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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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30 January 1970  
No. 0355/70

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(Information as of noon EST, 29 January 1970)

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WEEKLY SUMMARY

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**SECRET****FAR EAST**

After some seven months' absence, Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief adviser to the Paris talks, is returning to the French capital as head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the French Communist Party congress. Tho's return to Paris may be intended by the Communists to suggest that they have new positions to offer. Tho has turned up in Paris at important junctures in the past.

On 29 January, the same day the announcement was made that Tho would be in Paris, the North Vietnamese delegation to the talks accused the US of bombing populated areas in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese deputy delegation leader said three US planes were shot down well north of the Demilitarized Zone on 28 January. A US F-105 was in fact shot down by Communist antiaircraft gunners along the border between North Vietnam and Laos on the 28th. In addition, MIG fighters attacked US aircraft for the first time in 15 months, downing a US rescue helicopter as it searched for the crew of the F-105.

Government and opposition politicians in South Korea are busily strengthening their positions for next year's presidential and National Assembly elections. President Pak is pressing ahead with one of the country's most sustained and far-ranging anticorruption drives. Within the regime, the President is assembling the team that will be responsible for ensuring his smooth re-election. Pak has patched up differences with the dynamic Kim Chong-pil and apparently intends him to play a major role in the campaign, as he did in the coup that brought Pak to power in 1961.

Philippine President Marcos is coming under increasing pressure from important families within his country's oligarchy. Politically ambitious families are trying to curb Marcos' political power before he has an opportunity to prolong his presidency beyond a second term. It is widely assumed in the Philippines that Marcos' ambitions will cause him to try to pack the constitutional convention, whose members are scheduled to be elected in November. If Marcos succeeds in controlling the convention, he is expected to alter the constitutional limit on presidential terms in office.

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## VIETNAM

Communist forces maintained a relatively low tactical profile during the past week, but there were continuing signs that the enemy intends to increase its activity during and around the Tet holiday period.

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There is little hard evidence that the Communists plan or are in a position to launch massive, country-wide attacks comparable with those that came during the Tet holidays of 1968 and after the holidays in 1969. New surges of military activity--consisting largely of shellings, sapper and terrorist raids, and limited ground attacks--are expected in several areas, however. These could be a curtain-raiser for a larger effort later this spring.

Combat preparations appear to be more advanced in some regions, notably I and IV corps, than in others, reinforcing the likelihood of a series of localized attacks rather than a simultaneously timed big-unit offensive to usher in Tet 1970. In I Corps, for example, an extensive movement of supplies from enemy base areas along the Laotian border toward the coastal lowlands has been under way for several weeks.

At the opposite end of the country, there is evidence that several North Vietnamese regiments that moved from III to IV corps late last year may be getting ready for an early clash with South Vietnamese forces, rather than waiting to become firmly entrenched in their sanctuaries along the Cambodian border. ✓ Elements of three North Vietnamese regiments have begun to converge on Chau Doc city in the western reaches of the delta, while elements of a fourth reportedly plan to link up with local Viet Cong forces for possible large-scale attacks against the city of My Tho and its neighboring military base at Dong Tam.

There are few signs that the enemy is contemplating a sharp increase in offensive activity in II and III corps in the near future. Except for the North Vietnamese 3rd Division, which has been in a state of readiness for several weeks in Binh Dinh Province, most enemy main force units in the highlands and coastal regions of II Corps have assumed a defensive posture while refitting in base areas well removed

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
from high-priority targets. In III Corps, the evidence suggests that the Communists may be planning to intensify terrorist and sapper activity in Saigon and in its surrounding subregions during the Tet holidays. Available intelligence, however, does not reflect preparations for coordinated, large-scale military operations by the division-sized forces based near the Cambodian border in the corps' northern tier of provinces.

Although there are reports that COSVN has ordered a country-wide standdown of all Communist forces in compliance with its unilateral declaration of a four-day Tet cease-fire (5-9 February), the enemy will probably use the period to reposition and resupply combat units. South Vietnamese commanders in those areas where Vietnamization may soon face its stiffest challenge--I and IV corps--are optimistic, however, that they can turn back any attacks thrown at them over the holidays.

Le Duc Tho to Paris

Hanoi's politburo "adviser" to the Paris talks is returning to France, ostensibly to attend the French Communist Party Congress next week. Le Duc Tho has been absent for seven months and his return is likely to arouse widespread speculation that Hanoi is showing renewed interest in the negotiations. This probably is exactly what the Communists have in mind. They may calculate, among other things, that having Tho on tap in Paris will generate interest in, and pressure for, the naming of a successor to Ambassador Lodge. Communist intransigence in recent months has facilitated US and South Vietnamese efforts to demonstrate that progress in the negotiations is only possible if the Communists show some flexibility, and Hanoi may want to redress this impression.

