

15 April 1966

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 14 April 1966)

Far East

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Buddhist pressure has forced the Ky government to call for general elections within three to five months, but it is still uncertain whether this concession will satisfy the Buddhist leadership. Throughout the week the Buddhists have tried to strengthen their control of the demonstrators and have virtually pledged an all-out attack on the government. Viet Cong military action included a mortar attack on Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airfield and heavy resistance to US operation ABILENE. Hanoi and Peking propagandists are citing the south's political turmoil as additional proof that the US position is crumbling and that Communist victory is inevitable.	
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
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- COLOMBIA TO ELECT PRESIDENT 24
Carlos Lleras, the government's candidate, is assured of victory in the presidential election on 1 May. The election is not expected to arouse much popular enthusiasm.
- BARRIENTOS ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR BOLIVIAN PRESIDENCY 24
The former co-president of the military junta will have Luis Adolfo Siles as his running mate. The opposition has until 3 May to file nominations.

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Far East

VIETNAM

The political crisis in South Vietnam continued unabated this week as militant Buddhist elements tried to force the Ky government to hold immediate elections for a constituent assembly. On 14 April, the government tried to meet some of the Buddhist demands by offering to hold general elections within three to five months. Whether these concessions will satisfy the Buddhist leadership is not yet clear.

The Buddhist Institute on 9 April issued three communiqués--two designed to tighten Buddhist control over demonstrators in Saigon, and a third demanding an elected constitutional convention in the shortest possible time. A "leadership committee of Buddhist forces" was organized to wage a "more effective campaign" for their objectives. Institute leaders later spelled out Buddhist demands in a militant hard line which virtually pledged all-out attack on the Ky government.

The Ky government itself continues to face internal dissension. Reports circulating during the week indicated that some military elements in the government were highly dissatisfied with the premier's failure to exert firm pressure against the struggle forces in Da Nang. His intention to replace National Police Director Lieu drew the disapproval of influential cabinet members who preferred a less extreme course. Ky has now, at

least for the moment, reversed his decision on Lieu. He may have deferred to these officials who view Lieu as an important link with influential nongovernmental figures, including moderate Buddhist leaders and General Thi. The newly appointed I Corps commander, General Dinh, has apparently succeeded in exerting at least partial authority over antigovernment military units in the Da Nang area without force, but civil administration and the radio station remain in the hands of antigovernment elements.


The government's major concession to the Buddhists, the convening of the National Political Congress on 12 April, was initially unsuccessful. Only about half of the 168 invited delegates attended. Buddhist and Catholic religious leaders were notably absent. The council's call for general elections within four months, however, appeared to meet many Buddhist demands. However, the issue of whether the Ky regime will function as a provisional government is still in question.

Military Developments in South Vietnam

Following a relative lull in enemy activity during the past two weeks, Viet Cong military action picked up this week. A mortar attack against Tan Son Nhut Airfield some four miles northwest of Saigon killed at least seven US personnel and wounded 106. In addition, 63

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aircraft were damaged or destroyed and numerous airfield structures and POL storage facilities were set ablaze. This was the second major terrorist attack directed chiefly against US forces in as many weeks, each of which has resulted in over 100 casualties.

The heaviest fighting of the week, and the most costly for the US in some time, occurred in Phuoc Tuy Province some 40 miles south-east of Saigon where six battalions of the US 1st Infantry Division are concluding the second week of Operation ABILENE. After several days of facing only sporadic enemy resistance in ground sweep operations, following a series of B-52 Stratofortress strikes against suspected VC training and base camp areas, a US company on 12 April was engaged by an estimated Viet Cong battalion heavily armed with mortars, automatic weapons, and small arms. Thirty-four Americans were killed, 60 wounded, and four were listed as missing or captured. Later in the day a second US company skirmished with an estimated VC platoon in the same general area, bringing the total losses for the operation to date to 46 US killed and 120 wounded as against 55 enemy killed, 22 captured, and 675 suspects apprehended.

Hanoi on Unrest in the South and Negotiations

Both Hanoi and the Liberation Front have used their propaganda apparatus to encourage a continuation of protest demonstrations, hitting hard on the theme that the present "urban struggle movement" has the same goals as the Liberation Front. It has also tried to

channel as much of the antigovernment sentiment as possible into anti-Americanism. The Communists have singled out the more moderate elements among the demonstrators as traitors, probably in an effort to forestall any compromise settlement.

Hanoi's reaffirmation of its opposition to any settlement except on its own terms reflects its confidence of eventual victory. After several weeks of only muted discussions of negotiations, Hanoi used the 8 April first anniversary of the announcement of the "four-point" stand to restate emphatically its continued adherence to that demand. Articles and editorials appeared in all the major news media, emphasizing that the four points constitute a package and that the US must accept all four, particularly point three which deals with recognition of the Liberation Front.

