reflection on the Soviet experience is, therefore, preserved.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> RL Basic Briefing Outline, July 2, 1971, p. 1 (RL, v. V, pt. 10.) Ithiel de Sola Pool gave this description of the uncertainty in determining one's audience: "The mass media represent a peculiar mode of communication in which one does not know to whom one is talking. Broadcasting or writing for the press is like dropping a note in a bottle over the side of a boat. The man who receives it may be king or pauper, relative or stranger, friend or foe." (Pool, Mass Media and Their Interpersonal Social Functions in the Process of Modernization, p. 435.)

<sup>2</sup> Justification and the rationale for this approach were explained by Dr. Pool in these words. "For a few writers, scientists, and high officials direct foreign contact is a major source of information." As "elite persons," they are "domestic communicators as well as important men in their own right." As persons "well-informed about and possibly well-disposed toward the West, they can be an influential force for liberalization of the society." And he went on with this perceptive and relevant observation: "They are also gatekeepers through whom information flows to the average Soviet citizen, who himself rarely sees foreigners." (Pool, Opportunities for Change: Communications with the U.S.S.R., p. 12.)

<sup>3</sup> RL Policy manual, March 1971, pp. 13-14. (RL v. IV, pt. 4.)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-21.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 23-25.

<sup>14</sup> For a Soviet comment on the rationalization of audiences, see, U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare, pp. 21-24.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 26-28.

<sup>16</sup> The scientist went on to say that the Soviet people learn more about their own spaceflights from foreign radio than Soviet media, not to speak of American spaceflights which, he said, interest "the Soviet people as indeed all humanity."

<sup>17</sup> This problem was brought out by a former Leningrad student who had reviewed some of RL's output in December 1970. In the show, "From Cheka to KGB, #12," he pointed out the danger inherent in broadcasting about World War II "in which so many people suffered." He explained the difficulty of a Soviet audience trying to understand some of the observations about the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 presented in the program when their knowledge of the incident is incomplete. Explanations were needed, he said, in such references. "The agreement with Hitler

is hushed up in the USSR, and young people have a very hazy idea of it." He concluded: "One should approach this period with great caution." (RL, Special Program Evaluation Report #1-71, March 29, 1971, p. 2.)

Anyone who has had an opportunity to discuss international relations and history with even knowledgeable Communists will have probably experienced this problem of communications. Often times some of the most common knowledge about recent history is unknown. The effect is that a promising dialogue can collapse despite good intentions on both sides.

<sup>18</sup> Quality Control Report, #16-71, August 20, 1971.

<sup>19</sup> RL policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 12. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-13.

<sup>21</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of the dissent movement in the Soviet Union and examples of samizdat, see Boelurkiw, Bohdan R. Political dissent in the Soviet Union. Studies in comparative communism, April 1970: 74-148.

<sup>22</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 6 (RL, v. I.)

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>24</sup> RL, v. XIX, pt. B.

<sup>25</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, April 23, 1971, pp. 20-21. (RL, v. II, pt. D1.)

<sup>26</sup> RL, v. XIX, pt. A.

<sup>27</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 6-7. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>28</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, p. 21. (RL, v. II, pt. D1.)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp. 21-22.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 25-26.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 12. Mr. Schapiro added: "I would go so far as to say that, if my American friends will forgive me, when I read some of the things that are published by American intellectuals, or English intellectuals for that matter (except they write less), but when I read some of the stuff that is published by them I turn with a certain feeling of refreshment to the naive, but nevertheless honest and moral writing. What is naive? The naive of these great democratic societies of ours, where nonsense streams out of the public press, from intellectuals of one sort or another, at least you do not get that from the Soviet Union. You get the official claptrap, but the stuff of samizdat is clean; it's decent it's honest."

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 16-17.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 5. Mr. Floyd noted the extensive bibliography prepared by RL on samizdat and observed: "These chaps write a lot and the feeling is that they are not getting more economical with words and one would imagine that this process is going to continue. It is especially apparent with the output of documents concerned with the question of Jewish emigration and anti-semitism."

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-3.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> RL Policy formulation, June 8, 1971, p. 10. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>40</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, April 23, 1971, p. 4. (RL, v. II, pt. D1.)

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 33. Leonard Schapiro observed: "I might interpose this. To my mind it is a hundred times more important to demonstrate to these people what objectives liberal reporting is, than it is to pursue any particular opinion. Let them see that they get absolutely everything. If it is something that you dislike intensely, well, you say that you dislike it and you say why. Nevertheless, this is part of the intellectual produce of the country and therefore we broadcast it." And for Radio Liberty to depart from that would be disastrous."

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 31-32.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>48</sup> In October 1971, a conference was held at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario on samizdat. In a report on the conference giving his general impressions, Dr. Gene Sosin indicated that the conference acknowledged that dissent and samizdat are a fact of current Soviet life worth taking seriously. Those academicians present agreed that it would have been unthinkable to call such a conference even a few years ago and anticipate the convening of another one in the near future. Stress was placed on foreign radio broadcasting as a major factor in amplifying voices of dissent, encouraging this or that group to emulate others more bold and acting as a partial restraint on regime repression. Respect was evident for RL research on samizdat combined with urgent requests from many participants that RL provide them with material. (Sosin to Boite and Van der Rhoer, RL Telex from New York, October 28, 1971.) (RL, v. XIX.)

<sup>49</sup> RL Program Policy Division, Broadcast Guidance. The Use of Documents from the USSR, June 9, 1971, 7 p. (RL, v. IV, pt. 8b.)

<sup>50</sup> RL, Radio Liberty's Russian Service samizdat programming, Munich, April 1971, p. 1-5. (RL, v. II, pt. D2.)

<sup>51</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, April 1971, p. 5. (RL, v. II, pt. 1.)

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-19.

<sup>53</sup> Sakouta to Van der Rhoer, Coverage of samizdat material in August 1971 RL programs, RL Memorandum, October 20, 1971.

<sup>54</sup> RL Statement, June 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>55</sup> RL Show plan. To the Sound of Guitars, July 1, 1971. (RL, v. IX, pt. I.)

<sup>56</sup> The writer played this tape to four 13-year old American girls, and while only knowing the general message of the song's words, they were, nonetheless, deeply moved by the style and sincerity of the singer.

<sup>57</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, April 1971, p. 27. (RL, v. II, pt. D1.)

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp. 10-11.

<sup>59</sup> According to a recent resident of the Soviet Union, the Soviet citizen who is approached for interrogation by the police does not have to automatically respond to their questions. If the police have an order permitting them to interrogate, then one must talk. Still, one is not obliged to inform on others. By refusing to talk, he would be liable to the loss of a certain percentage of pay over a six-month period, thus avoiding the moral burden of incriminating a friend.

<sup>60</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, April 1971, p. 9. (RL, v. II, pt. D1.)

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

#### CHAPTER V: RL'S PROGRAMMING: PREPARATIONS AND OPERATIONS, POLICY AND QUALITY CONTROL

##### I. GENERAL PROGRAMMING: NEWS, COMMENTARY, FEATURES

##### A. RL's program operations division

##### 1. Theory of Programming

RL's business is broadcasting; programming is, therefore, its chief function. Mr. Tuck, RL's Chief of POD, put it this way: "The key to RL's operations is programming. This is the end product, the raison d'être of the whole operation. Programming is the point of contact with the Soviet audience." Therefore, one of the most commanding responsibilities of POD is to know what the Soviet audience wants and to determine how RL can satisfy these wants. As Mr. Tuck said, "Our business is psyching ourselves to psyche the audience."

In program planning POD operates, at least theoretically, on the principle of an inverted pyramid, as Mr. Scott described it, where the first appeal is to universality of interest, and this is the news, with expectation of a declining listener interest for the rest of the hour. News is the most important attraction for listener interest. Thus, in RL's four-part concept of programming,



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news takes first priority, news features second. Then, the remainder of the hour contains internal Soviet subject matter, for example, a review of samizdat, and finally a political or cultural show directed toward a more specialized audience. Hopefully, the listener who turns on his radio to listen to the news will be attracted by subsequent features and continue to listen. What makes programming so important for RL is that it can lose its audience with the turn of the knob.

#### 2. Administrative Style

In POD, Mr. Tuck operates on the Sargeant principle of devolution of responsibility. He believes in giving a man responsibility and the authority to go with it. In essentially a creative operation such as POD, he feels that this is the way to generate creativity within staff. Moreover, it tends to keep morale up, because it gives the individual a feeling of involvement from which is derived a sense of personal worth. Accordingly, the various Chief Editors and Program Managers are given a great deal of individual authority and responsibility.

Moreover, Mr. Tuck stressed the importance of maintaining in POD a division of labor between the administrators and substantive staff. It is important, he declared, to keep a creative professional staff, that is, the writers and commentators, free from burdensome supervisory duties. "The organization would suffer," Mr. Tuck said, "if top commentators were burdened with supervisory responsibilities."

Thus, the administrative style in POD tends to bear out the general tendency in RL toward administrative flexibility and autonomy, allowing the greatest possibility for initiative and creativity. For POD this is important, because it is here where creativity in programming begins.

#### B. Central News Service

##### 1. Administrative Aspects

Given RL's priority on news, the Central News Service plays a vital role in programming. For CNS, the key factor is professional journalism, and its chief, Mr. Lennart Savemark, does not doubt that his department is "grounded on the professionalism of the trade." A commitment of staff to a "high sense of professionalism," he said, "is the key to the operation." Many of RL's CNS staffers were professional journalists in the Soviet Union. Some were on the staff of leading provincial newspapers. Mr. Savemark singled out Mr. Peransky, a seasoned journalist, as a staffer who "has a high degree of professionalism."

The concept of administrative autonomy under policy guidance is also present in CNS. Here the principle has the special value of encouraging personal initiative, especially since it is the individual's responsibility to keep up with the flow of information; it has the added value of fostering an attitude of less dependency on administrative direction. The latter point has particular relevance to CNS in times of a news emergency. "These people can work competently without my interference," said Mr. Savemark, noting however, that he would be "in touch with the whole operation and it would function effectively." The reason for this, he said, as "the sense of professionalism among staff, independence, and the degree of administrative autonomy."

However, CNS has its personnel problems. The department, apparently is understaffed, and, as Mr. Savemark commented, "there are no reserves." The average age is said to be too high, creating special problems in emergencies. Moreover, the difficulty in recruiting is considerable. As Mr. Savemark said, "Where do you find a Russian journalist?" Accordingly, people have to be trained from the inside, and this means using journalistic resources for personnel training.

What makes CNS staff problems more pressing is the special linguistic requirements, particularly in the very important presentation of news. "An accent would turn a listener off," said Mr. Savemark, who pointed out the value of news announcers being able to speak as a "fellow countryman" to another "fellow countryman." "Every language is developing phenomenon," said Mr. Savemark, "words are added, expressions and other words are dropped; it is a living thing." The need to keep up with a changing language appears to be vital for RL, especially for news commentators. This is done partly by listening to tapes of Tass output. As Mr. Savemark said, "a whole show can go down the drain with mispronunciation."

#### 2. News Resources

CNS has extensive resources for bringing world news into RL's newsroom. First of all, it has access to the monitoring reports made by Mr. Schilling, RL's media analyst. As a specialist in Soviet propaganda, Mr. Schilling and his staff monitor all Soviet broadcasts daily and evaluate the adequacy of its coverage. Monitored tape is auditioned and edited for parts to be transcribed. Straight news items are typed and other features having direct interest to RL staff are done in full or in precise form. Typed materials are sent to CNS, relevant programmers and presumably the Research Department.

Moreover, CNS has access to the major wire services. The Tass service provides RL with complete coverage in both Russian and English, not just that going to its domestic service. CNS also has access to the wire services of the Chinese News Agency (in English), UPI, and Reuters. It also has a commercial telex for getting in touch with its own correspondents in the field. CNS has correspondents in Washington, New York at U.N. headquarters, London, Paris, Bonn, Milan, Tel Aviv, Copenhagen, and one in Taipei who covers the Far East. Another formal source of news input is RFE's wire service. In addition to this, RL gets RFE's daily News Budget delivered by hand every day which it keeps for reference purposes in its Information Center for 10 days.

RL has many other channels for the input of news. Using their own radios, RL staff has access to some 4 or 5 Soviet radio stations. (For a survey of environmental aids to programmers, see Appendix 13.) Some staffers have speakers in their homes and special devices on telephones for listening to Soviet radio broadcasts at any time. All supervisors have radio receivers in their offices. And then RL has access to broadcasts by West German and Austrian television, in addition to radio broadcasts from other foreign stations. Since most RL staffers have a multi-lingual capability, they have access to foreign news sources that would ordinarily be closed to those knowing, for example, only English.

A final point in the matter of news resources is the difference in time zones between Munich and the United States. From its headquarters in Munich, RL is close to Moscow; there is only a 2 hour time difference. Thus, RL has a leadtime of some 6 hours ahead of the United States. In the news-processing and newscasting business, this time difference is an important factor. The difference is made more meaningful by an awareness of the fact that half of the working day is over in Munich by the time New Yorkers begin their working day.

#### 3. Objectives and Policies

A basic operating principle for RL is to tell the truth as correctly and objectively as possible. This is the vital center of the entire operation. Without the credibility that comes from truth and objectivity, the radio could not be effective in achieving its purposes. For CNS this requirement carries with it a special burden because of the nature of

its tasks. News is made virtually every minute of the day; and the quantity of news is overwhelming. This imposes upon CNS the need for a special skill in the selectivity of news. Given the unique operational and policy requirements of RL as a "Home Service" for the Soviet people, this function is especially important. Then, there is the matter of speed. "One should have time to think," said Mr. Savemark, "but in the news business everything is done in a rush, finishing one project and then starting to work on another." Speed, therefore, imposes another special burden on RL's newsmen.

Yet, despite these built-in occupational hazards, CNS, "has no problems in the field of policy," according to Mr. Savemark. "CNS staff have different views; they have strong feelings, especially those who had suffered first hand from the regime," Mr. Savemark observed, "but there are no conflicts with the policy people." The basic reason for this he said, is that "the essentials of policy as set forth in the Policy Manual and policy guidances are in harmony with the professional standards of journalism, for example, in matters of objectivity and factual reporting." "RL's goal is unique," Savemark went on, "we would not be efficient if we did not apply the whole register of professional methods that are universal." To this extent, he said, CNS, though having a special audience with special requirements, "does not differ from operations of any professional news agency." In a sense, strict adherence to the rubrics of professional journalism acts as protective insulation against policy violations. For, as Mr. Savemark pointed out, "If an RL newsmen lowered his standards or insulted Soviet listeners, this would be self-defeating—it would be counter-productive and a violation of professional standards and policy as well." (In striving for objectivity, RL carries news items not particularly favorable to the United States.)

Moreover, CNS, like other departments of RL, is policy-oriented, and it plays a role in policymaking, particularly when news operations are involved.

#### 4. Role in programming

RL has very limited options as a communicator; people can turn off the radio at any time. Thus, if it is to communicate, it must do so effectively, and quickly. One single program area that unites all audiences is news and news analysis. This is the center of RL's broadcast schedule and the most important element in its daily program in all languages. The preparation of news programs is the primary responsibility of CNS.

(For an example of a week's broadcast schedule in the Russian Service showing of the news schedules, see Appendix 11.)

Newscasts are heard every hour around the clock in a full time effort to keep the Soviet listener informed. Each hourly newscast is followed by a "News Feature," lasting 10-20 minutes. The "Review of the World Press" contains what is determined to be the "big news story" of the day and may last about 4½ minutes. This is followed by an article from the world press, for example, something from the New York Times or LeMonde of special interest to the Soviet Union and lasts usually 4½ minutes. The "Background to News," prepared in CNS, varies in its commentary. There is also "Special Correspondents," a news show which consists of reports from the various RL overseas bureaus and are either telexed or voiced. These reports, like the one in October 1971 on Britain's entry into the Common Market, give local reactions and general commentary on an important news story as seen from the correspondent's station. CNS also has available what are called "actualities" for its newscasts. These are taped recordings of statements by the various persons featured in the news.

The actual procedure in news-processing seems to be fairly simple. A key person in

the process is the News Evaluator. He comes to work at 0800, selects information from the wire services and other sources, establishes with the Duty Editor a priority for "news," and prepares a News List for the morning News Meeting. Policy guidance can be introduced at this morning meeting; the day's broadcasts do not begin until 1445 CET.

The News Evaluator and Duty Editor coordinate the work of the CNS. They decide "what is news," applying universal principles on requirements and also RL policy. They are the primary determiners of "news." If any question arises on a particular item, they confer with the Chief Editor or Mr. Savemark. If they are in doubt on a policy matter, then they in turn confer with staff of PPD.

Staff of CNS know each morning the gaps of news that are to be filled and distortions corrected. Saturated in Soviet media over a prolonged period and having available an extensive monitoring service, they can predict almost 100%, according to Mr. Savemark, how Soviet news will be treated.

After the selection of news has been made and priorities established, the individual news item goes to a news writer who checks it for correct names and whether there were any previous stories. CNS has its own ready-reference collection of standard references (for example, Deadline Data on World Affairs, Facts on File, Keesings Contemporary Archives, Great Soviet Encyclopedia, standard dictionaries, etc.), and staff has access to the library's resources. The script, having been written, goes to the news editor for review. The Duty Editor assembles the newscast and goes to the studio where he reads it "live." It is also taped for repeat broadcasts.

The newscast is written in the Russian language and copies are sent to the Nationalities Service where it is translated into their own specific languages for delivery. The Nationalities Service also broadcasts news and prepares its own material, drawing from CNS and its own research resources.

By and large, the news is oriented toward international coverage in an effort to give the Soviet listener a fuller picture of the world scene. Internal developments may just be mentioned, and not treated in detail, except when there is an international reaction to an internal Soviet development. A case in point is the *Izvestia* article in October, asserting that the Soviet Government did not put dissenters in psychiatric hospitals. GNS reported this news item but did so from the reactions of the international press, thus internalizing the story through reports from other sources.

The key point in RL's newscasts, as in that of other programs, is the essential criteria of reporting and commenting from the point of view and perspective of the Soviet listener, not from that of the outsider.

#### C. Russian service programs

##### 1. Proportion and Thematic Mix of Programs

RL's greatest programming effort goes into the Russian Service. The rationale for this is very simple: approximately one-half of the Soviet population are Great Russians, and they constitute the dominant ethnic elite; the Russian language, as the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, is spoken and understood not only by the Great Russians but also by many of the other nationalities.

Programs in the Russian language are broadcast 24 hours a day. A day's broadcast in the Russian Service consists of approximately 5 hours of original feature programming, in addition to 20 minutes of news and commentary each hour provided by CNS. A feature program is re-played on an average of 6 to 8 times in a 24-hour period in order to reach the broadest possible audience. It must be remembered that the Soviet Union covers approximately 11 time zones. (For

comparisons purposes, continental United States covers only 4.)

Most programs in the Russian Service run 10 to 15 minutes in length except for readings from samizdat in the program series, "Documents from the USSR," and presentations of Western literature in the series, "From the Outer Shore." Another show that would fall into this category is, "Unpublished Works of Soviet Authors," which has been running since May 1969. These are 30-minute shows, continued from day to day until the full text is completed. Solzhenitzyn's "First Circle," for example, was read over a 6-month period, 3 days a week. (For example of a week's programming in the Russian Service, see Appendix 10.)<sup>1</sup>

RL's programming, prepared for both general and specialized audiences, is divided into two major categories with a balance of about half and half: one part is responsive, containing news, press reviews, press articles, correspondents reports, commentaries of the day (that is, the product of CNS); the other is assertive, containing material planned in advance to carry out RL's policy objectives.

In the area of Soviet internal coverage, approximately 38% of RL's total Russian language time on the air is used by features pertaining specifically to Soviet domestic affairs. Of these features, 60% analyze both present and past political events. The other 50% concentrate on social and cultural affairs with a particular emphasis on "heretical works" which the regime does not allow to be published or broadcast but have been acclaimed in the West. Out of 36 hours of Russian weekly original programming 6 hours consists of samizdat. Regular series in the Russian Service include: "Letters and Documents," "Unpublished Works of Soviet Authors," and "Samizdat Review." "Russia Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" fills in gaps of official history created by regime censorship. Economic developments in the Soviet Union absorb about 4% of total air time.

On the world scene, RL's coverage is somewhat less than that on domestic affairs. Of its total Russian language time on the air about 30% is taken up by features relating to developments outside the Soviet Union. The proportion is divided roughly as follows: the United States 4%; Soviet bloc countries 3%, and other countries 23%. Coverage of developments in areas outside the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc and the United States is almost 50% concerned with current political developments. Current cultural events occupy about 35% of this sector with remaining shows devoted primarily to economic development, scientific and social topics. Sixty-five percent of air time coverage on the United States relates to current social developments, while the remainder deals with scientific and cultural themes; only a small proportion is specifically allotted to political matters. Most of the programming about other Soviet bloc countries analyze political developments with about 30% covering economic and cultural topics.

RL internalizes scripts on external affairs, relating them specifically to Soviet internal concerns. This is done by suggesting practical alternatives in the daily life and work of Soviet citizens. For example, "Across the Ocean," produced in the U.S. Division, illustrates to listeners how problems they face in their own society are solved in the American society; "East European Notes" describes constructive institutional changes in East Europe. To repeat, in dealing with external themes, RL, in its role as a "Home Service," attempts to present the point of view and perspective of an interested Soviet citizen.<sup>2</sup>

##### 2. Summary of Program Content

Examination of Appendix 10 provides at a glance the general picture of program content for a week's programming in the Russian Service. "Billboard" is just what it says: it is a voiced run-down of the programs be-

ing scheduled for the day. Since Soviet listeners do not have available published time schedules of programming, "Billboard" takes care of that requirement. News and news features take the first 20 minutes of every hour, followed by the various features from the Russian Service.