A possible hint that Hanoi still sees some usefulness in the



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Paris talks has appeared in two recent radiobroadcasts containing references to the Viet Minh compromise agreement with France in March 1946. The way in which the agreement was praised as buying time for the Communists to prepare for a protracted war of resistance could mean that the Communists see opportunities for applying similar tactics now.

#### Party Anniversary Coming Up

Meanwhile, Hanoi is preparing to mark the 40th anniversary of the Vietnamese Communist Party on 3 February. Unlike recent years when the occasion had been given perfunctory treatment, the party announced last April that this year's celebration would be special. Despite Ho's death, it is making good on its promise.

Party histories and chronologies of past achievements have already started to appear in the press and a rash of articles and speeches by important party leaders can be expected. The day itself probably will be marked by appearances by the party hierarchy, possibly along with a host of foreign Communist dignitaries and a heavy round of speeches.

The turnout and rhetoric could be revealing vis-a-vis North Vietnam's future course and the shape of its leadership. The

occasion should bring back into public view party first secretary Le Duan, who has been out of the spotlight for several months. It might also provide some clues about whether the leadership is confident enough and considers itself sufficiently organized to hold a party congress this year, as might be in order.

Some indications of policy and leadership trends in Hanoi since Ho's death were provided by a pamphlet published for the party anniversary. A summary of it broadcast on 20 January was noteworthy for its hints of current Communist tactics in the war, and of the rise of Truong Chinh to special prominence in the politburo. It cites the "August Revolution" of 1945--and links Chinh and Ho as its chief architects--as a "model" of revolutionary war and suggests that the Communists, as they did then, should now concentrate on preparing militarily to exploit favorable openings for a seizure of power in the South.

Generally the summary strengthens the impression that Hanoi is trying to restore a better balance between the efforts needed to consolidate and develop North Vietnam and those devoted to fighting the war. The relative priority of these two tasks has been the touchstone of debate in Hanoi for the past decade and it has been only since

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late 1968 that the pendulum has swung back toward re-emphasizing the North and trying to prosecute the war in less costly ways. This course has long been cham-

pioned by Truong Chinh even though the broadcast attempts to associate Le Duan with a similar view.

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## ELECTION POLITICS ON THE RISE IN SOUTH KOREA

With the economy booming and subversion by the Communist North currently at low ebb, government and opposition politicians alike seem mainly preoccupied with strengthening their positions for next year's presidential and National Assembly elections. To promote an image of austere efficiency and honest administration, President Pak Chong-hui is pressing ahead with one of the country's most sustained and far-ranging anticorruption drives. Although no senior officials have been directly affected, the public is being treated to the satisfying, if rare, experience of seeing a number of government bureaucrats called to account.

The fragmented opposition is also beginning to show signs of pulling itself together in preparation for contesting the elections. At its annual convention early this week, the New Democratic Party, the nation's only significant opposition grouping, named veteran politician and party vice chairman Yu Chin-san to succeed the party's ailing leader. The New Democrats also called for a nominating convention next June to select their candidate to oppose Pak next year. The nomination is likely to be hotly contested, but even if the party is able to overcome its many factional divisions and close ranks behind its candidate, the New Democrats face an uphill fight against Pak and his entrenched Democratic Republican Party.

## PHILIPPINES DOMESTIC POLITICS BESET MARCOS

Important families within the Philippine oligarchy have moved to curb President Marcos' political power. Earlier this month when the

speakership of the House of Representatives was up for election, the Manila press interpreted the reelection of the incumbent as a

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victory for the sugar bloc over Marcos.

The President wanted to replace the speaker, Jose Laurel, Jr., with a former Liberal Party president who contributed substantially to Marcos' re-election by switching sides during the 1969 campaign. The President was displeased with Laurel because of his intrusion into national economic planning, which Marcos considers an executive preserve.

A number of the oligarchic families involved in the speaker-ship skirmish, some with relatives aspiring to carry the colors in the 1973 presidential race, apparently hope to block Marcos' expected efforts to prolong his presidency beyond the constitutional eight-year limit. It is widely assumed in the Philippines that Marcos' ambitions will be reflected in an attempt to pack the constitutional convention, for which delegates will be elected next November.

In this political maneuvering, Marcos appears to be under-strength in two areas that are normally strongpoints for a newly elected Philippine president. He is being pressed by excessive patronage demands from his Nacionalista Party followers, who are still heady from their landslide victory in November and who expect the usual distribution of posts by a new incumbent. Marcos' ability to respond is limited, however, because most political plums were awarded during his first term in office. Also, a national mood of cynicism stemming from

flagrant election irregularities in the recent election is reflected in the almost universally harsh treatment the press has accorded Marcos instead of permitting him the normal grace period.