Infiltration

Hanoi's determination to press the war is also reflected in the continuing dispatch of large numbers of PAVN troops to South Vietnam. The presence of 11 North Vietnamese Army units of regimental strength along with five separate battalions, totaling some 20,000 men, has been confirmed. In addition, the presence of at least eight to ten other PAVN units is suspected. If confirmed, these units would raise the total PAVN strength in South Vietnam to over 30,000. Available evidence indicates that large-scale infiltration is continuing as the Communists prepare for their rainy season offensive.

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In addition to infiltrating regular units, Hanoi has recently been forced to send in a considerable number of replacements for Viet Cong and PAVN casualties. Many of these troops are being assigned to what had once been purely Viet Cong units as well as filling out depleted PAVN units.

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timates of infiltration in 1965 reach almost 20,000 men, and preliminary estimates for the first ten weeks of 1966 total more than 3,500.

Peking on Vietnam

The political upheaval in South Vietnam has probably also strengthened Chinese faith in ultimate Communist victory. There are no indications of a shift away from Peking's sober view of the over-all situation, however.

The main object of Peking's policy is still to keep the Vietnamese Communists in the fight while holding Chinese risks at as low a level as possible.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

People's Daily on 10 April asserted that popular unrest in South Vietnam provides "fresh proof" that the US position is "fast crumbling," but an editorial printed the next day took the long view on revolutionary struggle and warned that expecting victory in every battle "is asking the impossible."

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INDONESIA'S RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

Djakarta's current anti-Peking orientation, superimposed on traditional Indonesian dislike of the local Chinese, is generating the highest level of anti-Chinese demonstrations and seizures of Chinese property since independence. Stringent restrictions and lack of protection by Indonesian authorities have forced Chinese Communist consulates in Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes to close. Chinese schools and associations in wide areas of Indonesia have either been confiscated outright or "placed under the protection" of local military authorities.

The current anti-Chinese activity is being planned and carried out primarily by anti-Communist Moslem youth groups who in many instances appear to receive varying degrees of covert support from local military authorities.

In the latest of a long series of protest notes to Djakarta, Peking requested on 12 April that the Indonesian Govern-

ment immediately arrange for the evacuation of all Chinese who wish to leave for the mainland and ensure protection and accommodation at ports of embarkation. This appears to be designed to discredit the new government and improve Peking's image among the Overseas Chinese. If significant numbers of Chinese should seek repatriation, Indonesia would be in no position to comply with Peking's demand that transportation to the mainland be provided.

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Djakarta, for its part, appears entirely willing to let relations deteriorate.

A suggestion for a "counterattack" by Radio Indonesia, made by Indonesia's minister of information on 8 April, may mark the beginning of a concerted anti-Peking propaganda campaign.

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**CHANGES IN SOVIET PARTY RULING BODIES
AT 23rd CONGRESS, 8 APRIL 1966**

PRESIDIUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE _____ Title changed _____ **POLITBURO OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

Members

BREZHNEV-----				BREZHNEV
KOSYGIN-----				KOSYGIN
PODGORNY-----				PODGORNY
SUSLOV-----				SUSLOV
VORONOV-----				VORONOV
KIRILENKO-----				KIRILENKO
SHELEPIN-----				SHELEPIN
MAZUROV-----				MAZUROV
POLYANSKY-----				POLYANSKY
SHELEST-----				SHELEST
SHVERNIK-----		Replaced By		PELSHE
MIKOYAN-----		Dropped		

Members

Candidates

DEMICHEV-----				DEMICHEV
GRISHIN-----				GRISHIN
MZHAVANADZE-----				MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV-----				RASHIDOV
USTINOV-----				USTINOV
SHCHERBITSKY-----				SHCHERBITSKY
YEFREMOV-----		Dropped		
		Added		KUNAYEV
		Added		MASHEROV

Candidates

SECRETARIAT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

First Secretary

BREZHNEV-----

Secretaries

SUSLOV-----
SHELEPIN-----

DEMICHEV-----
USTINOV-----
ANDROPOV-----
PONOMAREV-----
KAPITONOV-----
KULAKOV-----
RUDAKOV-----
PODGORNY-----

Added

Dropped

SECRETARIAT OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

General Secretary

BREZHNEV

Secretaries

SUSLOV
SHELEPIN
KIRILENKO
DEMICHEV
USTINOV
ANDROPOV
PONOMAREV
KAPITONOV
KULAKOV
RUDAKOV

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Europe

SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES

The composition of the new party bodies elected last week indicates that the power balance within the leadership remains substantially unaltered.

