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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Secret

6 February 1970
No. 0356/70

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
(Information as of noon EST, 5 February 1970)

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


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NEW POLITICS AND OLD PROBLEMS IN KENYA

The parliament elected in December may mark the beginning of a new political era in Kenya, or at least a new phase in the era dominated by Jomo Kenyatta. Sixty two percent of the National Assembly are new members, younger and better qualified than their predecessors, and well aware of their tribes' interests. Bitter tribal rivalries remain, however, and Kenyatta and his Kikuyu clique still hold the reins of power. One of the most important problems is whether anyone can succeed Kenyatta without setting off a disastrous tribal conflict.

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Celebration of the 40th anniversary of North Vietnam's Communist Party brought forth a display of unity in Hanoi but left the real alignment of power in the post-Ho hierarchy ambiguous. Le Duan played the leading role as party first secretary, but his speech, the major exposition of the day, laid out no new policy lines. To a great extent, he stuck to policies that have long been apparent and for which other leaders have been the principal spokesmen.

Politicking has increased in Saigon in anticipation of next fall's Upper House elections. Many political relationships, both friendly and hostile, are apparently no longer being taken for granted, and imaginative political initiatives may be tried. President Thieu has decided to prosecute in absentia two Lower House deputies accused of having contacts with the Communists. Thieu may be on somewhat shaky ground, however, in basing his action on a Lower House petition calling for the lifting of the deputies' parliamentary immunity. Many deputies will resent the arm-twisting it took to get three quarters of them to sign the petition, and one opposition group plans to ask the Supreme Court for a ruling on the constitutionality of Thieu's action.

The military situation near the Plaine des Jarres in north Laos remains relatively quiet, but it could heat up with little notice. Communist forces have been on the move southeast and northwest of the Plaine, and the enemy commanders may be delaying their offensive until they can move on several fronts simultaneously. Prime Minister Souvanna's proposal to "neutralize" the Plaine may have some effect on both the scope and timing of Communist military moves, however. To the northwest, the Communists have intensified their efforts to bring the entire Nam Beng Valley under their control. It now appears that the Chinese road builders will try to reach the Mekong River during the current dry season.

Philippine President Marcos has sought to obscure the genesis of last week's bloody student riots against his political ambitions. He claimed that the Communists were trying to mount a coup. Some powerful families in the Philippine oligarchy who share the students' antipathy toward Marcos' ambitions appear willing for their own reasons to accept the President's charges at face value. The specter of a Communist menace will make it easier for these families to resist the economic and social reforms that are necessary for further national growth, but which would weaken their tight control of the country.

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VIETNAM

The celebration in Hanoi of the 40th anniversary of North Vietnam's Communist Party brought forth a display of unity by the presence of all party leaders except those currently out of the country. Party First Secretary Le Duan emerged as the most prominent figure for the first time since Ho's funeral, but he carved no new ground for North Vietnamese policy when he gave the major speech of the day. In this, his first broad policy statement in more than two years, Le Duan for the first time publicly endorsed changes in Hanoi's policies that have occurred in the past year and a half.

Le Duan emphasized the need for more attention to building up the North, and he echoed other North Vietnamese Communist statements calling for a more gradual approach in the South. He promised no success without many more years of fighting, but he also stressed the importance the Communists attach to tactical flexibility, both on the battlefield and in negotiations.

Neither the contents of the speech nor Le Duan's re-emergence did much to clarify the real power positions of individuals in the post-Ho hierarchy. The speech was an exposition of policies that have long been apparent and for which other leaders have been the principal spokesmen. Moreover, it was almost mandatory that the party first secretary have a leading role on this occasion in order to support the regime's assertions of unity and continuity of policy.

Le Duan now seems to be personally on board with current policies, but his appearance does not explain his relative obscurity during the past two years, and especially during the post-Ho period, nor the fact that he has not been a leader in policy shifts and innovations in that same period.


Tet Holidays and the War

The Communists, in an effort to usher in the Tet holidays with a credible display of military muscle, launched widespread harassing attacks against targets largely in the northern half of South Vietnam early this week.

Allied field forces and military bases, as well as South Vietnamese territorial security forces supporting the pacification program, bore the brunt of more than 100 enemy shellings, sapper raids, and guerrilla strikes. Key urban centers remained generally free of enemy action, except for light mortar attacks against a few provincial capitals in the delta and some increase in terrorism in the Saigon area.

In these attacks the enemy lost some 500 killed as a result of superior allied firepower. Nearly one quarter of the losses occurred in two significant ground battles. One involved a battalion of South Vietnam's 1st Division with an equivalent force of North Vietnamese regulars near the Demilitarized Zone in a test of "Vietnamization." The other was a sapper battalion action against

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pacification forces along the northern coastal plain.

Guerrilla, sapper, and local force units spearheaded the latest round of attacks, perhaps in an effort to buy more time for first-line main force combat units to prepare the battlefield for heavier actions later in this year's winter-spring campaign.

the Communists will probably respect the cease-fire periods declared for Tet, they also warn of the strong possibility of widespread, coordinated attacks unfolding in its wake.

Politicking Picks-Up in Saigon

Many of South Vietnam's key political leaders are becoming more active in anticipation of next fall's Upper House elections, and a few seem to be re-examining some of the most basic aspects of their political positions.

President Thieu also appears to be taking a fresh look at his political alliances. He reportedly has given some consideration to revitalizing the moribund Lien Minh front in an effort to persuade labor leader Buu and his following to remain affiliated with this progovernment organization. Moreover, Thieu is apparently planning to give active backing to a slate of senatorial candidates chosen by the almost equally moribund National Social Democratic Front after a half year of relative indifference toward that group.

many relationships, both friendly and hostile, are no longer being taken for granted and that imaginative political initiatives may be essayed before the elections next fall. Talk about developing new political alliances is cheap in South Vietnam, however, and at this point there are no solid indications that lasting new relationships are likely to be built.

Even those opposition elements who are widely regarded as natural allies remain extremely

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
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cautious toward any overture for closer cooperation in the coming campaign. Senator Don, for example, hosted a dinner for an impressive array of such politicians last month, but the popular General "Big" Minh was conspicuously absent and those present remained true to form, unable to agree on the leadership or support needed to form a viable political alliance. Don, however, reportedly still hopes to get his alliance off the ground this year.

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Vice President Ky, meanwhile, reportedly is looking to the Upper House elections as a barometer by which he can chart his

own course for the 1971 presidential elections. Ky expects next fall's elections to provide a clear indication of President Thieu's standing with the people, and he believes that anything less than a clear-cut victory for progovernment slates would remove Thieu as a serious candidate for re-election. Although the vice president has privately indicated that he will not openly support any senatorial candidates, some reports suggest that he may work behind the scenes to organize a candidate list as one step in a long-range challenge to Thieu in the next presidential elections.

This week President Thieu also ordered a military tribunal to proceed with the prosecution of two Lower House deputies accused of supporting the Communists. Thieu decided to act after he received official word that three fourths of the deputies had signed a government-sponsored petition calling for the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of the two men. The President's action may place new strains on his relations with the National Assembly. It took considerable arm-twisting to persuade such a large number of deputies to sign the petition, and an opposition group plans to ask the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of taking legal action on the basis of the petition. Thieu's decision to bring the two deputies to trial reflects to a great degree the personal prestige he has staked on this case.

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PEKING UPS THE ANTE ON RECOGNITION

Overshadowed by the talks in Warsaw and Peking, Communist China's talks with Canada and Italy concerning recognition are continuing, although with little prospect of immediate success. Ever since the talks began last year at Canadian and Italian initiative, the Chinese have maintained an intransigent position that has stalled both negotiations. This intransigence reflects Peking's current assessment of Nationalist Chinese vulnerability as well as a determination to reject anything smacking of a "two Chinas" arrangement. None of the parties has sought an excuse to break off the discussions. Canada and Italy apparently intend to hold periodic meetings with the Chinese, hoping to find some compromise formula on recognition.

