


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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43

17 July 1970  
No. 0379/70

State Dept. review completed

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## Cambodia: *Planning For A Protracted Struggle*

More than a month has passed since the North Vietnamese moved deep into western Cambodia to attack Siem Reap city. It appeared then as if Hanoi might have decided on an early showdown in Cambodia, but in the ensuing weeks the war bogged down with the onset of the summer monsoons.


The cities of Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, and Kompong Speu have been harassed almost every night, but ground assaults have been few and widely spaced. The Communists are maintaining enough pressure to keep the Cambodians tied down to defensive positions in the major population centers. An occasional ground attack, such as the one this week against the mountain resort town of Kirirom or the district capital of Saang last week, probably were made for tactical or psychological reasons.

The evidence suggests that the Communists are going through a period of retrenchment and consolidation. The loss of materiel from the sanctuaries undoubtedly is one important factor; the sheer magnitude of the task in Cambodia is another. Approximately 260 miles of rugged terrain separates Communist main force units along the South Vietnamese border from the small groups far to the west that have pushed the Cambodians into Thailand. A campaign of swift strikes, much of it by small bands living off the countryside, has given the Communists loose control over more than half of Cambodia's territory. It is doubtful that the Communists intend to fight for every square mile of this territory, but they almost certainly intend to do as much with it as they can. This will require more troops, more cadre, and more help from the indigenous Cambodian, Lao, and tribal people who live in the area.

The situation in the countryside is confused and no clear picture of what is happening there has emerged. It is apparent, however, that the Communists are making a strong effort to build a

Cambodian Communist movement. They have brought in Khmer-speaking cadre from South Vietnam to help out, and they are using Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists to set up an administrative apparatus. It will not be an easy job. The Cambodian Communist movement—the so-called Khmer Rouge—is weak. The Vietnamese are racially distinct from the Khmer; they speak a different language, and they must overcome the burden of long-standing Khmer animosity. The Communist threat cannot be written off on these grounds, however.

The Communists are superb organizers, and they know how to use terrorism to get what they cannot get otherwise. The Communists are relying heavily for support on the personal popularity Sihanouk enjoys among many peasants. In addition, as long as North Vietnamese units are available to impose discipline, such indigenous forces can be useful to the enemy.



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Hanoi probably now recognizes that to cause the early downfall of the Lon Nol government would require an all-out military operation, including a direct attack on Phnom Penh itself. Hanoi may yet decide to try this route, but more likely will proceed with its present course of solidifying Communist control over northeast Cambodia and concentrate on building a viable

Cambodian Communist movement in the rest of the country. The Communists will undoubtedly also attempt to keep up the pressure on the Lon Nol government, hoping it will become more amenable to Communist demands or actually collapse under the strain.

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NORTH KOREA: Government changes announced last weekend do not portend any marked changes in North Korea's policies. The foreign minister, perhaps as a reward for the recent improvement in Pyongyang's relations with Peking, was elevated to the post of second vice premier. He was replaced by his former deputy, a

widely traveled specialist in African and Arab affairs. Other announced changes in agricultural and labor assignments may represent little more than window dressing in lieu of any progress by the regime in overcoming the perennial problems in these sectors.

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## Vietnam

### *Buddhist Antiwar Campaign*

Militant Buddhists in Saigon have taken another step in their developing peace campaign. Thich Thien Minh, leader of the more activist group within the An Quang faction, has proposed a cease-fire and regroupment of troops of both sides in designated areas, and the establishment of a provisional government over both North and South Vietnam. This would be followed by internationally supervised elections in both sections of the country. Minh also announced that a new committee including major religious and political groups would be established this summer to "investigate" the restoration of peace in Vietnam.

Although the government has issued repeated warnings against political activity that

tends to undermine the war effort, it has permitted some coverage of Minh's proposals in the press. It seems likely, however, that a more vigorous publicity campaign by the Buddhists could provoke a government crackdown.

### *Student Agitation Continues to Simmer*

Militant South Vietnamese students continued their peace and anti-US agitations with a small demonstration in Saigon last weekend. In accordance with President Thieu's recent warning that agitation threatening public order would not be tolerated, the police used unusually firm measures to disperse the 300-400 protesting students. Symptomatic of the government's tougher

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attitude for the first time since the student protest movement began, police pursued the demonstrators after they retreated into the university grounds.

The abortive demonstration followed a student meeting attended by American and other foreign antiwar groups. The meeting focused on attacks on the Thieu government and on the US,

25X1 [redacted] the demonstration that followed was largely the result of encouragement given to the Vietnamese students by the American peace group. Although there has been some contact between Vietnamese student leaders and antiwar students in the US for some time, this was the first instance of active collaboration between the two groups in a demonstration.

25X1 There is no evidence that further demonstrations with American participation are being planned. Saigon will probably bar American student agitators, and collaboration between South Vietnamese and US students will probably remain limited. Moreover, the Vietnamese students remain divided, with only a relatively small extremist element attempting to promote further agitation. Although the extremists apparently hope the harsh police measures will create additional sympathy for their cause, so far strong measures seem mainly to have discouraged more moderate students from joining with them.

#### *Shaping Up For Senate Election*

The newly announced line-up of candidates for the Senate indicates that the government is likely to do fairly well in the 30 August elections. With 30 of the 60 Senate seats being contested, 18 slates of 10 candidates each, totaling 180 candidates, have filed to run. Under the South Vietnamese constitutional system, candidates do not run as individuals; the 30 candidates belonging to the three lists getting the most votes will win seats.

The slate with the strongest chance for election appears to be the one headed by the present chairman of the Upper House, Nguyen Van Huyen, and including former prime minister Tran Van Huong. Although these men and their associates are not controlled by the government, President Thieu respects them as responsible independents and would welcome their election. Another strong slate, more closely tied to the government, is headed by Senator Huynh Van Cao and is being backed by the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor.

Of the 18 slates, four are unambiguously oppositionist. The strongest of these is headed by Vu Van Mau and is backed by a relatively moderate group within the militant An Quang Buddhist faction. The decision not to run by Senator Don, who once aspired to become the chief spokesman of the opposition, will probably be interpreted as a sign of government strength.

The personal prestige of the candidates is often of significantly greater importance than the issues in attracting votes in South Vietnamese elections, and an initial reading suggests that government-supported slates will do well. Many local government officials, particularly at the district level, are also likely to have an appreciable pro-government influence among villagers going to the polls even without resorting to such crude measures as ballot box stuffing.


A number of slates have included candidates from many major voting groups in an effort to broaden their appeal. This will tend to divide the support for some of the more prestigious candidates and makes the outcome of the election somewhat uncertain.

#### *Enemy Summer Campaign Delayed*

The Communists annual "summer" campaign has been delayed, and in some areas disrupted. Communist forces in the southern half of

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South Vietnam have been frustrated by recent developments in Cambodia, and some enemy units are having trouble deploying for attack in the northern provinces. Consequently, enemy military activity is still at a low level.

This is further reflected in weekly casualty statistics. Sixty-one Americans were killed during

the week ending 4 July—the lowest weekly total since December 1966. Claimed enemy losses for the same week were below 1,400 for the first time in nearly two years.

Although Communist local force, sapper, and guerrilla units can stage small-scale attacks and harassments throughout South Vietnam at any time, the main force threat is centered mainly in the northernmost provinces of I Corps. Recent North Vietnamese troop movements in the Laotian panhandle have included the remaining two regiments of the North Vietnamese 304th Division. One of these newly arrived regiments suffered heavy losses in the Khe Sanh area in action that began late last week. Some of these units appear to be engaged at the moment in road building and logistical activities, but the sudden appearance of at least two regiments of fresh combat troops in western Quang Tri Province adds greatly to the enemy threat just below the DMZ.

Just to the south, some enemy forces have moved east from their A Shau Valley base area and are engaging allied units in central Thua Thien Province. These forces have also been engaged in supply activities for some time and are probably now ready for battle.

To counter this growing enemy threat, Saigon has dispatched a 3,000-man Marine brigade to Da Nang. Improving weather conditions, a reduced US presence, and the long refitting period enjoyed by most of their main force units may tempt the Communists to engage a South Vietnamese unit in northern I Corps soon. The Communists may be hoping that a resounding victory on the battlefield would shake the growing confidence of the South Vietnamese forces and justify the expense of men and materiel required for such an attempt.

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**Laos: Communists Prepare Peace Ploy**

There is new activity on the diplomatic front. On 12 July the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane informed Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma that a letter will be arriving shortly from Laotian Communist leader Souphanouvong. The letter reportedly will be delivered by a representative empowered to "examine the arrangements" for an "eventual meeting" between the "interested parties." This initiative apparently is at least in part a response to Souvanna's offer late last month to open exploratory talks at a site in Pathet Lao territory.

Signs of increased Communist diplomatic activity relating to Laos have been accumulating during the past two weeks. On 3 July the Polish ICC representatives for Laos and Vietnam were reported to have arrived in Hanoi.

On the following day, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin also arrived in the North Vietnamese capital. This was Firubin's second unpublicized trip to Hanoi this year. The first, in late February, preceded by a few days the Communists' 6 March peace proposal for Laos.

In Vientiane on 6 July the Polish ambassador paid a visit to Souvanna and informed him that negotiations between the Communists and the Lao Government would soon be "possible." The next day the ICC for Laos issued an unprecedented statement—made possible after months of stalling by the sudden acquiescence of the Polish representative—that all parties appeared to be willing to abide by the Geneva Accords and that the ICC stands ready to facilitate negotiations on this basis. On 10 July it was learned that the French Government had issued visas for a five-

man Pathet Lao delegation to travel to Paris at an undetermined date.