Changes in the Presidium--now renamed Politburo--and Secretariat were minor. As expected, Brezhnev received the title of general secretary and emerged from the 23rd Party Congress with enhanced prestige. The two old party veterans, Mikoyan and Shvernik, were retired. The addition to the Politburo of three republic party bosses--Pelshe from Latvia, Kunayev from Kazakhstan, and Masherov from Belorussia--placed greater emphasis on regional representation. Pelshe also replaced Shvernik as chairman of the Party Control Committee.

The retention on the Presidium of those identified with a moderately liberal position--Podgorny and Kirilenko, for example--is evidence that the more orthodox faction has not fully consolidated its position. In a sharp break with past precedent, few of the full members of the Presidium spoke in the debate. One of these, President Podgorny, made a plea for greater democracy within the party. The appeal was distinctly out of key with the generally hard tone of the other speeches. It thus appears that the members of the leadership have, for now, agreed to accept some airing of the differing


points of view among them, and issues such as the treatment of Stalin and the role of the party in the life of the country remain unresolved.

Brezhnev departed from the recent practice of listing the members of the Politburo and Secretariat alphabetically. It appears from his listing that Suslov ranks next after him on the Secretariat, and that Shelepin and Kirilenko rank below Suslov in that order. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov were accorded protocol treatment which appears intended to point up the importance attached to experience and to convey an impression of a stable collective leadership around this hard core.

The changes in the composition of the two bodies elected by the Congress--the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission--are the smallest since the early 1930s before Stalin began his great purge. The changes suggest that Brezhnev was the strongest single influence in the selection of new members. No shift in the relative proportion of party and government officials is apparent. The military representation increased slightly (34 to 36), but the number of retired or semiretired marshals almost doubled (4 to 7). The replacement of cultural figures at the two extremes of the political

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spectrum by more moderate representatives is indicative of the over-all results of the congress. The final resolution on the political program of the party, although setting a line of greater orthodoxy in party and cultural affairs, was not especially

tough and Brezhnev's last speech carried a conciliatory tone. The net effect was to suggest that the Soviet leadership had taken a slight shift to the right but by and large was still middle of the road.

IMPORTANT RAILROAD UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR

The USSR has recently started construction of a railroad which will span the 440 miles between Tyumen and Surgut in an important new oil-producing region in Western Siberia.

The new line will have considerable economic significance, because access to this area for freight now is solely by river during the six-month navigation season, and by a temporary road built over the frozen ground in winter. Pipelines now under construction or already in use will eventually handle the bulk of the petroleum moving out of the area, but a railroad is required to carry freight to support oil operations.

The new line will also have some military significance. In particular, it and other lines now planned or under construction will open up more of this vast,

sparsely settled region for the further proliferation of ICBM sites.

Some Soviet authorities have suggested that the Tyumen-Surgut link may eventually become part of a second rail connection across Siberia to the Pacific, in addition to the existing Trans-Siberian line. Even the most optimistic Soviet writers, however, believe that 15 to 20 years would be required to complete such a system. Even when completed, it would not be economical for a much longer period, because this would depend on the exploitation of a huge undeveloped area. In view of the continuing competition over the allocation of industrial resources in the USSR, it is questionable whether the Tyumen-Surgut line will ever be extended to the Soviet Far East and the Pacific.

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SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS

Premier Kosygin's report on foreign trade to the 23rd party congress catalogued the fundamental problems the USSR faces--primarily a need to expand exports. He exhorted Russians, from laborer to factory manager, to seek solutions. The presentation differed from that given during the Khrushchev regime when expansive goals were stated with little attention to the means of accomplishment.

Kosygin directed attention mainly to trade with the developed West, and dismissed trade with underdeveloped countries with little more than cursory consideration, pointing out its primarily political character. Trade with developing nations is largely dependent on Soviet deliveries on credit under aid programs and has shown little vitality in recent years.

Kosygin detailed exchanges with Western industrial countries, linking imports from them to Soviet earnings there. He indicated that more salesmanship is needed to promote Soviet "first-class equipment" which fails to reach Western markets because of lack of advertising and proper equipment servicing. The prospects for more licensing agreements for technological know-how which could save "hundreds of millions of rubles" on scientific research also was emphasized.

During the past year under the direction of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the USSR has paid strict attention to the need for expanded foreign exchange earnings. Tightly managed foreign trade last year

enabled the USSR to cut hard currency outlays to about one half the record expenditures of 1964, thus reducing the impact of the large grain purchases since 1963 on financial reserves. Recently released trade results for 1965 show that Soviet exports to the free world rose by 15 percent while imports were kept to a two-percent rise, reversing the trend of recent years. Gold sales in 1965 dropped to \$310 million from the \$520 million per year in 1963 and 1964. Testifying to the continuing Soviet efforts to "pay as you go," recent evidence suggests that the USSR plans to refrain from its usual spring gold sales this year, which in recent years have been used to meet the costs of wheat purchases.

