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CONTENTS

(Information as of noon EST, 11 February 1971)

EUROPE (CONTINUED)

MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

FAR EAST

Indochina: *Hitting Where It Hurts*

After a ten-day allied buildup south of the Demilitarized Zone, South Vietnamese forces early this week launched the first major ground attacks of the war against the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in the Laos panhandle. The operation is meant to disrupt North Vietnam's current dry-season supply effort, which now is in full swing. Its success will depend primarily on how much it inhibits the movement of enemy supplies to the battlefields farther south. Other considerations will be the number of Communist casualties inflicted and the volume and type of supplies captured. A successful operation could curtail Communist military capabilities significantly in Cambodia and South Vietnam through most of 1971.

Hanoi has anticipated strong allied ground attacks against its infiltration corridor for months, and has moved several thousand troops into the area to meet the threat. Communist concern probably began to climb sharply toward the end of January when Hanoi detected the first stages of allied deployments for the current operation.

Communist forces initially fell back before the South Vietnamese thrust, but they are likely to make a stand and perhaps try to counterattack before long. During the first few days of the operation, enemy units in exposed forward positions harassed ARVN columns but withdrew when pressed. Communist artillery units shelled advancing South Vietnamese troops as well as fixed allied supply points and fire support positions when they could. Farther west, in the Laos panhandle, enemy forces were digging in around key facilities, supply lines, and dominant terrain features, and are under orders to hold their positions as long as possible.



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Despite growing allied pressure, the Communists are bent on moving substantial amounts of supplies through the Tchepone area for as long as they can. Since late January, unusually large numbers of trucks have been noted moving south.

In northern South Vietnam, meanwhile, the Communists apparently plan to continue shelling and probing allied positions stretched along Route 9 that are supporting the ARVN drive into Laos. Elements of an artillery and an infantry regiment have borne the brunt of the effort so far, but reinforcements may be moving in from north of the DMZ. There is no evidence that the

large number of North Vietnamese combat units located within easy reach of the DMZ area will mass and attempt a major strike against the allies along Route 9 any time soon. [redacted] 25X1

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Laos: *Up Tight in the North*

The government's position around both the Long Tieng base complex and Luang Prabang is deteriorating, and political nervousness is increasing proportionately.

On 7 February Communist units overran a number of government outposts guarding the eastern approaches to Long Tieng. The positions that fell included a mobile group headquarters about nine miles northeast of Long Tieng; the group commander was killed in the fighting. Irregular forces defending Khang Kho, also east of the Long Tieng complex, were forced to abandon their positions on 8 February and retreat south following a coordinated North Vietnamese attack. The full extent of the casualties is not yet known.

Heavy Communist shelling attacks have continued at Ban Na, hampering aerial resupply and medical evacuation efforts. Other government positions in the Ban Na/Sam Thong/Tha Tham Bleung area have also been subjected to probes and shelling attacks, and two outposts near Tha Tham Bleung have been abandoned.

Meanwhile, the government is taking steps to strengthen its forces west of the Plaine. Two irregular battalions have been airlifted into positions north and northeast of Long Tieng. About 200 reinforcements are being airlifted into the Pha Khao area, where a Communist ground attack was beaten back on 10 February. In addition, government forces from the various outposts lost to the Communists are moving back toward the Long Tieng area.

The precise timing of any Communist drive southwest of the Plaine is not yet clear, but the continuing expansion of forces in the area indicates that the Communists plan to follow up their recent attacks. Ban Na seems to be the probable starting point for any Communist push on the complex. It commands the northern approaches to Long Tieng and contains several key artillery positions.

Farther north, in the Luang Prabang area, government irregulars have again been driven from positions along a ridge about ten miles northeast of the capital. Three NVA companies launched coordinated attacks on these sites on 9 February. The Communists have previously used these positions to shell nearby government outposts.

The government has moved to strengthen its forces around Luang Prabang and has airlifted two irregular companies into the area. An operation to retake positions about 30 miles northeast of Luang Prabang was disrupted almost immediately, however, when an NVA force scattered the lead government elements as soon as they had cleared their helicopters.

The deteriorating situations at Luang Prabang and Long Tieng are causing growing concern among top Laotian government leaders. On 9 February the National Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma declare a state of emergency and order a general mobilization in all areas



except the Vientiane military region.

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Increased nervousness on the part of some civilians is noticeable as well. The sound of government artillery can be heard in Luang Prabang, and has given rise to numerous rumors about Communist intentions and an imminent threat to the town. The established Pathet Lao policy of professing allegiance to the King would seem to rule out such a threat, as it has in years past, but the Communists indeed have much to gain by continuing to underline Luang Prabang's vulnerable military position.

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Cambodia: *More Misfortune for Phnom Penh*

The country suffered a new setback from a totally unexpected quarter when Prime Minister Lon Nol was stricken by a stroke on 8 February. The Cambodian leader's illness should not lead to any immediate political instability or detract from Phnom Penh's determination to resist Communist aggression, however.

It may be several weeks before a precise prognosis can be obtained on Lon Nol's prospects for a full or partial recovery. According to one press report, Lon Nol's younger brother and close confidant, Lon Non, has claimed that Nol's convalescence would last a month. Lon Non also indicated that Deputy Prime Minister Sirik Matak will assume the prime ministership in an acting capacity.

Matak is an experienced administrator and served as acting prime minister for over three months during the early prewar days of the government. Since last March he has been responsible for managing the regime's domestic business, with Lon Nol concentrating almost exclusively on military matters. Matak may be in for some tough political going, however. He has been criticized recently by students, intellectuals, and other of the government's key supporters for his failure to stem inflation and cut down on bureaucratic corruption. Matak may also be handicapped to some extent by the fact that he cannot hope to enjoy the degree of support from the military establishment that Lon Nol has been able to accrue over the years.

As long as Matak retains Lon Nol's backing, however, he should be able to preserve the political unity that has been one of the government's most important wartime assets. Moreover, as he so ably demonstrated when he led the move to oust Sihanouk, Matak is a skilled political infighter who possesses the strong will necessary to keep independent-minded Cambodian officials in line.

Matak may well choose to return much of the responsibility for the daily conduct of the war over to Lon Nol's two key military subordinates, Generals Srey Saman and Sat Sutsakan. It clearly will not be physically possible for Matak to give the exhausting personal attention to military affairs that Lon Nol has. While this may result in some temporary dislocation and confusion, it may also help breed greater efficiency in the long run as Cambodian Army officers are forced to assume their normal responsibilities.