The outlines of the latest Communist diplomatic ploy are not yet clear. The anticipated letter from Souphanouvong could accept Souvanna's offer to open preliminary talks in Pathet Lao territory and suggest that the ICC guarantee Souvanna's safety. Souvanna has said that he is ready to discuss any subject, including the US air operations which Hanoi has insisted must stop before any formal negotiations can begin. The North Vietnamese may be willing to begin conversations that they can portray as exploratory talks rather than negotiations in order to press Souvanna further on the bombing issue. In 1968 Hanoi engaged the US in talks restricted solely to Allied air operations and may reason that the Communists' recent gains in south Laos may make this an opportune time to undertake a similar exchange with Vientiane.

The Communists appear to be increasingly prepared to use the threat of further military moves in southern Laos to force Souvanna to the negotiating table. Although the level of fighting has been relatively low in recent weeks, the North Vietnamese capability for major combat in southern Laos has been growing.

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Communist propaganda [redacted] [redacted] have reported frequently in recent weeks that the North Vietnamese intend to strike hard in southern Laos during the rainy season. Inasmuch as the Communists already seem to control enough of the panhandle to support their operations in Cambodia and South Vietnam, such attacks would appear to be aimed chiefly at inducing Vientiane to negotiate on terms favorable to Hanoi. [redacted]

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## Thailand: *A Storm Weathered*

The government last week skirted the closest thing to a constitutional crisis since parliament was established last year. At issue was a bill before the House of Representatives that raised taxes. Increased revenues, the government argued, were necessary to help the country meet increasing security obligations.

The depth of the opposition in Bangkok evidently came as a surprise to government leaders. Almost overnight they were faced with the prospect of defeat in the house at the hands of a coalition of opposition MPs and wayward members of their own Saha Pracha Thai (SPT) party. There were also reports that students from the major universities in the city would publicly demonstrate against higher taxes.

Defeat on an issue that had become a major test of strength would clearly have meant a considerable loss of prestige for the government. The powers of parliament are carefully circumscribed under Thailand's constitution, however, and rebuff on the tax bill would not have forced the government either to resign or dissolve parliament. Some Thai leaders opposed dissolution on the grounds that the SPT would likely fare badly in new elections. Nonetheless, there was a widespread expectation that dissolution was the least the government could do if it lost in the house.

It is a commentary on the fragility of Thai constitutionalism that the debate on the tax bill raised fears that the government might take care of the opposition by suspending the constitution. Army leaders have taken pains to keep such fears alive, and the promulgation of an army "alert"

during the controversy may have been designed to cow opposition elements.

In the end, the government managed to whip enough of its supporters into line to eke out a one-vote victory, but its troubles clearly are not over. To gain its victory, Prime Minister Thanom had to promise to rescind two of the more onerous tax measures as soon as possible. The concession was not much, but symbolically it demonstrated that the opposition can exert leverage on a leadership that for years had been running things more or less as it saw fit.

The tax bill hassle took place against the backdrop of developments in Cambodia. For the first time in recent memory, a foreign policy question—namely whether Thailand should commit troops into Cambodia—has become a matter of public debate in Bangkok. Foreign Minister Thanat and Deputy Prime Minister Praphat participated in an unusual discussion on Cambodia before 3,000 students on 13 July. The students reportedly were unenthusiastic about Praphat's depiction of the Communist threat to Thailand.

The public display of differences among top Thai leaders on what to do about Cambodia may harden existing divisions within the Thai leadership. The emergence of Cambodia as a major public issue will also make it more difficult to conceal certain Thai activities in support of Cambodia and will serve to limit the government's freedom of action.

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### Malaysia: *Elections Leave Same Old Problems*

The results of the long-delayed elections in East Malaysia may influence the Kuala Lumpur government to change its mind about restoring parliamentary democracy, which has been in abeyance since the communal riots of mid-May 1969. The ruling Alliance Party swept the Sabah elections and did fairly well in the Sarawak state vote, but failed to bring home enough federal parliamentary seats to make up the two thirds majority it had hoped to attain. Such a majority would have enabled the Malays who now dominate the Kuala Lumpur government to push through constitutional changes aimed at ensuring Malay pre-eminence in the country.

The "ultra" Malays—the extremists who provide the muscle in communal riots and to whose wishes a Malay-dominated government must defer—are not likely to accept a government that the Malays cannot fully control. Despite public pledges that the emergency rule will be lifted this year, the government can easily use the possible threat of renewed racial violence as an excuse to continue the reign of the National Operations Council and further delay the convening of parliament.

The final decision will probably be up to Prime Minister Rahman. He has been adamant, however, that his long-postponed retirement will not take place until civil order is assured and he could easily be influenced by his Malay colleagues to insist on the retention of emergency law. Although many Malaysian politicians of various races feel that Rahman should follow through with his retirement plans, Rahman's personal prestige still gives him the authority to make major decisions regarding the nation's future, and those "ultras" who would like to prolong emergency rule will probably try to delay his retirement.

In Sarawak, where the Malays make up only 18 percent of the population compared to 32 percent for the Chinese and 50 percent for tribal groups, the Alliance captured only nine of 24 federal parliamentary seats. The Malay component of the Alliance, however, took almost all of the Muslim vote in the state assembly elections, and last week formed a coalition with the Chinese-dominated Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). SUPP, which has a large leftist component, had at first planned to ally itself with the Iban-led Sarawak National Party as an opposition coalition, and its alliance with the Alliance came as a general surprise.

SUPP's motives for joining the Alliance are still unclear. The decision was made by a handful of party leaders who apparently believe that the formation of an Iban-Chinese government in Sarawak would bring down the wrath of the federal government and would negatively influence Kuala Lumpur on whether to reconvene the federal parliament. Before concluding the merger, however, SUPP leaders did extract a written agreement from their Malay partners that various measures protective of Chinese interests will be taken and that the SUPP deputy chief minister in the state will have full veto power over all state government decisions.

The main problem confronting the new state council now is how the Ibans will react to being virtually cut out of the government. Although two Ibans are in the state cabinet, politically active Iban leaders may look on SUPP's alliance with the Malays as inimical to Iban interests. The new government will certainly have a hard time building up local confidence and will probably meet with at least equal difficulties in dealing with federal authorities in Kuala Lumpur.

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COMMUNIST CHINA: The freeing of Bishop Walsh last week appears primarily designed to cover China's embarrassment over the death last April of another US prisoner, Hugh Redmond, which was announced in conjunction with the Bishop's release. The Chinese are sensitive to charges of "inhumane" treatment of foreign prisoners in China, and probably hoped that favorable world commentary on the Bishop's release would outweigh any adverse reactions to the

Redmond "suicide." The release of Walsh, who still had 10 years to serve of a 20-year sentence for "espionage," represents one of the rare cases in which the Chinese have commuted a previously specified sentence for a foreign prisoner. Although this abrupt action brings to an end a long-standing source of contention between Washington and Peking, its immediate implications for current Sino-US relations remain unclear. [REDACTED]

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### France: *Pompidou Has A Successful First Year*

Since France's executive team, headed by President Pompidou and Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, came to power just over a year ago it has made progress toward establishing the "New Society" proclaimed as their goal for France, and avoided the chaos that Gaullists long predicted would follow the General's departure. There have been some anxious moments, but by staying on top of events, the government has succeeded in preventing incidents from becoming crises, thereby maintaining a relative degree of social and political stability. Given the strains imposed on the French economy, society, and political machinery by the succession of crises that eventually led to De Gaulle's resignation, this was no mean accomplishment.

On the economic front, Pompidou and his finance minister, Giscard d'Estaing, skillfully managed the August 1969 devaluation and then implemented an economic stabilization plan that has restored confidence in the franc and slowed inflation. Rising wages and prices, however, continue to be a problem. In labor relations, Chaban-Delmas has maintained pressure on both employers and organized labor to modernize their attitudes toward each other. Often through last-minute government intervention, major labor unrest has been averted.

On the student front, disturbances this year at Nanterre in March and in Paris in May marred a

school year that was, however, less chaotic than those in recent years. By proposing and gaining National Assembly approval of stiff antidemonstration legislation, the government made a start toward a short-term solution to the "youth problem" in France.

Apparently pleased with the government's efforts to maintain stability, the public has shown in recent opinion polls satisfaction with its new leaders. Almost 60 percent of Frenchmen believe that Pompidou and Chaban-Delmas have done a good job, a high percentage when measured against the less than 40 percent of the electorate that put Pompidou in office last June.

The election to the National Assembly in late June of the dynamic anti-Gaullist writer and publisher, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, was a warning of sorts to the Pompidou team. The government's massive majority in the National Assembly, however, remains cohesive despite some dissension, and it is capable of resisting any challenge to Gaullist dominance for the foreseeable future. The next major political contest is not likely to come until the 1973 legislative elections. Unless the government becomes complacent or bungles a crisis badly, the chances are good that the Gaullists will retain a majority in support of Pompidou. [REDACTED]

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IAEA-EURATOM: *Safeguards Problem*

The prospective negotiations on the safeguards agreements required by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continue to pose problems for both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The safeguards are intended to prevent the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful uses. How the IAEA will finance the safeguards has become a serious issue. French intransigence has continued to prevent agreement among the EURATOM members on a mandate to begin negotiations that will decide the respective roles of the two organizations.

The anticipated large increase in inspections of nuclear facilities required of the IAEA has sharply divided its membership on how to cover the costs—estimated to total \$15.4 million by 1980. Nonadherents to the NPT as well as the less developed countries have indicated that they will push hard for a financing formula putting the greatest burden on the NPT's nuclear cosponsors, the US, the UK, and the USSR. The US and UK have voluntarily offered to open certain facilities to inspection—not required by the NPT, but designed to make the treaty more palatable to the nonnuclear weapon states for whom the safeguards are mandatory. Several IAEA members have responded by insisting that the Americans and the British cover at least the bulk of these additional costs.

To date, the work of the IAEA's safeguards committee in developing plans for the future in-

spection procedures has proceeded amicably, but the continued impasse in EURATOM remains a major problem. The main stumbling block is France's insistence that it would no longer feel bound by EURATOM's safeguards system if it is made subject to IAEA supervision. Some of the six member states are reportedly ready to agree to a "minor amendment" to the EURATOM treaty. This would have the effect of further loosening controls on the French but would at least enable negotiations with the IAEA to open. The Dutch, among others, would have trouble agreeing to such an amendment. Some sources have said that if no agreement is reached at the 20 July Council meeting, the member states, other than France, and the Commission may decide to open negotiations with the IAEA outside the framework of the EURATOM treaty.

