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The most authoritative article, by Defense Minister Grechko in Pravda, was moderate. Grechko emphasized the role of the party in defense policy and noted the special attention the party and government are paying to a "reasonable combination of nuclear-rocket weapons with the perfection of usual classical armament." He outlined the postwar appearance of "new imperialist forces" including "neo-fascism" and "revanchism" in West Germany, and urged the need for ideological and military unity of the socialist states.

While Grechko referred specifically to the US only once--as encouraging West Germany--First Deputy Defense Minister Zakharov in Izvestia launched an anti-US diatribe. He catalogued "aggressive" US acts since 1945, including the establishment of NATO and its members' instigation of "more than 100 military provocations," most recently in Czechoslovakia. Citing figures to "prove" the vast scale of the Western threat, he called for military preparedness but gave assurance that the party and government are doing all that is necessary.

Grechko attacked the "adventurist" policies of the "Mao Tse-tung group." Zakharov on the other hand did not mention the Chinese threat. It did receive attention, however, from his fellow first deputy defense ministers, Sokolov in Red Star and particularly Yakubovsky--who commands the Warsaw Pact forces--

in Sovetskaya Rossiya. Sokolov, like Zakharov, underlined the NATO threat posed by an arms buildup and a ring of bases around the USSR. He too called for continued strengthening of Soviet defenses, at the same time noting that the Soviet Army is equipped with the "newest military technology and weapons, including nuclear weapons of all calibers, and missiles of various operational ranges, from tactical to intercontinental."

The death rate among Soviet generals, which has attracted the attention of the Western press, continues to be high, but not dramatically so, and seems to have no political significance. The impact of last winter's severe Asian flu epidemic on an over-age military hierarchy probably accounts for some of the increase in the year's mortality rate among the generals as compared with last years. Most of the recent deaths seem to have had natural causes, with two exceptions. General Popov--believed to have been posted to the Defense Ministry's Chief Inspectorate--and Lt. Gen. Kadomtsev--who commanded air defense aviation--were described as having perished "tragically," which usually denotes a violent death. These two may have died in a single accident. Because of the dissimilarities in the status and professional position of the other generals who have died recently, there is little reason to suppose that their deaths were linked.

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SOVIET FARM CHARTER BREAKS LITTLE NEW GROUND

The newly published draft of the Soviet Union's collective farm charter primarily codifies legislation and practices that have evolved since publication of the outmoded 1935 charter and does not appear to signal significant change for the USSR's 36,000 collective farms. The new charter will serve as a model to govern all major aspects of collective farm management and life.

A high-level committee chaired by Brezhnev began work on the draft early in 1966, but debate on controversial issues presumably has delayed publication until now. The draft will be submitted in November to a national conference of collective farmers for final approval. Sharp debate in the press has already begun, suggesting continued differences in the leadership over agricultural policies.

The draft reaffirms the collective farm as an integral part of Soviet society and enumerates rights as well as responsibilities of the collective and its members. The most important rights granted the farmer are guaranteed pay in cash and farm products, participation in farm administration and election of its officers, and maintenance of private plots and livestock.

Guaranteed annual wages were established by a 1966 decree. Although the right to elect farm administrators and other provisions of self-government supposedly were insured by the 1935 charter, local government and party officials actually usurped most of these rights. The new draft allows, but does not require,

the secret ballot in farm elections and calls for general farm meetings four times a year. These provisions, if implemented, may give the farm worker a voice in farm administration. The present draft, however, does not preclude a continuation of direct state supervision over the selection of farm management.

The area allotted to private plots and the number of livestock permitted by the draft charter are less than in 1935, but are higher than current actual levels. The provision to make plot size and number of livestock partially dependent upon the amount of labor participation in the collectivized sector, a potential loophole for restricting private activity, has already come under attack in the press.

Many of the provisions which grant rights to the farm appear to be compromise solutions on particularly sensitive issues. The draft allows, for example, the farm to choose the form of labor organization, reaffirms the right to establish subsidiary farm enterprises, and allows participation in interfarm activities and organizations. Regulations governing some of these activities are contained in existing decrees or may yet be formulated.