Carrying the War to the Communists

The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) dry season offensive in eastern Cambodia moved into its second week, with elements of Vietnamese Communist main force units putting up a determined defense of their bases and supply lines in Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces. The Communists reportedly suffered substantial losses in their initial attempts to blunt the offensive, however.

The heaviest fighting was reported around the Chup rubber plantation, just east of Kompong Cham city. There, ARVN forces, backed by air and artillery support, successfully repelled a series of enemy ground and mortar attacks. One of the few enemy prisoners captured near Chup stated he was from the 272nd Regiment of the Communist 9th Division.

The Communists also attacked ARVN forces closer to the border in Kompong Cham. An enemy mortar attack, on an ARVN regimental command post near the town of Krek, at the junction of Routes 7 and 78, caused no casualties but destroyed a sizable quantity of fuel and ammunition.

In southern Kratie Province, the Communists staged several ground and mortar assaults on ARVN units near the town of Snuol. The ARVN troops reportedly inflicted more casualties on the enemy than they themselves received in those actions.

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Communist China: *Harassing the Hierarchy*

Peking's campaign against the alleged political shortcomings of China's local authorities is steadily gathering momentum. In recent weeks the propaganda rhetoric has become progressively more strident, and the movement has taken on the appearance of a major, multifaceted critique of both the post - Cultural Revolution party and government apparatus and the civilian and military cadres who staff it. The current intensity of the campaign suggests, moreover, that it may be an outgrowth of divisive though muted struggles over power and policy in Peking.

In part, the campaign may be viewed as a sustained effort to restore lines of authority broken during the Cultural Revolution. Despite marked progress in reinstituting the local party apparatus, the regime still has no easy task in making its will prevail on a conglomerate of new and "rehabilitated" cadres, especially since they include many who have lost their enthusiasm for leadership and others who now feel freer to question Peking's programs. Some press articles over the past few days have been unusually candid in admitting that many senior officials are reluctant to accept instructions from higher levels on the grounds that the directives do not apply to conditions in their bailiwicks. In addition, several provincial editorials last week indicated that some local authorities are questioning Peking's guidelines on this year's grain production and its program of developing small-scale, self-supporting industrial enterprises in rural areas. The regime's mounting frustration is illustrated by the recent revival of the old Cultural Revolution slogan that Mao's instructions must be followed "whether or not they are understood."

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Beyond the pulling and hauling between Peking and various provincial authorities, there seems to be a growing concern in Peking that the rebuilt local party and government organs are evolving into a conservative elite similar in spirit to the apparatus Mao set out to purge and revitalize during the Cultural Revolution. Thus, charges have been repeatedly made that local leaders are failing to adhere to Mao's line, are becoming arrogant and complacent, are unresponsive to popular will, and are in danger of "falling off the locomotive of revolution." In practice, the local promoters of the revolution are expected to respond to such charges by engaging in more self-criticism as well as by accepting frequent critiques of their performance from the "revolutionary masses"—a process that tends to raise political temperatures and enormously complicates day-to-day administration.

It is also apparent that much of the current invective is being directed at professional army men who have assumed dominant leadership positions in most localities. In recent weeks provincial radiobroadcasts have loosed a torrent of commentary detailing how military officiials have overstepped their authority by acting in a high-handed and arbitrary manner. Publication of a new Mao directive ordering military administrators not to fear criticism and to conduct "rectification" every one or two months suggests that political pressures on the army are increasing.

The furor over the quality of local leadership may also be a reflection of maneuvering and muted policy disagreements within the politburo. The curious juxtaposition in national propaganda of heavy criticism of the army's administrative performance with periodic testimony as to the importance of its political mission affirms that the military's increased role in civil affairs is still a contentious issue. It also seems possible that many of the diatribes on leadership deficiencies are being penned by militant ideologues who believe their position in regime councils is being undercut as the reconstruction process moves forward. Indeed, one factor in the recent fall of the former head of the Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Po-ta, may have been his opposition to increased military influence. Chen's setback, the earlier demise of Public Security Minister Hsieh Fu-chih, and recent rumors that another ranking politburo member—Kang Sheng—may now be in serious trouble are also part of the uncertainty surrounding the nation's leadership.

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South Vietnam: *Communist Fortunes Decline in the Mekong Delta*

During the past several years, Communist forces in the Mekong Delta have been growing progressively weaker. Although American combat forces were withdrawn a year-and-a-half ago, a series of positive events have improved the lot of the South Vietnamese Government there considerably. These include the assignment to the area of several first-class regional commanders, new tactics, increased emphasis on the role of the territorial security forces, expansion of the village militia and, more recently, the Cambodian cross-border operations that stimulated a more aggressive fighting spirit in the South Vietnamese Army. Consequently, the Communists have found it increasingly difficult to maintain either large concentrations of forces or the effectiveness of their political cadre in the heavily populated portions of the delta. With the additional restrictions imposed on their military forces by the disruptions to their Cambodian supply lines, the Communists are capable of only small-scale shellings, limited ground attacks against remote outposts, and occasional harassments similar to the cyclical pattern of activity evident throughout most of 1970.

Major General Ngo Quang Truong, who took over MR-4 last August, recently voiced his satisfaction with the performance of the South Vietnamese forces in the delta, specifically citing the progress of the 21st Division in penetrating the large enemy redoubt in the inhospitable U Minh Forest. The construction of four artillery bases in the interior of the forest is proceeding on schedule and he claims that half of the enemy's 3,000-man force there has been wiped out. Truong, one of South Vietnam's most widely respected military men, claims "the delta will be under effective South Vietnamese governmental control in 1971."

South Vietnam's 9th Division has established artillery positions on every mountain peak in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province, and it is now in the difficult process of destroying enemy strong points located in numerous mountain caves. Although the Communists will still be able to slip some personnel and supplies across the Cambodian border from time to time, the area is gradually being denied them as a major base area.

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Even the South Vietnamese 7th Division, once considered one of Saigon's least effective army units, has been driving deep into Communist Base Area 470 in northwestern Dinh Tuong Province and has constructed fire support bases there. According to Truong, three battalions of the North Vietnamese 88th Regiment that infiltrated into the area early last year, before the allied cross-border operations into Cambodia, will be forced either to break up and disperse or to "face annihilation." As a result of the South Vietnamese occupation of this long-time enemy sanctuary, many civilians are now voluntarily moving back into nearby regions previously under enemy control.

