


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26 November 1965

OCI No. 0317/65

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review completed

RECEIVAL RECORD
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AGENCY ARCHIVES, [redacted]

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
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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 24 November 1965)

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VIETNAM	1
<p>Heavy fighting in western Pleiku Province continued during the past week, and the intensity of Viet Cong actions increased markedly throughout South Vietnam. Hanoi, in a recent attempt to bolster Viet Cong morale, gave red-carpet treatment to a visiting "liberation army" delegation. Still trying to appear reasonable on peace talks despite its adamant public statements on the issue, Hanoi also received another delegation from a non-Communist country (Italy) which came to discuss an end to the fighting. Moscow's statements in support of the Vietnamese Communists continue to avoid mention of a negotiated settlement.</p>	

The Communist World



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PLANS FOR THE SOVIET OIL INDUSTRY IN 1966	8
<p>The USSR plans its largest jump ever in crude oil production and is likely to meet the goal. It may have future distribution problems, however, because scarce pipeline resources are being diverted to natural gas.</p>	
SOVIET-JAPANESE TALKS ON TRADE AND CIVIL AIR ROUTES	10
<p>The trade talks will cover the most extensive agreement to date, a five-year pact for the period 1966-70, but are not expected to bring any sharp increase in trade. The air negotiations center on Tokyo-Moscow service and the difficult issue of Japanese rights over Siberia.</p>	
COOL AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE USSR	11
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- PROGRESS OF THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC REFORM 12
In the four months since its introduction, the reform has improved price relationships, halted excessive investment spending, and reduced the strain on the balance of payments. Temporarily, however, it has slowed the industrial growth rate and lowered living standards.
- BULGARIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS BECOMING MORE FLEXIBLE 13
In recent weeks Sofia has made political and economic overtures to the West that appear to reflect a basic reappraisal by the regime--apparently emulating Rumania and Yugoslavia--of how its national interests can best be served.
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- SINGAPORE PLANS TO RESUME TRADE WITH INDONESIA 14
Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman considers the plan a security threat and says he will use force to stop it.
- SUDANESE COMMUNIST PARTY OUTLAWED 15
A constitutional amendment passed this week will force the Communists underground, but they will probably retain a sizable influence among labor, students, and professionals.
- GUINEAN "PLOT" CRISIS DEVELOPING 16
President Touré, reacting to alleged plotting against his regime, has broken diplomatic ties with France and has shaken up his government. The crisis, moreover, does not yet appear to have reached its climax.
- TSHOMBE'S CONGOLESE OPPONENTS INCREASE THEIR PRESSURE 17
President Kasavubu and his allies are stepping up their campaign to destroy the ousted premier as a political force in the Congo.
- RHODESIA'S REBEL REGIME IN FULL CONTROL 17
International pressures are mounting, however, and there have been disturbances by local Africans and some white opposition to independence.

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Europe

SPECIAL NATO COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR SHARING PROBLEMS 20
Defense ministers from ten of the fifteen alliance countries will consider three main problem areas, especially that relating to improvement and extension of allied participation in nuclear planning.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FRENCH POLITICS
The near certainty of De Gaulle's victory leaves little beyond the size of his majority to speculate about. Only widespread voter abstention will keep him from the "massive endorsement" he has asked for. A less-than-wholesale endorsement is unlikely, in any case, to affect his basic policies, except possibly to make him more cautious in implementing them. Such an outcome, however, might breathe new life into the lackluster opposition. (Published separately as Special Report OGI No. 0316/65A)

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SWEDISH RULING PARTY MOVING LEFTWARD IN FOREIGN POLICY 22
Prime Minister Erlander's dominant Social Democratic Party, under pressure from a strident left-wing minority, is pursuing a more active foreign policy and appears to be moving to the left on several controversial issues.

Western Hemisphere

RIGHTIST DOMINICAN UPRISING FAILS 23
At midweek there were indications that President Garcia Godoy was trying to "balance" the failure of the rightist conspiracy by finally acting against leftists in the government.

HAVANA TO HOST TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE IN JANUARY 24
Although the meeting has a standard Communist-influenced "revolutionary" agenda, and could well become another Sino-Soviet battleground, Castro sees it as a major effort to demonstrate that the Cuban regime is not isolated from the world.

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- CHILEAN COPPER STRIKE 25
The month-old strike is basically a contest between the Communists and Socialists, who want full nationalization of the copper mines, and President Frei, who considers his more moderate halfway approach to nationalization the keystone of his reform and development program.
- URUGUAYAN LABOR UNREST 25
Despite a government employees' walkout and the threat of a Communist-instigated general strike, the government is standing firm on its wage stabilization program.

United Nations

- COMMUNIST CHINA MAKES GAINS TOWARD ADMISSION TO UN 26
Peking's supporters did not muster the required two-thirds majority in this year's vote, but its opponents failed for the first time to get a plurality. Peking has hailed the outcome as a vindication of its obdurate stand, which the Chinese Communists apparently believe will gain them membership eventually on their own terms.

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VIETNAM

Military activity in South Vietnam during the week ending on 24 November was highlighted by continued heavy fighting between allied troops and Communist forces in western Pleiku Province, and by a marked increase in the intensity of Viet Cong actions throughout the country.

Communist losses between 13 and 20 November--totaling 2,262 killed and more than 1,100 weapons lost--were higher than for any other week of the war. Allied casualties of nearly 2,000 killed, wounded, or missing also reflected the severity of recent combat.

Heavy fighting several miles west of the Plei Me Special Forces camp abated at least temporarily after a sharp encounter between Vietnamese airborne units and Communist forces on 20 November. However, nearly 7,000 allied troops are continuing their sweep, and further clashes with probably three North Vietnamese regiments remaining in the operational area seem likely. By 23 November, enemy losses during the ten days of fighting in this area totaled more than 1,500 killed.

In Quang Ngai and Binh Duong provinces regimental-size attacks were successfully beaten off by government troops. However, a series of actions initiated by another enemy regiment in the coastal province of Phu Yen was still in progress as of 24 November. Other Viet Cong forces inflicted moderate damage on airfields at Soc Trang and Tan Hiep in the delta region south of

Saigon and attacked government outposts in Chau Doc, Gia Dinh, and Quang Ngai provinces. Heavy sabotage activity noted along Route 13 and its tributary roads north of Saigon was probably designed to impede allied forces operating in Binh Duong Province.

