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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Nyerere's Plans for Tanzania

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NYERERE'S PLANS FOR TANZANIA

Although many African states avow socialist aims, Tanzania is one of the few to move from rhetoric to practice. With his Declaration at Arusha in 1967, President Nyerere committed his ruling party to mitigating social and economic inequalities between urban and rural inhabitants and between the governing elite and the masses. Since then he has proposed radical changes in the school system to make it more relevant for the country's overwhelmingly rural population and has adopted a rural development program based on communalized farming.

A slow but determined effort is being made to carry out Nyerere's ideas. Several ujamaa (socialist) villages—the backbone of his approach to socialism and rural development—have been set up, and major revisions in the curriculum and organization of primary and secondary schools are now in the planning or experimental stage. Because the government has very limited funds and few trained people, progress will continue to be slow and uncertain, but political leaders are under little popular pressure to move faster. In fact, one of the main problems is to try to convince the deeply conservative and tradition-minded peasantry of the need for change.

Of almost equal importance to Nyerere is the liberation struggle against the white-ruled states of southern Africa. As his government has become more deeply involved in supporting the African insurgent movements, he has grown fearful that the white governments will eventually retaliate militarily. Consequently, Tanzania is planning to expand its defense forces and acquire more sophisticated weapons. Unable to obtain modern arms cheaply from either the Soviet Union or the West, Nyerere has turned increasingly to Communist China, which has been willing to provide military and economic aid on unusually favorable terms.

UJAMAA: THE BASIS OF TANZANIAN SOCIALISM

Socialism, like democracy, is an attitude of mind.
—Julius K. Nyerere

Tanzania's socialist experiment cannot be understood apart from the ideas and personality of President Julius Nyerere. Central to his thinking is the concept of ujamaa. Nyerere rejects both capitalism and "scientific" socialism as unsuitable



President Julius Nyerere

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and alien to Africa. Instead, he maintains that Africa's traditional society, which he considers intrinsically egalitarian and democratic, can serve as a guide to building a new society. Work, cooperation, sharing, equality, and communal democracy, which he asserts are part of traditional life, must also be part of socialist life.

From independence in 1961 to the Arusha Declaration in 1967, however, Nyerere's plans to build socialism were ill-defined. He tried to involve the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and through TANU, the peasantry in such cooperative efforts as road and school construction and in setting up communal farming villages. In 1961 his government also embarked on a crash program to expand and diversify the country's already thriving cooperative marketing movement.

These efforts, however, were not very successful. Although some peasants benefited from the government's economic development efforts and a few began to increase their individual holdings and to hire labor, the vast majority of farmers continued to eke out a living near subsistence level. By 1966, moreover, the problem of urban unemployment, already severe in some West African states, had begun to emerge in Tanzania. These trends toward social stratification rather than equitable development in both urban and rural areas deeply disturbed Nyerere.

Nyerere was equally upset about the spread of elite attitudes among the educated. Although he had tried to imbue these people with his own dedication to frugality and honesty in public service, he saw them becoming a privileged and self-serving class. This was sharply brought home to him in October 1966 when the students at University College in Dar es Salaam demonstrated against the terms of national service. They had been asked to give six months to military training

and subsequently to serve 18 months in government jobs they would have occupied anyway—but at only 40 percent of the established salary. Even though their education had been paid for by the state, they protested.

Shocked and angered, Nyerere dismissed the protestors from the school. Then in quick succession he cut his own salary and that of other high government and party officials, civil servants, and army officers to emphasize the importance of national service. Although these measures were strictly aimed at the elite, they also set the stage for the Arusha Declaration.



Nyerere practicing what he preaches

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THE ARUSHA DECLARATION

TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; this struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity.

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited, and disregarded. Now we want a revolution—a revolution which brings to an end our weakness—so that we never again are exploited, oppressed, or humiliated.

*--The Arusha Declaration
5 February 1967*

In late January 1967 Nyerere met with other TANU leaders at Arusha, a small town in northern Tanzania. The outcome of their deliberations was the Arusha Declaration, a statement of TANU's policy of socialism and self-reliance. Over the next several months Nyerere issued two more policy papers—Education for Self-Reliance and Socialism and Rural Development—which, with the Arusha Declaration, set forth the core of present policies.

The declaration called on the government to take several steps: 1) to consolidate control over the "major means of production"; 2) to prepare development plans the country could carry out without being overly dependent on foreign loans and grants; 3) to ensure that incomes in the private and public sectors were on a par; and 4) to improve the living standards of the peasantry. TANU was called on to make sure that party members, and particularly the leaders, adhered to TANU's socialist principles; the party was to set up a program to train its leaders to carry out the government's policies.

The first of these objectives was accomplished easily. The day after the declaration was announced, Nyerere nationalized foreign-owned commercial banks, import-export firms, and insurance companies, and took over the largest industries and agricultural estates. Although there were some short-term dislocations, the government has managed these enterprises fairly well.

More important politically, the government set down strict conflict-of-interest rules for political leaders. Not only are the leaders expected to promote socialism, they must also set a personal example. To ensure that they do, they are required by law to divest themselves of all outside business interests—shares and directorships in privately owned companies, rental properties, and extra salaries—or resign. Nearly 13,000 elected officials and civil servants have had to comply with these rules. Although many of them are unhappy, party leaders have strongly supported Nyerere on this point, and the few party members that have been openly critical have either resigned or been ousted from TANU.

Since Arusha, the government has also tried to exert greater control over the distribution of income, particularly between urban and rural areas. It has put into effect price and wage guidelines, reformed the tax structure, and abolished several local levies. As a result, the tax burden is being shifted away from the largely subsistence-level rural sector and onto those in urban areas who are better able to pay the costs of development. Moreover, the major emphasis of the new five-year plan (1969-74) is on rural development. The government intends to allocate almost three times as much of total development funds to agriculture in this plan as it did in the last one, or about \$76 million.

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SOCIALISM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Others try to reach the moon. We try to reach the villages.
-Julius K. Nyerere

In line with renewed emphasis on rural development, Nyerere has called for major reforms in education. Tanzania, like other African states, inherited from the colonial authorities a school system that catered essentially to the elite. Although some modifications have been made, the system has retained its elite character. Only about a fifth of the children now entering school, for example, can expect to go beyond the primary level, and the curriculum is tailored mainly to preparing a few for university or technical training. Most students, therefore, have received a largely irrelevant education.

In Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere argued that the schools should promote equality and help improve rural life rather than alienate the students from it. He has proposed changes that will prepare most students for rural living. He has told them to grow their own food, to produce some for market, and to help in other ways to maintain their schools. He has encouraged the teachers to let the students plan and run their own experimental farm plots. He has also recommended that the examination system be de-emphasized to make cooperation, not competition, the basis of education.