Kosygin reiterated that serious attention must be paid to the most effective use of imports. He suggested that the "cap" will remain on the Soviet industrial plant import program, which has hitherto been financed in part by Western credits, until a significant expansion of export earnings occurs.

Soviet purchases from the free world, however, approach \$2.5 billion annually, some 30 percent of all imports. The USSR continues selectively to buy plants and machinery from the West. Such purchases were about \$250 million last year. Some contracts already have been signed this year and the USSR now is negotiating with Fiat of Italy for an automobile production facility which may cost several hundred million dollars.

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FIREBAR CRASH IN WEST BERLIN

The Firebar, twin-jet, high-performance fighter which crashed in the British sector of West Berlin on 6 April, is the most modern operational fighter in the Soviet inventory.

This aircraft, built in January 1966, belonged to the Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army in East Germany. It crashed for unknown reasons during a probable delivery flight. Salvage operations

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[redacted] have provided a unique opportunity for first-hand study of this aircraft. It is believed to carry the best operational electronic and other equipment available on any fighter in the Soviet air forces. Prior to the crash, Firebar prototypes had been observed only in a fly-by at the 1961 Tushino Air Show. Recently Firebars were shown on Soviet television and appeared in photography after their initial delivery to East Germany about three weeks ago.

Soviet desire to prevent Allied intelligence exploitation of the Firebar was apparent shortly after the crash when the Soviets demanded that their salvage teams be allowed to raise the plane. The British refused, replying that the plane was in their sector and it was their responsibility to recover it. Soviet divers at the crash site

were not allowed to enter the water and Soviet observers were required to remain about 200 yards from the salvage barge.

From the beginning the Soviets showed no intentions of challenging British jurisdiction, and only once made any threats. They told the British that if their demands were not met they would take "appropriate measures" the responsibility for which would rest with the British. This position was later softened and subsequent Soviet protests, while frequent, avoided further threats. In the public media, the Soviets have said little except for a statement released shortly after the crash proclaiming the aircraft crew as heroes for flying the disabled plane into an unpopulated area.

Having failed to prevent the exploitation of the Firebar, the Soviets apparently lost interest in the expeditious return of the aircraft. On 9 April, when the British offered to return the already recovered portions of the aircraft, the Soviets refused and insisted that the British return the complete aircraft. Finally on 13 April, after the British threatened to move the aircraft because it was creating a hazard for river traffic, the Soviets agreed to transfer conditions and accepted the aircraft.

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NATO ALLIES DEVELOPING COMMON POSITIONS

In the meeting of Atlantic Council representatives on 7 April, America's 14 NATO allies insisted on close consultation over any major moves in response to French actions in withdrawing from the NATO military structure. Substantive objections also were raised about the draft of a US reply to the French aide-memoire on 29 March. The main complaint was the lack of time for consultation on the situation. The US note was modified to take the substantive objections into account and was presented to the French Government on 12 April. Belgium and the UK also submitted drafts of their proposed replies for further consideration by the other allies.

On 4 April, the 14 agreed that the US, UK, and West Germany should take the lead in preparing a coordinated position on the question of the continued presence of French troops in Germany. A meeting of the representatives of these three governments has been scheduled for 15 and 16 April in Bonn. On 18 April, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville will arrive for exploratory talks with the Bonn government. Despite the conciliatory tone of Bonn's recent cabinet statement, German insistence that French forces cannot remain in Germany merely on the basis of the 1954 convention once "integration is broken up" indicates that this question is far from settled as De Gaulle wishes.

The Benelux governments foresee difficulties in relocating major NATO military commands now in France in their small and crowded countries, but reportedly concluded that there was no alternative. They foresaw considerable domestic political opposition, however. Italy, on the other hand, appears more eager to receive some of the installations, and a Ministry of Defense study is reported to have recommended a military school at Turin as a site for the NATO War College.

Belgium probably would welcome the North Atlantic Council (NAC) political headquarters for prestige reasons, but it probably would prefer not to have SHAPE, with its 3,000-member staff. The UK has also offered to receive NAC headquarters, but recognizes the need to keep the military headquarters on the continent. The 14 disagree over whether the NAC political headquarters should be moved if the French do not require it. The UK, West Germany, Belgium, Turkey, and Iceland are reported to feel that NAC could not operate efficiently in Paris. Italy, Denmark, and Portugal oppose any move for fear it would endanger cooperation in other fields and make resumption of French participation in NATO more difficult. The Netherlands and Luxembourg, although expressing their neutrality, probably would agree to a move.