A typical day's programming in the Russian Service, oriented to the special interests of a Soviet audience, might include, in addition to news coverage, the following items: a Soviet engineer's samizdat essay on economic reforms; a samizdat text of an appeal to the Soviet Government on behalf of imprisoned Jewish dissenters; details of changes in the Communist hierarchy of Soviet Azerbaijan; a foreign traveler's impressions of a visit to Soviet Central Asia; a British agricultural specialist's views on increasing farm output; a French journalist's analysis of recent political developments in Moscow; a discussion by scholars of problems faced by the individual in the Twentieth Century; a review of measures to reduce the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia; a report on social legislation in Canada; a reviewer's synopsis of a Polish film not shown in the Soviet Union; a talk on labor productivity in the United States; a documentary on the New Economic Policy (NEP) during the period of the 1920's; a reading from the work of the purged, and never rehabilitated, Soviet writer, Boris Pilnyak; a dramatization in Russian translation of scenes from a new American play; and a message from an American writer to his colleagues in the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

In the show "Meetings with Listeners," RL tries to establish a direct dialogue with the Soviet people. On this program it answers letters and airs the reactions of listeners. It also discusses the goals and purposes of the station, along with commenting on plans for programming. In addition, it provides a platform for individual authors to air their views on the shows they do.<sup>4</sup>

RL uses cross-reporting in its programs. This is a device that enables RL to disseminate information on developments throughout the whole of the Communist world. For example, a broadcast on June 16-17, 1971 called, "Yugoslav Workers," discussed freedom of Yugoslav workers to travel abroad, their earnings and the extent of their savings, as well as their changed approach to work in their own country upon return. This program proved to be of great interest to the outside panelists of Soviet citizens (some former, others still living in the USSR) who reviewed the program in a post-broadcast audition. They commended the fact that the statistics were allowed to speak for themselves. A young Soviet professor commented that this is "a real eye-opener for the Soviet listener."<sup>5</sup>

RL also tries to provide the lighter touch in some of its programming. In a post-broadcast audition of "Wide Wide World," a news presentation, one senior RL staffer referred to the presentation as being, "lively and light-hearted, using good radio technique and is a welcome change of pace." Among the items broadcast was this: "Los Angeles swimming pool requests patrons not to disturb lifeguards unless their lives are really in danger."<sup>6</sup>

RL does not program music, except of a very select nature—for example, "troubadours," singing samizdat songs on "Sound of Guitars." It does have a transitional theme, played in various rhythms and styles depending on the show, that identifies the station. This theme is taken from "Hymn to Free Russia" written by Grechaniov during the period of evolving democracy between the March democratic revolution and the November Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. RL uses this theme as a reminder to the Soviet people that Russia has a tradition of democracy.

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RL has limited music programming because it is felt that Soviet listeners have good coverage over their own systems and from other foreign broadcasters, and hence has no significant appeal for RL's purposes. Music programming, such as it is, focuses mainly on theoretical discussions in which musical illustrations are used. The program is in the form of a musical analysis or commentary, the sort of thing that Boris Goldovsky used to do on the Saturday afternoon broadcasts of the Metropolitan Opera. For example, the program for October 14-15, 1970 aired a show called, "This is Jazz" (13:30 minutes). It was a discussion of jazz guitar and guitarists based on a book by Barney Kessel with three long musical selections.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Policy and Procedures

"Scriptwriting is a creative work; one must have flexibility administratively; there must be allowances for give-and-take in expressing one's views; there must also be a sense of compromise over wording"—these are some of the views that Victor Frank, RL's veteran Senior Commentator in the Russian Service, expressed on the importance of allowing the writer a wide range of independence within the structure of policy.

And, apparently, the writer has a wide range within which to exercise personal initiative. But, within certain definable limits; for as Mr. Diakowski said, "the writer does not have free rein; someone has to say yes or no." And he cited the example of a writer who has a book show and wants to program a show on opera. He would not be permitted to do so. The assignment would go to the person covering music.

But what is important, Mr. Diakowski observed, is "the way things are treated." And in this area where policy and substance converge the Russian Service strives to maintain the proper balance between creative independence and policy direction. According to Mr. Diakowski, writers in the Russian Service have a "finger-tip sensitivity" on policy matters. "They are deeply involved in their craft, in their subject, and in policy. It is a matter of osmosis," he explained; "they know instinctively what not to do."

Accordingly, the writers establish the parameters of a show, and by and large determine its contents in consultation with the editor. They prepare the original script which is the major effort. In writing they must be aware of the "sound quality" of what they write. As Mr. Diakowski described the technique of script-writing: "one must write for the ear." Every effort is made in the Russian Service, as indicated in another part of this study, to develop a multi-functional capability among writers; that is, to have research expertise, writing ability and good voicing technique for broadcasting their own scripts. The ideal is to develop and combine the qualities of skilled technical and substantive specialist with those of an effective radio communicator.

Mr. Frank falls into this category of a multi-functional specialist. (For his biography, see Appendix 1.) He has a program once a week called, "Heart of the Matter." (He also participates on panel shows on samizdat.) He has complete independence in designing this show. If he sees a particular development, say in samizdat, he will analyze it and discuss it on his program, all the while preserving the independence of this work. Yet, he has this "finger-tip sensitivity" in policy. Thus, the end result represents the individual effort of an intelligent man who is able to analyze, write and comment orally on matters of consequence.

Programming procedures in the Russian Service, like those of CNS, are fairly simple. For example, if in consultation with Munich an RL free-lance writer in Geneva prepares a script on French cultural affairs, it will go to Mr. Backerac, the Chief Editor, for his review. He will check it out for language,

style, and policy—though it is not likely that policy questions would arise since the script deals with cultural and political affairs. There is also a final check for facts. At this point the script is in rough draft. It is then typed on a final master copy; it goes to the editor for final review, and then to the Schedule Coordinator, who knows the assigned deadline and is responsible for the flow of scripts from the typists to the Production Department. This process may take as much as ten days.

The Production Department prepares the script for airing. Usually it takes 2-to-3 days from the time of script removal to airing. Each show is produced by the same Continuity Team. This team has its own producers and other staff who schedule production time, arrange for speakers, and other performers if needed. After the taping process is completed, one copy of the tape goes to the Russian Service and another to pre-broadcast review in PPD. These final reviews provide a last minute check for possible violations and error before actual airing.

Mr. Diakowski has in his office a massive master chart of a week's programing divided into blocks of 24 hours. It is a wall-size enlargement of the Russian Service program schedule reproduced in Appendix 10. On this chart slots are available for inserting reference cards for a particular show that is being scheduled for airing. At one glance, the observer can see the status of programing in the Russian Service.

The U.S. Division in New York contributes to programing in the Russian Service. Slots are available for its programs which are recorded on tape in New York and sent to Munich headquarters. Sometimes changes are required in Munich, owing to new developments in subject matter being treated and possibly for other reasons. But tape cannot be edited very easily; sometimes a last minute decision has to be made to accept or reject it. Munich checks out the output from New York and has the final word on where their program contribution will fit in.

A final point on the matter of policy and procedure is the daily morning Russian Service meeting. Briefly, this meeting provides both the mechanism and the occasion for upper level review by the Chiefs of POD and PPD of feature programing and also for discussion of policy matters and the issuance of a daily guidance.

### D. Nationalities service

#### 1. Disproportion in programing

RL's programing is structured not only to serve the Great Russians but also to meet the needs of millions of other Soviet nationalities. For, the Soviet Union is a multinational state, having in its population of 241,784,000 ethnic groups numbering more than 170 (the Great Russians constitute barely one half), speaking some 125 different languages and dialects, and practicing 40 different religions that embrace in substantial numbers the major faiths of the world. It comes as a surprise to many Americans when told that in this complex nationality structure within Soviet society there are more Turks than in Turkey and more Moslems than in the United Arab Republic.

To reach these diverse peoples of the Soviet Union, RL broadcasts in some 20 languages. From its Nationalities Service broadcasts are aired in Ukrainian and Belorussian, both Slavic languages; and in the following non-Slavic languages: Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian; the North Caucasian languages, that is, Adighe, Avar, Chechen, Karachi, Ossetian, Tatar-Bashkir and Crimean Tartar; and the Turkistani languages, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uighur, and Uzbek. Recently, the Nationalities Service began broadcasts in Karakalpak.

RL directs a portion of its broadcasting energies and resources to the non-Russian

peoples because they too are denied, among other rights, the right of a free press, and owing to their own unique historic colonial experience, they have added reason for listening to RL's message. A panel of 21 specialists at a conference sponsored by New York University and RL believed that "there was no question of the fact that a considerable audience existed among the Soviet nationalities who would be receptive to Radio Liberty broadcasts."<sup>8</sup>

By and large Russification of the nationalities, a policy dating far back to the history of Tsarist Russia, has fallen far short of Soviet goals so that the languages, religions, traditions, histories, and cultures of these non-Russian peoples remain vigorous and intact. For example, 30 million Soviet Moslems (one Soviet citizen in 8) are successfully resisting assimilation. More than 98% of those inhabiting their own Union Republics (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Kirghiz) are listed in the census as having retained their own mother tongue. (Among demographers language is regarded as the key indicator of assimilation.) They have resisted suppression of their Islamic faith, and in defiance of Soviet authorities have established illegal mosques, trained mullahs, and, in general, have carried on their ancient religious practices. Moreover, Soviet Moslems are part of the Islamic community with its distinct way of life much of which continues despite education and modernization. Scholars have noted a marked tendency for them to identify more with traditions of Asia and Islamic values and with their own Islamic neighbors than with the alien cultures of the Russians and other Europeans.<sup>9</sup>

What is said of Soviet Moslems can also be said of the other major non-Russian nationalities, the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, and Armenians—all have rich national cultures and unique historical heritages which set them apart from the Great Russian experience. Under the impact of the spirit of nationalism that has been enveloping the modern world, these nations and nationalities have been experiencing a new sense of national identity, albeit within the Soviet structure, but, nonetheless, one of a special appreciation of their own cultures, languages, and histories. As Walter Lippman said some six years ago in commenting on the power of modern nationalism: "In Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union itself, nationalism is the strongest force working against global revolutionary communism."<sup>10</sup>

In programming, the Nationalities Service has from the beginning been assigned a disproportion of RL's broadcasting resources. By and large, the nationalities were considered to be outsiders when RL was first established. Organized under Great Russian influence, the Great Russian point of view predominated, and only after great pressure from the other nationalities in the emigration were they given a place in the organization's structure. Accordingly, RL reflected the old Great Russian view, and no doubt in the early years this had a detrimental effect on getting across the point of view of the nationalities. As one RL staffman in the Nationalities Service put it, "the nationalities were not taken seriously." This attitude affected priorities in programming, development of resource material for research, and the allocation of manpower.

Only in recent years, perhaps in the early 1960's, has there developed in RL a greater appreciation of the nationalities and a growing awareness of their importance in the larger framework of international relations. What generated this reassessment was primarily the growing strife between China and the Soviet Union. This emerging conflict created an internal situation of particular interest to the goals and purposes of RL, for it centered geographically on areas in

Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Sinkiang, both of which share a common historical and ethnic heritage. Also with the growing prominence of the developing areas of Asia and Africa, and the emergence of serious problems in the Middle East, RL began to re-evaluate the role of the Soviet nationalities, especially in view of their sharing with these areas of the world a common Islamic heritage and a unique colonial experience. All of these forces converged in the early 1960's to make the nationalities a subject of higher priority in RL. Accordingly, after 1965 the situation of the Nationalities Service improved markedly, and this tendency seems to be continuing.

Presently, the breakdown in programming for each day is as follows: Russian, 24 hours; Ukrainian, 13; Belorussian, 10; and the others, 4; that is, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, North Caucasian languages, Tatar-Bashkir and the Turkistani languages.<sup>11</sup>

A breakdown in new programming calculated on the average time per day in each language is as follows:

Russian, 4 hours 11 minutes.  
 Ukrainian, 73 minutes.  
 Belorussian, 41 minutes.  
 Turkistani A: Uzbek and Uighur, 21 minutes.  
 Turkistani B: Kazakh and Kirghiz, 19 minutes.  
 Turkistani C: Turkmen and Tajik, 16 minutes.  
 Tatar: Crimean Tatar and Tatar Bashkir, 50 minutes.  
 Armenian, 40 minutes.  
 Azerbaijani, 36 minutes.  
 Georgian, 44 minutes.  
 North Caucasian: Adyge, Avar, Chechen-Ingush, Karachi-Balkar, Ossetian, Russian, 44 minutes.<sup>12</sup>

The criteria adopted by RL for determining broadcasts in a specific language and the proportion of broadcasts in a given language are: (1) the population or population density; (2) the existence of a developed, or developing, national self-awareness; (3) strategic location of the language group; (4) RL's transmitting capabilities for reaching the audience; and (5) the availability of data on a nationality and of speakers in the emigration.

The Baltic States meet this criteria, but RL has been unable to get the necessary approval to broadcast to the area. Also, broadcasts in Moldavian are not contemplated since Moldavian is a dialect of Rumanian, a language covered in RFE broadcasts.

In practice, therefore, RL broadcasts in some 18-20 languages, and broadcast times are allotted to them roughly according to their status within the USSR. Daily programming is conducted in Russian, Ukrainian, Uzbek, Belorussian, Tatar, Uighur, Azeri, Georgian, and Armenian. Every other day programs are transmitted in languages of other nationalities, that is, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen. Approximately twice a week broadcasts are made in different languages of the North Caucasus which rotate with each other, that is, Karachi, Ossetian, Chechen-Ingush, Avar and Adygei.<sup>13</sup>

## 2. Program Content

In its programming the Nationalities Service places great stress on themes that appeal to the growing awareness of nationality among the non-Russian peoples. Emphasis is given to certain aspects of human and civil rights, but the main thrust is, apparently, in the cultural area. "Culture is a political weapon that is legal in the Soviet Union," said Mr. Sztumpf. Accordingly, programming such as the Tartar's program, "Our National Heritage," is designed to acquaint the listener with his national cultural past and to bring to his attention contemporary works of native authors who have appeal for today but are banned. The underlying purpose is,

as Mr. Herus, manager of the Ukrainian-Belorussian programs, said, "to give a feeling of continuity in the national past through culture."

In the Soviet context culture has distinctive political implications that are not clearly understood in this country. To Americans, culture is identified with American literature, art, and an appreciation of the nation's historical past as a diverse but unifying shared experience. The Soviet nationalities, like ourselves, have their own national literature, language, art, and historical traditions. Among Soviet Moslems, Islamic culture has in addition a strong religious ingredient. Sovietization, however, is a long-term process that seeks to destroy these cultural values—this is the goal of Soviet nationality policy, and, in effect, to establish a sort of homogenized culture—"rapprochement" the Soviets call it—based on what amounts to Soviet Russian norms. Culture, therefore, has a political meaning. Hence, for the various nationalities to assert their own national cultural values carries with it strong political overtones.

Samizdat has provided the Nationalities Service with a unique opportunity in their programming for appealing to the sense of national traditions and to the desire for respect of universal and Constitutional rights among the non-Russian peoples. While much of samizdat is concentrated in RSPSR proper, especially in the major cities, still the movement is spanning out into the outlying nationality areas, particularly in the Ukraine where it has been especially powerful. Peter Reddaway said, "... the mainstream of samizdat is limited to certain areas, but once you look into the minorities, samizdat is all over the country."<sup>14</sup> RL has responded to this development. In commenting on expanding its broadcasts into the nationality areas, Mr. Van Der Rhoer declared that RL's non-Russian broadcasters "are only just beginning to realize that samizdat is not just a specifically Russian or Ukrainian phenomenon but does go much wider."<sup>15</sup>

Accordingly, the Nationalities Service features a great deal of samizdat literature, and its coverage is expanding. A work by a Ukrainian writer that was given special coverage was Ivan Dziuba's, "Internationalism or Russification?" A broadcast review of this book is included in the study as Appendix 12. The full text was programmed and read.<sup>16</sup> In August 1971, the Ukrainian Service gave extensive coverage to readings from *Ukrainsky Visnyk*, the journal of Ukrainian dissenters.

It is in this area of RL's effort where the technique of cross-reporting has special relevance: cross-reporting universalizes samizdat and broadens its impact. In the Turkistani Service I and II, for example, material from the RSPSR and Ukraine was broadcast in August 1971. Included in this broadcast and those in the Tatar-Bashkir Service were Solzhenitsyn's letter to KGB Chief Andropov protesting the search of his apartment and the physical beating given to a friend by KGB investigators. The North Caucasian Service carried a broadcast of Sakharov's pamphlet, "Reflections on Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom"; it was aired in the Russian, Karachi, Ossetian and Avar languages.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, special attention has been given in the Nationalities Service to airing protests by Soviet Jews against various forms of violations of human and civil rights. In August, the Georgian Service broadcast a letter by 24 Jews from the North Caucasus to Golda Meir; they also broadcast a letter by 7 Leningrad Jews to UN Secretary General U Thant.<sup>18</sup>

Again, the significance of cross-reporting samizdat by the Nationalities Service is that it universalizes pleas for the fulfillment of human and civil rights and broadens the movement for internal reform.

Feature programming in the Nationalities Service is designed to satisfy the particular needs of its audience; and so is its coverage of news. CNS sends news items to the Nationalities Service in the Russian language. Drawing upon their own vast research resources in their own languages, the men within the various subdivisions of the Nationalities Service recast the news, integrating coverage from the various nationality areas. Then, they compose their own scripts in their own national languages to be broadcast to their own audience. The Ukrainian Service, for example, will focus on Ukrainian concerns, sometimes even including material from the Ukrainian-American press in New York. Developments in the Middle East relating to the Moslem peoples—the Kurdish problem in Turkey, for example—will be included in the newscasts of the Turkistani Service. News from the developing countries is also given wider coverage in the Soviet Moslem areas. This is the direction of their interest, and the news, as the first priority of RL programming, is structured accordingly.

## 3. Policy and Procedures

Like the other departments of RL, the Nationalities Service plays a contributing role in the formation of policy. On policy questions PPD counsels with staff having specialized knowledge in the nationalities area. Staff has the opportunity on such occasions to present their point of view in the process of policy formation. Specialists therefore, can and do influence the shape and direction of policy. Inclusion of the special annexes to the Policy Manual covering the various countries in the Nationalities Service is a concrete manifestation of the Service's participation in the policy process. Examination of any of these annexes will reveal that it could have been prepared only in participation with area specialists who also have a feel for RL policy.

Moreover, the morning meeting of the Nationalities Service, attended by the Director of PPD, provides the occasion for a daily exchange of views whenever a policy question arises on a show to be programmed. Finally, membership of upper echelon staff from the Nationalities Service (that is, Mr. Sztumpf) and the other departments on the Council of Editors provides still another level of participation in the policy process.

For the Nationalities Service the policy question of transcending importance is RL's insistence on a stance of non-predetermination of the Soviet nationalities. RL holds to the view that only the Soviet people themselves can determine what institutions and status their nationalities shall have. This principle is spelled out in the Policy Manual and other policy guidances.

The Broadcast Position Statement on the Nationality Question gives this guidance on appeals to local nationalism: "... RL strives to nurture and develop nationalist feelings which recognize the democratic rights of all, and to stress the humanistic potentialities of nationalism while discouraging its chauvinistic, paranoid or arrogant forms."

A recent show from RL's Tatar Program given on October 1, 1971 and entitled, "Let the Tatars of Central Asia be given a national press!" demonstrates how such a policy statement is applied. In the beginning it is pointed out that close to a million Volga Tatars live in Central Asia, of whom 600,000 are in Uzbekistan and 300,000 in Kazakhstan. The script goes on:

"Neither a newspaper nor a magazine in their native language is put out for the Volga-Ural Tatars living in Uzbekistan. It is true that a newspaper "Banner of Lenin" is issued for the Crimean Tatars living there in exile, but this comes out in the Crimean dialect. As for the absolute majority of Tatars living in Uzbekistan, these are Volga Tatars. They are people who were sent from



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Tatarstan and Bashkiriya. On the basis of data compiled by the Ethnographic Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, more than 90% of the Tatars living in the Central Asian republics consider Tatar to be their native language. According to letters sent to Tatarstan, there is great interest in a native language press. It is also true that some of the Tatars of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan receive periodicals published in Tatarstan. But it is clear from the letters written to Kazan publications that there are serious problems connected with receiving publications from Tatarstan in Central Asia. For one thing, despite the fact that the circulation of Tatar periodicals has grown recently, there are still not enough to cover the needs of the people in the republic itself. As a result, the Tatars in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are pining for publications in their mother tongue.

It is then pointed out that the Russians—the largest minority population of Uzbekistan—do have their schools and periodicals, whereas the Tatars from the Volga (the 2nd largest minority) have nothing. In the citation above, it is also mentioned that the Tatars in exile from Crimea also have their own publication despite the fact that they are much smaller in number than the Volga Tatars.

In summary, the Tatar program called for publication facilities for their minority equal to that of the dominant Russian minority of Central Asia, or equal to that of the small minority of the Crimean Tatars (also discriminated against). In this way, Tatar national pride and aspirations are summoned in support of the establishing publications in the mother tongue equal to that received by two other nationalities, but in no way detrimental to these nationalities.<sup>20</sup>

Policy and procedure are closely integrated in the Nationalities Service, and as elsewhere in RL creativity is encouraged by allowing considerable organizational autonomy within the structure of policy. A good deal of autonomy within a structure of policy exists within the Nationalities Service along the lines of the Sargeant principle. Mr. Sztumpf recalled an incident when an RL staffman stimulated policy formation at the top. He had been on vacation in Turkey and heard of clashes along the Sinkiang border before they had been reported in the West or elsewhere. Upon returning, the matter was brought up as a policy question since it involved Turkestan and RL's position in this dispute. Subsequently, a policy guidance was formulated.

According to Mr. Sztumpf, "the essence of autonomy is with the writers." He explained it this way. If a staff writer wants to prepare a particular script, he merely gets the approval of the Chief Editor. This relationship is linked by a feeling of good faith in the organization, and all are bound, Mr. Sztumpf said, "by a community of common responsibility." Specialists in the area, he went on, have a "ticker-tape knowledge and awareness of developments," owing to their knowledge of sources and various connections. They are saturated by the influx of news and information. Thus, they can pass judgment on how to treat developing problems in an authoritative manner. Many matters, he went on, were strictly routine, for example, the cotton problem in Uzbekistan. Specialized staff know the developments there. Thus, he said, by way of summing up, the routine is done at the desk level by the writer and the Chief Editor. The upper levels of authority deal with larger organizational and policy questions. They can and do assert their authority; but "the range of autonomy at the lower level is considerable." Mr. Sztumpf said, adding, "this allows for maximal creativity by staff."

In general, the procedure for preparing scripts and producing programs appears to be similar to that of the Russian Service. Again,

what seems most significant is the multi-functions of staff as researchers, writers, producers and performers. The Program Support Unit of PPD reviews programming originated by the Nationalities Service.<sup>20</sup>

#### E. Support functions in programming

##### 1. Environmental Aids: Internal

Undoubtedly, RL's formal research facilities, described above in Chapter I, are the strongest internal environmental aid in programming. (For a summary of environmental aids to RL programmers, see Appendix 13.) Research is the underpinning of the entire operation; it is formally integrated into programming; its function is, therefore, vital for RL's purposes. What makes the support functions of research so important derives from the fact that RL as a "Home Service" that seeks to report truthfully must have informational resources available that can be used to correct the distortions and fill in the gaps of official Soviet media. Research provides the missing pieces of the fragmented mosaic that constitutes the Soviet citizen's view of reality. Only through research can RL expect to project a reasonably reliable picture of reality in its programming.