Most of the 26 members of the IAEA's policy-making Board of Governors want to expand the board as one means of making the institution of safeguards more palatable. The Soviets oppose a privileged position for EURATOM on inspections and thus are trying to block an Italian scheme to increase the board membership in such a way as to give itself and West Germany, both EURATOM states, permanent seats. The board has not been able to resolve this impasse over expansion, and the issue will be on the agenda of the annual conference of all IAEA members in September.

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ARMS CONTROL: The Argentine delegate at the Geneva talks has indicated his country will support the US-USSR draft treaty limiting the use of the seabeds for military purposes if a few changes are made in the text. Argentine acceptance of the treaty would go far toward countering the attitude of Brazil, which last week

again voiced strong objection to the treaty. If Argentina should, however, join Brazil in opposition, the Latin Americans—already aroused by US and Soviet views on other maritime issues—may as a bloc withhold approval of the treaty at the fall session of the UN General Assembly.

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USSR: *Party and Government Organs Have Busy Week*

The Soviet party central committee met on 13 July and in a surprise move delayed the 24th Party Congress until March 1971. The two-day Supreme Soviet session which followed was, by contrast, uneventful. The formation of a new government produced no new faces and the two brief foreign policy statements on Indochina and the Middle East were relatively routine.

The central committee, which met to discuss the work of the Supreme Soviet prior to its opening, also heard a report by General Secretary Brezhnev on the scheduling of the long overdue congress. According to the party rules it should have been held by March 1970. An agreement was finally reached this spring to hold it by the end of the year. There may have been some dissenters at the time among the politburo members, but most of them, including Brezhnev, noted in their election speeches in early June that the 24th Party Congress would be held in 1970. Brezhnev publicly reiterated this commitment as recently as 2 July.

The decision to postpone the congress once again may not have been made until the central committee met on Monday. Pointed reminders of the importance of holding congresses on a regular basis have appeared in the press. The leadership is clearly sensitive on this point, and may, therefore, have wished to spread more widely the responsibility for a further postponement. In fact the regional party officials attending the plenum could be expected to argue that there was no longer sufficient time left this year to hold all the required pre-congress local level party conferences.

Brezhnev may have provided some explanation for the shift in plans but his report probably

will not be made public. One of the main reasons for the delay could be the continuing problem of working out guidelines for the next five-year plan. Approval of the plan (1971-1975) is slated to be a major item for the congress. At an earlier central committee plenum in July, the agricultural section of the plan was approved, but agreement has apparently still not been reached on what priorities to establish in allocating resources to the other sectors of the economy. The leadership may hope that by March these difficulties can be worked out.

Although political maneuvering among various groupings in the leadership may have been a factor in the postponement, the naming of Brezhnev and Kosygin as the main speakers at the congress serves notice to party functionaries and government bureaucrats that they can expect relative continuity at the top for the next half year. This would seem to be aimed at discouraging further jockeying for position.

The legislative session which followed the plenum was anticlimactic. Nikolay Podgorny was returned as president of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Aleksey Kosygin was re-elected to a new term as premier, and all members of his cabinet were reconfirmed.

The statement on the Middle East, read by party secretary Boris Ponomarev, was generally a mild one. One formulation, that "only the peoples and the governments of the Middle East states should be masters of the situation in the Middle East," may have been aimed at allaying international concern over a possible great power confrontation in the area. A statement on Indochina, read by politburo veteran Mikhail Suslov, was noisily anti-US, but consistent with previous Soviet positions.

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### European Communities: *Enlargement Negotiations Begin*

Britain and the European Communities (EC) begin hard negotiating on the question of British entry next Tuesday in Brussels. The formal opening of talks on 30 June highlighted the problems—the upcoming session will try to determine the procedures to be used in solving them.

The most contentious issue will be Britain's contribution to the financing of the Communities. The EC believes applicants must accept both the treaties that founded the Communities and the decisions taken since then. Among the most important is the one made last December on how the EC should be permanently financed.


The British long ago indicated they are ready to accept the treaties and the decisions, provided some of their problems are solved. Their chief negotiator, Anthony Barber, implied on 30 June that the financing decision would have to be altered if Britain is not to bear a disproportionate burden. Although EC officials think that London may eventually settle for high costs in financing in return for gains in other areas, hard bargaining is clearly ahead.

The financing issue itself is closely related to the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which accounts for well over 90 percent of community expenditures. EC Agriculture Commissioner Mansholt stated publicly last week that the CAP "mess" might be cleaned up at the negotiations. Nevertheless, the Six have generally agreed that there be no tampering with the basic prin-

ciples of the CAP. If they were, Britain might be caught in a tug of war between the conflicting ideas of the present EC members on how the CAP should be reformed.


There are a number of other significant problems. At the opening session, Barber emphasized the complications caused by Britain's commitments to the Commonwealth. The other candidates for EC membership—Denmark, Ireland, and Norway—also have several particular problems that the EC thinks will have to be solved before Britain's accession can occur.

In preparation for the negotiating session on 21 July, discussions have already begun on when these subjects are to be taken up.



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Although the negotiations could become bogged down unless there is early agreement on such "facts" the British approach involves the risk of overemphasizing problems and playing down the larger potential significance of a coalescence of much of Western Europe around the Communities. Perhaps to counter this danger, London has spoken of the need for effective institutions in the enlarged Communities. It also continues to allude to the prospect of closer coordination of European defense policies, including Anglo-French nuclear cooperation.



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ITALY: Premier-designate Giulio Andreotti, a Christian Democratic traditionalist and an opponent of the center-left alignment when it began, is facing considerable difficulty trying to reconstitute the coalition. The divisions over the limits of acceptable cooperation with the Communists are hard to paper over because regional governments are now being established in Tuscany and Umbria where Socialist-Communist cooperation is almost a foregone conclusion. On

the other hand, the disagreement over economic policy, which has also been a major hurdle in the negotiations, may be eased. The Communist leadership issued a statement on 9 July implying a sharp turn in party policy away from demanding instant government action on expensive reforms. Left-wing leaders will now find it easier to agree with their coalition partners on a satisfactory pace for reforms. [redacted]

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UN-SOUTH AFRICA: The Africans in the UN this week requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to deal with the controversy over arms for South Africa. The request is clearly designed to head off London's intention to resume sales of defensive military equipment to

the government in Pretoria. The English-speaking African representatives at the UN want to link the Council meeting with the raucous World Youth Assembly currently under way, hoping to put added pressure on the UK. London plans a policy statement early next week. [redacted]

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
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
**Jordan: *Agreement to Disagree?***

The latest accord between the government and the fedayeen, as finally approved by the King, eliminated most of the provisions of the first draft that Husayn had found particularly objectionable.

The Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, speaking on behalf of all the fedayeen organizations, dropped its demand for the withdrawal of military reinforcements from around Jordanian towns. The final version of the agreement merely called on the government to "cancel all arrangements and extraordinary measures that were taken during the crisis." This phrase could be interpreted to include the additional troops ringing Amman, but it is also less likely to antagonize the army. Similarly, the earlier draft had called for the dissolution of any organization, and the deposition of any individual, hostile to the fedayeen; the new language only requires the government to "ensure that no organization, machinery, or element will act against the Palestinian revolution."

For their part, the fedayeen have agreed to submit to disciplinary regulations similar to those supposedly agreed on last February but never enforced. The latest accord makes it clear, however, that enforcement is to be left to the fedayeen themselves—and it is by no means certain that they will be able or willing to follow through, particularly with respect to the more radical organizations.

King Husayn is said to doubt that the new agreement will work out any better than previous arrangements.



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Although King Husayn seems to have come out better than might have been expected, his acquiescence in concessions that previously would have seemed impossible—such as yielding the fedayeen the right of self-discipline—again points up the continuing erosion of his authority.

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## Arab-Israeli Situation

### *Nasir Extends Moscow Visit*

President Nasir's visit to Moscow was further extended for additional meetings between the leaders of the two countries, suggesting that some differences have arisen, probably related at least in part to the recent US diplomatic initiative. Foreign ministers Riad and Gromyko subsequently met on 12 July in an unusual Sunday session. Cairo press reports indicated that political and military discussions at the ministerial level would be resumed. Egypt's semiofficial newspaper *al-Ahram* has reported that high Egyptian officials will stay in Moscow with Nasir until his return to Cairo, now set for early next week.

an Egyptian reply to the US peace initiative will be sent to Washington following Riad's return to Cairo and after consultations with other Arab states, particularly Jordan and Syria.

### *Israelis Denounce Foes, Profess Interest in Peace*

The extended talks in Moscow and the USSR's floating in London of an allegedly new "peace plan," combined with the deployment of the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system a step closer to the Suez Canal, gave Israeli leaders another opportunity to sharpen their attacks on both the Egyptians and Russians while continuing to profess their own abiding desire for a peace settlement.

Prime Minister Golda Meir used a press interview to scorch the Russians as "the worst kind of imperialists" whose aim is to infiltrate the whole Middle East. Claiming that Israel "had not missed a single opportunity for peace," she said that repeated overtures had been made for secret talks with Cairo.

In a speech to the Knesset, Foreign Minister Eban also took up the cudgel, accusing Nasir of opening the gates of the Middle East to the Rus-

sians. Eban charged that the Soviet inroads had upset the military balance in the Mediterranean, and that the recent Soviet "peace plan" was aimed at undermining the existence of Israel.

The USSR's so-called "peace plan"—the terms of which actually were first published in *Pravda* 18 months ago—was characterized by an Israeli Foreign Ministry official as a "smokescreen" to disguise the Soviet Union's military support for the Arabs. The official insisted that it was not up to the Soviet Union, (nor, apparently, to any other outside power) to formulate the conditions for peace. Foreign Minister Eban reflected this view by calling for Egyptian and Israeli representatives to meet in "a very unofficial manner" to prepare for actual talks.