Moral Support for Viet Cong

Hanoi underscored its support for the Viet Cong this week by giving red-carpet treatment to the visiting South Vietnam "liberation army" delegation of military heroes. They were received by Ho Chi Minh and feted by almost the entire DRV leadership at one ceremony after another. The extensive publicity surrounding the delegation's visit suggests that Hanoi is using it to demonstrate its faith in the military capability of the Viet Cong, and to strengthen the insurgents' determination to continue the war.


DRV propaganda also played up the 25th anniversary of an obscure uprising against the French to demonstrate the traditional revolutionary character of the South Vietnamese people. A special editorial in the 23 November party daily claimed that this event exemplified a determination on the part of the Vietnamese that would enable them to fight until the US was defeated.

Propaganda on Negotiations

Hanoi's propaganda on negotiating a settlement remained

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The Indochina - South China Area

— South Vietnamese military boundaries

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adamant this week. Ho Chi Minh restated the DRV position in an open letter to American Nobel Peace Prize winner Linus Pauling on 17 November. Ho called for US recognition of Hanoi's four points. In a continuing effort to appear reasonable, however, the regime continues to host non-Communist delegations which come to Hanoi to discuss an end to the fighting. The ex-mayor of Florence, Giorgio La Fira, has just returned from talks with the North Vietnamese leaders. They probably told him, as they have others in the past, that the US must stop the bombings in the North and declare a unilateral cease-fire in the South.

Moscow's statements in recent weeks have not gone beyond standard condemnations of US actions in Vietnam and continue to avoid any mention of a negotiated settlement. This suggests that Moscow is apparently resigned to a prolonged struggle in Vietnam and remains determined to avoid open divergence from Hanoi's stand.

Moscow vs. Peking on Vietnam

Although the USSR also continues its policy of restraint toward answering Chinese attacks against Soviet policy in Vietnam, it has apparently decided to reply indirectly to Peking's 11 November indictment of US-Soviet collusion over Vietnam. A 20

November article in the East German newspaper Neues Deutschland, openly critical of Peking's anti-Soviet tactics with regard to the Vietnamese conflict, is aimed at convincing Communist audiences that Peking's opposition to coordinated Communist bloc support for Hanoi is creating serious difficulties for the DRV in its prosecution of the war. TASS promptly replayed portions of the article which cited Chinese obstruction of Soviet military aid to the DRV as evidence that Peking is "putting ideological differences above the struggle against imperialism."

DRV Air Defenses

Four more surface-to-air missile sites were discovered in North Vietnam this past week, bringing the total number of sites to 49. Three of the sites are located in the Haiphong area, bringing to ten the number of sites defending this vital port city. The other site is about 27 miles northeast of Thanh Hoa.

US aircraft attacked two sites northwest of Hanoi on 22 November. Pilots reported that a radar van was destroyed and other SAM-associated equipment possibly damaged at one. Two secondary explosions were observed at the other.

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South Vietnamese Politics

At a press conference last week, Saigon student union leaders called for an end to the Ky government, criticizing its performance and lack of popular support. Student representatives from Dalat also reportedly attacked the government at the conference. Student groups from the Hué area, which have been openly hostile to the government since August, were not represented. There has been no noticeable public reaction to the conference, and US Embassy officials doubt whether the conference spokesmen

have much influence within Saigon student circles.

Members of the ruling military Directorate are again considering the eventual formation of a senate body representing the various ethnic and religious groups in South Vietnam. The Directorate shelved such a plan about a month ago, after an experimental conference of provincial council representatives produced more bickering than agreement.

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
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PLANS FOR THE SOVIET OIL INDUSTRY IN 1966

The increase planned by the USSR for the production of crude oil in 1966 is the largest ever. The minister of the oil-extraction industry recently stated that crude oil production next year is set at 264 million metric tons, a rise of 21 million over the expected 1965 output. Previously, the largest planned increase had been 19 million metric tons in 1962.

As in the past, the bulk of the crude oil produced in 1966

will come from the Urals-Volga oil fields. The new fields in West Siberia and on the Mangyshlak Peninsula in Kazakhstan are still in the early stages of development and will produce only relatively small quantities. However, the USSR has historically been able to meet its crude oil output targets, and the 1966 goal seems to be within its capabilities. Looking further ahead, Soviet officials have estimated that 1970 crude oil production goals will range between 350 and

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USSR: Major Crude Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines

1 November 1965

Crude Oil

Natural Gas

PRODUCING AREAS

Established


Major New Finds

PIPELINES

In Use

Under Construction

Planned



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370 million tons. If the 8.6-percent rate of increase planned for 1966 is maintained, the larger 1970 figure appears altogether possible.

The bulk of the additional output probably will be used to meet growing domestic demands and the needs of the Eastern European satellites, which are becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR as their main supplier of crude oil. As a result, no dramatic upsurge in Soviet oil sales to non-Communist countries is likely in 1966. Such sales, however, probably will increase at about the same rate--10-11 percent--as is estimated for this year over 1964.

The 1966 plan continues the trend noted previously during the seven-year plan (1959-65), in which priority in pipeline resources was

given largely to the natural gas industry. Gas pipeline construction averaged about 4,000 kilometers annually during this period compared to about 2,000 annually for oil pipelines. In 1966, construction of only 1,400 kilometers of oil pipeline is planned, the smallest increment scheduled in recent years. The construction of oil pipelines at the end of the seven-year period will be only about half the planned goal of 28,600 kilometers.

The lag in oil pipeline construction has not yet caused difficulties in the distribution of crude oil or petroleum products. Problems are likely in the near future, however, unless construction is accelerated. [redacted]

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SOVIET-JAPANESE TALKS ON TRADE AND CIVIL AIR ROUTES

The USSR and Japan will open talks in Tokyo soon on their most extensive trade agreement to date, a five-year pact covering the period 1966 through 1970. Both are approaching these negotiations in a cautious mood. It appears unlikely that the USSR, for whom Japan already is an important trade partner, will increase exchanges sharply in the near future.

In recent years there have been continued Soviet and Japanese expressions of interest in expanding trade, including occasional talk of Japanese participation in developing the resources of Siberia, but trade growth, while steady, has

not been spectacular. During the last five years, Soviet-Japanese commerce has increased from \$150 million to \$410 million. Any dramatic expansion of trade will continue to be inhibited by a number of factors. These include Tokyo's fears of overdependence and its commitments to its other suppliers. Other factors are strategic trade controls, competition of other free world countries, and the USSR's own desire for balanced trade.