Specifically, the talks have bogged down over Peking's refusal to accept a formula similar to that by which the French in 1964 agreed to recognize the Communist regime as the sole legitimate government of China. Peking demands that Ottawa and Rome do this and recognize its territorial claim to the island of Taiwan as well. Canada and Italy have indicated they are willing to recognize Peking as the sole government of China and to support the Communists' case in the United Nations, but they have thus far remained strongly opposed to accepting Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. They believe that such action would jeopardize future

trade and other informal contacts with Taipei, and more importantly might complicate their relations with the US.

The Chinese, nevertheless, consider that they are negotiating from a position of strength and have much to gain by sticking to their optimum demands. Peking is well aware that a number of other Western states, including Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria, will probably follow Ottawa and Rome's lead in establishing ties with China. The loss of support of such a sizable bloc of Western states, particularly on Peking's current terms, would severely undercut the current international position of the Chinese Nationalists as the government of China, and more importantly, would discredit any future attempt by Taipei to assume a position as the government of an independent Taiwan.

Peking also bases its uncompromising position on its current view of US China policy and on the recently resumed dialogue with the US at Warsaw. The Communists, currently engaged in probing the amount of US accommodation on Taiwan, are, of course, reluctant to demonstrate much flexibility of their own in regard to this central issue. On the other hand, Peking no doubt judges that if it succeeds in gaining Canadian and Italian recognition on its harsh terms, future US efforts to promote any sort of two Chinas solution will be severely circumscribed.

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COMMUNIST FORCES STILL BUILDING UP IN NORTH LAOS

Prime Minister Souvanna's public proposal on 31 January to "neutralize" the Plaine des Jarres may play some role in influencing both the scope and timing of Communist military moves in north Laos. The solicitous attitude of the North Vietnamese chargé in Vientiane in following up Souvanna's proposal on an official level suggests that Hanoi is interested in sounding out the Lao Government, rather than rejecting Souvanna's initiative out of hand. By holding open the possibility of further discussions on the proposal, Hanoi may hope to gain a temporary respite from heavy air strikes and give its forces more time to improve their military position.

Meanwhile, the military situation remains relatively quiet near the Plaine des Jarres, but it could heat up with little notice. In recent days government patrols have reported sizable numbers of enemy troops moving southeast of the Plaine. The Communists know that General Vang Pao is sensitive to troop movements which could pose a threat to his headquarters area, the home of many thousand Meo refugees. They may hope to force Vang Pao to pull back some troops that have been disrupting Communist supply movements along Route 7 since late August.

Government patrols also have sighted a multibattalion North

Vietnamese force moving toward the Plaine from a point some 20 miles to the northwest. Some troops told a local villager they were headed for Muong Soui, which has become an important tactical airstrip for government forces.

Hanoi may be holding back its offensive against the Plaine until all its forces are in position and able to move on several fronts simultaneously. This would help explain the enemy's apparent reluctance to take greater advantage of its overwhelming numerical superiority in clearing some of the government's more isolated and lightly defended outposts near the Plaine.


To the northwest, the Pathet Lao are intensifying their efforts to bring the entire Nam Beng Valley under Communist control. The Pathet Lao have been moving new units into the valley since last summer and now significantly outnumber the government troops. The government's presence has been reduced to one major outpost some eight miles west of Pak Beng. The timing of the Pathet Lao campaign, which has been gaining momentum since the capture of Pak Beng in April 1969, suggests that it was undertaken, at least in part, to facilitate the Chinese road building project. Pathet Lao propagandists have told local villagers that a road will be built to Pak Beng this year.

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Northern Laos: Current Situation



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PHILIPPINE STUDENTS PROTEST MARCOS' POLITICAL AIMS

President Marcos was obviously shaken because last weekend's bloody riots were aimed at him personally, but there is no good evidence that the disturbances will result in any progressive changes in administration policy. Marcos has sought to obscure the genesis of the demonstrations by charging that the violence outside the presidential palace was part of a Communist plot to take over the government. Student members of pro-Communist organizations did help fan the rioting that broke out on 30 January, but the student protestors were attacking Marcos' ambitions to perpetuate his presidency, not attempting to bring down the government.

There may have been as many as 20,000 involved in the demonstrations and at one point an attempt was made to storm the palace gates. Guns were fired by both sides and four students were killed and over 100 injured. The rioting became so serious that Marcos finally called in the armed forces chief of staff to direct operations to end the demonstration.

Marcos' alarmist allegations may have temporarily undercut

some powerful families in the Philippine oligarchy who, with the students, are against any move by Marcos to pack next year's constitutional convention. These politically ambitious families appear to have accepted the allegations about a Communist plot as a means of maintaining the status quo. Most members of the Philippine oligarchy have been unwilling to accept the economic and social reforms that are necessary to further national growth, but which would weaken their tight control of the country. Marcos' dependence on these important families makes it less likely than ever that he will push for any meaningful reforms.

The students and others opposed to Marcos' ambitions will probably consider as an empty and expedient promise his press statement on 2 February that he would not seek a third term even if the constitution were altered. The students now realize they have a certain amount of political muscle and will probably continue to agitate against Marcos and may become radicalized in the process.

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SECRET**EUROPE**

Soviet policy makers continued this week to divide their major attention between the Middle East and West Germany. The notes delivered to Paris, London, and Washington were clearly intended to encourage Western pressure on Israel to stop the bombing of Egypt. On German matters, the Soviets kept the dialogue going with Brandt's emissary in Moscow but seemed primarily interested in probing for West German concessions. The USSR and Romania took pro forma notice of the 22nd anniversary of their friendship and assistance treaty, but neither side mentioned that the treaty expired two years ago and that the Soviet leaders have not made any decision about going to Bucharest to sign a new one.

Tito has moved from Tanzania to Zambia on his African tour, plugging hard for his pet project, the nonaligned preparatory conference tentatively set for Dar es Salaam in mid-April. So far Tito is no doubt pleased with the results of his talks, but a wide variety of views awaits him when he meets with leaders of Libya, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt.

Hungarian party boss Kadar has returned home from East Germany, without reconciling his positive responses to Brandt's Eastern policy with Ulbricht's negativism. Kadar also indicated that there were still differences about Hungary's liberal economic reform and about a reorganization of the CEMA trade system.

The good personal relations between Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou were reinforced by Brandt's visit to Paris on 30-31 January. In one of the regular biannual Franco-German meetings, Brandt obtained strong French endorsement of his efforts to improve relations with the East. The two leaders emphasized moving ahead with efforts to expand and develop the European Communities, but neither seemed to think that extensive supranational powers for the European Parliament are a priority matter.

The Nonproliferation Treaty will enter into force next month. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency will meet on 24 February to consider procedures for negotiating safeguards agreements with nonnuclear adherents to the treaty. UN Secretary General Thant will address the Geneva disarmament committee on 18 February, probably calling for action on the proposed seabeds treaty and for a moratorium by the superpowers on further testing and deployment of new weapons systems.

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GATT'S 26TH GENERAL SESSION WILL BE A TEST OF WILLS

The contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will face a number of serious international trade questions when the 26th General Session of GATT opens on 16 February. Many members are concerned about the recent proliferation of regional preferential arrangements negotiated by the European Communities (EC) that are threatening to undermine the most-favored-nation principle, basic to GATT's foundation. Some GATT members will also try to launch an attack on nontariff barriers (NTBs), which, with the gradual reduction of world tariffs, have been increasingly recognized as a major obstacle to world trade expansion.

Regional preferential arrangements are generally considered not to be consistent with the GATT unless they are intended to lead to a free trade area or customs union, and involve a substantial portion of the trade between the parties to the agreement. Attention currently centers on EC preferential agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, which each country considers vital to the continued expansion of their exports. Neither agreement satisfies the GATT requirements. The greater concern, which will be discussed at an informal high-level meeting at the session, is the EC's intention to conclude similar agreements with Spain and Israel, details of which are being worked out. Negotiations between the EC and some Arab states are also anticipated.