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EEC COUNCIL MAKES LIMITED PROGRESS

The French permitted the council at last week's meeting to define the EEC's negotiating position on several Kennedy Round issues apparently in return for German agreement that the financial regulation for the community's agricultural policy be settled no later than 10 May. The Kennedy Round advances--principally in the chemicals and aluminum sectors--were in fact slight, but the Five were apparently gratified by the French "concessions."

On the financing of agriculture, the council reached agreement in principle on almost all the major issues. Some of these agreements, however, remain somewhat vague and imprecise--notably on the date for the farm fund to assume responsibility for subsidizing products other than grain, on the member-state contributions to the fund for the "transitional" period up to 30 June 1967, and on the level of certain fund expenditures. The US mission has noted that some of the agreements could become "unstuck" in the process of filling in the many details.

Bonn has been insisting that agreement on agricultural financing be contingent on parallel progress on the Kennedy Round. Should the financial regulations be settled in May, however, it is unlikely that the community will have been able substantially to advance its Kennedy Round position by that time. The Belgians and Dutch

are concerned that foot-dragging by Bonn on agricultural financing would--in view of French insistence on its priority--be even more damaging to Kennedy Round prospects.

Settlement of the financing question would further reduce the credibility of future French threats to abandon the Common Market. It is, however, uncertain whether the Five would feel strong enough to resist if France later proves reluctant to advance the Kennedy Round. The complexity of Kennedy Round interests--both in and out of the community--could in any case enable Paris to avoid the onus for delays.

At last week's meeting, the Commission's proposal for a world wheat agreement was backed by the Five, but opposed by France. The French plan calls for a higher world price which, in effect, would generate funds--principally from the major commercial importers, the UK, Japan, and Germany--to finance noncommercial exports to underdeveloped countries.

Some of the Five have the impression that Paris will be flexible despite the fact that its plan would be extremely beneficial to France and reflects Paris' long-standing views on surplus financing. Paris appears, moreover, to interpret present US production trends as giving the US reason to favor the French plan.

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EUROPEAN LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

The current campaign by Communist-controlled trade unions for representation in EEC consultative bodies is likely to have important implications for the European labor movement. Last November the French and Italian General Confederations of Labor (CGT and CGIL)--the two largest Communist-dominated trade unions in Europe--resolved jointly to seek community representation and establish a committee to work for a common front of Western European trade unions.

The immediate aim of the unions is to gain seats on the advisory Economic and Social Committee (ESC) scheduled for re-appointment on 24 April. ESC membership legally is decided unanimously by the Council, but the ultimate decision on each national delegation rests with the member state concerned.

In Italy, the decision of the coalition parties is likely to be a difficult one, especially in view of the fact that the Socialists are the second major party both in the government and the CGIL. Unions oriented to the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats--but not necessarily all elements of the two parties--are opposed to the CGIL's representation. A negative decision in Rome could embarrass the center-left government if the French subsequently acceded to the CGT's demands.

The French decision apparently now rests with De Gaulle.

The government already permitted CGT delegates to represent labor interests--in rotation with other French unions--at the ILO, but it is reportedly divided over sending them to the EEC. The Socialist Workers' Force is strongly opposed. The Democratic French Confederation of Labor does not favor CGT representation, but doubts that, if present, the CGT could exert much influence on the free trade unionists dominating the ESC.

The joint CGT-CGIL line reflects the increasing emphasis which the Italians place on regional labor cooperation, as opposed to ties with the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). It also parallels increasing Communist "acceptance" of the EEC itself, and the recognition that the Italian Government may, in fact, soon seat some Communist deputies in its delegation to the European Parliament.

The seating of CGT and CGIL delegates in community bodies is also likely to raise problems for the two free trade-union internationals--the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU). The Secretariat of the EEC organization of free trade unions has already had to reject an appeal that the ICFTU propose a common program for its European affiliates and those of WFTU.

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Middle East - Africa

ABDULLAH YAFI FORMS NEW LEBANESE CABINET

On 9 April, Lebanese President Hilu announced that a new cabinet had been formed under Abdullah Yafi. Yafi is an ardent Arab nationalist but a political moderate. He has not been prominent in local politics since 1958, when he was one of the principal Muslim leaders of the antigovernment forces in the "civil war." Although he is not himself a member of the legislature, Yafi has been able to put together a cabinet of eight members of parliament and one nonmember, in addition to himself. Formal parliamentary approval of the new cabinet is expected within two weeks.

The new cabinet represents a broad spectrum of Lebanese political opinion and is essentially a coalition of the so-called "majority" and "minority" factions in the legislature. The previous two cabinets, formed by Rashid Karami in July and December 1965, had been made up entirely of nonpolitical technicians, since the majority and minority had not been able to agree on the composition of a coalition government.