Although the Israelis are clearly concerned by recent developments, they remain opposed to US efforts to "do business" with Moscow. The Israelis are convinced that the Soviets want permanent turmoil in the Middle East, not peace. Tel Aviv realizes that it probably cannot now separate the USSR from the Arabs, but believes it must try to keep a wedge between Moscow and Washington if it is to avoid an unfavorable settlement. Israeli leaders and the press have lately concentrated on the theme that the Russians will move as far in the Middle East as the US lets them, and that it is now time for Washington to take a firm stand, i.e., in solid support of Israel.

### *Military Developments*

On the military front, Israeli aircraft continue their regular pounding of the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system along the west bank of the Suez Canal. Their approach has apparently been somewhat more cautious, however, and no Israeli aircraft have been lost since 2 July. A Tel Aviv spokesman said that fewer missiles are being fired; the Israelis are also using evasive tactics and are making extensive use of electronic countermeasures. Air Force chief General Hod remains

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confident that the Israelis will "find the answer" to the integrated Soviet-Egyptian system, and claims that the missile network still does not deny freedom of action over the canal.

Along the other cease-fire lines, Arab fedayeen stepped up their attacks, apparently in an effort to keep the Israelis busy on these borders as well. Last week, Jordan-based fedayeen repeatedly fired Katusha rockets into the Beit Shean Valley settlements. In response, Israeli aircraft struck into northern Jordan at least four times,

and on 13 July an Israeli commando force moved across the river to knock out a Jordanian Army post. Farther south in the Jordan valley, four Arab guerrillas were killed by Israeli troops following a rocket attack on a small town to the north of Elat. Meanwhile, Lebanese-based fedayeen continued to lob rockets and mortar shells into Israeli settlements near the border; in two instances, they also attacked Israeli resorts on the Mediterranean. On 13 July, the Israelis moved an armored force into Lebanon from northern Galilee to strike at guerrillas in the area. [REDACTED]

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### The Sudan: *Revolution Takes a Radical Turn*

In the three months since the quashing of the Ansar sect's uprising in early April, the Sudanese Government has accelerated its pace toward the establishment of a radical socialist economy and a police state.

The Numayri regime's confiscation in early July of privately owned agricultural lands marks the latest move in what may be the most comprehensive nationalization program in Africa or the Middle East. Having disposed of their conservative Ansar enemies, the young revolutionary leaders apparently estimated that they could socialize the economy without serious domestic opposition. To this end, the government in late May launched a sweeping nationalization of Sudanese and foreign-owned banks, insurance companies, industrial firms, and farm lands—a program that may not yet have ended. The seizure of some 100 industrial companies has virtually ended private enterprise in the country. Although a few firms were left untouched, including the US Mobil Oil Company, their prospects seem dim.

The wholesale nationalization of private capital reveals the considerable leverage the Communists have in policy-making positions of the government. Three Sudan Communist Party members in the ruling Revolutionary Command Council and the cabinet are credited with planning the moves and influencing council decisions for their implementation. Minister of State Abu-Isa and Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Sulayman, both Communists, have been charged with carrying out the program. The wave of nationalizations shows that the moderates within the regime have been at least temporarily eclipsed in the formulation of economic policy by the Communists, who have apparently won the ear of the dominant radical nationalist faction led by President Numayri.

The rapid expansion of the public sector foreshadows a protracted period of economic dislocation. The initial chaos resulting from such an abrupt reorientation of the economy and from the halt in foreign and domestic investment is already apparent. Furthermore, the dismissal of

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experienced Sudanese staff members from banks and firms, and their replacement by retired army officers and other unqualified personnel, has seriously reduced managerial efficiency.

Most Sudanese outside the business community generally accepted the regime's new economic policies without comment. However, the promulgation in late April of Republic Order No. 4, which contains the legal and administrative tools of repression, generated widespread public shock and fear. This new order spells out a long

list of political and economic crimes, and explicitly decrees the death penalty as the only punishment for many of the offenses. By clearly exposing Numayri's harsh reaction to any antiregime sentiment, the edict has dissolved much of the popular good will he has been cultivating. While no organized resistance has materialized since the crushing of the Ansar, the full enforcement of the order could serve to stimulate the growth of opposition to the regime and swell the ranks of right-wing dissident elements.

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## Lebanon: *The Making of the President 1970*

Sometime in the month preceding 23 August, Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies will meet and by secret ballot will elect a president to succeed Charles Hilu. Under the terms of the National Covenant of 1943, which apports political offices to the various religious communities in the country, the new president should be a Maronite Christian.

To date, there has been little open campaigning; activity has centered largely on a behind-the-scenes search for financial support from foreign powers. Of the dozen or so potential candidates, the front runner at this juncture appears to be former president Fuad Shihab. Public support for Shihab has been announced by the Parliamentary Democratic Front, which won control of the Chamber of Deputies in 1969 and presently has a theoretical majority. In the past, the Egyptians have also supported Shihab, a valuable asset because of Nasir's influence with the Muslim masses; unless Cairo has recently been alienated, this support should be forthcoming again.

Because Shihab is regarded as pro-Muslim, however, he is anathema to many Christian deputies—particularly the Maronites. These deputies, who form the major opposition grouping, are likely to throw their support behind the nominee of one or another of their three parties. Two of these parties, which form a parliamentary bloc known as the Chamounists, indicated on 9 July that they would support the third party's leader, Pierre Jumayyil. This may prove to be only a

temporary decision, however, and Chamoun himself—who served as president from 1952 to 1958—may eventually end up as the major opposition candidate.

The basic issue in the election centers on what course the new president would follow in relations with other Arab countries. Generally speaking, Shihab and his supporters view Lebanon as an integral part of a greater Arab nation. They see their country's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the fedayeen movement as not only unavoidable but in fact desirable. In inter-Arab politics, they have been pro-Nasirist and sympathetic toward other radical states. The opposition sees Lebanon as a unique state with both its character and its interests distinct from that of other Arab countries. They are against either a fedayeen presence in the country or any involvement in the battle against Israel.

Virtually the only other major influence in the election will be confessionalism, or religious identification. Although political parties exist in Lebanon, the country's unique political process does not operate on the basis of conventionally organized groups. Rather, the parties are collections of personalities and their followers, and tend to represent the parochial interests of their constituents. To a great extent, these interests arise from Lebanon's religious divisions: each community wants to safeguard what political prerogatives it already has while seeking to enlarge them at the expense of the other factions.

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**Cuba: *Preparation for 26 July Celebration***

Fidel Castro probably will use his traditional speech on 26 July to announce new measures intended to boost flagging morale and restore vitality to the Cuban revolution.

The frenetic activity during the sugar harvest has decreased, leaving the population weary. Moreover, public disappointment over continued shortages and the failure to achieve the coveted and much-publicized goal of ten million tons has been offset only partially by Castro's calculated strong reaction to armed exile attacks this spring and by his multifaceted campaign to aid Peruvian earthquake victims. To renew enthusiasm, Castro probably will employ a combination of tactics including the removal of a few high-ranking incompetents, a temporary relaxation of certain austerity measures, and promises for a better future.

Two cabinet members have already been changed, and a few more ministers and mass organization leaders may meet the same fate. Education Minister Jose Llanusa presumably lost his post because he failed to provide the facilities and teachers to cope with Cuba's mushrooming student population; Sugar Industry Minister Francisco Padron was reassigned as a natural result of the harvest shortfall. If more changes occur, the new appointees probably will be similar to the replacements for Llanusa and Patron—competent military officers or respected technocrats.

In addition, Foreign Minister Raul Roa may be replaced by Minister without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Roa is little more than a mouthpiece for Fidel and has been in poor health. Rodriguez is an internationally respected representative who could tactfully manage Cuba's efforts to re-establish commercial and diplomatic ties with the rest of Latin America.

To stem the flow of trained personnel abroad, Castro may announce the initiation of new travel curbs and may even offer assistance to those skilled emigres who want to return to Cuba. Havana recently said that applications for permission to emigrate by air to Madrid and Mexico City received after 31 May 1970 would not be approved. A similar move against the Varadero-Miami refugee flights may be in the offing. The travel restrictions coincide with recent efforts to halt the exodus of refugees into the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay by erecting physical barriers around the base.

Castro may also proclaim a new law that makes education up to the university level compulsory. Because all schools at the secondary level are gradually coming under military control and the time spent in such institutions is credited against a student's military service obligation, the law would in effect lower the draft age from 17 to 12 or 13.

Fidel may also be planning to resurrect the topic of "sectarianism"—his term for "old Communists" of the pre-Castro era who dare to criticize his methods and goals. The issue was last raised in 1967 and culminated in a purge in early 1968 of several dozen members of a "microfaction." Their worst crime seemed to be challenging Castro's policy of "exporting the revolution" instead of concentrating on improving domestic economic conditions.

The anniversary celebrations should give the population much-needed relaxation. Two weeks have been set aside for the festivities and efforts have been made to improve the lot of the Cuban consumer by increasing food supplies. The occasion will also be marked by the inauguration of various projects such as public parks and newly constructed apartments and housing developments.

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
USSR-PERU: After several delays the Soviet relief airlift appears to be moving ahead. The lead flight encountered several equipment difficulties and weather problems and did not arrive in Lima until 13 July, two days behind schedule. Five subsequent flights have been completed on time, however. Each Soviet aircraft has delivered about six tons of cargo, including medical supplies, food, housing and road equipment as well as technicians and medical personnel.

The official government newspaper gave the most dramatic coverage to the arrival of the first

plane, using such phrases as the "most spectacular airlift of all times." Prior to the actual inauguration of the airlift two major Lima newspapers used political cartoons that served to embarrass the USSR. As the Soviet relief effort progresses, news coverage will probably increase and for the most part depict the Soviets in a more positive light. The US Embassy in Lima comments, however, that so far the limited press treatment and talks with the man-in-the-street indicate that Peruvians see Soviet aid as primarily a grandstand play undertaken for political gain.