Should Marcos fix his sights on perpetuating himself in office, his success will depend on his ability to play upon family rivalries that exist in the oligarchy and to reduce those economic issues on which they could make common cause.

Concern within the establishment over Marcos' overriding ambition appears to be filtering down into other levels of Philippine society. Student demonstrations on 26 January demanding the nonpartisan election of delegates to the constitutional convention erupted in a display of disrespect toward the chief executive unparalleled in Philippine politics. Sticks and bottles were hurled at the President and his wife as they left the Congress building after he delivered his annual state-of-the-nation address.

Meanwhile, the consuming attention Marcos will probably be forced to devote to political infighting will further reduce the likelihood of any meaningful attack on the Philippines' basic social and economic ills. It probably will also place any foreign affairs initiatives on the back burner for the time being, especially the renegotiation of political and economic agreements with the US.

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## CHINA'S CRIME IN THE STREETS

Peking is showing increasing concern over the rising urban crime rate and the persistence of widespread illegal practices in both town and countryside. Corruption, petty crime, arson, and thievery, which were almost non-existent before the Cultural Revolution, are beginning to receive attention at nearly all levels of administration, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Although the current level of disorder does not threaten Peking's political control, the regime's efforts to restore political and social stability are being hampered.

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At the top of the list are corruption and "bureaucratic maneuvering." An article in the latest issue of the party's theoretical journal, Red Flag, complained that "class enemies" in an east China province were actively engaged in speculation, embezzlement, and the theft of state property. Similar complaints have been echoed in several other provinces. Reports from Kwangtung Province indicate that a stepped-up anticorruption campaign is currently under way in both urban and rural areas. Some government officials have been questioned and a number of rural commune members have been purged for corruption and black-market activities. Other reports indicate that security patrols have been augmented in urban areas to suppress blatant black-market operations and to prevent arson and hotel robberies.

A prime source for much of the current criminality appears to be the huge number of urban unemployed, mostly high school and college students, who have been sent to rural areas since late 1968. The enforced migration is bitterly resented by most of the students, and it is frequently evaded by those who have learned to circumvent police controls and checks. Curbing the student crime problem is complicated because urban and commune authorities apparently lack clear-cut guidelines that would deter the students' return to the cities.

Alienation of the youth, however, includes other young people as well. Radiobroadcasts suggest that undisciplined young workers are a problem, and even those ex - Red Guards who have been allowed to participate in the new "revolutionary committees" are less than politically docile.

There are reports that some steps have been taken to centralize urban police functions under a single authority, a move that would greatly aid crime control efforts. The reassertion of strict authoritarian controls, however, is not likely to be achieved until the regime is sufficiently confident both of its political control apparatus and the personnel who administer it. Thus far, the pace of revitalizing the public security system has been slow and uneven at best. [redacted]

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
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**SECRET****EUROPE**

Czechoslovak party chief Husak enhanced his position to a degree this week by reshuffling the leadership, but at the expense of compromises that enabled more conservatives to move closer to the top. Husak was able to promote a probable supporter to the powerful post of Czech party boss, to replace a potential rival, Lubomir Strougal. Strougal was transferred to the job of federal premier, a position less dangerous to Husak's future. Nevertheless, several hard liners who served under Novotny returned to power, and Alois Indra, Moscow's present watchdog in Prague, was elevated to a non-voting post on the party presidium. More personnel shifts are expected.

European security was the primary topic discussed last week when the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries met in Sofia. The participants reportedly reviewed the position NATO representatives took on this subject at their meeting last December.

The North Atlantic Council decided this week to intensify efforts to develop ground rules for conducting future multilateral talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on European security. The Allies are likely to find it hard to come up with an agreed policy on appropriate forums and procedures for negotiating with the Communists, but the Warsaw Pact's continuing efforts to arrange a conference will serve as a catalyst.



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A meeting on 27 January, billed as decisive for the formation of a new Italian center-left coalition government, ended inconclusively. The four party secretaries who attended are now holding sessions with their respective executives.

A Soviet delegation arrived in the US on 28 January to negotiate a cultural exchange agreement for 1970-1971, but the recent demonstrations involving the Moscow Philharmonic in Washington and New York may be used by Moscow as a pretext to cut back on exchanges. Bilateral discussions of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions will begin on 11 February in Moscow, and the two sides have arranged to reconvene the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 17 February.