In addition to the army gains, Truong believes the territorial security forces in the delta have improved and are being utilized with greater efficiency. The recently concluded "Dong Khoi" campaign, in which Regional and Popular forces conducted simultaneous cordon and search operations, was highly successful. Because of this, Truong said similar, short-term, but highly concentrated operations are being planned for the future.

To further improve the operation of the regular army troops in MR-4, Truong is realigning their operational areas. The Marine brigade presently near Neak Luong in Cambodia is being pulled back and will be replaced by two regiments of the 9th Division, leaving a third regiment in the Seven Mountains region of Chau Doc Province. The operational area of the 7th Division is being expanded to pick up some of the slack left by these moves. The 21st Division will continue to be responsible for the southern six provinces of MR-4.



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Philippines: *Students Refuse to Quit*

Students in Manila, who have been confronting the government since mid-January, seem determined to keep up the fight. They have armed themselves with incendiary devices and some other weapons, including two machine guns, in order to maintain control of the university grounds. Their announced objectives include the withdrawal of all criminal charges against "activists," permanent control of the university radio station and printing facilities, and the denial to security forces of entry into the university premises.

The longer term goal, however, probably is to develop political issues that will embarrass the Marcos administration. Indeed, the students' present activities seem designed to provoke the security forces into the use of violent tactics. The movement is basically antiestablishment and is led by a radical student organization, although some moderates have joined it during the past two weeks.

The students took up the torch in January when the drivers of Manila's "jeepneys"—converted jeeps used extensively for public transportation—went on strike to protest a raise in petroleum prices. Marcos responded by rolling back gas prices and declaring that only the cost of some higher grade petroleum products would be increased. The jeepney drivers, for the moment at least, seem mollified and have generally lost interest in the strike.

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Student tactics hav included setting up barricades around the University of the Philippines and protesting marches. The president of the university is under virtual house arrest; he reportedly is allowed to survey the campus only under a student escort.

The government's restrained methods of dealing with the problem have apparently only increased student resentment. Marcos may be waiting for student violence to bring an aroused and inconvenienced public around to supporting his administration, at which time he could bring troops onto the campus. The authorities issued an ultimatum to the students on 8 February stating that, if the barricades were not down by the ninth, police forces would be moved in. So far this threat has not been carried out.

Anti-Americanism has not yet become a key issue in the present troubles. The radical students may soon, however, turn to this ever-popular issue to keep up the fight, and Marcos' dilemma of whether or not to send in the troops and create a few more "martyrs" will remain.

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Thailand: *Insurgent Gains in the North*

Communist insurgents in the north are making some headway in recruiting lowland ethnic Thai villagers. Since the insurgent movement began there over three years ago, its appeal has been directed almost exclusively at remote hill-tribe peoples who have long been excluded from the mainstream of Thai society. Thai government leaders have consistently maintained that lowland ethnic Thais were impervious to insurgent proselyting and that any efforts to integrate them into armed units with the tribal people would prove futile because of the traditional animosities between the two groups.

US Embassy reports indicate, however, that insurgent groups ranging in size from 50 to 130 members conducted propaganda and recruiting sessions in ethnic Thai as well as hill-tribe villages in three districts of Chiang Rai Province on at least a dozen occasions between October and December 1970. In one instance, armed insurgents sealed off a complex of ten lowland Thai villages in Chiang Muan district, near the Laos border, where they remained overnight in order to conduct propaganda meetings. The insurgent band reportedly included a number of youthful Thais native to the Chiang Muan area who were recognized by their fellow villagers. Local authorities not only failed to challenge the insurgents, but made no official report of the role played by the ethnic Thai recruits because they feared that Thai officials further on up the line would hold them accountable.

The deputy governor of Chiang Rai, who is clearly alarmed over the deteriorating security situation in his province, recently told an embassy official that the absence of an effective Thai Government presence together with widespread corruption among police and local officials were prime reasons why the insurgents were enjoying some success in attracting ethnic Thai to their movement.

Bangkok's confidence in its estimate of the insurgency in the north has also been shaken by the extent of Communist strength, organization, and support as revealed by the operations of Chinese irregulars in that sector. Over the past two months some 750 former Chinese Nationalists—remnants of forces driven from China two decades ago—have conducted operations under Bangkok's auspices against several insurgent base areas along the Thai-Lao border in northern Chiang Rai Province. In addition to capturing two bases, sizable quantities of military equipment, field supplies, and documents, the irregulars have fared surprisingly well against the considerable resistance put up by the Communists.

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The Thai 3rd Army, which is directing the irregular operations, has provided logistical, air, and artillery support to the Chinese, but in only one instance have its ground forces been committed to the fray. Bangkok apparently still prefers to have the irregulars, who are now manning defensive positions in captured enemy camps pending the arrival of reinforcements, continue to carry the brunt of the effort against the insurgents.

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Moscow "Goes Public" on SALT Problems

Moscow last week broke its public silence on contentious issues under negotiation at SALT as *Pravda* and *Izvestia* attacked Washington's stand on American forward-based systems (FBS) and an initial, ABM-only agreement. The two articles represent Moscow's first step in maneuvering for position at the renewal of SALT in Vienna on 15 March and suggest there is little prospect for give in the Soviet negotiating position.

The Soviets took up the cudgels on 3 February in a *Pravda* article written by V. Shustov, a disarmament expert in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shustov charged US "militarists" with ordering the American press to stress that the strategic arms talks should not be concerned with "nuclear facilities advanced to the frontiers of the USSR and other socialist countries." He went on to declare that this position "deliberately disregards" the fact that a mutually acceptable agreement must yield no unilateral military advantage to either side. The article also claimed that the strengthening of US military forces over the past year is incompatible with efforts to reach an agreement.

Three days later, *Izvestia* attacked Washington's attitude toward an ABM-only agreement. Citing Western reporting on Ambassador Smith's remarks before a Congressional committee, this article alleged that Smith devoted great pains to an attempt to prove "why the US should not conclude a separate initial measure" limiting ABMs. It charged Smith, the head of the US SALT delegation, with trying to prejudice the views of legislators and scientists in the US who have reacted favorably to the suggestion for an ABM-only agreement.