So far in 1965, trade is at about the same level as last year. As in past years, the goods exchanged consist mainly of Soviet

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crude oil, petroleum products, pig iron, and lumber, and Japanese industrial goods such as merchant ships, machinery, and complete industrial plants.

Soviet-Japanese talks on civil air routes, which have been held on and off for several years, have already reopened in Tokyo. These talks have centered on To-

kyo-Moscow air service and Japanese rights over Siberia, a point over which negotiations broke down last year. The Japanese have reportedly accepted a temporary arrangement using Soviet aircraft and crews over Siberia as long as a future agreement allows for full Japanese flight rights. Negotiations on these matters are still under way.

HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE USSR

An outbreak of hoof and mouth disease, perhaps of epidemic proportions, has occurred in the USSR.


Moscow has maintained official silence as to the extent of the outbreak, but measures are being taken over a wide area to control and prevent the spread of this highly contagious disease.

control stations, some manned by military personnel, in the RSFSR and Ukraine as far west as Minsk, almost as far north as Leningrad, and south to the Caucasus. It is not known how far east the disease has spread.

On many main roads, passengers in cars and buses must get out to disinfect their shoes, vehicle tires are washed, and trunks are inspected.

Although mortality rates of animals infected with hoof and mouth disease are normally low, reduced productivity could lower meat and milk production

in 1966. In addition, measures to control the spread of the disease may disrupt normal marketing of animal products in the coming months.



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PROGRESS OF THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC REFORM

Four months after its introduction, the Yugoslav economic reform appears to be progressing satisfactorily, although not without widespread complaints and a dampening effect on economic development. The reform and preceding stabilization measures have improved price relationships, halted excessive investment spending, and reduced the strain on the balance of payments. Temporarily, however, they have slowed the rate of industrial growth and depressed living standards.

To bring Yugoslav prices more into line with the world market, the regime has permitted substantial increases for agriculture, mining, transportation, and other services while allowing only moderate rises for manufacturing industries. The new price relationships are having the intended effect of putting great pressure on manufacturing plants to produce more efficiently. The regime shows little inclination so far to provide subsidies or easy credit for enterprises in financial difficulty.

Real wages of workers in manufacturing have been hard hit by the efforts to improve the economic position of agriculture, basic industries, and services. Large increases in agricultural producers' prices have led to much higher retail prices for food, which most manufacturing enterprises have been unable to compensate for fully through wage increases. Most urban families also must now pay much

higher prices for utilities, transportation, and other services. Domestic sales of industrial consumer goods have been hampered both by the lag in consumer incomes and by the diversion of supplies to the export market. Although the reform had the initial effect of boosting the cost of living at least one fourth, there apparently has been little further increase since August.

Devaluation of the dinar from 750 to 1,250 to the dollar and continued state control over some imports have improved Yugoslavia's balance of payments. Exports so far this year are 20 percent higher than during the same period in 1964, while imports are down 5 percent. Pressure on the balance of payments also has been eased by the agreement of some Western countries to postpone due dates for Yugoslav repayments on earlier credits and by a standby credit of \$80 million from the International Monetary Fund. Foreign exchange reserves, according to a recent Tito speech, are at the highest level since the war. However, they are still inadequate to permit much relaxation of state control over foreign trade and a renewed rapid growth of imports.

The long-term success of the reform is by no means assured as yet. Much will depend on restraint in setting economic goals, in making credit available for investment, and in rescuing inefficient enterprises from the consequences of the reform.

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BULGARIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS BECOMING MORE FLEXIBLE

In a new and--for Bulgaria--surprising display of political flexibility, Sofia in recent weeks has made a series of political and economic overtures to the West which appear to reflect a basic reappraisal by the regime of how its national interests can best be served.

Sofia recently made its first request to the UN for technical aid, with an expressed preference for US technicians. This initiative closely follows Sofia's proposal to send a construction delegation to the US, its request for a US delegation of electric-power specialists, and the conclusion of a consular agreement with Washington. Bulgaria also has stepped up its campaign for better economic and cultural ties with Western Europe and its non-Communist Balkan neighbors since early last summer. In addition, party chief Zhivkov is currently making official visits to the Middle East and Africa.

These developments follow official visits to Sofia last September by Yugoslav President Tito and Rumanian party chief Ceausescu, as well as Zhivkov's visit to Moscow last month. It seems likely

that he received encouragement at these meetings to go ahead with his new foreign policy initiatives.

Zhivkov evidently has concluded from observing his Yugoslav and Rumanian neighbors that he can safely and profitably expand contacts with the West as well as with other non-Communist areas without basically altering his dependent relationship with Moscow. Never a dynamic or imaginative leader, Zhivkov presumably hopes to satisfy both political wings in his party by indicating to nationalist party members a new maneuverability in foreign relations, and to conservative elements that this is possible without breaking the traditional and comfortable dependency on Moscow.

As a consequence of last April's abortive conspiracy against his regime, Zhivkov and Moscow must have concluded that Bulgaria's image as an appendage of the Soviet Union had become unacceptable to significant numbers of party members. His new overtures to the non-Communist world will serve to mollify this element, but will probably elicit renewed opposition from the party Stalinists.

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Asia-Africa

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SINGAPORE PLANS TO RESUME TRADE WITH INDONESIA

Singapore's planned resumption of barter trade with Indonesia on 1 December may seriously exacerbate relations with Malaysia.

Malaysia broke off barter trade with Indonesia in August 1964 as a security measure against increasing Indonesian infiltration efforts against Singapore. Since Singapore's

separation from Malaysia last August, however, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been under strong pressure from business and labor groups to resume the once lucrative trade.


Preparations have now been made to route the renewed Singapore trade through an island some 13 miles from Singapore harbor. British officials in

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Singapore and Malaysia feel that such a controlled resumption of trade would pose little threat to security. Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman, who is deeply antagonistic toward Lee, and other leaders in Kuala Lumpur nevertheless consider the plan a security threat. They also appear convinced that Lee is making a calculated effort to provoke the Malaysian Government.



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SUDANESE COMMUNIST PARTY OUTLAWED

The Constituent Assembly in Khartoum has passed a constitutional amendment declaring Communist associations unlawful and authorizing the assembly to enact the necessary legislation to effect the amendment.

