


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**DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE**

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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43

6 September 1968
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(Information as of noon EDT, 5 September 1968)

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
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 The recent renewal of royalist attacks on Sana was encouraged by violent, armed dissension within the republican ranks. Disunity is endemic among the republicans, and even though it has been damped down again, this latest manifestation may impel the republican government to renew efforts for a settlement of some sort with the royalists.

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


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Army leaders have extended their control by replacing President Massamba-Debat with one of their own, but the tenuous peace in Brazzaville appears increasingly threatened by splits within the army and a resurgence of tribalism.

FIFTH OAU SUMMIT SHAPING UP IN ALGIERS 21
The Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Council of Ministers began meeting in Algiers this week to determine the agenda for the fifth OAU summit which opens on 13 September. This year's session promises to be one of the liveliest and most divisive of recent years.

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EUROPE

Pravda and other authoritative Soviet newspapers warned during the week that a "counterrevolutionary" threat remained in Czechoslovakia and that the situation there was not yet "normalized." Moscow now claims its invasion was necessary to head off an "imperialist" plot aimed at disrupting the socialist world.

The Czechoslovaks wondered how much Moscow will restrict their freedoms but nevertheless seemed of a mind to test the limits of acceptable behavior. There is, in particular, deep disquiet among journalists and intellectuals as censorship is reimposed and rumors circulate of plans to purge them.

Rumania and Yugoslavia—particularly the former—are still worried that they are next on Moscow's list of victims. Both regimes are preparing their populations psychologically for such a possibility. Both also continue to maintain their military and security forces on an alert status, and the Yugoslavs are reported to be improving defenses along their borders with Bulgaria and Hungary.

In Hungary, party leader Kadar is reported to be showing signs of strain. He is said to be deeply concerned about the negative effect of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on his own image and on dissension within the party.


The Czechoslovak affair has also deepened the factional splits within the Polish party. Gomulka's nationalist opponents, who were against Polish participation in the invasion, are probably intimidated by Moscow's show of strength. Gomulka's position has thus been bolstered for now, but at the cost of further isolating him within the leadership. The Soviet politburo—almost totally immersed in the Czechoslovak situation since the invasion—has begun to resume its normal activities. There is still no confirmation of the rumored central committee plenum on 2 September, and the activities announced for various politburo members and party secretaries during that day make it seem unlikely that one actually took place.

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EASTERN EUROPE



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TENSION EASES AS OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUES

Moscow has reduced somewhat the more blatant signs of its presence in Czechoslovakia and has toned down its press attacks on Czechoslovak leaders. Although this suggests that the Soviets are relatively satisfied with the present conduct of the Dubcek-Svoboda leadership, Pravda and other authoritative newspapers warned throughout the week that a "counterrevolutionary" threat remained and that the situation in Czechoslovakia had not "normalized." As long as Moscow continues to insist that this is the situation, no substantial reduction of the massive military presence can be expected.

In its press and in an extensive series of diplomatic justifications of the invasion, Moscow has almost entirely dropped the fig leaf it used in the first days--that it had been invited in by unspecified Czechoslovak leaders. Now, Moscow claims that it moved to head off an "imperialist" plot which, under the guise of "bridge-building," aimed at disrupting the socialist world. This line has the advantage of carrying a warning to the other Eastern European countries that they too must be wary of improving relations with the West.

Premier Cernik early this week reportedly expressed the view that the situation in Czech-

oslovakia was still uncertain. It apparently remained unclear to him just how much the USSR intended to restrict the government's freedom of action. By week's end, this ambiguity still seemed to exist in Czechoslovak minds.

The Czechoslovaks, past masters at passive resistance, have apparently chosen to accommodate themselves to the USSR's demands as slowly and ineffectually as possible. Some even seem to be of a mind to test the limits of acceptable comradely behavior. Lidova Demokracie, the People's Party paper, summarized the situation by pointing to the vicious circle argument that the Soviet troops will not leave until the situation normalizes and the situation will not normalize until the troops leave.

Party leader Dubcek continued his quest for national acquiescence in the Moscow agreement. In addresses to the central committee on 31 August--with its preintervention composition--he and President Svoboda indicated that the country's liberalization would be severely curtailed. Dubcek also said that he considered void the party congress held during the first week of the invasion.

At the central committee meeting, action was taken to

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enlarge that body and also its presidium. The changes resulted in both bodies retaining a progressive majority, although political labels may now be somewhat meaningless. Several pro-Soviet conservatives were dropped from the presidium. In a separate but related action, Interior Minister Pavel, a strong Dubcek supporter, resigned, probably because of his difficulties with the Russian security forces. His replacement, Jan Pelnar, seems to be something of an opportunist.