The views in the two articles were preceded by remarks of Soviet Defense Minister Grechko in Finland on 29 January. In a luncheon address on the last day of an official visit, Grechko said that there had been no substantial results at SALT because the US "wants to take advantage" of the talks. Reading from prepared notes, he said that SALT was not being carried out on an equal basis, and that the USSR could "not accept this."

These three events seem in part to indicate a new determination in Moscow to make its case in public for propaganda effect. In a private conversation last month, Pravda commentator Yury Zhukov said that his government was irritated by US press leaks on SALT, and would be responding in its own way.

The articles—which probably are only the opening shots in a campaign leading up to the Vienna round—are intended in particular to demonstrate Moscow's resolve on the FBS issue and thus influence the US to consider a separate limitation on ABMs. The Soviets as yet have been careful to discuss publicly only those issues causing negotiating problems and on which they have taken a particularly strong position. The Soviets may hope that by calling public attention to fundamental differences in the negotiations and by pitching their statements to Washington directly, they will increase pressure for some further movement in the US position. 25X1

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Polish Leaders Assess Past Errors and Future Hopes

Party leader Gierek was able to strengthen his position at a central committee plenum on 6-7 February that assessed the faults of the old leadership and charted a course for the immediate future. Although Gierek only promised that the party will consider a myriad of measures to rejuvenate national life, he seems to have convinced most of the people that a new start is being made.

Gierek minced no words in divorcing his regime from the former leadership. He accused it of misinterpreting the December upheaval, an expression of legitimate grievances, as a counter-revolution. He blamed the clique surrounding ex-party leader Gomulka and his already ousted politburo colleagues, former economic czar Jaszczuk and ideologist Kliszko, both of whom were stripped of their central committee membership. Gomulka, who is still hospitalized, was let down more gently; his membership was only suspended. Moreover, Gierek acknowledged Gomulka's past achievements, and said that the former party leader would not be further punished.

As expected, former trade union chief Loga-Sowinski, a Gomulka holdover, was ousted from the politburo, as was Stanislaw Kociolek, whose dismissal had been demanded by the workers along the Baltic coast. No replacements on the policy-making body have been made, but the balance between Gierek's followers and others has not been perceptibly altered as a result of the ousters.

Gierek announced his intention to advance the date of the next party congress, originally scheduled for next year. This indicates that he is confident of gaining further control over the party machinery during preparation for the conclave. Meanwhile, accelerated changes in the middle and lower level party bureaucracy and all levels of the government can be expected; some of the ministerial changes may be made at a parliamentary session beginning on 13 February.

Replacements for the dismissed associates of Gomulka on the central committee are workers,

except for the deputy defense minister in charge of the army's political administration. His appointment may indicate Gierek's desire to improve control over internal security troops, whose brutal measures against the strikers in December resulted in riots and more recently led the workers to call for the dismissal of the long-time security chief, Moczar. Although Moczar is useful to Gierek on the politburo, his other liabilities suggest that his importance as a challenger to Gierek's power has long been overrated by both his supporters and detractors.

Gierek's sketch of the future seemed confined to the few months that will precede the party congress. He advocated strengthening the features that have characterized his rule so far, including greater participation by all segments of the population in the party and government, a continuing direct dialogue with the workers, a rejuvenation of trade unions, and a more genuine legislative role for parliament, with power to oversee the government.

The new party leader went out of his way, however, to assure both his domestic and foreign audiences—especially in Moscow—that the leading role of the party will not be challenged, and that the party as a whole was not being indicted for the shortcomings of the former leadership. He said "bourgeois democracy" had no relevance in Poland, and pointedly added that "Poland can develop only in an inseparable alliance with the USSR and its socialist neighbors, and the party is, and will remain, the leading force of the Polish nation. Any neglect of these basic truths would be fatal." [redacted] 25X1

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USSR-Austria: *Little Change in Attitudes*

Austrian Foreign Minister Kirschlaeger's visit to Moscow from 25 to 29 January, his first since Chancellor Kreisky's socialist government was installed last spring, served to keep relations between the two countries in adequate repair. He was not able, however, to work much of a change in Soviet attitudes.

Despite the final communiqué's claim that the talks were friendly, an Austrian official described them as "cool to chilly." The mood was foreordained by Kreisky's blunt comments to the Council of Europe on 25 January on the subject of a Conference on European Security (CES). Austria favors and would like to host a CES, but believes it should discuss real issues. In talks with Kirschlaeger, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko belabored Kreisky's suggestion that Berlin and the Middle East could be on a CES agenda. The former, he said, might doom the conference from the start, while the latter was the prerogative of the Big Four powers.

Talks with Soviet President Podgorny revealed no change in Moscow's opposition to Vienna's quest for some kind of arrangement with the European Communities. Podgorny reiterated Moscow's fear that such an association might lead to a decline in Austria's trade with Eastern Europe and, more importantly, to West German economic ascendancy in Austria. Neutral Austria would like Soviet acquiescence before reaching any agreement with the Communities, although Vienna's leaders defend their sole right to interpret their neutrality.

Kirschlaeger may have achieved a breakthrough on the question of defensive missiles, however. Although Gromyko stood by the past Soviet position that all missiles are banned under the State Treaty of 1955, Prime Minister Kosygin later said that the issue could be reviewed by experts because Austria was so obviously interested. Kosygin indicated, however, that Moscow's price would be Austrian agreement to buy the missile system from the USSR. [redacted] 25X1

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Italy: *Social Reform Program Moves Slowly Ahead*

Prime Minister Colombo's government is making progress on its social reform program despite its preoccupation with recent outbreaks of violence. Organized labor appears to be giving the government effective support.

On 6 February, after a 17-hour talk between representatives of the government and the three major labor confederations, substantial agreement was announced on the housing and health care reform measures for which organized labor has been pressing. Draft legislation on housing is scheduled for presentation to the cabinet by 20 February with reforms in health care to follow by 15 March. Future government-labor discussions are to concern three other long-sought reforms on the development of southern Italy, agriculture, and transport.

Steady progress on the social reform program demanded by labor appears to be a prerequisite for industrial peace and strong economic growth. Continued strike activity last year together with a sharp rise in absenteeism limited the rise in industrial production to 6.5 percent, significantly below the predicted rate of 10.5 percent.