Yafi says he will continue the reform policies of the outgoing cabinet, which include a clean-up of the administration and the implementation of economic development and social security programs. These programs, however, are likely to be impeded by the inability of the politicians in the cabinet to agree on specific measures.

The new cabinet will also continue the traditional Lebanese policy of neutrality among the Arab states, and between the East and West. This policy has always coincided, however, with close relations with the US.

Yafi has stated specifically that Lebanon will not become a member of any "alliance," an obvious reference to the "Islamic alliance" proposed by King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, which Arab nationalists in Lebanon and elsewhere regard as an anti-Nasir plan supported by the US. Yafi's statement was apparently required to encourage more radically nationalist and socialist groups, like that headed by left-leaning Druze leader Kamal Jumblat, to participate in the new government.


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CONGO (Léopoldville): Provincial Consolidation



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CONGO PRESIDENT MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE POSITION

Congo's President Mobutu, now in his fifth month in power, is moving to strengthen his domestic position and to end his diplomatic isolation.

General Mobutu, who was almost unacceptable to neighboring African rulers when he seized power last November, made great gains at the recent Nairobi conference of leaders of 11 east and central African nations. He made points by emphasizing that he had repudiated excessively pro-Belgian policies of the despised Tshombé regime, and he secured commitments from neighboring states to end all aid to the few remaining rebel forces. Visits he paid to the capitals of Uganda and Burundi may help make the commitments stick.

Congolese military forces, with mercenaries in the van, continue to make progress against rebels in the northeastern provinces and west of Lake Tanganyika.

On the domestic front, Mobutu is trying to use the Congo's meager

administrative talents more effectively by consolidating provinces. On 5 April he announced that the 21 provinces would be realigned into 12 new ones--a step back toward the preindependence arrangement. The announcement has stirred up those provincial bureaucrats who fear a loss of position and those tribes which dislike their new affiliations. Opposition from these sources, and general Congolese inertia, may prevent implementation of the program.

One of the changes may provide a new indication of how much strength Tshombé retains in his old Katanga stronghold. Two provinces, one of them now ruled by Tshombé's old henchman, Munongo, are being combined into a new Sud-Katanga. While Tshombé watches from his self-exile in Belgium, the two old provincial legislatures are to meet jointly on 25 April to select a governor of the new province. In the meantime, political infighting will prevail over performance of administrative duties in all areas subject to the changes.

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IRAQI PRESIDENT KILLED IN AIR CRASH

The death of President Arif in an air crash on 13 April removes the one stabilizing political factor in Iraq. No other Iraqi in or out of the government has comparable stature and influence. Rival military factions within the regime almost certainly now will maneuver for control, and Baathist, pro-Nasirist, and other nationalist groups now will be encouraged to try to seize power.

According to the constitution, the cabinet and the National Defense Council must elect a successor within a week. Prime Minister Bazzaz, who is temporarily serving as president, seems the least controversial of the likely candidates and hence may get the office. However, the chances for maintaining order for very long appear to be slim in view of the government's internal differences and the plotting against it.

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UN GIVES BRITAIN INCREASED POWERS IN RHODESIAN CRISIS

The UN Security Council, after the unprecedented delay caused by its African chairman, authorized Britain on 9 April to use force to prevent oil shipments to Rhodesia through the Port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique. The resolution-- approved by ten Council members, with the Communist members, France, Uruguay, and Mali abstaining--states that the Security Council finds the situation a "threat to the peace."

The resolution calls on Portugal not to receive oil at Beira destined for Rhodesia nor to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia, asks all states to divert vessels believed to be carrying oil to Rhodesia, and authorizes Britain to arrest and detain the Joanna V presently docked in Beira, if it discharges its cargo of oil there. Britain is empowered to act only on the high seas, however, and if the Joanna unloads oil it may be stopped only after it is beyond Mozambique territorial waters.

The UN's African members tend to view the resolution in general as too limited in scope, and will probably continue to press for stronger measures.

Meanwhile, the UN General Assembly Committee on Colonialism is continuing its debate. African states may again seek the broad sanctions which were voted down on 9 April. One calls on South Africa to prevent oil from being shipped to Rhodesia; another urges the UK to take all

means to prevent the transportation of oil into Rhodesia, and a third requests all states to apply measures for complete interruption of economic relations.

More moderate Africans want to await the results of the present resolution and then call for a Council meeting in May for a wide-ranging debate. However, the arrival at Durban this week of the tanker Manuela, which probably was destined for Beira until a British frigate intervened, could impel some African governments to call for an extension of the Security Council's recent action to include blockading the arrival of suspect tankers at South African ports.