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## USSR TAKES NEW TACK TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

The Soviets seem to be pushing back the target date for their proposed European security conference. A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman on 13 January publicly admitted that the timing was slipping, presumably from Moscow's earlier estimate of the first half of 1970. That same week 28 European Communist parties met in Moscow in what may be the beginning of a new Soviet effort to solicit broad-based support for the conference.

The Soviets reportedly proposed that the 28 parties work toward a European "people's congress"--which will probably include many of what the Communists call "progressive" European forces--in the second half of this year. The concept of holding such a congress before a conference of governments was established at the Karlovy Vary conference of European

parties in 1967 and was restated during the world Communist meeting in Moscow last year.

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[redacted] differ about whether the Soviets intend to link this newly proposed congress to the preparation of a conference of European governments. The timing strongly suggests, however, that the Soviets do indeed plan to use the congress as an instrument for broadening mass support for a later meeting on European security.

In the process of arranging and staging such an appeal to the peoples of Europe, however, the Soviets seem to be delaying the achievement of their aim of convening a meeting of governments--a meeting Moscow hopes would end in a tacit acceptance of the permanent division of Germany. [redacted]

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## YUGOSLAVS SEEK TO INFLUENCE FUTURE COMMUNIST MEETINGS

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Belgrade sees Moscow's proposal at the January meeting of European Communist parties that a people's congress be convened later this year as tailored to its own specifications. It clearly expects to take a hand in drawing up the agenda and choosing the participants.

Belgrade is eager to schedule these talks as soon as possible.

It plans to push, as its representative did at the meeting in Moscow, for the participation in the congress of all parties in Europe on an equal basis. The Yugoslavs do not want the congress to be confined to European security but to explore all avenues to detente. In their view, only from such discussions can the smaller states of Europe obtain guarantees regarding non-

interference in their internal affairs.

Although Moscow's proposals for the congress appear similar to Belgrade's, the Yugoslavs are not sanguine that their format will gain wide acceptance. Belgrade realizes that, contrary to its own objectives, the Soviets see the congress as a device to give impetus to a European security conference designed to do little except verify the status quo, including the Soviets' right to intervene in the affairs of other socialist states. Nevertheless the Yugoslavs will play the game as long as the ground rules for future meetings, including the congress, remain as they are now--an open exchange of views with no binding resolutions. The leeway provided by these ground rules allowed the Yugoslavs to send a representative to the Communist meeting in mid-January, the first they have attended since 1957. Should the rules tighten, however, Yugoslavia will again retreat to the sidelines to protect its independent standing.

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## EAST GERMAN TACTICS TOWARD BONN

The East German press this week commented negatively on Chancellor Brandt's letter to Premier Stoph, and its frontier guards harassed West Germans traveling to and from West Berlin until 28 January. Nevertheless, Pankow proposed that technical-level negotiations on postal and transportation matters resume soon.

The East German Government has yet to reply officially to Brandt's formal proposal that the two Germanies begin discussion on a renunciation-of-force agreement. The news media, however, predictably criticized Brandt for allegedly failing to propose talks on Pankow's terms and for not accepting the draft treaty proposed in December by Ulbricht as a basis for negotiations. The main party paper claimed that this treaty "shows the only realistic way" to establish peaceful relations, and insisted that recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state by Bonn is "necessary." The paper did not claim that this was a precondition for beginning talks, but Ulbricht had previously said that a renunciation-of-force agreement is useless unless the contracting parties are both recognized as sovereign, independent states.

East Germany's harassment of West German travelers reached its peak on the 27th, then stopped the next day following the conclusion of meetings in West Berlin of Bundestag committees and party groups. The carefully controlled exercise was designed to emphasize Pankow's

claim that West Berlin is an independent political entity and that East Germany controls West German access to the city. Allied traffic was not affected.

Pankow, at the same time, however, took the initiative in proposing that the two sides resume discussions of postal matters on 30 January, to which Bonn agreed. One of the major issues to be resolved in these talks is whether an agreement should include provisions relating to West Berlin. In November the East Germans balked at accepting language suggesting that the Federal Republic is legally competent to handle West Berlin's postal affairs. On 22 January, Pankow also proposed that talks on transportation matters be resumed on the 26th. The West Germans, however, said that they were unable to accept the proposal on such short notice and suggested that these talks begin in mid-February.

East Germany this week also held meetings with several of its allies. Soviet Defense Minister Grechko met on 26 January with the East German big three--Ulbricht, Honecker, and Stoph--as well as with Defense Minister Hoffmann and Security Minister Mielke. The topics of conversation were not disclosed. Hungarian party and government chiefs Kadar and Fock arrived on 28 January, and there is evidence that they wish to discuss Hungarian - East German differences, especially over how to respond to West German overtures.