This trend has made more urgent the idea of a generalized preference scheme between all the developed and less developed countries as an alternative. The generalized preference question will not be on

the formal agenda, but GATT Director-General Long would like the members to discuss informally how such a system could be accommodated within the GATT rules. Less developed countries are anxious that some plan be formulated, but there is little agreement on how to approach the problem. There are particularly wide gaps between the US and EC positions. The GATT discussions are not expected to serve any constructive purpose until the developed countries agree on a common approach.

Long will ask the members to agree not to introduce any new NTBs and to arrange first-phase negotiations later this year or early in 1971 to remove existing ones. The members may not be ready, however, to take such firm action on this widely varied assortment of trade restrictions, including explicit quotas, import deposit requirements, and the American selling price. Long would also like the members to address the problems associated with declining prices in the international commodity market, and will propose the setting up of consultation mechanisms to maintain more "orderly" marketing. Although the members are unlikely to come up with any concrete plans, they undoubtedly will desire to continue to study this serious problem.

The session opening on 16 February is widely expected to provide a test of GATT's ability to find new ways to promote international trade expansion after the last tariff reduction negotiated in the Kennedy Round takes effect in 1972. The current outlook does not appear too promising.

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HELICOPTER CARRIER MOSKVA ENDS ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT

The Soviet helicopter carrier Moskva and her two ASW escorts returned to the Mediterranean on 4 February after a 20-day deployment to the Atlantic.

Heavy weather prevented the ships from carrying out ASW training during most of the period, but an exercise was held with a diesel submarine off Portugal on 2 February. The submarine was part of a Northern Fleet force of seven submarines, a submarine tender, and an oiler that is replacing a similar force in the Mediterranean.

During the eight-hour ASW operation two to four helicopters from the Moskva continuously hovered over the submarine some 17 miles away. The helicopters used their dipping sonar equipment but did not drop detection buoys.

This was the Moskva's first deployment into heavy seas. Inclement weather battered the ship and its two escorts during the first two weeks in the Atlantic but they did manage to

conduct refueling operations. Earlier, while transiting the Mediterranean, the Moskva had suffered minor structural damage to equipment mounted on the bow.

The strength of the Mediterranean squadron will swell to some 46 ships during the turnover period, but probably will drop to about 13 surface combatants, ten submarine, and ten support ships by the end of next week. A Sverdlov-class cruiser which served as the flagship of the group coming down from the Northern Fleet did not enter the Mediterranean and is returning to home waters.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

The Israelis are keeping pressure on Nasir with more air strikes deep into Egypt. This week, they struck a radar site on the Mediterranean to the north of Cairo and a military installation on the Nile some 200 miles south of Cairo. The strikes are not only producing some serious defensive problems for Nasir, but are also causing concern in both Western and Eastern capitals. After last week's raids close to the Egyptian capital, Moscow began new diplomatic initiatives aimed at curbing the Israelis and may be considering new military support as well.

Along the Syrian-Israeli border, a flurry of conflict broke out in the Rafid area of the Golan Heights. Neither damage nor casualties were heavy, although Israel lost another aircraft. The clash erupted after a lone Syrian MIG sonic-boomed Haifa, apparently in retaliation for past Israeli sonic boomings of Damascus. The Israelis expressed the belief that Syria's increased aggressiveness was meant to enhance its image prior to the meeting in Cairo on 7 February of the so-called Arab confrontation states—Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Iraq.

Nigerian politicians are beginning to meet and maneuver in anticipation of an eventual return to civilian rule, although most of them probably realize that the military government does not intend a hasty change-over. General Gowon is maintaining his conciliatory policy toward the conquered secessionists, but he is probably facing increasing pressure from elements who believe the Ibos are being given too much in the way of relief aid. Lagos' extreme sensitivity about foreign participation in this effort was highlighted last week by its expulsion of a US official concerned with relief matters.

The political stalemate in Dahomey is now well into its second month. Top military officers met on 19 January in an attempt to break the impasse, but agreed only on the reintegration of military personnel who had been discharged or imprisoned for political reasons. One of those reinstated was Lt. Colonel Alley, a former chief of state who is now the most senior officer in the army.

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West Pakistan Governor Nur Khan's surprise resignation last weekend may have been triggered by President Yahya Khan's concern over increasing violence in the country and his dissatisfaction with Nur's handling of recent communal rioting in West Pakistan. Nur's replacement, Lt. General Attiqur Rahman, apparently is under instructions to crack down on troublemakers; a number of arrests have already been made.

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SOVIETS TRY NEW MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE

Moscow's diplomatic demarches in London, Paris, and Washington early this week probably represent the opening move in a new effort to relieve Israeli military pressure on President Nasir. The Soviets probably hope that their show of concern will encourage the British, French, and US to press Israel to stop the bombing of Egypt.

If this initiative fails, and Israeli military action continues to embarrass Moscow and its Egyptian client, the Soviets may be forced to make some hard decisions entailing serious risks to their position in the Middle East. They may be tempted to make some dramatic political or military moves to help Nasir out of his predicament. Nasir's desire for some strong assistance probably prompted his reported visit to Moscow last month.

The choices for Moscow are difficult. The USSR is unlikely

to try to halt the Israeli raids by making concessions in the four-power negotiations on the Middle East. The Israelis are as intransigent as ever about the terms for a settlement, and it would be political suicide for any Arab leader to agree to the kind of concessions that might attract Israeli attention. The Soviets might undertake new diplomatic moves at the UN and in Washington. These, however, would not be aimed at obtaining a settlement, but only at isolating Israel.

The Soviets are also unlikely to look upon new arms supplies to Nasir as a satisfactory alternative. The Egyptians have been manifestly incapable of handling their present holdings competently, and new materiel--to be effective--would require the commitment of Soviet personnel to combat duty. It is doubtful that Soviet concern over Nasir's condition has yet reached the degree that would compel Moscow to take such a risk.

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Other choices of action are similarly unpalatable. An ultimatum to Tel Aviv to leave Egypt alone would risk having Israel call the Soviet hand. The Soviets, who tend to overestimate US influence over Israel, might consider more threatening diplomatic approaches to the US, but this could seriously disturb the progress of US-Soviet relations in such critical areas as strategic arms limitations.

A final alternative would be to temporize. Moscow can try to persevere, giving Nasir more

of the same kind of political and military support he has had, meanwhile hoping he can somehow ride out the storm. Israel, however, seems capable of keeping the USSR indefinitely in this serious bind.



The only easy way out for the Soviets is an unlikely Israeli decision to stop the bombing. Without this, Moscow will have to determine whether to undertake a new diplomatic tack of some sort, risk a military undertaking, or stall. So far, the Soviets seem to be turning first toward a diplomatic initiative.

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EASTERN EUROPE OFFERS LIMITED MARKET FOR MIDDLE EAST OIL

Recent East European barter arrangements with the Middle East for oil will result in only a small flow for at least several years. National oil companies of the Middle East states welcome these opportunities, however, to get a foothold in the oil market.

Moscow now supplies about 85 percent of the 35 million tons of oil required by Eastern Europe, except Romania which is a net exporter of oil. Commitments made to East European countries in return for investment in Soviet industry probably ensure that the USSR will remain their major supplier at least through the mid-1970s. Both the USSR and Eastern Europe are expanding the existing pipeline network so about 45 million tons of Soviet oil can be delivered in 1975. At that time an additional 10-15 million tons per year probably will also be delivered by sea.

Faced with oil production problems and a dependency on oil sales to Western countries for substantial hard currency earnings, the USSR has encouraged East European countries to develop other sources of supply. These countries are participating in a number of long-term deals calling for the delivery now of industrial goods and technical services that can be paid for

later with oil shipped by national oil companies in the Middle East. Hungary will send \$15 million worth of machinery and equipment to Iraq for the development of the North Rumaila field where the USSR also is involved. Recently, Czechoslovakia agreed to provide equipment, valued at \$32 million, for constructing a refinery at Basra. Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary also have agreements with Iran which they have recently reaffirmed.