A determined effort is being made to carry out these ideas. Agricultural courses have been introduced in all primary schools; and civic courses stressing the Arusha Declaration are being given to secondary students. Some schools have also set up experimental farm plots. Because of the lack of funds and trained personnel, however, many of the Ministry of Education's plans are still

in the discussion or experimental stage. Provisions for in-service training for teachers are being made because few of them have had any agricultural training; and during the next five years, the ministry intends to revise the primary school curriculum completely. Major changes in the secondary schools, however, will not begin before 1976.


Along with school reform, Nyerere has called for a more broadly based, concerted effort to increase cooperative and communal village farming. Regional party leaders are now setting up ujamaa villages, and TANU is running "socialist seminars" for grass-roots and middle-level party leaders, civil servants, teachers, national servicemen, villagers, and others to show them how to carry out the Arusha Declaration. The government at the same time is focusing its agricultural extension efforts and rural development funds on these villages to try to make them work.

The success of this program, however, depends largely on local leaders below the regional level, where the governing structure is still weak. Local party and government officials simply lack the training, financial resources, and staff to do an effective job, and the government in Dar es Salaam is capable of giving only limited help. Most peasants, moreover, stubbornly resist efforts to change their traditional way of life.



Ujamaa village in southern Tanzania

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The most successful socialist villages to date are concerned with cattle and tobacco growing in northwest Tanzania. Many other such villages reportedly exist throughout the country; one foreign adviser has said there are as many as 500 of them. The actual number of cooperative farming ventures is difficult to determine, however, because the term "ujamaa village" is used loosely to cover all kinds of experimental farming projects, old and new. Nearly 300 of these villages, moreover, have been organized by the Tanzanian Army along the Mozambique border. Basically strategic hamlets, they are modeled somewhat after the Israeli kibbutz as a first line of defense in case Portuguese forces should try to retaliate against Tanzania for supporting Mozambique insurgents.

THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Aid to the African liberation movements in their struggle against white-ruled states ranks in Nyerere's view just behind social and economic development at home. Although he would prefer a peaceful evolution of majority African rule in these areas, he has become convinced that only the use of force will ultimately bring an end to white domination.

Because Nyerere is uncompromisingly committed to the liberation struggle, Tanzania has become deeply involved in supporting guerrilla insurgency. Tanzanian officials head the African Liberation Committee, the main conduit for African aid to the insurgents; and the Nyerere government is providing arms, money, training, staging bases, and logistical support. In conjunction with Zambia, Tanzania is also planning to build the 1,000-mile Tan-Zam railroad from Lusaka to Dar es Salaam in order to free Zambia from its heavy dependence on the railway systems of Rhodesia, Portuguese Mozambique, and Angola. Fearful of military retaliation from these states, both countries are currently planning to bolster their defense forces.

More than any other foreign power, Communist China has been willing to support Tanzania in these efforts. The Chinese have provided substantial quantities of small arms and ammunition and some guerrilla training to the insurgents. In addition, Peking has provided considerable economic aid, which has been funneled into building a \$7-million textile mill as well as an experimental farm, a farm implements factory, a dam project, two radio stations, and a joint shipping line. When Nyerere was unable to obtain aid for the Tan-Zam railroad from Western sources, Peking quickly offered to build it under an interest-free loan. The favorable terms and the speed with which the Chinese have completed preliminary work on the project have deeply impressed the Tanzanians. Construction of the rail line, which is expected to begin shortly, could eventually bring as many as 5,000 Chinese technicians and workers into Tanzania and Zambia.

The Chinese have also given the Tanzanian Army and police large quantities of arms and materiel, largely free of cost. This aid has included trucks, anti-aircraft guns, medium tanks, engineering equipment, patrol boats, and landing craft, and enough small arms for 20,000 men. The Chinese have also built an arms repair facility in Dar es Salaam and a \$1-million police training school at Moshi.

A Canadian team had handled most of the army's basic training and staff work until recently. Nyerere, however, told the Canadians they had done their job so well that they were no longer needed. The Tanzanians apparently intend to do their own staff work and most of their own training. As the country's defense forces expand, however, the training role of the Chinese will increase. At the moment, they are involved only in training a couple of tank and engineering companies and instructing the police in weapons handling and guerrilla warfare tactics. Peking has already agreed, however, to help build a naval

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force and naval facilities at the port of Dar es Salaam and to train naval recruits; it has offered to provide an air defense system as well. If a formal agreement is reached, it will almost certainly be asked to train Tanzanian pilots.

The Chinese have been discreet as well as generous. They have engaged in little of the blatant propagandizing and none of the heavy handedness that have often characterized their aid elsewhere. As a result, they have neither offended nor alarmed anyone but instead have made some influential friends, particularly in the Tanzanian Defense Ministry. Officials there have argued strongly in favor of Chinese aid. Nyerere himself apparently believes that Chinese aid is vital, perhaps even indispensable, to the liberation struggle.

The Chinese probably hope to erode, and if possible to eliminate, Western and Soviet influence in Tanzania and to gain paramount influence in the southern liberation movements. If these presently ineffective groups should become a serious threat to the white governments, the Chinese would then be in a position to extend their influence southward. They have already made some significant inroads in Tanzania. With the Tan-Zam railroad project, they have become the country's largest aid donor, and, with the departure of the Canadians, the way is left open for them to gain predominance in the army as well.

One of the main obstacles in the path of the Chinese, however, is Nyerere himself. So far, his interests and theirs have dovetailed nicely, but his desire to keep Tanzania nonaligned is genuine. Although he is grateful to the Chinese for their aid and shares some of their ideological views, he clearly does not want them influencing his policies. At times, he has gone out of his way to warn them that Tanzania makes its own policy and that he will tolerate no outside interference. By the

same token, he has reminded those in the West who have expressed alarm over his close relations with Peking that it is China, and not the West, that has been willing to help him.

Because the Chinese have a near monopoly on military aid, however, and because their role in the military seems certain to grow, they could eventually pose a serious threat to Nyerere's hold on power or his use of it. Nyerere seems aware of this danger, and willing to take the risk to obtain the kind of aid he believes Tanzania must have.

OUTLOOK

The Arusha Declaration is a declaration of intent. [It] lays down a policy of revolution by evolution.

--Julius K. Nyerere

It is too soon to judge whether the Nyerere government will succeed or fail in its efforts to build socialism in Tanzania. It faces enormous problems of inertia and underdevelopment. With the Arusha Declaration and the policies that have stemmed from it, a beginning has been made. Progress, however, will be extremely slow and uncertain. The successful implementation of these policies will, to a great extent, depend on the leaders' ability to instill in party members and civil servants a strong sense of commitment to present policies. TANU's ability to mobilize the peasantry is also a crucial factor.

Much will depend on the continuing leadership of Nyerere himself, because he is the driving force behind Tanzania's socialist effort. Although party leaders strongly support him, it is questionable whether they are as firmly committed to his reforms and would carry them out as vigorously if something happened to him. Although his most likely successor, Vice President Kawawa, is a good

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administrator and a tough politician, he is not as capable intellectually, nor does he have Nyerere's prestige and popularity. It is doubtful that he would move as strongly against corruption and the elite as has Nyerere or that he could effectively carry on Nyerere's programs.

