

14 January 1966

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# WEEKLY SUMMARY

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

### OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review  
completed

DIA review  
completed



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## C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 13 January 1966)

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Major military activity this week in South Vietnam was concentrated in the III Corps area, although Communist forces continued to chip away near the Quang Ngai provincial capital. There are indications of a step-up in infiltration of North Vietnamese Army elements into South Vietnam. There is no sign that the Shelepin mission to Hanoi has resulted in new Soviet military aid or brought any change in the DRV's terms for a peace settlement. Hanoi, with shrill propaganda backing from Peking, continues to denounce the US peace offensive as deceitful.	
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 Security forces are taking steps to counter expected attempts by extremists to disrupt congressional elections scheduled for 27 March and presidential elections on 1 May.

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## VIETNAM

The major allied effort this week continued to focus in Hau Nghia Province near Saigon. After a successful operation in the western part of the province between 31 December and 6 January, nearly 8,000 US and Australian troops on 8 January began a sweep of another Viet Cong base area some 40 miles to the northeast. Only sporadic resistance has been encountered, but extensive fortifications, tunnel networks, and large amounts of supplies have been uncovered. By 12 January, 109 Viet Cong had been killed and 80 captured, with only light allied casualties reported.

Large-scale enemy activity was also concentrated in the III Corps area. Viet Cong attacks of battalion strength reported in Long Khanh and Binh Long provinces on 9 January resulted in moderate government casualties. An ambush of a government convoy in Phuoc Tuy Province the previous day resulted in 34 killed (including three US advisers), 30 wounded, and 10 missing.

Communist forces continued to chip away at government positions southwest of the Quang Ngai provincial capital. On 11 January, they overran a government outpost--the fifth in this area since mid-December. Small-scale Viet Cong activity remained at the high level of the past six weeks and included acts of terrorism in Saigon.

The Saigon government intends to publicize plans for its rural construction program and the eventual formation of a national civilian advisory council during the important lunar new year (Tet) holiday which begins on 21 January. Although the ruling generals were apparently unanimous in approving these new programs, personal friction among them may affect implementation.

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PAVN Infiltration

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
Over 380 trucks were reported headed south on Route 911, through the Laos panhandle, since 27 December.

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The volume of traffic reported thus far suggests that Route 911

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*The Indochina-South China Area*

— South Vietnamese military boundaries

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is serving as an important alternate to the northern section of Route 23, which apparently has been carrying less traffic this year than last.

#### DRV Rail Lines Open

The DRV has apparently succeeded in opening all three of its major rail lines to through traffic despite repeated US air strikes before 24 December. Ac-

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the Cao Nung bridge on the Hanoi - Lang Son line, hit on 1 December, had been temporarily restored and is probably operational.

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restoration of all interdicted points on the Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line. Through traffic on this line had been impeded since the first US attacks in July, although trains were moving on uninterdicted portions. The Hanoi-Haiphong line, never seriously damaged, also appeared operational.

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#### Shelepin in Hanoi

There have been no private reports on the substance of discussions between the North Vietnamese leaders and the Shelepin delegation, which left Hanoi on 13 January. Speeches by North Vietnamese officials during the visit suggested that the DRV expressed continuing confidence in the Communist military prospects in Vietnam and gave no indication of any present willingness to modify DRV terms for a peace settlement. Hanoi's bel-

licose tone suggests that any Shelepin soundings on negotiations met a negative response.

The anti-Chinese thrust of Shelepin's mission was increasingly apparent in Soviet statements. Shelepin laid particular stress on the overriding need for bloc unity and "joint practical steps" to support Hanoi. Moscow has long used this theme in attempts to discredit Peking by emphasizing that China's unwillingness to cooperate does "serious harm" to the war effort. The USSR can also be expected to cite Premier Pham Van Dong's expression of "deep gratitude" for Soviet aid.

The Vietnamese, however, remained extremely cautious in offering any support for Moscow's efforts to discredit Peking. The premier in one speech pointedly expressed satisfaction over the "transportation" of Soviet aid goods to Vietnam--a remark which seemed designed to offset Soviet charges that the Chinese had been obstructing the USSR's aid. There were other actions during the visit which suggested Hanoi was trying to assuage Chinese irritation over the visit.

Neither Shelepin nor the North Vietnamese leaders have thus far made more than cursory public mention of Soviet military aid, which the DRV is probably pressing to increase. Shelepin has merely noted that Soviet-DRV cooperation in strengthening the defense potential of North Vietnam "continues to develop."

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The speeches betray a marked divergence between Hanoi and Moscow in their public treatment of the stepped-up US "peace offensive." Shelepin has not concurred in the North Vietnamese leaders' repeated denunciation of Washington's diplomatic efforts as "deceitful and perfidious trickery." However, he has pointed out, in keeping with standard Soviet propaganda, that the "so-called peace initiative" coincides with a continued US build-up in South Vietnam. TASS reports have toned down particularly abusive North Vietnamese comments on US moves, and Moscow has not replayed Pham Van Dong's vituperative 8 January speech.