During the week, the Russians gradually turned back control of various key buildings, such as party central committee headquarters, to the Czechoslovaks. Other ministries, such as interior and defense, remained in Soviet hands.

The occupying forces have also begun to return control of radio, TV, and the press to the Czechoslovaks. The Russian experiment in producing occupation newspapers was short-lived because of a public boycott. Reportedly the Czechoslovaks quickly perceived that at least one paper had been put together and printed in East Germany. Subsequently, the Czechoslovak regime's new censorship bureau issued broad guidelines that no "negative information and comment" concerning Moscow and its allies, or critical comment on the party police, worker's militia, or army will be tolerated.

Although there have been reports that the USSR has a list of 40,000 people to be deported, it does not seem to have acted on it. Premier Cernik has reported that the government knew of only five persons--high-ranking security officials--who have been arrested.

It is too early to put a price tag on the disruption to the Czechoslovak economy, but one estimate places the cost for the first ten days at about \$25 million per day. The interruption of transportation produced the greatest strain on the economy, interfering with food supplies to the population, supplies of materials to industry and agriculture, and foreign trade. The Czechoslovak economy may require as long as two years to recover from these economic dislocations.

One anticipated effect will be to tie Czechoslovakia's external economic relations more closely than ever to the USSR and other Communist nations. Pravda on 2 September warned the Czechoslovaks against seeking hard-currency credits in the West and pointed out the advantages to Czechoslovakia of its relations with CEMA. Economic negotiations reportedly will be held in Moscow the second week in September.

Rumania and Yugoslavia continued during the week to show fear that they might be the next target of a Soviet invasion.

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
Rumanian leader Ceausescu, having previously made it clear in typical rhetoric that Rumania would forcibly resist foreign armies, then soft-pedaled his remarks in the face of continued Soviet pressure tactics. This "soft response" followed, however, a Rumanian party resolution condemning the Czechoslovak invasion and reasserting the right of national sovereignty. Ceausescu thereby apparently hoped to preclude any future Soviet assertions that dissatisfied Rumanian officials had called in Soviet troops.

On the internal scene, Ceausescu acted to prepare the Rumanian population psychologically for any eventuality, including invasion. He and other high-level party officials made speeches in different sections of the country, carefully chosen so that each speaker, by reason of experience or by ethnic background, could make the maximum impact in uniting the traditionally Russophobic population behind the regime.

Despite pressure from Moscow and some Eastern European countries that it moderate its position, Yugoslavia continues to push its highly critical view of the occupation. The Belgrade lead-

ership, nevertheless, is plainly concerned by its inability to get a clear reading of Soviet intentions.

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Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations have taken a decided turn for the worse and the bitterly contested, nationalistic Macedonian issue has been revived in a vicious polemical exchange. President Tito may take advantage of the situation to move against hard-line remnants in Yugoslavia whom he believes are capable of collusion with the USSR.

There has been little change in the status of the occupation troops in Czechoslovakia. US attachés in the USSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria reported they could find no evidence of a Soviet build-up along the Rumanian borders in these countries.

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EASTERN EUROPE REACTS ADVERSELY TO SOVIET INVASION

The USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia has suspended the movement toward liberalization and freer national expression in Communist Eastern Europe. Even as the Russians were suppressing the Czechoslovaks, however, they were also dramatizing for all Eastern Europeans the power and appeal of the Czech movement. Eastern European leaders who supported Moscow's move now face the delicate task of justifying to nationalist elements within their own regime and to their own people an unacceptable premise--the necessity of subjugating national interests to those of Moscow.

In the past year, a revolution of expectation, reinforced by increasing signs of freedom in Czechoslovakia, has been under way in Eastern Europe. Unlike the previous generation, which accepted authoritarianism with a resigned cynicism, the present generation expects a better life. This is especially true among the rebellious youth who will return to classes this month in a hostile mood following the events of August.

The crisis has intensified differences within the Polish

leadership, and rifts in other Eastern European party hierarchies are expected. Conservative elements, emboldened by the display of Soviet force, may decide that the time is ripe to oust liberal reformists from their positions.

In contrast, the unity of the Yugoslav and Rumanian leaderships has been strengthened by their vocal opposition to the occupation of Czechoslovakia and by rumors--possibly self-inspired--that they might be next. Although Tito and Ceausescu have aroused unprecedented patriotic support, their realistic appraisals probably will lead them to less vigorous resistance to some Soviet foreign policy goals.

Until Moscow signals how far it is prepared to go to impose its will, the atmosphere in Eastern Europe will remain tense and permeated with distrust, and policy making will be erratic. Most Eastern Europeans, leaders as well as led, while they may not for a time be able to advance toward national independence, have nevertheless developed more powerful anti-Soviet feelings as a consequence of Moscow's invasion.