How Nyerere handles the Chinese will also be important. Thus far, Tanzania has obtained much from Peking for little in return. A crucial

challenge to Nyerere could come if the Chinese gain a strong foothold in the military, such as the staff and training positions that the Canadians held. Nyerere probably wants to keep them out of these slots, and many army officers, who are Western trained, certainly feel the same way. If the Tanzanians are unable to manage their military forces, however, the Chinese may well be called on to help.



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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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(Information as of noon EST, 15 January 1970)

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Pressures to lessen the costs of the UN force in Cyprus have led to plans to reduce the peacekeeping mission.

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- NYERERE'S PLANS FOR TANZANIA
Since 1967, President Nyerere and his ruling party have initiated a series of political, economic, and educational reforms in an effort to reduce inequalities in Tanzanian society and promote economic development. At the same time, Tanzania has become more deeply involved in supporting African insurgency against the white-ruled states to the south and, as a result, has sought to bolster its defense forces. Rather than cut development funds to pay for defense, Nyerere has turned increasingly to Communist China, which has been willing to provide economic as well as military aid either free or on easy credit terms.

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In the next three months Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica will hold important elections. The military might intervene in three of the countries under certain circumstances.

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DOMINICAN PRESIDENT PURGES DISSIDENTS


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President Balaguer has expelled high-ranking dissidents from the governing party and apparently is bent on cementing his control before announcing whether he will seek re-election in May.

CHILEAN LEFTISTS FIND UNITY ELUSIVE

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The divisions within the Communist-leftist electoral front are widening because of the impasse over the selection of a presidential candidate.



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FAR EAST

The Chinese Communists, already in the midst of difficult border talks with the Soviet Union, last week began to set the stage for talks with their other major antagonist, the US. The Chinese probably hope to be able to exploit the talks with the US in order to bring pressure on the USSR. The Sino-Soviet talks in Peking are not going well, and the two Communist nations have been engaging in an increasingly shrill polemical debate. It seems doubtful that either set of talks will produce any concrete results for a long time.

Political maneuvering in Saigon has quickened since members of the Upper House drew lots to determine who would have to run for re-election later this year. Several candidates planning to oppose the incumbents are scurrying around lining up support and seeking advice from leading independents and opposition figures. The militant Buddhists, who also plan to field candidates, intend to spread them around on slates of other groups.

Although military activity in the south has been fairly light so far this year, a number of indications portend an upswing in over-all Communist activity in South Vietnam over the next few weeks and perhaps months, but a major offensive such as occurred in 1968 seems unlikely.

The Communists in Laos also appear to be getting ready for increased offensive activity. Already a certain momentum seems under way in the Plaine des Jarres area, where North Vietnamese troops finally managed to take a key hilltop with the help of poor weather, which prevented close air support for the Laotian defenders. The Communists appear to have enough men and supplies in place to embark on a major offensive, but they have been concentrating on securing their supply lines from government harassment.

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COMMUNISTS IN LAOS SETTING STAGE FOR HEAVIER ACTION

On 12 January the North Vietnamese finally succeeded in pushing government guerrillas off Phou Nok Nok, an important hilltop northeast of the Plaine des Jarres. Extremely poor weather conditions, which ruled out any close air support, probably contributed heavily to the government's inability to hold this key position.

Although it appears that the Communists have the necessary troops and supplies in place for a major thrust against government positions around the Plaine, the enemy has shown a reluctance to launch such an operation until confident that major supply lines are secure from government harassment. With this in mind, North Vietnamese forces concentrated most of their military activity during the past week east of Xieng Khouangville, where they overran a number of bases from which guerrillas had disrupted pack horse - coolie caravans moving along a trail network that originates in North Vietnam. Ac-

ording to local villagers, the North Vietnamese now plan to move against Muong Moc, the main guerrilla support base in this area.

There are some signs that the North Vietnamese may have moved another combat regiment into Laos. [redacted]

[redacted] large numbers of troops, who stated they were headed for the Plaine des Jarres area, crossed the border on foot in late December.

In the southern part of the country, Communist forces launched a limited rocket attack against the Pakse airfield on 9 January. The barrage was not followed up with a ground assault, however. This suggests that the Communists, smarting from their loss of the Plaine des Jarres this rainy season, were more interested at this time in the psychological impact of the rocket attack than in additional territorial gains. [redacted]

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
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Laos: Current Situation



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VIETNAM

Military Action Off, But
Only Temporarily

The level of enemy military action prevalent in the northern provinces last week has tapered off somewhat, but there are numerous indications that further upsurges of activity are scheduled throughout much of South Vietnam in the coming weeks.

Some fighting continues in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh provinces, although of lesser magnitude this week than last. Allied forces largely initiated the actions. Battles were also fought this week in Tay Ninh Province and in scattered sectors of Mekong Delta provinces as allied forces continue to seek out enemy troops massing for offensive operations.

Quang Nam Province will participate in a general attack and uprising and that all units are to be ready before 25 January.

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Evidence on the present state of enemy preparedness suggests, however, that many main-force combat units will not be ready for large-scale operations before late February or early March.

~~South Vietnamese Army commanders in the northern provinces expect the Communist spring campaign to feature periodic surges of shellings and small-scale ground attacks over a wide front. Most of them estimate that the Communists will continue to stage these "highpoints" for psychological effect, while they buckle down for a long struggle. The commanders point out that Viet Cong local force and guerrilla troops in I Corps have been seriously weakened during the past two years, and the cost in manpower~~

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[redacted] there will be phases of intensified enemy action preceding and following the Tet lunar new year holidays in early February. [redacted] a "highpoint" will come during the three-day Tet holiday in violation of the cease-fire, as occurred in 1968.

[redacted] claimed that all enemy units in

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
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of another major offensive would be prohibitive.

I Corps Commander General Lam is concerned, however, about the large North Vietnamese concentrations that remain just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in Laos west of the A Shau Valley. He believes that enemy attacks this spring from those areas might force his units to give ground initially, but is confident that such enemy thrusts can be contained.

~~The South Vietnamese assessment of the current situation in I Corps appears to be generally realistic. The Communists will probably refrain from overly ambitious attacks in the northern region, but there is a potential danger from the dozen or more enemy regiments nearby in North Vietnam and Laos. These forces could be used to test the mettle of the South Vietnamese units that have taken over defensive responsibilities from US Marines below the DMZ.~~

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The Candidates Get in Line

Political maneuvering in Saigon has quickened since Upper House members drew lots late last month to determine which seats will be contested in elections later this year to fill half of the House seats.

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SUBVERSIVES IN INDONESIAN MILITARY GET THE TREATMENT

President Suharto's continuing campaign to purge both Communist sympathizers and followers of former president Sukarno from the military picked up steam again recently with the arrest and interrogation of several senior army and naval officers. These officers had been under suspicion for some time, but government security priorities have been such that only recently has there been time to investigate them thoroughly.