South Africa has officially protested to London, raising the specter of a confrontation involving all of Southern Africa as a result of Britain's resort to the use of force with UN authorization. Pretoria also emphasized its determination to adhere to its anti-embargo policy.

Portugal has delayed its official reaction, but the press and popular sentiment in Lisbon and Mozambique are strongly anti-British. Although the tanker Joanna V may offload at least part of its cargo into newly constructed facilities at Beira, Lisbon is likely to delay a decision on permitting the oil to be pumped through the pipeline to the Umtali refinery in Rhodesia. 25X1

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OBOTE CONSOLIDATING SUPREME POWER IN UGANDA

In the seven weeks since Prime Minister Obote seized supreme power in Uganda, he has consistently outmaneuvered his moderate opponents and is gradually consolidating his authority. With the pressure of the moderates diminished, the influence of Obote's several radical advisers will probably increase.

Obote has added the powers of the president and vice president to those he holds as prime minister. However, he has been careful to avoid any direct attack on the former president's continuing role as prestigious and hereditary ruler of Uganda's dominant tribe, the Baganda.

Obote remains dependent on the police and army to retain control, but he now is planning to revise the constitution in order to strengthen his central government--apparently with himself as an executive president--at the expense of the semiautonomous kingdoms, particularly Baganda. To get his revisions through parliament, Obote hopes to isolate the elite Bagandans by exploiting the hostility toward them that prevails in most other regions.

He apparently intends to keep the vociferous parliament in recess until he has lined up the necessary two-thirds majority.

Obote's new army commander, Colonel Amin, has broken up the dominant southern officer group

in army headquarters and has replaced them with fellow northerners. Former commander Opoloto has been relegated to a staff function, and officers loyal to him have been dispersed throughout the army's four battalions. Amin has increased his own popularity with the enlisted men by promoting many of them to officer status. For the short term these tactics have thwarted any possible countermove against Obote.

Obote's political opposition remains vocal but ineffective. With most of their leaders in prison or in hiding, they have chosen to challenge Obote's acts in the courts, so far with little success. Their earlier allegations of corruption against Amin, Obote, and two northern ministers were not proven before the judicial commission of inquiry, perhaps because opposition lawyers were not allowed to cross-examine key witnesses, some of whom had been intimidated by the police.

Military aid agreements which Obote signed last year to lessen Uganda's dependence on Western sources are being implemented.

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Western Hemisphere

BOSCH ACCEPTS DOMINICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

Juan Bosch accepted the presidential nomination of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) on 10 April despite his statement three days earlier that he would not run. Bosch told a US official that his reversal was caused by the "extreme pressure" brought to bear on him by PRD functionaries.

Before changing his mind, Bosch was in a period of intense depression probably brought on by the need to make a major decision and by his reluctance to enter the race. Significantly, Bosch left a way open to back out of the campaign later. He claims that a "military terror machine" remains in existence and says that he does not believe the armed forces will allow him to govern if elected. Only a few days before his nomination Bosch proposed to a leader of Balaguer's Reformist Party that he and Balaguer agree on a new provisional regime and postpone elections. He may again bring up this idea.

The PRD convention was characterized by relative moderation. In his acceptance speech Bosch lashed out at the US "Goliath," but he said relations with the US must be conducted with intelligence. The PRD platform sounded no note of urgency in calling for the departure of foreign troops.

Bosch's running mate is Antonio Guzman, a businessman-farmer and stalwart supporter of Bosch. One of those proposed last May as the head of a provisional government, Guzman has little personal following but will lend an aura of respectability to the ticket. The tone of the convention and Guzman's selection suggest that Bosch may conduct a moderate campaign aimed at swaying voters who fear that his election will lead to instability and violence.

Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) leader Caonabo Javier said after the PRD convention that the situation "demands" that his party and the PRD "go together to the elections"--a development that would give Bosch a boost. 25X1

It seems likely that Hector Aristy's nascent "24th of April Movement" will not run its own man, but instead will back Bosch. The Dominican Communist Party announced its support of the PRD leader but cautioned that this does not mean "bourgeois democracy" has become a party objective. Thus, if the PRSC backs Bosch, the "unity of the left," nonexistent since the installation of the provisional

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government, will be re-established and Bosch's chances for election will be considerably improved.

Meanwhile, Balaguer and Rafael Bonnelly have publicly denied that a deal for a joint slate is afoot and each has accused the other of soliciting support from the far right. Talks between their supporters appear to have made no progress.

In other electoral developments, Garcia Godoy legalized the pro-Communist 14th of June Revolutionary Movement. Four

other minor parties also were recognized as able to participate in the election. Garcia Godoy believes the groups will cause less trouble if they are allowed to take part in the campaign.

