

10 November 1966

OCI No. 0315/66

Copy No.

56

WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review completed

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55-228530/1

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(Information as of noon EST, 9 November 1966)

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Major attacks this week by Communist forces in Tay Ninh Province were probably aimed at protecting their War Zone "C" stronghold along the Cambodian border. [REDACTED]	
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
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Western Europe and Japan. It also has arranged to import natural gas from Afghanistan and Iran for its gas-deficit areas.




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
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- ANTIGUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN GUATEMALA 18
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VIETNAM

There has been a series of major engagements this week between US and Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces in Tay Ninh Province, 60 miles northwest of Saigon.

The action began on 4 November when the Communists launched several attacks against allied and South Vietnamese installations in the vicinity of Tay Ninh city. The base camps of the US 196th Infantry Brigade and the Philippine Civic Action Group west of the provincial capital were hit by over a hundred rounds of mortar fire. Two Americans were killed and 54 wounded. A South Vietnamese district headquarters southeast of Tay Ninh city also was attacked on 4 November by an estimated 800 Viet Cong.

After losing 50 killed, the attacking force broke contact and withdrew to positions northeast of the city. Later in the day, elements of the 196th Infantry (attached to Operation ATTLEBORO) and Vietnamese Special Force units re-established heavy contact with the enemy in this area.

Thirteen US battalions from the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 196th Infantry Brigade, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade were subsequently committed to the action. After several days of sustained contact

with large-scale Communist forces entrenched in heavily fortified bunkers and caves in this area, which borders on the southern periphery of the War Zone "C," the allies claimed that more than 850 of the enemy had been killed. US casualties stood at 85 killed, 340 wounded, and five missing.

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
the 6,600-man Viet Cong 9th Light Infantry Division, possibly reinforced by the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment, may have been deployed to counter US forces participating in Operation ATTLEBORO. The Communists probably view this operation, which has already destroyed numerous base camps and seized enough rice to feed an entire division for a year, as a serious threat to their War Zone "C" stronghold, including COSVN--the highest Viet Cong political and military headquarters in South Vietnam.

Communist intentions in the current battle area remain unclear.

[REDACTED] large truck convoys at several points along the Cambodian border in northern Tay Ninh Province could indicate either an intensive enemy effort to resupply and reinforce War Zone "C" or an attempt to provide retreating Communist regulars transportation to sanctuary in Cambodia. 25X1

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The Indochina - South China Area

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There was little significant military action elsewhere in South Vietnam during the week.



Political Developments
In South Vietnam

With both the Manila Conference and the US elections completed, Premier Ky plans to act on the resignations of six cabinet ministers pending since early October.

In addition to Economy Minister Thanh, who resigned on 27 October, Youth Minister Trieu and Education Minister Truong will definitely be leaving the cabinet. Deputy Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, Labor Minister Hung, and Transport Minister Thuan, however, have agreed to remain. The status of Social Affairs Minister Lieng has not been finally settled. According to his political adviser, Premier Ky plans to replace the southern-oriented ministers leaving the cabinet with other southerners, but his specific choices are not yet known. These steps may stabilize the cabinet somewhat, but they are unlikely to eliminate southern concern about the concentration of real government power in the hands of a few northerners.

There is some indication that Premier Ky may appoint a southerner to the position of police director currently held by General Loan, whose arrest of a southern subcabinet official in late September ignited the north-south regional tensions. Loan would retain his post as director of the military security

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service. [redacted]

Cambodia Calls for "Summit"
Meeting With Vietnamese Communists

Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk announced on 3 November that he will hold a "summit meeting" in Phnom Penh in a "few" weeks with North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong and Liberation Front chief Nguyen Huu Tho. Sihanouk did not indicate the purpose of the meeting, but the implication is that it would be portrayed as the "Indochinese peoples'" response to the Manila Conference. Although it is possible that the Vietnamese Communists would participate in such a meeting if they believed that it could be turned to their political advantage, the North Vietnamese chargé in Vientiane told the US ambassador on 7 November that there was no need for "special personalities" to travel to Cambodia.