The assembly's action came after more than a week of pro- and anti-Communist agitation in Khartoum, which included widespread rioting. The strongly conservative Muslim Brotherhood became aroused last week when a Communist student declared publicly that God was a fallacy and went on to make derogatory remarks about the prophet Muhammad and his wife. Thousands of anti-Communists stormed Communist centers, and the Communists were forced to request police protection. Over the weekend, however, the Communists marshaled their

own followers and provoked violent street demonstrations.

The amendment was passed on 22 November by an overwhelming majority.



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The Communists now will be forced to go underground, but will probably be able to retain their extensive influence in trade unions and student and professional groups and will continue to agitate against the conservative regime. The Communists will probably also continue to manipulate the leftist and pro-Egyptian people's Democratic Party and the leftist "Democratic Socialist Alliance."

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GUINEAN "PLOT" CRISIS DEVELOPING

Guinean President Touré, reacting to alleged plotting against his regime, has broken diplomatic ties with France and has shaken up his government. The crisis, moreover, does not yet appear to have reached its climax.

The government announced on 10 November that it had crushed a coup attempt and planned to take severe measures against those behind it. On 15 November, two French cabinet ministers and several moderate African leaders --most notably Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny--were named as instigators of the plot.

Paris maintains that the charges are absurd, and the accused African leaders have issued statements to the effect that Touré's troubles are really due to his own mismanagement of Guinea's affairs. Both Guinea and Ivory Coast have called for adjudication by the Organization of African Unity.

Discontent has been widespread in Guinea for over a year because of economic decline and the regime's harsh measures to control speculation. Touré may be using the plot charges to undercut substantial high-level opposition within Guinea's single political party and the cabinet.

Touré may also be trying to revive Guinea's standing in West

Africa by encouraging opposition elements elsewhere who resent continuing French influence. It is this aspect of the matter which places him in direct confrontation with moderate Houphouet-Boigny. Rivalry between the two presidents has been particularly acute since the Ivory Coast leader early this year organized the African and Malagasy Common Organization, which Touré views as a threat to real African unity.

On 20 November, Conakry announced extensive shifts in high-level government personnel. The most important of these was the transfer of Minister of Defense and Security Fodeba Keita to the Ministry of Rural Economy. At the same time, the gendarmerie was separated from the Ministry of Defense and placed under direct presidential control. Touré apparently was displeased with Keita's lack of enthusiasm in ferreting out plotters.

Most of the Guineans implicated so far are relatively unimportant or already discredited. However, Touré has said that two other groups, presumably more influential, are under investigation. Conakry radio has been giving heavy play to the "confession" of a high Ivory Coast official--now in custody in Guinea --and demands for execution of the traitors are increasing.

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TSHOMBE'S CONGOLESE OPPONENTS INCREASE THEIR PRESSURE

President Kasavubu and his allies are stepping up their campaign to destroy ousted premier Tshombé as a political force in the Congo.

In the week and a half since Tshombé engineered the parliamentary defeat of Evariste Kimba's proposed government, the anti-Tshombé forces have turned to extraparliamentary methods to undercut the former premier in Leopoldville. Newspapers supporting Tshombé have been harassed, and strong man Victor Nendaka's goon squads have been intimidating pro-Tshombé parliamentarians.

Nendaka and some of the other top leaders apparently would like to arrest Tshombé.

[Redacted]

So far, however, they have been stymied by the reluctance of army chief Mobutu.

Tshombé lacks resources in Leopoldville to counter this kind of activity, and he appears

nervous and on the defensive. The mercenaries are on the other side of the country, and Nendaka was able to thwart an effort by Tshombé's Belgian advisers to bring a few of them to Leopoldville as a bodyguard. At the same time, Tshombé's assets--his popular appeal and his wealth--are essentially unimpaired. On the other hand the popularity of Kasavubu and Nendaka has nosedived as their preoccupation with the Tshombé vendetta has led them to neglect all normal government activity.

In this confrontation Mobutu's position is crucial. He distrusts Tshombé profoundly, but his natural inclination toward the other camp is tempered by disgust at Kasavubu's inactivity and concern over Nendaka's ambition. He is meeting late this week with his principal subordinates in the army. Although he is reluctant to intervene openly in politics, some kind of move on his part is a possibility after the meeting.

[Redacted]

RHODESIA'S REBEL REGIME IN FULL CONTROL


The rebel regime in Rhodesia remains in full control, despite disturbances by some local Africans, some white opposition to unilateral independence, and mounting international pressure.

As of noon EST on 24 November, Rhodesian African response to the declaration of independence has been relatively limited,

particularly in the rural areas. Attempts by the Africans to organize general strikes in Salisbury and the industrial city of Bulawayo have failed, although in some instances workers reportedly require police escorts to protect them from intimidation by nationalist firebrands. Incidents are increasing in Bulawayo, however, and one African was

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killed there this week when police fired into a demonstrating crowd.

There is opposition to Prime Minister Smith among high church officials, university professors and students, moderate African parliamentarians, and, reportedly, senior civil servants and military officers. Nevertheless, most foreign officials remaining in Salisbury believe that Smith retains the support of the majority of white Rhodesians, but that his position could become shaky as economic sanctions take effect.

The UN Security Council has adopted a compromise resolution calling for economic measures against Rhodesia, including an oil boycott. The boycott would probably be unenforceable, however, because oil from certain small international companies, or from producers in Angola, might be smuggled to ports in Portuguese Mozambique. In any case, oil is a distant third to coal and water-generated electricity as a source of power in Rhodesia.

South African and Portuguese officials apparently are attempting to determine the extent of economic support they might offer Rhodesia, but no clear picture has emerged [redacted]

[redacted] Prime Minister Verwoerd will not risk assistance which could bring UN sanctions against South Africa too. The US Embassy believes that this view may be too sanguine, in view of widespread popular support in South Africa for the white Rhodesians.

The South African National Bank already has given permission

for the resumption of preindependence financial and trade transactions with Rhodesia. [redacted]

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
African states, frustrated by Britain's unwillingness to use force against Rhodesia, are looking toward the Organization of African Unity to bring results. There is speculation that the OAU foreign ministers will soon meet to consider how to implement last month's heads-of-state resolution calling on OAU members to use all means, including force, against the unilateral declaration of independence if it is not thwarted by Britain. The ministers probably will try to put additional pressure on the UK and will plan action of their own in case this fails.