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## DUTCH COALITION FACES ROUGH FUTURE

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Elections for provincial assemblies in March may determine the future of Prime Minister De Jong's four-party coalition. Faced with an unpopular legislative program and declining support in public opinion polls, De Jong [redacted]

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[redacted] may call early parliamentary elections if the opposition parties, as expected, do well in the balloting. Parliamentary elections are not mandatory until May 1971.

The coalition, long assailed from many quarters, has managed to outlive the predictions of most observers. Its longevity may be due in part to its technically expert but politically colorless makeup. Coalition supporters view this increasingly as a liability, however, and are urging the uncharismatic De Jong to try to develop a more positive public image, particularly on TV. They believe such an effort must be made if the government is to carry through with its difficult legislative program.

Since early 1968 the government has been grappling constantly with mounting inflation while trying to maintain balanced budgets. In this effort, De Jong has had to accommodate the varying interests of the four coalition parties, as well as divert the criticisms of an increasingly vocal opposition. De Jong narrowly averted a coalition crisis last November over tax policy and one in January over wage policy. In the latter case, the coalition sacrificed its eco-

nomics minister and its own economic guidelines to maintain labor peace by approving a wage agreement that all the experts labeled clearly inflationary. Most observers are pessimistic about the future, anticipating other painful economic and fiscal problems and expecting inflationary pressures to become more acute in 1971.

The coalition is also the victim of growing public impatience with traditional Dutch politics. More and more people, particularly of the educated, younger generation, are disenchanted with the conservative, highly structured political system, and advocate the creation of a two-party system. This feeling pervades all parties to some extent, but it is most clearly expressed by the Democrats '66, a relatively new party that has done increasingly well in local elections in the past two years. Most observers expect it also to do well in the March elections.

De Jong may conclude that the coalition parties are better able to face general elections this year than next. On the one hand, the powerful opposition Labor Party is currently so split on doctrinal issues that it might suffer at the polls. On the other hand, De Jong's own Catholic Party is beginning to show signs of disarray over the religious controversies in the Catholic Church, and recent public opinion polls have shown some slippage in the party's standing. [redacted]

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**MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA**

In Nigeria, federal officials are continuing their efforts to ensure an orderly occupation of the former secessionist area of Eastern Nigeria. Large population movements and the breakdown of secessionist administrative machinery are causing some disruption, however. Lagos, in an effort to impose firm discipline on its occupying forces, is executing some looters, and an improvement in troop conduct has been reported.

The Middle East continues to simmer, as Israel hammers constantly at targets in Egypt. In the clearest explanation to date of Israeli motives for air attacks close to Cairo, Minister of Defense Dayan said flatly on 28 January that they were intended to undermine Nasir's authority. Dayan said, "We want to tell the people of Egypt... your leaders are not doing you any good." He added that the raids made it easier to hold the line along the Suez Canal and to convince Egypt that it is not ready for full-scale war.

An abortive coup attempt against the regime in Iraq last week has further strained already cool relations between Baghdad and Tehran. Iraqi accusations of Iranian participation in the coup, backed by extensive details, produced the mutual expulsion of ambassadors and consular staffs, and has probably eliminated any chance of solving the Shatt al-Arab River border problem in the near future.

In Congo (Kinshasa) President Mobutu's decision to purchase a large number of French-built armored cars [redacted] It appears, however, that he does not intend to purchase any sophisticated jet fighters this year, although he reportedly made inquiries about Mirage and Fiat jets.

A delegation representing the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government is presently in Somalia, and the chances look better than ever that the new "revolutionary" Somali regime will extend recognition to the Viet Cong. [redacted]


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**Israeli Airstrike in Cairo Area**  
28 January



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## CONFLICT CONTINUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Israel has continued its military strategy, begun in early January, of dramatic and embarrassing raids against Egypt. Israeli planes struck the closest yet to Cairo on 28 January when they hit an army training camp in Al Ma'adi some five or six miles from Cairo. The bombing of Al Ma'adi came close to the Cairo-American college there and shook the US Embassy. Heliopolis, on the northeast edge of Cairo, may also have been hit. The highlight of the past week, however, was the Israeli capture for 30 hours of the Egyptian-held Shadwan Island in the Gulf of Suez, about 20 miles northwest of an Egyptian naval base at Hurghada. The Israelis claim to have demolished the base after killing 60 Egyptians and taking 62 prisoners and some equipment.

Other cease-fire lines were relatively quiet. The Israelis, however, continued to hunt out Arab fedayeen in southern Jordan in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on Tel Aviv's Sedom potash plant and of Israel's armored thrust of 20 January into the As Safi area east of the Dead Sea.