Peking has not commented directly on Shelepin's visit to Hanoi, but Chinese news media have drawn on Western press accounts in such a way as to depict the mission as Soviet collaboration with US peace efforts. The icy treatment accorded Shelepin in his day-long stopover at Peking en route home further underscored China's disdain.

Peking has maintained a barrage of propaganda attacks against the US initiative all week. The party daily on 7 January called

the 14-point US peace proposition a "gigantic fraud" and said that the question now "is not one of peace negotiations but rather the inflicting of still heavier blows on the US." The article described the bombing pause as another "blackmail" effort and reiterated Peking's position that withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam "is the prerequisite" for a political settlement.

Peking's increasingly shrill attack may reflect concern that the US initiative could reduce Afro-Asian support for the Communist position on negotiations. Peking may also fear that Hanoi will succumb to the peace moves.

#### DRV Central Committee Meeting

According to diplomats in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese party again convened its usual year-end central committee session. There has been no formal acknowledgment that the meeting occurred, but a communiqué may be forthcoming around the middle of January. The DRV politburo was largely out of the public eye during the latter part of December. [redacted]

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## COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

North Vietnam's recent search for additional aid in China and the Soviet bloc, its second such venture in six months, reflects its dependence on Communist economic and military assistance.

In mid-1965, following a two-year lull in new economic aid, Hanoi arranged new assistance from every Soviet bloc country except Czechoslovakia as evidence of their support for North Vietnam's cause. In the last few weeks, another North Vietnamese delegation, led by Vice Premier Nghi, has revisited China and the bloc to seek more aid and postponement of payments on earlier credits, and probably to warn that Hanoi would be unable to meet many of its trade commitments.

During the past ten years Hanoi has leaned on economic assistance from other Communist countries to the tune of roughly \$1 billion. Peking's assistance accounts for almost 50 percent of that and the USSR's about 40 percent. The bulk of this aid serves to finance the import of equipment for the DRV's long-term economic development program. However, Communist assistance now being arranged probably will be used mainly to meet rapidly expanding needs for construction materials, for transport, and for the rehabilitation of war-damaged facilities.

Soviet economic aid is directed toward heavy industry, in particular mining, power, and manufacturing. The USSR is aiding in the construction of eight power projects and assisting in coal mining and machine building industries. Early Chinese aid was concentrated on rehabilitating transportation and telecommunications facilities, but now emphasizes heavy industrial projects, including the steel complex at Thai Nguyen. Roughly half of all imports from Communist countries are delivered under assistance credits.

The Vietnamese military establishment also relies on the USSR and China for its hardware and training in modern weapons. This assistance has been supplemented only marginally by captured French weapons, limited domestic production, and recently by token deliveries from East European countries.

In the last year, the scale of military aid has increased sharply. The value of deliveries from China and the USSR through 1964 is unknown, but is believed to have been small. However, Soviet deliveries of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery during the past year probably have totaled about \$100 million.

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**SECRET**The Communist World**SOVIETS INCREASING CAPABILITY FOR AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE**

Evidence that the Soviets are developing large, wheeled amphibious landing craft for their marine corps (called naval infantry) is a further indication of a program to achieve greater amphibious assault capabilities. The operational deployment of such craft would better enable the Soviets to land large numbers of troops and equipment necessary for the establishment and development of beachheads in seaborne assault operations.

Details of the new landing craft are not available. However, earlier this month a Soviet colonel of engineer troops, apparently involved in amphibious vehicle development, told the US service attachés in Moscow that his research institute had been working since 1 November on two designs of large wheeled landing craft specifically for the marine corps. The colonel stated that these projects were in line with recent Soviet "basic decisions to make a major expansion of seaborne amphibious capabilities." He indicated that the new craft would relieve the marines' present reliance on the smaller amphibious carriers designed primarily for river crossings. Soviet press coverage of marine corps activities to date has

consistently shown them to be equipped only with the smaller amphibious personnel carriers designed for the ground forces.

In other developments the colonel stated that a new medium-class tracked amphibious vehicle for the ground forces now is in production. He claimed, however, that the Soviets have decided to concentrate on large-diameter wheeled vehicles in the future development of amphibious vehicles. Wheeled vehicles, said the colonel, offer better cross-country mobility than tracked carriers, have fewer breakdowns, are easier to maintain, and require fewer spare parts.

In addition to the development of new equipment, there are indications of organizational changes in the Soviet marines. Some of the three or four marine brigades may have been enlarged to division-size units.

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**SECRET****SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ORDERS STAY IN SLUMP**

Although the USSR continues to survey the market for Western plants and equipment, and is encouraging Western salesmen to visit Moscow, there are no signs that a new round of Soviet orders will soon result. The lull in imports of machinery and equipment from the free world--dating from 1963-64--is expected to continue at least through 1967. Last year's marginal buying activity amounted to only some \$200 million worth of plants and industrial equipment.