From what has been said thus far it seems fairly clear that RL's research resources are essentially two-dimensional: the main source of research energy comes from the Research Department; but this is augmented by numerous informal sources coming from the individual facilities built up by RL's programmers and specialized commentators in the Russian Service, and notably by the staffmen of the Nationalities Service who by the special requirements of their tasks have constructed their own unique informational resources. Moreover, staffmen in all departments have developed over the years a specialized knowledge of the Soviet area and of RL's operations which in less direct ways constitute an input into its programming support.

The multi-functional utility of staff adds further support to programming as well as efficiency in the radio's operations. Not only does Dimitri Fospolevsky, for example, head a research section and prepare background research studies, he also prepares scripts, produces shows, and broadcasts his own material. (For his biographic sketch, see Appendix 1.) This total unity of functions epitomizes program support in its most complete form.

And then there are the morning meetings. They are more than an integrating process of policy, research, news and feature programming; as an organizational entity they perform a vital support function of the entire programming operations. At these meetings the collective judgment and wisdom of the organization is brought to bear on current developments and problems, and directed toward the ultimate purpose of the radio, namely, to air programs that will appeal to the Soviet audience.

Another organizational unit that plays an important internal role in program support is the Audience Research Division (ARD). As the audience research arm of RL, ARD provides listening evidence that fills the gap between the speaker and the audience. It tries to find out such information as clarity of signal and audience preference in programming, times of listening and preference among foreign broadcasters. Special program evaluations are also made by ARD, drawing upon the views of simulated listener panels of former and present Soviet citizens. Reports on interviews and post-auditioning panels are circulated for the information and guidance of RL programmers.

In general, ARD reports have affirmed the judgment of CNS staffers on the importance of "hard news" in its programming. Others have benefited from suggestions of listeners. Actual programs have been structured in response to audience requests. A change was

made in one program called, "Do You Remember," because some listeners said they were too young to remember. And, "Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," was programmed on the suggestion of a young Soviet listener who wanted to have more perspective on the Soviet reality.

However, the Nationalities Service has not benefited from ARD reports to the extent of the Russian Service. ARD is geared more to the Russian audience because of the special linguistic requirements for dealing with the nationalities and also because of the frequency of Russian visitors to the West. Central Asians, for example, are rarely permitted to go abroad so that the opportunity for interviews is virtually non-existent.

Finally, Mr. Scott, as the top administrator at Munich Headquarters, has apparently played an important part in strengthening RL's programming. According to one senior RL staffman, Mr. Scott has been "most effective" in getting all staff to work together—which is no mean accomplishment in an organization with staff of so diverse national backgrounds. But, more importantly, he has been "most effective in perceiving the needs of programming." In this area, his role has been described as being "imaginative" and "effective."

##### 2. Environmental Aids: External

In addition to in-house resources, RL draws upon the expertise of specialists on the outside for counsel in programming and policy formulation. The samizdat conference held in London in April 1971 and referred to above is an example of this sort of effort. The purpose of this conference was to get some guidance from these specialists on how RL could most effectively use samizdat material in its broadcasting, to get their assessment of the future of samizdat, and to ascertain what role RL should play in making this important documentary material available to outside scholars.

Another earlier example of drawing upon outside expertise in a conference format was the conference held in March 1967 sponsored jointly by New York University and Radio Liberty on, "Communicating with Soviet Youth." Over 21 specialists participated in this conference including some scholars of first rank in the United States—for example, Prof. Philip E. Mosely, Director of the European Institute of Columbia University, and Prof. Alfred Rieber of the University of Pennsylvania. The purpose of the conference was to deliberate on three questions: "Why do Soviet young people listen to a station like Radio Liberty and what do they expect from it? To what particular segment of the young audience should Radio Liberty give priority. In what ways has the youth audience changed in the 14 years since Radio Liberty began broadcasting?"<sup>21</sup>

RL also arranges for special consultations with noted scholars in the field of Soviet studies and communications. Among the visiting consultants and lecturers during 1971 were such noted scholars as, Prof. Frederick Baaghorn of Yale University, Prof. Harold Berman of Harvard University, Prof. Itzhak de Sola Pool, Chairman of the Political Science Department of NIT, Prof. Leonard Schapiro of the London School of Economics, and Nikita Struve of Sorbonne University, Paris. (For a complete list of visitors and lecturers, along with a list of outside consultants and participants in RL programming, see Appendix 13 and 27.)

A final resource in programming support is the use of free-lance specialists in Soviet area studies. The U.S. Division in New York, owing to its central metropolitan location, is able to draw upon a pool of specialists for research, consultation, and programming. And the headquarters in Munich through its bureaus in London and Paris is also able to draw upon the knowledge of specialists residing in West European countries.

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## II. INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR POLICY CONTROL

### A. Script Writer, Editor, Morning Meetings

Policy envelops RL's operations, and its application begins with the writers, for what they prepare is RL's initial product and is expected, therefore, to be taped, voiced and transmitted to the Soviet audience. "Finger-tip sensitivity to policy" is an expression that seasoned RL staffers use to define their concern for policy adherence at this level. Here, then, is the first filter screening out possible policy violations; it is a self-filtering process and occurs when the writer, responding almost automatically to years of induced behavior in policy obedience, formulates his thoughts according to what can and should be said.

"Policy violations are no real problem," said Alexander Backerac. "All writers have a sensitivity to the problems; they have an understanding of them and of policy." However, he qualified this sweeping generalization when referring to newcomers from the Soviet Union. "Some have been profoundly repressed during their lives in Russia," he declared, "and they feel RL's approach is too soft." "But sooner or later," he went on, "they understand no one is impressed by the 'hard approach' and see the need for policy and for a rational approach to the problem."

Editors such as Mr. Backerac are primarily responsible for seeing that the immoderate are restrained, and that RL policy prevails: this is the second level of screening. "The job of editor," said Victor Frank, "is to act as a brake on the writers and to restrain the vigor of those who may sometimes let their emotions run away." But, he said, "it is extremely rare if any excess in language slips through the many processes of screening."

Mr. Diakowski estimated that perhaps three policy violations occur in a week that must be corrected. By and large, it is a matter of a choice of words, he said. At worst, the offense is a "venial sin," and transgressions are caught by the editors. He gave this example. Writers steeped in the Western press may inadvertently refer to samizdat as "illegal" or "underground" literature. This is an RL policy violation: samizdat is not illegal; it is a legitimate expression of free thought, from RL's point of view. Or, reference to a "stupid cliché" or a "stupid act" might be used in commenting on a particular Soviet response or action by Brezhnev. The editor would blue-pencil "stupid," and as Mr. Savemark observed, the writer would be urged to explain why such a response or action by Brezhnev was "stupid" without giving the act that brash negative description.

Senior staff in both New York and Munich are convinced that no serious policy violations have slipped through, at least in recent years. "Rarely is a script rejected for policy," said Mr. Diakowski, "rejection is for sloppy writing or not having sufficient interest." Mr. Diakowski summed up what is probably a fair statement of policy control at the writer-editor level when he said: "The writer is sophisticated enough not to write such things that would violate policy, and the editor is sophisticated enough not to let them get through."<sup>23</sup>

Another level of screening, of a sort, enters in at this point, though less directly, in the form of the daily morning meetings. At the Research Meeting the Director of PPD raises policy questions and gives direction and counsel on particular subjects being referred to programmers. Similarly, at the News Meeting he raises policy questions in the news coverage for the day, if warranted, calling attention to the Program Manager of CNS on the need for any special treatment. And at the meetings of the Nationalities Service and the Russian Service both Directors of PPD and POD give direction and counsel on scripts then being prepared for feature programming.

### B. Final review in production process

#### 1. Time Sequence in Production as Buffer Against Error

Time is on RL's side in its production process, except in initial newscasts: they are delivered live; it is only a matter of a few hours separating the script writer from the broadcaster. The risks are present and the potentiality for violation is there. Still, careful writing and editing can eliminate violations, and the straight declarative technique in news-writing is a built-in protection against extravagances that creep into feature writing. Moreover, subsequent newscasts made during the broadcast day are taped, and, therefore, are subject to review and corrective action, if needed.

However, the production process in feature programs takes a great deal of time, perhaps from three to ten days. There is ample time, therefore, for both review of tapes and scripts. As Mr. Dakowski exclaimed, "Thank God for tape!"—meaning that the taping process permits a careful screening of shows as well as scripts in pre-broadcast reviews.

#### 2. Pre-broadcast auditions

Two checks take place at the pre-broadcast level. Programmers responsible for the show audition the taped program, checking for policy, performance, and continuity. Members of PPD also make daily pre-broadcast spot-checks of individual shows.

Another screening is done by a special panel drawn from PPD, the Research Department, and from other qualified staff members outside of POD. This screening constitutes an in-house evaluation of an entire broadcast day made with time allowed to correct minor policy violations or to "pull" a show with major deficiencies and to substitute another for it while the show "pulled" is being rewritten, either in whole or in part, for later programming. Such pre-broadcast auditions provide a regular check on the quality of the broadcast day making certain that it is in accord with RL's standards particularly on policy, content, tone, and basic techniques outlined in the Policy Manual.

Two people are assigned to each broadcast day—one auditions the newscast and a part of the feature programs. The auditors are supplied with scripts and tapes of the programs.

Each auditor on the panel prepares a written report on the program segments assigned for evaluation in which brief general comments are supplemented by a standard checklist for the auditor's specific judgment. The categories for evaluation are as follows: (1) policy violations in content, tone, or presentation (2) suitability for a general audience (3) suitability for any additional specific category or categories of listeners (4) constructiveness of approach (5) factual mistakes (6) delivery (7) corrections suggested and (8) action taken as a result of suggestions. In addition, each auditor is asked: (1) to recommend whether or not each program segment should be repeated, with five recommendations possible, namely, strongly recommended, recommended, perhaps, not recommended, under no circumstances; and (2) to give each program segment a numerical rating on a five-point scale—5 meaning excellent; 4, good; 3, fair; 2, poor; 1, bad. The auditor's report is sent directly to Mr. Scott and distributed among certain designated staff.

Errors, policy violations, or major deficiencies spelled out in the written pre-broadcast evaluation reports go into the monthly list, as do all similar notes from the daily spot-checks. Programmers are informed about the results of these pre-broadcast evaluations, which, in addition to screening possible violations and errors, constitute a body of instruction for future guidance. Moreover, the other information contained

in the reports go into a system of ratings, that is to say, repeat ratings, trend ratings, voice evaluations, authors' productivity, authors' latest direct familiarity with Soviet reality. This system has been established to compare quality with cost.<sup>24</sup>

The monthly report on errors and policy violations picked up in pre-broadcast spot-checks and reviews is compiled by Vitaly M. Sakouta, Assistant to the Director of PPD and sent to the Director. A copy is forwarded directly to the Executive Director of RL. This report includes discrepancies revealed in daily pre-broadcast spot-checks by PPD staffers as well as errors reported in pre-broadcast program evaluation reports.

A report on the Russian programs for June 1971 is included in the study as Appendix 14. This report speaks for itself as an indicator of the vigor of RL's self-criticism and the care exercised in screening programs. Follow-up procedures are also recorded—deletions are made; shows are "pulled."

The report reveals clearly RL's extreme sensitivity to the Soviet environment. Several cuts were effected, for example, in *Soviet Commentary* of June 23/24 because of references to "escape abroad," "escape from the homeland," and "comparisons between the USSR and a prison cell." In a talk on June 30/1 July, four paragraphs were eliminated because "the tone and sarcastic expressions about Brezhnev contravene policy."

The report also reveals how RL's sensitivity to policy can lead to the "pulling" of a show. For example, the show "Harvest" on *Soviet Commentary* of June 4/5 was "pulled." According to the evaluator, "this script was unrealistic. Why object to efforts to bring the harvest in? A better point would have been to show the hidden costs and wastes involved in the way it is brought in."<sup>25</sup>

Pre-broadcast evaluation of nationality programming takes place on a daily basis. The responsible organ for such evaluation is PPD. Under certain circumstances, POD takes responsibility, especially if PPD does not have the language capabilities for a given script. After pre-broadcast evaluation, if the script is found unsatisfactory from the point of view of quality or policy, the matter is discussed with the writer and his chief editor. If the script can be improved, the necessary changes are made and the script is then broadcast.<sup>26</sup>

Pre-broadcast evaluation reports display the same vigorous self-criticism and reveal very clearly the organization's engrained habit of careful screening. Examples of such reports are inserted as Appendix 15. The following excerpts from a random selection of reports give the flavor and an indication of the severity of staff criticism of their programming:

"1. Almost all of today's program and news features were interesting and well written. As a mark of their quality, it may be noted that this evaluator had fewer objections to make, as regards factual or policy mistakes, than ever before (as far as he recalls) on a single day's output.

"Only one intervention seemed to be called for in a news feature on a 'New Round of the Arms Race in the Middle East,' which attributed exaggerated performance characteristics to the MIG-23 interceptor aircraft, notably claiming that it is 'extremely effective at both high and low altitudes.' Even technologically, this is nonsense because the MIG-23 would have to have variable wings to be 'extremely effective' at both high and low altitudes. This is obviously not the case. . . . The author of the script would seem to have confused the MIG-23 with the MIG-25, which is, indeed supposed to have a variable geometry of its wings. (Action was taken)."<sup>26</sup>

"2. Across the Ocean, Rigerman's account of his impressions of the United States. His

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focus on free press as the most remarkable thing about America is just what we need. . . .

"It would have been much more effective to have the script read in the author's own voice although the announcer did an outstanding job. An attempt to avoid the problem of Rigerman's being American from the beginning and thus not a "former Soviet citizen" was unsuccessful. The term 'former Soviet man' evokes the whole ideological concept of 'Soviet man' that qualitatively different creation-to-be of communism. It was recommended that the phrase be dropped. (Action was taken.)

"Meetings with Listeners. . . . Delivery remains the author-announcer's weak point."

"3. Meetings with Listeners. Comparing humanitarian aspects of the monarchy of old Russia and the Soviet regime, the author has touched on a very delicate subject. RL should not play the role of defender of monarchy even if the old regime appears angelic in comparison with Stalinism. (Action was taken and appropriate changes in the text were effected prior to broadcast).

"KVN. It is very sad that a show of this nature is aired. It is in no way entertaining. The conscientious participants tried to save the bad texts. It is regrettable that pleasant and melodious songs performed by L. Pylayev were wasted. His manner of singing, which recalls that of Utessov and Mark Berens should find response among Soviet listeners. Out of several sketches only 'Vassik i Mussik' which contains some satire, deserves attention. Without the selection of good texts, KVN will never be a success. (No immediate action was taken)."

"4. Check list, 'American Journalist's Impressions of Albania.' In response to the questions, 'Do content, tone or presentation violate RL policy?' the evaluator indicated, 'Yes,' but no further action was taken."

"5. This was a 'wide, wide world' program today. The spotlight from script to script kept shifting from one part of the globe to another. Unfortunately, except for some of the news features, it was not always clear just why RL had a claim on the listener's attention with these fast changes of pace. I would have to rate the overall program as mediocre to poor.

"Most disappointing to me was the *Samizdat Review* which was a roundtable discussion on the Czechoslovak invasion as seen in samizdat, but the discussion seemed unable to decide between focusing on Czechoslovakia in 1968, Rumania in 1971 or samizdat and the result was a blurred focus.

"Best script reviewed was one on 'Convergence Revisited' . . . which was informative and judiciously argued. The voices on this script were also the most convincing of the day.

"I failed to see any good point at all in a repeat in *Far East* series of a year-old script on a correspondent's impressions of a visit to the capital city of Cambodia.

"News features continue to give more attention to the Middle East and Israel than is warranted by the course of events or of our Soviet listeners' interest. . . ."

### 3. "As broadcast" check at transmitters

A final step in the review process is the "as broadcast" check made at the transmitters. For many years RL has maintained a strict regulation that all material "as broadcast" over its transmitters had to conform in detail to the material prepared and voiced from its studios. The purpose of this procedure is threefold: (1) to meet the requirement of the West German Government that material broadcast be retained for a three-month period for reference purposes if needed (no request for such information has ever been received); (2) to provide the Spanish Government with summaries of material transmitted from Pals on certain designated subject matter; and finally (3) to enable RL to make

sure that what has been written, approved and taped at Munich headquarters conforms to the material that is actually being transmitted to the Soviet audience.

Each transmitter station automatically records RL material as it is actually being broadcast. This material is retained for six months and is reviewed by selected, qualified personnel for comparison with original scripts to insure that there were no deviations from prepared material and that no unauthorized material has been added. Recordings in West Germany, made at the Lampertheim transmitter station, are made on an "Assmann" recorder. Similar equipment is used at the Pals and Taipei stations.

Hard and fast procedures relating to recording and review of tapes are contained in Staff Memorandum No. 6 of February 1, 1968, which remains current. The memorandum spells out in detail the methods of recording, the review procedure at all three stations, and the minimum review requirements for all languages broadcast (for example, from the Taipei station, an average of 2 hours of broadcast material in the Russian language is to be checked weekly.) It also provides for reports on personnel assigned to content control activities and for reports on deviations. The directive states that the chiefs of the Production Department and POD will report to the Executive Director all deviations in "as broadcast" material from program scripts, "together with a statement of the cause of the deviation if known, a statement of corrective action taken, and a recommendation for action to preclude recurrence if appropriate." Similarly, the Executive Director is directed to report all deviations to the President of RL."

Apparently, this check at the transmitters has been effective as a last-minute, final screening. According to Mr. Van Der Rhoer, "problems very seldom arise," and an RL statement on policy procedures declared in a discussion of content control at the transmitters and the incidence of deviations, ". . . it should be noted that none had been observed in at least the past two years."

### C. Post-Broadcast Auditions

At this point in RL's operations the programs have been transmitted, and it is, of course, too late now to recall the signal. If policy violations have slipped through or errors in fact or faulty producing techniques occurred, then it is just too late to do anything about it. The damage, if any, has been done. The spoken word, more than the written word, is irrefragable, and the damage done is long amending. However, RL has a system of post-broadcast auditions, a sort of review after the fact, but, nonetheless, it is another important input into the review process, protecting the organization against factual error, policy violations, and production shortcomings.

This post-audit review of RL's programs is done by executive personnel in the U.S. Division at New York. Staff takes turns auditioning a day's broadcast. They review program content and evaluate its effectiveness from every point of view relating to such key points as how successfully RL communicates with its audience, identifies with its listeners' interests, and provides them with solid information and thoughtful stimulating material. This post-audit review informs the President in detail about program content and stimulates the development of substantive suggestions for policy formulation and more effective execution.<sup>23</sup> What makes these reviews especially meaningful is that they are done by veteran RL staffers who over the years have been totally immersed in policy requirements and the goals and purposes of the organization.

In brief, the post-broadcast auditors summarize each show within a day's programming and evaluate it, generally using RL's policies and objectives as a criteria. They

grade each show according to suitability for a general audience and specific categories of listeners most likely to be interested in the particular broadcast, that is, the creative intelligentsia, managing personnel in the Soviet economy, military personnel, party and government functionaries, workers, rural population and youth. They also grade the show on the same scale as noted above for pre-broadcast reviews, that is, bad-1 to excellent-5, and according to four sub-categories, that is, presentation and format, pertinency of subject and treatment to audience or specialized audiences, voices, and overall impressions of the show.

RL's sharp internal criticism is carried into the post-broadcast evaluation. Yet, characteristically, the evaluators appear to strive for fairness and a balanced appraisal. An exceptional example of a post-broadcast auditioning report is attached to the study as Appendix 16. In a random selection of post-broadcast auditions it is possible to find such judgments as these found in the audition of a Russian program for Friday/Saturday, October 30-31, 1970:

"1. *General Appraisal*: I was very favorably impressed with the professionalism, cogency, and timeliness of the day's programming.

"2. *Countries and Continents*: Informative and interesting subject matter but a dull format. Why have three speakers if you are not going to capitalize on the liveliness of a round-table discussion? The results of this is just three people taking turns providing information. No sense of give-and-take; almost no sense of personality on the part of the speakers.

"3. *Peking and Its Politics*: Informative and authoritative, but a presentation that often borders on tediousness: one voice rapidly reading a very long piece of text.

"4. *Signal* (military affairs show): Good, solidly-informative content and an excellent presentation; spontaneous, warm lively.

"5. *Commentary on Soviet Themes*. Show title, 'Heroic Minority': The anonymous commentator pays tribute to those Soviet citizens brave enough to compile and distribute samizdat literature and declares that more of this kind of courageous activism is needed. He comments that it is the political passivity of the majority which enables the injustice and inefficiency and general viciousness of the Soviet system to continue. "This was the most explicitly agitational of the day's features. I personally agreed with the commentator's view. I am not sure how it would affect a Soviet listening audience."

RL also conducts a post-broadcast evaluation of scripts in the Nationalities Service. It is made primarily as a means for developing new ideas and discarding outmoded concepts in programming. The evaluator's comments also provide a kind of interfacing mechanism whereby policy and research can contribute to the improvement of programming. Reports on post-broadcast evaluation of scripts in the Nationalities Service are made in memoranda to Mr. Van Der Rhoer. A copy of an extensive report on 27 North Caucasian scripts is included in the study as Appendix 24.<sup>25</sup>

### D. Rationality and trust in policy control

RL has many instrumentalities for policy control, extending all the way from the script writer and upper echelon of editors and policy controllers in Munich, to the "as broadcast" content controllers at the transmitters in West Germany, Spain and Taiwan, and, in declining importance, to the post-broadcast auditors in New York. The checks are there, and as far as can be judged by the outsider, they are used in a reasonable and judicious way. After all, there are limits to which any organization can impose a regime of internal control without exhausting its resources, both human and physical. Policy control cannot be total; pol-

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icy violations are always possible: at best, control mechanisms can only reduce the probabilities. The alternative is "1984" which is not only impossible but self-defeating.

The heart of the matter, therefore, is trust and rationality: trust in the individual, for policy control must begin and end with the individual; and rationality in the wisdom of the policy constructed and of the people who are to carry it out. Trust in the integrity of the individual combined with the exercise of his intelligence and the rationality required in policy formulation would seem to be the greatest safeguard. For, RL must assume a bond of trust in its staffmen that is based on shared beliefs in commonly held goals and purposes, and based also on a shared intellectual and moral commitment to a policy structure that is believed to represent the only rational and realistic means for achieving a common goal.