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NATO RE-EVALUATES DEFENSE CONCEPTS IN A NEW CLIMATE

The rapid occupation of Czechoslovakia has produced a new climate of apprehension within the Atlantic Alliance. The present NATO concept of warning time, which presupposes a military build-up by a prospective attacker during which time the Allies would engage in political consultation, is being re-evaluated.

The West Germans are particularly insistent on this, contending that the demonstration of Soviet mobilization efficiency and speed makes the present NATO concept not only of doubtful validity but also dangerous. They point to the massive number of Warsaw Pact troops near the Bavarian frontier and to the successful jamming of the early warning radar system there. The review of the warning time concept will be part of the September work program developed by NATO Secretary General Brosio in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis.

The Alliance's Military Committee has recommended that any plans for reductions in troop strength should be held in abeyance and that withdrawal of forces should be postponed. Reactions to this proposal in the Defense Planning Committee--which does not include France, a nonparticipant in

the integrated military command--revealed much disagreement.

The Danes saw the proposal as merely an example of the "emperor's new clothes." Belgium and Canada opposed any decision that would require them to change their force reduction and redeployment plans. West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands wanted a strong public statement on the maintenance of Alliance force levels. The dispute was apparently resolved by a statement of the committee on 4 September which reaffirmed that NATO's military capability should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual East-West force reductions balanced in scope and timing.

National responses to Chancellor Kiesinger's vague reference to the need for a NATO summit conference have been universally unfavorable, but there is some interest in accelerating ministerial consideration of this month's re-evaluation program. The United Kingdom is proposing that the Defense Planning Committee and North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings, scheduled for December, be held in October or November; preliminary reactions have been favorable.

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SWEDISH VOTERS TO CHOOSE NEXT GOVERNMENT

The Swedish electorate on 15 September will determine whether the Social Democrats, who have ruled the country for more than 35 years, will continue in power. The alternative is a centrist coalition made up of the Liberal, Conservative, and Center parties.

Early opinion polls showed the combined opposition in a slight lead in the race for control of the parliament's lower chamber. The Czechoslovak drama, however, has muddied the political waters.

The small but vigorous Communist party has matched Sweden's other parties in condemning the Soviet action. It has been cultivating an image of liberalism and independence from Moscow for the past several years, but Swedish political analysts believe it will nevertheless suffer from the Czechoslovak affair.

The Social Democrats have seen a small but steady erosion of their voter strength since 1962. In the last general election in 1964, they won 113 seats, the bourgeois parties 112, and the Communists eight.

Facing the prospect of losing control--as have sister par-

ties in Norway and Denmark--the Social Democrats have been scraping around for popular issues. In particular, they have drummed away at the US involvement in Vietnam in an effort to win over radical youth elements, who appear to be looking further to the left for political fulfillment.

If the results are close, as is normally the case in Sweden, the Social Democrats may turn to some form of cooperation with the Communists to maintain their grip on the government. A government formed by the bourgeois parties probably would bring new changes in domestic policy but it might mute neutral Sweden's voice in international affairs.

For the Social Democrats' Tage Erlander, prime minister for well over 21 years, this apparently will be the last election, and for Sweden it will likely be the last nationwide balloting under a bicameral parliamentary system. Constitutional reform provides for a popularly elected unicameral legislature in 1970. Minister of Education Olof Palme, who has bitterly attacked the US role in Vietnam, is generally considered a leading candidate to succeed Erlander as head of the party.

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FAR EAST

There was fresh evidence during the week that the Vietnamese Communists intend to stretch out their current phase of military activity over a prolonged period. Newly captured documents tend to support other indications that the enemy is carefully husbanding his capabilities by using economy-of-force tactics to keep losses considerably below the high levels sustained during the all-out Tet push.

Allied spoiling operations and air strikes have almost certainly upset the enemy's timing in some areas. Nevertheless, the Communists can be expected to punctuate their wide-ranging campaign of mortar and rocket harassment and ground probes in outlying areas with strikes against urban centers when they calculate that this can be done at relatively low cost.

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in an otherwise unexceptional National Day speech, surfaced another variation in Hanoi's formulation of the role of the Liberation Front. He said that the US has to "recognize and talk" with the Front, but he omitted earlier demands that any postwar settlement must be in accordance with the program of the Front, or that the South Vietnamese had to be left alone to settle their own affairs. This is the second time in two months that Hanoi has tried at an authoritative level to signal some flexibility in its position on the Front.