Moscow apparently views an expanded import program as necessary to support its efforts to increase industrial output. However, the USSR's present foreign exchange shortages, resulting from heavy expenditures for grain imports, as well as the continued delay in completion of plans for 1966-70, apparently inhibit the Soviet planners from giving a go-ahead to their foreign traders. These difficulties, notwithstanding the Soviet desire for more

advanced Western technology, remain apparent in its efforts to buy know-how alone, or to conclude barter contracts for Western equipment.

French, US, German, British, Japanese, and Italian businessmen have visited Moscow during the past year. Italian firms hope that several contracts under negotiation for at least two years will be signed in 1966, but these are relatively small. Exchanges of Soviet and Italian missions and technicians to discuss a proposed \$300-million Fiat automobile plant deal are continuing, but no firm arrangement is expected soon. Other countries indicate that orders are being discussed and that the USSR continues to seek bids on large projects such as a petrochemical combine involving components from several West European countries. None seems hopeful, however, that there will be any major growth of sales in 1966.

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## POLISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS DETERIORATE

The regime's ban on travel abroad by Poland's Roman Catholic primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, is apparently related to its desire to keep Pope Paul from making a trip to Poland this May, when he reportedly was to attend the celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Poland. The regime may also want to scuttle the cardinal's own plans to visit the US next fall. In any event the ban--which may be of indefinite duration--signals a major deterioration in church-state relations.

It came less than a day before Wyszynski's scheduled post-Ecumenical Council trip to Rome for the 13 January observances of the Polish millennium at the Vatican. His talks there were expected to explore the implications of the deteriorating church-state situation in Poland for the pontiff's rumored visit. In a prompt response to the ban, the Vatican indicated that the regime move "all but eliminates" the possibility of a papal visit.

The ban culminated a month-long vituperative campaign against the cardinal's attempts--without first consulting the regime--to open a semipolitical dialogue with the German Catholic episcopate. The announcement cited the "antistate" nature of this activity as the main reason for the ban. The regime particularly castigated the conciliatory 18 November letter sent by

Polish bishops to the German hierarchy for its failure to take cognizance of East Germany or to take a stand against the "revanchist elements" in West Germany; for presenting postwar Polish acquisition of the Oder-Niesse territories as a necessary adjunct of territorial losses in the East instead of "an act of historical justice"; and for its request to "forgive and be forgiven."

The Gomulka regime apparently felt that church "meddling" in one of the most sensitive areas of Polish foreign policy was the direct result of its cautiously warm response to Cardinal Wyszynski's public support in early September for the official position on the Oder-Niesse frontier.

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Cardinal Wyszynski--who had traveled to Rome 11 times since his release in 1956 from three years of house arrest--denied on 9 January that he has been guilty of political malfeasance and promised silence on the issue. While there is little evidence of public alarm over the deteriorating church-state situation, this could be changed if the cardinal takes his case to the people.

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**SECRET**Asia-Africa

## DEADLOCK BETWEEN INDONESIAN ARMY AND SUKARNO PERSISTS

The present deadlock between Sukarno and the Indonesian Army has brought a near halt to significant economic and political moves, as army leaders continue to reject a direct thrust against the President.

[REDACTED] Sukarno has refused to ban the Communist Party unless all other political parties are banned as well. The army is apparently willing to accept such a measure, but only if Sukarno agrees to a sweeping governmental reorganization and certain policy changes.

In the face of the political impasse, efforts to grapple with Indonesia's pressing problems are faltering. The Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) apparently hesitates to exercise its authority, lest its efforts be countermanded by Sukarno's regular cabinet. Although a deputy supreme commander for economic affairs was appointed to KOTI last month, Defense Minister Nasution has publicly announced that the regular cabinet presidium retains full responsibility for economic measures.

The country's galloping inflation and other economic troubles remain largely unchecked by any recent measures. The army presumably hopes to fix the blame on Sukarno. Nevertheless, Nasution is said to fear that the President will capitalize on the situation by waiting for total economic chaos and then issuing a call for national unity.

Nasution feels that the army is vulnerable on other scores as well. Sukarno may attempt to exploit the mass killings of Communists in Java and Bali, as well as growing corruption in the army. Army leaders continue to feel that an overt move against Sukarno would split the army and generate difficulties even more grave than those facing it now.

Sukarno's expulsion of US correspondents from Indonesia this week points up his sensitivity to speculation about his political future. He feels the American press has been applauding his weakened position at the hands of the army. Ousting the correspondents gives vent to his irritation and reasserts his claim to leadership.

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**SECRET****INDIA'S CONGRESS PARTY SEEKS SUCCESSOR TO SHASTRI**

Ranking members of India's Congress Party are scheduled to meet on 14 January in New Delhi to pick a successor to Lal Bahadur Shastri. The party leadership, eager to preserve an image of unity at a time when the nation faces major economic and foreign policy problems, reportedly hopes to reach a decision quickly. The selection may be more bitterly contested, however, than in 1964 when Shastri was Nehru's heir apparent.