Italy's neo-fascists have been seeking to profit from reaction against the widespread and frequent strikes of the past 18 months with scattered but increasingly violent attacks against leftists and public authorities. Bombings, one death, and a number of injuries last week at the hands of neo-fascists in southern Italy prompted sharp demands from center-left and Communist parties for a government crackdown.

The Communists, in a further effort to enhance their image as a democratic political party, called for "law and order." The national labor confederations, which are variously affiliated with the Communists and the four center-left parties of the Colombo coalition, called a two-hour general strike on an anti-fascist theme but generally seem to be supporting government efforts to contain violence from either right or left extremists.

The easing of pressure should be welcome to Prime Minister Colombo as he prepares for his visit to Washington on 18 February. He reportedly objects to the image of extreme political instability in Italy which he believes has been disseminated in the American press.

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Maritime Issues to the Fore

The signing of the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the seabeds was accomplished on 11 February at ceremonies in the US, UK, and USSR. It will come into effect when these three and only 19 other governments have ratified. This should occur fairly rapidly, even though there may be a number of holdouts. France and Communist China traditionally decline to adhere to international arms control agreements of this sort. A few Latin American nations that think the treaty impinges on their claims to 200-mile territorial waters may also fail to ratify; only two of the nine making such claims signed the treaty this week.

The General Assembly's seabeds committee convenes in New York next week for the first time since its recent expansion from 42 to 86 members. The meeting is in preparation for the 1973 Law of the Sea conference. Its chairman, Ceylon's UN delegate Amerasinghe, hopes the committee will agree to establish two working groups: one to handle the question of international machinery to control peaceful exploitation of the ocean floor, the other to consider most of the other maritime issues, e.g., territorial waters claims and rights of passage through international straits. A few other issues would be left for action by the committee itself.

A key decision on voting procedures that might set a precedent for the rules governing the 1973 conference itself may also be made at the upcoming meeting. The US favors the institution of no more than a two-thirds majority rule, whereas several other states, especially the West Coast Latin American states—concerned that an international seabeds regime might have jurisdiction over valuable natural resources close to their shores—want a "consensus" arrangement that would permit them to filibuster to protect their interests.

The New York sessions follow intensive regional consultations on maritime issues since the Assembly voted last December to organize a new Law of the Sea conference. The superpowers have consulted in particular with other leading maritime nations—the Soviets with Canada and the US with the Japanese—and they will have a bilateral meeting in Washington early next week before the seabeds committee convenes. Moscow opposed the Assembly resolution calling for the 1973 conference—apparently fearing it might grant too much authority to an international regulatory mechanism. In view of this, it is especially important that these preparatory talks go well. The 1971 and 1972 General Assemblies have the right to opt to cancel the 1973 conference or alter its agenda. [redacted] 25X1

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USSR-SYRIA: Syrian Prime Minister Asad's recent Soviet visit appears to have allayed mutual suspicion somewhat, although the views of the two governments on political tactics in the Middle East clearly remain out of harmony.

The final communiqué stressed examples of growing Soviet-Syrian economic cooperation, especially the Euphrates Dam project. Differences between Moscow and Damascus on the issue of a political settlement were not resolved, however. The Soviets almost certainly pressed for a public Syrian endorsement of a political settlement; their failure to obtain it is undoubtedly a principal reason that the talks were characterized as "frank" in the final communiqué.

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Cairo's Offer Leaves Tel Aviv Cold

President Sadat's proposal to reopen the Suez Canal in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal has not evoked a positive response from Israel.

Sadat made his offer on 4 February when he announced Egypt's agreement to maintain the cease-fire for another 30 days. Terming it a "new Egyptian initiative," Sadat called for the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the east bank of the Suez Canal as the first stage of a timetable to be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the 1967 Security Council resolution on the Middle East. If this were done, he added, Egypt would then be prepared to begin immediate steps to clear the canal and reopen it "for international navigation."

The Egyptian president's proposal appears to be yet another effort to convince world opinion that Cairo genuinely desires to explore new avenues for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It may also have been directed at those Western European countries most interested in seeing the canal reopened in order to motivate them to increase the pressures on Israel to adopt a more forthcoming position on the question of withdrawal.

Egypt's public offer appeared to catch Israel somewhat by surprise, and an official reaction was several days in coming. On 9 February, however, in a speech to the Knesset, Prime Minister Golda Meir characterized the proposal as designed to give Cairo a strategic advantage without including any real commitment to peace. Although Mrs. Meir stated that Israel would favorably consider proposals aimed at the mutual reduction of military forces along the canal, she did not indicate that Israel was prepared to depart from its long-held position of no withdrawal without a signed peace treaty. The Prime Minister did say, however, that Israel was prepared to discuss a separate arrangement, outside of the peace talks, for reopening the canal to all shipping provided that ships flying the Israeli flag were included.

Although there are likely to be further exchanges on this topic, the initial Egyptian reaction was to term Mrs. Meir's statement "an outright rejection of the Egyptian peace gesture." An Egyptian spokesman also clarified Sadat's reference to international navigation in the Suez Canal by explaining that Israeli ships would be able to use the waterway only after the problem of the Palestinian refugees was solved in conjunction with implementation of the entire Security Council resolution.

The USSR's satisfaction with the current Middle East situation came through clearly in a recent conversation between a medium-ranking Foreign Ministry official and a US Embassy officer in Moscow. The Soviet official praised Sadat's proposal to reopen the canal as a "positive initiative," but made it clear that Moscow does not expect the canal to be reopened except in the context of a general settlement. The Soviet official also had warm words for the somewhat less obstructive Syrian attitude toward political developments in the Middle East, opining that if the Jarring mission achieved real progress, there was a good chance the new government would say something publicly modifying its position on a Middle East settlement. 25X1

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Chad: *Insurgency Dims Peace Prospects*

Despite initially encouraging signs, the campaign waged by President Tombalbaye to resolve peacefully Chad's persistent Muslim rebellion has borne little fruit. The scheduled further reduction of the French counterinsurgency role is fast approaching, and armed dissidence is on the rise again in all sectors.

Last August, Tombalbaye belatedly acknowledged the existence of the insurgency and promised to correct the administrative abuses and lack of social services that contributed to it. Combined with the offer of a general amnesty, an all-out effort was launched at home and abroad to get peace talks moving.