The navy now is a particular target because it did not undergo the exhaustive investigations experienced by the army and, to a much more limited extent, the air force following the Communists' abortive coup in 1965. For the past four years a number of pro-Sukarnoists, pro-Communists, and even party members have been untouched because of unaggressive naval leadership. The replacement of the former navy chief and a number of his staff officers in last November's military reorganization removed the chief obstacle to a thorough screening.

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PEKING TALKS ON TWO FRONTS

Already in the midst of difficult negotiations with the USSR, the Chinese Communists last week began to set the stage for talks with Peking's other major antagonist, the US. This unprecedented development does not appear to signal any loss of nerve on the part of the Chinese, who in fact have stepped up the pace in their war of words with Moscow. But the leadership in Peking undoubtedly sees an interrelation between the two sets of discussions and is clearly prepared to play off one opponent against the other should the opportunity arise.

The negotiations with the Soviets unquestionably have top billing in Peking. The second round of discussions now under way following the return of chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov to China were resumed, however, in a grim atmosphere. Neither side is putting forward the optimistic private comments that accompanied the opening phases of the first round of the talks. The Chinese, moreover, last week surfaced a highly negative view of the accomplishments of the first round in a Hong Kong Communist newspaper. This article laid full responsibility on Moscow for the lack of progress thus far in the talks, charging the Soviets with failure to restrain its forces along the Chinese border and reiterating the established Chinese position that a mutual disengagement of forces from the border must precede negotiations

on other substantive border issues. The Chinese also made public an official protest to Moscow, excoriating Soviet references to the "country" of Taiwan.

The USSR has responded in kind, denouncing the war preparations campaign still under way in China and accusing Peking of whipping up a "war psychosis" and "rabid anti-Sovietism." These polemics were somewhat less strident than those of the Chinese, but they represent a significant departure from Moscow's propaganda standdown of last September. Both sides in fact appear to have accepted for the moment a public war of nerves as an accompaniment to the private discussions in Peking. Moscow apparently came to believe that last year's public exchanges were working against its interests, and it is possible that Soviet patience may wear thin at some point if the polemics continue.

The Chinese probably view the forthcoming talks with the US in Warsaw primarily as another aspect of the war of nerves with the Soviets, although Peking is also interested in sounding out Washington on a number of important Asian problems. During a conversation

stated that the Chinese were particularly pleased with the resumption of the talks in Warsaw

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because they would have a "dis-comforting effect" on the Soviets. He implied that Peking hoped to exploit chronic Russian fears of a Sino-US rapprochement in order to press Moscow both to lower its ante in the stalled border talks and to reduce its military and political pressure against China.

At the same time, Peking is clearly interested in assessing at closer range future US intentions in Asia. A number of Chinese officials during recent months have expressed unusually candid interest in Washington's present policies in Asia, particularly with regard to Vietnam and to China itself.

As the official acknowledged, Taiwan remains the "stumbling block" to improved relations with Washington. Peking almost certainly does not actually expect much movement on this issue, and the fact that the Chinese will allow their chargé in Warsaw to represent them at the "ambassadorial-level" talks suggests that they do not believe there will be much progress on important matters at this time. UNCC

he expected the US to raise subjects, peripheral from the Chinese point of view, such as exchanges of journalists, the granting of visas, and trade matters.

In short, the Chinese do not expect a major breakthrough of any kind, but they see prospects of harassing Moscow and improving China's understanding of US moves in Asia as sufficiently advantageous to reopen the Warsaw contact. Their views of the talks with the Soviets is probably similar. At this juncture they apparently do not expect much real progress toward the resolution of the border problem, but they probably believe that it is better to keep talking than to allow the situation to deteriorate sharply, thereby risking a military confrontation with the Soviets on a scale larger than that of last spring and summer.

Peking is probably even more eager, however, to see signs of such "reasonableness" surface in the press in order to give the Soviets additional food for thought.

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EUROPE

During a press conference in Moscow earlier this week, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin covered a wide range of foreign affairs topics. He reaffirmed Soviet determination to work for a European security conference and said that the US was invited to participate. He blamed Washington, however, for frustrating Moscow's efforts. Zamyatin was also critical of recent statements in Washington concerning the possible expansion of the Safeguard ABM system. He noted, however, that Moscow expects the next SALT round in Vienna to be in the "same spirit" that marked the preliminary round in Helsinki.

Zamyatin was uninformative with regard to the talks with China, only confirming that negotiations resumed following Kuznetsov's return to Peking two weeks ago. The spokesman's remarks on the Middle East were confined to countering charges that Moscow has revised its position on the "Rhodes formula" for talks between Israel and the Arabs. He claimed that Moscow has never agreed to support direct Arab-Israeli negotiations in any form.

Romania's Premier Maurer has indicated privately that Bucharest will probably soon have to agree to hold Warsaw Pact maneuvers on its soil. He expressed confidence, however, that the size and duration of the maneuvers could be arranged in advance and kept under control, in part because of Moscow's interest in promoting detente in Europe. Maurer also implied that this was a minimum response to pressure from the other members, who consider that Romania is working in the "opposite direction," to strengthen the pact.

East Germany has asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply its safeguards system to a recent shipment of 200 kilograms of enriched uranium received from the USSR. This is the first instance of a request for IAEA safeguards on fissionable material shipped by the USSR. Soviet handling of the request may be an indication that Moscow is intent on bolstering the IAEA safeguards system as the time for the Nonproliferation Treaty to become effective draws near. The treaty requires the application of IAEA safeguards to adhering nonnuclear states.

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US-SOVIET BILATERAL TALKS INCREASE

Following the successful preliminary round of strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki, the Soviets have indicated interest in negotiating on a number of less important subjects. Moscow may hope these bilateral discussions will create an atmosphere of detente, which it seems to favor at this time because of the state of its relations with China. On the other hand, the Soviets have recently increased their anti-American propaganda, and they are still no more disposed than previously to reach agreement on important issues under discussion, such as the Middle East.

One week after the windup of the Helsinki talks, the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised the US of its readiness to consult further on the subject of the law of the sea. They already had agreed to establish a twelve-mile zone for territorial sea and exclusive fisheries rights, and to provide for free passage through international straits. Any agreement would culminate a joint effort dating back to 1967.

The US and the USSR are also planning to hold a second round of talks in Moscow on the practical application of peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). They met last year in Vienna in an attempt to work out procedural arrangements for making the technology of PNE available to third countries. At that time, the

Soviets acknowledged publicly that they had a PNE program and offered to supply technology to other nations as part of Moscow's obligation under the nonproliferation treaty. Moscow apparently favors an agreement that would permit PNE excavation shots, but prefers to coordinate a position with the US before discussions are held by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The two sides are also supposed to open talks in Washington in late January on continuing the bilateral cultural-exchange agreement, and Ambassador Dobrynin has stated that he is confident there will be an agreement. The Soviets, however, usually drag their feet when it comes time to renew the cultural pact, and this year will probably prove no exception. Moscow is suspicious of US efforts to increase cultural contacts and prefers to concentrate on an exchange of scientific and technological information.

