


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WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review completed

DIA review
completed.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EDT, 27 May 1965)

	<u>Page</u>
VIETNAM	1
Soviet military aid to North Vietnam is growing rapidly and now includes an increased number of jet fighters. A third surface-to-air missile site has been detected under construction near Hanoi, although no missiles have yet been identified in the DRV. In the South, the Viet Cong are applying increased pressure, using ambushes, sabotage, and terrorism, while still avoiding the commitment of large main-force units.	
<u>The Communist World</u>	
USSR TAKES HARDER LINE TOWARD THE US	5
This policy reflects the increasing Soviet commitment to North Vietnam, which practically precludes any improvement in relations with the US, especially while bombing of the DRV continues.	
RUMANIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS	8
A recent series of visits to Czechoslovakia by high-level Rumanian officials may be the initial steps toward closer ties between the two countries, whose relations up to now have been marked by distrust and animosity.	

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	<u>Page</u>
PEIPING ABOLISHES MILITARY RANKS	9
The decision appears to have been adopted primarily for internal political reasons and is unlikely to have a significant effect on Chinese military capabilities.	
<u>Asia-Africa</u>	
AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS	10
The Chinese Communists are making a major effort to dominate the "Bandung II" meetings scheduled to open in Algiers on 29 June. Local arrangements are confused and tardy.	
FURTHER GAINS FOR COMMUNISTS IN INDONESIA	11
Sukarno has publicly praised their revolutionary fervor and added two pro-Communists to his cabinet. His campaign against Malaysia continues.	
SHASTRI'S MOSCOW VISIT STRENGTHENS INDO-SOVIET TIES	12
The Soviet leaders made a major effort to establish close personal relations with Shastri and to enlist Indian support against US policy in Vietnam.	

25X1

NEW CLASHES BETWEEN INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TROOPS	13
Neither side seems disposed to make much of last week's encounters in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, but the latest shooting complicates British peacemaking efforts.	
SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO TURKEY	13
Gromyko's trip seems to have been directed more at improving the diplomatic atmosphere than at seeking agreement on substantive matters. Next, the Turkish premier will visit the USSR.	
BURUNDI'S HUTU MAJORITY WINS FIRST ELECTION VICTORY	13
The radically inclined and politically more sophisticated Tutsi minority is not likely to surrender its former dominance readily, however, and may attempt a coup.	

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Page

DAHOMEY REMAINS UNSTABLE

14

An influential group is agitating against premier Aho-
madegbe's regime but seems reluctant to stage a coup.

Europe




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BELGIAN ELECTION UPSET

17

The losses by the governing Social Christian and Social-
ist parties in the 23 May elections represent a setback
for their efforts to resolve Belgium's bitter language
controversy and foreshadow a period of instability in
the country's political life.



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Western Hemisphere



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Page

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

19

There is no sign of a solution to the stalemate in the Dominican Republic, although the Imbert regime continues to gain momentum both politically and militarily. An unofficial and uneasy cease-fire is being maintained, partly through pressure from the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

THREATS TO BARRIENTOS REGIME IN BOLIVIA

23

A turbulent week opened with a drive by the government to assert its authority over the Communist-dominated tin miners and ended with junta chief Barrientos acting to save his regime from threats posed by the personal ambitions of his principal rival, armed forces commander General Ovando.

COLOMBIA UNDER STATE OF SIEGE

24

Agitation by Communist-front student groups precipitated a declaration of a state of siege on 21 May. President Valencia, now empowered to govern by decree, is said to favor an attempt to force Congress into accepting his economic reform program.

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VIETNAM

The Soviet commitment to North Vietnam, measured in terms of military deliveries, is growing rapidly.

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The number of jet fighters in North Vietnam has grown to between 63 and 67 [redacted]

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A third surface-to-air missile site has been detected in the Hanoi area. [redacted]

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[redacted] the new site is being built about 13 nautical miles east southeast of Hanoi. Four launch revetments appear to be well along in construction, the fifth is in the early stages, and work was apparently just beginning on the sixth position [redacted]

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Construction is continuing on the other two SAM sites. The second site, which has five of the revetments now almost completed, still has no missile-associated equipment. Such equipment has appeared at the first site, but no missiles have yet been detected.