The closure of the Suez Canal complicated the delivery of oil to Eastern Europe. The construction of pipelines is being considered by some Arab countries and could relieve this situation. A new trans-Israeli line paralleling an existing one that has carried small amounts of Iranian oil for transshipment to Romania is about to go into operation and may be used to transport more Iranian oil destined for Eastern Europe.

Czechoslovakia and Hungary find their landlocked positions to be a major obstacle to importing oil from the Middle East. A pipeline to those countries from the Mediterranean Sea across Yugoslavia has been discussed for several years but probably could not be operational before 1974.

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ALGERIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS SHIFT SLIGHTLY

During the past few months, a slight but perceptible cooling has occurred in Algeria's relations with the Soviet Union while those with France have improved. Nevertheless, good relations with Moscow as well as with Paris continue to be very important to Algerians.

The zenith of Algerian-Soviet relations and the nadir of Algerian-French relations occurred nearly simultaneously early last year. A long-term trade agreement with the USSR had been concluded, involving the sale of large amounts of wine that had glutted the Algerian market after France deferred its purchases for domestic reasons. During early 1969, many prominent Soviet officials, including President Nikolai Podgorny, visited Algeria, and Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika and other high-level Algerians went to the USSR.

Since then, the number of Soviet visitors has declined. In recent months, there has been more grumbling in Algeria than usual over the quality and content of Soviet military and economic aid, and the Algerian press has been far less effusive in praising Moscow's assistance.

A principal factor contributing to Algerian coolness toward the USSR was the improve-

ment in relations with France. Last summer, negotiations were concluded for the purchase from France of 28 Fouga-Magister jet aircraft, the first major effort by the Boumediene regime to diversify its sources of military aid, over which the USSR had enjoyed a near monopoly. Subsequently, the French foreign minister, who visited Algiers last fall, indicated that Paris was willing to resume its wine purchases. The expectation of regaining this traditional market, involving both a better price and payment in francs, made the wine deal with the Soviets less attractive. As a result, the Algerians may have sought some adjustments in terms and quantities during trade talks in Moscow last month.

Improvement in intra-Maghreb relations also diverted Algerian energies from their earlier close association with the Soviets. The Algerians collaborated closely with their more moderate neighbors during the recent Islamic and Arab summits, and with Morocco in its rapprochement with Mauritania. Other developments affecting relations with the Soviets are a marked increase in US business activities, particularly in the development of the state petroleum industry, and numerous contracts awarded to West European and Japanese groups.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Talk of reintegrating Cuba into the inter-American system, and elections past and future dominated the news from Latin America this week.

The ministerial-level meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, which is being held in Caracas, Venezuela, provided the forum for the discussions on Cuba. Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad-Tobago emphasized the need for hemispheric solidarity, especially in the economic sphere, and urged consideration of an end to the "economic boycott" of Cuba and a resumption of trade. Williams was careful to distinguish between full membership for Cuba in the OAS as opposed to participation in the economic activities of the inter-American system. President Caldera of Venezuela made a balanced but clear response to Williams' statements, arguing that it is not always possible to separate economic and political factors.

These statements follow closely on recent declarations by other Latin American officials calling for a re-examination of the basic reasons for excluding Cuba. The foreign ministers of Chile and Peru recently voiced similar sentiments, as have the three major candidates in the Chilean presidential election. Although all the statements specify that Cuba must adhere to accepted international practices, they demonstrate a growing interest in bringing Cuba back into the inter-American system.

In general, many countries feel there is no reason for not trading with Cuba, inasmuch as they have relations with other Communist countries. Moreover, the statements come at a time when some leaders may be feeling some domestic pressure to express their independence of the United States.

Fidel Castro has recently shown some interest in commercial ties with other Latin nations, particularly those in the Caribbean, but he has stated that before discussions can even begin, the Latin American countries must repudiate the OAS sanctions.

On the electoral scene, Costa Rican opposition leader and former president Jose "Pepe" Figueres won a landslide victory in the elections last Sunday. His National Liberation Party also increased its majority in the national legislature. Unofficial returns indicate that the Socialist Action Party, a Communist front, won two seats in the legislature, which may provoke trouble from elements of the extreme right.

In Chile, persistent animosity and distrust between the Communist and Socialist parties keep cropping up during the process of organizing Salvador Allende's presidential campaign. At issue is the control of local committees being set up by the leftist-Marxist electoral front. The determination of the Communist leaders to play a major role in the front is in line with their expressed opinion that, in Chile, a popular front is currently the best means of acquiring a "platform of power." Election campaigns are continuing to arouse interest in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Colombia.

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SUBVERSIVES THREATEN GUATEMALAN ELECTION

Communist terror tactics continue to disturb the political scene as the elections on 1 March near. President Mendez is under mounting pressure to go beyond the minimum steps he has taken for increased security.

The assassinations last week of a well known journalist and of a right-wing former judicial police chief revived public apprehension, which had ebbed with the restoration of constitutional guarantees on 15 January. A wealthy industrialist has been kidnaped and several bombing incidents have occurred within the past two weeks.

President Mendez once more proclaimed a state of precaution, providing the lowest form of emergency powers for the security forces, with a proviso that normal political activity is not inhibited. He also installed a new team to direct the national police and named former minister of defense General Rolando Chinchilla to the ministry of government, probably to exhibit further motion in the security field.

The president has resisted "unleashing" the police in a major anti-Communist effort be-

cause previous counterterror programs added to the level of over-all violence. The government Revolutionary Party (PR) believes that an increase in terrorism represents the greatest threat to its election chances. The PR presidential candidate, Mario Fuentes Pier-rucini, is expected to win unless a major Communist thrust enhances the appeal of the right-wing National Liberation Movement's Col. Carlos Arana. Arana has a reputation as the commander who rid the northeast of Communist guerrillas.

[REDACTED]

At this point all the legitimate political forces, including the military, seem determined to uphold the electoral process. If the Communists mount a serious offensive, however, Mendez' reluctance to respond forcefully would no longer remain acceptable to the armed forces. [REDACTED]

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DOMINICAN OPPOSITION ACCELERATES CAMPAIGN

Last week's widespread student disturbances, virulent politicking, and charges of government repression have set the tone for the turmoil that will characterize political life from now until the presidential election in May.

Dissident groups used the front page publicity on recent disappearances of several opponents of the Balaguer government to initiate student protests around the country. Secondary school students, responsive to Communist-led organizations, came out in large numbers, and police were faced with disorders in most cities. In clashes between university youths and security forces in Santo Domingo, four students were wounded. Continued assassinations of army personnel--the latest on 3 February--have made security forces eager to do battle with leftists in general, and further incidents between students and police are likely.

Charges of repression will continue to headline the opposition campaign; some allegations are justified. Coercion and intimidation have long been legitimate tactics in the Dominican Republic, and the president has few qualms about dealing with the opposition in a high handed manner. Balaguer probably does not need strong-arm methods to win, but he is well aware that the more formidable his position, the more certain he is of con-

tinued military backing. In turn, the opposition is shifting its attention to intrigue and plotting in an attempt to gain its ends, believing that Balaguer can easily win an election.

The leadership of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the major opposition party, already views a coup rather than elections as the more realistic long term means of gaining power. In a speech last month, PRD Secretary General Pena Gomez all but ruled out official electoral participation by his party if President Balaguer runs. Although a final decision will be made later by a national convention, the speech predicated participation on the "remote possibility" that Balaguer will not seek re-election. Former General Wessin's Quisqueyan party, the leading antigovernment force on the right, has also turned its attention to plotting rather than campaigning.

At present, however, the various parties have few military allies. Civilian supporters of the PRD are capable of inciting serious urban riots, but they would be unable to sustain a revolt. The military, the all important factor in the Dominican equation, is still firmly with Balaguer. So long as the President maintains order and appears to be headed for another term, he is unlikely to suffer serious defections among his military supporters.