Constituent Assembly Debate

Prior to beginning work on the constitution, the Constituent Assembly has begun formal discussion of the government's partial veto power over the assembly's draft. Delegates appear united in their opposition to the veto provision as it now stands, but vary in their willingness to provoke or confront the government over the issue.

The debate is continuing, but US officials in Saigon believe the assembly will seek a compromise solution.

Latest Air Engagement

Two North Vietnamese MIG-21s were shot down on 5 November by USAF F4C jets near Yen Bai. The Communist jets were attempting for the third time in four days to down US electronics and reconnaissance planes which regularly operate in the Yen Bai area in support of US strike missions.

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RED GUARD VIOLENCE MOUNTING IN PEKING

Disorderly and startling events continue to mark the political scene in Peking, where Red Guard demonstrations and attacks against important officials are becoming more violent.

The month-long drive against Li Hsueh-feng, who replaced the fallen Peng Chen as head of the Peking city party committee in May, may be coming to a head.

[redacted] on 6 November, thousands of Red Guards angrily demonstrated for hours outside the city headquarters building, then broke in and occupied it. They gave the impression they intended to stay indefinitely. [redacted]

Press correspondents report that early this month wall newspapers began to appear in front of the State Council office denouncing propaganda chief Tao Chu for being a "dedicated agent of the bourgeoisie" and for "taking a revisionist line." Later, however, posters defending Tao went up alongside those criticizing him. Both types of posters were reportedly still being displayed on 8 November. Tao ranks fourth in the present hierarchy.

Since 5 November, wall newspapers and huge black characters

denouncing economic planner Li Fu-chun have been prominently displayed near the ones on Tao Chu. Li was charged with being an "eclectic who compromises with the bourgeois line." Specifically, he was blamed for "oppressing" revolutionary forces in the 7th Ministry of Machine Building, believed to be the organization responsible for producing guided-missile components. Top officials in this ministry have been repeatedly attacked in wall posters since late October.


The standing of Premier Chou En-lai has come into question, although he has not yet been criticized by name. According to a press report, Red Guards were milling around in front of the State Council building on 8 November, displaying a large banner demanding that Chou give them an audience immediately. Chou, who spoke after Lin Piao at each of the first three Red Guard rallies has not made a public statement since 30 September.

Some decline in his status may be reflected in the attacks on officials in 21 ministries and four government staff offices since the abortive 18 October rally. At the 3 November Red Guard rally, Lin Piao for the first time indicated that government agencies, as well as party organizations, would be targets of the "cultural revolution." [redacted]

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KOREA: Armed Incidents 13 Oct - 2 Nov 1966



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SECRET**ARMED INCIDENTS ALONG KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE**

Since mid-October North Korean infiltrators have on several occasions ambushed South Korean (ROK) and US troops along Korea's Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The upsurge of violence suggests a temporary shift in the emphasis of their missions from intelligence collection and subversion to harassment of the UN forces.

In the past, infiltrating agents usually avoided firefights unless challenged by the ROK military or security services. However, the larger and more heavily armed infiltration teams noted since mid-October have deliberately sought out and attacked ROK forces.

Beginning on 13 October, North Korean units carried out seven surprise attacks against ROK troops in a five-day period. By 2 November, when uniformed North Korean troops killed six Americans and one South Korean in an eight-man patrol unit, ROK and US forces had suffered some 36 fatalities in 40 incidents this year. The comparable figures for 1965 were 20 South Koreans killed in 55 incidents and for 1964, four South Koreans killed in 32 incidents--with no US fatalities in either year.

The marked increase in armed incidents along the DMZ during the past few weeks probably does not reflect a North Korean decision to engage in wholesale violations of the armistice agreement, nor is there any evidence

that Pyongyang intends to open a "second front" in the Vietnam war. It may believe, however, that the heightened tensions along the Korean DMZ will serve as a warning to both the South Koreans and the US against further deployments of ROK troops to Vietnam and demonstrate North Korean support of Hanoi to other Communist states.

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North Korean agent operations along the DMZ have been conducted with varying intensity since the armistice agreement in 1953. This year, concentrated operations began in May and have continued to the present with some interruptions due to heavy rains and agent losses. The normally heavy autumnal agent activity along the DMZ usually tapers off in November when the foliage disappears and snow begins to fall. Operations then are infrequent for several months.