Formation of a collective farm union, an idea debated for a number of years, is not mentioned in the charter, but further discussion on the subject can be expected. Such a union, in theory, would be independent from the Ministry of Agriculture and would administer the affairs of all collective farms.

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YUGOSLAVS COMPLETE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Yugoslavia's general elections, which began in early April, ended on 12 May after placing over 43,000 legislators in the federal, republic, provincial, and communal assemblies. Under a law adopted last January, voters had a wide choice for a record number of posts in an unprecedented number of constituencies. To protect the Communist Party's foundations, the candidates had been thoroughly screened in the nominating process.

On the average there were twice as many candidates as seats; approximately 87 percent of the electorate voted. As in previous elections not all candidates were party members, but no figures are available on how many nonparty candidates ran or were elected. Candidates were allowed to criticize and debate alternative proposals on how best to achieve the regime's goals. Many of the local elections were hotly contested on a personal basis, and the election procedures seem to have been designed to promote the selection of the candidate most capable of implementing the regime's programs. The elections incidentally provided the authorities with clues as to who is popular among the electorate and why.

Widespread dissatisfaction remains among authorities and the voters with the complicated electoral mechanism. Post-election assessments are virtually unanimous in calling for another revamping. Voters were confused by the intricacies of the system

and the leadership concerned by its lack of control over "election excesses." One communal assembly re-elected its president two days after he had been expelled from the party, and in another commune a candidate was elected on his advocacy of denationalization of peasant property. In many cases run-off elections will be held because no candidate received a majority.

The current system provides for the direct election by secret ballot of the upper house in each assembly except the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Nationalities. Delegates to the Chamber of Nationalities, composed of 20 representatives from each republic and 10 from each province, are elected by the republic and provincial assemblies. A recent constitutional amendment provides that the Chamber of Nationalities must approve each bill before it becomes law.

Yugoslavia's 501 communal assemblies also are elected by direct secret ballot, and they elect most of the remaining chambers at all levels of parliament. These chambers are less influential, however, and their legislative function is restricted to specific economic-social areas. The final step in the formation of the government takes place on 16 May when the newly elected Federal Assembly convenes to approve the 20-member Federal Executive Council (cabinet) of premier-designate Mitja Ribicic.

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COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES

REGISTRATION MEETINGS	SOCIALIST ALLIANCE NOMINATION MEETINGS	501 BICAMERAL COMMUNAL ASSEMBLIES	<p>REPUBLIC ASSEMBLIES</p> <p>BOSNIA (400)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REPUBLIC CHAMBER (120) ● SOCIO-POLITICAL CHAMBER (70) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (70) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (70) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (70) <p>CROATIA (440)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REPUBLIC CHAMBER (120) ● ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (80) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (80) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (80) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (80) <p>MACEDONIA (340)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REPUBLIC CHAMBER (100) ● CHAMBER OF COMMUNES (60) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (60) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (60) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (60) <p>MONTENEGRO (254)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REPUBLIC CHAMBER (70) ● CHAMBER OF COMMUNES (46) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (46) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (46) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (46) <p>SERBIA (440)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REPUBLIC CHAMBER (120) ● ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (80) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (80) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (80) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (80) <p>SLOVENIA (285)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● REPUBLIC CHAMBER (90) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (75) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (60) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (60) <p>AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE ASSEMBLIES</p> <p>KOSOVO (270)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PROVINCIAL CHAMBER (70) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (50) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (50) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (50) ● ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (50) <p>VUJVDINA (350)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● PROVINCIAL CHAMBER (90) ● ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL CHAMBER (65) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (65) ● EDUCATIONAL-CULTURAL CHAMBER (65) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (65) 	FEDERAL ASSEMBLY (620 Deputies)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● COMMUNAL CHAMBERS (20,062) ● CORPORATE CHAMBERS (20,217) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● CHAMBER OF NATIONALITIES (140) ● SOCIO-POLITICAL CHAMBER (120) ● EDUC-CULTURAL CHAMBER (120) ● ECONOMIC CHAMBER (120) ● SOCIAL-HEALTH CHAMBER (120)

- Elected directly by secret ballot
 - Elected indirectly by the Communal Assemblies
- Numbers in parentheses represent number of Deputies

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EAST GERMANS PRESS FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BONN

A belatedly published speech made by party boss Ulbricht at a meeting of the central committee on 30 April appears to confirm that the East Germans have decided to press Bonn to establish diplomatic relations.