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He didn't want to miss the streetcar. (*El Comercio - Lima, Peru*)

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**Bolivia: Political Developments**

President Ovando and army commander General Miranda have squared off but have not yet come to blows. Miranda has emerged as the military strong man through the ouster of armed forces chief General Torres

[Redacted]

General Miranda does not appear to have any driving political ambitions, although he has been concerned over the leftward drift of the Ovando government. A confrontation between Miranda and Ovando can probably be averted if the President publicly reaffirms his faith in the army commander.

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General Torres was removed from his position on 9 July through a reorganization of the military high command. The reorganization abolished Torres' position as armed forces commander in chief and established an Armed Forces Supreme Council composed of the three service chiefs.

[Redacted]

even if Ovando chooses to avoid a showdown at this time, the moderates in the military who support General Miranda are likely to use their advantage to press Ovando for further governmental changes in the near future. The President has so far refused to remove the remaining leftists from his government and, even if he decides to forfeit the first round to Miranda and the moderates, it is only a matter of time until this issue provokes a new confrontation.

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On 10 July Miranda expressed the fear that Ovando was trying to remove him, and a committee of his supporters went to the President in an attempt to avert further problems. Ovando finally agreed to issue a statement reiterating his confidence in Miranda and the other service commanders. This appeared to satisfy Miranda and calmed tensions, at least temporarily.



**GUATEMALA:** Terrorism directed at partisans of President Arana has broken a month-long lull. In the last week, two of Arana's supporters have been assassinated, including the mayor of Zacapa. In addition, a wealthy plantation owner has been kidnaped for ransom by the Rebel Armed Forces. President Arana, who won office promising to end political violence, is yet to be challenged by a major terrorist act. He will, however, be under

strong pressure to react if a prominent figure becomes a victim of the violence. Arana's determination to resist using illegal methods against the leftist terrorists may cause him difficulty with his extremist supporters. Right-wing thug and congressman Oliverio Castaneda is leaving the country for three months to avoid a confrontation with Arana over how to deal with the security situation.

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CHILE: Marxist presidential candidate Salvador Allende promises that his government would join Fidel Castro to launch a "Latin American revolution." As his fourth presidential campaign has gained momentum in recent weeks, Allende has made less effort to play down his Marxist policies. In recent speeches Allende has also called "American imperialism" the one enemy of Latin America

and said his government would respect the principle of nonintervention only to the extent that it judged other governments "reflect the will of the majority." He has also reiterated his promise to establish relations with all countries, including Cuba, Communist China, East Germany, and North Vietnam. [redacted]

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**Brazil: *Gubernatorial Candidates Chosen***

President Medici has completed the selection of candidates he favors for the gubernatorial elections to be held in all 22 states in October. There is little doubt that the state legislatures will elect the men Medici wants as governors, probably in the hope that he will permit a slightly greater display of democracy in the congressional balloting scheduled for November.

The majority of the future governors are technicians; among them are at least three retired military men, but no active duty officers. Loyalty to the 1964 "Revolution," as verified by the National Intelligence Service and local army commanders, appears to have been the overriding criterion in their selection, although demonstrated administrative competence was usually also a factor. Personal political prestige seems to

have been a secondary consideration; a number of the prospective governors have not previously held any elective office. All are political conservatives, and, with one exception, they belong to the progovernment National Renewal Alliance. The lone designate from the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement will govern the only state where his party has a majority in the legislature—Guanabara, which encompasses the city of Rio de Janeiro.

By hand picking the men he wants to collaborate with him on the state level in the country's administration, Medici has demonstrated that he intends to continue to control tightly the limited reactivation of Brazil's political institutions. [redacted]

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
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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Komeito: Reaching Too High?*

**Secret**

**No 43**

17 July 1970  
No. 0379/70A

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## *Komeito: Reaching Too High?*

In the five and a half years since its inception, the Komeito, (Clan Government Party) political arm of the militant Buddhist Soka Gakkai organization, has continued to surprise observers with its rapid growth. The aggressive, opportunistic party reached a new peak last December by winning 47 seats in the 486-man Diet and becoming Japan's second most important opposition party. It is now planning to run candidates in all 123 electoral districts in the next Lower House elections, hoping to close the gap between itself and its rival in the opposition, the debilitated but still formidable Japan Socialist Party.



**Komeito leaders give "banzai" cheers after the party nearly doubled its pre-election strength**

The party has a history of confounding its skeptics, but legitimate questions are now being raised concerning Komeito's ability to sustain its past rate of growth. The Komeito has benefited greatly from circumstances, particularly the void in opposition politics that has been created by the decline of the Japan Socialists. Notwithstanding its capabilities, however, future advances will probably come with greater difficulty. Right now the eyes of its leaders are probably riveted on the highly fluid state of affairs among the leftist opposition parties and the labor unions. At stake is the party's chance to surpass the Socialists as the most important opposition force in Japan.

Komeito was established by the Soka Gakkai, a lay religious organization, in late 1964 as the successor to a more informally organized political grouping that had run candidates in local elections and for the Upper House of the Diet for almost a decade, inheriting 15 seats in the Upper House and over 1,000 seats in local assemblies from its predecessor. The establishment of a political arm marked Soka Gakkai's plunge into Lower House politics, where the real legislative power in Japan lies.

Soka Gakkai's decision to enlarge the scope of its participation in Japanese politics probably was motivated by a desire to extend its influence, rather than to "translate religious principles into daily life," as claimed by Soka Gakkai leaders. The formation of a political party served to provide Soka Gakkai's zealous membership with an added goal to strive for, as well as to win prestige and popular attention for the group. In addition, the Buddhist organization probably wanted to broaden its base of support by attracting small

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businessmen and others interested in securing the patronage of Soka Gakkai's numerous, highly disciplined followers. The Soka Gakkai claims 7.5 million households, nearly one sixth of the eligible voters in Japan, as members. The actual number may be considerably less.

#### *Leadership*

The Komeito's success has in large measure been a result of young and able leadership. This has given it a clear advantage over the Japan Socialist Party, the largest opposition group party, which has been handicapped by its predominantly older and less flexible leadership. Most of Komeito's leaders have long been members of the Soka Gakkai and advanced to their present positions on the basis of their talents at organizing and gaining members for the new political group. These leaders are dedicated believers in their militant brand of Buddhism, but are not so dogmatic that they are insensitive to changes in the Japanese political climate.



**“The Generation Gap Hardly Shows in Japan's Youngest Party”**

The leadership also differs from that of the Socialists and other major parties in that it does not visibly suffer from factionalism. This unity has accounted for the party's ability to adjust its policies to shifts in Japanese public opinion, while the Socialists, because of bitter factional infighting among the top hierarchy, remained incapable of responding to even the most obvious changes in popular attitudes. The impressive gains made at the expense of the Socialists in the December general elections testify to the sharply contrasting leadership situations in the two parties.

#### *Legality of Komeito*

The intimate ties between the Komeito's leadership and that of the Soka Gakkai, a lay religious organization founded on the teachings of the militant Nichiren Buddhist sect, raise a basic question concerning the party's constitutionality. Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution states that no religious organization “shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.” This was included in the US-authored document to prevent a revival of the pre-World War II type of ultranationalistic state religion that was so effectively manipulated by the militarist government. Soka Gakkai's adherence to Nichiren's philosophy of meshing religion with national life, its highly aggressive conversion techniques, and its intolerance of other religions, all arouse fears in the minds of many Japanese that a reversion to a prewar type of fascist government could occur if the Soka Gakkai were eventually to reach power through the Komeito.

Komeito leaders defend their party's constitutionality by insisting that its activities are strictly political and that it does not pursue any religious objectives. They also cite a long series of constitutional arguments relating to freedom of speech and political association. Nevertheless, they took a positive step to dissociate themselves from their parent organization in the public eye last January by announcing that Komeito's party leaders were resigning their executive positions in

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the Soka Gakkai, although they would be retained as "advisers." In all likelihood, Soka Gakkai's operational control over the party will not be diminished very much, if at all, by this move. However, the ruling conservatives, who see the Komeito as a useful tactical ally on certain issues, have not challenged its constitutionality, and are unlikely to do so as long as the Komeito is not an immediate threat.

#### *Policies*

Komeito's policy apparently is determined by only four or five men dominated by Soka Gakkai president Daisaku Ikeda. The party's policies, unlike those of Soka Gakkai, however, are not determined on the basis of a broad moral or religious philosophy.

On the contrary, Soka Gakkai is highly materialistic, placing great emphasis on the satisfaction of material wants as the path to human happiness and fulfillment. A new "third world," based on a vaguely defined, "humanitarian socialism" in which the welfare of the entire people, not just one class, is the ultimate goal. The Soka Gakkai contends that neither Communism nor capitalism can achieve true happiness and eternal peace. Under capitalism, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, while under Communism the government controls all of the capital and natural resources in a totalitarian fashion, seeking "efficiency" at the price of individual freedom. Considerable emphasis is placed on fulfillment of material desires during a person's own lifetime, rather than on sacrificing in this world in order to be rewarded in the hereafter. Based on this philosophy, Komeito's policies have an obvious appeal to those elements of Japanese society that have not fully shared in the postwar prosperity.

In the day to day political arena, Komeito's policies generally are more reflective of trends in public opinion than of the doctrines of Nichiren Buddhism. The leadership has shown a deft ability to identify the broadest possible consensus on each issue and then to fashion its position

accordingly. Functioning as an accurate barometer of prevailing public concerns over the past year or so, the party has hit hard on pragmatic, bread-and-butter domestic issues like moderately priced housing, pollution, traffic congestion, inflation, and misuse of public funds. These important nonideological areas have been neglected by Japanese opposition parties, particularly the ideologically hidebound Socialists. These are areas, furthermore, where the ruling conservatives have done an inadequate job of publicizing their achievements.

