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Nigeria



The frustration of this latest southern attempt to achieve a balance of power with the North by constitutional means has produced deep dismay in the East, whose leaders head the southern coalition. Coming on top of the failure of other such challenges in recent years, the Western election is viewed as final proof that the North will never allow its present federal dominance to be questioned by democratic procedures.

[Redacted]

Such concerns were directly expressed by Eastern Premier Okpara in recent separate appeals to US and UK representatives to "save" the situation before it is "too late." Otherwise, he predicted, he and other southern moderates would lose control to more radical elements, leading to a violent north-south confrontation which would destroy the federation.

[Redacted]

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
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BRITISH FEAR RHODESIAN UDI IS IMMINENT

The area of maneuverability between Salisbury and London is rapidly diminishing, and UK officials fear that a Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) may be imminent.

Prime Minister Smith responded to Prime Minister Wilson's proposal for further talks in Malta with the statement that the differences between the two governments now appeared irreconcilable. During the past week, Smith also rejected Wilson's terms for a royal commission and the UK's alternative suggestions for a nationwide referendum on the 1961 constitution or the drafting of a new constitution altogether.



Smith may still prefer to seek negotiated independence

rather than risk UK sanctions, but he apparently is under heavy pressure from extremists in his cabinet to end the fruitless talks with London and declare independence.



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Wilson may hope that, if he can keep discussions open, any split within the Rhodesian cabinet will widen, preventing the decisive step of UDI.



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Europe

THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

De Gaulle's announcement that he will seek re-election on 5 December appears to have completed the list of French presidential candidates, although nominations are not formally closed until 16 November. In his announcement, De Gaulle sought to set the tone for the campaign as a choice between his own strong, independent France and the weaknesses of the Fourth Republic.

De Gaulle is likely to try to reinforce the image of himself as the "national" candidate by limiting his campaign appearances and continuing to disparage the political parties. The mechanics of his campaign will be handled by the National Association for the Support of De Gaulle, the organization that has been used to play down his own connection with the Union of New Republic and thus ease the way for outsiders to support him.

The five major opposition candidates have formally welcomed De Gaulle's candidacy as emphasizing for French voters the distinction between "personal rule" and "democracy." Their primary goals in the campaign now are clearly to hold down the size of De Gaulle's majority and to maintain the link with their traditional supporters for a subsequent election without De Gaulle.

Within the parties backing the opposition candidates there remain significant divisions. The Socialist Party following the lead of its long-time secre-

tary, Guy Mollet, "enthusiastically" announced its support of Francois Mitterrand. However, continuing differences between Mollet and Mayor Gaston Defferre of Marseilles, who earlier had sought to be the candidate of a broad center-left coalition, may result in less than full backing by Defferre's supporters. The Radical Socialists also endorsed Mitterrand, but several top party officials forced inclusion of a favorable mention of center candidate Jean Lecanuet in the announcement. The Catholic Popular Republican Movement endorsed Lecanuet, its former president, but two of its biggest names, Pierre Pflimlin and Maurice Schuman, both of whom served briefly in De Gaulle's government, were absent from the party meeting.

One of the most interesting developments in the campaign is the French Communist Party's endorsement of Mitterrand and its willingness to campaign for him; this position is opposed by a splinter group from the party's left wing. The Soviet news agency TASS has posed an additional problem for Communist voters by quoting remarks of "French observers" that De Gaulle would have the support of those who do not favor the Fifth Republic "but nevertheless approve some positive, realistic, foreign political actions of the government."

Mollet believes one million of the four million Communist voters will support De Gaulle, an estimate thought conservative by some observers.

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Western Hemisphere

CANADIAN LIBERALS FAIL IN BID FOR MAJORITY GOVERNMENT

The Liberal Party retained control of the government in the 8 November Canadian general election but failed to gain an absolute majority in Parliament. The Liberals won 129 seats to the Conservatives' 99 in the 265-member federal Parliament. This was a rebuff to Prime Minister Pearson, who had built up the need for a majority government as the main issue of the campaign. Pearson wanted a stable majority in order to be able to put through new social and economic legislation.

The Liberals' failure may reflect voter irritation over the five elections in the past eight years. It seems unlikely that the government will be tempted to turn to the voters again very soon.