Hanoi continues to make other civil defense preparations. [redacted]

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[redacted] the massive defense efforts observed appear to be preparation for an extended siege rather than an effort to maintain domestic morale, which remains at least outwardly healthy.

[redacted] Hanoi is prepared to bear considerable punishment short of total war, and only "if the Viet Cong is turned" will negotiations be possible.

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DRV Political Developments

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
DRV intent to weather the air strikes for the time being has also been widely reflected in its propaganda this week. Several major commentaries and editorials have emphasized that Hanoi will not quit under the pressure of the attacks. Hanoi also took pains in its propaganda [redacted]

[redacted] to reiterate its requirements for a settlement.

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to Binh Thuan Province. Route 20 between Saigon and Da Lat has just been reopened after being cut for two weeks. Traffic on the coastal railway has been seriously disrupted with large stretches of track inoperable between Da Nang and Phan Thiet.

While the present focus of Viet Cong activity is in the delta and in the provinces north and northeast of Saigon, increased action may occur in the highland region of I and II Corps as the monsoon season intensifies. The pattern of recent sabotage efforts may represent a coordinated effort to isolate the central coastal area and the highlands while summer rains inhibit government use of aircraft.

Political Developments in South

Premier Quat's measured efforts to maintain a political balance while strengthening his own authority have been jolted by two events of the past week. On 20 May, a new coup attempt by Colonel Thao, fugitive ringleader of the abortive February coup, was reportedly thwarted by the arrest of some 40 conspirators. Thao himself again escaped, but government sources claim to have evidence that he was acting in collusion with the Viet Cong,

Viet Cong Actions

The Viet Cong are applying increased pressure in the countryside while still carefully avoiding commitment of large main force units against regular government forces, except in situations overwhelmingly in their favor. Recent highly successful ambushes--in Binh Dinh, Phuoc Long, An Xuyen, Binh Dinh, and Thua Thien provinces--illustrate current Viet Cong tactics.

Sabotage of government communication lines and terrorism against the rural populace remain widespread. Intensified Viet Cong interdiction has closed roads leading from Saigon to Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and Hau Nghia provinces, and large sections of Route 1 from Quang Ngai

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as well as with sundry malcontents. Whatever the facts, Premier Quat and his military supporters are apparently using the incident to purge some elements unacceptable to the Buddhists, while seeking to reassure the Catholic community by blaming the Communists for instigating the coup plot.

Quat's long-delayed cabinet reshuffle was finally announced on 25 May, but Chief of State Suu refused to approve at least two of the changes on technical grounds. Suu was evidently influenced by the incumbent ministers' threats of political repercussions if they were re-

moved. Regardless of Suu's ability to hold out against Quat and the military on this issue, the incident suggests that his preoccupation with constitutional legalities can be exploited by Quat's opponents to challenge the premier's authority.

US Air Strikes

Last week, sustained US air attacks caused the greatest damage to North Vietnamese naval vessels recorded to date. At least eight patrol-type ships, including several Swatow gunboats, were either destroyed or heavily damaged. [REDACTED]

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The Communist World

USSR TAKES HARDER LINE TOWARD THE US

The USSR's harsher line toward the US reflects the increasing Soviet commitment to North Vietnam, which practically precludes any improvement in relations with the US, especially while bombing of the DRV continues.

A 20 May TASS statement on President Johnson's V-E Day address of 7 May was one of Moscow's strongest attacks on him to date. It coincided with the arrival of Soviet military equipment in the DRV and the resumption of US air strikes. It seems intended to impress US policymakers with the USSR's determination to proceed with its program of military assistance to Hanoi.

Recently, high-ranking Soviet officials have made unusual efforts to convince Western representatives of the extent of the Soviet Union's commitment to support Hanoi in whatever course the DRV leaders decide upon. Soviet leaders apparently feel that the Vietnam conflict will become more dangerous before any prospect for negotiations emerges. They now seem primarily intent on discouraging the US from expanding military pressures. Soviet presidium member Shelepin told the US Army attaché on 7 May that although the USSR has no desire to get involved in the conflict, the US is mistaken if it believes the bombings will force an end to the war. He asserted that the airstrikes "will become only the beginning of something bigger."

