


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23 April 1965

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SPECIAL REPORT

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA



The burden of evidence accumulated in recent months indicates that "export of the revolution" continues to be a key policy of the Castro regime despite important Communist reverses in Brazil, Chile, and British Guiana last year. Indeed, one of the chief purposes of a [redacted] meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in Havana last November was to add impetus to militant Communist activity in the hemisphere. As before, responsibility for administering Cuban support of revolutionary groups in Latin America rests with the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI).

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The Cuban leadership seems to be concentrating its subversive efforts on three countries--Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where guerrilla and terrorist organizations have been operating for some time. This does not mean that Cuba is cutting out other subversive efforts. Rather, it seems to be concentrating largely on targets of opportunity in other Latin American countries.

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The Cuban Subversive Effort



Funds for the promotion of subversive activity in Latin America come out of the over-all DGI budget, rather than from any single DGI department. The money is usually in US dollar currency. Payments are made only when the revolutionary groups have submitted an acceptable plan for armed struggle. The department that directs guerrilla warfare operations has a budgeted account to provide food, clothing, and pocket money for Latin American trainees in Cuba.

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[redacted] the DGI in 1963

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
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disbursed about \$250,000 to various Guatemalan revolutionary groups. Of this money, some \$200,000 went to Marco Antonio Yon Sosa's group--the most militant activist outfit operating in the country. Another \$50,000 was given to revolutionary groups in El Salvador, \$30,000 to a pro-Castro political organization in Panama, and \$15,000 to pro-Castro subversives in Nicaragua.

the arms themselves cannot be traced to Cuban origins.


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DGI gave more than \$1 million to Venezuelan guerrillas between 1960 and [redacted] 1964.

In addition to money, there is the question of Cuban arms assistance to revolutionary groups on the continent. The three-ton Cuban arms cache found in Venezuela in November 1963 showed that Havana is both willing and able to render this service. [redacted]

[redacted] this cache was only part of "an unknown amount of arms" sent to Venezuela during the 1960-64 period. Also, one of the rifles found in a guerrilla arms cache in Argentina last year had the same specifications as the Cuban rifles found in Venezuela. In general practice, though, Havana prefers to provide insurgent groups with funds to purchase arms so that



Cuban Propaganda

Providing guerrilla warfare training, political indoctrination, and some financial assistance remain the major forms of Cuban support for Latin American revolutionaries. Propaganda, however, also is an important means by which Havana reaches and gives direction to pro-Cuban groups on the continent.

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Havana radio broadcasts some 143 hours a week to Latin America in Spanish, French, Creole (to Haiti), and in the Indian dialects of Aymara and Guarani.

Although priority attention is presently being given to the sugar harvest campaign, Cuba's press service and world-wide radio facilities continue to devote much time and space to Latin American "national liberation" movements. Prominently featured in recent days have been the activities of Colombian and Venezuelan guerrillas and the "repressive" government actions taken against them.

In late 1964 and early 1965 Fidel Castro and Che Guevara made several notable references to Cuba's role in fostering the "anti-imperialist struggle" in Latin America. Castro told a Western correspondent in Havana in late October that the continuance of the Cuban revolution depends on "other Cubas" succeeding on the continent. Castro expressed this thought again in a public address on 2 January 1965 in which he said that the US would ultimately be forced to come to terms with Cuba when it has to deal simultaneously with "several" other revolutionary regimes. On 19 April, Castro said the guerrilla movements in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala "cannot be crushed."

On 30 November 1964, Che Guevara made the most militant public statement on armed revolution in Latin America to be delivered by a ranking Cuban

official for some months. He hailed what he called the growing strength of the Latin American "liberation movement," and called for greater efforts by the revolutionaries in the hemisphere. Guevara made special reference to the progress of the revolution in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia. On 13 December, while in New York to address the UN General Assembly session, Guevara said that "bullets not ballots" will bring revolution to Latin America. He candidly admitted that Cuba has helped the "freedom fighters" of Venezuela "acquire military knowledge," and again singled out revolutionaries in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia for special praise.

Several times during his recent three-month tour of Africa, Guevara praised the fighting efforts of the pro-Castro militants in these three countries. He also spoke of the need to form a Latin American "international" to coordinate the "national liberation movement" in this hemisphere. There are good indications that steps are now being taken to set up such hemisphere-wide machinery.

Another example of inciting to revolution by propaganda was a series of lectures on "The Tactics of Revolutionary Struggle in Latin America" delivered in Havana in late February by German Lairret, the so-called "head of mission" representing the Communist-dominated Venezuelan National Liberation Front. Lairret hewed closely

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to the Cuban line in saying that the only way to establish a Marxist-Leninist government in Latin America is through armed struggle. He argued there was no other way to defeat the established military forces which he described as the greatest bulwark against Communism.

Lairet declared that the armed struggle must be combined with the political struggle, and that broad "national patriotic fronts" must be established, in order, for example, to attract the direct participation of discontented military officers. All political action, he asserted, must be aimed at fomenting maximum political and economic instability. In pursuing this object, Lairet urged that Communists spare no effort to gain the support of the middle classes. After victory, these elements will be discarded, according to Lairet.