Israel was still concerned about the fate of the Israeli watchman captured by Arab fedayeen on 31 December. He was reportedly visited in Jordan by the Red Cross, but his captors apparently are holding out for a swap--not of the 20-odd Lebanese civilians captured in retaliation by the Israelis--but of Palestinian fedayeen prisoners held by the Israelis.

President Nixon's message to a conference of Jewish leaders in Washington evoked accolades from Tel Aviv, but produced new bitterness in the Arab States. The President made a standard reiteration of US friendship for Israel, called again for a peace settlement reached through agreement and negotiations between the principals, and denied again that the US was trying to impose a settlement. He also stated that the US was prepared to supply arms to Israel if an imbalance occurred.

The Israelis, who have been talking in terms of a "serious erosion" of US policy, saw new hope in the President's statements. Foreign Minister Eban even went so far as to suggest that the US might reconsider its position regarding Big Power talks and revert to what Israel has been suggesting all along--that the Big Power stop drawing maps and restrict themselves to getting the parties concerned together.

The Arab States reacted sharply, taking special note of the timing of the statement, when Israel has been battering them consistently and hard over the past month. They saw new proof that the US is "hopelessly in the Israeli camp" and described the Nixon statement as "the most hostile US attitude yet toward the Arabs." They predicted that the US was attempting to foreclose French arms sales to the Arabs and viewed the statement as a prelude to the provision by the US of more Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft to Israel.

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## NIGERIANS MOVING TO ENSURE ORDERLY OCCUPATION

Federal authorities have continued their efforts to ensure an orderly occupation of the former secessionist area of Eastern Nigeria. At present, however, the basic situation there is characterized by the disruption common to most conquered areas, compounded by large-scale population movements.

The fear among Eastern tribesmen that the Nigerians intended to massacre them has been subsiding, as large numbers of people have come out of the bush and returned to their towns and villages. Some have already gone to other parts of the federation, including Lagos.

These population movements, coupled with the sudden collapse of the secessionists' administrative machinery, have disturbed the patterns of life in most of the main towns of the former enclave, however. In addition, a serious economic problem has resulted from the virtual absence of Nigerian currency, although Lagos reportedly intends to circulate some soon.

Some soldiers of the federal 3d Division, which became widely dispersed in the course of overrunning the former enclave, have been behaving like conquerors. Fairly widespread looting and rape took place shortly after the secessionists' collapse. In addition, the advancing federal forces' practice of commandeering vehicles was

continued by undisciplined soldiers after the war had ended.

Federal officers have taken firm measures to improve discipline, including the execution of some looting soldiers, and an improvement in troop conduct has been reported. Federal authorities have also replaced some 3d Division troops, who were operating far from their field headquarters, with soldiers from the 1st Division, whose command headquarters is nearby. This move should ensure closer control of occupying soldiers by officers in division headquarters. It also means, however, that elements of the predominantly northern and Muslim 1st Division troops are now garrisoned in the heart of Iboland, where northerners are remembered above all for their massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria in 1966.

The Nigerians remain extremely sensitive about foreign participation in their relief effort. Relief officials in Nigeria maintain that there is enough food available to prevent widespread starvation and that the major need is additional transport, which is being acquired from the UK, the US, and West Germany. The Nigerians are also bitter about foreign press reporting of the relief effort and now seem inclined to limit, if not prevent, access to secessionist territory by the press.

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## PAKISTANI POLITICS MARKED BY VIOLENCE

The campaign for the constituent assembly election in October has been under way since 1 January, when full-scale political activity resumed throughout the country. Serious violence has already marred the opening days of the campaign, and more is likely to occur.

President Yahya Khan has taken extensive precautions to avoid civil disturbances. He has issued a statement outlining rules of conduct for political activity, making it clear that violence will not be tolerated and that troublemakers will be dealt with harshly. Furthermore, he has kept aloof from the political fray in the hope that, at least initially, his government may be able to act as a neutral arbiter among rival political groups. Nevertheless, security conditions are shaky at best, especially in turbulent East Pakistan. The capabilities of the armed forces and police would be severely strained by any massive outbreak of violence in the eastern province.

Some trouble has already occurred, prompting Yahya publicly to warn politicians to keep their supporters in line. On 18 Janu-

ary, orthodox Muslims and leftists clashed at a political rally in Dacca. In the ensuing melee, at least two died and hundreds were wounded. This violence erupted on the eve of a week of public meetings, demonstrations, and strikes called by students in Dacca to commemorate last year's widespread agitation against the unpopular Ayub regime. The week saw further disorders and two highly successful general strikes that brought activity in the city to a near standstill.