The 20 May TASS statement is considerably stronger in tone and comes from a more authoritative medium than Moscow's initial criticism of the President's State of the Union message last January. It reiterated the claim that US statements on improving relations with the USSR are incompatible with the US "aggression" against "socialist" countries. Underscoring Moscow's anti-US mood at this time was Shelepin's 9 May comment to the Israeli ambassador that President Johnson's recent remarks on the international situation "represented a serious turn in American policy." He bluntly warned that "the Soviet Union could not accept this."

Another reflection of Moscow's willingness to accept a further deterioration of US-Soviet relations is a 19 May Pravda article signed "Observer"--a device used to indicate high-level concurrence--which attacked US actions in the Dominican Republic. The article was in marked contrast to Moscow's earlier low-key and relatively meager commentary on events there.

Moscow, however, is being careful to avoid provocative incidents. In early May, for example, Soviet authorities refused to allow a "peaceful demonstration" by Latin American students outside the US Embassy. Such a decision could have been taken in part to avoid a repetition of the 4 March Asian student

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protest which got out of hand and was subsequently exploited by Communist China.

The prevailing hostile Soviet attitude toward the US has also crept into cultural relations. A number of planned trips by various Soviet delegations to the US have been can-

celed due to the "present political climate." Official exchanges and diplomatic social contacts continue, however, and Moscow can be expected to hold the door open for eventual talks on Vietnam in order to be in a position to take full advantage of unforeseen developments and opportunities.

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RUMANIAN-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

Following a period of animosity and mistrust, Czechoslovakia and Rumania have re-established contacts at a high level and may be moving into a period of improved relations. Encouraged by Prague's efforts toward greater independence, Rumania may view Czechoslovakia as a potential ally in bloc affairs.

In honor of Rumanian participation in the 1945 liberation of Czechoslovakia--given wide publicity by both countries this year for the first time--Rumanian Defense Minister Salajan led a military delegation to Czechoslovakia in late April. His well-publicized trip was followed by a short stopover for talks in Prague by Foreign Minister Manescu en route to Egypt. Rumania then sent Premier Maurer to Prague for V-E Day celebrations--the highest level representation Bucharest sent anywhere for the occasion and among the highest in Prague.

The current spate of high-level visits to Czechoslovakia contrasts sharply with Rumania's policy over the past two years of curtailing trips by ranking

delegations to other Soviet bloc countries. It is consistent, however, with the Bucharest regime's campaign to emphasize Rumania's contribution to the Allied victory--before the Communists came to power--thereby identifying the regime with traditional Rumanian nationalism.

In what appears to be an attempt to correlate Czechoslovak statements with Rumanian independent foreign policy positions, Bucharest quoted Czech leader Novotny's recent call for better relations with the Chinese and Albanians. The TASS summary ignored this part of Novotny's address.

Czechoslovakia apparently has changed its former policy of purely pro forma relations with Rumania and is willing to explore the possibility of warmer ties--just as it did with Yugoslavia last year. Any such improvement in relations could only encourage the "liberal" forces in Czechoslovakia which have brought Novotny to increasingly independent, enlightened policies.

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PEIPING ABOLISHES MILITARY RANKS

The Chinese Communist decision to abolish all formal military ranks appears to have been adopted primarily for internal political reasons. This unexpected move, publicized in a broadcast on 24 May, marks a reversion to a system of "positional" ranks under which authority and responsibility are derived from the place of the individual in the command structure. It is unlikely, however, to have a significant effect on Chinese military capabilities.

The shift probably reflects a desire to emphasize the superiority of distinctively Chinese military organizational forms developed by Mao and employed by the Chinese Communists during their successful revolution. It also serves to underscore Chinese rejection of foreign, and particularly "revisionist" Soviet patterns.