Garcia Godoy has called for peaceful celebration of the 24th of April anniversary of the revolution. To mark the event, the extreme left is planning demonstrations that could spark disturbances. The first is set for 17 April. [REDACTED]

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THE SITUATION IN ECUADOR

Although momentarily calm due to the Easter holiday, the general situation in Ecuador remains disturbing. Irresponsible politicians now are preparing for a struggle to control the eventual constituent assembly. Guayaquil business interests have gained considerable influence in the new regime but have shown no desire for constructive action. The military, the nation's most

important institution, is lying low but could lose patience with the weak government.

Communists are enjoying unrestricted freedom and will continue to gain strength under provisional President Yerovi. There is increasing evidence of Communist infiltration of the administration through lower echelon appointments. [REDACTED]

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JAGAN'S DILEMMA IN BRITISH GUIANA

Cheddi Jagan has shown no sign of having found a definite program for returning to power in British Guiana since his return there in early March, following a trip to London as well as to Cuba, Moscow, and other points in the Soviet bloc.

During his travels the leader of the opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) spoke like a revolutionary leader. Jagan was quoted as saying in Havana that the "highest form of revolutionary struggle is the armed struggle." In various anti-American speeches made in the Soviet Union and later broadcast to the Caribbean and Latin America, he said that when British Guiana receives its independence on 26 May "one type of colonial domination will simply be substituted by another and the phase of US neocolonialism will begin."

Despite its leader's brave words, the PPP has done little more than continue its ineffectual obstructionism in the legislature. The party has refrained from large-scale violence and now may be waiting for independence and the subsequent departure of British troops in October before making its move. Then, Jagan's decision on peaceful or violent opposition to the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham will depend on his assessment of the government's security forces,

the temper of his East Indian followers, and the possibility that elections now scheduled for 1968, will be conducted fairly.

If Jagan believes he has a chance of returning to power via elections, he will probably refrain from violence. However, Jagan probably doubts that Burnham would hold an election he was fearful of losing, much less step down should the PPP somehow win. This would tend to encourage Jagan to adopt a violent course to overthrow the government. On the other hand the very good possibility that Burnham would move swiftly and ruthlessly to crush any large-scale PPP-inspired violence places Jagan in the frustrating position of probably coming out loser no matter what course he adopts.

For his part, Burnham is anxious to find an excuse to dispense with his powerful political rival. Although the PPP is temporarily in check, Burnham fears that Jagan cannot be kept down forever and that eventually the numerical superiority of Jagan's followers may return him to power. For this reason Burnham would be pleased if frustration should drive Jagan to some drastic action which would give Burnham the excuse to imprison him.

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COLOMBIA TO ELECT PRESIDENT

Carlos Lleras, the government-backed candidate, is assured of victory in the 1 May presidential election. In general, he will continue the policies of the present government. The active political opposition has selected Jose Jaramillo Giraldo, the darkest of the dark horses, as its candidate.

The opposition Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) and Lauro-Alzatista Conservatives are badly disorganized and will not participate in the electoral campaign. Only the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), which received about 20 percent of the votes in the March congressional elections, is sponsoring Jaramillo's candidacy. ANAPO realizes

Jaramillo has no chance of winning, but by running a candidate it keeps itself before the public eye and has a chance, if it receives enough votes, of increasing its prestige.

Jaramillo, a 51-year-old lawyer, has been a deputy, a senator, and president of the Supreme Court. However, he has been out of politics for the past nine years. He is a Liberal and has been closely associated with Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, leader of ANAPO.

The election is not expected to arouse much popular enthusiasm and will probably take place in a peaceful atmosphere. [REDACTED]

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BARRIENTOS ANNOUNCES CANDIDACY FOR BOLIVIAN PRESIDENCY

Rene Barrientos Ortuno, former co-president of the military junta and co-commander of the armed forces, on 9 April publicly declared himself a presidential candidate for the 3 July national elections. He will run as the candidate of the Front of the Bolivian Revolution (FRB), the four-party alliance he put together last November.

Barrientos assumed the presidency of the FRB on 11 April. Luis Adolfo Siles, a respected but colorless person with little political stature, is to be Barrientos' vice-presidential running mate. The FRB plans to hold a convention on 28 and 29 April

to choose candidates for Congress and to register Barrientos and Siles with the electoral court.

None of the other political parties have named candidates for president or congress, and there are only three weeks remaining before the 3 May deadline for nominations. They may still try to come up with candidates of their own, jump on the Barrientos bandwagon in exchange for postelection spoils, press for a postponement of the elections in order to gain time to organize, or abstain from the elections altogether. [REDACTED]

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