Ulbricht scored Bonn for rejecting East German proposals to negotiate various issues and for attempting to mislead "public opinion" by referring to East Germany as a "foreign state." He then said that Bonn's full recognition of Pankow was a condition to "normalizing" relations.

East German officials have in the past demanded that Bonn establish diplomatic relations and have referred to West Germany as a "foreign state." They have, however, quickly backtracked when these demands caused an uproar in West Germany and probably also in East Germany.

Ulbricht made a long and rather tortured explanation of how Pankow can demand that Bonn recognize East Germany as a sovereign state while insisting at the same time that the states remain part of the "German nation." His remarks suggest that he was rebutting in advance arguments on this apparently controversial issue from West Germans, and perhaps East Germans. He stated that "history" teaches that "it is possible that relations under international law exist between sovereign states of the same nation," and cited as an example the "exist-

ence of a number of sovereign states...of the Arab nation."

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Two factors may account for the East Germans' shift in tactics toward Bonn. On one hand, they are encouraged by the recent decisions of Iraq and Cambodia to recognize their regime, and probably by the fact that some West Germans, including two Social Democratic Party regional organizations, have advocated recognition. They presumably believe that time is now on their side in their attempt to gain recognition.

On the other hand, Pankow which apparently has reservations about the Budapest Appeal for a European security conference, may be attempting to preclude negotiations or compromises at a conference on issues they consider to be non-negotiable. In this connection, Ulbricht remarked that the East Germans will pose no conditions for a security conference, but immediately added that European security is tied to the establishment of "normal relations" between the two Germanies.

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SOVIETS MAINTAIN NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN


A guided-missile destroyer and an oiler from the Pacific entered the Indian Ocean on 6 May to continue the Soviet naval presence there.

This is the third group of Soviet warships to sail these waters in the past year. Two guided-missile ships which had been there since November left for Vladivostok in late April. The Soviet warships make official visits to Indian Ocean ports, but spend a good part of their time at anchor in the areas of Mauritius and the Seychelles. Two Soviet mooring buoys recently were installed in international waters on Fortune Bank east of Coetivy Island. In addition to the warships, Soviet oceanographic


and space support ships frequent this area of the Indian Ocean.

The USSR probably will seek use of Indian Ocean port facilities to support the warships, space support and research ships operating there. In this context, the Soviets may hope eventually to gain regular use of facilities in Port Louis in Mauritius. Two guided-missile ships visited there last month.

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INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS



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MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA

Action along the Israeli-Jordanian border remained at the same high level that has characterized the past few weeks, and clashes along the Suez Canal also continued on a daily basis. Attempts by the Lebanese Government to negotiate an understanding with the fedayeen groups operating in southern Lebanon proved futile this past week in Beirut.

The Iranian Government and the Western oil consortium reached a compromise on revenues for the year that began on 21 March. Through a combination of increased oil production and advance payments, the consortium probably will more than meet the Shah's demands for \$1 billion in revenue. Although the Shah may not be happy about the necessity for advance payments, he has accepted the offer as a realistic compromise.

The three-week-old strike of Turkish contract workers at American installations has now spread to facilities at Incirlik Air Base. Mediation efforts have made little headway, and the tense atmosphere at some sites could lead to serious incidents. The situation is apparently delaying conclusion of the important Turkish-American bilateral agreement, under negotiation for over two years, which the Turks are especially anxious to sign before parliament adjourns on 1 June.