The Chinese armed forces operated effectively without formal rank designations until 1955 when Peiping switched to a system similar to that employed by the Soviets. The changeover at the time was explained as a necessary part of the armed forces modernization effort and signaled the beginning of a period of professionalism in the military services which lasted until the dismissal of Defense Minister Peng Te-huai in 1959. Peng was disgraced, apparently chiefly because he had been stressing professional qualification at the expense of party control and had also opposed Mao's decision to pursue the

ideological quarrel with Moscow at the risk of a cutoff in Soviet military assistance.

The present reversion to a system without formal ranks probably reflects the growing obsession among top leaders in Peiping with the problem of instilling the proper revolutionary zeal in the rising generation. In this context, they are no doubt especially concerned with the armed forces as the basic instrument of control. An editorial in the Liberation Army Daily on 25 May declared explicitly that political considerations were of first importance in making the change. It asserted that the decision was correct and necessary in order to make the army "still more proletarian and militant" and to promote "revolutionization of the ideology of commanders and fighters."

The Chinese Communists are apparently concerned that the move might be interpreted outside China, and perhaps within the military establishment itself, as a blunder which would lead to weakness or disorganization. They are clearly anxious to avoid giving the impression that their latest move would reduce their ability to intervene in Southeast Asia. The editorial in the army paper noted specifically that in Korea the absence of formal ranks had not adversely affected either the operations of volunteers or the "united command in a combined military action taken together with the armies of fraternal countries."

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Asia-Africa

AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS

With only a month remaining before the scheduled convening of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers on 29 June, preparations remain highly confused. The Chinese Communists are making a major effort to advance their interests there.

The Algerians, fearing a debacle, are trying hard to put on a reasonable show. Nearly 5,000 laborers are working around the clock to ready facilities, but at best only the main conference hall will be finished on time. Housing and transportation will be makeshift and inadequate. Entertainment being virtually nonexistent in Algiers, officials are considering chartering a Caravelle to fly interested delegates on nightly trips to Paris.

After considerable confusion stemming from numerous imprecise communications on the conference, President Ben Bella finally issued formal invitations in mid-May. It is still not known how many of a possible 67 governments (including Holden Roberto's Angolan government in exile) were invited.

Even the agenda is not yet set. Among the issues some participants wish to discuss are Palestine, Cyprus, UN reorganization or removal to Geneva, US policy in Vietnam and the Caribbean, disarmament, decolonization, human rights, economic development and coopera-

tion, and establishment of a permanent Afro-Asian secretariat.

Chinese preparations continue at a brisk pace. Premier Chou En-lai, scheduled to visit Tanzania early in June, probably will make other stops in Africa and the Middle East en route to Algiers to line up support for Chinese positions. Vice Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei is touring North Africa, probably for the same purpose. The Chinese have not let up in their campaign to exclude the USSR, claiming that a Soviet presence would only serve to divide the conference, and are still trying to weaken India's position by accusing it of serving "imperialistic purposes."

These tactics are causing concern among moderates and even some radical countries. At the early May preparatory meeting in Algiers the Ghanaian and Guinean delegates are said to have vehemently disassociated themselves from the Chinese attack on the Indian ambassador. The moderates have done some consulting on tactics, but do not yet appear well enough organized to counter Peiping and its allies.

The USSR is likely to make further efforts to counter Chinese opposition to its attendance. A TASS summary of a recent article in the Russian weekly New Times, obviously alluding to Peiping, decried attempts to split the Afro-Asian movement. It claimed many Afro-Asian countries favor Soviet participation, which "cannot but be useful" to attain the conference's aims.

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FURTHER GAINS FOR COMMUNISTS IN INDONESIA

Developments in Indonesia continue to favor the Communists, while President Sukarno pursues his campaign against Malaysia on both diplomatic and military fronts.

Sukarno's most recent praise for the Communist Party came in a speech at its 45th anniversary celebration on 23 May. He termed it the "most revolutionary progressive group" in the nation and called party chairman Aidit a "foretress" of Indonesia. He told photographers to take a picture of him embracing Aidit, and concluded by telling the Communists to "go ahead, go ahead, go ahead."