In the economic field, the Senate's recent passage of the export control act should lead to increased US exports to the USSR and will at least help remove a perennial psychological barrier in Moscow's dealings with Washington. Finally, the Soviets continue to be interested in establishing direct shipping services with the US, and the US Embassy in Moscow expects a formal request for renegotiation of the present civil aviation agreement.

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EAST GERMANS CONTINUE RECOGNITION DRIVE

East Germany's efforts to obtain diplomatic recognition from non-Communist states are having limited success.

During the past week Pankow announced that Congo (Brazzaville) has agreed to exchange legations. It thus becomes the first black African state to extend recognition, and the seventh "third world" country to do so since April. In a related move, Kuwait on 8 January agreed to exchange official trade missions with the East Germans.

The Ulbricht regime has been campaigning in several other countries, including India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Somalia, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Chile, and Laos. None of these states has indicated that it is willing to extend recognition in the immediate future, and Ceylon, Chile, and Laos have rebuffed the East Germans. The fact that Bonn recently has been invoking few if any sanctions against countries that recognize Pankow, however, will make it easier for other states eventually to make the decision to establish relations with the East Germans.

India is the big prize, and recognition from New Delhi would be a major breakthrough for the East Germans. Some West German officials are clearly worried, regarding this as "only a question of time."

West Germany provides Djakarta with seven times as much aid as East Germany and has used this as leverage. A large East German delegation reportedly is to visit Indonesia before October, however, and presumably will bring up the issue again. Bonn has countered by inviting Indonesian President Suharto for a state visit in October.

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MOSCOW MAINTAINS ACTIVE ROLE IN EGYPT

The Soviet Union intends to continue its active role in the Egyptian economy through 1970 while apparently keeping tight control over the pace of military assistance to Cairo.

Under a new protocol, trade in 1970 is expected to reach \$345 million, a sizable increase over 1969. According to the agree-

ment, the USSR will not be a major wheat supplier but will provide a "substantial part" of Egypt's industrial requirements as well as raw materials for its iron, paper, aluminum, and pipe industries. In addition to traditional purchases such as cotton, the USSR will double imports of Egyptian crude oil. In 1969, the Soviet Union took an estimated

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one million tons, all of which was shipped to other countries, including Cuba and Bulgaria.

According to an Egyptian press report, the recent economic discussions in Moscow included talks on a new five-year trade and aid agreement and on Soviet involvement in the next Egyptian five-year plan to begin next year. The official announcement at the conclusion of the talks, however, did not mention these. About three fourths of some \$400 million in economic credits extended in 1964 remain to be used. Projects under these credits will be carried out over the next several years.

The Aswan Dam, the principal Soviet aid project, will be completed this year. The last three turbogenerating units are being installed at the Aswan power plant. Expansion of the iron and steel complex at Helwan, the first major venture undertaken by the Soviets after the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, is not expected to be finished until at least 1976. A new rolling mill went into operation in early 1969, and in November the USSR agreed to import cold-rolled sheet steel produced there. In July 1969, the Russians finalized terms on projects valued at \$110 million that had been included under a 1964

aid pact. These projects included an aluminum complex, a phosphorus complex, and a ferrosilicon plant.

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
Last year Moscow provided Egypt with at least 50 SU-7s and MIG-21s, as well as VYDRA-class landing craft and YURKA-class minesweepers, all of which are in active use in the Soviet armed forces. These deliveries suggest that the USSR is making good on its promises to replace and upgrade Soviet materiel as rapidly as it can be absorbed by Egypt. Moscow presumably is dismayed, however, by continued equipment losses. Since the end of the June 1967 war, Egypt has lost 65 fighter aircraft in skirmishes with Israel.

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POLAND AND FRANCE INCREASE ECONOMIC TIES

Poland is touting its recently signed five-year trade and economic cooperation agreement with France as a model that it would like its other major Western trading partners to follow. Poland is particularly pleased with France's liberalized import quotas on Warsaw's manufactured goods and its extension of credits for upgrading Poland's copper industry.

The trade agreement signed in Paris on 23 December is aimed at doubling the level of trade over the next five years as well as eliminating the sizable Polish trade deficit that has averaged about \$30 million annually over the last four years. Poland's almost stagnant export trade with France will receive a boost because France has agreed further to liberalize imports of Polish goods produced with French assistance. Fulfillment of trade goals would result in annual increases of roughly \$30 million over the next five years. It does not seem likely, however, that such large increases can be achieved. Poland's trade last year with France, its third largest Western trading partner, is estimated to have dropped slightly below the 1968 total of \$130 million. Poland's plans for 1970 and for 1971-75 call for annual increases of only 5 to 6 percent in its trade with the West as a whole.

France also agreed to provide a three-year credit of \$135 million for the supply of machinery and equipment as well as technical assistance for the exploitation of Polish copper resources. Terms of the credit are not known, but repayment apparently will be made chiefly by the export of copper mined and processed in Poland. French aid in the development of Poland's already rapidly expanding copper industry will not only allow Poland to meet its own growing demand for copper, but will provide a surplus for export by the late 1970s.

Poland, in talks with its other major Western trading partners, is seeking at least as favorable trade concessions and even larger credits for industrial development. The currently existing mood of detente is encouraging Poland to seek favorable terms for trade by exploiting competition among West European countries. In trade talks under way with West Germany, for example, the Poles are turning aside Bonn's protestations that Polish demands are contrary to West Germany's commitments to the Common Market. Warsaw claims that such difficulties on tariff and trade liberalization matters were effectively finessed in the 25X1 agreement with France, either through "fine drafting" or "in practice." 

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HOXHA REGIME PRESSES CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Albania's so-called cultural revolution has entered a new, more militant phase. Since its inception in 1967, the revolution has not lived up to expectations, mainly because of Tirana's preoccupation with Soviet intentions toward the Balkans and the passive resistance of a large part of the population. Now, however, the Hoxha regime appears intent on using elaborate measures to ensure its success.

In the most drastic development of the cultural revolution to date, Tirana organized the country's youth last fall into a movement reminiscent of the Chinese Red Guards. The extent of the movement's activities is unclear, but the youth were given license to examine and resolve problems facing the party and country under the slogan "observe, uncover and correct." Youth will still be closely supervised, but the new movement is a sharp departure from the past when the revolutionary zeal of the young people was directed toward "volunteer" labor projects.

The regime has apparently become determined to mobilize youth in direct proportion to mounting resistance. A striking example is afforded by a clash sometime last year between two youth leaders and local functionaries in the Tepelene district. The two youths committed suicide after their crit-

icism of local shortcomings was rebuffed and a slander campaign was mounted against them. An investigation by the party central committee resulted in the public trial and purge of a number of Tepelene leaders.