John Diefenbaker, leader of the opposition Conservatives, has benefited to the extent that he now has a freer hand in choosing his own successor and his time of departure from the party leadership. Nevertheless, the 70-year-old Diefenbaker, the object of controversy within the party, is not expected to remain in politics long enough to try again for the prime minister's office. There are several

attractive candidates to succeed him as party leader, including the premiers of Ontario and Nova Scotia, who campaigned vigorously for Conservative candidates in Tuesday's elections. Diefenbaker now is in a strong position to pick his successor and time of departure.

The effect on Pearson's leadership of the Liberal Party is less certain. His prestige nationally and within the party has been dealt a serious blow. He has not hidden his dislike of the rough-and-tumble of political life, and in view of the election results may begin to look about for an eventual successor.

Foreign Minister Martin, a probable contender for the leadership when Pearson steps down, has suggested a coalition with the New Democratic Party, which won 21 seats in the election, but the NDP leadership has so far reacted coolly. Such an arrangement, although acceptable to most Liberals, would encounter strong opposition from left-wing elements within the NDP. It appears likely that the NDP will choose instead to support the government on a selective basis.

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OAS COUNTRIES TO MEET

The long-delayed plenary meeting of Organization of American States members is scheduled to convene on 17 November in Rio de Janeiro, despite the announced absence of Venezuela in protest against recent political developments in Brazil. Other critics of Brazil--notably Chile, Mexico, and Costa Rica--evidently have decided to attend in hopes of restoring OAS prestige lost at the beginning of the Dominican crisis.

Chile and some other members want to focus the meeting on reorganization of the OAS and enlargement of its socio-economic functions, rather than on discussion of anti-Communist security measures such as a permanent Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Critics of the US and OAS role in the Dominican Republic have not flatly rejected the concept of a limited standby IAPF, but they do not favor action on this at Rio. The US will not press for an IAPF unless there appears to be a favorable consensus.

Chile's reorganization plan includes three coequal and geographically decentralized councils: economic-social, cultural-educational, and political-juridical. The US does not oppose relocating OAS headquarters but believes such a compartmentation would weaken the position of the OAS secretary general and fragment the Pan-American Union secretariat, which has staffed the OAS. Moreover, a separate economic

organ could complicate the operation of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), which must maintain close liaison with US and international financial institutions in Washington.

Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have proposed an "inter-American protocol on economic assistance," which conceivably could include contractual obligations relating both to economic aid and to import and other trade restrictions. The US questions the desirability of seeking early agreement in these areas, which it considers more appropriate for long-range study by the CIAP and by the OAS' Inter-American Economic and Social Council before consideration by a later conference.


The coming conference probably will confine itself to general discussion and broad resolutions as guidelines for working committees to study charter amendment proposals. Other proposals which may come up and be assigned for further study include the holding of an annual OAS meeting to replace the emergency Foreign Ministers' Conferences and the anachronism called the Inter-American Conference (not held since 1954). Ecuador wants to raise border claims against Peru, and critics of US Dominican policy may also try to be heard. Other potentially heated issues are the use of international waters and protection of the human rights of individuals and groups.

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SCATTERED SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC



Santo Domingo has remained relatively quiet. Daily newspapers have been issued for over a week, and there is a slow but steady reopening of business firms in the former rebel zone. The Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) is gradually withdrawing from the zone, encouraging the hesitant Dominican police to take over security duties there.

The collapse last weekend of much-advertised general strike plans did much to encourage an atmosphere of comparative stability. President Garcia Godoy now has begun a round of consultations with leaders of the various political parties, to establish guidelines for their activity leading to elections next summer.


Garcia Godoy apparently has won left-wing cooperation in the "package deal" whereby some of the most controversial right- and left-wing figures were to accept overseas assignments. There are indications that some of the former rebel chiefs feel they should go abroad in the interest of their personal security and long-run ambitions. In the face of opposition from the military, however, the President seems to have backed away momentarily from plans to transfer several of the armed forces leaders to overseas assignments. This hesitation may prompt the

"leftists" to reconsider their willingness to leave.