Komeito's view of foreign policy generally tends to support a posture of "complete neutrality" for Japan; building bridges to the antagonistic world camps in a spirit of Buddhist pacifism. Consistent with this outlook, a readjustment in the US-Japan security relationship is considered necessary. This would entail phasing out the mutual security treaty during the next decade and a concurrent reduction in the number of US bases in Japan. The Komeito maintains that the treaty subordinates Japan to the US, exacerbates tensions in Asia, and pits one Japanese against another. The party has been reserved, however, about participating in "joint struggles" with other opposition parties, and Komeito leaders made it clear many months in advance that they would not allow participation in violent and irresponsible political actions directed against the treaty.

Komeito's attitude toward American policy in Vietnam is a carefully developed reflection of what the party estimates to be the general consensus in Japan. It has avoided branding the US as "aggressor," but has criticized Washington for a lack of understanding of Asians. In recent months the leadership has been relatively quiet on the Vietnam issue, probably reflecting the Japanese public's growing disinterest since the cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam. As the Vietnam war has subsided as a political issue, the party has devoted less attention to the theme that the mutual security treaty could drag Japan into a Far Eastern conflict against her will.

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Japan's relations with China have been a major preoccupation of the Komeito during the last year, as the Cultural Revolution ebbed. Clearly aware of traditional and widespread Japanese sentiment for improving relations with China, the party has focused on the theme of Japan as a bridge builder between China and the US. From time to time, it has expressed an interest in sending a delegation to China, but its overtures apparently have brought no response from the Chinese. The Komeito apparently is again preparing a secret letter to Peking soliciting an invitation for a visit, which it hopes could occur in the summer or fall of this year. In the meantime, party officials periodically call on the ruling conservatives to recognize Communist China, to promote Peking's admission to the UN, and to liberalize restrictions on trade with China.

The Komeito, however, will probably continue to attract Soviet attention because of its growing importance in Japanese politics and because the Soviets no longer have good relations with the major leftist opposition parties.

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*Election Performance*



The party's impressive gains in last December's Lower House elections—it practically doubled its representation by winning 47 seats in the 486-man house—vaulted the Komeito into the position of second largest opposition party in the Diet. The party doubled the proportion of the vote it won in the 1967 Lower House election, garnering almost 11 percent of the national vote, and averaging 15 percent of the vote in the districts in which it ran candidates.

The Soviet Union has not received so much attention, probably because the party stands to gain considerably less political benefit from "building bridges" to the USSR. Japanese generally are far more suspicious of the Soviets than they are of the Chinese.

In contrast to previous elections, candidates were posted for the first time in districts where the party was not a sure winner. In the past, accurate predictions were made on the number of highly disciplined Soka Gakkai members who would be voting in each district, thereby enabling the party to avoid contesting "risky" elections. As a result, the party built up an image of "invincibility" that, on the district level, was somewhat tarnished in the December election. The principal motivations for venturing into

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Lower House Election 1967 & 1969 - (Diet-486 Seats)



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districts where the chances were limited were probably to build up a base for future elections, as well as to reduce the victory prospects of other parties—particularly the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which the Komeito hoped to replace as the second largest opposition party.

The Komeito depended heavily on the ranks of the Soka Gakkai for organizational support and for votes. Its zealous campaign workers, as usual, were guilty of more election violations than those of the other parties, and in many areas aggressive tactics alienated many potential non-Soka Gakkai supporters. Soka Gakkai's alleged tactic of moving adherents from one district to another to support weak candidates, however, was apparently not very heavily employed in this election, probably because the large number of candidates (75) made it impractical.

The Komeito in the past has had considerable difficulty in appealing to the non-Soka Gakkai voter, partially because of the authoritarian, fanatical image that the Soka Gakkai has in the eyes of many Japanese. It has had only mixed success in attracting the highly important "floating votes," of the continually swelling urban-centered group of voters who are largely uncommitted. There is evidence, for example, that in some areas where candidates attracted as much as a third or more of their votes from uncommitted voters, this happened because a particularly attractive candidate was put up or because the other parties' political fortunes were at a low ebb.

The near doubling of the Komeito representation in the Diet came largely at the expense of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), who lost 40 seats to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Komeito, and the Communists. Several seats were also picked up from the conservatives and from the rival Democratic Socialists. Inasmuch as all parties gained at the expense of the JSP and Komeito gained at the expense of most of its competitors, it is difficult to determine which parties have been or will be hurt the most.

#### *Efforts To Broaden Support*

Leaders of the Soka Gakkai and the Komeito are clearly aware that their base of support must be significantly broadened beyond the ranks of Soka Gakkai believers if they are ever to achieve a successful mass party. Countering the unfavorable image of the Soka Gakkai held by many Japanese has occupied much of the energy of the party's leaders, who have worked assiduously at cultivating a moderate, pragmatic image. Downplaying Soka Gakkai's professed objective of bringing a Buddhist theocracy to Japan, Komeito leaders instead have succeeded in taking perhaps greater advantage of growing Japanese nationalistic sentiment than any other party.

Organizational genius and efforts to identify with the interests of the average Japanese have resulted in a number of new Komeito-sponsored mass organizations. The most significant efforts have been in the labor and student areas, but a variety of women's and cultural groups have also been set up.

These organizations offer an acceptable compromise to those Japanese who want to be politically involved but also want to avoid the stigma possibly attached to involvement with the Soka Gakkai. Furthermore, these organizations give individuals a chance to gain recognition and to participate in public affairs on a scale normally inaccessible to most Japanese. A most attractive feature is that members can advance to top positions regardless of their social background, highly appealing in Japan's status-conscious society.

The formation last year of Minro, Komeito's labor union, so far has produced only limited results. Potentially, however, the new union offers an opportunity to make significant inroads into the largely unorganized mass of workers in small and medium-sized enterprises. This large and important source of support has long been neglected by Sohyo and Domei, Japan's two principal labor federations. Komeito's effort has

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brought belated expressions of interest in these workers from the two labor giants. Nevertheless, the party's leaders seem to be moving leisurely toward getting the new union fully functioning, consistent with their forecast that formation of the union would take "considerable time."

In late October of last year the Soka Gakkai launched a new national student organization, Shingakudo, with a claimed membership of 70,000. Unlike the other major student organizations in Japan, this one at the outset foreswore the use of violence to achieve its objectives. The new student union was intended, according to its sponsors, to provide a "third road," between left and right, in the politically important student movement. The new group, of course, could provide an important source of young, energetic support, while at the same time drawing off potentially active adherents to Socialist and Communist party youth arms.

Komeito and Soka Gakkai leaders may be having second thoughts about their ability fully to control their student arm, which has exhibited strong overtones of radicalism. The Japanese media, fully aware of the mobilization potential of the highly disciplined Soka Gakkai, quickly dubbed Shingakudo as the "third Zengakuren," a reference to Japan's largest student federation and its smaller competitor, Zenkyoto. Both Zengakuren and Zenkyoto, which play a radical and occasionally influential role in national politics, view the new Soka Gakkai group more as a rival than an ally. The radical tendencies of Shingakudo have already developed into a source of friction with Soka Gakkai/Komeito leaders. This situation is unusual, because dissent within the Soka Gakkai, if it does exist at significant levels, almost never comes to the attention of outsiders. Soka Gakkai leaders are exerting maximum efforts to bring their maverick student army into line, and can be expected to be reserved in their support until these efforts are successful.

### *Komeito Under Attack*

The Komeito (and the Soka Gakkai) until recently, enjoyed a virtual immunity from public criticism, largely because of Komeito's religious overtones, its relatively virtuous conduct in public, and the image of "invincibility" it had built up in elections before the one last December. This immunity, however, has been gradually evaporating since December, when the Japan Communist Party alleged that Komeito officials tried to squelch publication of a book highly critical of the Soka Gakkai, written by a well-known political commentator. The media latched on to the disclosure, and the opposition parties, seeing an unprecedented opportunity to embarrass the Komeito, jumped into the fray. Komeito officials denied charges that they had "suppressed freedom of speech," but the issue continued to heat up with the disclosure that ruling conservative party officials had aided Komeito efforts to stop publication of the book, apparently in return for past favors. Much to the dismay of many of the rank and file, party leaders attempted to stay out of the limelight, vainly hoping that the issue would not assume serious proportions. Because it did, however, Soka Gakkai President Ikeda issued a public apology for the incident. Both the chairman and secretary general of the Komeito subsequently announced their intention to resign, apparently over the book incident and over the results of a recent gubernatorial election in which the Komeito, allied with the ruling conservatives, fared poorly.

Because of the importance to the party of these two able leaders, their resignations were refused. The scandal, however, is likely to have an important impact on the Komeito. Most important, the scandal has sounded the death knell for cooperation with other opposition parties. The Communists and the Komeito, already competing vigorously for support from the same lower class elements, will be further apart than ever. The Communists, for their "vigilance" in defense of

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individual freedoms, may well gain in respectability from the episode, while popular suspicions of the Komeito will probably increase. Komeito and Soka Gakkai activities will now be subjected to much greater scrutiny by the media and opposition.

The scandal may also have some repercussions within the ruling LDP as well as on Komeito-LDP party relations. Kakuei Tanaka, secretary general of the LDP, who apparently is responsible for liaison with the Komeito, will be blamed for involving the ruling party in a distasteful scandal. Tanaka had been mentioned prominently as possible successor to Prime Minister Sato.

#### *Rougher Sledding Ahead*

At each stage of Komeito's rapid growth, many observers claimed that the party had reached a "plateau," and that there would be little, if any further growth. Undismayed, the party continued to confound its detractors, culminating with December's impressive gains in the Diet. It now seems likely, however, that future gains won't come as easily. Plans have been announced to run candidates in all 123 Japanese electoral districts in the next Lower House elections, a move that will confront the party with far more challenging conditions than it has encountered thus far. In the past, candidates have been entered almost exclusively in densely populated urban areas where Soka Gakkai supporters are concentrated. If the new plan is implemented, however, candidates would be running in a variety of rural and less populated urban areas where known supporters are fewer in number. Particularly in the rural areas, suspicion of the Soka Gakkai runs high, and aggressive tactics tend to be counterproductive when viewed in the context of traditional rural norms.