Zambia's moderate President Kaunda is under increasing pressure from cabinet militants who believe that by provoking Rhodesian reprisals against the highly vulnerable Zambian economy they can force Britain to intervene. When the cabinet was considering a total trade boycott against Rhodesia, Kaunda made a public appeal for British troops to secure the Kariba power station on the Rhodesian side of the border. A promise of contingent military support from Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda was also apparently intended to induce London to send troops.

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own political party may force him to take action if the Smith regime shows great staying power. Zambian animosities could also be aroused if racial incidents occur in the Zambian copperbelt, where a majority of the skilled workers are white Rhodesians, many of whom are showing sympathy for the Smith regime. [redacted]

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Europe

SPECIAL NATO COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR SHARING PROBLEMS

The NATO special committee of defense ministers which meets in Paris on 27 November will bring together, under Secretary General Brosio's chairmanship, ten of the 15 members of the alliance. An eleventh member--Norway--has said it may join the committee later. France, Portugal, Luxembourg, and Iceland have indicated that they have no intention of participating.

Defense Secretary McNamara is expected to initiate discussion of three main areas of the nuclear-sharing problem facing NATO: improvement of communications and exchange of intelligence among alliance members, provision for adequate and prompt consultation on decisions to use nuclear weapons, and improvement and extension of allied participation in nuclear planning. Pro-

visions have been made for follow-up work to be done by three working groups, expected to report to the next special committee meeting tentatively scheduled for February or March. An interim procedural report of the November meeting will be made to the regular NATO ministerial meeting in December.

Indications are that interest will focus on the third, or nuclear planning, working group, which the US is determined to hold to at most five members (US, UK, Italy, West Germany, and perhaps a small-country representative). The recommendations of such a group could include creation of a small standing group for NATO nuclear affairs. [redacted]

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SWEDISH RULING PARTY MOVING LEFTWARD IN FOREIGN POLICY

The Social Democratic Party, which has dominated the Swedish political scene for more than 30 years, faces pressures which could divide the party and which already show signs of forcing changes in foreign policies. The problem is essentially a conflict between the moderate and pragmatic--but aging--leadership headed by Prime Minister Erlander, and the party's generally more youthful left wing. Although still only a strident minority, the left wing appears to have gained influence during recent months.

On domestic problems there appears to be no basic conflict, perhaps because the Social Democrats have provided one of the most comprehensive programs of social welfare yet devised, and have led labor and capital into a cooperation that has given Sweden both stability and the highest living standard in Europe. The left wing therefore has turned increasingly to foreign policy issues to engage its interest and idealism. Basic to its approach is its insistence that Sweden abandon the essentially passive foreign policy of past decades and become more actively involved internationally.

The US involvement in Vietnam has provided a ready-made issue for the left wing, which is basically unsympathetic toward the US in any case. Last summer, acting Foreign Minister Palme, widely regarded as Erlander's probable successor and perhaps

the leading spokesman for the left, suggested in a speech that the US was supporting reactionary forces that were suppressing demands for social justice. Under pressure to clarify the government's position, both Erlander and Foreign Minister Nilsson indicated that they supported Palme's statement.

This stand on Vietnam, as well as recent feelers put out by Stockholm relating to a Nordic defense alliance, indicates that the party leadership has decided to appease the radicals by moving left on foreign policy issues.

Such a shift may preserve the loyalty of many who are attracted by the refurbished Swedish Communist Party under its new leader, Carl Hermansson. The Social Democrats probably see this as the major threat at the moment, particularly in view of the Communists' success in projecting their image as a "national" party independent of Moscow.

In assessing the prospects for his party, Erlander must find particularly troubling the fate suffered by his Norwegian colleague, Einar Gerhardsen, whose long-established Labor government was defeated in elections this fall. Gerhardsen, too, faced pressures from the left and right in his party. He temporized and, as a result, Labor lost votes to the "national" Communists as well as to the nonsocialist parties.

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
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Western Hemisphere

RIGHTIST DOMINICAN UPRISING FAILS

A right-wing effort to establish a rival government to the Garcia Godoy regime quickly failed on 22 November as the Dominican armed forces remained loyal and firm US backing of the government discouraged many potential participants. The plan called for seizure of vital installations throughout the country, but the uprising was localized in Santiago. Conspirators established roadblocks around that interior city and announced they had formed a "Revolutionary Democratic Government" headed by a relatively minor conservative politician, Tomas Alcibiades Espinosa. Police and troops quickly dispersed peasants manning the barricades and arrested Espinosa and other leaders of the revolt.



The dispatch of 60 US troops to Santiago on 21 November at the request of Garcia Godoy strengthened the resolve of local military commanders to oppose the rebels and convinced many civilian plotters that the scheme was bound to fail.

The rapid collapse of the uprising will weaken the right but probably not end plotting completely.



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many other conservatives will probably not be satisfied as long as any liberal government is in power. The collapse of this attempt, however, will probably halt rightist terrorism at least temporarily.

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The military emerged relatively undamaged because officers involved in the plotting backed out at the last moment. Defense Minister Rivera's strong support for the President, despite his concern over some of the regime's policies, will probably further increase Garcia Godoy's developing confidence in him. Nevertheless, the President has voiced considerable suspicion over the loyalty of other officers, particularly army chief Martinez, and still wants to make some changes in the military leadership.

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At midweek there were indications Garcia Godoy was trying to "balance" the failure of the rightist conspiracy by finally acting against leftists in his government. He removed Attorney General Morel Cerda and replaced him with a moderate, Gustavo Gomez Ceara.

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Such moves would go far toward reassuring moderates and conservatives, such as Joaquin Balaguer that the provisional government will henceforth pursue impartial policies.

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HAVANA TO HOST TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE IN JANUARY

Fidel Castro personally attaches great importance to a conference sponsored by the Communist-influenced Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) which is scheduled to meet in Havana from 3 to 10 January. The conference is a major effort to demonstrate particularly to Washington that the Cuban regime is not isolated from the world.

This will be the first time that Latin American representatives have joined AAPSO deliberations as accredited delegates. Unofficial delegations will attend from 100 countries, including the Soviet Union and perhaps Communist China. The agenda, agreed on at a preparatory meeting in Cairo in September, indicates that the session will be devoted to attacks on "imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism," demands for greater economic rights for underdeveloped countries, and calls for intensification of "all forms" of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The conference will become another Sino-Soviet battleground unless Peking decides to boycott the meeting. As yet, the Chinese have given no indication they are prepared to do this. China, however, is probably unenthusiastic, and whether it attends or not may ultimately depend on how many Chinese-oriented delegations obtain invitations. Official invitations will be issued by the Cubans--and most will probably go to Moscow-oriented organizations in cases of conflicting claims between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking groups. A column in Pravda of 14 November clearly indicated that Moscow looks to the Havana conference to consolidate gains made at Peking's expense at the abortive Bandung II meeting in Algiers.