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HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR GROPE TOWARD COMPROMISE

The halting movement toward normalization of relations between El Salvador and Honduras continued last week as bilateral talks got under way. The relative calm along the border was shattered, however, by the first clashes of any significance since last summer's five-day war.

Bilateral talks began in Costa Rica on 26 January. Although Honduras had previously insisted that discussion of the border dispute precede discussion of other issues, a more flexible approach was finally adopted. Both delegations agreed to concentrate first on humanitarian matters, such as exchange of mail and family visits, and to consider the more difficult problems at a later time. The meetings recessed on 30 January and are scheduled to resume on 23 February.

With peace negotiations just beginning, a series of clashes between Salvadoran and Honduran troops has caused concern on both sides. The incidents resulted in fewer than a dozen casualties, and apparently stemmed from active patrolling along the undefined border. Neither government permitted them to be blown out of proportion by the mass media.

25X1 Although further clashes would have a destabilizing effect, the possibility is remote that they would lead directly to a major outbreak of hostilities.

Unlike last summer, when atrocity stories abounded, no deeply emotional issues have yet arisen. Moreover, the OAS decision to increase the number of military and civilian observers will probably help to keep the lid on. Nevertheless, continued incidents would strengthen the hand of those who, for political or nationalistic reasons, have opposed compromise. With Salvadoran congressional elections scheduled for 8 March, and with certain Honduran leaders interested in dispensing with the 1971 presidential elections, each government is particularly sensitive to criticism of its handling of relations with the other. Should the border problem inflame public opinion, either side could be forced to adopt a tougher stance and the success of the bilateral talks would be severely jeopardized.

Continued problems would also impede efforts to revive the Central American Common Market. The economics ministers of the five member states will meet on 12 February to work out a modus operandi that would allow the market's executive organs to resume formal operations. Honduran intransigence prevented progress at the first meeting on 9 January, and its position at the upcoming meeting will provide a reliable indicator of its interest in ending the crisis atmosphere that has pervaded the market.

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
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNDER HUSAK

Party first secretary Gustav Husak is beginning to mold Czechoslovakia's institutions into instruments of his own power. He is not in full control yet, but since taking over from Dubcek last April, he has steadily asserted his position, most recently at last week's party central committee plenum, which approved sweeping leadership changes. At that meeting, Husak put his own man into the powerful post of Czech regional party chief. In the process, he engineered the transfer of his potential rival, Lubomir Strougal, to the job of federal premier, thus removing him from his party power base. Husak also indicated that he intends to satisfy Soviet demands while trying to avoid a full reversion to Stalinist practices.

Husak has been building up to this stage of affairs gradually. He succeeded in bringing relative stability to the leadership and imposed measures that produced a period of at least surface calm in the country. He accomplished this by forcing the party to adopt a "middle-of-the-road" political course similar to that instituted by Janos Kadar in Hungary after the 1956 revolt. In addition, he has once again thrown a veil of secrecy over policy making and politics and restored party and police control over society. Under Husak's leadership, virtually all of the demands made by the USSR since the invasion have been met. Czechoslovakia's image in the Communist camp has been refurbished, and a strong public endorsement has been won from the Soviet Union and most of the other invasion powers.

Husak's next task is to put down some deeper domestic political roots. Apparently encouraged by Soviet support, he now plans to complete "normalization" of domestic affairs and of relations with the Warsaw Pact governments this year. To do so, however, he and his colleagues must reckon with a number of political, economic and social problems that could delay this process. Husak will eventually have to assert his authority over conservatives in the leadership who will attempt to press him into more orthodox policies, as well as over the even more extreme conservatives who are seeking control of the regional party apparatuses in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia. He must also quickly solve problems that could ultimately jeopardize the economy and with it, his position. Finally, his willingness to serve the Russians has widened the gulf between the party hierarchy and the population, and Husak is faced with popular alienation and passive antiregime dissidence, especially among students, workers, trade unionists, and intellectuals.

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HUSAK THE MAN

Gustav Husak has unquestionably put his stamp on the Czechoslovakia of today. A brilliant, dynamic, and sophisticated individual, Husak has been one of the most controversial figures in Czechoslovak politics for over 20 years. Less than 15 months after Dubcek replaced Novotny in January 1968, Husak became the first intellectual since Lenin to head a ruling European Communist party.

Husak was born 10 January 1913 to a Slovak peasant family in Dubravka, near Bratislava. Having earned a doctor of laws degree and subsequently joining the Communist party, he was in his 30s when he became head of the Slovak government. He had already gained the reputation of a brilliant political tactician who knew how to exploit the weaknesses of his adversaries.

Arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo when World War II broke out, Husak was released almost immediately, reportedly through the intervention of Alexander Mach, then minister of interior in the Slovak regime that was collaborating with the Nazis. Husak was later accused of "red fascism" because of his friendship with members of the collaborationist regime and because he later intervened to help lighten Mach's postwar sentence for treason.

Husak played a key role in the Slovak national uprising in 1944 and, at the same time, developed a growing reputation as an ardent Slovak nationalist.



Gustav Husak
Party First Secretary



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Emerging in the postwar period as a major political figure, Husak was criticized for tolerating the excesses of the security police and for his severe repression of national minorities, particularly Hungarians living in Slovakia. Following the Communist coup in 1948, Husak became embroiled in the ensuing power struggle that led to Czechoslovakia's Stalinist era. Accused of "bourgeois nationalism," he was expelled from the party in 1951 and subsequently arrested. In April 1954, he and four others were tried on trumped up charges of treason, sabotage, and espionage, and Husak was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Released in 1960, Husak lived quietly, partly because Novotny was cognizant of his potential for sowing disunity within the party, and partly because Husak himself had no desire to serve the regime. Husak was officially rehabilitated and readmitted to the party in 1963, and for five years was employed as a "scientific" worker in the Slovak Academy of Sciences. In a recent speech, Husak said that he had turned down the post of deputy premier in 1964, in the wake of the disastrous economic recession of the year before.

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Although his stature within the Slovak regional party had grown remarkably, Husak apparently played only a minor role in the Slovak drive, spearheaded by Dubcek and Vasil Bilak, to remove Novotny from power during the final months of 1967. In fact, it was not until Brezhnev washed his hands of the affair, and the majority of the party leadership lined up against Novotny, that Husak offered his support to Dubcek in what he has described as a "Christmas letter."

HUSAK UNDER DUBCEK

In April 1968, three months after Dubcek replaced Novotny, Husak was named deputy premier in charge of "the great Slovak dream": federalization of the country. This plan was designed to give the Slovak minority greater rights and near-equality with the more populous Czechs by dividing the country into separate Czech and Slovak republics with their own distinct national governments drawn together under a minimal federal government apparatus in Prague.

In July 1968, a month before the Soviet invasion, Husak became embroiled in a heated dispute with his Czech colleagues over whether the Slovaks should be given parity on the federal level. Most Czechs believed that the principle of "majority rule" should apply on the federal level, and looked for the extraordinary party congress, then set for 9 September, to settle the argument. The Slovaks—and Husak—appeared headed for certain defeat on this issue, and the invasion oddly enough, benefited Husak by allowing him to preserve considerable leverage in asserting Slovak claims.

Husak's preoccupation with federalization also revealed that, as a result of his imprisonment during the 1950s, he had developed a more benign attitude toward the national minorities. A

bill granting greater rights to all minority groups, appended to the federalization legislation, was drafted during 1968 under Husak's guidance. In addition, he seemed to display a more tolerant attitude toward the religious communities during this period.

On other reforms of Dubcek, however, Husak from the beginning expressed reservations. Although he lauded the idea of "democratization," including fewer restrictions on the mass media, he criticized Dubcek's Action Program for generating "incorrect views." As Husak saw it, there were three main dangers: (a) that the liberal organizations might develop a nonsocialist philosophy that could attract a large popular following; (b) that among opinion makers "radicalized Philistines" could emerge who considered that the entire system under Novotny had been bad and must be changed and, (c) that there could be a resurgence of the dogmatists who wanted a simplistic return to rule by force.