Addressing a party central committee plenum in December, party leader Enver Hoxha specifically pointed to shortcomings in the current five-year plan, and underscored the basic objective of Albania's cultural revolution--the need to throw off the country's predominantly conservative, Moslem ethics and mores, and to mobilize the entire population behind the regime's efforts to modernize Albania. An immediate aim is to "free" the country's women from their subordinate roles and bring them into the working force.

The fourth five-year plan ends this year, and the regime is intent on its successful completion. The country's long-awaited educational reform, calling for extensive on-the-job training in place of formal education, went into effect on 1 January, and the regime has intensified its campaign against religious superstitions and ancient customs, including clannish feuding. There are indications that in the months ahead even top officials will be called upon to set a good example by doing stints of manual labor.


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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Israel continued this week to hit hard at its Arab neighbors, particularly at Lebanon and Egypt. Damascus also reportedly came in for some window-shattering sonic booms from Israeli aircraft, a tactic the Israelis have frequently used over Cairo. The repeated Israeli air strikes in Lebanon around and at fedayeen camps have provoked an exodus of civilians to the north, political disarray in Beirut, and fears that Israel might follow through on its threats to occupy Lebanese soil if the fedayeen are not curbed.



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Nigeria's civil war, which began shortly after the leaders of the former Eastern Region proclaimed the secession of Biafra in May 1967, ended suddenly this week in a complete victory for the federal government. Federal authorities seem determined to avoid further bloodshed and to allay fears about Lagos' intentions toward the defeated secessionists. They thus expect to lay the groundwork for an equitable reintegration of Biafra into the federation. The process will be long and difficult, however.

President Mobutu of Congo (Kinshasa) reportedly is negotiating for the purchase of large numbers of heavy armored cars and jet planes from France and Italy. Mobutu's desire for heavier military equipment probably stems in part from his fear that President Ngouabi of radical Congo (Brazzaville) will increase his hitherto limited support for Mobutu's domestic enemies. Mobutu is also striving to isolate Ngouabi diplomatically and to mend his own fences with neighboring leaders.

The Dahomean military remains deeply divided following an unsuccessful attempt by disgruntled officers to oust coup leader Kouandete and restore recently deposed President Zinsou. Meanwhile, the ruling military triumvirate has appointed a commission to arrange to hold national elections by the end of March.


The UN Security Council president for January, Terence Nsanze of Burundi, expects to call a council meeting on South-West Africa soon. African members will urge the council to deal with Pretoria's refusal to comply with the deadline of 4 October 1969 for withdrawing its administration from the territory.



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BIAFRA SUCCUMBS TO FEDERAL NIGERIAN PRESSURES

Federal authorities have moved quickly, but with considerable sensitivity, to re-establish Lagos' writ throughout the former secessionist enclave following the sudden collapse last weekend of Biafra's bid for sovereignty. At the same time, the federal government has begun direct talks in Lagos with major secessionist leaders, a development that reflects a desire on both sides to start the difficult task of trying to heal the wounds inflicted over the past four years.

The Biafran collapse was signaled by the abrupt departure of Ojukwu on the night of 10 January. A day later, Biafran General Effiong, left in charge as "administrator," broadcast an appeal to federal leader General Gowon for an armistice, naming a delegation of prominent civilian secessionists to "negotiate" Biafra's return to the federation. Although Ojukwu's whereabouts had not been definitely established, as of noon on 15 January it appeared most likely he was in Gabon.

Ojukwu was probably forced out by a faction of the secessionist leadership that came to believe, following the federal troops' recent gains in the offensive they began last November, that an eventual federal military victory was inevitable. This apparently became the prevailing view around 9 January, even though Biafran Army units had not been routed in crucial areas.

Following Ojukwu's departure and Effiong's statement of 12 Janu-

ary, the federal Third Division on the southern front was suddenly able to move swiftly northward. By 14 January it had occupied all major towns in the Biafran enclave as well as the two main secessionist airstrips and Radio Biafra. In contrast, the federal First Division on the northern front never did break through the defending Biafran units into the main enclave.

Although some secessionist troops have surrendered to the federal forces, the bulk of the approximately 40,000-man Biafran Army probably has melted into the bush. At this time, it seems highly unlikely that any significant guerrilla resistance will develop.

Since 12 January, General Gowon and the commander of the onrushing Third Division have appeared eager to wrap up the war quickly and with as little bloodshed as possible. In his prompt response to Effiong's armistice appeal, Gowon again offered a general amnesty to all who were "misled," and spoke of an "honorable reconciliation." On 14 January the Third Division commander ordered his troops to stop further tactical movements and to remain in their "barracks," a move apparently intended to minimize contact between federal soldiers and the fearful Biafrans. The commander announced that federal police would maintain law and order in the area.

Reassured by these gestures and by the absence so far of any significant excesses by victorious federal troops, Effiong and his civilian

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delegation arrived in Lagos on the night of 14-15 January. Their talks with federal leaders clearly cannot result in any special status now for Biafra's weary Ibo tribesmen. They could, however, be an important initial step toward the distant goal of national reconciliation.

Meanwhile, Nigerians are showing mounting resentment over the highly publicized concern being expressed in Western countries over the problem of getting relief to needy Biafrans. This is widely seen as "colonialist" interference in Nigeria's affairs. The government

has directed that all foreign relief be channeled through federal authorities.

In an effort to capitalize on this Nigerian sensitivity and to advance the erosion of Western influence that occurred during the war, the Soviets are publicly pushing the "interference" theme. Behind this propaganda line and the praise Moscow is heaping on the federal government for holding Nigeria together lies Moscow's concern about its future position in the country, now that Lagos' dependence on the USSR for arms may soon decline.

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UN FORCE IN CYPRUS PLANS CUTBACK

The UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has drawn up plans to reduce the peacekeeping mission there in response to growing pressure to lighten the financial burden. In obtaining Security Council agreement last month to extend the UNFICYP mandate until June, Secretary General Thant had promised to put into effect, in consultation with the governments concerned and with his representatives on Cyprus, a fairly sizable reduction in forces with substantial financial savings.

The proposed reorganization looks toward a cautious conversion of the peacekeeping operation into an observer-type mission. UNFICYP officers envision a reduction of 500 men from the present level of 3,475. The cutback will occur in the Nordic contingents, but will be

phased out so as not to discourage participation by these countries in future UN operations. Districts where serious tensions exist between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots will not be affected. The Canadians would be responsible for Nicosia, the most sensitive area.

Despite the great caution with which the phasing down will proceed, alarms may be sounded. The Turkish Government almost certainly will oppose the planned reduction on grounds that the safety of Turkish Cypriot enclaves will be jeopardized. The UK may also be concerned that such force reductions will lessen the security of its bases, the primary targets of the recently heightened anti-British propaganda of the Greek Cypriots.

