SPECIAL REPORT

PRE-ELECTION PICTURE IN TURKEY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
PRE-ELECTION PICTURE IN TURKEY

The Turkish electorate will go to the polls on 10 October 1965 to choose a new parliament which will determine the future course of democracy in Turkey and the country's role in world affairs. As the political campaign enters its final week, it is still uncertain whether any single party can win a majority or whether Turkey will again be faced with the frustrations and limitations of a coalition government. It appears likely, however, that the Justice Party, the acknowledged successor of the old Democratic Party outlawed following the 1960 military coup, will win at least a substantial plurality. The military leadership has expressed itself strongly in favor of coalition government, apparently on the assumption that it is more representative and easier to control. All 450 seats in the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, will be filled; senatorial elections will be held next year. The president's term expires in 1968 and he is not affected by the assembly elections.

Years of Transition

The elections will ring down the curtain on the revolutionary period that began on 27 May 1960 with a military coup d'etat that ended the increasingly authoritarian regime of President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Bayar and Menderes—both executed by the military regime following a lengthy trial—were leaders of the Democratic Party. The years since 1960 have been a period of transition during which the military has gradually returned the processes of government and politics to civilian leaders, albeit under the watchful eyes of the Turkish high command.

These years of transition were not easy for the Turks, who traditionally prefer strong leadership and direction. Not only were the military leaders inept in governing, but the institution of a proportional representation electoral system resulted in a series of weak coalition governments that did little to inspire public confidence. The postrevolutionary period has also spawned extremists of both the left and the right, which may do more damage to Turkey's democratic development than did the rigidity of the prerevolutionary government.

From Revolution to Reformation

The leaders of the 1960 revolution had no desire or
PARTY STRENGTHS IN TURKISH ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1961 General Election</th>
<th>1963 Provincial Assembly Elections</th>
<th>1964 Senatorial Elections</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party (JP)</td>
<td>49.78</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>49.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Peoples' Party (RPP)</td>
<td>41.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Turkey Party (NTP)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation Party (NP)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (or unreported vote)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Labor Party (TLP)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party (JP)</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Peoples' Party (RPP)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Turkey Party (NTP)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP)</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nation Party (NP)</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (or unreported vote)</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vacancies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures include lifetime senators and presidential appointees.
intention to perpetuate the military regime. They had met virtually no opposition, and soon after the arrest of all the members of the old ruling faction they announced their intention to restore civil rule. However, the military ruled as the Committee of National Union for about a year before turning the government over to a selected constituent assembly, soon replaced by an elected National Assembly. Even after the elected government was installed, military influence remained strong.

The military regime had a forceful impact on the governmental structure and political life of Turkey. In addition to changing the electoral system, it sponsored a constitution that replaced the single-house Grand National Assembly with a bicameral legislature and provides for a new court to pass on the constitutionality of acts of government. It also outlawed the Democratic Party (DP), which had controlled the government for a decade, and forced its members to split up into several political parties. Only recently has the new Justice Party (JP) become the acknowledged successor of the DP, rather than merely one of several competitors for the old DP loyalty. Now the JP is regarded as the old DP under a new name, especially in the provinces. When JP leader Suleyman Demirel opened his campaign recently in the eastern city of Erzurum, he was greeted by the chant, "Long live the second Menderes."

The general relaxation of government controls since the revolution has also permitted the emergence of an openly organized political left, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP). The Communist party was outlawed in Turkey in the 1920s. While the TLP is currently very small and lacks parliamentary representation, it is building for the future and, if it is able to attract a substantial part of the Turkish labor movement and youth groups, could become a potent factor in Turkish politics.

Despite the general dislocation caused by the military revolution, the quadrennial rhythm of national assembly elections was unbroken. The last election before the revolution was held in 1957; the 10 October election will be the second held since then. This month's vote will be the first really free one since the revolution. The elections in October 1961 were still under the shadow of the revolutionary regime.

The degree of freedom in the current electoral campaign is perhaps best illustrated by the number of candidates who were closely tied to the old regime. Former president Bayar's daughter, former prime minister Menderes' son, and a brother of the former minister of finance are among those standing for election as representatives of the Justice Party.
The National Assembly will probably experience a very substantial turnover this year. Some of the party primaries indicated a changeover of up to 50 percent.

The Justice Party

The JP has been the dominant party in the current coalition government. It is basically a movement of the rising peasantry, commercial and industrial classes, and urban lower classes. It is trying to displace the older military, civil servant, landowner elite traditionally represented by the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP). In the competition with the leftist TLP for the vote of the urban lower classes, the JP's reputation for having a sympathetic attitude toward religion in a secular state, is a distinct advantage. These people, who are mostly migrants from the provinces, tend to take their Muslim religion more seriously than most urban Turks.