Although the insurgents in eastern Chad showed no discernible interest in coming to terms, many rebel leaders in the central region respected a self-imposed cease-fire for six months while pursuing negotiations with the government. Last month a settlement was announced with 12 Moubi chieftains, but it may not be accepted by the entire tribe, who in 1965 were the first to revolt. Moreover, the remaining rebel bands in the truce zone have resumed operations.

The aggressive and well-armed Toubou tribesmen in the north also remain recalcitrant. Peace overtures by the government last December via a special mission to Libya did not persuade the Toubou sultan-in-exile there to enter into discussions nor did they lead Tripoli to withdraw its support for the dissidents. There is increasing evidence that Libya began extending modest financial and material aid to the Toubous last year in reaction to Chad's close ties with Israel.

The last of the French combat troops, who were sent to Chad in early 1969, are scheduled to be withdrawn within the next few months, leaving behind only an expanded military advisory group and the administrative reform mission. Chad's French-led forces, however, backed by the permanent French intervention unit at Fort-Lamy, are considered by the French commander ready to assume the defense burden outside the north. A final sweep by the French troops is under way in the north to force the Toubous to seek peace or to neutralize them temporarily.

Although the level of fighting is far below that of two years ago, no quick end is in sight. The prospects for extending peace to other areas might be enhanced if the government can somehow find the resources to fulfill visibly its promises to the Moubi, but a planned crackdown on lagging tax payments in the more secure prefectures could intensify the rebellion still further. 25X1



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Libya: *A Change in Direction?*

Premier Qadhafi made two speeches recently that seem to point Libyan policies away from the "Qadhafi plan" for Arab military unity against Israel and toward a primary emphasis on the alleviation of domestic ills. This new policy line—if it is more real than illusory—will probably have little chance of success so long as the center stage of Arab politics is occupied by the emotional issue of Palestinian liberation.

The most striking aspect of the first speech at Zawiyah on 24 January was that it was aimed almost exclusively at the Libyan public and did not deal with grand designs for Arab strategy as Qadhafi has been prone to do. He called for a constitution, a peoples' council, and a president elected by popular referendum. Although Qadhafi said that he would not nominate himself for the presidency, two days later, before adulatory crowds, the premier decided that he would not rule himself out after all.

The speech in Benghazi on 2 February expressed Qadhafi's disillusionment with his efforts to inspire Arab unity. He ruefully acknowledged the possibility of separate peace settlements with Israel by Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. Moderate in tone, this speech once more centered around the promise that the Libyan people would have a chance to question government policy.

Qadhafi has obviously been under a great deal of pressure lately. In addition to the usual business of government, the quadripartite union envisioned with Egypt, Syria, and Sudan, the question of the Arab-Israeli cease-fire, and the international oil crisis have all occupied much of his time and energies.

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There seems little doubt that Qadhafi and the regime are increasingly disturbed about the unsettled domestic scene. They may be groping their way toward some type of popular institution for the safe release of public indignation—perhaps along the lines of Egypt's docile assembly, the Arab Socialist Union.

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Both speeches did contain the veiled threat that if Arab-Israeli fighting broke out once more, Libya "would join" the fray. Despite national discontent and xenophobia, the premier would not find it hard either to rekindle his own enthusiasm or to whip up popular support for his pan-Arab policies. A peaceful progression toward closeness with the Maghreb and a steady plodding toward long-term solutions to domestic underdevelopment may be the stuff of true Libyan statesmanship, but the appeal of pan-Arab nationalism will continue to be capable of deflecting Libyan policy from more sober and long-term goals.

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USSR-MAURITIUS: The Soviets will start using Port Louis this April to service its fishing fleet in the Indian Ocean under the terms of a pact signed in July 1970. Mauritius is insisting that the Soviets submit a manifest of incoming fishing crews at least ten days in advance and one for outgoing crews 14 days before the exchange. The USSR had requested that its crews be exempt from normal customs and immigration procedures. Soviet tankers will be permitted to refuel on the same ad hoc basis as ships of any other country.

Soviet spokesmen have indicated that 8,000 tons of fuel per month will be the maximum required during the height of the fishing season, and the number of tankers calling at Port Louis will depend on the number of fishing and whaling ships in the area. On the average, about a dozen Soviet fishing vessels operate in the Indian Ocean at any one time and close to 60 whaling ships are present during the whaling season in the Antarctic. Currently, Soviet tankers from ports in the USSR carry fuel for both types of ships in the Indian Ocean.

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South African Police Harass Clergy

Many South African church leaders believe that the recent arrest of the Anglican dean of Johannesburg, a well-known critic of apartheid, is part of a calculated attack on clergymen who are critical of government policies.

The dean, who has been charged with possessing and distributing subversive literature, is the most prominent, but not the only, anti-apartheid clergyman who has been subjected to recent police actions. Since the World Council of Churches gave $200,000 in "humanitarian" aid to the southern African liberation movements last September, several other clerics have had their passports withdrawn and three visiting churchmen have been deported for openly criticizing the government's racial policies. Although the head of the security police publicly denied last week that the police were engaged in a "vendetta" against the churches, another official has admitted that the Vorster government is deeply concerned about the "liberal" views of Catholics and Anglicans and is determined "to pick off" their most vocal leaders.

The dean's arrest has stirred apprehension in church circles, but it has not yet intimidated liberal church bodies. Protest from the pulpit against the arbitrary and far-reaching police powers of the state has been loud and strong. The government, however, has characteristically turned a deaf ear. In a press interview, the minister of police noted casually that he had been unaware of the dean's arrest and detention until the following morning, and that this was "the normal way in which these things are done."

This admission reflects the autonomy with which the security police are allowed to operate against government opponents. In detaining the dean, a British citizen, however, the Vorster government may have blundered. Although his arrest is unlikely to deter the Heath government from selling arms to South Africa, the Laborites and British press in their effort to stop the arms sale may use it to embarrass Heath. 25X1

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NIGERIA: During the past two weeks the government has had to deal with extensive labor and student unrest. In defiance of a government ban on strikes, workers in the private sector—who are faced with a rapidly rising cost of living—have been striking for wage increases to match those recently granted by the government to public employees. Most of the strikes have been of the wildcat variety. The government appears powerless to enforce its antistrike decree and may have to make employers in the private sector—some of whom have already granted wage increases—give in to the workers' demands.