These tactics have long been advocated by Fidel Castro and are well spelled out in Che Guevara's pamphlet on guerrilla warfare.

The Havana Meeting

The meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in Havana last November had as one of its main purposes the strengthening of militant Communist activity throughout the hemisphere. The meeting's communiqué specifically called for the Communists to give "active aid" to the "freedom fighters" in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Honduras, Haiti, and Paraguay. All Communists in

the hemisphere were also urged to "intensify solidarity" with the "anti-imperialist struggle of the Panamanian people." Representatives at the Havana meeting also accepted the need to overcome the internal factionalism that is plaguing many Latin American parties, and to promote their "solidarity with Cuba."

Cuba, for its part, is reliably reported to have promised to withhold assistance from any group that is not endorsed by the local orthodox Communist party. This is a sharp departure from past Cuban practice. Havana formerly preferred to work with revolutionary groups not controlled by the local Communist parties. The regular Communist parties were considered to be lacking in revolutionary militancy. The change may partially be the result of a certain Cuban disillusionment over the failures of the Castro-style guerrilla organizations, and the recognition of a need to repair relations with the old-line Communist parties.

In any case, the impact of decisions taken in Havana are now becoming evident. There has, for instance, been a marked change in the policy of the Guatemalan Communist party. It has shifted emphasis from tactics to increasingly close cooperation with Yon Sosa's Cuban-supported guerrillas. Similarly, the Venezuelan Communist Party is trying to entice some leftist-extremist groups into a National Liberation Front to serve as a political umbrella for the

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Cuban-backed Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

In Brazil, leaders of the regular Communist party (PCB) and the small pro-Chinese Communist party (CPB) reportedly are conerring on possibilities for conducting joint activities for the first time since the two groups split in 1962. This may well be partially the result of the Havana meeting, and is in line with Cuba's repeated call for increased militancy on the part of the hemisphere's regular Communist parties.

In Colombia, the Cuban-supported Army of National Liberation (ELN) is reliably reported to be planning a "Latin American guerrilla movement" to be coordinated in Havana and to include guerrilla groups from the Andean countries, and Guatemala. The Colombian Communist Party, heretofore an advocate of gaining power by peaceful means, is now reported to have decided to switch over to a program aimed at encouraging armed rebellion.

The Uruguayan Communists have begun preparations for a Latin American "solidarity with Cuba congress" to be convened in Montevideo this summer. This is in line with a proposal to convene multilateral meetings at regular intervals to provide more effective coordination among Latin American Communist parties. In addition, a source of proven reliability has reported that a Latin American Communist "politburo" has been established to coordinate

the implementation of the agreements reached at Havana.

It is composed of representatives of Castro's party and the Communist parties of Bolivia and Uruguay. This group recently held its first meeting in Havana. The following survey discusses Cuban-supported subversive activities in some of the countries singled out for special attention at the Havana meeting.

Venezuela

Havana, impressed by the fact that the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) is a well-established Communist-terrorist apparatus, continues to place Venezuela at the top of its subversion list. The FALN can draw upon some 2,000 supporters--several hundred of whom are full-time activists who have received training in Cuba--spread throughout the country. Beginning in late September 1964, the FALN stepped up its activity, primarily in the countryside.

Recent reports [redacted]

[redacted] indicate that the Venezuelan Communists are preparing a comprehensive plan of political action throughout the country to complement the FALN's guerrilla operations. German Lairet, in his recent Havana lectures, said that the FALN is currently seeking to incorporate more peasants into its guerrilla units and has stopped recruiting in the cities. He said that as a consequence of this policy, the number of

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
Principal Targets of Cuban Subversion in Latin America



**CUBAN SUPPORTED
GUERRILLA LEADERS**



Yon... of Guatemala



Fabio Vasquez of Colombia

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peasant guerrillas in Falcon State, one of the principal areas of guerrilla operation, had increased from 14 to 44 percent. Laird declared that never again would the FALN make the mistake of trying for a "quick victory" by means of urban terrorism--a tactic which failed miserably in late 1963 in trying to bring down the government of former President Betancourt.

There may have been a Cuban angle in the recent interception in Caracas of more than \$300,000 destined for the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV). The fact that the couriers had connections with the Italian Communist Party (PCI) ties in with the report [redacted]

[redacted] last December that the Cubans intended to use the PCI as a secure communications link to the Venezuelan Communists. It also fits with another report that Cuba had promised FALN leader Alberto Lovera that it would extend considerable financial assistance to his organization this year.

The Cubans will certainly continue to give priority to the training of Venezuelans in guerrilla warfare tactics. [redacted]

[redacted] It is possible the Cubans may also have one or more guerrilla advisers

in the field with the Venezuelan insurgents. [redacted]

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Guatemala

Castro's chosen instrument for carrying out antigovernment activities in Guatemala is the guerrilla movement led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. He was the recipient of \$200,000 in DGI funds in 1963 alone. Yon Sosa was reported to be in Mexico City in early April making arrangements with the Cuban Embassy there for more weapons. Yon Sosa's group probably has a hard core strength of from 75 to 300. Since the end of 1964, these insurgents have specialized in terrorist activity in and around the capital, Guatemala City. On 31 December, terrorists destroyed the US AID mission garage in Guatemala City along with 23 vehicles. On 20 February, ten soldiers were killed or wounded by grenades thrown by Yon Sosa's terrorists during a parade in the capital. The terrorists also initiated a series of bombings during the 31 March celebration marking the anniversary of the Peralta coup, even though a state of siege had been in force by the government.