In Africa, Guinean President Toure's exploitation of the alleged revolutionary plot first announced in February has led to death sentences for nine principal plotters. Toure's announcement that "radicalization" of the revolution would continue and that those not for it would lose their jobs suggests that the purge is not yet over. In Dahomey, a wave of student and labor protest has been added to the long list of serious domestic problems that are beginning to threaten the life of the fragile government of President Zinsou. Along the vital Benguela Railroad, in Angola, a spate of sabotage by insurgents based in the Congo (Kinshasa) and Zambia has prompted Portugal to suspend all international traffic over the line, a tactic that has been effective in the past to force Kinshasa and Lusaka to rein in the guerrillas.

Numerous actual or would-be Pakistani political leaders are keeping up low-level maneuvering in anticipation of an eventual return to non-military rule. The martial law administration, meanwhile, appears increasingly concerned over reports that the small, pro-Peking faction of the Communist Party is collecting weapons for a possible "peasants' revolt" in East Pakistan during the summer monsoon.

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NIGERIAN ARMY COMMAND RESHUFFLED

Federal leader Gowon has made major changes in his military command in an effort to get federal forces back on the offensive in the civil war that is now in its 23d month. Meanwhile, Nigerian oil production reached a record high in April, but Biafran units still pose a serious threat to oil installations.

General Gowon has replaced all three of his division commanders and his quartermaster general in a shake-up that may include still further changes. There seems to be no significant opposition to the changes made thus far; Gowon has paid due regard to trival sensitivities and the officers replaced have all been given other assignments.

Despite the reshuffle, federal forces do not appear likely to mount any successful offensive activity for some time. The 1st Division, which captured Umuahia last month, has been bogged down there ever since and faces serious supply problems. The largely ineffectual 2d Division has been on the defensive for months, and the 3d Division reportedly has

become seriously disorganized following the Biafran recapture of Owerri last month.

Nigeria's two oil-producing companies, Shell-BP and Gulf, recorded nearly 600,000 barrels per day in April, making Nigeria the 11th largest oil-producing country. Biafran forces are close to several oil fields, however, as well as to the Trans-Niger Pipeline. On 9 May, a secessionist raiding party captured two drilling camps near Kwale, and more raids are expected. The secessionists have not sabotaged any of the very vulnerable oil installations still in federal hands, probably in the hope of eventually recapturing them intact.

Meanwhile, eight Soviet economic technicians arrived in Lagos on 9 May, probably under the terms of an economic cooperation agreement signed by the USSR and Nigeria last November. Some of the technicians are to advise the federal government on the establishment of a state construction organization, while the others, who are geological survey experts, may be involved with Soviet assistance to a proposed Nigerian steel mill.


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Biafrans Still Pose Serious Threat to Nigerian Oil Installations



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STAGE SET FOR NEW ARMY-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON

Another confrontation is possible between the Lebanese Government and the fedayeen, following the collapse of negotiations early this week.

Fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat came to Beirut last week to confer with President Hilu and President Nasir's emissary, Sabri al-Khuli, in an attempt to arrive at an understanding on the problem of fedayeen activities in Lebanon. Arafat demanded complete freedom of action for guerrilla groups in Lebanese territory without any coordination or control by the military. He further insisted on the right to bring fedayeen troops into the country.

President Hilu, who has remained adamantly opposed to any concession that would encroach upon his country's sovereignty, rejected these demands. He is convinced that Beirut must have a showdown with the fedayeen eventually, and that it should not allow them to pick the time. The continued firmness of Hilu's stand depends, however, on the support he receives from the military and from influential Muslim and Christian political leaders.

In the short term, the support that the Lebanese Army will give

to Hilu matters most. General Bustani, the army's commander, has been vacillating, and Hilu presently has doubts of Bustani's complete support. The politicians, motivated by personal political considerations, have also been wavering in their stand toward the fedayeen.

Although [redacted]

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[redacted] care-taker Prime Minister Rashid Karami may be willing to form a new cabinet, Lebanon remained without a viable cabinet during the past week. It is unlikely, moreover, that Karami or any other Muslim politician would be willing to form a cabinet without a broad consensus of support on the fedayeen issue.