In China the drive against the Red Guards in the provinces continued to gain momentum and scope. The full weight of the mushrooming campaign, carried out mainly by local military commanders, is now being felt by millions of students who once were in the vanguard of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

The long-ensconced military oligarchy in Thailand received a jolt last weekend when the opposition Democratic Party scored a resounding victory against government-sponsored candidates in municipal elections held in Bangkok. Even though the Democratic Party is Thailand's only truly national party, its strength is largely centered in the Bangkok area; it is unlikely to do nearly as well in legislative elections next year. The overwhelming nature of the Democrats' Bangkok success, however, suggests more antigovernment sentiment than the Thanom government had bargained for when it finally unveiled Thailand's new constitution last June.

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VIETNAM

Enemy forces last week sustained pressure on secondary targets with a number of mortar and rocket attacks and ground assaults. Strong Communist units meanwhile continued to maneuver in the vicinity of many key urban centers. Despite widespread indications that major attacks might occur against some of the primary urban targets during the week, however, no such attacks were forthcoming.

There is considerable evidence that extensive allied patrolling, sweeps, and air strikes have thwarted enemy attacks plans in several key areas, notably around the Demilitarized Zone and in the Da Nang - southern I Corps sector. An estimated 1,200 Communists have been killed in the outlying areas around Da Nang, for example.

In III Corps, the extent to which allied sweeps have prevented Communist movements into attack positions near Saigon is not wholly clear. [redacted]

[redacted] an attack on the city has been delayed--suggesting that the enemy's attempt to screen movements along the infiltration corridors from northwest III Corps have been hampered by allied sweeps and air strikes. In the

delta, [redacted] allied sweep operations disrupted enemy preparations and forced the postponement of strong Viet Cong attacks against Cai Lay and Can Tho cities. 25X1

Except in a few areas--central I Corps, Duc Lap, and northwest III Corps--the Communists have withheld most of their main force regiments from the fighting. This has resulted in lower enemy casualties than in the Tet and May offensives. Some 12,000 enemy troops were reportedly killed in the first 12 days of the May offensive, while enemy losses for the first 12 days of the recent fighting stand at about 8,500.

There is little doubt, however, that the Communists intend to press their offensive into key urban areas wherever their forces can get organized for strong attacks. Sizable, and in many cases fresh, enemy units continue to threaten other known Communist objectives such as Ban Me Thuot and coastal cities in I Corps. Based on the evidence now available, the Communists intend to wage a protracted offensive characterized by widespread shellings and attempts at ground assaults in and around key urban targets. 25X1

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Hanoi's National Day Celebrations

Free of the threat of air attack, Hanoi this year celebrated its national day more elaborately. Public meetings were held over a three-day period, Ho Chi Minh made a ceremonial appearance, a special MIG-21 fly-by was staged, and Premier Pham Van Dong issued a strong nationalistic appeal for continued prosecution of the war.

At overseas receptions the holiday was marred by intemperate speeches by Chinese representatives. In Peking and Paris the Chinese belabored the North Vietnamese not only for the Paris peace talks but also for their support of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Hanoi was not intimidated. The premier digressed from his theme of Vietnamese nationalism to publicly reiterate the regime's support of the Soviet move.

In other developments, the Vietnamese Communists are strongly pressing their claims to political control of the South Vietnamese countryside. A series of Hanoi broadcasts in

the past week claimed that "liberation committees" and "revolutionary administrations" had been elected in the past few months throughout rural areas in the South. Most of these administrative organs were said to be at the village and hamlet level, but the Communists also claimed to have established three provincial committees. Generally, the new administrations are portrayed as spontaneous developments of the ongoing "general uprising" but, in some cases, Liberation Front participation is acknowledged.

Beyond this propaganda, reports from South Vietnam indicate that strenuous Communist efforts to create and to maintain such new administrative organizations have been under way for several months. In addition to serving more immediate purposes, these bodies will provide the foundations at the grass-roots level for the eventual surfacing of a national political-legislative apparatus laying claim to extensive territorial control. Such an apparatus is a fundamental part of Communist strategy for a future period of increased political competition with the Saigon government.

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THAI OPPOSITION PARTY WINS INITIAL ELECTORAL SKIRMISH

The government has lost the opening round in its electoral test of strength with opposition elements, but the setback may cause complacent Thai leaders to step up preparations for next year's legislative elections.

The opposition Democratic Party took 22 of 24 seats in the voting on 1 September for the Bangkok municipal assembly. Three recognized government slates managed to elect only one progovernment candidate. The election, the first meaningful one in Thailand in ten years, was orderly and relatively clean, although some cases of government chicanery were reported.

Widely interpreted as an important political barometer, the results could have a significant impact on key legislative elections scheduled for early next year. The Democrats, the only nationwide opposition party currently active, came out of the election substantially strengthened. Out of the limelight for ten years and weakened by the recent death of their leading public figure, the Democrats needed the psychological boost that the Bangkok victory gave them.