Student unrest began early in the month in western Nigeria when a peaceful demonstration against poor food at the University of Ibadan deteriorated into a full-scale riot in which the police killed two students. Sympathy demonstrations followed at other schools. For the present, student agitation has subsided, and the University of Ibadan, which was closed because of the rioting, is scheduled to reopen on 12 February. 25X1

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Chilean Politicians Open Up

Politicians are becoming increasingly active as 4 April, the date of the nationwide municipal elections and a special senatorial election to fill the seat vacated by President Allende, approaches. On 4 February Allende held a press conference marking his first 90 days in office. His comments were generally moderate, although he sharply criticized the president of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) for statements about the investigation of the murder last October of the army commander in chief. In addition, Allende was careful to draw a distinction between his government for "the benefit of all Chileans" and the Socialist Party. He mentioned particularly the party's new secretary general, extremist Carlos Altamirano. In an apparent attempt to reassure those who were concerned because of Allende's support for Altamirano's election, the President said, "Transformations and changes are going to take place within bourgeois democracy, and if Altamirano believes we should go faster, I will tell him why we're not going to go faster."

The PDC candidate for the senate election has attacked the government for its alleged pressure on voters. He condemned Allende's announced trip to the senate electoral district as unseemly electoral intervention. There is a possibility that the PDC and the conservative National Party will arrange a face-saving compromise by which the Nationals will withdraw their candidate, thus eventually leaving a race between the PDC man and the Socialist sponsored by the government coalition. The PDC candidate believes that his only chance for victory—slim in any event—lies in a two-way contest. A deal of any sort with the right is opposed, however, by strong forces within the PDC as well as by those conservatives who still see the Christian Democrats as the cause of all the problems now facing Chile.

Allende is attempting to allay any fears of a confrontation with the US over the copper nationalization issue—a clash Altamirano and Communist Party Secretary General Luis Corvalan would like to see happen—by deftly placing the blame for any such development on the US. Speaking to copper workers he said that the copper nationalization could not be considered aggression against the US. In an interview with a French reporter the President said that if the US opposed "our right to nationalize copper, they will bear the responsibility." 25X1

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Argentine President's Position Deteriorates

President Levingston's position with most significant Argentine power groups appears to have deteriorated somewhat in the past week, largely as a result of the President's own actions. Levingston's already weak position was hurt further as a result of three events: a strongly worded presidential attack on foreign investment and large Argentine businesses, the announcement of a 5.5-percent increase in the cost of living for January, and the firing of the popular Social Welfare Minister Francisco Manrique.

Levingston apparently received a relatively free hand from the commanders of the three armed services when he met with them on 31 January, but his adoption of nationalism to achieve popular support and his dismissal of Manrique—who has close ties to army commander General Lanusse—can only serve to widen the breach between the President and the military junta. Levingston has acted in apparent defiance of Argentina's maker and breaker of presidents, General Lanusse, and at the same time has shown

a marked lack of progress in dealing with the country's pressing economic and labor problems.

The President's adoption of a nationalistic line may well have touched a responsive chord with the public in general, but this is probably more than balanced by the negative reaction to the dismissal of Manrique and the implications for the working man of the January inflation rate. Labor is now involved in wage negotiations with the government and reportedly will demand increases far in excess of the unofficial guidelines established by the Levingston government.

Business, too, has lost almost all confidence in the government and has already begun to withhold new investment. This is particularly true of foreign investors who are not convinced by the President's statements that he is opposed only to those foreign businesses—meat packers and petroleum companies—that have sought to frustrate his programs and have generally worked against the Argentine national interest.

The President, thus, has failed so far to attract wide popular support and is rapidly losing the good will of important elements of such groups as the military and business. [redacted] 25X1

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Ecuador: *Domestic Problems Surface in Wake of Tuna War*

President Velasco received strong international backing for his anti—US stand during the "tuna war," but he has not succeeded in drumming up significantly increased popular support at home. Plans for a national plebiscite later this year to ratify a new constitution, which is also designed to demonstrate approval of the president's dictatorial take-over last June, are again drawing opposition fire.

Domestic political groups have had little choice except to support Velasco on such nationalistic issues as the fisheries dispute, but they have responded in lukewarm fashion. In addition, the recent decision to expel the US Military Group, a probable face-saving device designed to gloss over Ecuador's inability to persuade OAS members to pass an anti—US resolution, has prompted a decidedly mixed reaction. Editorial comment has generally supported the government move, but several papers have taken a cautious line. Military leaders were taken by complete surprise by the decision, and a number of officers expressed their personal regret to the US mission. The President's failure to consult with military leaders has helped to raise rumors of a possible military move against the administration.

With the furor raised by the tuna boat seizures now subsiding, Velasco's foes are again focusing on the plebiscite issue. Velasco has proposed a new constitution similar to the 1946 document which he helped draft. The "new" constitution will grant greater authority to the executive, curtail congressional activities, and place greater restrictions on personal freedoms. Velasco's opponents have complained that there is no way to oppose the plebiscite or propose new alternatives. In the past two weeks, both the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party—the major opposition groups—have publicly criticized the President's plan; leaders of both parties have been jailed. The President's demonstrated intolerance for dissent has held active political opposition to a minimum. [redacted] 25X1

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

HAITI: The press on 10 February reported that 2,391,916 votes were cast in the referendum on 31 January that ratified the choice of Jean-Claude Duvalier as the successor to his father. The Central Election Committee announcement did not state that all the votes were affirmative. It noted that one "no" vote and two blank ballots were cast, something of a feat since available information indicates that only preprinted affirmative ballots were available at the polling booths.

In early February rumors circulated that Duvalier would soon turn power over to Jean-Claude and would go abroad for medical treatment.

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On 10 February, however, Luckner Cambronne, one of Duvalier's closest confidants, told the US ambassador that Duvalier will remain in office as long as his health permits, possibly "for another ten years." On 5 February, National Security Volunteers (VSN) in the Artibonite region appeared to be mobilizing. Duvalier has brought VSN contingents to Port-au-Prince on other occasions when an important event was to take place.

The conflicting rumors defy reconciliation or evaluation. In the past, Duvalier has used his poor health to further his plans, pretending to be sicker than he was to confuse the opposition and bewilder observers as to his intentions and capabilities. At any rate, his state of health does not appear thus far to have interfered with the execution of his plan to arrange the succession.