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The departure of some of the ranking rebel leaders should do much to restore right-wing and moderate confidence in Garcia Godoy's government and may further reduce tensions. However, it will also remove the most influential non-Communist leftists from the scene, making the Constitutional cause more vulnerable to Communist exploitation.


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The arms-collection program still is under way but amounts to little more than a formality. Garcia Godoy now plans to set up special posts throughout the country where civilians can surrender weapons at lucrative prices.

Much of the heat seems to have gone out of the controversy over how to reintegrate lower level members of the rebel military back into the regular forces --an easing for which Garcia Godoy claims credit. The rebel chiefs now have agreed to reintegration of their troops at prerevolutionary ranks. Some of the rebel military and police may be returning to their homes rather than awaiting reintegration.

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ARGENTINA-CHILE BORDER CLASH

A clash between Chilean carabineros and Argentine gendarmes in a disputed border area has set off violent demonstrations in the Chilean cities of Santiago and Punta Arenas. [redacted]

[redacted] the incident, UNCODED took place on 7 November near Lago Desierto.

Incidents along this part of the poorly marked, sparsely populated border have created friction between the two countries since the latter part of

the 19th century. Late last year Argentina and Chile agreed on British arbitration of their border disputes, but thus far no arbitral award has been made.

Presidents Frei and Illia met in the Argentine city of Mendoza two weeks ago and agreed to bring their nations closer together through friendly settlement of border incidents. Although both sides are still showing a conciliatory attitude, this latest incident may be a setback to their efforts, since politicians in both countries have shown an aptitude for using such clashes to inflame nationalistic passions. [redacted]

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BOLIVIA EDGING CLOSER TO FIRM ELECTION DATE

Bolivian Co-President Barrientos told a public gathering in Cochabamba last week that the junta will turn the government over to a constitutional successor next August. Barrientos intimated that an election date might be set later this month or in early December, provided there is political tranquility.

Although Co-President Ovando and most of the junta members had wanted to announce a date for elections on 4 November, Barrien-

tos apparently persuaded them to delay until he has formed a political front to support his presidential candidacy.

There are indications that such a front is beginning to take shape, involving four small left-of-center parties. Major problems remain to be overcome, however, including agreement on apportionment of congressional seats and the choice of a vice-presidential candidate. [redacted]

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ARGENTINA-CHILE

Border Areas in Dispute



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VENEZUELA TAKES FIRMER STAND AGAINST INSURGENTS

Venezuelan security forces have scored some notable successes in the past month against the Communist-dominated Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

The army has captured more than 100 guerrillas in eastern Venezuela, causing a number of desertions from FALN units still in the field. The police have also apprehended a number of terrorists in and near the eastern petroleum district, and the resulting suspicion among the members of the Communist Party (PCV) that the organization has been infiltrated has destroyed morale to the point where some rank-and-file members are refusing to attend meetings or accept directions from their leaders.

Police in Caracas and elsewhere arrested several prominent leaders of the FALN during October, including the national commanders. This sweep of FALN personnel has created a serious void at a crucial time, which probably will expose other weaknesses heretofore not apparent.

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The most spectacular incident was the seizure of an arms cache in a subterranean "muni-

tions factory" near Caracas. On 29 October, an estimated \$300,000 worth of equipment was found in a network of tunnels under an innocent looking farmhouse near Caracas. President Leoni and his ministers of defense and interior visited the site soon after it was seized and in later TV and press interviews described the operation as "the biggest blow yet struck" against the FALN.

Apparently in retaliation for government inroads and in an effort to demonstrate a continuing capability, FALN leaders reportedly plan a series of terrorist actions in the region of Ciudad Bolivar. Although FALN claims may well be a form of whistling in the dark, some display of vigor may occur if only to gain publicity. In Bolivar State on 6 November, security agents found a dynamite bomb near the spot where President Leoni was to dedicate a new highway. Security agents uncovered no evidence and made no arrests.

The government's successes have increased its determination to avoid any compromise with the FALN or the PCV whereby a PCV promise to end violent acts would be traded for governmental permission to engage in more legitimate political activity. Furthermore, government officials, including President Leoni, seem to have come to a fuller realization of the nature and extent of the insurgency problem and the PCV's part in it.

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