Israeli leaders are, of course, watching developments in Lebanon very closely. They have made it abundantly clear that if Beirut permits the fedayeen to open a "third front" in Lebanon, they will react quickly and strongly. Months ago, they suggested that if the Arab guerrillas are permitted freedom of action in southern Lebanon, they might have to take up a defensive position north of the present Israeli-Lebanese border.

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DAHOMEY GOVERNMENT ENDANGERED BY GROWING UNREST

The government of Dahomey's President Zinsou, already beleaguered by obstinate financial problems, a split within the army, and incessant coup plotting by an assortment of civilian opponents, is now beset by a wave of discontent among students and workers.

A strike by secondary students, backed by some teachers, erupted late last week and quickly developed into an attack on the government for its alleged sellout to "French imperialism." Zinsou reacted by closing the struck schools. They reportedly were reopened on 13 May, but most students remain out of school, with the result that Dahomey's two major cities are now burdened with a large number of foot-loose, disgruntled young people ripe for the organizational talents of opposition leaders.

Long-simmering labor discontent has also increased recently. Desperately trying to meet Paris' demands that budgetary retrenchment precede further French subsidies, Zinsou earlier this month proposed drastic cuts in some of the fringe benefits for government employees. The proposal immediately brought forth predictable complaints and strike threats. Under pressure, Zinsou reduced the size of the proposed cuts, but without appreciable

effect on the aroused government workers, who have now garnered considerable sympathy from angry teachers and other workers. A walkout by government workers called for 16 May could easily trigger a general strike and widespread street demonstrations.

Zinsou also continues to be dogged by the problem of former chief of state Lt. Col. Alley. Alley would like to be returned to a top army job, but is unacceptable to the present chief of staff and his associates, who installed Zinsou as president last August. Following Alley's refusal to be shelved in a foreign assignment, Zinsou has turned the problem over to a military disciplinary committee, despite indications that Alley retains considerable support in the army.

The division within the army over Alley, at the very least, decreases the chances that it would act effectively to control any large-scale demonstrations against Zinsou's regime. Zinsou himself recognizes the vulnerability of his position. In a conversation with the US ambassador on 13 May, he acknowledged that there is a growing danger he may be overthrown, but he insisted that he will not back away from the stands he has taken.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Governor Rockefeller's fact-finding mission to Mexico, Central America, and Panama dominated events in Latin America this week.


For the most part, the Latins have given the governor a warm and enthusiastic welcome. The accidental death of a Honduran student during a demonstration on 14 May is the only incident to have marred Rockefeller's visits so far. The first phase of the trip will end on 18 May in Panama City; the second leg will begin in Venezuela on 27 May.

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
Tension between Costa Rica and Panama over repeated incursions by the Panamanian National Guard in search of anti-junta insurgents has subsided. Costa Rica is still waiting for a satisfactory reply to its protest note, but has not as yet asked the Organization of American States to take any action on the matter.

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Foreign and economic ministers or their representatives from all Latin American nations except Cuba are meeting in Chile this weekend to approve and coordinate a new plan to improve economic relations with the US. The ministers, who are meeting within the framework of the Latin American Special Coordinating Committee (CECLA), will be studying recommendations drafted by technical-level experts this week. The new formula reportedly includes a request for more favorable credit terms, technological assistance, and a bigger share of US markets. The whole package will be forwarded for President Nixon's perusal and will be discussed again next month with the US at the meeting of the Organization of American States' Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Trinidad.

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PERU AGAIN UPS THE ANTE FOR IPC

The Peruvian minister of mines and energy, General Fernandez Maldonado, announced on 13 May that a special investigations committee had found that the International Petroleum Company (IPC) owes the state an additional \$54,848,306.10. Fernandez Maldonado stated that the results of the investigation would be given to Peru's attorney general for initiation of appropriate legal actions against IPC.