Although the Democrats' showing may also attract some other antigovernment elements to rally behind their banner, they have a long way to go before they can expect to challenge the government with any chance of success next year. The party does not appear to have much following in the countryside, and it is clear

that the Bangkok vote reflects the indecisiveness and complacency of progovernment forces as much as it does Democratic strength.

The election is a major disappointment to those elements within the government who had hoped that a Democratic Party defeat in Bangkok, its traditional area of strength, would clear the way for an easy government victory in the legislative elections. Moreover, the setback in Bangkok represents a repudiation of the municipal leadership that has been associated with Deputy Prime Minister Praphat and hence is a particularly bitter pill for the government faction centered around Praphat.

One consequence of the election will be to strengthen the hand of Prime Minister Thanom in the factional wrangling with Praphat. The deputy prime minister is the only Thai leader actively organizing a political apparatus in the countryside, however, and he will have to play a key role in establishing a unified government party.

Although the turnout in the Bangkok election was low and local issues were important, the voting does suggest that there may be more antigovernment sentiment in the country than has been recognized heretofore. The election results indicate that the government will have to put aside its squabbling and marshal its considerable resources to guarantee a clearcut victory in next year's legislative elections.

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SUPPRESSION OF CHINA'S RED GUARDS GAINS SPEED

The recent shift to the right in China's internal politics has brought terror to millions of Red Guard students, who just a short time ago were the apple of Mao's eye and a militant instrument of the Cultural Revolution. Local authorities--mainly military men who have long suffered verbal abuse at the hands of Red Guards--are apparently being given a mandate to deal harshly with them, and are exercising this prerogative with enthusiasm.

[redacted] the first moves against radical Red Guard groups began early last spring. According to a Red Guard tabloid, military officials in Swatow ordered "rebel" organizations to "lower their flags" on 6 April. One officer reportedly ordered his men to flog the radicals with leather whips, exclaiming, "Ever since March last year I have been humiliated by you. Now is the time for me to let off steam."

[redacted]

Treatment of "1966 and 1967 graduates"--older Red Guards who were kept in school so they could participate in the Cultural Revolution--seems to be particularly rough, probably because they tended to be leaders of militant groups. Aside from those who are specifically charged, many others are being treated as political criminals and sent to prison mines or military-run state farms under the pretext that they are being given "job assignments."

[redacted] so-called "worker-propaganda teams," supervised directly by municipal revolutionary committees, have been formed to occupy schools and to subdue remaining Red Guard organizations. Army troops apparently are to lead the teams. Teams as large as 10,000 have been formed in Harbin and Sian.

In this emotional atmosphere, it is evident that plans tentatively considered in July to try

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to resume meaningful education soon in colleges are now in abeyance.

The process of forming new provincial governments, renewed last month after several months of indecision, apparently is to be completed this weekend. On 3 September, the New China News

Agency broadcast "situation reports" about both regions of the kind that have preceded other recently established local governments. The new leaders are expected to be the old-line military and party officials who appeared with Mao Tse-tung at large turnouts of officials in Peking in mid-August. [redacted]

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Jordan and Egypt are both still fearful that Israel will launch another major reprisal raid against them, and the terrorist bombings in Tel Aviv on Wednesday seem likely to provoke one. The Israelis are easily capable of mounting such an attack at any time, but at the moment are embroiled at the UN with their protest over Egypt's cross-canal raid. Firefights continue to occur daily, including a new series of exchanges along the previously quiet Syrian frontier.

Libyan Prime Minister Bakkush resigned on 4 September and was replaced by Wanis Qaddafi after King Idris refused to accept Bakkush's suggestions for cabinet changes. Political power continues to reside in the King.

The Organization of African Unity's (OAU) summit meeting in Algiers next week seems certain to have a number of sharply divisive issues on the agenda, foremost among them the Nigerian war, which the OAU is pledged to resolve.

Nigerian federal authorities were finally persuaded this week to permit daytime relief flights to Biafra's starving refugees, although disagreement over which airfield to use may continue to delay the operation. The negotiations in Addis Ababa, however, are dwindling to an inconclusive end because the participants are preparing for the OAU summit conference. Federal troops are trying hard to complete the capture of remaining Biafran-held towns and airfields before the conference closes, but the determined Biafran defense makes this an unlikely prospect.

Congolese Army leaders in Brazzaville have deposed President Mas-samba-Debat and installed one of their own number, but he in turn may be threatened by increasing dissension in the army and among tribal elements.