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Despite this emphasis on urban terrorism, the countryside has not been neglected. There, the Communists and

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pro-Castro guerrillas have harassed military outposts, assassinated certain military officers or persons unpopular with the peasants, and raided small businesses. The outlook moreover, is for more rather than less rural violence along these lines. The central committee of the Guatemalan Communist party is reliably reported to be making preparations for beginning the "armed struggle" throughout the country. The party also is trying to form a "national front of resistance," including Yon Sosa's guerrillas.

Colombia

Cuban-supported, "national liberation"-type insurgency appears to be just getting under way in Colombia. Havana regards a newly formed, pro-Castro organization called the Army of National Liberation (ELN) as the country's number one terrorist group. Fabio Vasquez, the group's chief of guerrilla operations, returned to Colombia in late November after having gone to Cuba the previous month seeking funds. Havana had earlier given the ELN \$25,000 to set up guerrilla operations, [redacted]

[redacted] This group-- which numbers about 50--is the one which attacked the small town of Simacota in Santander Department on 7 January.

Recent information indicates the ELN has been perfecting its organization and building strength for future actions. [redacted]

[redacted] several echelons of protective cover separate one leader from the

action group in Santander Department. This is an indication of the professional techniques being employed by the ELN in the face of persistent efforts on the part of the Colombian authorities to arrest ELN members.

Other Cuban Targets

There are increasing reports of Cuban cooperation with perennial antigovernment plotters in Panama. A number of Panamanians have recently returned to Cuba for a refresher course in guerrilla warfare techniques. More are expected to leave for Cuba soon.

Serious Cuban involvement in plotting against the Robles government apparently had its origin late last year when the militant Panamanian revolutionary leader, Lelis Amadeo Rodriguez, submitted a report urging Havana to exploit Arnulfo Arias' Panamenista Party. He quite correctly described this party as the only Panamanian political party with genuine mass support. His report aroused Castro's interest and reportedly led to an investigation in Panama by a personal representative sent by Che Guevara. Lelis Amadeo Rodriguez departed for Cuba on 23 March reportedly to collect the aid Cuba had offered.

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[redacted] over 40 leftists-- extremists and Communists have returned to that country from exile, since October. All had been involved in an abortive

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guerrilla campaign in December 1963, and many spent their exile in Cuba undergoing additional training in guerrilla warfare techniques.

In Ecuador [redacted]

[redacted] a "hard-line" leader recently returned from Cuba with about \$100,000 to finance antigovernment activities. [redacted]

[redacted] the Cubans requested the Ecuadoreans to supply them with certain official government forms and passports. These are intended for use as false documentation to enable Latin Americans to travel to Cuba clandestinely and to enter other Latin American countries at will.

The Honduran Communist Party (PCH) is preparing to launch guerrilla operations along the north coast. The party calculates that the anti-regime sentiment which is building up in Honduras can be turned to its advantage. Approximately 70 PCH members and other leftists-extremists are reliably reported to have received guerrilla training in Cuba.

Recent Havana radiobroadcasts have emphasized the need to form a united revolutionary front in Haiti. The most recent Creole broadcasts have featured selections on how to make preparations for the "first stage" of revolution. The Haitian listeners have been

informed that Guevara's whole book has been translated into the Creole idiom.

The Paraguayan minister of interior announced in January that 62 Paraguayans living in exile in Montevideo had recently left for Cuba to receive training in subversive activities. There is also good evidence of continued Cuban contact with Paraguayan exile guerrilla bands operating in Argentina near the Paraguayan border.

Outlook

Cuba probably will continue its pattern of concentrating support on those Latin American revolutionaries who have some prospects for success, rather than taking a "shotgun" approach to revolution in the hemisphere. Guerrilla organizations in Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia probably will continue to receive the bulk of Cuba's support.

Nevertheless, Cuba's leaders may now be less confident about the early emergence of "new Cubas" in Latin America. Castro's regime has been in power for over six years and the appeal of Castroism today is probably less than at any previous time among the masses in Latin America. Castro's appeal seems to have gone downhill steadily since the October 1962 missile crisis. Moreover,

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nowhere in Latin America are political, social, and economic conditions as unstable as they were in Cuba at the end of the Batista era. It may also be that the Cuban leaders themselves are becoming more preoccupied with making their own politico-economic "system" work, and realistically appraise their chances of bringing down another government in this hemisphere in the short run as slim at best.

However, the existence of Cuba's highly professional espionage and subversion agency, the DGI, and developments stemming from the Havana meeting of Latin American Communists in November, serve to illustrate that "export of the revolution" continues to be an immutable feature of Castro's policy.
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