This new debt is in addition to the \$690 million IPC allegedly owes the state for the oil it is charged with illegally extracting and marketing since 1924 and approximately \$15 million the state oil company claims as payment for petroleum products supplied to IPC following the expropriation. The nearly \$55 million the government is now adding to IPC's "debt" stems from the company's alleged failure to comply with a supreme decree of 1959 obligating IPC to re-invest part of its profits in Peru in return for a raise in fuel prices. The large size of the previously established "debt" makes this new finding almost irrelevant, except as a possible fallback position in the event that the military government should decide to give up its claim to the \$690 million in an effort to resolve its dispute with the US.

The Peruvians may feel that they can make a much better legal case for this new-found debt than for the \$690 million and through this method offset any compensation to IPC for its expropriated assets in the country. They may also believe there is a better possibility that the US Government would view this as a legitimate claim. The US Embassy, however, notes that the Peruvian Government never lived up to its obligations under the decree of 1959 and that, therefore, the provisions regarding IPC obligations carried no force.

The Peruvian negotiating team in Washington held a press conference this week in which optimism was expressed, despite the absence of any real progress thus far. Alberto Ruiz Eldredge, a member of the team and one of President Velasco's chief advisers on the IPC issue, stated that talks were taking place in an atmosphere of "great cordialty and frankness" and that he was "optimistic" that the two countries would resolve their differences. Thus far, however, President Velasco has maintained his adamant position in IPC's "debt," the major point of difference between the two governments.

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DISARRAY IN THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

During the past week several members of the Chilean Congress as well as youth, student, and peasant leaders have resigned from President Frei's Christian Democratic Party (PDC).

The resignations occurred following a dispute over whether the PDC should run its own candidate in the presidential election in 1970 or should try to run a "popular unity" candidate with Communist and Socialist support. A party assembly two weeks ago decided by a vote of 233 to 215 to run a PDC candidate without other backing. Senator Rafael Gumucio, who had hoped to be a joint candidate, resigned, taking several other leftists with him. This group does not plan to form a new political party but will start a "movement" open to the Marxist left. They hope that a candidate from their group could obtain Communist and Socialist backing.

The bulk of the party, however, remains committed to the position adopted two weeks ago.

Even Radomiro Tomic, a leading candidate who had said he would not run without Communist and Socialist support, has remained in the party and has had no comment on the resignations. The Communists and Socialists have repeatedly rebuffed Tomic's overtures. Perhaps to avoid commenting he quietly left Chile early this week for his planned trip to Eastern Europe, the USSR and possibly to countries of the Communist Far East.

A major issue in the presidential campaign will be President Frei's economic and social reform program. Those leftists who have resigned from the PDC are dissatisfied with the pace of reform and believe that a more radical approach to Chile's problems is necessary. Most Christian Democrats, however, believe that Frei has done as well as could be expected and are willing to stand on his record. Nevertheless, the defection of important leftist leaders will reduce the party's appeal to a broad spectrum of voters.

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BOLIVIA ENTERS A PERIOD OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY

Bolivian President Siles is settling into office three weeks after the death of President Barrientos. He has not yet enunciated any specific policies, however, and his leeway for putting his own stamp on the government has been restricted by the influence of armed forces Commander in Chief Ovando, who is functioning in effect as a co-president. Siles has stressed his willingness to work with Ovando, but he refuses to be treated as a "lackey."

In a press interview last week, Ovando emphasized his commitment to constitutionalism and reminded the public that he had "constitutionalized the country in 1966"--a reference to the democratic elections held when he was junta president. He added that despite this commitment he would intervene in the government, and even overthrow Siles, if such action became necessary "to save the Bolivian revolution." He hedged on his future political activities, saying only that he would not run for president in uniform and that he would not ac-

cept Siles' support in the presidential election scheduled for May 1970.

Siles, in a separate interview, described himself as the "defender of the constitution." He said that although he could be thrown out of office by a group of "five armed men," he believed that students, labor, and the armed forces would defend him because he represented constitutional succession.

Although Ovando told US Ambassador Castro that Siles was a "trial" to him and otherwise conveyed mistrust of the president, the two men probably will manage to work together unless some crisis hits the country or Siles tries to assert too much independence. An outbreak of guerrilla warfare, serious economic difficulties, or significant agitation by miners, teachers, students, or other special interest groups could cause the military to move against Siles.

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