#### E. The Czechoslovak crisis, August 1968: A case study of RL's policy operating in crisis conditions

Perhaps, one of the best tests for RL's ability to maintain control over its broadcasting operations through the mechanism of policy is the case of the Czechoslovak crisis in August 1968. At the request of the writer RL staff in Munich prepared a report entitled, "Radio Liberty Coverage of 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis." This report is included in this study as Appendix 23. The report contains documentation on basic general and specific policy guidances from the President, Executive Director and the policy staff. It also summarizes RL coverage in translation from the Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar programs for selected days during the build-up of the crisis in mid-June, to the peak of crisis with the Soviet bloc invasion on August 21, and during the immediate post-invasion period. Appended to the report are translations of extracts from RL programs.

On the basis of a review of this material it is possible to generalize that RL exercised a great deal of caution, moderation and restraint during this period of crisis.

Guidances were planned and formulated as the crisis gathered momentum. In the spring, monthly and daily guidelines provided continuing ad hoc guidance with caution the key word.<sup>30</sup> Contingency plans for programming were made on July 30, well in advance of the resting of the crisis on August 21, the day of invasion. These plans were published on August 21, as Daily Guidance Note No. 14. Supplemented by daily guidelines throughout the period, these formed the basis for RL's programming during the crisis. Themes in RL's programming in the contingency were to be: the background situation, stressing obvious misreading of facts; the loss of moral, ethical and practical positions for the Soviet Union; total failure of CPSU policies which led to action against what were basically new ideas; the "tragic irony" of using Warsaw Pact forces against a long-standing socialist ally and member country; the intervention as a blow to the desire of the Soviet population to see a better and more peaceful world; the damage to the cause of socialism and of liberalization at home; and the irreparable split in the world Communist movement.

On August 21 and immediately thereafter, regular programming was scrapped. New programming concentrated mainly on straight news coverage reported over the major international wire services. Emphasis was placed particularly on developments in Czechoslovakia and world reaction to the crisis, especially reaction within the Communist movement. Strict procedures were established for clearing all news features and commentaries through PPD as soon as written and before broadcast and distribution to the desks.

### III. QUALITY CONTROL IN PROGRAMMING

#### A. Internal instrumentalities for quality control

##### 1. Will Klumpf, Quality Controller

Policy control and quality control overlap to a considerable extent. Pre-broadcast and post-broadcast auditioning provide in-house evaluations on both the quality of programming as well as judgments on policy matters. Beyond this, no other formal institutional mechanism for quality control seems to exist, except for the important tasks performed by Mr. Will Klumpf, administrative assistant to the Executive Director.

In general, Mr. Klumpf acts as Mr. Scott's personal deputy for programming and production—a sort of right-hand-man who oversees program auditioning, checks for quality effectiveness, policy and overall excellence in production. In addition, he is responsible for giving Mr. Scott full knowledge of what goes on the air and how it goes on the air.

Perhaps, the ultimate effectiveness in the art of broadcasting lies largely in what Stanislavski said of a play and the theater, namely, that there are various "planes" of a play, one of which is on the "aesthetic plane, with the sublayers of all that is theatrical, artistic having to do with scenery and production."<sup>31</sup> Mr. Klumpf, a long-time student of the theater, at one time an actor, and now a specialist in Soviet affairs, attempts to fulfill this task for RL. He tries to introduce into programming a sense of theatricalism, that is to say, the skills and techniques of radio theater in order to make the broadcasts more effective. This entails good staging, good voicing, good taping, and skillful continuity in production. By imparting a sense of theatrical style in programming, Mr. Klumpf attempts to achieve quality performance and quality production. An important aspect of this effort is to make sure that the day's broadcast has a proper mix of discussion, interviews, straight reporting, music, and human interest features. He constantly reviews taped shows in pre-broadcast auditions to make sure that the final product has quality.

That RL should have special concern for staging its programs derives from both a common sense judgment and a deeper knowledge of the Russian reality. Russia is the nation of Chekhov, Stanislavski, and the Moscow Art Theater, and Russians are a people who have appreciated theatricalism as a part of their life style. It is understandable, therefore, why programming should be structured with a critical eye toward staging which for the Russian people has a special appeal.

##### 2. Ratings on Voicing

One important aspect of in-house quality control is the matter of voicing. RL auditions programs under simulated jamming conditions. The purpose is to seek guidance in casting, that is, to find out which voices penetrate jamming the best. It is ironic that the finest quality of speaking voice under normal conditions will not be always the most intelligible under jamming conditions. Oftentimes a voice poorly rated normally will be most effective under jamming.<sup>32</sup>

Voices can also be evaluated by outside panels of former and present Soviet citizens in order to obtain an objective appraisal on quality and effectiveness. The report on such panel reviews is broken down into 12 categories that are designed to elicit evaluations of the speaker's delivery and voice quality. A random selection of reports on these evaluations have such comments as:

"The speaker's tone is too cold which is not the same as objective or dispassionate. He reads rather like a Soviet judge or bureaucrat. "I have listened to this voice twice already—it hasn't gotten any worse, and

doesn't need to get better. I think this woman speaker [is] one of the best in the world.

"The voice sounds too bombastic.

"He has something wrong with his teeth. This elderly voice is not suitable for radio. Moreover it sounds slightly archaic, emigre. "I think this is an alien, emigre voice. . . . This is the kind of voice to avoid, it is too remote from the listener.

"This is one of Liberty's best voices, absolutely contemporary, intelligent and remarkably soft and natural. This is the kind of voice sound on which to build Liberty. Perhaps the voice is not young, but there is no emigre sound here; for the Soviet listener it is 'one of ours.'"<sup>33</sup>

Careful records are kept on grading of voices. When a speaker's quality dips below a certain level, then he or she is taken off the air. A theoretically perfect score is 5.0; below 3.0 is regarded as poor. In July 1971, one speaker, receiving a 2.9 rating, was taken off the air.<sup>34</sup>

##### 3. Ratings on Shows

RL also maintains a type of "Nelsen rating" on its shows as a means of quality control. Evaluations are made periodically, and records are kept. A theoretically perfect rating is 5.0, below 3.0 is poor, and the lowest possible rating is 0.0. A report on 22 shows that were given "trend ratings" at the start of FY 1971 and 1972 contained this spread of ratings for FY 1972: Memory Calendar, 4.7; Vladimirov Talks, 4.6; Samizdat Review, 4.3; Across the Ocean, 3.8; Collector's Corner, 3.1; and Philosophic Talk, 2.5. After 17 individual evaluations, Philosophic Talk was taken off the air.<sup>35</sup>

#### B. External instrumentalities for quality control

##### 1. ARD in Quality Control

RL's Audience Research Division plays an important role in quality control. Drawing upon evaluations both within and outside the Soviet Union, ARD attempts to provide another input into the process of improving programming for the purpose of appealing to a wider audience. According to George Perry, Assistant Director of ARD, ARD "acts as something of an inspector general for RL programmers." They respect ARD's evaluations, Mr. Perry said, since they help programmers better accomplish their tasks. As Mr. Perry put it, "ARD helps relieve the programmer of the feeling that he is shouting down a tube but rather is functioning as successfully as possible."

On the basis of extensive testing of opinions through post-broadcast audition panels as well as by direct interviews with Soviet citizens, ARD prepares reports evaluating programs. These are circulated throughout RL for the information and guidance of staff.

In brief, ARD's business is feedback, and though working under serious handicaps—obviously, it cannot conduct Gallup-type polls and Nelsen-type surveys inside the Soviet Union—ARD tries, nonetheless, within these strict limitations to give programmers some idea of their impact and influence. Programmers in turn can judge for themselves the quality of their efforts and improve them accordingly.

##### 2. Quality Control Reports

One form of RL's evaluation comes from quality control reports. These constitute the judgments of a simulated Soviet audience. Mr. Max Ralis, ARD's Director, gave this general description on how these panels are set up. What RL attempts to do, he said, is develop the best available substitute audience. To create such a substitute audience, ARD selects a panel from Soviet citizens recently arrived in the West and persons temporarily out of the Soviet Union who are studying in the West. A random selection is made from



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this group which would constitute a better than average approximation of a Soviet audience. Persons on the panel, Mr. Ralls said, must give their honest reactions and evaluations, and they must be articulate. Among those now available for such panels are a Soviet student, a former actor, a linguist, and other recent arrivals. Sailors and workers have not proved too effective on such panels.

All panels have instructions on listening. They are directed to forget all their Western influence and try to react to the program as if they were a Soviet listener inside the Soviet Union. Then each panel member rates each broadcast on probable impact. Ordinarily, the panel listens to two programs a month of 1½ hours of broadcasting. They do not sit together, but audition individually. Tapes and scripts are sent to them to their homes in Western Europe and the United States. ARD conducts about 24 such panels a year. They focus only on Russian language broadcasts, mainly because non-Russians are not available.

An example of a Quality Control report is included in the study as Appendix 17. A general appraisal is given of the day's broadcast at the beginning of the report, each segment of the broadcast is briefly summarized; and a capsuled evaluation of each is recorded. The summary of the panelists' ratings are included in a check-list appended to the report. The check-list cites each program being evaluated, and this list is correlated with major categories under the headings, program content; effectiveness; credibility; discretion; delivery; format and presentation; language and style; sufficiency of auxiliary, historical and other data; and a question as to whether the program should be repeated. The final category deals with audience and is broken down into 9 major categories according to the particular audience of RL's concern. Within all categories there are six choices for grading.

Review of a random selection of Quality Control reports gives the impression that the panels are, indeed, very frank in their commentary and appraisals. Criticism is very sharp; yet the reports are generally balanced, pointing out both the strong and weak points of a program. By and large the panels are made up of largely educated and professional people, and thus their criticism would have to be taken seriously since they constitute RL's prime Soviet audience. Here are a few examples of comments made in one of these reports:

"1. *Russian Art and Literature's* theme, the respect accorded Russian art abroad, was welcomed, but the script fell down, perhaps, because of the odd voice and intonation.

"2. One low point was hit by the *Washington Observer's* Note about U.S. politicians' travels, which did not concern the listener in the least.

"3. One of the new panelists . . . was struck by one quality of the Newscast which enhanced its effectiveness, namely the utter lack of propaganda or anything which could be construed as subjectivity. Other panelists . . . also stressed this point . . .

"4. Three panelists concentrated on the speaker. JFS and RFS regarded him if not as a foreign reader, then at least as one from the old emigration. BFS went into detail on this: "Though Mr. . . . has an authoritative and pleasing voice, it does not stand up to the requirements of contemporary Russian pronunciation.

"5. *Report from USA* . . . heavily criticized . . . just simply boring.

"6. *Report from Bonn*. This talk about the vacations of German workers drew a varied and vehement response. For EFS it was 'witty and live,' for UFS it offered an indirect, implied refutation of the Soviet claim that only in the USSR is labor highly valued and vacations are paid.

"At the other end of the scale HSC and GFS found it 'gray, banal and superficial.'

AFS and XFS were bored, JFS and GFS complained at the 'dry, official recitation of facts.'

"7. *Russian Art and Literature* . . . Certain panelists, however, were more than deterred by the presentation and delivery. JFS thought the terminology too 'Western' and unfamiliar, but, above all, the 'intonation illogical, hindering perception' . . . For XFS it was a 'caricature' and, as UFS put it, 'this is the kind of voice put on by Soviet actors when they want to imitate pre-revolutionary conservatives and bureaucrats.' RFS, to be fair, thought this might possibly be an advantage, contrasting favorably with the 'robust, over-cheerful voices of Soviet art critics.'

"8. *University of the Air* . . . This has got to be a parody. This professor, or, whoever he is, obviously an all-out supporter of capitalism, starts by philosophizing about high matters, how people in the West are free to join societies, etc. And then he gives as an example a French society of animal lovers—which really is what the talk consists of. This must be a joke . . ." <sup>42</sup>

### 3. Special Program Evaluation Reports

Another type of audience reaction to programming quality is the Special Program Evaluation Report. "When a unique person comes along," said Max Ralls, "we try to get him to participate in a special listening session and report on it." Evaluations by this "unique person" are put into the Special Program Evaluation Report. An example of this type of report is included in the study as Appendix 18.

The value of such reports again depends upon the auditioner's perceptiveness, general intelligence, and ability to articulate his views. One such session with a group of Soviet seamen was clearly unproductive when the subjects could not identify some notable cultural figures on the Soviet scene mentioned in an RL broadcast being auditioned, though they were acquainted with Pasternak and Solzhenitzyn.<sup>43</sup>

### 4. Target Area Listener Reports

Another input into evaluating the quality of RL's programming are reports directly from the Soviet listening audience, usually from visitors in the West. An example of this type of report is included in the study as Appendix 19.

Though reports of this nature are very limited in number, still they do provide some indication of the quality of RL's programming. For example, the wife of a Russian scientist who was an Uzbek regretted that so little of RL's broadcasts were on medical research. Also, while RL's programs were "varied and rich," still she found some of them "a bit heavy." Both husband and wife declared that they followed with interest programs on samizdat and "all kinds of literature—both Soviet and foreign."<sup>44</sup>

Another listener, a university professor, rated RL first among foreign broadcasters for its "courageous, high quality programs (especially of late) on themes which are not discussed elsewhere," that is to say, samizdat.<sup>45</sup>

### 5. Evaluation by Outside Specialists

Another form of quality control is evaluations by outside specialists in Soviet affairs. Leading authorities in the West are asked to audition a block of programming and give their judgments. An example of this type of evaluation is included in the study as Appendix 20.

RL staff is by no means of one mind on the value of these reports. On the one hand, such auditions were said to have not worked out too well, owing to individual prejudices of these specialists; and on the other, the view was expressed that their evaluations must be taken seriously.

A review of randomly selected evaluations by outside specialists indicates that they

can be very frank, even tough, in their appraisals, yet balanced and seemingly fair-minded.

### 6. On the Value of ARD Reports on Quality Control

That ARD evaluation panels play a role in determining the quality of RL's programming cannot be denied. Yet, it would be extraordinarily difficult to ascertain just how great a role that is. It is known that programs have been affected by direct listener response through ARD. And while some RL staffers feel that panel reports may have no direct impact on programming, nevertheless, it is believed by others that they have the value of re-affirming in the long-run judgments made in the past—for example, the value of heavy emphasis on factual reporting in newscasts.

Improvements have been made in programming, it is asserted by ARD staffers, by passing on information derived from panels of auditors. Leading supervisors get these reports, it is said, and the feedback, though simulated, is ground back into the system as a new input. Yet, as one person said critically, except for reports from outside specialists, panels of simulated Soviet listeners had "to be taken with a grain of salt." Presumably, what limits the value of these reports is the fact that many criticisms, however valid they may be, call for remedies that are in violation of policy; and this is unknown by the outside auditors.

Admitting these shortcomings of panel evaluations, nevertheless, to this outside observer, they seem to have the value of at least providing some evidence of probable listener response and reaction without which there would be none and thus provide RL with at least a measure of quality control, however slight. Despite known imperfections, auditioning panels, especially of substitute Soviet listeners, are at least a beginning of a much more demanding (and what is now a virtually impossible) task of knowing the Soviet audience, and, accordingly, on the basis of this limited knowledge, of improving program quality.

### FOOTNOTES.

<sup>1</sup> RL program schedule—Russian Service, p. 1. (RL, v. VIII, pt. E.)

<sup>2</sup> RL basic briefing outline, July 2, 1971, pp. 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, pp. 12-13. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>4</sup> RL basic briefing outline, July 2, 1971, p. 6. (RL, v. V, pt. 10.)

<sup>5</sup> Quality Control Report #16-17, August 20, 1971, p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> RL Audition Report, Russian Program, October 14-15, 1970, November 13, 1970, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> NYU-RL Conference, Communicating with Soviet youth, 1967, p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> RL Statement, June 1971, p. 15. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>10</sup> The Washington Post, May 11, 1965, p. A21.

<sup>11</sup> SFRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 20.

<sup>12</sup> RL, Breakdown of RL's new programming in each of its languages, April 30, 1971. (RL, v. III, pt. H.)

<sup>13</sup> RL, Policy in determining the proportion of broadcasts in particular languages. (RL, v. VIII, pt. 5a.)

<sup>14</sup> RL, Future of samizdat, April 23, 1971, p. 21. (RL, v. II, pt. D1.)

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>16</sup> Introduction to Ivan Dziuba's "Internationalism or Russification?" (RL, v. III, pt. F.)

<sup>17</sup> Sakouta to Van Der Rhoer, RL Memorandum, October 20, 1971, "Coverage of Samizdat material in August 1971 RL programs." (RL, v. IX, pt. C.)

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pt. b.

<sup>20</sup> RL, Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 15. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>22</sup> NYU-RL Conference, Communicating with Soviet youth, 1967, p. ix.

<sup>23</sup> In New York, the Policy Coordinator of the U.S. Division regularly reviews before broadcast the scripts of all U.S. Division news features and replies to listener mail, and auditions or screens the script of any other shows whose content, treatment or tone is of special concern. Policy questions are usually brought to the Policy Coordinator's attention by the desk managers, and the issue settled either through them or directly with the writer concerned. (RL, Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 15. *In*, RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>24</sup> Procedures used in improving quality through pre-broadcast spot-checks and evaluations. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 2A.)

<sup>25</sup> Sakouta to Van Der Rhoer, Interoffice Memorandum, Errors in June 1971 Russian Shows Revealed by Pre-broadcast Spot-checks, July 16, 1971. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 2G.)

<sup>26</sup> RL, Evaluation procedures for Nationality programming. (RL, v. XX, pt. 2A.)

<sup>27</sup> Pre-broadcast evaluation of Russian Program Features and New Features for 13/14 May 1971, May 14, 1971.

<sup>28</sup> Pre-broadcast evaluation of Russian Program Features and Newscast for 6/7 July 1971, July 7, 1971.

<sup>29</sup> Pre-broadcast Evaluation of Russian Program Features and CND Features for August 11/12, August 16, 1971.

<sup>30</sup> Pre-broadcast Evaluation of Russian Program Features and CND Features for August 11/12, 1971, August 16, 1971.

<sup>31</sup> Pre-broadcast Evaluation of Russian Program Features and News Features for 19/20, August 1971, August 23, 1971.

<sup>32</sup> RL, Program content control, October 1971. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 3A and # 3B.)

<sup>33</sup> RL, Policy formulation, June 1971, pp. 16-17. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>34</sup> RL, Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 17. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7.)

<sup>35</sup> RL Memorandum to HHS, Audition of RL Russian Program for Friday/Saturday, 10/30-10/31, 1970, Feb. 3, 1971. (RL, Post-Broadcast Auditioning file.)

<sup>36</sup> Memorandum to Mr. Van Der Rhoer, Jan. 18, 1971. North Caucasian Scripts, 13 p. (RL, v. XX, pt. 2C.)

<sup>37</sup> Donohoe to Critchlow, RL Policy and Planning for the Czech Crisis in Brief, September 29, 1971, p. 2. RL published a staff report entitled, "Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Public," August 1968, 152 p. The report compared RL coverage of the crisis with that of Soviet media. It was prepared by Olivia L. Gilliam and Edward W. Pell.

<sup>38</sup> Stanislavski, Constantin. *Creating a role*. (Translated by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood.) London, The New English Library, Mentor, 1968, p. 19.

<sup>39</sup> Quality and quantity controls on authors, performers, producers, and on training and production format and techniques, October 1971. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 4K.)

<sup>40</sup> RL, Auditioning and evaluation, October 1971. (RL, v. XVI, pt. 1A.)

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* (RL, v. XVI, pt. 1B.) That RL has achieved a fair measure of success in voice training of its speakers is revealed by an appraisal of a Soviet university professor. A synopsis of her observations are as follows: "It seemed apparent to her that RL has made a considerable effort to give its staff professional training. The quality of the programs has been much higher in recent years, she commented. 'The programs made by recent emigres were easily distinguishable from those made by the older emigres; she found the latter to be of 'low quality, difficult to comprehend and filled with out-dated expressions.' The style of the program and the voice of the speaker readily indicate whether the author was an older or a recent emigre, whether he was cultured or uncultured. The female voices used by Radio Liberty have improved greatly over the past five years, the source said; now they sound younger and

clearer. More 'Soviet' expressions are used, which makes the programs more pleasant and easy to understand. She was rather critical of the quality of Radio Liberty's male speakers' voices, however." (RL, TALK #225-71, Sept. 14, 1971. *In*, RL, v. XVI, pt. 4A.)

<sup>42</sup> RL, Auditioning and Evaluation, October 1971. (RL, v. VIII, pts. 6 and 7.)

<sup>43</sup> RL, Quality Control Report No. 17-71, Review of the Russian Program Broadcast on July 3/4, 1971, August 25, 1971. (RL, Quality Control Reports file.)

<sup>44</sup> RL, Special Program Evaluation Report No. 4-71. Four Soviet seamen listen to tape recording of Radio Liberty Broadcast of January 26/27, 1971, May 5, 1971. (RI, Special Program Evaluation Reports file.)

<sup>45</sup> RL, TALK, October 11, 1971.

<sup>46</sup> RL, TALK, No. 234-71, September 24, 1971. (RL, v. XVII, pt. 4.)

#### CHAPTER VI: RL'S AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

##### I. DIFFICULTIES IN EVALUATING RL'S EFFECTIVENESS

###### A. Limited access to Soviet population

RL operates at a serious disadvantage as a "Home Service" to the Soviet population. It has only very limited direct access to the Soviet people and, therefore, has great difficulty in evaluating, in any systematic or scientific way, its impact on the Soviet audience and its overall effectiveness as a broadcaster.

The Soviet Union is a closed society; it is not possible to take public opinion polls as would be the case in most non-Communist countries in the world. RL must rely on interviews with a very limited number of Soviet visitors abroad, and listeners in other categories, such as defectors and legal expatriates. What is perfectly normal public opinion procedures in an open democratic society such as the American, borders on treason in the Soviet society. Citizens run great risks as it is in listening to foreign broadcasters. They run even greater risks if they expose themselves to detailed interviews on foreign broadcasting listening habits in the manner of surveys customarily conducted by professional pollers in this country. Moreover, foreign poll-takers would be looked upon as espionage agents by the regime, and, accordingly, they too would be accepting great personal risks by engaging in poll-taking on Soviet territory.

Closed societies of the Soviet type over-protect their citizens against the "contamination" of foreign ideas and ideologies that could threaten the regime's security. This is one dimension of people-to-regime relationships in political totalitarianism of which censorship is only one part; another part is the prevention of direct physical access to the people by outside sources. Both censorship and this denial of access are segments of the larger political and ideological effort to maintain both ideological purity and the regime's monopoly over the input of information into Soviet society. The purpose is to control what the Soviet citizens can and cannot listen to as well as to deny them the right not to listen.