The conference probably will be used by Havana to discuss hemisphere strategy and tactics with representatives of Latin American and other leftist-extremist groups. The Cubans probably will also take the opportunity afforded by the conference to pledge additional material assistance to selected African insurgent groups.

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
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CHILEAN COPPER STRIKE

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A month-old copper strike in Chile is continuing in spite of a lack of sympathy in labor circles for the illegal and politically motivated walkout. The government has arrested Communist and Socialist leaders of the copper confederation and asked the confederation's Christian Democratic members to return to their jobs, but has made no move to take over the mines temporarily as suggested by some administration officials.

The strike is basically a test of strength between Communist and Socialist advocates of complete copper nationalization and supporters of a copper bill which would allow the government to purchase a half interest in copper companies owned by US and other private companies. President Frei considers this legislation the keystone of his reform and economic development program and is determined to see it enacted.



By striking out actively against the government, the Socialists apparently hope both to discredit the Communists' declaration of limited cooperation with the ruling Christian Democrats and to force the Frei administration into an unpopular use of troops in the mining area.

Thus far neither side has shown any desire to compromise. The Chilean economy has been losing an estimated \$1 million per day in foreign exchange, and the financially hard-pressed government can probably not take much more of a strain. Unless the workers return to work in the near future, the government will have to take over the mines.

URUGUAYAN LABOR UNREST

The Uruguayan Government remains at an impasse with labor over wage demands. Government employees' unions have been on strike demanding wage hikes much larger than the government is prepared to grant. On 27 November, government wages--affecting 25 percent of the labor force--are to be frozen for the year preceding general elections. A number of other unions have also walked out for short periods.

The Uruguayan Communist Party has been working toward a 24-hour general strike on 25 November to force wage increases commensurate with the estimated 60-percent cost-of-living increase, and to make the

government lift wage penalties imposed on workers who took part in strikes last month. The government recently vetoed a bill designed to lift the penalties and is standing firm on its wage stabilization program designed to hold raises to 25 percent. It reportedly intends to penalize the strikers with new sanctions and may reimpose recently lifted emergency security measures.

Labor has made a breakthrough at one point. Montevideo municipal employees have forced the city council--controlled by the opposition Colorado Party--to give in to their wage demands.

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United Nations

COMMUNIST CHINA MAKES GAINS TOWARD ADMISSION TO UN

Although the Chinese Communists did not receive the two-thirds majority last week needed for admission to the United Nations, their opponents failed for the first time to muster a plurality against them. China's gain relative to the last vote on the question in 1963 was due in large part to the switching of votes by African members. In the vote on the resolution to admit China this year (47 for admission, 47 against, and 20 abstentions), Peking gained eight new African supporters and lost two while Taiwan won two and lost nine. Although France worked closely with Red China's sponsors, there is no evidence that it tried to persuade its former African colonies to switch to Peking.

For the first time the Latin American bloc was not unanimous against Peking. The Chilean delegate abstained [redacted]

[redacted] and Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago also abstained. UN diplomats now fear that many Latin American votes may shift to outright support of Peking next year.

The Chinese Communists have hailed the outcome as a vindication of their obdurate stand and apparently believe that their refusal to compromise will make it possible to gain membership eventually on their own terms. A People's Daily editorial on 19 November, Peking's first major response to the vote, asserted that support for the US position had

weakened and called the vote a "humiliating setback" to US efforts. The editorial cited US inability to "rig up" a majority as evidence of increased US "isolation." The Chinese confidently reiterated their conditions for accepting a UN seat, including expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists, UN condemnation of "US imperialism," cancellation of the resolution charging China and North Korea with aggression, and complete UN "reform."

Their statements strongly suggest that the Chinese did not expect to gain admission this year and that they believe "manipulation" will continue to be used against them in the future. They appear to believe that China will prosper outside the world body, and that time will show the difficulties the UN will have as it tries to function in the absence of a nuclear power representing nearly a quarter of the world's population.

Because of the narrowness--only seven votes--of the margin upholding the "important question" ruling which requires a two-thirds majority to admit China, few delegations believe Peking's opponents can use this tactic next year. Backers of Taiwan now may be more interested in the Italian idea of a study committee or even some kind of "two-Chinas" solution. Many delegations strongly favor a "two-Chinas" approach despite the probability that Peking would not join an organization which includes Taiwan. [redacted]

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION
1965

<p>For Seating of Communist China: 47</p> <p>Afghanistan Albania Algeria Britain Bulgaria Burma Byelorussia Cambodia Central African Republic (No) Ceylon Congo (Brazzaville) (No) Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Ethiopia Finland France (No) Ghana Guinea Hungary India Iraq Kenya Mali Mauritania (Abstention) Mongolia Morocco Nepal Nigeria (Abstention) Norway Pakistan Poland Rumania Sierra Leone (Abstention) *Singapore Somalia Sudan Sweden Syria *Tanzania Uganda Ukraine Soviet Union United Arab Republic Yemen Yugoslavia *Zambia</p>	<p>Against: 47</p> <p>Argentina Australia Belgium Bolivia Brazil Canada Nationalist China Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Gabon *Gambia Greece Guatemala Haiti Honduras Ireland Israel (Abstention) Italy Ivory Coast Japan Jordan Liberia Luxembourg Malagasy Republic *Malawi Malaysia *Malta Mexico New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Panama Paraguay Peru Philippines South Africa Spain Thailand Togo Turkey United States Upper Volta Uruguay Venezuela</p>
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Abstentions: 20

<p>Austria Burundi Cameroon (No) Chad (No) Chile (No) Cyprus (No) Iceland Iran (No) Jamaica Kuwait</p>	<p>Lebanon Libya (No) *Maldive Islands Netherlands Portugal Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal (No) Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia (Yes)</p>
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Not Participating: 3

Congo (Leopoldville)	(No)
Dahomey	(No)
Laos	(Yes)

1963 TOTALS

For:	41
Against:	57
Abstentions:	12

*New Members

() Vote in 1963, where different, is shown in parentheses

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
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26 November 1965

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SPECIAL REPORT

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FRENCH POLITICS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND FRENCH POLITICS

De Gaulle appears assured of an easy, first-ballot victory in France's presidential election on 5 December, and only widespread voter abstention will keep him from the "massive endorsement" he has asked for. Public opinion polls suggest that he will win between 60 and 70 percent of the vote. The size of his majority is unlikely in any case to affect his basic policies, although he may be more cautious in implementing them if he falls short of 60 percent.