Two days later Sukarno added to his cabinet two more pro-Communists who may be secret party members. They fill newly created portfolios--for basic irrigation and for electricity and energy. Both positions seem susceptible to significant Communist exploitation, particularly the former in view of the major activity in which the Communists are already engaged among the peasants in densely populated Java.

At the plenary session of the Communist Party's central committee earlier this month, Aidit called for extending government supervision of "imperialist" enterprises to actual ownership. He reiterated that activity among the peasantry--at least 70 percent of the population--is the party's primary task and must be both broadened and intensified. Probably as the result of the strong antagonism Moslem peasants in East Java displayed toward the Communists

early this year, Aidit urged intensified mass education in Marxism in rural areas and careful planning of all activity directed against the peasants.

On the international level, Sukarno seems primarily engaged in tactics to prevent Malaysia's participation in the Afro-Asian conference in late June. He sent Foreign Minister Subandrio to Canton on 27 May to confer with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, presumably to coordinate strategy for the Algiers gathering. Sukarno apparently hopes to utilize the preconference meeting of foreign ministers as the forum in which to cancel Malaysia's chances by persuading other delegates that all issues be settled unanimously. Military measures against Malaysia continue to be planned, but no successful infiltration of peninsular Malaysia has occurred for six weeks. On the Borneo border, Indonesians have intensified patrolling and reconnaissance and an increase in attacks is expected.

Sukarno is also looking ahead to his Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO). Communist China has agreed to August 1966 as the tentative date for the first CONEFO, and is assisting in the construction of a complex of office buildings in Djakarta for the projected organization. Officials of both nations have hinted that they view CONEFO as a framework for the creation of a rival UN.

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SHASTRI'S MOSCOW VISIT STRENGTHENS INDO-SOVIET TIES

Indian Prime Minister Shastri's recent trip to the Soviet Union probably has substantially strengthened Indo-Soviet ties within the framework of India's basically non-aligned foreign policy. Shastri's irritation at the United States over a variety of matters, his desire to prove his ability to get along with the Russians, and his eagerness to appear appropriately anticolonialist for the upcoming Asia-Africa Conference make the Indians highly receptive to Soviet pressure.

Soviet leaders made a major effort to re-establish the close personal relations that characterized the Khrushchev-Nehru era. Premier Kosygin reportedly attended Shastri constantly for four days and, at the end of the visit, their wives embraced in a tearful good-by.

Moscow sought to exploit current US-Indian frictions to enlist Indian support in mobilizing the Afro-Asian world against US policy in Vietnam. Kosygin hinted that Shastri's proposed trip to the US had been postponed because of Washington's irritation with New Delhi's Vietnam policies. The Soviets also gave an anti-US content to their re-endorsement of Indian nonalignment; in a major speech in Shastri's presence, Kosygin argued that "non-alignment" in its true sense requires action against injustice,

and that the "Vietnamese people" are fighting against the resurgence of US imperialism to the benefit of all "freedom-loving" people.

As a measure of Soviet success, the 19 May communiqué called for an immediate halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, but did not repeat earlier Indian demands that all outside interference in Vietnam cease. Both Shastri and his foreign minister claim that they were unaware of the suspension of US raids at the time of the visit and might have modified the communiqué had they known. The remainder of the communiqué did not significantly depart from previous Indian positions, but gave them a somewhat more radical tone.

There was no mention of India's most pressing foreign policy problems, its disputes with Pakistan and Communist China. Because of Moscow's current efforts to improve its relations with Karachi and to play down its differences with Peiping, New Delhi had to be satisfied with private Soviet expressions of sympathy and support.

The Soviets, however, apparently offered substantial new aid for India's third five-year plan.

The modest level of Indo-Soviet trade will also be raised.

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NEW CLASHES BETWEEN INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TROOPS

The continuing volatility of relations between India and Pakistan was freshly illustrated during the past week. A high rate of incidents occurred along the 17-year-old Kashmir cease-fire line, patrols clashed in the Rann of Kutch, more than 250,000 troops remained deployed at close proximity along the borders, and indications of heightened Hindu-Muslim communal unrest appeared in northern India.