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SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

The 49th anniversary celebration of the Russian revolution produced no surprises. The speeches were overshadowed by earlier statements on major domestic and foreign policies by Brezhnev and Kosygin, and only one new item, of limited interest, was displayed in the military parade.

The celebration was attended by all the Moscow-based members of the politburo except Kirill Mazurov and candidate member Petr Demichev, who may have been ill. The position of the leaders on the reviewing stand in Red Square underscored the continued ranking status of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Suslov. Old Bolsheviks Mikoyan and Voroshilov were also given prominent places.

The traditional speech on the eve of the 7 November celebration was delivered by Latvia's Arvid Pelshe, the most recent addition to the politburo and the only present top leader who was in the party before the 1917 revolution. On domestic affairs Pelshe restated standard themes aimed at justifying post-Khrushchev policies. He balanced praise of Soviet achievements, particularly in agriculture, with an acknowledgment of problems still unsolved.


The anniversary speeches broke no new ground on foreign policy. Pelshe condemned the Chinese for rendering--by their repeated rejection of joint Communist action--"enormous services" to US "aggression" in Vietnam. He also denounced the "so-called cultural revolution," claiming it "has nothing in common either with revolution or culture

or with Marxism." The handful of Chinese diplomats present during this speech walked out, as they did the next day during Defense Minister Malinovsky's address.

Pelshe reiterated Moscow's long-standing pledge to provide continuing aid to the Vietnamese Communists, and reaffirmed Soviet endorsement of Hanoi's tough terms for a Vietnam settlement. He deprecated recent US expressions of readiness to improve relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, and asked rhetorically what value such statements can have while the US "further extends its aggression in Vietnam." He stressed Moscow's adherence to the principles of "peaceful coexistence" and cited improved relations with France, Italy, Canada, Japan, and other non-Communist states as proof of the correctness of this line.

The military parade was essentially the same in composition as the last two except for the appearance of a turreted reconnaissance vehicle first displayed in Warsaw this year.

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Reconnaissance Vehicle with Turret secret**SECRET**

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SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE AND PURCHASE OF NATURAL GAS

The USSR has been moving rapidly to secure a share of the developing market for natural gas, of increasing importance not only as an energy source but also as a raw material for the petrochemical industry. Europe's trade in natural gas--with large reserves located in the North Sea, the Netherlands, Algeria, and Libya --promises to be extremely competitive, and the USSR is attempting to protect its position as a supplier through long-term agreements.

The Soviets have expanded deliveries of natural gas to Eastern Europe, and they are negotiating sales to Italy, Austria, Finland, and Japan. Initial deliveries entail large investments in pipelines or liquefaction facilities, port terminals, and specially constructed ships. Moscow is taking a long view, however, that natural gas deliveries may in the future earn large amounts of foreign exchange. It is looking wherever possible for arrangements that will minimize the current impact on its own financial resources.

As it has in Eastern Europe, the USSR is proposing the use of pipelines to supply prospective customers in Western Europe.

Negotiations with Tokyo are aimed at achieving sizable Japanese investments in Siberian gas fields and facilities for liquefaction and delivery of methane gas. The Soviets hope for long-term contracts, which they probably will get in the absence of other competitive suppliers in the Far East.

In a reverse procedure, the USSR has made arrangements with Afghanistan and Iran to import natural gas to its own gas-deficient areas and has extended about \$100 million in credits to exploit gasfields and build transmission lines. The first Soviet imports of natural gas will take place next year when the pipeline from Afghanistan is completed. As much as \$425 million worth of natural gas may flow through this line to the USSR by 1985.

Arrangements with Iran were concluded this year. They call for Soviet imports of up to \$850 million worth of gas over a 15-year period. The USSR is helping to build a 600-mile pipeline which should begin to function by 1970.