The Komeito, unlike the LDP and the JSP, gains an advantage from not running too many candidates in the same district; it thus avoids splitting the vote and hurting the election chances

of all of the party's candidates. Furthermore, the seats already won are probably held more firmly than is perhaps the case with any of the other parties. Only three of the 47 candidates elected in December were "squeakers," that is, elected by razor-thin margins.

The Komeito's rate of growth will be affected significantly by the ability of the Socialists to pull themselves together and stem the steady erosion of voter support. Clearly the Socialist debacle in the December election aided Komeito gains, and continued deterioration of the Socialist party could "open up" districts where the Komeito previously could not muster enough votes to elect a candidate. Movement toward a realignment of the left, however, with the creation of a new, moderate leftist grouping, would present serious obstacles to future advances. There is a very large number of voters in Japan who at one time or another have been sufficiently dissatisfied with the ruling conservatives to cast their lot with an effective alternative—if there were one. For a number of years, however, no Japanese opposition party has been able to inspire confidence in its ability to get things done on pragmatic, nonideological issues, and, thus most of these dissatisfied have stuck with the LDP.

Since the December elections, speculation in the media on the possibilities for a realignment of the left has increased. For example, an announcement by the Democratic Socialists set 1972 as a "target date" for bringing the moderate wing of the Japan Socialists into a new leftist political alliance.

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Growing discussion about a possible realignment of the highly politicized Japanese labor

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movement, potentially an important ingredient in a political shift, has also added to the speculation. Domei, a major labor federation loosely affiliated with the moderate Democratic Socialist Party, has been calling for a new mass labor union federation, oriented more toward pragmatic economic issues than political "struggles." In late May, Japan's largest labor federation, Sohyo, announced that it would be willing to meet with the other important labor groups to discuss unification of Japan's labor unions. In the announcement Sohyo acknowledged that a realignment would not be possible if it continued to support the Japan Socialist Party and Domei continued to support the Democratic Socialists. A loss of exclusive labor union support by the Socialist parties would be a strong stimulus for efforts to put together a new moderate leftist political grouping which could present an important threat to Komeito growth.

How vigorously the Komeito and the Soka Gakkai carry through on their professed aim of "separating" themselves from each other could also have an important impact on longer term



President Daisaku Ikeda  
"Can He Keep his Party and his Church Separate?"

prospects. This goal could prove to be a double-edged sword. If the Komeito does not put on a good show of "divorcing" itself from the Soka Gakkai, many Japanese will retain their old suspicions that the party is merely an arm of a fanatical authoritarian religious group. On the other hand, serious attempts to reduce ties with the Soka Gakkai would risk some of the important organizational and electoral support provided by the dependable, well-disciplined ranks of Soka Gakkai. At this stage it seems unlikely that the Soka Gakkai leadership would permit the party to drift away. Nor do the Komeito leaders seem confident enough of the party's ability to appeal to the all important "floating vote" to venture out on their own.

Success in broadening the base of support will depend to some extent on the success of the multitude of "front" organizations, particularly the labor union and the student associations. The seemingly slow pace of efforts thus far to stimulate the development of these organizations does not give much of an indication as to the depth of the party's commitment to ensuring their success.

For the near future the party can be expected to concentrate on overcoming the bad publicity generated by efforts to suppress publication of the book critical of the Soka Gakkai. In particular, Komeito will probably move more vigorously to exploit growing popular concern over the government's traditional preoccupation with economic growth at the expense of badly needed investment in Japan's social infrastructure. Carrying forward the trend in the December electoral campaign, party leaders, in all likelihood, will hit harder on issues like pollution, inadequate public housing, and inflation, while the Japan Socialist Party sinks further into a morass of ideological bickering and factional infighting. The Komeito will be keeping a close eye on developments in the Socialist and labor camps, for therein may lie the key to future growth.

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
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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*WEEKLY SUMMARY*  
*Special Report*

*Mobutu's New Congo*

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**№ 43**

17 July 1970  
No. 0379/70B



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## MOBUTU'S NEW CONGO

Joseph Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa), assumed control of the government in 1965, and has given his country better internal security and political stability than it had known since gaining independence from Belgium in 1960. He has gone far toward remaking an unruly army into a fairly effective counterinsurgency force, and the once-formidable rebel bands have been whittled down to small groups of fugitives. Still, Mobutu's hold on power depends on his constant manipulation of key army officers; military discipline remains dubious, and the army is the prime power base.

So far, Mobutu has merely made a good start toward transforming the Congo into a modern national state, drawing power from a reasonably effective administrative structure and a popular political party as well as a loyal army. Presidential and legislative elections scheduled for late 1970 will offer a good measure of Mobutu's attempts to develop broad popular support for his government, but they will not give voters a real choice of candidates. Moreover, his ability to achieve mass support probably depends ultimately on completing the hitherto uneven recovery of the economy, which at the time of independence was among the most advanced in black Africa.

President Mobutu will make his first state visit to Washington in early August.



President Joseph Mobutu


### *Side-stepping the Army*

Although Mobutu has held command of the Congolese Army since early 1961, he derived a nonmilitary outlook from his early experience as a student and journalist in Belgium. Although he believes that his people need and expect an authoritarian leader, he also recognizes the army's well-earned reputation for brutality toward civilians. Accordingly, he has cultivated an image that dissociates him from the army and embodies the African traditions of chieftainship.

Underlying the flamboyant posturing for which Mobutu is well known is a starkly pragmatic concern for power, particularly for those additional levers of authority that lessen his dependence on the army. Retaining a grudging respect for the Belgian colonial administration, he gave first priority in 1966 to reasserting the supreme authority of the national government over the numerous semiautonomous provinces. He has largely succeeded in restoring a centralized administrative structure, staffed almost exclusively with civilians. His undisputed power to appoint, rotate,

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or dismiss government officials has enabled him to dominate the small minority of educated Congolese who aspire to careers in public service.

#### *Playing down Potential Rivals*

Mobutu's control of the governmental structure has not resulted in effective administration, however. An adequately trained and disciplined civil service is yet to be developed, and Mobutu's practice of rotating field administrators out of their own tribal areas has barely begun to reduce endemic corruption. Because most personnel serving in the provinces are unreliable, Mobutu must depend heavily on the more effective provincial governors and also on a few aides in the office of the President who tour the provinces as trouble-shooters.

Mobutu usually avoids delegating much authority to his key aides, however, because he apparently regards anyone who administers effectively as a potential rival. He is especially suspicious of former politicians or others who have any form of local following. At the cabinet level, he has replaced influential politicians with people selected primarily for their administrative competence.

Mobutu's compulsion to keep power in his own hands not only stunts sorely needed managerial talent, but also inhibits any orderly process for reaching decisions. He seldom discusses important matters with the cabinet, nor does he ordinarily utilize subordinates for any systematic review of pending problems. Hence, his own administrative workload is overwhelming, and he tends either to procrastinate or to make snap decisions. In fact, the more critical the problem, the more he inclines toward furtiveness, which precludes any kind of teamwork.

#### *Supplanting the Parliamentary System*

Mobutu's determination to retain all real authority, while giving the populace a sense of participation, stems from his recollection of how the

Congo's European-style parliamentary system broke down in 1960. Mobutu assumed power in 1965, and declared himself president of the Republic, to end a stalemate between then-president Kasavubu and ousted premier Tshombe. The constitution promulgated in 1967 formalizes the supreme executive authority that Mobutu has asserted since his take-over. The constitution also provides for a reformed National Assembly. This body, which has not yet been elected, is subordinated to the presidency to such an extent that Mobutu will retain control of the legislative process.

Mobutu's instrument for activating the new political system is the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR), the official party formed in 1967. Although the constitution authorizes two political parties, recent electoral ordinances stipulate that both presidential and National Assembly candidates must be approved by the MPR Political Bureau. In the elections for the National Assembly, voters are to choose between two ballots, signifying approval or rejection of the MPR slate of candidates for each electoral district. In the presidential elections, each voter likewise is to cast a ballot for or against Mobutu, whose candidacy for a second five-year term was announced at the MPR national congress last May. Although the present electoral procedure allows the voters no real choice of candidates, it may be the first step in a gradual process of voter education.

Presidential and legislative elections are scheduled, respectively, for 28-29 November and 12-13 December of this year. All indications are that Mobutu intends the pre-election campaign to be the most intensive effort in public indoctrination since he assumed power. Voting is mandatory for all citizens aged 18 and over who qualify for the franchise, and getting out the vote will require more extensive contacts with the rural populace than most local officials have ever attempted. Since late 1969, Mobutu has spent more time than usual touring outlying areas to stress the importance of the elections, and the recent

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MPR national congress was concerned primarily with preparations for carrying the campaign to every village.

*Striving for Mass Support*

Although the MPR will have no visible opposition in the upcoming elections, other factors apparently have convinced Mobutu that the party must campaign vigorously. He wants to placate the minority of educated Congolese who understand the European parliamentary system and still hope that the Congo may eventually attain a truly representative government. There is speculation that in 1975 the MPR will nominate twice as many candidates as there are seats in the National Assembly, and voters can then select which deputies they prefer from the party slate. Meanwhile, the directive that higher education is a criterion for selecting candidates is expected to mollify the more sophisticated critics of the present procedure.


Mobutu's broader objectives may be inferred from the rule that individuals on active duty with the army or police are ineligible to vote or to hold elective office. His "temporary" separation from the army, announced when he accepted the presidential nomination, likewise highlights his deter-

mination to keep the army out of politics. Another indicator of possible future directions is the fact that the members of the MPR Political Bureau—all Mobutu appointees—have been assigned to manage the election campaign in their home districts. As a majority of these people have some prominence outside the governmental hierarchy, their roles in the local campaigns may go far toward developing a party structure that reaches deeper into the hinterland than the central government's administrative hierarchy.