Home Minister G. L. Nanda, who as second-ranking cabinet member was sworn in as interim prime minister immediately after Shastri's death, probably lacks the political backing necessary to continue on in his own right.

A far stronger candidate is Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan. A former chief minister of Maharashtra State, Chavan took over the defense portfolio at the height of the 1962 Chinese invasion and has presided over a major build-up of India's armed forces. He shared with Shastri widespread acclaim for what the Indians regarded as a strong military showing in the recent war with Pakistan.

Chavan has several liabilities. At 51, he may be con-

sidered too young by senior colleagues who would be distressed at the thought of his acquiring a long-term lease on the premiership. He is not on good terms with fellow Maharashtrian S. K. Patil, who played an important role in the Shastri succession. Nevertheless, Chavan as a major force in western India may be able to make a deal with other regional bosses, such as Congress Party president Kamaraj (the south) and Atulya Ghosh (the east).

Former finance minister Morarji Desai, who lost a major bid for the office in 1964, will probably try again this time. His once-impressive political base has dwindled since he left office in August 1963. His major assets--an ability to get things done and firmness toward Pakistan--have been pre-empted during the past year by Shastri and Chavan. His best hope appears to lie in the slim possibility that Chavan, finding his own path blocked, would defer to the older (70) Desai and persuade other party powers to go along.

There is an outside chance in event of a deadlock that Kamaraj, probably the strongest figure in Indian politics, despite his limited linguistic and educational background, would take on the premiership. A deadlock among the leading aspirants might also favor the chances of several other candidates, including Steel Minister Sanjiva Reddy, Agriculture Minister Subramaniam, and Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi.

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## INDIA AND PAKISTAN AGREE ON STEPS TO EASE TENSIONS

The Tashkent Declaration of 10 January eased several of the problems which had resulted from the Indo-Pakistani war of last autumn but solved no basic quarrels. The status of Kashmir, primary cause of the conflict and the overriding issue between India and Pakistan, was mentioned only briefly. Inclusion of even this reference presumably was a concession to Pakistani President Ayub, but his acceptance of the other provisions in the declaration without substantial progress toward a Kashmir settlement must be considered a victory for the late Prime Minister Shastri.

The most important statement in the declaration provides for withdrawal, not later than 25 February, of all armed personnel to positions held prior to 5 August 1965--the date on which Pakistani-trained infiltrators began to cross the cease-fire line into Indian-held Kashmir in large numbers. This means that India now must give up areas controlling access routes used by the infiltrators--which it has been most reluctant to evacuate. Moreover, it probably would have preferred stronger assurances against future infiltration than the pledges the two countries made to base their relations on the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of each other.

According to other provisions, the high commissioners (ambassadors) will be sent back to their posts, prisoners of war will be repatriated, propaganda directed against the other nation will

be discouraged, and measures for restoring economic and trade relations will be considered.

Shastri failed to secure a no-war pact. Ayub insisted that such a pact could only follow decisive action on the major issue (i.e., Kashmir). Instead, in a nod to the UN Charter, the two leaders reaffirmed their nations' obligation to settle all disputes without recourse to force. They also pledged to continue meetings "both at the highest and at other levels"; the possibility of further summit meetings will depend on the attitude of Shastri's successor.

Shastri's death does not appear likely to prejudice implementation of the agreement unless he is succeeded by a hard-liner on Pakistan questions, such as former finance minister Morarji Desai. Interim Prime Minister Nanda has announced that his government will abide by the decisions taken at Tashkent. Immediate press comment in both countries has been generally favorable, although public reaction in Pakistan has been described as uniformly adverse and right-wing opposition leaders in India have been critical. Pakistani Government officials, however, view Tashkent as an important step toward securing "objective" Soviet treatment of Kashmir, as opposed to Moscow's previous pro-India position.

Premier Kosygin can be satisfied that he achieved the limited objectives the USSR sought when

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convening the meeting. The agreements underscore his success in bringing India and Pakistan together, apparently without irritating either party. Soviet relations with Rawalpindi were improved, and Pakistani leaders will, in the future, give more weight to Moscow's potential role in resolving the Kashmir dispute.

The USSR was also able to strengthen its position as an Asian power and lay claim to the role of peacemaker in contrast with the "incendiary" attitude of Peking throughout the crisis. The coincidence of the Tashkent talks with Shelepin's trip to North Vietnam and Brezhnev's visit to Mongolia further highlighted the USSR's present efforts to isolate Peking.

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#### COMMUNAL TENSIONS RISE IN CEYLON

The introduction and enactment of legislation allowing greater use of the minority Tamil language in certain circumstances have heightened communal tensions in Ceylon. Recognizing that serious communal riots--such as those of 1958--could bring down his government, Prime Minister Senanayake is determined to suppress any civil disorder.

The new regulations, which Parliament passed on 11 January, are designed to implement the spirit of language legislation enacted by the former socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) government. They permit the use of Tamil rather than the official Sinhala tongue for transactions between the government and the minority Tamils, who make up about 22 percent of the population. The leftist opposition, led by the former SLFP prime minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, now maintains that the new regulations are prejudicial to the majority

Sinhalese interests and will divide the state.