HUSAK'S RISE TO POWER

Husak's resurgence as one of the country's most influential politicians began almost immediately after the invasion in August 1968. He was a member of President Ludvik Svoboda's delegation that went to Moscow to negotiate the release of Dubcek and the other leaders who had been taken prisoner. During the talks, Husak is said to have argued cogently and forcefully; he apparently impressed his Soviet counterparts who began a dialogue with him that has continued to the present.

Husak's increasing influence also prompted the "illegal 14th party congress," held clandestinely in a Prague factory on 22 August, to elect him to the presidium and central committee. Following his return to Czechoslovakia, Husak dominated the "extraordinary" Slovak party

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congress on 26-29 August and was elected Slovak party first secretary.

Shortly thereafter Husak delineated his policy of "realism" and became the foremost spokesman for "normalization"—broad compliance with Moscow—as the only possible course in the face of military occupation and the threat of a blood bath. Husak was the first Czechoslovak leader to characterize the Moscow Agreement of 26 August, the official catalog of Russian demands, as an "honorable solution." Significantly, he subsequently dissociated himself from the preinvasion leadership and criticized the results of Dubcek's reforms, particularly the uncontrolled mass media, the undisciplined party dissidents and unruly students. He also declared the 14th party congress invalid and called upon Dubcek and other leaders to do the same.

The motive for Husak's apparent transformation and his uncompromising support for "normalization" appears to have been a combination of pragmatism and opportunism. His stress on the bilateral character of the Moscow Agreement suggests that he expected that the Soviets would not make any significant concessions to Prague until after their demands had been met. In particular, Husak probably had been assured by the Soviets that he could go ahead with federalization. Some of Husak's comments also suggest that he believed that Soviet occupation forces eventually would be withdrawn.

Husak's strong leadership in the aftermath of the invasion—Dubcek appears to have relied heavily on him—and his dialogue with numerous Russian visitors led to widespread speculation as early as September 1968 that he was being groomed as Dubcek's successor. In the next three months, however, Husak restricted his activities to finishing work on the federalization bill, streamlining his own Slovak party leadership, and

tightening control over the Slovak people. At the same time, he became the central figure in an informal coalition of Slovaks and moderate as well as conservative Czechs within the central party apparatus who were disenchanted with Dubcek's ineffective and essentially anti-Soviet leadership. As a result, Husak's "group" and its ideas prevailed at the November 1968 party plenum that elected a new "centrist" leadership and adopted a "realist" political line, in effect isolating Dubcek.

After this, Husak came more and more into prominence and Dubcek faded into the background. Serious anti-Soviet riots in late March 1969 embroiled the Czechoslovak leadership in its most grave crisis after the invasion. The Russians apparently demanded that Dubcek be ousted and a new leadership formed that could exercise effective control of the population. There are indications that Moscow had threatened to bring additional troops into the country if the changes were not carried out.

Husak took advantage of the situation. He reportedly rallied the despairing leadership and allegedly was instrumental in constructing a new regime whose members were more acceptable to the Soviets. Husak was nominated for the post of party chief by Dubcek after the latter agreed to step aside, and, on 17 April 1969, he received an overwhelming majority of central committee votes. Moscow's role, or lack of it, in Husak's ascendancy is still unclear. It seems most likely that the Soviets gave tentative approval, since they probably considered Husak the strongest leader in Prague and because they undoubtedly had determined that his alleged Slovak "nationalism" and his authoritarianism could work to their advantage. The Russians probably also realized that, if necessary, the uncharismatic Husak would be much easier to replace than Dubcek.

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HUSAK'S POLICIES

"If...Novotny managed everything, including the economy, bureaucratically, Dubcek did not manage at all."

Prague Radio, 3 January 1970

Since Husak took over, he has sought to avoid the divergent excesses of the Novotny and Dubcek regimes. Most of the leadership's policies, in fact, have reflected Husak's preoccupation with "normalization" and in effect are less bloody but just as repressive as those employed by Novotny, if not more so. Husak's policies thus far are directed toward four basic goals: 1) to unify the party and restore its "leading role"; 2) to establish and maintain an effective system of control over the populace and all social organizations; 3) to remove the disruptive influence of "anti-socialists," i. e., the liberals and moderates who have played an influential role since the Dubcek period; and 4) to regain the confidence of the leaders of the invasion powers and other socialist allies.

Husak does seem intent on preventing a return to the pre-January 1968 political setting, but

his role in each policy formulation is difficult to evaluate. Many of his immediate goals are identical with those of the ultraconservatives who are putting pressure on him. Further, Husak's responses to various pressures suggest that he is guided more by pragmatism than by principle. His actions to date have been reflexive, designed to stabilize his own position and to reassure the Soviets that he can control the situation and cope with domestic problems.

THE PURGE

In the short time he has been in office, Husak has initiated extensive personnel changes at all levels of the party, government, and social and economic organizations. The first phase of the purge installed "realists" sympathetic with Husak's concepts in place of the liberals and moderates associated with Dubcek. The conservatives were largely untouched because of their rapport with the Soviets. Since April 1969, some organizations have been reshuffled a second time, for the most part because the regime was dissatisfied with officials who were dragging their feet in implementing leadership directives. During the party plenum last week, several prominent leaders were ousted from the party presidium, which

CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KSC) (as of 28 January 1970)				
First Secretary	Secretaries	Other Members of the Secretariat	Members of the Presidium	Candidate Members of the Presidium
Gustav Husak (S)	<u>Vasil Bilak</u> (S) <u>Jan Fojtik</u> <u>Alois Indra</u> <u>Frantisek Penc</u>	<u>Miroslav Moc</u>	<u>Vasil Bilak</u> (S) <u>Peter Colotka</u> (S) <u>Evzen Erban</u> <u>Gustav Husak</u> (S) <u>Antonin Kapek</u> <u>Josef Kempny</u> <u>Josef Korcak</u> <u>Jozef Lenart</u> (S) <u>Jan Piller</u> <u>Lubomir Strougal</u> <u>Ludvik Svoboda</u> (Honorary)	<u>Frantisek Barbirek</u> <u>Dalibor Hanes</u> (S) <u>Vaclav Hula</u> <u>Alois Indra</u>
<p>----- Leaders who subscribe to an essentially more orthodox political philosophy than Husak</p>		(S) Slovak New Appointees		

indicates that even those holdovers from the Dubcek era who had fallen in line with Husak's "realism" are no longer acceptable.

Under an elaborate party card exchange program now under way, district party officials are screening local party functionaries, and party central committee commissions are investigating the rank and file. Husak has declared that all party members must support his policies or get out. Last week's plenum set up a 12-member commission, dominated by prominent pro-Soviet conservatives, to oversee the program. This suggests that the regime will comply with the Soviet request that the Czechoslovak Communist party be substantially reduced.

Husak is purging "antisocialists" by removing them from their jobs and expelling them from the party. Up to now, the party leader has, however, been willing to give virtually all dissidents one last chance to fall in line before facing censure. Despite conservative pressure, Husak has continually stressed—most recently on 29 January at the party plenum—that there will be no "show trials." A few outspoken intellectuals, such as national chess champion Ludek Pachman and television commentator Vladimir Skutina, have been arrested, but most of the prominent progressives still in the country have not. Dubcek, for example, was recently assigned as Czechoslovak ambassador to Turkey. Other key liberals, such as former National Assembly president Josef Smrkovsky, are still free, although he and others in similar straits have had an extremely difficult time finding suitable employment.