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UNREST IN INDIA FORCES CABINET CHANGE

The increasing tempo of public disorders that have erupted sporadically throughout India during the past few months forced the resignation of Home Minister Nanda on 8 November. Prime Minister Gandhi--possibly hoping to avoid further internal difficulties in the ruling Congress Party--has assumed the Home portfolio herself. The office includes over-all responsibility for security and law enforcement.

Nanda's ouster followed a mammoth riot in New Delhi on 7 November, which started when a demonstration by more than 100,000 Hindu extremists favoring a ban on the slaughter of cows got out of hand. Police gunfire resulted in six or more deaths and scores of injuries, and the rampaging mobs caused extensive damage. The fact that thousands of Hindu holy men (sadhus) were in the vanguard of the mob was particularly damaging to Nanda in view of his close association with some sadhu organizations.

The decision to fire Nanda may have serious repercussions within several Congress Party state governments, where factional feuds have barely been kept in check by a firm party edict against state cabinet changes prior to the general elections next February. Some of these strains may be brought into the open again if state party units no longer feel bound by New Delhi's injunction.

Meanwhile, there is every prospect that the spate of rioting over diverse issues will continue and possibly intensify as elections draw near. Many of the disorders over the past several months have been created by students agitating over purely local and often petty issues, but politicians--including some within the Congress Party--have begun to channel such agitation toward specific political objectives.

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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISPUTE

On 4 November the UN Security Council concluded its consideration of Israel's complaint about Syrian-supported terrorism and Syria and Egypt signed a joint defense agreement. These two developments offer some prospect that a major clash between Israel and Syria will be averted for the time being. Israel, however, probably considers that it has exhausted diplomatic means for stopping the terrorism, and another serious incident almost certainly would precipitate a large-scale Israeli reprisal.

A Security Council resolution which "invited" Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents was vetoed by the USSR. The Israelis, nevertheless, are interpreting as a victory the 10-4 vote, with one abstention, in favor of the resolution. With this token of international support they may exercise restraint in the face of minor incidents which do not result in Israeli fatalities, which is frequently the case in the occasional exchanges of fire between regular armed forces along the border.

However, there were ten sabotage incidents during the four-week period when the question was before the Security

Council. If these continue--demonstrating that Syria either cannot or will not control the terrorists operating from its territory--Prime Minister Eshkol's government will be inclined to retaliate and will also be under strong domestic pressure to do so. The present attitude in Israel appears to be one of "wait and see."

One thing Israeli officials will watch closely is the effect the joint Syrian-Egyptian defense pact may have on the border situation. Article One of the agreement stipulates that each signatory will aid the other if it is attacked, but Article Two calls for "consultations" if international events seem to be endangering the security of either country. Nasir, who would not welcome a fight with Israel at this time, probably hopes he can restrain the Syrians from further actions which would provoke the Israelis.

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THE GHANA-GUINEA ROW

Ghana's detention of Guinea's delegation to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meetings in Addis Ababa has continued to have serious repercussions, despite the release of the group on 5 November. The episode has further weakened the ailing OAU and precipitated a new crisis in US-Guinean relations.

Although the OAU summit session convened as scheduled on 5 November and managed to avert the ignominy of a formal breakup, the latest flare-up between Ghana and Guinea turned the conference into a shambles. The two West African states have been feuding since ousted Ghanaian president Nkrumah was welcomed in Conakry last March. The final blow to the summit was Guinean President Touré's boycott even after Emperor Haile Selassie and Presidents Nasir and Tubman--three of Africa's most prestigious leaders--had prevailed on Ghana's General Ankrah to release the Guineans. Touré sent word that he still could not come to Addis Ababa while Ankrah was there. Three of the leaders most concerned about keeping Touré's friendship--Nasir, Tubman, and Algeria's Boumediene--thereupon found pretexts to return home early.

Even before Touré finally turned down Nasir's entreaties to come, it had become evident that this year's summit would not fulfill the hopes of Haile Selassie and other OAU boosters who had hoped to revive the organization's flagging fortunes by focusing attention on non-divisive southern African problems. The disillusionment with the OAU already felt in many quarters was reflected in the appearance of only 18 heads of state or government from a total OAU membership of 38 states. Had Touré arrived, personal participation by African leaders would still have been the smallest since the OAU was founded in 1963.