Neither side seems disposed to make much of the small clash in Kutch which broke the month-long cease-fire there, and the UN is on the scene in Kashmir patiently trying to keep each encounter localized. The gun-fire nonetheless complicated British efforts to get both sides to agree on a mode for settling the Kutch dispute and for withdrawal of troop concentrations elsewhere along the border. [REDACTED]

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SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO TURKEY

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Turkey last week appears to have been directed more at improving the diplomatic atmosphere than at seeking agreement on substantive matters. Although Turkey sought a more explicit endorsement of its position on Cyprus, Gromyko merely reiterated Moscow's recognition of the rights of the Turkish minority on the island and its opposition to Cypriot union with Greece. He evaded the issue of Soviet arms aid to the Greek Cypriots.

Gromyko's major interest in Ankara reportedly was to discuss means of increasing Soviet-Turkish trade under the recently expanded trade protocol. He also indicated Moscow's general willingness to provide aid but apparently made no specific offers. Despite the lack of movement on substantive matters, both sides appear anxious to continue to improve relations, and Turkish Premier Urguplu accepted Gromyko's invitation to visit the USSR. [REDACTED]

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BURUNDI'S HUTU MAJORITY WINS FIRST ELECTION VICTORY

Burundi's generally pro-Western Hutus are organizing to exploit their first electoral victory over the country's other ethnic group, the Tutsis. In the mid-May voting, the Hutus won a sizable majority in the new assembly.

Some of the Hutus were elected under the banner of the UPRONA party, through which they had previously shared rule with the more politically sophisticated Tutsi minority. These Hutus have reportedly now agreed with fellow tribesmen to form

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a new strictly Hutu party--Union Populaire du Burundi--and through it to organize the assembly and government. A popular and militant figure now in exile, Paul Mirerekano, may be called to lead it.

The radically inclined Tutsis are not likely to sur-

render their former dominance readily. They apparently believe they can continue to manipulate the Hutus, although it appears they face more formidable opposition than in the past. They may decide on more drastic measures, possibly including a coup attempt. [REDACTED]

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DAHOMEY REMAINS UNSTABLE

The tenuous political situation in Dahomey continues following the arrest of a small group of civil servants accused of plotting against premier Ahomadegbe's regime. [REDACTED]

conomic interest groups and championed by various opportunists. Although Apithy tends to be somewhat more leftist than the others, ideological or programmatic differences play virtually no part in the contenders' quest for power.

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The army and the labor unions, whose joint action upset the Maga regime in October 1963, appear tempted to rebel against Ahomadegbe's proposed austerity program. However, the unions now lack leadership, and Soglo is reluctant to have the army take the initiative.

Dahomey's politics have long been dominated by a competition among three personalities --Ahomadegbe, Apithy, and former president Maga--all of whom have led the country at one time or another. Each is backed by certain regional, tribal and eco-

In any case, a successor regime will face the same problems which have proved insoluble in the past. Dahomey is a poor country, unable to pay its own way even on a modest scale, and is burdened with an unusually large group of semieducated young men who are unemployed and restless. [REDACTED]

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
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BELGIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

MAY 1965 ELECTION



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BELGIAN ELECTION UPSET

The losses suffered by the governing Social Christian and Socialist parties in Belgium's 23 May national elections is a setback for their efforts to resolve the country's bitter language controversy and foreshadows a period of instability in its political life.

The parties' failure to win two thirds of the seats in Parliament will prevent constitutional ratification of a legis-

lative compromise both permitting increased representation for the more rapidly growing Dutch-speaking population and providing certain guarantees for French-speaking Belgians. The business-oriented Liberals were the principal winners in the elections, apparently largely as a result of their opposition to the language compromise. Strongly nationalist parties from both French- and Dutch-speaking areas of the country

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also made parliamentary gains.
The Communists picked up one new
seat.

Protracted negotiations will
probably be necessary to form a
new government, which will per-
haps include the Social Chris-

tian Party of caretaker Prime
Minister Lefevre but be headed
by someone else, possibly party
chairman Paul Vanden Boeynants.
Paul Henri Spaak would probably
continue as foreign minister if
his Socialist Party is in the
government.