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LEBANON FACED WITH DUAL DANGERS

Two recurring, related problems, fedayeen activities and Israeli air strikes, have plagued the Lebanese Government during the past week and have posed new dangers for internal stability.

Hit a number of times by Israeli aircraft in past weeks, the government has sought by various actions to curb the fedayeen and thus avoid giving Israel any reason to attack Lebanon again. The government earlier this month announced that the fedayeen had agreed not to fire upon Israeli targets from Lebanese territory and not to train fedayeen inside the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The fedayeen, however, quickly refuted the government's statement and denounced any such restrictions, calling upon the Lebanese people to continue their support of fedayeen efforts.

The president and prime minister also sought to improve army morale by replacing Commander in Chief Bustani. Bustani had become increasingly unpopular with the army's command staff because of his handling of the Cairo negotiations in November when he capitulated to fedayeen demands that they be allowed freedom of activity in Lebanon. His replacement, General Nujaym, who commanded the southern military sector a few years ago, is regarded

as a well-qualified and capable officer. He is expected to deal firmly with the fedayeen, although it is unlikely he will try to crush them for fear of plunging Lebanon into another crisis.


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Preparing for possible Israeli moves along the border, the Lebanese cabinet earlier this week decided to take a number of steps to strengthen the area. Shelters and fortifications are to be built and the local inhabitants are to be trained and armed by the Lebanese Army. The army itself will attempt to acquire modern arms to enable it to defend the border more effectively.

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INDIAN NAVY HAVING PROBLEMS WITH SOVIET-BUILT SHIPS

India is having problems with some of its newly acquired Soviet ships and has protested strongly to the USSR about their quality and performance. Two Petya-class escorts and an Ugra-class submarine tender delivered in 1969 are in the Bombay naval yards for major repairs.

In addition, Indian Navy officers have recently complained about the communications equipment on and the general performance of the two submarines acquired from the Soviet Union. They expressed fears that the submarines might also develop serious problems.

Under the terms of a \$100-million agreement signed in 1965, India was to purchase four F-class submarines, five Petya-class escorts, an Ugra-class submarine tender, two Polnocny-class medium landing ships, and five small motor gunboats. The Indians may also have concluded an agreement for Osa-class guided missile patrol boats and a submarine rescue vessel.

Delivery under the 1965 contract was to be completed by the end of 1969. Two submarines and two escorts, however, remain to be delivered. The third submarine will be in India by the end of this month and the fourth is expected by mid-year. The two remaining escorts are to be turned over to Indian crews in February.

The agreement calls for the Soviets to provide training in maintenance and operation of the ships at Indian expense, and to guarantee the equipment for one year. Soviet specialists are sent along with the

ships to make any necessary warranty repairs.

The Soviet-built ships and technicians are assigned to Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of India. This port is scheduled to be a major naval base and repair yard by 1972, but the only naval yard in India now capable of handling the large Soviet ships is on the west coast at Bombay.

India has developed two fleets to counter what it regards as a major threat from the Pakistani Navy to Indian coasts and maritime lines of communication in the Arabian Sea, and from a possible Chinese submarine threat in the Bay of Bengal. The Western Fleet, headquartered in Bombay, is equipped with ships from the UK. The Eastern fleet, officially called the Eastern Naval Command and headquartered in Vishakhapatnam, has been equipped with Soviet-built ships.

The Soviet agreement requires India to prevent any third party from having access to Soviet-provided ships and, until recently, the Indians have assigned Soviet and British built ships to separate commands. This has tended to compartmentalize Indian naval capabilities. About six months ago a UK-built destroyer was transferred from the Western Fleet to the Eastern Fleet. Two more destroyers are scheduled to be transferred from Bombay to Vishakhapatnam by the middle of this year. The Soviets may not agree to this integration, but the Indian Navy probably will ignore past practice in order to tailor its forces to meet changing situations.

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CROP OUTLOOK AND PEASANT DISCONTENT IN INDIA

Because of exceptionally favorable weather conditions in most of India during the third quarter of 1969, prospects for the 1969-70 crop year are good. Even with the deficient rainfall in the October-December period, agricultural experts are predicting a record total foodgrain production of about 100 million tons. India, however, will probably continue to require food imports for the next few years at least. The crop remains heavily dependent upon the monsoon, and progress with irrigation projects is slow. Moreover, the population growth lessens the impact of production gains.

Economic radicals, including the "young Turks" in Prime Minister Gandhi's faction of the Congress party, appear to view food and development problems as basically solvable, technical difficulties. Many are now focusing attention on related social questions arising from the fact that all segments of Indian society are not sharing in the benefits derived from increased agricultural production. The gap is widening between the few affluent landowning farmers who are benefiting from the Green Revolution--the scheme to develop the country's vast agricultural potential--and the far larger body of small landholders and landless peasants who are not. According to a recent central government report, this situation could eventually lead to "an explosion in the countryside."

Rural discontent has been most apparent in the two Indian states

where Communists dominate the government--Kerala and West Bengal. Especially in the latter, landless peasants have been encouraged to plant and harvest crops on land belonging to absentee landowners. Violence is commonplace and contributes to the serious friction existing between supporters of the state's competing political parties.

Government efforts on a country-wide basis to narrow the gap between rich and poor peasants are viewed by the radicals as insufficient. Attempts to plug the many loopholes in existing land-reform legislation have failed because most state leaders, dependent upon landowners for financial support, avoid bold reforms that might antagonize these important backers.

The central government is in no better position to take vigorous action. Even Prime Minister Gandhi, who is staking her political fortunes upon an appeal to the young and poor, did not feel strong enough to take forceful measures to aid the landless. Meeting in plenary session in December 1969, her Congress party endorsed the principle of land reform but left its enforcement to the reluctant states.

Continued government inaction will perpetuate rural tensions easily exploitable by Communists and other leftists. The radicals in Mrs. Gandhi's party, moreover, could threaten party unity by increasing their pressure on her for land reforms. 25X1

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Venezuelan President Caldera continues to exert pressure for more favorable treatment in the US oil market. Caldera, whose administration faces financial and political difficulties, wants increased oil imports to help underwrite his promised reform program. He has told the US chargé in Caracas that Venezuela would be "less than satisfied" with a policy that did not accord Venezuela equal treatment with Canada.

Fidel Castro has acknowledged that the Cuban sugar harvest is slightly behind schedule. He said heavy rains caused delays in some provinces and indicated that low production in other provinces is due to a letdown of worker dedication. If worker discipline falters this early in the harvest, the ten-million - ton goal will be seriously jeopardized, as the most arduous phase is yet to come.

Argentine President Ongania and Chilean President Frei issued a joint declaration on 11 January following Ongania's two-day visit to Chile. Relations between the two countries are seldom smooth, but a determination to minimize differences is implicit in the expressions of cordiality and pledges of cooperation in the declaration.