These disturbances are merely a taste of things to come as the intensely emotional electoral campaign progresses. Many of the major parties have already held mass rallies. Bengali politician Mujibur Rahman drew the largest crowd on 11 January; about 300,000 people gathered to hear him in Dacca. Crowded meetings and rallies will be increasingly frequent in the coming months and will almost certainly produce further incidents. Although Yahya apparently sincerely wants and intends to hold elections in October, a serious breakdown in domestic peace and order could cause him to reconsider his announced timetable for a return to civilian rule.

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## UNITY GROWING AMONG MAGHREB COUNTRIES

Apprehension with regard to expanding Egyptian influence in Libya apparently has accelerated the slow trend toward growing collaboration among the other Maghrebian countries--Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

The Libyan coup and mutual hostility toward Nasir seem to have spurred Algeria and Tunisia to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation early this month and to settle several long-pending problems. The last obstacle to the successful conclusion of the prolonged and difficult negotiations was overcome when Tunisia renounced its claims to a small strip of the Algerian Sahara.

Subordination, rather than renunciation, of Morocco's far

more substantial territorial claims led to the signing a year ago of a similar treaty of friendship between Algiers and Rabat. Subsequently, Algeria's Boumediene facilitated Morocco's rapprochement with Mauritania, and this may pave the way for Nouakchott's inclusion in Maghrebian regional organizations and meetings.

Moreover, during both the Islamic and Arab summit conferences held in Rabat last year, the Algerians aligned themselves with the Moroccans and Tunisians. All three countries have adopted similar basic approaches to the Middle East situation: they are emphasizing the role of the Palestinians and playing down that of the "front line" Arab states. ↙



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The Inter-American Economic and Social Council talks in Caracas have so far been characterized by more responsible discussion and fewer polemics than has been the case in previous meetings of this sort. The Latin American nations are far from unified over the major issues of trade and development assistance. One sour note has been the criticism of the US position by some of the Brazilian press, perhaps reflecting the pessimism of the Brazilian delegate to the talks as well as the sensationalist nature of the papers themselves.

Officials in several Latin American countries are again taking public positions in favor of increased ties with Cuba. The foreign ministers of Peru and Chile have recently made statements to this effect, as has Luis Echeverria, the sure winner of the Mexican presidential campaign. Castro stated last year, however, that the Latin American nations must repudiate OAS sanctions against Cuba before he will agree to work toward establishing diplomatic relations.

Military disenchantment with the leftist trend of the Bolivian Government and with the presence of leftist civilians in the cabinet is continuing to grow. President Ovando appears to be under increasing pressure to remove the radical civilians from his cabinet. This dissatisfaction could also reflect on General Juan Torres, the armed forces commander. Torres, who is highly nationalistic and anti-US, is frequently treated as one of the cabinet and is considered one of the four members of the "political committee," which reportedly is responsible for major policy decisions.

Bilateral talks between El Salvador and Honduras began last week. Honduran insistence on dealing first with the border dispute is expected to hamper efforts to reach agreement on other matters and to prevent quick movement toward restoration of diplomatic and trade relations.

Elections hold center stage in Costa Rica, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. In Costa Rica and Guatemala, mudslinging campaigns are the rule. The winner in Costa Rica's election on 1 February may have trouble achieving national unity as a result. Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party has all but ruled out official participation in the elections on 16 May if President Balaguer runs for re-election. If the party does not participate officially, its bloc of votes is likely to be scattered among several smaller opposition groups, increasing Balaguer's chances of victory.

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## CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL RACE TAKES SHAPE

The long-predicted, three-man contest for the presidency in elections next September is now a reality. After extensive maneuvering and much disagreement, the Communist-leftist electoral front has settled on Socialist Senator Salvador Allende. He will be a strong contender against independent conservative Jorge Alessandri and Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic.

Allende has run well in two of his three previous tries for the presidency. In the election of 1958 he trailed the victorious Alessandri by less than 34,000 votes, and received nearly 39 percent of the vote in 1964, when Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei won the only majority achieved in a Chilean presidential election in this century. Frei's total vote--56 percent--was attained, however, with the almost complete support of the Chilean right, and his party's electoral showing has declined sharply ever since. Tomic, for example, received only 20 percent of the vote in a recent poll in the Santiago area.

The selection of Allende came suddenly after a prolonged deadlock that had seriously strained the Popular Unity Movement, a combination of six dis-

parate parties put together by the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh). Allende's persistence overcame a contagious disenchantment with his credentials and with what some view as a shopworn image, which at one point infected even the PCCh. Communist leaders probably concluded that their long, if often uncomfortable, alliance with the more extremist Socialists was the most important element in their drive for power and that the four lesser parties must go along without further compromise.