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Western Hemisphere

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SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

There is no sign of a solution to the stalemate in the Dominican Republic, although Antonio Imbert's loyalist regime continues to gain momentum both politically and militarily. An unofficial and uneasy cease-fire is being maintained, partly through pressure from the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

The Loyalists

The loyalist military offensive cleared rebels from the area north of the US-patrolled line of communications in Santo Domingo before a 24-hour cease-fire went into effect at noon on 21 May. Imbert's troops met only light resistance and captured more than 1,000 prisoners and numerous weapons. The cease-fire was not officially extended but each side has stated that it will not resume fighting unless provoked.

The loyalist regime continues to gain confidence and Imbert appears to be rallying middle- and upper-class support. These classes evidently fear that a compromise government influenced by ex-President Bosch --such as one headed by Antonio Guzman--inevitably would be based on liberal policies that would damage their interests. The regime also enjoys strong support from the loyalist officer corps which opposes a political solution that would

give influential positions to Bosch supporters.

In an attempt to broaden its base and gain a semblance of legitimacy, the Imbert government announced on 24 May that it would form a "consultative council" of business, professional, labor, and political groups to which it would delegate "full legislative powers." Among the political groups that apparently will be represented on the council are five "political parties" that support Imbert. Three of these are small personalistic factions; the other two are larger but lack widespread support.

The loyalist government has also tried to mobilize mass support. In a recent nationwide radio address, Imbert attempted to refute the idea that he would impose authoritarianism, stating that his "provisional and transitory" government would ensure that the "era of privilege and irritating social inequality" had ended. His government has also held rallies in outlying towns in an effort to develop popular backing, apparently with some success. There now is reason to believe that much of the populace--including some elements who dislike Imbert personally--would accept him if he could provide an effective government that would furnish jobs as well as security.

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Buoyed by such indications of support and by his military successes, Imbert continues intransigent about political compromise. His line is one of strong anti-Communism and unconditional surrender. There has been growing resentment in the Imbert camp over the US role in preventing any new attack against the rebels. In public statements Imbert's regime has declared that foreign attempts to arrange a settlement constitute unjustified intervention in internal Dominican affairs. Despite the presence of the Inter-American Armed Force (IAAF) between the contending forces, the loyalist government has spoken of "cleaning up the rebels" by possibly launching an attack from the National Palace--the only place where the IAAF is not interposed.

The Rebels

The rebels appear to have taken a more conciliatory public attitude toward negotiations, possibly because they believe that a political settlement would favor them. They have publicly indicated their willingness to negotiate with the US or international organizations. Rebel leader Francisco Caamano has stated his cabinet would resign if it would "serve the revolution." The rebels, however, remain firm on two points: their demand that the 1963 constitution--a symbol of the revolution--not be sacrificed; and their opposition to the military and to Imbert, whom rebel minister

Aristy has called "an enemy of the people" who would be subjected to their "just vengeance."

The rebels' attitude toward the military is a major point that any negotiated settlement must consider. Antonio Martinez Francisco, Bosch's hand-picked secretary general of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), has maintained that the armed forces need to be reduced in size. Another PRD leader has said that the party will demand that its members who have served with rebel units be incorporated into the Dominican military establishment.

Extremists continue to play an important part in the rebel camp.

Morale within extremist ranks seems to have decreased somewhat. Some have spoken--somewhat wistfully--of hoped-for arms and advice from Cuba. Within the rebel camp there is an increasing shortage of arms and ammunition; this may in part explain the 25 May attack on the National Palace, which is the only remaining ammunition storehouse in the rebel area. As their military prospects have dwindled, the number of rebels willing to fight also has reportedly decreased.

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
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The Interior

There have been at least two small rebel attacks against police posts in the interior during the past week, but at present calm conditions prevail.



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The important Santiago area has been tranquil and loyalist police and military forces are in control, but the people are reportedly confused by the prolonged political machinations in the capital. Some people in the interior seem to be increasingly annoyed by what they consider US political manipulations in Santo Domingo.

The OAS

Secretary General Jose Mora of the Organization of American States, that body's appointed

mediator in the Dominican Republic, has taken the initiative in trying to bring both factions to the conference table and has worked hard--thus far unsuccessfully--to get them to accept a compromise.