Following the government's introduction of the proposals on 8 January, leftist-inspired communal rioting broke out in Colombo. Clashes between police and demonstrators resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency. Strict curfews were imposed, public meetings banned, and broad press censorship instituted.

Although the coalition government had sufficient parliamentary strength to pass the new regulations, some discord has arisen within the coalition ranks. Senanayake, moreover, depends on the continuing support of the Federal Party, which is not technically a member of the coalition and has traditionally represented the more extreme Tamil demands. The intensified leftist campaign to discredit the pro-West government probably will continue to center on explosive communal issues.

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## INSTABILITY IN FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA

Unstable conditions continue to prevail in a number of former French African territories. Recently installed military regimes are consolidating their positions in Upper Volta and the Central African Republic, while political and military infighting appears to be building up in Congo (Brazzaville). Tribal dissidence in Chad and racial tension in Mauritania threaten stability in those countries.

In the Central African Republic (CAR) army chief Bokassa is trying to entrench himself in power. He has abolished the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly with no mention of new elections. He has also promised to create a society in which differences of wealth and position are abolished. Although most of his pronouncements have been greeted with enthusiasm so far, decrees abolishing polygamy and providing for mobilization of unemployed into "collective work brigades" may check his popular appeal.

The new government named in Upper Volta on 8 January excludes holdovers from the old regime as well as the leaders of the labor agitation which triggered the coup. Col. Lamizana, now President, and his military colleagues have retained direct control of all key ministries, and he has announced that the army plans to retain power until the situation is normal and the national finances are straightened out.

Voltaic political factions probably will soon seek to reassert themselves, but they now seem to be concerned primarily with the fate of ousted President Yameogo, who is "under army protection" near the capital.

Political infighting, possibly involving the military, appears to have reached a new peak within the radical Brazzaville regime.


[redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] a cabinet reshuffle was announced on 31 December. For the most part the ministers merely changed their responsibilities, but a leader of the pro-Peking faction, Secretary for Youth and Sports N'Dalla-Graille, was dropped entirely, and the able gendarmerie commander also lost his position. The over-all effect seems to be to strengthen the hand of President Massamba-Debat.

Chad's Christian President Tomba Ibaye faces mounting unrest in the predominantly Muslim eastern and central areas of his country. Dissident tribesmen who have been openly defying the authorities since October recently stepped up their attacks on security forces. Some wear military insignia, and they are showing signs of improved organization.

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Tombalbaye has strengthened the security forces by placing French officers in command, and France, which still keeps 1,000 troops in Chad, has promised increased military aid. Nevertheless the government troops would be hard pressed if the dissidents got more arms.

Mauritania appears to be entering a period of acute tension between the 25-percent Negro minority and the politically dominant Arabic-speaking Maures. On 5 January Negro secondary-school students struck in protest against a new requirement that they study Arabic. Faced with a scheduled sympathy strike of civil servants, about 80 percent of whom are Negroes, President Moktar Ould Daddah announced the suspension of all top civil servants involved.

Although the relatively well-educated Negroes provide the bulk of Mauritania's skilled

manpower, they have little representation in the cabinet and in the ruling party. Over the past year the influence of radical Arabs has been growing, especially in foreign policy. Mauritania has established diplomatic ties with several Communist countries, including China, and has lined up with radical African states on such issues as Rhodesia. 25X1

The Chinese Communists almost certainly regard their recent expulsion from Dahomey and the CAR as temporary and relatively minor setbacks. 25X1

In Dahomey, in fact, Peking's rebuff has been attenuated by the fact that its New China News Agency man is being permitted to remain. In the CAR, however, the Chinese diplomats were accused of attempting to organize a militia force and the NCNA man was also sent home.

On the other hand, Burundi expelled the US ambassador on 10 January, and the Chinese may soon be invited to re-establish diplomatic relations. 25X1

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**SECRET****BREAKDOWN OF ORDER THREATENED IN WESTERN NIGERIA**

Law and order are crumbling in Nigeria's Western Region and may soon break down completely in the face of violent resistance to the government which rigged its own re-election in October. Prospects for a compromise appear dim.

Violence has intensified in the past six weeks. Government functionaries have been murdered and much of their property has been destroyed. In some localities essential services have been interrupted, taxes are not being collected, and business activity is impaired. Ordinary criminals are taking advantage of the situation. Cars driven by Americans and Britishers and US AID vehicles have been attacked, lending substance to reports that the dissidents now consider Americans fair game on the grounds that the US is subsidizing the incumbent regime. Rioting with ugly intertribal overtones occurred on the outskirts of Lagos, the federal capital, as dissidents tried to capitalize on the attention focused on Nigeria during the Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia held there this week.

Federal security forces in the Western Region may lose control of the situation. The morale of the police, a number of whom have been killed, is low and the army is reportedly unhappy over its role in maintaining the unpopular regime.