Much time was taken up at the recent gathering--especially during the preliminary foreign ministers' meeting--with attacks on the stewardship of the organization's freewheeling secretary general. Africa's elusive "unity" was marred by the surfacing of some of the other proliferating bilateral disputes. The continued failure of the OAU's Liberation Committee to produce results in white-ruled southern Africa generated additional prolonged wrangling. A formal move to kill the committee outright finally failed, but its budget was extended only for three months.

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Guinea, meanwhile, has launched a full-scale campaign against the US as Touré continues his allegations of US responsibility for Ghana's detention of the delegation headed by his foreign minister. On 8 November, Touré announced extensive punitive measures against US operations in Guinea, including the expulsion of all Peace Corps Volunteers and other personnel.

Touré may be trying to shore up his domestic popularity at a time when the balance of power within his regime is shifting. His attacks on the US appear to reflect increased pressures from party militants, radical youth and labor leaders, and some political figures, including Foreign Minister Beavogui.

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ARMS PURCHASES IN LATIN AMERICA

Although recent purchases of jet aircraft by Argentina and Chile have triggered a wave of criticism and aroused fears of a Latin American arms race, no abnormal increase in arms procurement appears in prospect.

The larger Latin American air forces have been using jets for ten years, but most are obsolete trainers or fighters of Korean war vintage such as the F-80 and F-86. Some countries still regularly use World War II fighters, although spare parts for them are no longer available and they are unsafe and costly to maintain.

The latest controversy seems to have begun over Argentina's purchase from the US of 25 A4Bs which could be used on Argentina's only aircraft carrier. The A4B is a subsonic, lightweight jet attack aircraft still being used in Vietnam. An additional 25 of these aircraft were originally slated for Argentina, but transports and ancillary equipment will probably be supplied instead. The Argentine Air Force has had maintenance problems with its F-86s and British Meteors and has been using French MS-760 four-seat trainers for attack aircraft. The purchase arrangement for the A4Bs was concluded late in 1965, but they have not yet been delivered.

Soon after the Argentine purchase became known, Chile

revealed that it had bought 21 Hawker Hunter fighters from the British at a reported cost of \$11.2 million to be paid over a five-year period. The Hunter, heavier and larger than the A4B but of about equal performance, will replace older jets and propeller-driven aircraft. The foreign criticism which greeted this purchase apparently surprised the Chilean Government, which had for some time budgeted for the replacement of the older planes.

Peru, which has had Hawker Hunters since 1957 and also uses F-86s and British Canberra jet light bombers, has been shopping for more modern equipment.

President Belaunde recently rejected a US offer of additional F-86s

Although other arms deals have been mentioned--such as Brazil's purchase of new tanks and Venezuela's search for new naval ships--there has actually been no unusual increase in arms purchases in Latin America this year. Those governments such as Argentina, Chile, and Peru which are seeking to modernize their inventories are probably reacting to pressure from military leaders.

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KEY CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN BRAZIL

On 15 November Brazilians will go to the polls to elect all 409 members of the Chamber of Deputies and 23 of the 66 senators. These will be the first direct national elections to be held since the 1964 revolution which ousted leftist President Goulart. The state legislatures have already elected new governors and the outgoing Congress has named retired Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva to succeed President Castello Branco.

The progovernment National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) is expected to retain its majority, although the only legal opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), may make substantial gains. Leaders of ARENA believe that it will retain its control in rural areas, but many party candidates fear that their prospects have been damaged by recent government acts unseating "undesirable" congressmen and recessing Congress until 22 November.

The Castello Branco government has taken a number of other steps to facilitate the election of progovernment candidates, including refusing to certify some candidates proposed by the MDB and changing ballot requirements. In addition, rumors that the regime will remove still more congressmen have added to electoral tensions and to some extent inhibited opposition campaigning. Nonetheless, the MDB stands to pick up seats in important urban areas such as Sao Paulo, Recife, Guanabara, and Porto Alegre, where there is widespread dislike of the government.