South Africa's low-key and low-cost political and economic efforts with neighboring Black African ministates are paying off. On 31 August, Lesotho ordered South African political refugees out of the country, and last week Malawi laid out the red carpet for the visiting South African foreign minister.

In Izmir, Turkey, the routine visit of several ships from the US Sixth Fleet is continuing without serious incident. Most of the ships are due to leave on 7 September. A leftist demonstration scheduled in Izmir this weekend could result in a new clash between rightist and leftist students, but the reinforced police should be able to prevent any major disturbance.

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ARAB STATES REMAIN WARY OF NEW ISRAELI COUNTERRAID

Both Egypt and Jordan remain fearful of Israeli reprisals in the wake of a new wave of Arab terrorist activity last month.

Israeli Defense Minister Dayan threatened severe reprisals against the Egyptians last week after an Egyptian patrol crossed the Suez Canal, killed two Israeli soldiers, and kidnaped a third. Dayan told a UN official that Israel considered the incident the most serious "in any area" since the Egyptian sinking of an Israeli destroyer late last year. He called on Cairo to fulfill a number of clearly impossible conditions by way of apology, a demand to which the Egyptians predictably failed to respond. Subsequently, Israel called for a meeting of the Security Council to protest the incursion.

The Israeli airliner impounded by Algeria in late July was released on 1 September. If Israel is in fact planning a reprisal raid, this might remove

a slight deterrent, but the Israelis would probably be inclined to wait until after the Security Council meeting before making a major assault. Whenever it comes, the blow could fall with equal likelihood on Egypt or Jordan or both.

The Jordanians continue to believe that Israeli forces are poised to strike along the northern cease-fire lines and fear that Israel may push on to take the strategic heights in northern Jordan. A new element was added when, for the first time in months, Syrian and Israeli units exchanged fire across their cease-fire lines twice during the past week.

Meanwhile, the Arab League foreign ministers began their scheduled meeting in Cairo on 1 September. The Tunisian delegation immediately walked out, protesting that other representatives were trying to muzzle their views. The meeting is unlikely to produce anything but the usual Arab pyrotechnics.

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INTERNAL DISSENSION SPARKS RENEWED FIGHTING IN YEMEN

Factional fighting among the Yemeni republicans in Sana has encouraged increased royalist pressure against them.

A long-standing cleavage between supporters of Prime Minister al-Amri and his group of senior army officers on the one hand and those of the more radical, junior army officers--many belonging to a minority religious sect--was renewed by open rebellion last week. The violence was triggered by al-Amri's decision to replace the army's chief of staff and three battalion commanders with his own supporters.

The three dismissed commanders believed that al-Amri was

plotting to take over complete control of the army, and they ordered their troops to surround Sana airport, block the main roads leading out of the city, and seize army headquarters. Fighting lasted three days before al-Amri brought it under control. Meanwhile, the royalists reportedly exploited the situation by shelling Sana severely with artillery.

The republican factions have come to blows before, but this incident was by far the most serious. Continued internal difficulties may eventually persuade the republicans to intensify their efforts to reach some kind of accommodation with the royalists.

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ARMY TIGHTENS GRIP ON CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

The dominant military men in Congo (Brazzaville), among whom opportunistic army chief Ngouabi is currently pre-eminent, have replaced President Massamba-Debat with one of their own number and have promised changes in the country's institutions. The army leadership is torn by personal and tribal splits, however, and these moves may not have full approval from all top military leaders.

Massamba's removal was precipitated by the armed clashes that occurred last weekend when the army moved to disarm dissident youths in Camp Meteo, a paramilitary installation near Brazzaville. The army overran the camp on 31 August after two days of bloody fighting. The 23 Cuban military advisers in the camp apparently played no direct role in the fracas. At the request of the army, they were transferred to the Cuban Embassy after the fighting and are scheduled to be sent home.

Evidence is accumulating that the Meteo incident was rooted in ethnic animosities, and many of the dissidents apparently were tribal partisans of Massamba, who last month lost most of his authority to Ngouabi. Massamba, who at first maintained an ambivalent attitude toward the clash, was placed under virtual arrest soon

after the fighting began. A communique issued on 4 August by the Ngouabi-dominated National Council of the Revolution (CNR) "accepted" his resignation, blaming him for the fighting. Capt. Raoul, a mulatto who became prime minister only last month, was designated acting president.

Ngouabi, operating in the CNR and increasingly the paramount power broker, has also decreed major changes in civilian and military institutions. He has revived a scheme to merge army and civil defense forces and has announced the restructuring of the single political party. Executive organs of the party's ancillary youth, labor, and women's groups were summarily abolished.