The political opponents, who represent rival factions of the region's predominant Yoruba tribe,

have balked at all efforts to bring them together. The impasse is part of the wider struggle between progressive, predominantly non-Muslim southerners and the tradition-bound Muslim northerners who have controlled the federal government since before independence in 1960. The northerners and the unpopular Yoruba faction now in control of the Western regional government have been allied since early 1964. The dissident Yorubas, for their part, are allied with the ruling elements of the other two southern regions who are helping to fuel the current disorder.

The US Embassy in Lagos believes federal Prime Minister Balewa, a moderate northerner who has so far treated the Western difficulties as a matter for the regional government to handle, must take some dramatic action if he is to pacify the fighting Yorubas. Late last week Balewa's secretary implied that decisive measures could be expected soon. However, the northern-controlled parliament, which convened this week, may do no more than permit a brief airing of the discontent and then proceed to endorse harsh police measures which are already under way in the region. There are also indications that the regional government intends to move against non-Yoruba residents from the other two southern regions. Such action would almost certainly add to the regional strains which threaten the longer range future of the federation.

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## AFRICANS GIVE LONDON NEW BREATH ON RHODESIA QUESTION

Britain has obtained the temporary acquiescence of most African governments in its Rhodesian policy.

African representatives at the recent Commonwealth meeting in Lagos have apparently agreed to give Britain's economic sanctions program against Rhodesia several more months to work. Although members of a new sanctions committee can recommend another Commonwealth meeting "when they judge that this is necessary," July is the only deadline suggested in the Lagos communiqué for success of Britain's present policy. Another Commonwealth meeting will take place if the Rhodesian rebel regime is not toppled by then. Meanwhile, the plans of some African governments for another OAU conference on 21 January on the Rhodesian question appear to have been dropped for lack of a quorum.

The July date gives Britain more time to develop emergency supply routes to Zambia sufficient to enable Zambia to join in sanctions against Smith. US officials believe, however, that it may take until July to establish those

routes. This would delay until after July the time when Zambia, in line with Britain's strategy, can give the final thrust to the "quick kill" sanctions program. Any appreciable delay in the new extension given to British policy by the Africans at Lagos would lead those countries to increase pressure on Britain for more immediate and forceful action against Rhodesia.

Political and economic stability within Zambia, upon which Britain's Rhodesia policy depends, is potentially threatened by a conflict between the government and the Zambian Mine Workers' Union (ZMU). The union, which represents 32,000 African mine workers, is resisting attempts at control by the governing political party. Complications could arise from the reported support of the ZMU in this dispute by pro-Rhodesian Europeans in the Copperbelt who want to foment trouble for the Zambian Government. President Kaunda intends to deport any Europeans involved, and that might lead to the exodus of other already jittery whites whose skills are important in Zambia's economy.

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## FRENCH CABINET CHANGES

The cabinet changes effected in France at the time of De Gaulle's presidential inauguration on 8 January are designed to create a more liberal social and economic image for the government in anticipation of the 1967 legislative elections. In the cabinet reshuffle, 11 members were added, nine were removed, and six were shifted from one post to another.

De Gaulle's desire to project a "new look" internally is reflected in the establishment of a new "superministry" for economic and financial affairs under former premier Michel Debré. He reportedly will supervise the work of eight other cabinet-level posts, including several new ones which were created in such fields as education and housing. The precise role Debré is to play in the functioning of the government, however, particularly his relationship with Premier Pompidou, probably still remains to be worked out.

The most important figure to leave the government was finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing, who had been personally identified with the economic stabilization plan which is widely considered to have cost De Gaulle votes in December. While Giscard was personally expendable, De Gaulle is not likely to alter

fundamentally an economic policy that has limited inflationary tendencies in France and built monetary reserves to record levels.

The cabinet changes do not seem to have significantly affected the government's support in the National Assembly. With Giscard's ouster, the bloc of 35 Independent Republicans which gave the government an absolute majority might become somewhat less consistent in its support of government policies and programs. Three members of the Independent Republican Party are in the new cabinet, however, and the recognition that Gaullist support could be vital to the party's electoral success in 1967 will probably forestall any mass defection. On the other hand, De Gaulle's failure--or inability--to add any important new names to the cabinet except for Fourth Republic Premier Edgar Faure lessens the chance that the government can garner much support from the opposition.

Retention of both Pompidou and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville is in line with De Gaulle's argument that no basic changes in his foreign policy were necessitated by the presidential election and that none are intended.