Without the normal techniques for testing audiences, RL faces a serious problem, therefore, in attempting to judge the effectiveness of its operations. George Perry, ARD's Assistant Director, summed it up very succinctly when he said: "We have no access to the population. This is the main obstacle." Mr. Sargeant expanded on the implications of this problem:

"Many of the techniques and tools that are available to a radio attempting to communicate with an open society are completely unusable so far as the Soviet Union is concerned. If you can't take public opinion polls or conduct audience research surveys, or, indeed, even provide for the monitoring of your radio's short wave signal so as to determine whether it is reaching the areas and audi-

ences you intend to reach, you are indeed flying, if not blind, at least in a pea-soup fog."<sup>1</sup>

###### B. Resulting problems for RL

This constricting condition on evaluating audience impact creates a set of special problems for RL, namely: (1) without a reasonably accurate accounting of audience impact and effectiveness, how can RL know it is accomplishing its objectives? and (2) not knowing audience impact, and thus audience preferences, how is it possible to structure programs that will have the greatest appeal and effectiveness?

##### II. POSITIVE MEANS FOR EVALUATING RL'S EFFECTIVENESS

###### A. Interviews with Soviet citizens

###### 1. Some Sources for Judging Audience Response

Despite known disadvantages which by the nature of things cannot be easily corrected, RL attempts, nonetheless, to establish some positive basis for judging audience impact, however imprecise it may seem compared with the reasonably accurate techniques in American public opinion research. It does this by collecting evidence on audience reaction, (1) in interviews with Soviet visitors to the West, legal Soviet expatriates, Soviet defectors, and with some Soviet listeners actually living in the Soviet Union itself; and (2) from letters received from Soviet listeners through the indirect method of a mail drop in the West. The substitute audience panel and the special program auditions panel, discussed in Chapter IV, provide another input, though limited, into assessing possible audience response.

Through these efforts ARD attempts to fill the gap between the speaker and the audience, to determine an accurate image of the listener and the listener's image of RL (both essentials for success in communications), and to build the foundations for a continuing dialogue with the audience. The Director of ARD files a quarterly report containing an analysis of and references to listener mail, reactions to RL emanating from the media of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, conversations with Soviet listeners at home and abroad, and related background material on attitudes and conditions in the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

###### 2. Difficulties in Interviewing

Interviews, or "conversations" as RL prefers to term them, presumably since they lack the formal structure and statistically-workable ingredients of professional poll-taking known in the United States, are regarded as a prime indicator of audience response. During FY 1971 interviews were conducted with hundreds of Soviet citizens, of whom well over one-half were foreign radio listeners. But, interviews are very difficult to conduct. Polling by Soviet Government agencies has only begun in recent years in the Soviet Union, and the people do not regard them as scholarly efforts but rather as instruments of the KGB. The problem is especially acute in the Soviet Union where the climate of suspicion impedes a genuine exchange of views, especially with a foreigner. Even interviews conducted with Soviet visitors in the West are carried out with difficulty. It is estimated that only one out of eight contacts will yield a fruitful interview.<sup>3</sup>

The results of interviews are sent to RL headquarters in Munich by field correspondents where they are compiled in a final Target Area Listeners Report that is prepared by ARD and distributed throughout the organization. These reports describe the interviewee, his occupation, nationality, age, and language facility. They include such details as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming effectiveness, and specific programs of interest. In addition, the conversation is summarized, and this may include statements about public reac-

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tions, comments on recent events and expectations about future developments. An example of a TAL report is included in the study as Appendix 19.

### 3. Analysis and Use of Interview Data

RL approaches analysis of audience research data conservatively. ARD does not claim to have enough data at its disposal from interviews to speak about a "sample"—that is, an interpreted in a statistical sense.<sup>4</sup> It does not go beyond the claim of having only "bits and pieces of samples that could be indicative of some certain groups," as Mr. Perry said. Yet, Mr. Sargent has written that such interviews have been collected and properly coded, transferred to cards and can be processed by machines to show "an increasingly accurate picture of the listeners, and of potential listeners."<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, ARD is able to give RL programmers some perception of their audience's image and scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness. In recent years this perception and measure of effectiveness have no doubt become more reliable because the percentage of ARD interviews has been progressively increasing from 17% in 1969 to 23% in 1970 and up to 41% during the first quarter of 1971.<sup>6</sup> The ages of RL's listeners were estimated in mid-1971 to be 35% in their 20s; 31% in their 30s; and 16% in their 40s.<sup>7</sup> The preferred listening time was cited at 2001-2400 for 57% of listeners with the next highest percentage preference at 16% from midnight to 0400.<sup>8</sup> The distribution of audience occupation in 1970 was concentrated heavily among the intellectuals, including university students: 72% of the listeners were said to be from the intellectual professions.<sup>9</sup>

Clearly, audience research data of this nature confirms RL's judgment on audience structure, policy content, and program design. This is especially true of ARD studies on audience reaction to samizdat, presently the main staple of RL's programming. Again, RL's judgment was reaffirmed. During the first quarter of 1971, 87% of the interviewees mentioned samizdat favorably, 3% with mixed or neutral reaction, 10% hostile reaction. During the 4th quarter of 1970, 100% of the interviewees mentioned samizdat in a friendly manner; for the 3rd quarter of 1970, there was 90% with 10% mixed or neutral. The total overall percentage for this nine-month time-frame from July 1, 1970 to March 31, 1971 was 85% friendly, 4% mixed or neutral, and 11% hostile. Moreover, RL's focus on the intelligentsia was reaffirmed. The majority of listeners mentioning samizdat (70%) belonged to various segments of the intelligentsia.<sup>10</sup>

Undoubtedly the most comprehensive assessment of empirical evidence of RL's effectiveness drawn from interviews is contained in ARD's quarterly reports. The report for the second quarter of 1971 generalized on the data collected in an effort to determine listener profile, effects of jamming, specific program interests, programming suggestions, RL's impact and image in the eyes of its listeners, attitudes on specific problems such as samizdat and Jewish emigration, criticism of RL, and responses from the nationality areas.

On the basis of empirical evidence the listener profile for the second quarter of 1971 looks like this: RL respondents came from all walks of life, although the number of those holding positions in the technological, scientific, and cultural fields outweighed those in other professions. Many listeners were under 40 and an "overwhelming majority" supported RL and its aims. Listening took place mainly in large industrial cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev and their surroundings, though a sizeable number in Siberia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in Central Asia, to Georgia and Armenia in the South. Most listeners whose national-

ity was ascertainable were Russians, followed by Ukrainians, Belorussians, Karelians, Georgians, Kazahs, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Tatars, Bashirs, and others from Eastern Europe.<sup>11</sup>

Other categories within the report either directly or indirectly provide some indication of RL's effectiveness, but perhaps none so much as "Radio Liberty's Impact and Image in the Eyes of Its Listeners." Under this category numerous comments were made about reasons for listening to RL and what its impact was judged to be.

For a scientist, RL had become a "most important source of information and a link between our more free-thinking intelligentsia and the Soviet working people." A musician considered that "normalization" of Soviet life could only come through the creation of a public opinion which would exert pressures for change. Since there was no freedom of information at home, the initiative had to come from abroad—and RL, he said, was the only possible source. "Thanks to Radio Liberty's broadcasts," said a Moscow engineer, "I have learned to think and develop a 'free relationship' with the outside world." This theme was reiterated by a Soviet musician who said that "free voices from abroad, especially the voice of Radio Liberty, are the only forces which can wake people up and open their eyes."

Listeners were aware of regime attacks on RL, and expressed concern for the radio's future. According to a Moscow engineer, rumors were being circulated to the effect that the station would soon cease broadcasting.

RL was of special interest to a Leningrad scientist since, in his words, it is what a Russian radio station would have been like if we had had freedom of speech in our country." A traveler from Sverdlovsk considered RL to be a free and international station, not government operated like the BBC or VOA, and this enabled it to devote so much time to Soviet problems. He appreciated this. A Kiev intellectual who previously thought RL was an "American propaganda station" had changed his opinion when he became more familiar with its broadcasts. He now felt that, although financially supported by the United States, it was working for the good of Russia. Whenever an official announcement was made in Soviet media, said one engineer, it was very common to hear people remark: "That's what 'ours' said. But we will have to know that 'they' will say." "They" was RL.<sup>12</sup>

Scattered evidence of impact and effectiveness like this and other evidence included in the quarterly report cannot constitute a "sample" according to the statistical requirements of public opinion research. RL is the first to acknowledge this limitation. Yet, it would seem to be a commonsense judgment that comments by opinion leaders such as scientists, engineers and others within the intelligentsia could be reflective of important preferences and predilections of others within the Soviet intelligentsia and perhaps even in broader segments of Soviet society.

### 4. Alternative Methods In Measuring Impact: Szalay Report

To the outside lay observer it does indeed seem that RL has a narrow base upon which to judge audience response and that within this economy of means it attempts to make the most of the data in order to structure its programming according to the interests of its listenership and its own political goals as a broadcaster. Accumulation of data over the years presumably has provided RL with substantial material upon which to make reasonable assessments of its impact and effectiveness. And this it seems to have done, within the limits of available data.

Still, the question arises whether or not more could be done with the data that is available. "Caution is ARD's virtue," said one senior RL staffman; yet, is it too cautious?

### (b) Szalay report on alternative methods

This writer has no specialized knowledge for making such a determination. However, Dr. Lorand B. Szalay accompanied the CRS research group to Munich as a special consultant in audience research where he observed and analyzed the audience research operations of both RFE and RL. Dr. Szalay is an American specialist in the field of communication research, intercultural communication, and psycho-linguistics, trained at the University of Vienna and the University of Illinois, and in recent years engaged in special contract work for the United States Department of Defense at the American Institutes for Research, Kensington, Maryland.

RFE attempts to do more than RL in the field of audience research, owing to the unique characteristics of its audience area in contrast to those of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, RFE has made greater claims for the results of its broadcasting efforts than has RL. For this reason, Dr. Szalay spent a greater portion of his efforts in observing and analyzing RFE's audience research department. On the basis of his examination of both audience research operations, Dr. Szalay has made the tentative judgment that RL could perhaps do more with its audience research data drawn from interviews than what is now the case. Dr. Szalay's full report is included at the end of this study in a "Special Addendum."

### B. Letters from Soviet Listeners

#### (1) Techniques for Eliciting Listener Response

Interviews as a means of evaluating audience response are supplemented by letters from Soviet listeners. Such letters are regarded as documentary evidence upon which judgments can be made on Soviet listening behavior and on Soviet attitudes toward RL programming.

There are two ways in which letters are received from the Soviet Union. One is by establishing give-away accommodation addresses in the West. Under this system the listener is asked to write a particular box number in a designated West European city, and he will receive in return certain give-away material, such as books and records. A popular give-away book of particular interest to radio enthusiasts is the *World Radio TV Handbook*. This is merely a standard radio handbook available in any major reference library in the West.

The other system of eliciting listener correspondence is to urge the listener to communicate with the RL speaker at an address given in the West. In both cases, the mail is forwarded to RL where it is categorized according to favorable and unfavorable letters, location of sender, etc. Such letters-to-the-editor type of correspondence and give-away offers to listeners are common practice in a free society such as that in the United States.

#### 2. Statistics on Listener Mail

According to RL, audience feedback through mail has increased considerably in the past decade.<sup>13</sup> Except for a momentary decline in early 1971, apparently, the general trend continues upward. Actual numbers of letters received are not available for publication; percentages are. This may not be entirely satisfactory, but it does serve the purpose of giving some indication of listener response through mail, and at the same time denying important information to the Soviet censor.

Increasingly, more listener mail has originated from the Soviet Union than from the countries of the Soviet bloc. In 1968, 31% came from USSR; 69% from the bloc. In 1969, 56% from the Soviet Union; 44% from the bloc. In 1970, 62% from the Soviet Union; 38% from the bloc. And for the first three months of 1971, 87% came from the Soviet Union; 13% from the bloc.<sup>14</sup>

In the second quarter of 1971, listener mail decreased in number. Aside from the seasonal factor (the second and third quarters of the year usually have less mail than the fall and winter quarters), the decrease in listener mail in the second quarter was ascribed to RL's discontinuance of give-away offers and to the hostile and systematic campaign which Soviet media have been waging against RL during the past three quarters. In fact, only one letter was a response to a former give-away offer, while most of the other mail items contained comments, both friendly and critical, to problems and questions raised in RL's programming. It was during the first quarter of 1971 that 105 attacks against RL in Soviet and orbit media were recorded, a figure surpassed only during the previous quarter when 156 attacks were recorded.<sup>25</sup>

Audience mail does serve the useful purpose of giving RL some perception of its listenership. In the first quarter of 1971, 96% of the mail was regarded as substantive in content; 4% without substantive content. In the second quarter, the percentages were 95% and 5% respectively.<sup>26</sup>

Russian is the language in which most of the broadcasts were heard. In the first quarter of 1971, the percentages were 85% Russian, 13% Ukrainian, and 2% Georgian. In the second quarter, the percentages were 74% Russian, 16% Ukrainian, 5% each for Belorussian and Bashkir.<sup>27</sup>

As for geographical distribution of audience mail, in the first quarter of 1971, 56% came from the RSFSR, 30% from the Ukrainian SSR, 4% from the Georgian SSR, and 2% each from the Latvian, Estonian, and Moldavian SSRs. Those addresses that could not be ascertained were placed at 4% for the entire USSR. For the second quarter the percentages were 50% RSFSR, 31% Ukrainian, 6% Belorussian, 6% each for the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs. From the other Communist countries in Eastern Europe the percentages were as follows: 30% Rumania, 30% Poland, 20% Czechoslovakia, and 10% each for East Germany and Bulgaria.<sup>28</sup> In 1967, RL reported that "an extremely high proportion" of its mail comes from Moscow.<sup>29</sup>

RL also categorizes its mail according to "repeat writers" and "first-time writers." In the first quarter of 1971, the letters from repeat writers were 6% from the Soviet Union and 71% from the bloc countries. Letters from first-time writers were 94% from the USSR and 29% from the bloc countries. In the second quarter of 1971, the percentages were 6% repeat writers from the USSR, 97% from bloc countries; and 94% first-time letters from the USSR, and 33% from the bloc countries.<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, RL records the sex of its correspondents. In the first quarter of 1971, 81% of the correspondence was from males, 19% from females. In the second quarter, 68% was from males, 16% from females, with 16% unascertainable.<sup>31</sup>

### 3. Content of Letters

RL also categorizes the content of its mail according to "friendly" letters and "hostile/critical" letters. The report for the second quarters of 1971 stated that the proportion of hostile to friendly letters was not as high as in the previous quarter, but was "still substantial." "Some of the hostile letters," the report said, "indicated that their authors were acquainted with the official reactions to Radio Liberty's activities."<sup>32</sup>

In general, friendly listeners praise RL's operations and criticize their own Soviet media. Judgments are made within the context of comparisons between Soviet "democracy" and genuine democracy in the West. RL is also praised for providing information to the Soviet listener in the tradition of a free press. One listener from the Ukraine commented favorably on RL for its "regular and accurate information." In turn, he criticized the Soviet leaders who "maintain a

cowardly silence and wish to hide a pig in a poke from their very own people . . ." The writer continued:

"In so doing, of course, to our shame and regret we have to learn the truth not from the voice of the public, but from abroad. And all this only serves to undermine more and more their authority in the eyes of their own people . . . Let me express over and over to you my acknowledgment that you have been able to open my eyes and broaden my horizon."

Taking issue with RL's question on the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the writer continues:

"I only regret that I am a Russian and still live in this wretched Russia and have to write in shameful block letters like an illiterate at a time of freedom of the press and speech. And I am not sure whether my letter will reach you and whether I will find out about it in your broadcasts. If you receive it, may I ask you strongly to put over its message in several programs; for, because of the strong jamming, I may not hear my own voice . . ."<sup>33</sup>

Another writer from Stravropol Kray, RSFSR, a woman listener, made the sweeping judgment that "everybody [in the USSR] listens to Radio Liberty." In the buses, she said, people exchange comments about its broadcasts. She praised RL's *Women's Show* series devoted to the Soviet working woman but added this critical comment: "You in the West have no idea what . . . [the life of a Soviet woman is like], but you are not to blame for that."<sup>34</sup>

RL also receives and records in its files letters that are hostile and critical. A worker at the Zaporozhstal factory, claiming to speak for his comrades, denied both the persecution of Jews and the restrictions on the freedom for Soviet writers. Seemingly well informed about the activities and works of a number of Soviet dissidents, he compared the virtues and achievements of the Soviet constitution with the "freedom" in America where "in broad daylight" a President is murdered.<sup>35</sup>

A letter in a similar vein from a listener in Moscow Oblast dismissed the "slandereers" whose "cast-iron throats will be silenced," and concluded: "The day will come when there will be no more West Germany, US, or any other capitalist country."<sup>36</sup>

Another letter from a group of Tatars and Bashkirs charged that RL presented their life "in a distorted way;" that they "have got enough of everything;" and expressed compassion for the lot of former Soviet citizens living in the West in these words: "We are sorry for you, brothers."<sup>37</sup>

RL categorizes responses from listeners according to "friendly" and "hostile/critical" reactions and attempts to measure the response in percentages. During the first quarter of 1971, the category "friendly" response recorded 43% for letters and 85% for interviews; the category "hostile/critical" recorded 57% for letters and 15% for interviews. For the second quarter, the percentages for the "friendly" category were 74% for letters, and 88% for interviews; and for the "hostile/critical" category, 26% for letters and 12% for interviews. The total percentages for both quarters and for both letters and interviews were 81% for "friendly" and 19% for "hostile/critical."<sup>38</sup>

### 4. Significance of Listener Mail

Listener mail provides RL with another important input of data, despite acknowledged imperfections, to flesh out its perception of the Soviet audience and to measure its effectiveness in broadcasting. It provides further documentary evidence, though minimal, of audience reaction. What is important to bear in mind in measuring the value of listener mail was pointed out by George Perry, namely, that "people write when they are really motivated, either pro or con"—meaning that listener mail reflects a significant reaction to programming and thus takes

on a special value of its own in determining audience reaction.

On the other hand, the value of this reaction may be somewhat diminished by the fact that, apparently, RL strongly encourages listener response by mail; in fact, the practice may be overdone. As one senior RL staffer said in a post-broadcast audition on the matter of soliciting listener mail: "Perhaps we are unwittingly giving it more emphasis than is advisable."<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, this does not devalue listener mail per se as an important input factor in measuring audience impact; for, listener mail, whether pro or con, is an affirmation of RL's purposes, namely to provoke the Soviet people to think critically and independently and to contemplate alternative solutions to problems on the basis of more complete information. Dr. Sosin inferred as much in a statement evaluating the evidence on RL's listenership. The evidence that RL is heard in the Soviet Union, he said, comes from hundreds of interviews with Soviet tourists, members of delegations in the West, conversations with Soviet citizens held by Western tourists, guides and students, and "perhaps most important," he said, "from letters which slip through the net of Soviet censorship and reach Radio Liberty's mail drops in the free world." "The great majority of this audience mail is favorable," he continued, "and encourages Radio Liberty in the conviction that its basic premise is sound, namely, that in all walks of Soviet life people are thirsty for information and ideas denied them by the official media; that in the current era of ferment after de-Stalinization they seek a deeper understanding of their own society."<sup>40</sup>

### C. Other bases for evaluating effectiveness

#### 1. References to RL in Soviet literature

For internal organizational purposes RL relies wholly on interviews and listener mail as positive means for evaluating its effectiveness. Still, the frame of reference for audience reaction could be broadened to include comments in Soviet literature (not regime attacks) on RL and other foreign broadcasters, and also to include general evaluations on RL's activities made by Western authorities, private scholars or officials in government.

With regard to the first point, that is, references in Soviet literature, there has been a steady growth of evidence to demonstrate the value of RL in the eyes of many Soviet listeners. Frequent references have been made to Western broadcasts in Soviet literature, particularly in samizdat, and appeals have been voiced, urging that such broadcasts be continued.<sup>41</sup> Yuri Galanskov, author of the samizdat, "Organizational Problems of the Movement for Full and Universal Disarmament," made this reference in an appeal on behalf of imprisoned dissenters:

"The Western press, and especially Western radios in the Russian language, give wide currency to facts of arbitrary judicial actions and administrative perversion, pinpoint their social nature, and force the state organs and officialdom to take urgent measures. This overcomes the natural inertia and conservatism of the bureaucracy . . . In functioning like this, Western press and radio perform the task of an organized opposition which is presently lacking in Russia, and thus stimulate our national development."<sup>42</sup>

A recent example of this sort evaluation by indirection was the revelation in *New York Times* in August 1971 of the existence of a publication in the Soviet Union called, "Political Diary." It was described as an exceptional example of political samizdat. Typical of the disquiet evident in this publication was a letter dated February 1966 and sent by an educator to Premier Kosygin. Of particular importance for this study is the writer's reference to Western radio broadcasts. The letter, printed in the *Diary*, said that people



had a great many questions to which easy are not getting direct answers, either in the press or on the radio, or in the speeches of our party and Government leaders. It is not surprising that many of our people are beginning to find their answers in foreign radio broadcasts."<sup>33</sup>

Another form of evaluation by indirection is the frequency with which the upper echelons of the Soviet ruling elite draw upon foreign broadcasters like RL as sources of information. This statement cannot be documented with the precision of the above reference to the "Political Diary;" but it is known that the Soviet leadership draws heavily upon daily monitored news from abroad. As Dr. Poole observed: "For the Soviet elite there is, of course, as there always has been, substantial coverage of foreign news sources in the classified monitoring reports."<sup>34</sup> Even middle and upper class Russians have short-wave radios available, and, accordingly, as Dr. Poole noted, "BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Liberty broadcasts are normal information sources for high status Soviet professionals or bureaucrats."<sup>35</sup> By implication, therefore, the Soviet leadership itself places a high positive value on foreign broadcasters such as RL.

What effect such access to outside information sources has on the ruling elite cannot be determined. In a comment on the immediate prospects of samizdat developing into "any sort of important political force," Peter Reddaway made an observation that has relevance to this larger question. "I happen to think," he said, "that samizdat at its present stage and in the present state of the Soviet society has little or no direct impact on policy-making by the leaders. I do not see it as part of a political struggle. One the other hand, I see it as potentially of the greatest significance . . ."<sup>36</sup>

## 2. Views of former Soviet citizens and Western authorities

Other sources of evidence upon which to judge RL's general audience impact are the assessments of former Soviet citizens now living in Israel and the West who had been listeners while in the USSR, and also assessments by Western authorities who through their various academic and official connections have established credentials for passing judgment. All comments found tended to support the radio. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there has been no adverse criticism. The following are examples of favorable commentary.