POPULATION CONTROL

Party leader Husak has firmly curbed public displays of antiregime or anti-Soviet sentiment. When threatened with potential disturbances, the authorities have put the security police on alert,

PARTY FIRST SECRETARY HUSAK

ON HIS ROLE AS DEPUTY PREMIER UNDER DUBCEK

"Last August I was deputy premier...I knew absolutely nothing about things...Gradually, bit by bit, one got to know of various things, and for the first time my eyes were opened a little when in October we were in the Soviet Union for a conference—Dubcek, Cernik and I—and when during his several-hour speech Comrade Brezhnev began to recapitulate the entire story. This lasted for several hours, and...Dubcek could not even say boo. That is when my eyes were opened; I say that the whole affair was not fair play." They (the Russians) now hold against me the fact that at the Slovak congress (28-29 August 1968), I backed Dubcek when I said: 'if Dubcek falls I will go to.' Yes, it is true, I said so, under the circumstances I knew at that time...And this is how it is with all of us here, I think."

(25 September 1969)

ON REFORM

"The basic concept of post-January policy remains even today the starting point for forming the party program even though it must be theoretically extended, corrected slightly in many aspects, and made more concrete and gradually implemented."

(25 September 1969)

ON REPRESSIVE POLICIES

"We...regard all the temporary measures, unavoidable for restoring order, and strengthening state power, for putting a stop to economic disintegration and primarily for restoring the unity and action capacity of the party, as an unavoidable precondition for being able in the future to implement these positive tasks which could not be realized after January 1968..."

(25 September 1969)

ON WORKING WITH PEOPLE

"Real sensitivity is needed for work with the people. We are not butchers. Our party is no slaughterhouse. This is work involving living people—sensitive people—where mind and feelings play a role...The policy of the Communist Party is not carried out by the sword. Education is not a question of slashing, not a question of revenge...not a question of a personal settling of accounts."

(25 September 1969)

ON PARTY PURGE

"The Communist Party is a voluntary association of people thinking the same way. He who does not think the same way need not be in the party. And he who wants to fight it cannot be in it...Dead souls in the party are of no use to us; however, even less so are souls who are hostile to the party...This is not a raid on party members...We do not want to lose even one single honest party member."

(5 January 1970)

ON SHOW TRIALS

"...there are no forces either in the party leadership or in the central committee that would be striving for a return to the fifties, for distortion and violation of laws. Our party will not degrade itself to framing show trials..."

(29 January 1969)

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reinforced them with additional security forces and military units, and made thousands of preventive arrests. When large-scale demonstrations occurred throughout the country on 21 August 1969, the first anniversary of the invasion, the security forces were able to maintain control with tear gas, water hoses, truncheons and a strong show of military force. No Soviets were involved in putting down the demonstrations.

In the aftermath of the demonstrations, the government announced that people arrested for "opposition" in the future will face severe punishment and loss of civil rights. A legal punishment rarely used since the early 1950s was revived: "prohibition of residence." This measure calls for banishment from one to five years for a wide range of offenses, and could again become a common alternative to imprisonment.

Husak has restricted travel in and out of the country in an attempt to curtail Western influences, to close the escape hatch for dissidents, and to minimize the number of defections of badly needed scientific and technical personnel. The flow of traffic from the West into Czechoslovakia has been reduced, the number of Western news correspondents in Prague restricted, Western broadcasts jammed, and the sale of many Western newspapers and periodicals prohibited. Dubcek's numerous legal guarantees of due process and individual rights undoubtedly will be ignored, inasmuch as the wide-ranging powers of public prosecutors have been restored.

As a result, the public has been cowed. Husak, consequently, has lost the support of many who originally considered him preferable to any other but Dubcek. This change in attitude is responsible for passive resistance in the form of worker slowdowns, absenteeism and sabotage.

CULTURE AND EDUCATION

Cultural policy has become increasingly repressive, suggesting that Husak has no qualms about going even further than Novotny in attempting to corral the recalcitrant intellectuals. He has stifled the mass media by restoring censorship, abolished the more outspoken progressive publications, and ousted prominent journalists, editors, commentators, and media administrators. In addition, party committees headed by arch-conservatives have been set up to police the mass media. Husak has promised that censorship eventually will be abolished, but this is unlikely until the presence of censors in the editorial offices is superfluous.

The regime now exercises strict control over the cultural community by dealing directly with individual dissident intellectuals, rather than through their unions. Some unrepentant progressives have had their passports withdrawn. The government has been empowered to exercise greater control over the unions themselves by closely supervising their funds and restricting their publishing activities and contacts with Western counterparts.

Dissenting unions are being threatened with expulsion from the source of their organizational strength and finances, the Communist-controlled National Front. Organizations dropped from the front are considered illegal and are automatically disbanded. In early January 1970, the front rescinded the membership of the motion picture and television artists' association and warned five other cultural unions to change their attitudes or face a similar fate. To fill the vacuum created by the dismissal of many progressive writers, the Czech and Slovak ministries of culture intend to organize "groups" of reliable writers.

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Strict state control of education was re-imposed on 1 January 1970. In a complete reversal of policy, the Czech and Slovak ministers of education have been empowered to appoint and recall academic administrators and professors, and to create, abolish, or reorganize educational and scientific institutions. Political reliability has again become a prerequisite in the hiring of teachers and in the admission of students to the universities. Disciplinary commissions are being set up to deal with student radicals, and political indoctrination, beginning this month, will be intensified within the academic community.

The situation appears to be less repressive in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, where so-called "antisocialism" is more deeply rooted and where an orthodox minister of education is determined to stifle all student activity outside the classroom. He probably is attempting to prevent the students from organizing any mass demonstrations such as those that developed in late April 1969, when 20,000 students in 20 universities protested the ouster of Dubcek. The minister has also ordered all student and faculty publications discontinued until they can be evaluated and then reissued individually on a probationary basis.

FEDERALIZATION

Now that Husak has moved to Prague, his enthusiasm for federalization of all national organizations has diminished. Federalization of the government, when introduced on 1 January 1969, was incomplete and confused, and the program now poses both short and long-term problems. After one year of federalization, there still has been an inadequate delineation of responsibility and of chains of command. The system has revealed a shortage of qualified Slovak officials for federal posts, as well as an inadequate organizational arrangement in the Czech lands. To complicate matters, the Czechs and Slovaks are


implementing federalization at different speeds, at a time when tandem cooperation between the two groups is vital. Consequently, federalization has strained relations between the two nationalities. To eliminate one problem, the regime last week abolished the federal post of "state secretary," removing a bureaucratic level that had been created to give the minority Slovaks equal representation in the Czechoslovak cabinet.

Husak also has had second thoughts on federalizing the party. Such a federative arrangement—previously planned for next year—would strengthen the Czech and Slovak regional parties. In all likelihood it would enable the numerically stronger Czech party bureau to dominate federal party meetings, including the next party congress. The party leader is well aware that such a development would allow the politician who runs the Czech party to increase his power, and to isolate Husak from his own power base in Slovakia. To prevent this, Husak told the party plenum last week that he plans to recentralize party authority in Prague. He explained his retreat on this issue by emphasizing that national rivalries already had impeded policy making and had blocked implementation of the few decisions reached. Husak may also have been responding to Soviet complaints that federalization of the party would have a divisive effect on the leadership.

REHABILITATION

The program to rehabilitate former political prisoners who suffered unjustly during the 1950s, a reform that Husak originally endorsed wholeheartedly, is still in progress, but its pace has become monumentally slow. A central committee "white paper" justifying the program was produced under the direction of presidium member Jan Piller. It has been shelved, undoubtedly because it implicates both the Soviets and prominent Czechoslovak conservatives. Dissenting dogmatists, moreover, have caused the removal of

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some judges for allegedly exonerating individuals guilty of treason.

Some security officials have attempted to intimidate applicants for rehabilitation by subjecting them to intense personal investigations and by interviewing many of them in the same room in which they were brutally interrogated in the early 1950s. Prior to his recent removal, former Czech party chief Strougal, who served as interior minister under Novotny, blocked a Czech government bill regulating rehabilitation, and, late

in 1969, public prosecutors appeared to have begun a concerted campaign to limit the number of acquittals.