Ngouabi's ability to follow through on these changes and even to remain the Congo's predominant leader hinges on the tenuous cohesion of the army leadership. There are indications that he is even now being challenged by other army leaders, especially Defense Minister Poignet, to whom Massamba tried to turn over the presidency. With Massamba out and some type of army-led regime seemingly unavoidable, Poignet is apparently the man most acceptable to the French, who continue to monitor Brazzaville developments closely.

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FIFTH OAU SUMMIT SHAPING UP IN ALGIERS

The Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Council of Ministers began meeting in Algiers this week to determine the agenda for the fifth OAU summit which opens on 13 September. In contrast to last year's meeting at Kinshasa, where the Africans purposefully achieved an image of unity and cooperation, this year's session promises to be one of the liveliest and most divisive of recent years.

The central issue of this conference--and the most divisive--is the question of the unresolved Nigerian war, which the OAU last September took upon itself to try to solve. Despite strenuous efforts by Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie as head of the OAU's six-nation Consultative Committee on Nigeria, he will have little progress to report. The Emperor has been able to get the disputants to talk to each other--both at Niamey and at Addis Ababa--but no meaningful agreement has been achieved, even on relief measures. The Emperor, in his report, may well suggest that his committee be dissolved and that a new OAU body take over.

The solid line-up of the OAU last year with the Nigerian Government's position against Biafran secession has broken down. Four African states have recognized Biafra, others are wavering, Paris has "decreed" Biafra's right to

self-determination, and world sympathy for Biafra has risen sharply. The Biafrans, who have been working hard diplomatically, have enlisted Tunisia to carry their banner at Algiers. Tunisian officials reportedly plan to get the issue on the summit agenda for "in depth" consideration and to insist that rebel leader Ojukwu be given a full hearing.

The Nigerian federal government is working equally hard to keep the issue off the agenda and to prevent the appearance of the Biafrans. [redacted] however, [redacted] a Biafran delegation will appear at Algiers and be accorded observer or similar status. The problem could be further inflamed if any other African states recognize Biafra or if, as the French ambassador in Addis Ababa speculated recently, Paris decided to recognize Biafra before the conference convenes. The issue may well provoke a walkout by the federal government delegation.

The OAU will of course again laud the efforts of the liberation fighters of southern Africa and condemn the policies of the white-dominated states of Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese territories. This is the one main issue the Africans can unite on. This year, however, there may be a battle shaping up over control of the 11-member Tanzania-based African Liberation Committee (ALC), the OAU committee charged with

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handing out funds and arms to the fighters.

Several states would like to see the ALC out from under Tanzania's wing, and to put further controls on the committee's activities. Morocco, for one, has proposed that ALC membership be enlarged and that the chairmanship be a revolving one. A further squabble may arise over recommendations that the OAU withdraw its recognition of Holden Roberto's Angolan government-in-exile, a manifestation of the rising frustration many African leaders have with the debilitating effects of the several competing and quarreling nationalist movements.

Another issue, of lesser significance but perhaps no less divisive, may be a battle over the election of a new secretary general. The incumbent--the controversial, free-wheeling Guinean, Diallo Telli--is running hard for re-election, but he has irritated many states during his five-year tenure. Many former French and British colonies are clearly opposed to him but, as far as is known, there is no consensus

on a successor and he may be reconfirmed by default.

The Arab-Israeli issue also seems likely to be raised. This is always a difficult issue for many African states, both those who are sympathetic to Israel and receive Israeli technical assistance, and those who resent Arab interference in African affairs. African-Arab tensions have risen over the continued detention of former Congolese premier Moise Tshombe in Algiers, and the recent Algerian involvement in the Palestinian highjacking of an Israeli commercial aircraft.

The OAU generally tries to steer clear of commenting on international issues not directly pertaining to Africa, and may still do so this time. There is, however, some sentiment for a condemnation of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and also of US actions in Vietnam. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference on Vietnam, being held in Cairo from 7 to 9 September, may well spill over to the Algiers meetings.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Repercussions from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia continued to dominate hemisphere events this week.

The Chilean Radical Party, which issued only a lukewarm condemnation of the Soviet action, is coming under criticism from many political sectors. Two of its moderate candidates for the congressional elections scheduled for next year have withdrawn in protest over the party's abstention on the Chamber of Deputies' resolution expressing solidarity with Czechoslovakia. The party has since tried to retreat slightly from its first position.


In Venezuela, Communist Party expressions of outright support and encouragement of the Soviet action have been muted by an apparent divergence within the party leadership over this issue and the possible adverse effect it might have on the electoral expectation of its front, the Union for Advancement. Some party leaders are fearful that too public and vocal a stance in support of the Soviets could seriously backfire against the party's chances in the December congressional and presidential elections. Non-Communist parties are already exploiting the Communists' dilemma. If the Communists criticize the Soviets, they risk losing their main source of financial support, but failing to do so could cost them a sizable portion of the 150,000 votes they expect to pull in December.