Dr. Boris Tsukerman, Soviet physicist and human rights activist who left the Soviet Union in January 1971 and is now a citizen of Israel, declared that "Radio Liberty has its own audience in the USSR. This conclusion is the result of my conversations with many people."<sup>37</sup>

Mrs. Natalia Belnikov, wife of the deceased Soviet writer Arkady Belnikov lecturer at Yale University, and former staff member of the Sociological Department of the Moscow Radio and Television Committee, described their listening habits and those of their friends while in the Soviet Union. What seems most significant about her comments is the high value that is placed on the work of foreign radio broadcasters and also the widespread influence these broadcasts have within the Soviet intelligence. Mrs. Belnikov said:

"I well remember the efforts made by my friends to hear, despite difficulty, the unfettered word filtering through jamming. My invalid husband would spend hours sitting tensely before the radio, operating the volume and tuning controls with both hands. We saved our money, and even went without necessities, in order to buy the most sensitive receiver; all of us had homemade schedules of broadcasts by the BBC, VOA, and Liberty. People bought (illegally, of

course) special adapters for Soviet-made receivers in order to increase the range of frequencies. We would report to each other immediately on what we had heard, and set up a timetable to take turns listening. I happen to know that recently this timetable has been operating throughout the night time when the jammers are ineffective. The technique of listening has been perfected. Broadcasts are being recorded on tape recorders. The broadcasts that are most prized by listeners get transcribed on the typewriter and became part of samizdat . . ."<sup>38</sup>

Western specialists on Soviet affairs have also made assessments on the effectiveness of RL as a broadcaster. Pete Reddaway, Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics, stated that from his "intensive study in recent years" on the democratic tendencies and movements in the Soviet Union he has accumulated "massive evidence of the importance which these tendencies and movements attach to Radio Liberty."<sup>39</sup> Another scholar, Jean Train, Professor of Russian at the Ecole Polytechnique, declared that according to many of his informants, RL "is listened to avidly by most of the intellectuals and leaders in the Soviet Union" with whom he has been in contact for many years. So important are RL's programs to these intellectuals that a number of groups have been formed, he said, "for the express purpose of listening to them and discussing them afterwards."<sup>40</sup>

Governmental authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have commented favorably on RL's effectiveness. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, acknowledged that estimates of the number of RL's listeners are "of necessity less precise" than those of RFE, still, "there is extensive corroborative evidence which shows that . . . it has a large and tenacious audience." Mr. Hillenbrand went on to say that further evidence of audience impact comes from foreigners living and working in the area "who confirm that these peoples depend on the radios and that a significant proportion of the broadcasts penetrate the jamming." "One of my colleagues, fluent in Russian, who recently spent a two-year tour in the Soviet Union," Mr. Hillenbrand continued, "has said that in all his wide travels in that country he seldom met an individual who did not admit to listening to Radio Liberty."<sup>41</sup>

A similarly favorable appraisal came from Asher Lee, a British specialist on Soviet affairs and BBC Director of External Audience Research from 1948 to 1970. "In their research work conducted by us at BBC," Mr. Lee said, "we received many indications that this unique service provided by Radio Liberty was widely heard and appreciated by a significant audience in the USSR who, to a great extent, rely on Radio Liberty for information and an analysis on events in their land and abroad." Many Soviet listeners regard RL as their own station, he said, adding that RL broadcasters are regarded by Soviet listeners not "as foreigners transmitting from abroad, but as friends who enlighten."<sup>42</sup>

Taken together many of these statements, and others that are included in RL's formal presentation to Congress and appended to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, have the ring of a self-serving commercial so frequently seen on American television; but this is a matter of tone and style, and does not devalue the substance, for many of the scholars making these assessments are leading and respected specialists in Soviet affairs in the Western world; thus their judgments have validity; they carry the weight of authority. Negative appraisals by scholars could not be found in published literature.

## III. REGIME ATTACKS AND JAMMING AS MEANS OF EVALUATION

### A. Regime attacks on RL

#### 1. Soviet Tradition of Attacking RL

Documentary and empirical evidence are positive means which RL uses to determine impact and effectiveness. RL uses other means, essentially negative, that provide another measurement, however imprecise, namely, the number of regime attacks and the persistency of Soviet jamming.

Soviet attacks on RL are nothing new. What is new is the intensity and frequency of these attacks. The Soviet book, "U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare," published a few years ago summarized the regime's inveterate opposition to RL in these words:

"It is well known that of all types of Western 'freedoms' 'Radio Liberty' makes intensive use of one—freedom of slander, or falsifying facts and of fabricating provocative rumors. Up to the present day, 'Radio Liberty's' broadcasts transmitted) in the languages of the peoples of the USSR consist of overt and malicious subversive propaganda. All of this has been mentioned more than once in the Soviet press."<sup>43</sup>

#### 2. Pattern and Intensity of Attacks

In general, the Soviets have refrained from challenging individual RL broadcasts; they concentrate rather on across-the-board public attacks. According to RL, these attacks have increased "immeasurably" in recent years and are in the form of impugning RL motives.<sup>44</sup>

In over 174 million copies of Soviet publications in the first 9 months of 1971, RL was designated with such epithets as "subversive," "anti-Soviet," "cover for acts of espionage," "vicious dogs of imperialism," "pro-fascist," "spreaders of dirty slanders," etc. "Numerous radio broadcasts paint Radio Liberty in similar black terms," said Max Ralis, "and not least important, in thousands of party, factory and other meetings agitprop . . . (agitation and propaganda) emissaries continue to play the same tune as part of the systematic campaign by the Soviet authorities to discredit the station."<sup>45</sup>

The rhythm of regime attacks in Soviet media (correlated with circulation figures of the press) is recorded in Figure 9. This chart, covering the years from 1962 through September 30, 1971, illustrates visually the increased intensity of regime attacks, especially during 1971. What seems most significant about 1971 is the proportion of attacks that were intended for external consumption and the thematic content which was correlated with larger international issues. The increased regime attacks on RL concentrated on the alleged threat to the 1972 Olympic Games by RL's and RFE's continued presence in Munich, coupled with sharp criticism of Bonn for extending the broadcasting licenses of the two stations, and discussions and commentary on the so-called "revelations" by a former RFE employee, Czechowicz, and on the new sources of sponsorship and funding for RFE/RL. Much attention was given to Congressional criticism of both radios.<sup>46</sup> Examples of Soviet attacks are included in the study as Appendix 21.

By the end of September 1971, the peak figure on regime attacks in Soviet media reached 357 in printed matter with an estimated circulation of 174 million; yet, this does not represent the full picture. According to Mr. Ralis and Mr. Perry, circulation of the provincial and local press in the non-Slavic languages are restricted. They reason that there are probably more attacks in those unrecorded sources that are not reflected in the statistics. Soviet attacks by radio are also not recorded.

(NOTE.—Figures referred to are not printed in the RECORD.)

### 3. Why the Accelerated Regime Attacks

The acceleration of Soviet attacks on RL is politically motivated. As senior ARD staff-men said, RL had not increased its output during this period of intense regime attacks. Hence, this was not the reason. There seems little doubt that the Soviets wanted to force RL to close down its operations and get out of West Germany, for RL represents a threat to the Soviet Government's monopoly over information and to the success of its efforts to deny the Soviet people the right of a free press. Moreover, Moscow resents what it considered to be an invasion of its internal affairs.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the spring of 1971, Mr. Paul C. Bartlett, former President of Radio New York Worldwide, Inc., explained Soviet objectives and documented his statement with Soviet sources. Mr. Bartlett recalled a visit to Radio Moscow in the summer of 1970 where he had spent an hour and a half with one of the 11 committee members who control Soviet broadcasting. Asked if they knew about RFE/RL, Mr. Bartlett replied to the Committee: "Yes, indeed they did. They said they hope to drive them out of Germany." "They make no bones about it," Mr. Bartlett emphasized, "They said they want to get those pirate operations out of West Germany," and underscored their resolve with this exclamation: "We will move heaven and earth to do it."

In the spring of 1971, four developments converged to create favorable conditions for an all-out Soviet assault on RL. Success of Bonn's policy of *Ostpolitik* in which Chancellor Willy Brandt had heavily invested his Government's prestige required concurrence from Moscow. Staging of successful Olympic Games in Munich, an important prestige factor for the West Germans, also required Soviet concurrence. Renewal of licenses for both RL and RFE came due in the spring. Evidently, Moscow found in the licensing renewal issue a pressure point that could be used against West Germany to terminate the radios. Coinciding with these developments was the movement in Congress to reconsider not only funding and new sponsorship but even the existence of the radios.

The convergence of all these developments created an inviting opportunity for the Soviets, and they made the most of it. But, they failed. The West Germans resisted Soviet pressure and renewed the radio licenses.<sup>48</sup>

### 4. Effects of Regime Attacks

It is not possible to determine with any degree of accuracy the effects of the Soviet Government's media attacks on RL. It may be true, as Mr. Ralls asserts, that the attacks have had the effect of "popularizing the station among the Soviet people."<sup>49</sup>

And no doubt it can be safely argued that the attacks have alerted West German officials to the sort of pressures they can expect from Moscow in the future when the issue of the Radio's existence is raised again; and that the attacks may also have alerted West Germans, especially those who are concerned about the principle of a free press within their own country, to the challenges that they may expect in the future.

There would seem to be no uncertainty about the general impact RL must be making on the Soviet Union for its government to commit such energy in attacking the Radio. Regime reaction of this sort may be a negative way of measuring impact and effectiveness, but it, nevertheless, has a validity and weight value that cannot be ignored. Moreover, it could be some measure of the seriousness that Moscow attaches to

the operations of the Radio in the context of its relations with its sponsor, the United States Government. This, however, is a subject not discussed in this particular study.

### B. Soviet Jamming of RL

#### 1. Extent of Soviet Jamming

An equally important measurement of RL's impact and effectiveness, even though negative in character, is the persistency of Soviet efforts to jam its signal. Within 10 minutes after RL went on the air in March 1953, the Soviet Government began jamming operations; it has continued ever since, jamming RL around-the-clock 24 hours a day.

This has not been the case with other foreign broadcasters. As early as 1956, jamming operations ceased against the BBC on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit to Britain. VOA experienced a similar respite in 1959 when Khrushchev visited the United States. Between these years and 1963 both stations experienced periods of selective jamming during which many of their broadcasts got through without interference. In June 1963, the Soviet Government suspended its jamming of all major non-Communist world broadcasters, except RL.<sup>50</sup>

The Soviets use two forms of jamming, namely ground-wave jamming and sky-wave jamming. Mr. George Herrick, RL's Network chief, refers to them as "totally destructive jamming techniques." According to Mr. Herrick, "jamming of this nature falls into the category of highly sophisticated noise, buzz saw, multiple tone, etc. techniques. It is considered sophisticated because it has been refined to a technique which is highly selective in its destructiveness in that it is confined primarily to the target frequency without too many adverse effects on adjacent frequencies."<sup>51</sup>

Ground-wave jammers are, in effect, local broadcasting stations, interspersed throughout large metropolitan areas like Moscow, which radiate interfering sounds on the frequencies of foreign broadcasters to the Soviet Union. The operations of ground-wave jammers are more concentrated than those of the sky-wave and envelop narrow sectors within urban areas. They take over when favorable conditions for sky-wave jamming decline.

In contrast, sky-wave jamming embraces large geographical areas. The sky-wave jammer makes use of reflections from the ionosphere to destroy an incoming signal in the same manner employed by legitimate broadcasters in transmitting their signals. In effect, sky-wave jammers project mirror images of the short-wave broadcasters and by so doing disrupt his transmission. Figures 10, 11, and 12 portray visually the operations of both types of jamming.

Soviet jamming stations work in conjunction with an extensive monitoring network, and the two are linked by a very efficient communications system under central control. The monitors audit the whole spectrum of short-wave frequencies and report changes in previously established patterns to central control which directs the jamming effort.<sup>52</sup>

(NOTE.—Figures referred to are not printed in the Record.)

Soviet jamming operations are extensive, and they are expensive. It has been estimated that it costs the Soviet Government over 6 times as much annually to operate the jamming network as the annual budget of RL itself.<sup>53</sup>

A further indication of Soviet willingness to pay a high price to prevent its citizens from hearing foreign broadcasts, despite pressing economic problems at home that could use this allocation of funds, was the

estimate of USIA a few years ago on the cost of Soviet jamming. USIA compared jamming with the erection of the Berlin Wall as an admission of failure, and went on to say that, "The communists now employ something like 2,500 jammers against the Voice and other free world broadcasters. We estimate that it would cost us over \$150,000,000 per year to operate a similar network. This is three or four times the amount spent by all free world radios broadcasting to the communist bloc . . ." "RL estimates that the Soviets have 24 main jamming stations with between 10 and 15 transmitters per station."<sup>54</sup>

#### 2. Effects of Jamming on Listeners

There is no doubt that Soviet jamming impedes the audibility of RL's signal as it is beamed into the Soviet Union, and, accordingly, it can produce a negative effect upon the number of listeners in RL's audience. Recently, a ship's navigator said that in Riga, Latvia, RL listening was on the decline because a high-pitched whistle accompanies all its broadcasts and can be heard through the thin walls of an entire apartment building. Such an "alarm" would be sufficient no doubt to deter any listener, even if the signal could be heard through the jamming.<sup>55</sup>

Another indication of the effectiveness of Soviet jamming was revealed in the observations by a high Soviet official who was attending a recent meeting held under the French-Soviet cultural exchange program. He maintained that RL is heard in the Soviet Union; but he added jokingly, "I assure you that at least one hour of RL broadcasting time regularly reaches the Soviet audience." Queried about the other 23 hours of broadcasting, he responded euphemistically: "Oh, I suppose they get lost in various technical difficulties," meaning, of course, jamming.<sup>56</sup>

Jamming cannot only destroy the incoming signal, but it can also build deep frustrations within the listener. According to Max Ralls, "listening through jamming requires steady nerves, technical skill and a great deal of patience: when Radio Liberty is heavily jammed it is often easier to tune to another station with a more audible signal."<sup>57</sup> For this and other reasons a majority of the Soviet population does not listen to RL.<sup>58</sup>

Soviet listeners object to jamming, and their complaints to RL are numerous. It is characteristic that when listener advice is sought on programming, the response will be for RL to improve its facilities to cut through jamming. Only recently a Soviet nuclear scientist said that he had been able to listen to RL only rarely because of the heavy jamming. He complained bitterly of the "illegality" of this action, adding: "The more valuable the content of the broadcasts, the more strongly they are jammed." "Jamming and censorship," he said, "are the weakest links in the Soviet regime."

Frustration of the listener is no doubt the reason for listener complaints against jamming, especially when the radio's message is being very earnestly sought. The sound of jamming adds to this frustration. The ship's navigator referred to the high-pitched whistling sound used to jam RL's signal and the penetrating effect it had throughout thin-walled apartments. This writer listened to another type of noise the Soviets use in jamming, and the effect it can have on a listener's nerves is readily understandable. The noise sounded like a piece of heavy machinery grinding away in a steady, unrelieved, pulsating, monotonous drone, much like the near-deafening noise heard in the hold of a ship when the massive propulsion machinery attached to the drive-shaft is turning the propellers.

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However, jamming has also had a reverse effect than that intended by the regime. Along with the frustration it causes within the listener, jamming also creates a greater desire within the listener to hear RL's message, particularly when in the listener's mind the degree of jamming is measured by the importance of the message. According to Mr. Ralls, "heavy jamming" is given as among the reasons from respondents to listen to RL. One listener from the Moscow area wrote RL: "These absurd tactics . . . have a reverse effect . . . the more they jam, the more our citizens try to listen; the more they jam, the less our citizens believe their own propaganda. In our country, people attempt to find confirmation from other sources for almost every communique."<sup>60</sup>

### 3. On Avoiding and Penetrating Jamming

#### (a) Taking advantage of twilight immunity

Soviet jamming is only partially successful; optimum conditions for sky-wave jamming seldom prevail. What works against its total effectiveness is the phenomenon called, "twilight immunity." This is a condition caused by varying heights and density of the ionosphere itself. These conditions change with the time of day. The most drastic change occurs at sunrise and sundown. The ionosphere is higher at night and lower in the day. For example, an RL signal from a transmitter in West Germany or Spain beamed to the Kiev area in the Ukraine at 1600 hours CET is attacked by a sky-wave jammer in a different time zone. The conditions of the ionosphere for the jammer are different from that for the broadcaster. (See Figures 10, 11, and 12.) As a result, the jammer fails to destroy the signal. Depending on the time of day, the sky-wave jammer often undershoots or overshoots the target, allowing the broadcast's signal to be heard clearly. These times of day and night when RL can be heard with maximum clarity are predicted with about 95% accuracy eight weeks in advance.<sup>61</sup>

Twilight immunity lasts between 2-3 hours. Moreover, it is a "shifting phenomenon," in the words of Mr. Herrick, and works for the benefit of RL's operations. Given the vast spread of time-zones within the Soviet Union and constantly changing conditions in the ionosphere, listeners in differing geographic areas can take advantage of this phenomenon and can hear RL's signal.

#### (b) Increasing power output

By increasing power RL can also penetrate jamming and extend the period of twilight immunity. "There is no doubt that the one single factor responsible for Radio Liberty's advantage over jamming," RL's engineers wrote, "is power—effective radiated power, a combination of transmitter strength and high gain antennas." "Without it," they said, "all the engineering data and all the forecasts on ionospheric conditions, sun spots cycles, Twilight Immunity and other phenomena favoring broadcasters could not be effectively applied." "Power," they exclaimed, "gets Radio Liberty through jamming . . ."<sup>62</sup>

RL has a total transmitting power of 1,350,000 watts. Four of its large transmitters have been combined to provide two signals of 500,000 watts each and one signal 1,000,000 watts strong. By combining its power RL is able on special occasions to double or triple the possibilities of penetrating an area of reception denied by jamming. Such increase in power could also extend the twilight immunity zone anywhere from one-half to three hours. During the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, for example, RL combined its megawatt power in this way in order to create a single powerful signal for penetrat-

ing jamming and reaching the Soviet audience. This device has clearcut advantages, but it also has the disadvantage of denying power for transmission to other areas. An even spread of power is needed to insure maximum effectiveness. Thus, shifts to a single all-powerful transmission can only take place on special crisis occasions.

#### (c) Studies of ionospheric conditions

RL has taken other technical measures to counteract Soviet jamming. It established a series of monitoring stations around the periphery of the Soviet Union to audit its own signals and measure the intensity of jamming on them. It conducted intensive studies of ionospheric conditions and projected its requirements for short-wave frequencies on the basis of these studies. In recent years, the National Bureau of Standards at Boulder, Colorado, has developed highly sophisticated capabilities in this field. The Bureau now provides RL with forecasts which help it prepare broadcast schedules using the most effective frequencies to penetrate the Soviet Union at any given moment and taking maximum advantage of such natural phenomena as twilight immunity.<sup>63</sup>

#### (d) Use of computer models

RL has also developed its own highly specialized propagation program for predicting coverage in the audience area by using current computer technology. In a report providing a technical analysis of preliminary factors, twilight immunity factors, control factors and computerized service contours, RL network staff concluded:

"Our independent capability to run various computer programs as well as to write ancillary subroutines when necessary to adapt programs to our specific technical needs, permits us to rapidly evaluate the best combination of our technical facilities to use to most effectively over the U.S.S.R. target area and to overcome the jamming effort directed against our transmission."<sup>64</sup>

#### (e) Other anti-jamming measures

Other measures can be taken either to penetrate or avoid jamming. "Speech-processing" equipment—clippers, noise-suppressors, dynamic range limiting amplifiers are used. They increase the intelligibility of the signal.<sup>65</sup> RL programmers also take special pains to train speakers whose voices are especially suited to penetrate jamming, and despite technical obstacles, apparently, their voices can be reasonably audible.

Soviet listeners also put adapters on their own radios to increase the range of frequencies and to improve dialing and reception. Some Soviet listeners build an efficient selector that refines the process of tuning. As Mrs. Belinkov said of her husband: "My invalid husband would spend hours sitting tensely before the radio, operating the volume and tuning controls with both hands."<sup>66</sup> Listeners also orient a directional antenna toward the jammer; this, according to Mr. Herrick, reduces the effects of jamming.

Soviet listeners are aware of twilight immunity, and, they can take advantage of it. A recent arrival from the Soviet Union said very frankly that if a person wants to listen to RL, it can be done. During the period of twilight immunity, at 1900 in the evening, she said, the signal cannot be jammed. Then, it is also possible to listen at 0100 or 0400 in the morning.

Ground-wave jamming in the cities can also be avoided. All major Soviet cities have a special type of ground-wave jamming which obliterates practically all of the signals from foreign broadcasters that the

regime wants to jam. In some large cities, such as Moscow where its downtown area is heavily jammed, there is, however, an increasing number of people living in the outskirts and there the signal, according to one source, "can come in loud and clear."<sup>67</sup> Audience surveys show that about 75% of RL's listeners are city dwellers. For them it is, therefore, just a matter of going to the countryside to pick up the signal. Dr. Alexey V. Levin, a former Soviet nuclear physicist who had left the Soviet Union in 1968 and is now living in New York, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

"Of course, Radio Liberty's broadcasts are subject to constant jamming in Moscow and other big cities. The Soviet bureaucracy is determined not to lose its information monopoly. Jamming causes some people to travel late at night outside the city, perhaps for an hour or two, to listen to the broadcasts. Sometimes they take along a tape recorder and get them down that way. I, personally, knew people who did that."<sup>68</sup>

Thus, Soviet urban listeners hear RL's broadcasts in several ways. One is to travel to the surrounding countryside; another is to acquire the best receiving equipment; another is to rely on patience to wait for "gulls" in the jamming, which often means listening at very late hours. As one listener from Moscow recently said: "I listen on a sensitive Japanese transistor. During the day the jamming never lets up, so I try to listen after midnight . . ."<sup>69</sup>

Then, RL broadcasts on multiple frequencies, creating special problems for jammers. Moreover, regime monitoring requires that one channel be left unjammed. The task for the listener is to find which one.

Finally, vacation-time in the Soviet Union provides good opportunities for listening. The necessary leisure time is available, and atmospheric conditions are occasionally jam-free. In Bolgrad, Odessa Oblast, according to one Soviet maritime engineer, reception is so good that vacationers tape-record foreign broadcasts to take home to their friends or to sell on the black market. The most popular recordings, he said, concern persecutions and arrests in the Soviet Union.<sup>70</sup>

### 4. Jamming Effectiveness

How effective Soviet jamming is in destroying RL's incoming signal, and, conversely, how effective RL is in penetrating Soviet jamming cannot be determined in any precise way. According to Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand, evidence from persons living and working in the audience area confirms that a "significant proportion of the broadcasts penetrate the jamming."<sup>71</sup> Perhaps, this the most that can be said. RL seems to have been very cautious in making any sweeping generalizations on effectiveness, seemingly never going beyond this order of magnitude.