The act formally establishing the Inter-American Armed Force was signed on 23 May in Santo Domingo by the commanders of military contingents from the United States, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as well as by Mora. This is the first peacekeeping force to be established in the hemisphere. The Brazilian Government, at OAS behest, named 64-year-old General Hugo Panasco Alvim, to command the force. General Alvim, a veteran of the Italian campaign in World War II, is considered a forceful and experienced commander.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian contingent of some 1,200 troops has begun to arrive in Santo Domingo. As Latin American troops land, comparable numbers of US forces are being removed.



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THREATS TO BARRIENTOS REGIME IN BOLIVIA

A turbulent week in Bolivia opened with a drive by the government to assert its authority over the Communist-dominated tin miners and ended with junta chief Barrientos acting to save his regime from threats posed by the personal ambitions of his principal rival, armed forces commander General Ovando.

The military campaign got off to a good start on Monday. Before the day was over, miner resistance had been reduced to a number of strongholds. Desperate mine labor leaders attempted to avert military occupation of the mines and preserve their personal power by asking the sympathetic student organization to obtain a truce. General Ovando, for reasons not yet clear, unilaterally concluded an agreement which provided both for a cease-fire and an end to the miners' strike. The agreement cost the government the initiative in that it also provided that, by 29 May, government forces would be withdrawn from the mines they had occupied. Sporadic street fighting, however, continued in La Paz as late as Thursday.

Ovando may have lost his nerve as a result of a reported defection of 200 soldiers in the fighting near La Paz. It is more probable, however, that he acted to undermine Barrientos and thus advance his own ambitions. A decisive victory over the unruly miners, who for years have been the core of Bolivia's economic and political problems, would have greatly enhanced Barrientos' power position.

Skillful political maneuvering by Barrientos averted a coup attempt this week. He arranged the appointment of Ovando as junta co-president and then had himself appointed co-commander of the armed forces. His aim is to neutralize Ovando by binding him more closely to the government and forcing him to share authority over the military. The reconciliation is hypocritical and probably impermanent but has eased tensions in military and civilian sectors. A final showdown seems inevitable, however, and may only have been postponed for a short time.

The overthrow of pro-US Barrientos by Ovando would seem to facilitate an eventual leftist take-over of Bolivia, to say nothing of the encouragement it would give the Communists everywhere in Latin America. Successful or not, an Ovando move against Barrientos could provoke a civil war from which the Communists would probably emerge as the chief beneficiaries.

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COLOMBIA UNDER STATE OF SIEGE

Antigovernment agitation by Communist-front student groups precipitated a declaration of a state of siege in Colombia on 21 May. Although rioting continued through Tuesday, army and police vigilance prevented any serious damage. The outlook for restoration of order has been improved by the disappearance into hiding of the adult instigators behind the student unrest. Moreover, the military courts which now have jurisdiction over "crimes against internal security" are not inclined to be lenient.

President Valencia, now empowered to govern by decree, may attempt to force his economic reform program on the Congress. Some of his ministers have apparently urged him to dictate into law certain measures recommended by a commission set up in January to study social and economic problems. The recommendations were presented to a special session of Congress convened on 27 April, but by 20 May it was evident that the legislature was in no mood to act.

As a rule, presidential decrees during a state of siege have the force of law only as long as the state of siege ex-

ists, unless they are ratified by congress or issued to correct the conditions which precipitated the state of siege. Valencia's advisers believe they can use the latter loophole to give permanence to any measures he might promulgate in dealing with the present situation. The proposed reforms are generally popular and, with elections less than a year away, Congress may not attempt to repeal reforms if they become law.

Military leaders, who probably pressured Valencia into declaring the state of siege, continue to profess their loyalty, but an undercurrent of discontent pervades the military establishment. Minister of War Gabriel Rebeiz has found it necessary to have meetings of his field officers from time to time to reinforce their personal loyalty and to assess the morale of their troops. At these meetings, it has become customary to warn junior officers against "association" with retired General Ruiz Novoa, who was forced to resign as minister of war in January and has been unofficially campaigning for president ever since.

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