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In other developments, the military trial of David Knox, a British citizen charged with complicity in the invasion of Haiti last May, ended with a death sentence. President Duvalier, who had used the trial as a propaganda vehicle, has hinted that he will grant clemency.

Argentine President Ongania's removal of General Julio Alsogaray as army commander-in-chief last week finally provoked a strong public reaction from the general. His statements stressed the seriousness of leaving Ongania on his own and removing from positions of power those who sought a return to democratic processes. Alsogaray's protest poses no threat to the regime, however.



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GUATEMALAN TERRORISTS THREATEN MORE VIOLENCE

Only relatively minor incidents have occurred since the Communist Rebel Armed Forces assassinated Ambassador Mein last week, but the possibility of significant and even large-scale violence is strong. The group has threatened continuing acts of reprisal until the government frees guerrilla leader Carlos Francisco Ordonez, alias "Camilo Sanchez," whose capture continues to be denied by officials.

During the past week, several Guatemalan soldiers were injured when a mine exploded under their truck, and a firefight took place between police and suspects in the capital. A fire at the army's central barracks and ammunition dump may have been sabotage, but there is as yet no clear evidence. These and other events, however, become the source of many rumors which serve in turn to keep tension high.

All parties represented in congress have joined in calling for the formation of a "national front against violence." In mid-August, the ruling Revolutionary Party had invited "all sectors of society" to discuss the creation of such a front. The target of that proposal, however, was right-wing terrorism, to which substantial numbers of the party's constituency had fallen victim. The nominal support of the right-wing parties for such a front now, therefore, seems certain to founder upon the parties' deep antagonisms.

The search for the ambassador's assassins continues without significant developments. Guatemalan authorities are considering posting large rewards for information leading to the capture of any of the six suspects, whose pictures have been widely publicized.

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ARGENTINA'S TOP GENERAL PROTESTS HIS OUSTER

General Julio Alsogaray, in his first public statement since his removal as commander in chief of the Argentine Army on 26 August, strongly denounced President Ongania and his policies.

Alsogaray had been a focal point for a so-called "liberal" faction that had been urging the President to return the country to more representative government. He failed to get support that he expected from other military critics of the government, however, and thus was unable to prevent his ouster.

Three days after his removal, Alsogaray called in the press and issued a strong denunciation of Ongania and his policies. He charged that the takeover was cause for "deep concern about the future course of the government" and that his replacement only a month before he was slated to retire as commander in chief constituted almost an affront toward

the army as an institution. He stressed the seriousness of removing from positions of power those who sought a return to democratic processes.

Alsogaray's protest presents little real threat to Ongania, but the President has been known to overreact to personal criticism. In this case, however, he is aware that many in the army agree with Alsogaray's statements, and he realizes that disciplinary action against the retired general--especially imprisonment, even for a short time--would cause a division in the military and ultimately enhance Alsogaray's image. Failure to discipline Alsogaray, on the other hand, might be interpreted as a weakness on the part of Ongania. In any event, Alsogaray's open criticism of the President will make it more difficult for the liberals still in the service to influence Ongania.

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ECUADOR'S PRESIDENT VELASCO TAKES OFFICE

President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra announced the formation of his fifth government on 1 September. He has indicated that a major goal of his administration will be a shift in Ecuador's foreign policy toward a restoration of normal relations with the United States.

Velasco's new cabinet of "national concentration" contains a disparate collection of rather young ministers--average age about 42--whose main characteristic is professed loyalty to the President and his as yet poorly defined program. Ideologically, the new cabinet appears nationalistic and left of center. In addition to hard-core Velasquista ministers such as Agriculture Minister Pedro Menendez Gilbert, Guayaquil political leader, it has one Liberal, Minister of Government Blasco Penaherrera Padilla, one ex-Conservative, Foreign Minister Rogelio Valdivieso Eguiguren, and three identifiable leftists.

Except for Defense Minister Rafael Andrade Ochoa, who is

reportedly well qualified for the job, the appointees who head the crucial ministries of Foreign Affairs, Government, and Finance appear relatively inexperienced to cope with the difficult problems that now confront Ecuador.

The US Embassy comments that as problems arise, some further cabinet changes may occur over the coming months, particularly if Velasco follows his past practice of ignoring or overriding ministerial advice when making important policy decisions.

Many of the new government's designees have already met with US officials to consider Ecuador's economic needs and to discuss differences over aid policies and seizures of US fishing vessels. Velasco has indicated he hopes to improve US-Ecuadorean relations.

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