



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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

*Special Report*

*North Korean Tactics Against South Korea: 1968*


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
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**NORTH KOREAN TACTICS AGAINST SOUTH KOREA: 1968**

In 1968 South Korea faced the most formidable North Korean pressures and harassment since the 1953 armistice. Paramilitary operations from the North—the unsuccessful raid on the South Korean presidential residence in January and a large-scale armed propaganda and terror campaign in the mountainous east coast region in November and December—went far beyond the scope of any act of recent years. In addition to these operations, which involved large commando teams in rear areas, Pyongyang continued its armed reconnaissance and agent penetrations along the Demilitarized Zone, resulting in a record number of incidents and casualties.



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**NORTH KOREAN INCURSIONS**

North Koreans crossed into the Demilitarized Zone or entered South Korea by boat in 1968

Most of the North Korean activity involved short-term probing and reconnaissance missions against United Nations Command defenses along the Demilitarized Zone. The intruders generally tried to avoid contact with United Nations Command forces, but from September through early November they became more aggressive and conducted ambushes and planted mines within and just below the zone.

A large-scale guerrilla operation departed significantly from the over-all pattern of paramilitary activity during the year. A large number of guerrillas staged an armed propaganda and terrorist campaign in a remote area of the South Korean interior during severe winter weather



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It took two months of major effort to neutralize the guerrillas



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The short-term aim of these large-scale armed incursions probably is to probe South Korea's defenses for vulnerabilities which might be exploited in the future to shake public confidence in the government and thus weaken the nation's political and economic stability. The North Koreans almost certainly believe that these probing actions will also cause friction between Seoul and Washington over measures to counteract them.

Pyongyang's tactics have been aimed at achieving what it probably regards as the



indispensable conditions for advancing toward its goal of unification—establishing a strong subversive apparatus in the South and creating a guerrilla movement against the South Korean Government.

the true patriots of Korea and outstanding examples for other South Koreans to follow.

North Korean Premier Kim Il-song has stated that a political infrastructure can grow and develop assets only when agents operate in a favorable environment. Infiltration of armed agents for harassment, terrorism, and sabotage is probably seen as the necessary catalyst for creating a more revolutionary environment in the south.




North Korean theoretical journals and party spokesmen have long emphasized that a covert Marxist-Leninist party in the South is an essential precondition for a successful unification effort.



The generally strong anti-Communist attitudes of the South Korean population, however, have made political action work very difficult. In August, Pyongyang's effort apparently suffered a major setback when the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency arrested 158 persons, including a former national assemblyman, who were accused of belonging to a North Korean - sponsored United Revolutionary Party.

The increased militancy of the subversion program was evident in North Korean propaganda broadcasts in 1968, when broadcasts rarely carried the theme of peaceful unification. The Pyongyang-based "Liberation Radio" appealed to South Korean citizens to join the anti-US front and work to establish a Marxist-Leninist party for leadership in a violent struggle against the Seoul government. Since the unsuccessful raid on the presidential residence by [redacted] North Korean agents in January, Pyongyang media have been emphasizing "armed guerrilla struggle" in the South. Propaganda reports picturing the inception of a broadly-based, violent uprising in the South grew in intensity and specificity after South Korea's east coast was infiltrated late last year. For the first time threats of "execution" were made against people who aided the South Korean security effort. The propaganda appears



North Korean media have given heavy coverage to the court trials of the party leaders, calling them

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designed to create doubts about the validity of contrary claims by the South Korean Government and the United Nations Command that all this activity is carried out by the North.

North Korea seems, however, to want to keep its subversion program from leading to major hostilities. After the raid on the presidential residence and the capture of the Pueblo in January, there were relatively few North Korean operations until mid-year.




North Korean casualties significantly increased this year. This probably will not deter the North Korean leadership from working toward creating a "revolutionary" situation in the South during 1969. Kim Il-song knows that a "revolutionary movement" demands sacrifices during its initial stages, and he sees his campaign against South Korea as not only an essential program for uniting the peninsula under Communist control but also as a major contribution to the international Communist offensive against "US imperialism."



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