THE ECONOMY

The overriding priority of political issues since Husak became party chief last April caused decisions on several major economic matters to be postponed. A party plenum that would address the economy was postponed from October 1969 until last week. This session originally was slated

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to deal almost exclusively with the nation's serious economic difficulties, but the agenda was expanded to include many political questions.

Husak faces formidable economic problems. He must try to stabilize and give direction to the economy and oversee increased efforts to restore work discipline. During the past two years the Czechoslovak workers received sizable wage increases despite their failure to increase productivity. The resultant pressure on consumer goods supplies was a major factor in increased inflation.

In 1970 the Husak government will continue a restrictive, anti-inflationary policy, characterized by the Czechoslovaks as economic "consolidation." Anti-inflationary measures introduced earlier include stringent controls on wages and prices. Having failed to get a large Soviet loan, the government now plays down the importance of external aid, claiming that better use of available economic resources must provide the means for overcoming serious problems. Alarmed at the waste of resources in capital construction, central authorities are determined to concentrate in 1970 on priority projects and to retain tighter control over investment funds than they did in 1969. Central control of the economy will be strengthened, as will supervision of plan implementation.

The government will rely increasingly on administrative measures to tackle the serious problem of sagging labor productivity. On 1 January the government amended the labor code to provide strict penalties for absenteeism, loafing, and violation of wage regulations. An amended penal code provides for more rapid prosecution for misdemeanors such as theft of property and currency speculation. It seems certain that most of the economic reforms discussed in the Dubcek era will not be carried out, although enterprises

may continue to have some small freedoms obtained since January 1968.

THE CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE

Husak's "normalization" drive has inadvertently played into the hands of prominent conservatives within the party and considerably strengthened the conservative group as an influential pressure bloc.

On the surface, the chaotic power struggle between factions that has characterized Czechoslovak party politics in recent years appears to be over. Husak has virtually wiped out the vast web of recalcitrant progressives as an effective opposition. The most prominent hard liners, mindful of Soviet support for Husak, have found it expedient to fall into line. What is left of open "opposition" to Husak would seem to be a lightweight contingent of conservative extremists, who do not enjoy overt Soviet support, seeking to influence Husak's "realist" policies, which thus far have been acceptable to Moscow. Much more important is the growing opposition composed of Novotny's followers. They are particularly effective in the provinces, in the military, and at secondary levels in the party apparatus in Prague. On the surface they support Husak, but they also appear to be playing a waiting game, building positions of power and preventing Husak from too much moderation. They probably are encouraged by developments at last week's party plenum. Three prominent conservatives who served under Novotny replaced three moderates on the presidium, which suggests that Husak may no longer enjoy a decisive majority on the party's ruling body.

Husak's present strength is largely attributable to Soviet support. If the Soviets were to withdraw their endorsement, the conservative

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


Alois Indra
Conservative Leader

roup near the top probably would be available to Moscow as an alternative leadership. Perhaps the most influential of these conservatives is Alois Indra, who now serves as party secretary in charge of personnel appointments to the top levels of the government, and social organizations. Indra, one of the few leaders said to have been forewarned of the Soviet invasion, was Moscow's first choice to head a "collaborationist" regime. Despite his recent open support for Husak, Indra has engineered the elevation of a number of like-minded conservatives into the federal government apparatus. He probably still is Moscow's candidate for party leader if Husak should falter badly. At last week's party plenum, Indra was elevated

to alternate membership on the party's ruling presidium, a post in which he can more effectively breathe down Husak's neck.

Another prominent conservative, Vasil Bilak, is presently a presidium member and party secretary in charge of foreign affairs. An adversary of Husak, Bilak has maneuvered his way back into the Slovak party central committee from which he was expelled as an alleged "collaborator" shortly after the invasion.



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Vasil Bilak
One Husak Adversary



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Josef Kempny
Regional Party Boss

Power-seeking conservatives presently attempting to establish a power base in the party apparatus of the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia may run afoul of their new overlord, Josef Kempny. As first secretary of the powerful Czech party bureau, Kempny has in effect become the number two man in the Czechoslovak Communist party. Kempny is known to hold dogmatic views on some issues, but he has no popular following and owes his present stature to Husak,

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HUSAK

"Comrade Husak...(is) an outstanding political figure, a loyal son of his people...a man of great courage."
Brezhnev Speech, 27 October 1969

POLISH PRESS ON GOMULKA AND HUSAK

"(They are) two Communists whose biographies are strikingly resembling, who have made great contributions to the present historic shape of Poland and Czechoslovakia ...men of unflinching principle..."
Glos Pracy, 26 May 1969

HUNGARIAN MEDIA ON HUSAK

"...The Czechoslovak party has a leader who has proved by his views and activity so far that he is able and ready to solve the grave problems of Czechoslovak society."
Radio Budapest, 18 April 1969

whom he probably will support. Moreover, Kempny probably will not be as vulnerable to the pressures of conservative extremists as his predecessor, Strougal. This fact could be crucial to Husak's power in the future because Kempny, as Czech party chief, now is in a position to control the majority of delegates to the next party congress. If the Czechoslovak party ever is federalized, a Czech bloc could dominate the central party apparatus in Prague.

The conservatives, who now control the key portfolios in the party secretariat, also have created political and social mass organizations that have potential use as a threat to Husak. Such groups include a social-political mass organization, the Left Front, and ideologically approved youth and cultural associations. In addition, the hard liners have gained virtual control of the police and security apparatus. The conservatives as a group, however, do not appear to be unified on a common political philosophy, and there have

been reports of conflicts among their key leaders, especially over the question of pro-Soviet orientation. This could prevent them from becoming an effective coalition in the immediate future.

FOREIGN POLICY

Czechoslovak foreign policy is the exclusive domain of the archconservatives. Husak seems to stay out of it. Bilak serves as party secretary for relations with other parties, and Pavel Auersperg, a dogmatist who formerly served under Novotny, heads the party central committee's department for foreign affairs, which controls the Foreign Ministry. Indra, the party secretary for personnel assignments in the government, has in part been responsible for a purge in the Foreign Ministry as well as for the recall of liberal and moderate ambassadors who aligned themselves with Dubcek's policies and decried the Soviet invasion. Foreign Minister Jan Marko is a moderate, but he has no influence in policy matters.

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Czechoslovak foreign policy under Husak largely reflects the goals of Moscow. Prague's "initiatives" have primarily been confined to a successful campaign to improve relations with the invasion powers. Under Husak, the Czechoslovaks have parroted Warsaw Pact statements on disarmament, European security and East-West detente, most recently supporting the SALT talks in Helsinki.

Husak personally has long been suspicious of the motives of the West in general and the US in particular. Czechoslovakia, under his leadership, probably will take only small steps, after consultation with Moscow, toward improving bilateral relations with the West. In one of his rare foreign policy statements, Husak in December indicated that Prague hoped to expand trade with the West Germans, but he made all the old demands on Bonn, including renunciation of the Munich agreement from the beginning, before any further rapprochement could become a reality.


RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST ALLIES

The Soviets, initially wary of Husak, ultimately gave him their full official endorsement

when he and other top Czechoslovak leaders visited Moscow in October. The turning point in the Prague party leader's relations with the Russians appears to have been his blunt suppression of the nationwide demonstrations on the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Conservative leader Indra spent most of August in the USSR, probably discussing contingency plans with the Soviets in the event that the anniversary demonstrations got out of hand. After the anniversary passed without significant incidents, Indra publicly offered his support for Husak's politics. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets underlined their endorsement by awarding Husak the medal of "Hero of the Soviet Union."

Czechoslovakia's relations with the other invaders have improved, but in varying degrees. Hungary and Poland have gone out of their way to demonstrate their preference for the Husak leadership over a more orthodox regime. Both the Hungarians and the Poles have expressed concern that Czechoslovakia not return to a Stalinist system of rule, undoubtedly worried about the spillover effect in their countries. In December, after Kadar visited Prague to assess the situation for himself, the Husak regime for the first time

Popular Czechoslovak View of "Normalization" of Relations with Soviet Union



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