Communist terrorists in Guatemala continue their efforts to disrupt the campaign for the general elections on 1 March. A police official was killed in the capital this week, [redacted]

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[redacted] Counterinsurgent operations continuing in the north have not yet flushed out guerrillas who have harassed an oil-drilling operation off and on since last October.

The Peruvian Government is standing behind its new law curbing the press despite vociferous opposition from most of the public media. Declarations of support for the new law have come from the Communist Party and its labor confederation, but these have served only to provide more ammunition for opponents of the decree. The Christian Democrats, who have been supporting the military government, have split over the issue, and other progovernment political parties have issued statements strongly criticizing the press restrictions. [redacted]

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FOUR LATIN COUNTRIES ENTERING HARD-CONTESTED ELECTIONS

Elections to be held under constitutional governments in four Latin American nations during the next three months offer a fair possibility that current rulers may be defeated. In Colombia, Guatemala, and El Salvador, military leaders might intervene under certain circumstances. In Costa Rica, with its well-established tradition of peaceful transition, the election may be the last for the contending personalities, who have monopolized the political scene for two decades.

civil war in 1948. The choice of these overly familiar nominees provoked splits in both main political groups and has probably laid the basis for political realignments in the years ahead. The presidency has usually alternated between these two parties in closely contested elections, and this pattern would have Figueres win. Minor parties, including one known Communist-front group, may well keep either major group from winning a working majority in Congress, however.

Former Costa Rican presidents Jose "Pepe" Figueres and Mario Echandi are waging their campaigns with the bitterness and abundance of personal invective that have characterized most elections since the short

El Salvador's opposition Christian Democrats stand an outside chance of gaining in the legislative elections at the expense of President Sanchez' moderate governing party. As in Costa Rica, the small parties in



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El Salvador could hold the balance. Despite the Christian Democrats' efforts to prove their patriotism during the brief war with Honduras last summer, the



Military intervention could also occur in Guatemala, but on behalf of the opposition candidate, retired Colonel Carlos Arana of the rightist National Liberation Movement. Despite the government's removal of some of his key military supporters, Arana probably has enough influence in the armed forces to seize power. He might try to do so if he believes the government has rigged a victory for its candidate or if the Communist threat appears to be getting out of control. Communist terrorism has already marred the campaign.

A peaceful transfer of power from a full-term constitutionally elected president would be the first for Guatemala since 1951.

The campaign for what is scheduled to be the last of Colombia's four elections under the National Front arrangement for alternating the presidency between the Liberal and Conservative parties finds the country's political forces in the greatest disarray since dictator Rojas Pinilla was ousted in 1957. Jockeying for future political advantage, and dissatisfaction with the official Front candidate, Conservative Party's Misael Pastrana, have left party structures in a shambles. Although Pastrana is the front runner, three other Conservative candidates have substantial support. One of these, Rojas Pinilla, worries the military, which might intervene if by any chance he should win.

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DOMINICAN PRESIDENT PURGES DISSIDENTS

President Balaguer has purged high-ranking dissidents from the governing Reformist Party in his struggle for undisputed party leadership. Although elections are only four months away, Balaguer apparently is bent on cementing his political and military control before announcing whether he will seek reelection.

Last week the mayors of Santo Domingo and of Santiago, the nation's second largest city,

were expelled from the Reformist Party for one year. Both are outspokenly critical of any reelection bid by the President. Santo Domingo's Mayor Lluberes, a popular party leader in his own right, attempted to call an extraordinary party convention to nominate congressional and municipal candidates for the elections on 16 May and to increase pressure on Balaguer to announce his plans. The Balaguer-controlled national executive committee, however, expelled

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Police Occupy the Headquarters of President Balaguer's Reformist Party



the mayor and several others, and canceled the convention. A few days later the mayor of Santiago was similarly purged. Vice President Lora, who says he will run for the presidency whether Balaguer is in the race or not, has claimed that efforts are under way to expel him as well.

Both mayors have contested the actions as illegal, but Balaguer can probably make the decision stick. Offices of the Reformist Party in the capital were guarded by police last week to prevent "antire-electionists" from entering. These actions are a reflection of the municipal and provincial struggle for control of Reformist committees, a contest that has probably already been decided in the President's favor.

In recent weeks Balaguer has also moved to consolidate other areas of support. He made liberal use of year-end military promotions, both among officers and in the ranks. In December, the President faced down a threatened large-scale labor strike by warning of strong government retaliation, but declared a Christmas bonus for government workers.

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Some political observers contend that Balaguer's reluctance to announce whether he will seek re-election means he will step aside for a hand-picked successor. Although such a course remains possible, the President's maneuvering strongly suggests that he will make a last minute re-election attempt himself.

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CHILEAN LEFTISTS FIND UNITY ELUSIVE

An impasse over the selection of a presidential candidate is widening the divisions within the Communist-leftist electoral front. The six parties of the Popular Unity Movement (MUP) finally settled on a program in December after months of wrangling, but agreement on a presidential candidate has proven beyond them.

Until recently, prospects were good that the MUP would unite and support Socialist Senator Salvador Allende for the presidency in the elections scheduled for September. Many political observers in Chile predicted that ex-president Jorge Alessandri, an independent conservative, would finish first, followed closely by Allende and then by Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of the governing Christian Democratic Party. If no candidate wins a majority, however, Congress would have to decide between the two top contenders and the chances were considered good that anti-Alessandri Congressmen might choose Allende. The chief beneficiary of such an outcome would be the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh), which is the directing force within the MUP and is well prepared to assume a major role in the government it helps elect.

This prospect has been dimmed, however, by growing evidence of implacable disagreements within the left. The PCCh can no longer impose the appearance of unity, which had papered over old suspicions and mutual distrust among the ill-assorted MUP components. Communist efforts have been increasingly offset by conflicting personal ambi-

tions, widely differing responses to the military uprising last October, charges that PCCh relations with the Christian Democrats are too close, and splits over specifics in the MUP program that outlines the creation of a socialist state. The small, non-Marxist members of the front, which are led by the Radical Party, are threatening to register a separate candidate. Because their importance was to lend a gloss of moderation to the MUP, it seems unlikely that their tactics will do more than irritate their larger partners.

Possibly the most damaging effect on the coalition's plans to take power through elections has been the opposition to Allende's candidacy by young members who contend that he is burned out by three previous tries at the presidency. There is growing talk that an effort will be made to mobilize the MUP behind a candidate not yet in the running. Senator Rafael Gumucio, the elder statesman of the extremist faction that broke away from the Christian Democratic Party last year, and Aniceto Rodriguez, the secretary general of the increasingly extremist Socialist Party, are mentioned as the most likely substitutes. Whatever Allende's drawbacks, he is likely to be a better vote-getter than any of his less well-known competitors.

Meanwhile, the only officially registered candidate, 73-year-old Alessandri has taken advantage of the Chilean summer to begin his campaign in the hope of mobilizing supporters throughout Chile.

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