Among De Gaulle's five opponents, only Francois Mitterrand, who has the support of the Socialist and Communist parties, seems likely to get more than 20 percent of the vote. With little expectation of winning, the opposition parties are focusing their hopes of reducing De Gaulle's majority sufficiently to ensure them a continued political role following the election. However, the prospect of failing even this test has been insufficient to induce the parties to give up old loyalties and ideologies and form a united opposition. Only the shock of a very poor showing in the election is likely to renew interest in pulling together a broad democratic alternative to Gaullism.

De Gaulle's Strength

With the near certainty of a first-ballot victory for De Gaulle the only major point of speculation as far as the election itself is concerned is the size of his majority. In the latest poll, De Gaulle was favored by 43 percent of those responding. Mitterrand was supported by 15 percent, center candidate Jean Lecanuet and extreme rightist Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour each got 3 percent, and 36 percent of the respondents were undecided. These figures have remained virtually unchanged over several polls taken both before and after De Gaulle's announcement on 4 November that he would be a candidate.

De Gaulle apparently is the preferred candidate of a plurality of women voters. In a recent poll, 46 percent of the women favored the general while his nearest rival, Mitterrand, was supported by only 8 percent. The poll showed that De Gaulle's support by women voters cuts across age and social class and seems to substantiate a recent statement by a top Communist leader that, in any election in which De Gaulle is a candidate, 60 percent of the women who ordinarily vote Communist would support him.

Since this is the first direct election of a French president since 1848, there is no valid precedent on which to judge

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THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL OPPONENTS FOR THE ELECTION ON 5 DECEMBER



DE GAULLE



Francois Mitterrand
--the leftist candidate
who stands to make
the best showing
against De Gaulle



Jean Lecanuet
--upholding the political
center with an eye on the
period after De Gaulle.



Pierre Marilhac
--whose lackluster
campaigning reflects
his belief a De Gaulle
victory is a foregone
conclusion.



Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour
--vigorous campaigner
and champion of the
French - Algeria diehards
and other far rightists

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voter behavior. The October 1962 referendum, which proposed a constitutional revision to provide for the direct election of the president, is probably the best guide. In this referendum, De Gaulle personally appealed to the French voter for support, threw his full prestige behind the issue, and threatened to resign if his proposal did not receive clear support. All of the parties except the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (UNR) were opposed to the revision. Nonetheless, the revision was favored by a 62-percent majority of those voting or 46 percent of the 27.5 million registered voters. Almost 23 percent of the electorate abstained, a fact which reportedly greatly depressed De Gaulle.

In the 5 December election, too, it is possible that the generally accepted certainty that De Gaulle will win and the lackluster nature of the opposition will keep voters from the polls. The urge to remain at home may be offset, however, by the novelty of voting directly for a chief executive and by the large registration of first-time voters.

The Gaullist Campaign

In announcing his candidacy, De Gaulle told the French voter that he must choose between continuation of a strong, independent France and reversion to the weakness and chaos of the Fourth

Republic. To reinforce this image as a "national candidate," the general plans no personal campaign appearances. According to Minister of Information Peyrefitte, De Gaulle will not use all of the four hours of free radio-TV time allotted each candidate but will make only one or two brief TV addresses toward the end of the campaign. Moreover, Peyrefitte indicated that government ministers would speak only sparingly in support of De Gaulle's candidacy.

The campaign role of the UNR has also been minimized to strengthen De Gaulle's "above-party" appeal and to ease the way for non-Gaullist support. The general's campaign reportedly is being directed by Premier Georges Pompidou, Olivier Guichard and Jacques Foccart of the presidential palace staff, and Pierre Lefranc, who heads the National Association for the Support of De Gaulle. This organization, formed in 1958, has been used in past elections to play down De Gaulle's connection with the UNR and is again the vehicle for the "brain trust" behind De Gaulle's campaign.

The Opposition

The five opposition candidates have concentrated their attacks on De Gaulle's "personal rule" and his destruction of the constitutional balance in French politics. With varying degrees

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of enthusiasm they have also opposed De Gaulle's policies of alienating the US, reducing French participation in NATO, and weakening the EEC.

Francois Mitterrand is the strongest opposition candidate because he is the "sole candidate of the left." Mitterrand is national president of a group called the Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance, a splinter of the Radical Socialist Party. In addition he has the official support of the Radical Socialist organization itself as well as of the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Communist Party (PCF). Because he cannot hope to formulate a specific program acceptable to both his Communist and non-Communist supporters and because even informal negotiations with the PCF would cost him non-Communist votes, he has kept to vague statements of intent.

Jean Lecanuet, former president of the Catholic-oriented Popular Republic Movement (MRP), has the support of his own party and the right-wing Independent Party (CNIP). He agreed to run only after former premier Antoine Pinay and several other prominent non-Gaullists refused and by his own admission is primarily interested in offering a rallying point for the center. His candidacy received a slight boost from the last-minute withdrawal of Paul Antier, who called on his farm-based supporters to back Lecanuet. Of all the candidates, Lecanuet has been most concerned by De Gaulle's negative policies

toward the EEC and NATO, and in his campaign he has stressed the need for loyalty to the two institutions.

Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, an extreme rightist lawyer, derives most of his strength from supporters of a French Algeria, a rapidly diminishing group now that Algeria's independence is an irreversible reality. He is best known for his defense of the French military leaders who revolted against De Gaulle's Algerian policy.

The other two candidates are Independent Senator Pierre Marcihacy, who has no official party backing, and Marcel Barbu, a last-minute entry who appears primarily interested in using the radio-TV time to sound his personal views.

All of the major opposition parties are committed to one or another of the candidates. Important divisions within these parties over the merits of the respective candidates, however, reduce the significance of the official endorsements. The Socialist Party, following the lead of its long-time secretary general, Guy Mollet, "enthusiastically" announced its support for Mitterrand. Continuing differences between Mollet and Marseilles Mayor Gaston Defferre, who withdrew his candidacy after his effort to form a broad center-left coalition failed, may result in less than full support from Defferre's supporters.