The ARENA's Senate majority is not threatened. However, should the MDB gain some 50 seats in the Chamber of Deputies--which many believe it is likely to do--the two parties would be almost evenly matched there. Under these circumstances government legislative proposals favored by Castello Branco, such as a new constitution, could be in trouble.

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PERUVIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN LARGELY FREE OF NATIONAL ISSUES

Peruvians on 13 November will elect provincial and municipal councils, three national deputies, and the mayor of Lima. In recent weeks there has been a strong shift of emphasis in the campaign, which initially seemed to be interpreted as a plebiscite

on President Belaunde's administration but now is concentrating on local issues. Members of both major political groupings, however, may try to use the election results to demonstrate voter opinion of the government, now entering the second half of

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its six-year term. This may in turn lead to party realignments affecting the government and opposition camps, both of which have been experiencing internal strains.

Although 88 percent of the electorate is expected to vote, the campaign has failed to stir much interest among the voters. There have been sporadic clashes between supporters of rival candidates.

The most significant contest will be for the vacant Chamber of Deputies seat in Lima Department where nearly 40 percent of a national electorate is concentrated. Two other congressional by-elections are also occurring. The contest for mayor of Lima is attracting more than local attention

partly because it is widely believed that the winner will be a strong contender for the presidency in 1969. Except in one or two localities, candidates not affiliated with the two major political groups--including Communists and Communist sympathizers--are not expected to play a major role.

The opposition coalition has adopted the position that the municipal elections are purely local in nature and do not reflect on the Congress or on Belaunde's administration. Although most government candidates hope to benefit from Belaunde's record, the President has remained aloof and failed to enter the electoral arena on behalf of his followers.

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ANTIGUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN GUATEMALA

Antiguerrilla operations continue in the hinterlands of Guatemala. Thus far, at least two major encounters have taken place. According to the government, guerrilla losses and arrests amount to some 26 men, and several soldiers have also been killed or wounded. The government is also pressing an offensive in Guatemala City where

there has been a step-up in terrorist activity.

Although the government cannot claim broad success in the current operations, it has wrested the initiative from the extremists and it has evidently become increasingly aware that a soft approach to the guerrilla problem would not be successful.

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SECRETUNITED NATIONS

UN ABOUT TO VOTE AGAIN ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE

On 18 November the UN General Assembly will open its annual debate on the issue of Chinese representation.

The members will vote again this year on the procedural ruling that the issue is an "important question" under Article 18 of the charter, and thus needs a two-thirds vote for approval. A resolution to adopt this ruling was first introduced by the US and four others in 1961 when the risk that Peking might obtain a simple majority became more pronounced. Since then the "important question" issue has been reintroduced annually and voted upon before the vote on the substantive question. The ruling itself requires only a simple majority for approval. Each year support for it has dwindled. While it is expected that the ruling will again be upheld, the margin will be slim. Last year, 56 favored the procedural ruling, 49 opposed, and 11 abstained.

Since 1961, the substantive debate has centered on the so-called "hostile" resolution which calls for the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists and the admittance of Peking. Resolutions to this effect were defeated by margins of from 11 to 16 votes until last year when the vote was 47 to 47 with 20 abstentions. This year Peking stands a chance of gaining a simple majority. Although far short of the two thirds required for entry under the present procedural ruling, it would nevertheless

be a significant psychological victory.

The large number of variables make prediction of the voting difficult. One important consideration is Peking's unfavorable international image, further tarnished by the excesses of its "cultural revolution." China's leaders, moreover, have shown no interest in joining the UN and have put forward conditions for entry clearly unacceptable to a majority of the UN members. These are the cancellation of the UN 1950 resolution condemning China and North Korea as aggressors, adoption of a resolution condemning the US as the aggressor in Korea, revision of the UN Charter, inclusion of all "independent states," and exclusion of all "imperialist puppets."

Nonetheless, many members argue that China might "behave better" if it were in the UN where it could be "reprimanded." Others contend that no significant progress can be made on disarmament until China is a member. Secretary General Thant himself holds this position and his view could affect the vote of some members.

The only thing that prevents the UN from issuing an invitation to Peking to join is the reluctance of most members to vote at the same time for expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists. In fact, most members favor a "two China"

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