However, this is only one side of the matter. Perhaps, what is most important is the high value that the Soviet Union itself places on RL; it does this by investing millions of dollars in resources needed elsewhere into preventing RL's signal from reaching the Soviet audience. This is a very real measure, not only of regime reaction, but, more importantly, of the value that Moscow places on RL's effectiveness. As Foy Kohler, a former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union and a long-time specialist on Soviet affairs, observed in a comment on regime reaction to both RL and RFE: "If the radios were not reaching a significant audience, they would be accorded the silent treatment these regimes prefer to give to social phenomena

which are inconvenient for, or contradictory to, the official line."<sup>73</sup>

The recent complaint of a Soviet agricultural official on this misallocation of resources points up the seriousness of Moscow's resolve to black out RL's programs. "It is idiotic," he said, "to spend millions to jam foreign broadcasts at a time when the research budget for agriculture is reduced."<sup>74</sup> Agriculture has been and continues to be the Achilles heel of the Soviet economy. Yet, the Soviet Government, apparently, has a higher priority in the allocation of its resources, namely, to prevent a challenge to its monopoly on information.

#### IV. RL'S AUDIENCE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS

##### A. What does it all add up to?

How is it possible to make any valid judgments on the extent of RL's impact and effectiveness? Hundreds of interviews a year from a narrowly selected audience provide one input for measurement. Listener mail, some 6000 letters since 1956 (an average of some 33 letters a month), provide another.<sup>75</sup> Both represent positive means for judgment.

Assessment of regime media attacks and calculations of Soviet investment in time, resources and energy into jamming provide essentially negative inputs. Yet, they, at least, have the virtue of creating greater certainty in a very uncertain area of human judgment.

But what does it all add up to?

##### B. Dr. Wilbur Schramm's evaluation in 1962

This is the same question that Mr. Sargent asked in his lecture delivered during the inaugural year 1965-1966 of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at Tufts Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Mr. Sargent answered the question by recalling that in the autumn of 1962 he had asked Dr. Wilbur Schramm, Director of Stanford's Institute for Communication Research and a pioneer in the field of mass communications research, to spend a week at RL's Audience Research Department in Munich and to evaluate what RL was trying to accomplish.

Dr. Schramm gave Mr. Sargent this evaluation:

"Every time I come to Munich I am impressed by the cruel conditions under which audience research has to be done here. By the rules of the game, 95 percent of all the sophisticated methods available to field researchers in western countries are foreclosed from use. I described the process of RL audience research . . . as being about like a man fishing in a murky lake without any hook on his line. He is unable to see any fish, and practically unable ever to catch a fish. Only occasionally, by being very attentive, he may feel a fish brush against his dangling line. This is the kind of job Max Ralls is trying to do. For this reason, we must be careful not to ask too much of the results of RL audience research. We have no reason to suspect that our contacts represent a probability sample. Therefore, we have no right to apply the usual statistics of reliability, and no scientific right to ask questions about the size of audience or size of segments within it. We must be very careful about saying anything about the 'profile' of the audience. . . . My impression is that your Audience Research department is doing a careful and thorough job, and exercising considerable ingenuity and imagination . . . furthermore, no recent discovery of social science, or no tool transferred from Western audience research is likely to make any magic change in the amount of information that becomes available on your audience. . . . But I feel that you can be confident that work is going

forward in a solid and intelligent way, no claims are being made that should not be made, and the effort is in good hands."<sup>76</sup>

"We have made some progress in the years since Dr. Schramm wrote these lines to me," continued Mr. Sargent, "our data is a good deal more voluminous, and we are able to use modern data processing techniques for its analysis." Mr. Sargent went on to make what seems to an outside lay observer to be a justifiably cautious judgment, "but the main points he made then seem to me just as valid today."<sup>77</sup>

##### C. Possible modifying factors

Commonsense seems to dictate that the positive inputs of interviews and listener mail can at best give RL only a hazy image of its audience and an uncertain estimate of its effectiveness. Still, this judgment might be modified somewhat by the knowledge that interviews, particularly those among the scientific intelligentsia, have an especially high value in weighing impact since they represent opinion leaders within Soviet society. Moreover, the number of interviews are, apparently, on the increase, especially with the expansion in the last few years of the Soviet Union's scientific and cultural exchanges programs in the West.

This judgment might be modified still further by an awareness that while RL may have an opaque view of its audience, nevertheless, by the expertise of its staff, the quality of research, and particularly the emergence of the samizdat phenomenon, an unknown quantity in the early to mid-1960's, which provides rich new insights into the workings of Soviet society, RL itself can make assessments of its audience, programming needs, and probable effectiveness that may make this ordinarily opaque image appear somewhat clearer. Thus, it is possible, though not probable, that RL may not be "flying blind" entirely, to use Mr. Sargent's metaphor, and perhaps may even be in atmospheric conditions that are somewhat clearer than "a pea-soup fog."

##### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Sargeant, Communications to Open and Closed Societies, p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> Analysis Report #6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).

<sup>3</sup> Hopkins writes: "So far, Soviet mass communications researchers have done little to measure radio audiences and listenership. All that Soviet authorities know is that the radio broadcasting network is technically capable of reaching all but a fraction of the Soviet population." (op. cit., p. 249).

<sup>4</sup> According to one RL paper, "direct, though random, contact with the listener is established through listener mail, of which there has been a considerable flow since 1960, and through interviews with Soviet citizens visiting in the West. While these contacts are not quantitatively large enough to provide a representative sampling of the audience for statistical purposes, the substantive information contained in the *Listener Mail Reports* and *Target Area Listener Reports*, issued by the Audience Research Division, serves frequently to confirm or refine policy judgments, and on occasion listeners have made direct programming suggestions which were considered worthy or instituting in Radio Liberty programs." (RL Policy Formulation, June 1971, p. 19. In, RL, v. IV, pt. 7).

<sup>5</sup> Sargeant, Communications to Open and Closed Societies, p. 178.

<sup>6</sup> RL Visual Exhibits, Illustration 4. (RL, v. V, pt. 11).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Illustration 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Illustration 6.

<sup>9</sup> RL Inter-Office Memorandum, Briefing Material, Chart VI, Audience Occupation Distribution, p. 6. (RL, v. V, pt. 12).

<sup>10</sup> RL's Russian Service programming samizdat programming, April 1971, section V., pp. 20-21. (RL; v. II, pt. D2).

<sup>11</sup> RL, Analysis Report No. 6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>13</sup> Policy formulation, June 1971, p. 19. (RL, v. IV, pt. 7).

<sup>14</sup> RL, Inter-office Memorandum, Briefing material, August 26, 1971, p. 3. (RL, v. V, pt. 12).

<sup>15</sup> RL Analysis Report No. 6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), July 26, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>19</sup> NYU-RL Conference, Communicating with Soviet Youth, 1967, p. 4 ff.

<sup>20</sup> RL, Analysis Report #6-71, Evidence of Radio Liberty Effectiveness (Second Quarter of 1971), p. 18. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>29</sup> RL, Post-Broadcast Audition Report, Audition of RL Russian Program for Wednesday/Thursday, Oct. 14/15, 1970, November 13, 1950, p. 11. (RL, Post-Broadcast Auditioning File.)

<sup>30</sup> Sosin Role of Radio Liberty, pp. 95-96.

<sup>31</sup> RL Formal Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 8. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8. Italics added.

<sup>33</sup> Gwertzman, Bernard. Notes from the Russian Underground. *The New York Times*, August 22, 1971, p. 32.)

<sup>34</sup> Poole, Ithiel de Sola. *The Changing Soviet Union: The Mass Media As Catalyst*. Current, No. 67, January 1966:15.

<sup>35</sup> Poole, Final report, p. 11.

<sup>36</sup> RL, Future of Samizdat, p. 16. (RL, v. II, D1).

<sup>37</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 46. (RL, v. I).

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35. Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading British specialist on Soviet affairs, declared that despite the elaborate and expensive measures the Soviet Government has taken to prevent RL's broadcasts from reaching the Soviet audience, "there is much evidence that the present audiences can be counted in millions." (*Ibid.*, p. 29).

<sup>41</sup> SFRG, Report, pp. 20-21.

<sup>42</sup> RL Statement, June 14, 1971, p. 34. (RL, v. I).

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Radio in Psychological Warfare, pp. 33-34.

<sup>44</sup> RL Formal Statement, June 1971, p. 19. (RL, v. I).

<sup>45</sup> RL, Memorandum from Ralls, Why Soviet Citizens Listen to Radio Liberty, October 20, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. XVII, pt. 1).

<sup>46</sup> RL, Analysis Report #6-71, July 26, 1971, p. 8. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2), RL, Analysis Report #8-71, October 19, 1971, p. 1. (RL, v. XVII, pt. 1).

<sup>47</sup> SFRG, Hearings, pp. 121 and 123.

<sup>48</sup> Soviet press authorities cannot plead ignorance of RL's operations. Tass correspondents have visited RL in the past. They were cordially received by Mr. Robert B. Redlich, RL's Information Advisor, who declared,



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he discussed RL's operations with them in a most objective manner. However, upon returning to Moscow, Mr. Redlick said, the correspondents made "outrageous accusations" against RL's staff.

<sup>49</sup> According to RL, "A conservative estimate based on the available circulation figures shows that the attacks on Radio Liberty were carried in 174,000,000 copies of printed matter and transmitted in numerous broadcasts to vast audiences; it may be safely assumed, therefore, that Communist propaganda has, in effect, made a contribution to establishing RL as a household word both in the Soviet Union and in East European countries." The RL report goes on to say that this conclusion is confirmed by the Soviet citizens themselves. "Numerous Soviets interviewed by ARD correspondents during the year," it said, "expressed the same idea: the Soviet propaganda campaign against RL has served to increase interest in the station." A Moscow teacher in his 50's was quoted as saying: "After having heard so much about Liberty over domestic radio, a Soviet citizen who never tuned into this station previously will think, 'If our government finds it necessary to attack Radio Liberty so strongly, it must be a station broadcasting worthwhile material.'" (RL, Analysis Report #8-71, Soviet and East Bloc Regime Attacks on Radio Liberty Committee in 1971 (through September 30), October 19, 1971, p. 1). (RL, v. XVII, pt. 1).

<sup>50</sup> RL, Soviet Counter-measures against Radio Liberty, pp. 1-2. (RL, v. III, pt. M).

<sup>51</sup> Herrick, George. Are there different types of jamming? part 3. p. 6. (RL, v. XI).

<sup>52</sup> RL, Soviet jamming of Radio Liberty broadcasts, pp. 1-2. (RL, v. III, pt. MI).

<sup>53</sup> SFRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 20.

<sup>54</sup> RL, Soviet jamming of Radio Liberty broadcasts, p. 2. (RL, v. III, pt. MI).

<sup>55</sup> RL Visual exhibits, Illustration No. 16. (RL, v. V, pt. 11).

<sup>56</sup> RL, Analysis Report #8-71, July 26, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2.)

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ralls, Why Soviet citizens listen to Radio Liberty, October 20, 1971, p. 11 (RL, v. XVII, pt. 1.)

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> RL, RL's technical facilities, p. 2. (RL, v. III, pt. K.)

<sup>61</sup> RL, RL's technical facilities, p. 1. (RL, v. III, pt. K.)

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>64</sup> RL, Computer use and propagation, p. 3. (RL, v. XI, pt. 9.)

<sup>65</sup> RL, Basic briefing outline, July 2, 1971, p. 7. (RL, v. V, pt. 10.)

<sup>66</sup> RL Formal Statement, June 1971, pp. 43-44. (RL, v. I.)

<sup>67</sup> NYU-RL, Communicating with Soviet youth, 1967, pp. 3-4.

<sup>68</sup> U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Hearings. 92nd Congress, first session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1971, p. 54.

<sup>69</sup> RL, The Shortwave audience, p. 2. (RL, v. III, pt. J.)

<sup>70</sup> RL, Analysis Report #8-71, July 26, 1971, p. 8. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2.)

<sup>71</sup> SFRC, RFE/RL Report, p. 20.

<sup>72</sup> SRFC, Hearings, p. 174.

<sup>73</sup> RL, Analysis Report #8-71, July 26, 1971, p. 8. (RL, v. XII, pt. 2.)

<sup>74</sup> RL, The Soviet shortwave audience, p. 2. (RL, v. III, pt. J.)

<sup>75</sup> Quoted in, Sargent, Communications to open and closed societies, p. 177.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp. 177-178.

## CHAPTER VII: SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON RL

## I. A SURROGATE "HOME SERVICE" TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE

This study has been structured within a fairly restricted frame of reference defined in Chapter I. On this basis it is possible to suggest some general observations.

In the first place, there seems little doubt that RL is what it claims to be, namely, a surrogate "Home Service" to the Soviet people. In this role it tries to establish a dialogue directly with the Soviet people, fill the gaps created by Soviet censorship, remove the distortions of Soviet propaganda, and act as an "echo chamber," broadcasting back to the Soviet people the thoughts and ideals of their own "loyal opposition."

Assuming the stance of a "patriotic" Soviet communicator and acting on the democratic principle of a free press, RL identifies with what it believes to be the best interests of the Soviet peoples and speaks in their behalf, hoping that in the long run this effort will contribute to those forces seeking to bring about a democratic transformation of Soviet society. For, RL's ultimate goal is the peaceful democratization of the Soviet Union; and it holds to the belief that the best assurance for peace with Russia is through the diminution of Soviet totalitarianism and the growth of democracy.

## II. SUMMARY OF POSITIVE OBSERVATIONS ON RL

To achieve this goal, RL has established what appears to an outside observer to be an impressive organization: its staff is professional; its research facilities are extraordinary, serving not only RL but the community of Western specialists on Soviet affairs; its programming, tested by time and two decades of direct association with the Soviet audience, appears to be practical, yet imaginative and purposeful; its procedures in programming, developed over years of communicating with the Soviet people, seem to be sensible and efficient; its politics, highly intellectualized, rational, and pragmatic, are attuned to the most refined thinking in the Western community of Soviet specialists from which it draws for counsel in programming and policy formation; its procedures in policy formation, application and control are reasonable, strict, and as effective as probably could be expected; its audience research attempts to make the most of a virtually impossible task; its broadcasting facilities would seem to rank among the best in the world of foreign radio broadcasters; its philosophical orientation, reformist, idealistic, and pacifistic, is in the tradition of American Jeffersonian-Wilsonian democratic liberalism.

## III. NEGATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON RL

## A. An aging staff and difficulties in recruitment

Yet, RL no doubt has its share of organizational imperfections many of which were not apparent in a study-visit of such short duration as two weeks. The purpose of this study was not to make such a searching, detailed organizational appraisal. However, certain difficulties were apparent, and, perhaps, the most serious has already been discussed in Chapter I, namely, the problem of being caught in the scissors of an aging staff and the difficulties in recruiting newcomers from the Soviet Union.

To play its role effectively as a "Home Service", RL must have staff that is immersed in the Soviet environment with knowledge, habits, and linguistic abilities attuned to a new generation. Many senior

staff within RL are now from the older emigration and presently are being carried on in the organization out of necessity. The number will increase in the next few years, and the problem will become progressively acute.

On the other hand, RL has a built-in difficulty in recruiting new staff members from the Soviet Union, especially in the Slavic areas, to replace those approaching or actually in the retirement age. Apparently, this problem does not exist within the non-Slavic areas of the Nationalities Service which can draw upon ample personnel resources in Turkey. Resources in the West have disappeared with the passing of the old post-war emigration, and severe restrictions, placed upon emigration from the U.S.S.R., prevent the much needed infusion of young, new blood. How RL will cope with this situation is one of the most pressing personnel problems facing its administration.

## B. Attention to the nationalities

A second point of criticism would seem to be RL's failure to give more attention to the Nationalities Service. RL has not been spared reverberations of the historic conflict between the dominant Great Russian majority and the minority non-Russian nationalities. As indicated in Chapter V, the struggle continues within RL, but within an improving environment.

It is difficult to argue against the proposition that the predominating ethnic-political group in the Soviet Union is the Great Russian; that it is within this group where now and perhaps in the distant future resides the power and authority for shaping the country's future destiny; that historically it is the Great Russian who has held the commanding heights in Russia; and that, therefore, it makes sense to allocate the greater resources of the organization into the Russian Service.

Nevertheless, the nationalities seem to have a legitimate point of view, deserving attention. One of the most powerful forces in the modern world is nationalism, and though the Soviets deny its relevance in the Soviet setting, still they have been powerless to deny its penetration of the Soviet environment. A dramatic example in recent years has been the growing self-awareness among Soviet Jews that has been generated by a new anti-Semitic campaign initiated by the Soviet leadership. Moreover, the increasing prominence of the developing areas in international relations, notably the roles being played by India and Pakistan, along with the re-entry of China upon the world stage, re-inforce an argument made with RL in the mid-1960's, namely, that Soviet Russia's nationalities, especially the non-Slavic, have gained another measure of importance, owing to their unique relationships with these areas, and should be treated accordingly.

Samizdat records the growing concerns of the nationalities, making them a force to be reckoned with. This new energy, combined with that emerging in Russia proper and channeled within the constructive purposes as defined in RL policy, could prove to be an asset that may not now be fully appreciated.

## C. An inactive board of trustees

A third negative feature of RL's operations is the ineffectiveness of the Board of Trustees. It appears that RL's Board of Trustees has failed in its responsibilities to the organization. In contrast to RFE's Board of Directors which has actively participated in the affairs of the Radio, RL's Board of Trustees has played a very passive role, seem-

ing to defer to the President. Apparently, the strength of Mr. Sargeant as an administrator has compensated for any organizational deficiencies that might have resulted. If RL is to continue, particularly under the various proposals now under discussion, then this Board must be strengthened considerably and its role as an active participant in the organization's functions more sharply defined.

#### IV. PACIFICATION OF RL

The reality of RL conflicts sharply with its popular image. It began as a Cold War operation, and over the years transformed from advocacy of "liberation" to "liberalization." By any objective measurement using the traditional methodology of American historical scholarships, RL is not now a "Cold War operation" and its staff "a group of cold warriors" in the sense that these terms were used and understood during the 1950s. Rather, RL accepts all Soviet institutions (though not its ideology) and seeks to bring about peaceful internal transformation within the system as it now exists. RL concentrates its energies on the nation's elite and on the vast middle consensus of opinion; it encourages reformers; yet it seeks to moderate the extremists at either end of the political spectrum.

In external relations, RL does not advocate sharpening of tensions, though it could be argued that playing the role of a "loyal opposition" and encouraging Soviet forces of ideological erosion are in the Soviet environment tension-producing. Rather, RL encourages détente, amelioration of international differences through negotiations, strengthening of the United Nations as an instrumentality of peace, and creation of a world system based on political pluralism and the rule of law. And, while RL may be an irritant in Soviet-American relations (it represents an ideological challenge to the regime and thus it may adversely affect the modalities of relations, nevertheless, it is unlikely that it impairs détente per se which rests upon more broadly based and deeply rooted power realities. Directing its energies mainly toward the Soviet people, RL attempts to establish a dialogue with them on the assumption that by encouraging the forces of liberalization existing within Soviet society, natural and healthy self-generated pressures exerted from below upon the governing authorities will make them more responsible to the interests of the people, and, accordingly, create more favorable conditions for insuring détente and peace. For, the major premise of RL's philosophical view is faith in the wisdom of the Soviet people to achieve their nation's best interests, namely, peace and progress.<sup>1</sup>

Nor does RL slander the Soviet Union, its people and its leaders, though the Soviet regime would argue that reading over the air Solzhenitzyn's and Pasternak's works and the prescribed writings of other Soviet citizens on human, political and religious rights are acts of slander. Rather, RL as a "Home Service" assumes a "patriotic stance": it commends the leaders when a particular positive and creative action is taken; it points out imperfections in restrained, rational argument when a particular policy or action

is wrong or harmful; it never consciously disparages the Soviet Union as a nation-state; it never purposely offends or demeans the Soviet people or its leadership. To do so, according to RL policy, would be to defeat the purposes of its existence.

In brief, RL acts as a responsible instrumentality of the United States Government and operates within a larger and generally acceptable consensus of American national interests.

#### SPECIAL ADDENDUM: AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AT RADIO LIBERTY

(Review and Comments by Lorand B. Szalay)

(NOTE.—Figure referred to not printed in the Record.)

The following is a brief discussion of Radio Liberty's audience research. This discussion entails three sections:

The first section presents a summary of the situational factors and philosophies which underlie present research activities and which require thorough examination as a highly unique task requiring individual attention.

This section is followed by a short description of the three major ongoing research activities with regard to their utility to provide audience information directly relevant to the immediate task of broadcasting.

The third section deals with the confrontation of factors demanding a primarily qualitative, descriptive research approach versus factors calling for more objective, quantitative solutions. This conflict is also discussed in relation to the necessity of a confidential, secret approach versus the desirability of an open approach.

A resolution of these conflicts is offered in recommendations suggesting a research strategy for testing the viability of a transition from the present primarily qualitative, classified approach to a more objective, open approach in the future.

These recommendations cannot be accepted without reservation, however. First of all, they heavily rely on the example set by Radio Free Europe's audience analysis. Comparing Radio Liberty to Radio Free Europe, a much larger broadcasting and audience analysis activity, is irresistible because of its apparent similarities. However, there are some critical differences, especially between the audiences of the two stations, which would make an over-emphasis on the similarities undesirable.

Another problem is that the recommendations are based on the tacit assumption that the Soviet policy toward audience analysis may be induced to change if the data collection were performed by public opinion and market research firms and the open nature of this research that follows international examples and scientific standards cannot be denied.

What is suggested is not a drastic, immediate change in procedure. Changes in the present procedures would take place only after careful testing of viable alternatives.

#### SITUATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, INSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

In its background and objectives, Radio Liberty shows some distinct similarities with Radio Free Europe. The similarities are especially important in respect to audience analysis.

First of all, there is no direct physical access to the audiences toward which the station is primarily oriented, and there is little public opinion and feedback information on these main audiences. Moreover, the

stations operate in a highly sensitive psychological and political atmosphere. Although little is actually known about the opinions and attitudes<sup>1</sup> of these distant audiences, there are indications that during the last decades they have developed some characteristics which distinguish them from comparable Western audiences.