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**DE GAULLE'S NEW GOVERNMENT**  
(Announced 8 January 1966)

<b>CABINET POSITION</b>	<b>FORMER MINISTER</b>	<b>*NEW MINISTER</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Newly established post	<input type="checkbox"/> Dropped from this cabinet	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Newly appointed to this cabinet
Premier	Georges POMPIDOU	Georges POMPIDOU (No party)
Minister of State for Cultural Affairs	Andre MALRAUX	Andre MALRAUX (No party)
Minister of State for Overseas Departments and Territories	Louis JACQUINOT	Pierre BILLOTTE
Minister of State in Charge of Administrative Reform	Louis JOXE	Louis JOXE (No party)
Minister of State for Justice	Jean FOYER	Jean FOYER
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Maurice COUVE DE MURVILLE	Maurice COUVE DE MURVILLE (No party)
Minister of Interior	Roger FREY	Roger FREY
Minister for Armed Forces	Pierre MESSMER	Pierre MESSMER
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs	Valery GISCARD D'ESTAING	Michel DEBRE
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Charge of Cooperation	Raymond TRIBOULET	Jean CHARBONNEL
Minister of National Education	Christian FOUCHET	Christian FOUCHET
Minister of Public Works and Housing	Marc JACQUET (Public Works and Transport)	Edgard PISANI (No party)
Secretary of State for Housing		Rolan NUNGESSER
Secretary of State for Transport		Andre BELLENCOURT (Independent Republican)
Minister of Industry	Michel MAURICE-BOKANOWSKI	Raymond MARCELLIN (Independent Republican)
Minister of Agriculture	Edgard PISANI	Edgar FAURE (Radical)
Minister of Social Affairs	Gilbert GRANDVAL (Labor) Raymond MARCELLIN (Public Health and Population)	Jean Marcel JEANNENEY (No party)
Minister of Veterans & War Victims Affairs	Jean SAINTENY	Alexandre SANGUINETTI
Minister of Post & Telecommunications	Jacques MARETTE	Jacques MARETTE
Secretary of State Attached to the Premier for Information	Alain PEYREFITTE (Minister of Information)	Yvon BOURGES
Secretary of State Attached to the Premier for Relations with Parliament	Pierre DUMAS	Pierre DUMAS
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	Michel HABIB-DELONCLE	Jean DE BROGLIE (Independent Republican)
Secretary of State for the Budget	Robert BOULIN	Robert BOULIN
Minister for Youth & Sports	Maurice HERZOG	Francois MISSOFFE
Minister Delegate to the Premier for Scientific Research, Atomic Energy, and Space Questions	Yvon BOURGES	Alain PEYREFITTE
Secretary of State for Foreign Trade		Charles de CHAMBRUN (Democratic Center - associated with Christian Democrats, MRP)
Secretary of State for Home Affairs		Andre BORD
Secretary of State for National Education		Michel HABIB-DELONCLE

\* Members of the Gaullist UNR party or its labor affiliate, the UDT, unless otherwise indicated.

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## THE FIVE TO CONFRONT FRANCE AT EEC MEETING NEXT WEEK

A special EEC Council session--the first since June with French participation--will be held in Luxembourg on 17 and 18 January to discuss ways of resolving the Common Market crisis. The French are expected to raise the questions of majority voting and the role of the EEC Commission, and prospects are uncertain at best.

Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak believes that France is still bent on "emptying the Rome Treaty of its political content and significance" and is unlikely to be satisfied with any proposal the Five are likely to make. He insists that he will not accept any compromise which will weaken the EEC, and is deeply concerned, therefore, lest a "showdown fight" catch the Five without contingency plans. The Five have apparently not reached any coordinated position on issues likely to be discussed, but are committed to resist concessions which would violate treaty provisions.

Some reports indicate that a formula to bridge the majority rule question is still being sought. Bonn, for example, is reportedly considering a procedure whereby a member country could claim "vital interest," thereby presumably opening the applicability of majority vote to debate. The Foreign Ministry official who explained this idea cited Bonn's desire, however, to get on with community decisions on Kennedy Round negotiations "regardless of the outcome of the Luxembourg meeting." Another German official has insisted that his government would not "dream" of giving the French a veto in this area.

Should the French push extreme demands in Luxembourg, the Five are likely to reaffirm their adherence to community principles and feel freer to move ahead without the French. The permanent Brussels representatives of the Five have reportedly already agreed to hold the "normal" council session at the end of January, when the community budgets and the Kennedy Round would be the principal topics. Any decisions on these issues without the French would undoubtedly move the community close to a complete break.

French tactics remain unclear. Paris' agreement last week to go along with the 1 January 10-percent cut in the EEC's internal tariff and its proposal to postpone for four months a decision regarding the common external tariff may indicate a desire to avoid a confrontation with the Five at this time. A French spokesman hinted that a delay could be used "for surmounting difficulties of all kinds which have arisen from the present situation."

A more recent report indicates Paris may attempt at Luxembourg to reopen the whole question of Europe's organization. A French official in the EEC Commission stated that a cabinet-level group in Paris was considering a revival of past French proposals for a confederal political and military arrangement in Europe. Such a tactic would seem to have little chance of success without a simultaneous offer of some role for the British. 25X1

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## DOMINICAN STALEMATE CONTINUES

Leaders of the Dominican Republic's regular military forces have made it clear they will not obey President Garcia Godoy's order to leave the country until Francisco Caamano departs for an overseas assignment. The rebel leader says he will not leave until he has guarantees to protect those rebel military who remain behind. Tensions have been eased temporarily by the collapse of a leftist-led general strike late on 11 January and the departure of six second-echelon rebel officers to attaché posts abroad, but agitation by the extreme left or extreme right could touch off violence with little warning.