Allende, an active supporter of Fidel Castro, is running on a program specifically designed to create a socialist state. This plan, worked out by a committee representing all the members of the front, contains some compromises that in the long run may be too moderate for Allende. He is, however, a pragmatic and experienced politician who will try not to alienate the non-Communist support he needs to win. His most effective campaign support will come from the Communist political machine. He can also count, however, on the revolutionary image of his own less well-organized Socialist Party, Chile's largest labor organizations, and groups responsive to other elements of the leftist front. All will be peddling a program echoing that of the Communist Party

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except for some cosmetic verbiage. The program includes promises that an "assembly of the people" will control a completely overhauled executive, judiciary, and legislature, as well as the economy, armed forces, all communications media, and foreign policy.

Chileans have long accepted the Communists and Socialists as legitimate sectors of their political kaleidoscope. Many feel that the Christian Democrats' innovations and economic mistakes have been disastrous for the country; that Alessandri, at 73, represents worn-out solutions; and that there is no real risk in giving socialist theories a try. This attitude makes the victory of Allende and his Communist sponsors a real possibility in September.

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PANAMANTIAN/ELECTION TIMETABLE IN DOUBT

The Provisional Junta Government's already tenuous promise to hold elections in 1970 has been further compromised by the president of the electoral tribunal, who has indicated that there is insufficient time to organize an election for this year.

With only 11 months left, the tribunal has not yet received in-

structions from the government concerning the form or method of election, and it has not even been given the necessary budget. Moreover, time is growing short for preparation of the large number of identity documents that probably would be required.

Although the government began promising elections over a

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year ago, its primary motivation has been to enhance its public image rather than to promote a freely elected, representative government. Initially, presidential and congressional elections were under consideration, but later it became apparent that the government would only permit the election of a constituent assembly charged with amending the constitution. This was confirmed last October by General Torrijos on the first anniversary of his seizure of power.

The significance of Torrijos' vague promise to hold an election late in 1970 was sharply downgraded when the electoral tribunal revealed that the government was considering three voting plans. The first vastly simplified the election process. The government would select the delegates, although constituent assembly decisions would subsequently be submitted to a referendum. The second method permitted any individual to nominate himself to run for the assembly from his electoral district. With all political parties excluded from participating in the electoral process, few individuals who do not enjoy government patronage could expect to win. The third plan called for the election of delegates by business, labor, peasant, and professional groups.

This latter method dovetailed with the government's plans to organize the New Panama Movement, a political machine on the style of the Mexican Government party, and appeared to be the preferred approach. Efforts to organize the movement, however, had not proceeded very far and were further sidetracked by the December coup attempt. In addition, efforts to organize a compulsory government-controlled labor federation, which could form one of the pillars of the government party, ran into stiff business and labor opposition.

Torrijos, meanwhile, is still involved in reorganizing the National Guard. The principal coup plotters remain under arrest and will be tried for subversion. Other officers whose loyalty has been suspect have been removed from key positions. A number of staff posts have been vacant for over a month, and reports of tension within the Guard still persist. Under these circumstances, the government may wish to avoid the increased level of political activity implicit even in a controlled election, and may want more time to build a popular base of support. Last week's electoral tribunal statement, therefore, may represent a trial balloon designed to test public reaction to further slippage in the election timetable.

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## ARGENTINA STRIVES FOR NEW LOOK IN LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

President Ongania is continuing his efforts to develop more harmonious relations with neighboring countries, especially with Chile.

Recent meetings with Chilean President Frei and President Stroessner of Paraguay, as well as cordial receptions given Uruguayan and Bolivian officials, apparently were designed to overcome what the Argentines believe is an unfavorable image as an aggressive and militant nation.

In a communiqué marking the end of President Ongania's two-day visit to Asuncion last November, both presidents set aside ideological differences and past disputes and concentrated on mutual economic objectives. Although both came away with less than they wanted, the visit was cordial and created a reservoir of good will.

The meeting with Stroessner set the stage for Ongania's highly publicized meeting with Chilean President Frei. For Ongania, the visit marked the culmination of extended efforts to improve relations, which have

been strained by boundary disputes and the movement of Chilean migrant workers. Although the meeting did not produce dramatic results, the two leaders agreed to facilitate economic cooperation, to continue the work of the mixed boundary commission, and to seek adoption of new regulations to provide for entry and residence for migrant workers from both countries.

Ongania's trips could be criticized as producing no concrete results other than delineating mutual economic objectives, but they probably have provided some internal domestic political advantage--however marginal--for him. For example, the publicity engendered by the visits has diverted the attention of the populace at a time when the government is being blamed for not providing solutions to long-standing economic and social problems. Now that the groundwork has been laid for closer cooperation between Argentina and its neighbors, it remains to be seen whether Buenos Aires will take concrete steps to implement many of the economic objectives cited in the communiqués.

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