The most populated and prosperous parts of the country tend to support the JP, which has become the chief political beneficiary of recent economic and social change in Turkey. The party has gained steadily in strength since the parliamentary election in 1961, when it received only 35 percent of the vote. In the nationwide local elections in 1963, it received 46 percent of the popular vote, a trend that was continued in the June 1964 senatorial elections. In contrast, the RPP has failed to gain additional popular support, which has remained at about 37 percent since 1961.

The JP's participation in the current four-party coalition has been a mixed blessing for Demirel and his party. The JP has been able to demonstrate its responsibility and its acceptability to the army. It has also been able to assure the neutrality of Turkish bureaucrats, who have traditionally favored the RPP. On the other hand, the attacks of the leftist and RPP press have probably damaged Demirel's public image. The party has also been unable to devote much time to its pressing internal problems. On balance, however, it has become a more cohesive, disciplined political force than it was in the 1961 period.

The Justice Party has apparently succeeded in reaching a rapprochement with the military establishment. Until recently, there was a widespread feeling in Turkey that the military viewed the JP with suspicion and might be reluctant to let it assume control of the government. The fact that Premier Inonu's RPP government was pulled down by a coalition of parties last February and a new government formed without him suggested that the military would remain aloof from politics, at least for the immediate future.

The Republican People's Party

The RPP, led by the venerable Ismet Inonu, draws the bulk
of its support from the traditional military, bureaucratic, and landowner elite which dominated the Ottoman government in the last days of the empire and controlled the first republic during its first 25 years. The RPP in recent years has drawn its major support from Ankara, because of the concentration of the military-bureaucratic class in the national capital, and from the Eastern provinces, where each local "Aga" (large landowners), retaining his traditional mastery over the peasantry, can still deliver the vote. The party has also drawn on the university professors, professional men, and the older merchant class.

In the current campaign, the RPP is running scared and shows little optimism that it can improve its popular support much beyond the 37-percent mark. Its primary objective appears to be to prevent, if possible, a JP majority and thus assure a coalition government in which the RPP may again be able to play a leading role.

The party's future is further darkened by a developing internal split. The conservatives in the party still cling to their traditional values, but an important segment of the party is moving to the left. The party leadership is probably trying only to exploit any gains that the left may be making among the urban Turks, but a left-wing element is encouraging the party to assume a more socialistic stance. It is ironic that the RPP, which for most of its existence has been rightist, now should give the impression of veering to the left. The incipient split, however, has virtually immobilized the party at a time when unity is essential.

The Republican Peasant Nation Party

The RPNP is the product of the merger in the late 1950s of two small conservative parties, both organized by groups of dissidents from the old DP. Its greatest strength was in the conservative provinces of Central Anatolia. When retired colonel and former Committee of National Union member Alparslan Turkas and his radical followers took over the party in July of this year, it became what has been called a "potentially semifascistic organization which is essentially the personal vehicle of a single dominating leader."

TURKES had earlier tried to join the JP, where he had found a fringe group responsive to his highly nationalistic views. When he was rejected by the JP, however, he and his radical associates turned to the dwindling RPNP. In a well-organized campaign, they seized control of the party machinery. Many of the old RPNP members resigned, some of them saying the party was on the road to becoming a "fascist vehicle for a man with a fuehrer complex."
Turkes was assisted in his seizure of the party by a group of former war school cadets who had been expelled for participating in an abortive coup attempt in May 1963. Turkes has publicly proclaimed himself a "national socialist" and surrounded himself with rightist extremists from other parties.

The RPNP probably will not receive any substantial popular support in the forthcoming elections, but Turkes, as head of the party, will undoubtedly be elected to the National Assembly, where he will have a valuable public forum in which to air his extremist ideas. Turkes may hope to become a power balance in the government in the event that a close election requires the formation of another coalition government.

The Turkish Labor Party

The TLP is headed by an extreme leftist and possible Communist Mehmet Ali Aybar, and gives every appearance of being Communist dominated. It parrots the line of the clandestine Communist radio broadcasting to Turkey from East Germany and demands neutralism in foreign policy and nationalization of much of Turkey's economy. Aybar has charged that the agreements with the US, NATO, and CENTO have interfered with Turkey's sovereign rights. He has also proposed that the Cyprus problem be solved by a federation system on an island which is "totally cleansed of British military bases."

The TLP has no hope of making any immediate strong impression on the political life of Turkey, but it is working for the future when conditions may be more favorable for the development of the political left. Aybar is optimistic that the party can elect 15 deputies from widely scattered provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara. A former minister of labor, who is a leading figure in the RPP, also estimates that the TLP will win 10-15 seats in the National Assembly. Despite its name, the TLP has not been able to attract much support from organized labor.