On 6 January Garcia Godoy issued a decree assigning Minister of Defense Rivera, the army and air force chiefs, and nine leading rebel military personnel to overseas posts and naming navy chief Jimenez to replace Rivera. The action came as the result of the regular officers' refusal to obey an earlier presidential edict and followed an all-out leftist campaign to press the President to oust top military leaders. The campaign included a threat by Juan Bosch's party to "paralyze the nation" with a strike.

The military refused to obey and seized key communications installations throughout the country, and Jimenez rejected his new post. Most military leaders are sincere in the belief that changes in command would seriously impair morale and effectiveness since the shifts would appear to be the result of a capitulation to leftist demands. It is also evident that they see the action as a threat to the traditional autonomy of the armed forces.

[REDACTED]

the President intends to name himself as defense minister, an action that would also exacerbate civilian-military hostility. The regular military now say they will "consider" leadership changes once rebel military leaders--particularly Caamano--depart. Rivera says he is under considerable pressure from the army, air force, and civilian rightist groups to stay. Nevertheless, he would probably go once Caamano leaves, if he were permitted a dignified exit.

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In an attempt to press Garcia Godoy into keeping the rebel military leaders in the country, Communists and extreme leftist labor organizations joined forces with radical firebrands in the rebel camp in calling a general strike beginning on 10 January. The strike was only partially successful, however, as Bosch's party refused to join in and the general public remained indifferent. During the strike, however, Communist-led youths once again demonstrated their ability to tie up Santo Domingo with demonstrations and disturbances. Bosch has become increasingly critical of Caamano and probably would not be

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unhappy to see him go. This attitude arises from Bosch's feeling that if Caamano stays he might head a rejuvenated "constitutionalist" movement.

The President will probably exhaust other alternatives before asking the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to enforce his edict. The President demonstrated his willingness to call on the IAPF when on 7 January he asked it to regain control of Radio Santo Domingo from the regular military. Genral Alvim,

the IAPF commander, refused, and Rivera voluntarily turned the radio back to the government, on condition that it not be used to press for changes in the military hierarchy.

The regular military are probably encouraged by Alvim's reluctance to use the IAPF against them. The estranged relations between the IAPF and the OAS Committee may improve shortly, as Alvim is to be replaced by Brazilian Major General Braga on 17 January.

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#### BRAZIL'S WAR MINISTER ENTERS PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Brazil's war minister, General Arthur Costa e Silva, confirmed in a 4 January press conference that he will be a candidate in this year's presidential election. Some time before 3 October, Congress is to elect the successor to President Castello Branco, who is himself barred from re-election.

Costa e Silva hopes for endorsement as the government's candidate, but has hinted that he would consider running on an opposition ticket if Castello Branco does not support him. Costa e Silva apparently believes that he has a good chance of receiving the backing of major opposition groups because they lack a strong candidate. The President and his close advisers seem to prefer someone with a broader understanding of political problems, but they apparently are still undecided on a choice.

Costa e Silva's sudden announcement may have been intended to pressure Castello Branco into deciding in his favor. The administration's public reaction thus far has been confined to a statement by Justice Minister Magalhaes that any candidate must be nominated by a political party and that no new parties have been formed to replace those abolished last October.

Differences of opinion over a successor to Castello Branco could lead to serious friction between the war minister and other administration leaders. This in turn might weaken Castello Branco's military support, since Costa e Silva has been the decisive element in maintaining the loyalty of the armed forces behind the government.

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
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**COLOMBIAN COMMUNISTS THREATEN PRE-ELECTION DISTURBANCES**


The Colombian administration and its security forces are taking steps to counter possible attempts by extremists to disrupt congressional elections scheduled for 27 March and presidential elections set for 1 May.

The Chinese-supported Colombian Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML) began a propaganda campaign in mid-December urging a boycott of the elections.



The groups participating in this effort are all quasi-independent offshoots of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). They may be joined by the so-called Hard Line (Linea Dura) of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL/LD). This is one of the dissident groups in the Liberal Party. The PCC has already gone on record in its newspaper as opposed to a boycott, claiming that voting against the governing National Front is a more effective protest.

In addition to terrorism, extremists may also try to exploit strikes in several parts of the country. The threat is especially great in the petroleum industry and in major ports. The petroleum workers' union, long under the control of Communists, includes many members who have been trained in rabble-rousing and sabotage techniques. They caused damage exceeding \$2 million to US and Colombian oil installations in the strike of August 1963.



Any serious upsurge of guerrilla activity or terrorism would be a great embarrassment to President Valencia and the National Front government. One of the administration's achievements to which National Front candidates are expected to point with pride is the successful campaign against banditry and Communist guerrilla bands.



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