Such a result would be highly significant, as Mobutu's earlier efforts to build a mass organization were largely unsuccessful. Although the MPR has been in existence since 1967, the party's lower echelons in the provinces are still operated by central government officials, who have seldom succeeded in gaining grass-roots support. A basic obstacle is the traditional tribal or regional orientation of the rural populace. Mobutu apparently believes that his control of the modern levers of power is now so firm that he can counteract traditional influences in a mass party and a reformed National Assembly.

*The Populace—Apathetic or Discontented?*

Although the 1970 elections are expected to produce an almost unanimous vote of confidence



President Joseph Mobutu Greets Katangan Populace (L) and Meets with Chiefs in Bandundu Province (R)

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for Mobutu, it is conjectural whether the MPR will garner continuing mass participation, or whether a broadly based party will remain subject to control from Kinshasa. Concrete indications of popular attitudes toward the regime are lacking because most rural Congolese have had minimal contact with the central government since the breakdown of the Belgian administrative system in 1960. Concerted efforts to dispel this prolonged isolation and to evoke political consciousness presumably will encounter much apathy and some latent hostility.

Even so, Mobutu's failures to get positive responses from the masses must be weighed against comparable failures on the part of his opponents. None of the formerly prominent politicians has dared to challenge his rule since June 1966, when four coup plotters were publicly hanged. Although these men seemed fairly popular, their followers did not venture any protest or other action to save them.

Except for refugee rebels, Congolese university students have been the most vocal critics of the regime. In June 1969, a student demonstration in Kinshasa resulted in the killing of at least a dozen students by troops, followed by sympathy strikes at other universities and schools. No apparent support, however, was forthcoming from other elements of the population. Most students have sullenly complied with orders to join the youth wing of the MPR and disband their own organizations.

#### *Uneven Recovery of the Economy*

Although the great majority of Congolese have remained politically inert, material privations are so widespread as to provide ample ammunition for anyone who dares to challenge Mobutu on economic grounds. Only a small minority of Congolese have benefited from the extremely uneven recovery of the economy since the disruptions of the early 1960s. Since 1967, increasingly favorable trade balances have brought substantial accumulations in the Congo's gold and foreign

exchange holdings, which passed the \$200 million level in early 1970. The favorable balance, however, is due largely to rising copper earnings, while other sectors of the economy have not yet recovered from years of deterioration.

The Congolese who live in urban areas are directly afflicted by the continuing shortcomings in the modern sector of the economy. According to 1969 estimates, fewer Congolese were then regular wage earners than had been in 1959, and wage earners in 1969 comprised barely 12 percent of the total labor force. Although the urban unemployed suffer the most severe privations, wage earners are continually hurt by the rise in the cost of living. Periodic increases in official wage scales have not kept pace with rising prices, and real income for many urban workers has declined almost 50 percent since 1960.

In 1959, a large portion of the rural population was getting some cash income from a highly productive commercial agriculture, but much of the countryside was reduced to virtual anarchy in the early 1960s. By 1969, production of cash crops remained 10 percent below the 1959 level. Most subsistence crops are at or near 1959 levels, although the population has increased by roughly a third during the past decade. Surpluses of traditional food crops, formerly sold to obtain manufactured goods, have all but disappeared. Agricultural recovery has been impeded by the government's failure to maintain or extend the extremely limited network of paved roads. The usually impassable dirt roads also prevent the extension of social services to outlying areas. Consequently, most rural inhabitants have suffered an appreciable lowering of their living standard since 1959.

Rural inhabitants are less likely than urban dwellers to blame the authorities for their material privations, as they are more inured to primitive conditions and less politically conscious. Nevertheless, intensified efforts to involve the isolated villagers in MPR activities and to show Mobutu's concern for their welfare may create

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expectations far exceeding the government's administrative capabilities to deliver. Resulting frustrations might give new impetus to the sort of tribal or regional consciousness that Mobutu has been striving to overcome.

*Indispensable Foreign Participation*

The government's capabilities for meeting the material needs of the people depend largely on continuing infusions of foreign capital and on the talents of foreign personnel working throughout the country. Although financial aid from foreign governments and international agencies has declined from well over \$200 million annually in the early 1960s to less than \$100 million in 1969, the country still has thousands of highly qualified foreigners—executives, educators, military officers, and technicians who remain indispensable for the foreseeable future. Mobutu has not only extended the use of foreign experts in various government components, but has also engaged foreign firms to operate a number of public utilities and nationalized industrial plants.

The intensive grass-roots campaigning that the MPR is planning for late 1970 may tempt some party spokesmen to exploit latent Congolese resentment against foreign residents in order to curry public favor. Mobutu himself has placed great emphasis on various "Congolization" measures, and as recently as August 1969, a widely publicized drive was initiated to expel all foreigners who were not performing essential services. The targets of this drive, however, were mostly West African and Asian traders. Perhaps an underlying motive was to distract popular attention from Mobutu's extensive utilization of skilled Europeans.

Most indicative of Mobutu's increasing receptivity to foreign participation is the pattern of his dealings with Belgium and Belgian interests in the Congo. The latter were the prime targets of Congolization in 1966, and Belgians residing in the Congo bore the brunt of the hostility aroused by the mutiny of white mercenaries in 1967. The



**President Joseph Mobutu with King Baudouin During Visit to Brussels**

net result was a sharp cutback in Belgian technical assistance. Since early 1968, however, Mobutu has striven to attract Belgian capital and to secure the services of additional Belgian technicians. The dispute over nationalization of the Belgian-owned copper industry in Katanga was settled amicably last September, and the renewal of cordial relations between the two nations was dramatized through King Baudouin's attendance at the Congo's tenth independence anniversary this June.

The question remains whether foreign resources will be used effectively to promote balanced economic and social development. Mobutu has tried to counterbalance the Belgian presence with increased technical assistance and capital investment from other countries. A multiplicity of foreign-sponsored projects has intensified the need for over-all developmental planning, which is scarcely feasible under Mobutu's personal rule. However genuine his determination to promote effective administration, Mobutu instinctively uses material resources as largesse, to bond personal loyalties and to counterbalance rival power groups.

Mobutu views his relationship with the US as a special one and regards Washington as one of his major foreign backers. He looks forward to

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continued US support for his country's economic recovery and expects the US to continue to provide him with essential equipment for the Congolese armed forces. He is particularly anxious to acquire large US transport aircraft. These topics will undoubtedly be discussed when he visits Washington in August. Mobutu strongly believes that such US support is necessary if the Congo is to play a stabilizing role in Central Africa after years as a disruptive force, and if he is to counter what he regards as an increasing threat to the Congo's security from externally directed Communist elements.

#### *Nine Worrisome Neighbors*

Mobutu also has been preoccupied with the Congo's exposed location, surrounded by eight independent states and Portuguese Angola. He has taken a more active role in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) than any of his predecessors and has made gestures to dramatize Congolese solidarity with southern African nationalist movements. For instance, the Congo provides sanctuary for Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) and for its guerrilla army. By thus repudiating former premier Tshombe's "neocolonialism," Mobutu has been able to induce most of the surrounding independent governments to curtail support for Congolese refugee rebels.

The Portuguese authorities in Angola, however, have reacted to GRAE guerrilla thrusts from Congolese territory by repeatedly blocking copper shipments on the rail line from Katanga to Benguela. Mobutu, in turn, has veered toward unpublicized collaboration with Portuguese authorities, and the Congo's vaunted aid for GRAE guerrillas has been offset by unexplained obstruction of their border-crossing operations. In March 1970, two Portuguese representatives were accepted in Kinshasa with the provisos that they be located in the Spanish Embassy and conduct themselves unobtrusively.

Mingled with Mobutu's primary concern for the Congo's security is a personal ambition to

achieve recognition as an international leader. Although the Congo is a member of the French-sponsored Afro-Malagasy Common Organization, in early 1968 Mobutu drew Chad and the Central African Republic into a mini-common market, apparently to challenge France's economic predominance in central Africa. His efforts to forge economic links with Burundi and Rwanda were at least partially motivated by a desire to supplant Belgian influence. Neither venture, however, has produced solid links, while Mobutu's exaggerated fears of subversive influences from radical Congo (Brazzaville) have driven him to complicity in two abortive coups against President Nguabi.

#### *Outlook*

Although the elections later this year are expected to produce a one-sided vote of confidence for Mobutu and his party, the grass-roots campaigning and the efforts to generate mass participation in the MPR may have unforeseeable side-effects. If the plan to herd all adults to the polls is carried through, the more isolated tribesmen might naturally look for miracles, and campaign oratory may lead more sophisticated voters to expect more roads, clinics, or schools. If MPR local cadres remain active following the elections, they may generate continuing pressures to distribute largesse much more widely than the regime has hitherto attempted.

The intensified emphasis on the MPR and its activities will rankle many army officers, who have long resented Mobutu's keeping the army in the background. Nevertheless, Mobutu has constantly shown such an alertness for fluctuations in morale that he may forestall serious disaffection among ranking officers or troops by granting additional material benefits. Still obsessed with insurgency threats, Mobutu does in fact have his own plans for beefing up the armed forces during the next few years, even though there are no foreseeable threats of external aggression. Increased military expenditures, however, might preclude meeting popular expectations that the new political order will bring improved living conditions. Mobutu seems capable of finessing the

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dilemmas of heightened expectations for awhile; he has repeatedly averted looming crises by playing off rival interests or by simply desisting from provocative campaigns. Still, pressures for grass-roots economic progress and responsive leadership may build up as traumatic memories of the violent years fade.

Meanwhile, the question of how Mobutu's sudden demise would alter the Congo's prospects

for political stability and economic progress remains essentially unfathomable. The constitution of 1967 does not provide for a vice president; instead, a successor is to be elected within 90 days of the president's death. Mobutu's strategy of counterbalancing actual or potential power blocs does not favor the formation of a cohesive ruling group; nor is he likely to sponsor anyone who might be capable of filling his shoes.

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