Other Minor Parties

The conservative New Turkey Party (NTP), headed by Ekrem Alican, and the ultraconservative Nation Party (NP), headed by Osman Bolukbasi, will also participate in the elections, but they are not expected to win many seats in the National Assembly. The main goal of the NTP appears to be to prevent Communism from becoming a winning force in Turkey, and it regards itself as a communications link between the RPP and the JP. About 90 percent of its members are former DP members. The NTP is pro-Western, and its primary strength is located in the Central Anatolian province of Sivas and in the southeastern Kurdish area.

The newest political party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), was not organized in enough provinces to meet the minimum
qualified for inclusion on the ballot. It has already declared itself in support of the RPP during the forthcoming elections. Retired General Ulay, as head of the party, commented recently that the SDP has extended its hand not to the RPP’s right hand but to its left. The SDP is an insignificant political force, but it is another indication of the growth of a political left in Turkey.

Madanoglu, a "Loner"

General Madanoglu played a prominent role both during and immediately after the revolution and was a leading figure on the Committee of National Union. He was the CNU member largely responsible for the exile of Turkes and others.

When he resigned from the CNU, following an internal dispute, he rejected the option of becoming a life senator and withdrew from public life. He has always maintained close touch with the political situation, however, and when Turkes re-entered the political picture, Madanoglu soon followed.

Madanoglu could probably have had his name placed on any one of several party electoral lists but he chose to run as an independent. He fully expects to be elected, although the Turkish electoral system does not favor the independent candidate. Like Turkes and the TLP, he is probably thinking of the future rather than the present. Cemal Gursel’s term of office will end in 1968, and Madanoglu may have his eyes on the presidency.

Campaign Issues

The campaign, which is entering its final phase, has become heated at times, but there has been no violence. The spectrum of issues has included everything from personal attacks to the broader reaches of foreign policy. This is the first political campaign in Turkey in which key foreign policy issues have become controversial, largely because of the emergence of the vocal political left.

The JP has taken a strong pro-Western stand and has publicly declared that it is in Turkey's national interest to reinforce its security by close relations with Western friends and allies and by regional defense organizations such as NATO and CENTO. The JP also advocates friendly ties with the countries of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Afro-Asian countries. JP pronouncements have ignored the Soviet Union. The JP favors a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem through negotiations with Greece.
The opposition RPP, in a move apparently aimed primarily at attracting votes from the left, has become stridently independent and ultranationalistic, with anti-US overtones. RPP leader Inonu has also spoken out in favor of improved relations with countries outside the Western alliance system "in defense of our high interests in the international field." The RPP has taken a belligerent stand on the Cyprus issue, largely in order to embarrass the incumbent coalition and especially the JP.

On domestic issues, the RPP has become strongly leftist and antiforeign in tone, especially in fields of industrial development such as mining and petroleum. The JP, on the other hand, is moderate and pro-Western. It emphasizes that only a strong and stable government can solve Turkey's problems, in an effort to refute the frequent RPP charge that single-party rule could lead to oppression. The JP continues to advocate a mixed economic system and cautions that animosity toward foreign capital slows the country's rate of economic development, prevents needed industrialization, and harms international economic and commercial relations. The JP wisely avoids the hotly contested issue of foreign investment in the petroleum industry, but promises to encourage "productive investment."

It attacks all political parties, especially the JP. Its election theme has been that the "TLP will give land to the villages." It proposes nationalization of the oil industry, banking, insurance, and foreign trade, and calls for planned economic development.

TLP leader Aybar has strongly denounced Turkey's membership in both NATO and CENTO as incompatible with national sovereignty. In a recent anti-US diatribe, Aybar alleged that the "USA has laid its hands on all our national resources since 1947" and he promised that the USA "would be thrown out by the same way it came in."

RPNP leader Turkes, while giving lip service to Turkey's close ties with the West, appears to be drawn toward neutralism. In domestic affairs, he advocates a broad program of reform.

**Outlook**

As the political campaign draws to a close, there appears to be a consensus that the JP will win a substantial victory, although it may not gain a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. If it wins a large plurality, however, it would still become the leading member of any new coalition.
Political observers in Turkey believe there is a good chance that the JP will actually come close to the 50-percent mark, but other more conservative estimates say the number will be closer to 40 percent. The JP electoral committee predicts that the JP will win at least 240 of the 450 seats in the assembly. Kasim Gulek, a leading member of the RPP, has predicted that the JP will get about 44 percent and the RPP up to 40 percent. RPP spokesmen in general, however, have become openly defensive and seem to anticipate a serious electoral defeat.

Among the fringe elements, Turkes remains the man to watch as Turkey in its present mood seems to be fostering the growth of extremism of both left and right. If the RPNP receives a sizable block of seats--over 25--and if the JP fails to get an absolute majority--less than 226--Turkes may be the balance of power between the two major parties.

The TLP does not expect to get much of a vote, but may garner enough to boost its hopes for the future. It could become a potent force in the 1969 elections, however, particularly if it captures the leadership of the Turkish labor movement.