Despite the similarities between RL and RFE audiences, there are also some characteristic differences. The differences may have emerged as a function of the longer history of the Soviet communism and the inbred nature of the Soviet system as compared to the largely imported nature of the Eastern European Communist systems. The differences may also have resulted from the greater isolation of the Soviet population compared to the physically, geographically, and psychologically more exposed populations of the Eastern European border states.

For the Soviet audiences there also appears to be a stronger association between nationalism and loyalty to the political system. There are indications that external criticism of the system may be more readily resented on primarily nationalistic grounds. There is a type of national pride in the Soviet world power status, space achievements, and sport successes which is effectively exploited by the political system for denouncing criticism and political opposition as "unpatriotic." The Eastern Europeans, however, do not take pride in communism as a type of national achievement; rather it is generally viewed as a foreign imposition of Russian colonialism.

It is not only the combination of strong national feelings with ideological elements which complicates the situation; a combination of nationalism and white Russian centralism also produces a hard-to-predict attitudinal mixture, which challenges minority nationalisms that work toward independence and separatism.

All these factors and more contribute to making an especially complex communication task involving audiences with uncommon, occasionally highly ambivalent feelings and philosophies. Thus, the Soviet audiences pose special requirements which Radio Liberty must meet in order to provide effective, audience-adjusted broadcasting. In such a situation audience analysis becomes a most elementary and vital requirement.

At the same time, as a competent RL representative has expressed, no one in the West seems to have a very clear idea about the actual attitudes and beliefs of the broad Soviet citizenry.<sup>2</sup> Under these conditions the proper selection and planning of broadcasting, which is large in volume and can rely on little first-hand audience feedback, becomes an immense task.

The situational factors hampering audience analysis are overwhelming. Compared to the Eastern European development, they show only slow and minor improvements. The Soviet attitude of hostility has not mellow-

<sup>1</sup> Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

<sup>2</sup> This opinion is generally supported by the literature. As Inkeles and Bauer point out in their Harvard study on Soviet refugees, "there are many excellent books describing the history of the Soviet Union and the formal structure and functioning of its institutions, but we know almost nothing about the attitudes, values, and experiences of its citizens." *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Indicative of the Soviet Government's order of priorities in regard to its perception of RL's place in Soviet-American relations is the fact that there is no record of an official protest to the United States against RL's operations. Attacks in Soviet media, however, have been extensive.

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ed, jamming is in full effect, and the number of travelers (RFE's major information source) has not shown a dramatic increase. Moreover, the campaign of denouncing Radio Liberty and discouraging cooperation with Radio Liberty has recently been further intensified.

Listenership data are naturally very difficult to obtain in a closed society. In view of the Soviet system and the lack of surveys conducted on samples which would allow broad generalizations, it is impossible to give an empirically founded estimate on the actual proportions of the listenership. Nor is it possible to plot trends in the level of listening over time as Radio Free Europe has been doing for the last decade. Only a few general statements can be made which suggest that Radio Liberty is widely known and listened to.

In a closed society where listening to a foreign station is an officially proscribed activity, statements on listening or nonlistening cannot be accepted without reservation. The impact of the station, however, goes beyond the direct listeners; it also involves those who receive the information by word of mouth. These percentages may run high but are especially hard to estimate. In an open society the proportions of listenership may directly express the popularity of particular stations. In a society of controlled public media, however, where there is an intensive awareness of news censorship, the numerical data on the direct listeners is not sufficient to give a realistic idea of the importance of a station.

Under these conditions Radio Liberty does not feel that the situation is "thawed" to the point that they can provide public opinion research comparable to Radio Free Europe's. At the present time it is considered impossible to conduct open interviews on large visitor samples which could approximate in composition the home audiences. Whether this position is a legitimate one or merely an attitude based on past experiences is a debatable question which will be discussed later.

Nonetheless, Radio Liberty now holds the position that audience analysis, at least for the time being, cannot be conducted on the principles of open public opinion research. It cannot use open, large-scale surveys, first of all, because by doing this Radio Liberty would expose its sources, who as Soviet citizens would be subject to political persecution. Furthermore, Radio Liberty feels that a detailed elaboration of the present procedures is undesirable at least in terms of specifics, which could be exploited and frustrate future efforts of data collection.

Discussed in more general terms, Radio Liberty's audience analysis consists of three types of activities:

- a. Documentation of mail and press reactions.
- b. Panel evaluation of programs.
- c. Reports on interviews with Soviet travelers.

## DOCUMENTATION OF MAIL AND PRESS REACTIONS

Especially in the past this category of audience reactions to RL broadcasts has represented a major information source. While the content of the audience mail reveals public sentiments, the flow of this information depends a great deal on the fluctuating level of censorship and suppression of private mail traffic.

The content of this mail is conveyed by RL excerpts. This method is simple and com-

monsensical but provides little basis for broader generalizations and is not very convincing to the more skeptical. The central themes of these letters are: complaints about the suppression and distortion of news by the Soviet media, manifestations of desires to be adequately informed about the world, and compliments to Radio Liberty for its interesting and informative broadcasting.

While this content shows little change over time, the flow of these letters has shown a decrease in volume during recent months. Although it might merely be taken as a sign of loss of interest, this simple interpretation would ignore certain facts. Recently the foreign mail has undergone stricter censorship and strong anti-Radio Liberty campaigns have been launched. That the Soviet government has taken an increased interest in Radio Liberty is shown by the following yearly breakdown of the volume of media used in attacking Radio Liberty.

## PANEL EVALUATION OF RL PROGRAMS

As a partial substitute for first-hand audience feedback, Radio Liberty has developed a panel approach for program evaluation. A fairly sizable panel is formed of recent emigrants, travelers, and Soviet experts. The members of these panels receive samples of the new program items, and they are asked to evaluate them in terms of the effects they might have on Soviet audiences. To facilitate and systematize this evaluation, a variety of specific questions are asked: How interesting is its content? How effective will it be? How is the form of presentation, language, style? Is the program sufficiently supported by facts and data? Should the program be repeatedly used? Does the program appeal to the whole listenership? to the creative intelligentsia? to the scientific-technical intelligentsia? to journalists? to party and ideological leadership? to military, youth, workers, rural populations? The members of the panel evaluate each submitted program element in the above terms. Then the evaluations produced by individual members are summarized and the conclusions are formulated.

Considering the situational constraints, the above panel procedure appears to provide an economical solution. The panel's effectiveness, of course, depends a great deal on the authenticity of its members in their representation of the contemporary Soviet audiences—their concerns, attitudes, language, style, taste, etc.

## REPORTS ON INTERVIEWS

To differentiate this method from the RFE's public opinion questions, which are contained in a questionnaire administered in a uniform, schematic procedure called an "interview," Radio Liberty refers to its approach as "conversations." These are also fundamentally interviews, but they differ from RFE's surveys in that they are not organized on the same lines as Western surveys. They try to adapt to each individual informant and tap his personal knowledge and opinions in the framework of one or more conversations. The interviewer is not bound by prepared questions but has a checklist of possible topics. These involve general listening, foreign radio listening, general accounts of audience reactions, attitudes, opinions, etc. The conversation can be of any length, extend over numerous meetings, and can discuss audience characteristics at any depth. This procedure does not follow the rationale of Western opinion surveys, which attempt to work with representative samples by using

a standard, pretested set of work with representative samples by using a standard, pretested set of uniform questions. Accordingly, RL's evaluation is fundamentally descriptive.

The number of persons interviewed reaches several hundred yearly. Thus, the size of the group is large enough to warrant broader generalizations. The specific composition of these samples, however, represents the more thorny problem.

Radio Liberty's position, as it stands now, is that in order to protect informants, it would be "irresponsible" to place the interview in the public spotlight. As a "Note" by Radio Liberty on this subject states:

The difficulties encountered in conducting survey research work among Soviet citizens are all those obstacles which a totalitarian regime can systematically impose, the most important of which is the denial of free and ready access to interviewees, both within and without the territorial confines of the USSR. Internally, the Soviet Union is a closed society and systematic interviewing of a representative sample of the population is impossible for obvious reasons. This limits Audience Research essentially to interviewing Soviet travelers abroad. Here also free access is denied, however. Travelers abroad are generally briefed to be wary of foreigners or Soviet emigres who attempt to engage them in conversation on substantive issues. Surveillance of Soviet travelers, while not total, is also a common practice. Additionally, fear plays an important role. Radio Liberty and other foreign radios are regularly and systematically attacked by Soviet media in the most inflammatory terms. The virulent hostility of the Soviet regime to foreign radios in general and Radio Liberty in particular is consequently no secret to Soviet citizens and they are often hesitant to discuss listening (which can be interpreted as a political act) with a stranger until good rapport and some degree of confidence can be established, often a time-consuming process. In light of these impediments to normal social research, usual scientific sampling methods are precluded. An adjunct to the above is that the recruitment and training of qualified people to work as field interviewers is no easy task.

As an additional reason for keeping these interviews confidential, Radio Liberty refers to the need to protect the RL interviewer. This attitude of cautious secrecy prevails in the entire procedure from the moment of contact to the use of the results.

In respect to the contact no claim is made for random choice. To the contrary, those travelers are interviewed who in a careful process of establishing rapport present themselves as cooperative. Areas of conversation or themes about which the interviewee appears hesitant to speak are avoided. The broadcasting divisions receive the reports of the conversations in an anonymous form.

The main products that the broadcasting divisions receive are in the form of single listener reports. They describe the interviewee in terms of occupation, nationality, and language. The reports also include such details as place, listening times, language of broadcast, audibility, jamming, and specific programs listened to. In addition to these general, largely technical details, there is a summary of the conversation, which may include statements about public reactions, comments on recent events, and expectations about future developments. In the few reports I have read, there was a recurring complaint about the system's control of news

and the general lack of reliable, objective information.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

As a point of departure, we must recognize that the Soviet hostility toward public opinion research, the campaign conducted against Radio Liberty, and the retaliation of the Soviet authorities against Soviet citizens are real. The political proscription and persecution the citizens may be exposed to are too severe to be ignored. The citizenry, living in the heavily controlled social environment, is fully aware of the possible consequences and carefully avoids unnecessary risks. Nor could Radio Liberty survive if it did not proceed with caution and responsibility.

Just what the proper level of caution should be in the present period is not easy to tell. The number of Soviet travelers has increased, cultural contacts are generally on the rise, and Soviet citizens may move somewhat more freely or at least more frequently abroad.

Similar but probably more articulate developments were recognized and used by RFE for the institution of public opinion research activities founded on scientific principles. Parenthetically mentioned, this work requires a careful reconciliation of ideal criteria and diverse, situational constraints. Nonetheless, as a result of its audience research, Radio Free Europe is now in the position to document the size of its audiences and the dimensions of its impact.

The value of this knowledge is considerable and it bears both methodologically as well as substantively on the larger issue Senator Fulbright has clearly articulated in recent hearings on the role of social sciences in U.S. foreign policy and international relations. In our atomic age a better understanding of the Communist powers, their perception of the world, and the psychological factors influencing their decisions represents a matter of human survival. Senator Fulbright expressed surprise at how little research is presently being conducted on this issue.<sup>3</sup>

Both RFE's and RL's research is closely related to this issue. RFE has set the example that empirical research in this domain is not a hopeless enterprise. Even though Radio Liberty operates under more restrained conditions, Radio Free Europe's success suggests that it would be worthwhile to explore the applicability of new approaches under the present, partially changed situation. Just as it would be wrong to overestimate the changes in their dimensions and consequences, it would also be wrong to miss the opportunities these changes may offer for research. There are three main developments which suggest taking a fresh look at this problem.

a. There are some indications of freer criticism in the U.S.S.R. and a lessening of fears and inhibitions of the Soviet citizen to meet foreigners and to talk more openly.

b. Recent years have shown an increase in the number of Soviet tourists, especially travelers on scientific and business missions to the West.

c. Radio Liberty has shifted its institutional status from a situation of confidential, undisclosed sponsorship to an open in-

stitution with responsibilities and information policies exposed to public control.

This partially changed situation may not warrant a public opinion research matching Western polls in size and style but may provide for a gradual introduction of scientific methods on a modest scale and carefully adjusted in approach.

The groups interviewed presently from year to year are large enough (N=500) to warrant statistical treatment. By a certain standardization of the interview procedure, the comparability of the individual interviews may be substantially increased. By focusing the interview on predetermined categories of information, opinion profiles may be derived and trends analyzed.

It appears to be advisable to retain the present distinction between program evaluation by panel and audience research by interviews. Because it is especially important for the panel members to be articulate and up-to-date, the use of recent emigrants may be useful. For audience research in order to increase the representativeness of the interviewed samples, RFE's policy of using travelers exclusively may be adopted.

Similarly, it may be recommended that Radio Liberty explore the possibility of adopting the RFE approach of contracting out the interviewing to independent national public opinion and market research organizations. The language is a problem here but these national firms may hire Russians as interviewers just as RFE's contractors hire Eastern Europeans. The use of these independent business organizations offers an effective method of demonstrating that the surveys involve public opinion research with no relationship to intelligence and espionage work.

In order to reduce the problem resulting from a lack of experience with social science and survey methods, it is desirable to explore alternative methods in the administration and form of the interview to adapt it to the Soviet samples.

Here preference may be given to projective techniques which show people's perceptions and attitudes without forcing them to make statements on topics which may be judged sensitive or political by Soviet standards. Similarly, tasks of obviously mechanical nature (checkmarking, rank ordering of given alternative choices) may be used effectively to underscore the statistical, impersonal nature of the interest in contrast to the more personal nature of interest suggested by direct questions.

While some of these ideas may fail, others may work better than expected in the present situation which does suggest certain elements of change. After all, some of the present-day RFE research would have appeared unthinkable five or ten years ago.

Finally, because the Soviet public opinion data bear on a critical information gap which has important political as well as scientific relevance, and because this information is essential to provide for an educated U.S. public opinion instead of being kept confidential, it should be given the necessary publicity.

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and the occupation of Japan. He graduated from Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut, in 1948, with honors in history, and won the Ph.D. degree in history from the University of Rochester in 1959. For five months in 1946 he was employed by the State Department on the staff of the Far Eastern Commission. From 1948 to 1951 he was a graduate student and an instructor in history at the University of Rochester. In 1951, he was briefly employed by the Central Intelligence Agency prior to accepting a position on the staff of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service (now the Congressional Research Service) of the Library of Congress.

Dr. Whalen is a member of the American Historical Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and the American Political Science Association (Washington Chapter). Since 1966, he has been a regular participant in the Inter-University Research Colloquium on Russia and Eastern Europe, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of the George Washington University.

He has written, or helped prepare, the following:

1. U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Communist Aggression. *Baltic States: A Study of their Origin and National Development; their Seizure and Incorporation into the U.S.S.R.* Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954. 537 p.

[Prepared Chapters III and IV, re-wrote Chapter II, performed coordinating and editorial tasks for Committee.]

2. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Tensions within the Soviet Captive Countries. Hungary.* 83rd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954. pp. 173-206.

[Prepared study on basis of first draft by Dr. Bela T. Kardos.]

3. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. *Who Are They?* Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1957-1959.

[Prepared biographic studies on Janos Kadar of Hungary, Part 4; Tito of Yugoslavia, Part 5; Enver Hoxha of Albania and Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania, Part 9; and Karl Marx, Part 10.]

4. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. *The Soviet Empire: Prison House of Nations and Races.* Prepared for the Internal Security Subcommittee. 85th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958. 72 p.

5. *World Communism: A Selected Annotated Bibliography.* Prepared at the request of Senator Edward Martin and Senator Joseph S. Clark, Jr. of Pennsylvania and published by the Department of Public Instruction, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, 1958. 20 p.

6. U.S. Congress. Senate. *Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces: A Selection of Statements and in Interpretive Analysis.* A special study presented by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. 86th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1959. 13 p.

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8. U.S. Congress. Senate. *Khrushchev's*

<sup>3</sup> Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy, U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1969.*



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[A reprint of the article published by the Review of Politics.]

10. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications. 87th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962. 399 p.

[Prepared Chapters II, III, V, VII, and the major part of Chapter VI, and coordinated the study with the Committee staff.]

11. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Un-American Activities. World Communist Movement. Selective Chronology, 1818-1957. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963-1965. Vol. I, pp. 1-232; Vol. II, pp. 233-486; Vol. III, pp. 487-776; Vol. IV, pp. 777-1001.

12. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Soviet Political Agreements and Results. Prepared for the Internal Security Subcommittee. 88th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963. 7 p.

13. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. World Communism: A Selected Annotated Bibliography. Prepared for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. 88th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1964. 410 p.

14. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. The Soviet Empire: A Study in Discrimination and Abuse of Power. Prepared for the Internal Security Subcommittee. 89th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 197 p.

[Prepared Chapters I, II, III, IV, VI, and VII, compiled the appendix, selected maps and supporting material to be prepared, and coordinated the study for the Committee Staff.]

15. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sino-Soviet Report [and Hearings] on the Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 412 p.

[Assisted Committee Staff and acted as coordinator of LRS Staff (Dr. Jakobson, Mr. Leon Herman, Mr. David Lockwood and myself) in organizing these extensive hearings of leading experts in the United States and Europe on Soviet and Chinese Communist affairs.]

16. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Programs, 1962-1965: Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans and International Implications. Staff report, 89th Congress, 2nd sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 920 p.

[Prepared Chapter II relating to Soviet political goals and purposes in space; Part II of Chapter IV on Western projections of future Soviet space plans; and Chapter VI on developments in international space cooperation. Also assisted in preparing the summary of the study in Chapter I, prepared the press release and acted as coordinator of the project for the Committee.]

17. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. A Study of the Communist Party and Coalition Governments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European Coun-

tries. 89th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 33 pp.

18. Poland Since 1966: A Brief Selected Chronology. Published in the Congressional Record by Rep. Paul Findley, April 10, 1967, pp. H3731-H3741 (Daily edition).

19. Czechoslovakia, January to May 1968: A Brief Selection Chronology. Published in the Congressional Record by Rep. Paul Findley, May 29, 1968, pp. E4777-E4780 (Daily edition).

20. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Aspects of Intellectual Ferment and Dissent in Czechoslovakia. 91st Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969, 165 p.

[USIA ordered a special printing of this study (1,000 copies) for circulation throughout their libraries abroad.]

21. Leon M. Herman: A Remembrance. A eulogy delivered on June 3, 1969 and inserted in the Congressional Record with accompanying remarks by Senator Warren Magnuson under the title, "Tribute to Leon Herman, Distinguished Public Servant," June 12, 1969: S6410-S6411.

22. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. World Communism, 1967-1969: Soviet Efforts to Re-Establish Control. 91st Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 319 p.

23. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. World Communism, 1964-1969: A Selected Bibliography. 92nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 452 p.

24. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs, 1966-1970: Goals and Purposes, Organization, Resources, Facilities and Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Programs, Bioastronautics, Civil and Military Applications, Projections of Future Plans, Attitudes Toward International Cooperation and Space Law. Staff Report. Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division and Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service and the European Law Division of the Law Library, Library of Congress. 92nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 670 p. (Doc. No. 92-51)

[Prepared two chapters, one on Political Goals and Purposes of the USSR in Space, and the other, Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation in Space.]

25. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1964-1970: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, With Some Additional Titles from Other Sources.

Specialists in the field of Communist affairs have commented favorably on many of these studies in letters to the author. Among these specialists are George F. Kennan, John C. Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Alexander Dallin of Columbia University, Robert F. Brynes of Indiana University, Alvin Z. Rubenstein of the University of Penna., and Sir Bernard Lovell, one of Britain's leading specialists on space affairs.

In addition to his work published by Congress, Dr. Whelan has prepared since 1952 some 80 major studies for Congressional use on Soviet bloc affairs, world communism, American foreign policy, and international relations. Among recent examples are the following:

The Soviet Strategic Buildup and the American Reaction, 1967-1969: A Survey and Analysis. Part I: An Improving Soviet Strategic Posture and the American Deployment

of Sentinel, 1967, July 9, 1969, 70 p. (Multilith)

The Soviet Strategic Buildup and the American Reaction 1967-1969: A Survey and Analysis. Part II: Enlargement of Soviet Strategic Power and the American Response, 1968, September 9, 1969, 110 p. (Multilith)

The Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Crisis, 1970: A Brief Survey of Russia's Role in the Middle East and the Implications for the United States, July 13, 1970, 77 p. (Multilith)

For individual Members of Congress, he has also written many reports and memoranda which have appeared in the *Congressional Record*.

The following articles by Dr. Whelan have been published in scholarly journals:

1. George Kennan and His Influence on American Foreign Policy. *Virginia Quarterly Review*, v. 55, Spring 1959: 196-220.

2. A book review of W. W. Kulski's, "Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy." In, *American Political Science Review* v. 54, March 1960: 213-214.

3. Khrushchev and the Balance of World Power. *The Review of Politics*, v. 23, April 1960: 131-152.

4. The United States and Diplomatic Recognition: The Contrasting Cases of Russia and Communist China. *China Quarterly*, No. 5, Jan.-Mar. 1961: 82-89.

5. A book review of Sheldon Appelton's, "The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations." In, *The China Quarterly*, No. 9, Jan.-Mar. 1962: 208-210.

6. Three Ways of Looking at the Red Phoenix. *The Review of Politics*, v. 24, April 1962: 287-291.

[A review article based on three books: Isaac D. Deutscher, "The Great Contest: Russia and the West"; Jameson C. Campaigne, "American Might and Soviet Myth"; and Harry Schwartz, "The Red Phoenix: Russia Since World War II."]

7. How to Face a Changing World. *Virginia Quarterly Review*, v. 40, Summer 1964: 472-477.

[Book review essay based on George F. Kennan's, "On Dealing with the Communist World," and "Political Power: USA/ USSR" by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington.]

8. Khrushchev and the Balance of Power. Reprinted in, Paul Seabury, ed. *Balance of Power*. San Francisco, Calif., Chandler Publishing Co., 1965. Chapter 18.

9. The Press and Khrushchev's "Withdrawal" from the Moon Race. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, v. 32, Summer 1968: 233-250.

10. Leon M. Herman: A Bibliography of Published Works. *The Aste Bulletin*, University of Indiana, v. 11, Fall, 1969: 4-12.

11. Leon M. Herman, 1905-1969: An Appreciation. *Slavic Review*, v. 29, June 1970: 371-372.

12. A book review of Walter Laqueur's, "The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 1948-1969." (New York, Macmillan, 1969, 360 p.). In, *The Middle East Journal*, Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., v. 24, Autumn 1970: 421-422.

13. World Communism, 1967-1969: The Soviet Search for Unity and New Organizational Forms. 30 p. (This article is now under consideration for publication by the editor of *Studies in Comparative Communism*, a leading American periodical specializing in Communist studies.)