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The Radical Socialist Party also endorsed Mitterrand, but several top party officials forced inclusion in the official endorsement statement of a favorable mention of Lecanuet's candidacy. Lecanuet's own MRP endorsed him, but a leading MRP figure, Maurice Shumann, publicly criticized the candidacy and endorsed De Gaulle's. He indicated that the center might be playing a "suicidal role" by standing against the general.

Even the tightly disciplined PCF may be unable to deliver a full share of Communist votes to Mitterrand. A left-wing faction which reportedly urged the party leadership to put up a PCF candidate has now spoken out against Mitterrand. Two leading Socialists have also estimated that at least 25 percent of the 4 million voters who supported PCF candidates in the 1962 National Assembly elections would vote for De Gaulle.

De Gaulle After Re-election

It is unlikely that a "narrow victory"--defined as anything less than 60 percent of those voting on the first ballot--will alter either De Gaulle's basic policies or his determination to achieve them. There is evidence, however, particularly in his handling of the Algerian war settlement, that the speed and boldness with which De Gaulle moves to implement his policies is affected by his confidence in public support.

In the past seven years he has pursued, undaunted, policies

which at one time or another have brought into opposition political parties, intellectuals, a major part of the military establishment, various economic pressure groups, and even his own cabinet. De Gaulle has always felt that his exalted person, above partisan politics and symbolic of the spirit of France, has given him a direct relationship with the French people. He has relied on this basic groundswell of support to counter the opposition of selected groups.

Proof from the voters that this special relationship was deteriorating would be likely to make De Gaulle move more cautiously in controversial areas. In the unlikely event that he fails to win a majority on the first ballot and is forced into a runoff, there is even the remote possibility that he would withdraw entirely from the race.

If he is re-elected by an overwhelming proportion of the vote, De Gaulle might well be tempted to stake out new claims in the international and domestic spheres or enlarge old ones. He seems certain to continue his efforts to seek fundamental changes in the EEC and to undermine the US and NATO presence in Europe. He is likely to push for closer relations with the USSR and a variety of nations from Africa to the Far East. The increasing cost of the French nuclear force over the next few years will not be allowed to stand in the way of its achievement.

Regardless of the size of his majority, De Gaulle is likely

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to institute some changes on the domestic scene. One of the problems he will probably move to resolve is that of his successor. The constitution provides that the president of the senate temporarily succeeds the president in the event of his death or incapacitation, a provision which would bring to the presidency Gaston Monnerville, a man who has consistently and publicly opposed him. To alter this situation, De Gaulle is said to favor making the premier, who is chosen by the president, the interim successor until an election can be held.

In addition, there will almost certainly be changes in the present cabinet, now composed primarily of Gaullist party members or those not affiliated with any party. To further strengthen his image as a president of all the people, he might include more non-Gaullists, probably drawn from parties such as the MRP and Independents, who have been flexible in their opposition to his policies.

Opposition in Postelection Period

All of De Gaulle's opponents, certain of defeat, have projected their campaigns in large part to the postelection period, hoping that, a less-than-wholesale endorsement of De Gaulle will infuse new life into the opposition parties. Moreover, it could set the stage for a determined comeback by them in the 1967 legislative elections, in which local issues will be more important and De Gaulle himself will not be di-

rectly involved. This consideration is particularly important for the CNIP and the MRP, both of which have lost much of their traditional support to the UNR.

On the other hand a massive turnout for De Gaulle could prove to be a blessing in disguise for the non-Communist opposition over the longer term. While none of the defeats which De Gaulle has inflicted on these parties since 1958 has yet been sufficient to jolt them into joining forces, a humiliating defeat in this election might shake the old-line party leaders sufficiently to lead them to reconsider the merits of close cooperation.

Seen only in terms of this one election, a single opposition candidate representing a broad federation of the major democratic parties, such as that envisaged by Gaston Defferre, probably could not have beaten De Gaulle. In fact, the present proliferation of candidates may cut more deeply into the Gaullist total than a single coalition candidate could have. Nevertheless the failure of the federation effort robbed the parties of the opportunity to demonstrate that they have turned away from the paralyzing political infighting which characterized the Fourth Republic and to lay the groundwork for cooperative efforts to be pursued in a post - De Gaulle era.

Socialist-Communist Collaboration

The French Communist Party's decision to support the Mitterrand

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candidacy affords it distinct advantages, but some of these advantages could be nullified in the postelection period. The party supported Mitterrand despite his failure to negotiate a common program with the PCF, a condition it had repeatedly stressed was the sine qua non for its endorsement. Endorsement of a candidate espousing a mildly pro-NATO and pro-EEC platform has been regarded by some Communist militants as a capitulation to the parties of the democratic left.

By endorsing Mitterrand, however, the party was spared the need to run a Communist candidate who might get a substantially smaller proportion of the total vote than the 21-25 percent the party has won in previous parliamentary elections. Moreover, in the longer run, it could be a step toward the "unity of action" on the political front long sought by the PCF.

Contributing to the party's decision, too, was the knowledge that, in view of the developing dialogue between De Gaulle and the Soviet leadership, Moscow might not greet a PCF candidate with open arms. This seems borne out by a TASS comment that the general would win support not only from committed Gaullists but also from those who "approve some positive, realistic foreign political actions of the government."

The PCF has rationalized its current tactics by claiming that

its support of Mitterrand opens the door to future, more lasting cooperation with the Socialists. Should the Socialists return to collaboration with the center parties after the election and abandon all pretense of cooperating with the Communists, the PCF would be more effectively isolated and might face severe problems of internal discipline. The utility of "popular front" candidates and cooperation with the non-Communist parties would then be increasingly questioned.

Up to this point, the Socialists have succeeded in playing down the question of Socialist-Communist cooperation and the prospect of having to work out a common program if Mitterrand were elected. Whether the postelectoral period will be marked by any extensive cooperative efforts will depend on how Mitterrand fares at the polls. If he obtains a respectable proportion of the vote, the Socialists probably will be strongly tempted to explore and expand the possibilities for common political action. Conversely, if Mitterrand fails to run up a sizable total, the Socialists will probably turn again to the center and center left. The outcome of the Mollet-Defferre battle for control of the Socialist Party, which will be carried on at a special party congress after the first of the year, may also depend in large part on Mitterrand's showing.

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