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Hanoi's Other Struggle: Building Up The Home Front

Secret

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HANOI'S OTHER STRUGGLE: BUILDING UP THE HOME FRONT

Hanoi is seeking to gain greater support from the home front—the "great rear"—for the battle in the South. Its efforts to improve the performance of the North Vietnamese people and economy, already hampered by problems of inefficiency at home and complicated by the death of Ho Chi Minh in September 1969, were challenged anew by events in Cambodia in 1970. These developments forced Hanoi's leaders to divert more of their country's manpower, as well as more of their own energy, away from domestic problems and back to the war, but this has not meant that the North Vietnamese are neglecting the home front. Their approach has been strikingly pragmatic and uncoercive; efficiency, improvement in managerial techniques, and even material incentives are being emphasized, even though party control remains a basic feature of North Vietnamese society.

Hanoi has taken this pragmatic course primarily because of the requirements of the war and the overriding need to get as much as possible out of the North Vietnamese populace over the long haul. Indeed, most of what Hanoi has been doing on the home front seems to be aimed at putting the regime in a position to support the war effort throughout Indochina for the foreseeable future.

Although Hanoi is still able to provide essential support for the war, its current policies have not conspicuously improved the North's performance. Nevertheless, the regime probably will continue to rock along much as it is doing now, mainly because shifting from the carrot to the stick would undermine popular willingness to undertake the long-term effort Hanoi now foresees.

1970: Another Year of Character-Building

Last year, like the two before it, was a hard one for North Vietnam. In 1968 and 1969, Hanoi had suffered severe military setbacks in South Vietnam and had shifted to a lower cost, longer range war strategy. It had made this shift partly to devote more attention to rebuilding the North and improving its performance as the "great rear area" for the battlefield to the south—a performance hampered by continuing problems of morale and inefficiency. In September 1969, in the midst of this effort, Ho Chi Minh had died, and his survivors had been confronted with the added task of maintaining the regime's cohesion in the absence of his towering personality. No sooner had they settled the immediate questions raised by Ho's passing and begun to dig into their domestic problems, than the spread of the war to Cambodia provided a new test of their resilience and flexibility.

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Events in Cambodia compelled the North Vietnamese to turn more of their attention and energy to the immediate problems of the war, and to ante up more manpower than they had planned. It did not force complete reorientation of their priorities, however. The evidence so far is quite convincing that even in the broadened war Hanoi is still applying the economy-of-force strictures that it began using in South Vietnam after the offensives of 1968 and early 1969. Concomitantly, it is continuing to do its best—still with decidedly mixed results—to tidy up the situation at home. To achieve as much as it can in the North without interfering with its direct war contributions, the Communist leadership has spent the last year cajoling, prodding, and urging its people—but not often coercing them—to greater and more conscientious effort. Its task has been more than usually difficult because the populace seems to have gone a bit slack psychologically in the years since the bombing stopped.

In Charge: Le Duan

Hanoi's two long-standing goals—achieving the "liberation" of South Vietnam and "building socialism" in the North—remain very closely interrelated in Communist eyes. The North Vietnamese take seriously their role as custodians of the "great rear area," and clearly there is a consensus to keep the North as strong and viable as possible as the best means for Hanoi to support and attain its goal of ultimate victory in the war. Thus the continuing emphasis on programs and activities at home in no way indicates that Hanoi is wavering in its support of the war in the South. The North Vietnamese regime was sobered by the events of 1970 and now foresees an even longer struggle than before; it may be concerned over a drop in the dedication and effectiveness of the people; but the leadership's determination in the face of these challenges seems as strong as ever.

The Leadership: Le Duan Inter Pares

Because the North Vietnamese are intensely secretive with friend and foe alike, little is known about the workings of the inner circle in Hanoi. There were no formal changes in the Lao Dong (Communist) Party structure after Ho's death, and indeed Ho's position as chairman remains unfilled. There is now hardly any doubt, however,

Number Two: Truong Chinh

that Le Duan, the party's first secretary, is the leading figure in the collective that has governed the country since Ho's death. Le Duan lacks Ho's mystique, and he does not receive nor seem to seek the hero-worship that he and his colleagues accorded Ho; but his pre-eminence is visible in many ways. It was he who wrote by far the most authoritative document to come out of North Vietnam since Ho died, a massive article on the whole range of Vietnamese Communist policy that was published last February and disseminated widely in North Vietnam. Moreover, the regime's domestic policies bear more of a resemblance to Le Duan's pragmatic, flexible approach than to the more dogmatically Marxist views that are often attributed to National Assembly chief Truong Chinh, who is presently the second-ranking man in the party hierarchy.

At the top of the Politburo pecking order with Le Duan and Truong Chinh are Premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. It is believed that in the past policy disputes have divided these leaders—particularly Le Duan and Truong Chinh—but the salient characteristic of the Hanoi leadership during the last year has been its unblemished appearance of unity. The Communists have an interest in projecting such an image, of course, but it is something they have not always been able to achieve in the party. Historically, Hanoi has given the "democratic" aspects of "democratic centralism" full play and from time to time debate has spilled over into published Vietnamese Communist writings. Throughout 1970, however, the overt literature was almost entirely devoid of controversy.

A more concrete sign that there is no unmanageable friction in the Hanoi collective was the smoothness of the transition after Ho's death. In fact, the so-called "new" leadership is simply the "old" leadership minus Ho. For a few months there was a period of uncertainty in which Le Duan was not heard from and Truong Chinh was particularly prominent. Once Le Duan reappeared, however, his authority was unquestioned. Not only did he face no open challenge, but there has been no sign of a party shake-up that might have been expected if a serious behind-the-scenes struggle had taken place.

None of the evidence permits a confident appraisal of the depth or the durability of this apparent harmony. Hanoi's leaders must share a degree of real consensus developed during more than a generation of working together, but a good deal of animosity—animosity that could not be fully ventilated because of the need to present a united front to Hanoi's enemies—may also have been stored up over the years. As far as current policy is concerned the question is somewhat academic; dissension has been contained in the past when it was running stronger than it seems to be running now, and any disputes at present are almost certainly manageable. But over the longer term the leadership problem will bear watching, particularly if current trends in the war continue. The make-up of the ruling group has remained essentially the same for decades. Since 1960, when Truong Chinh was formally replaced by Le Duan as first secretary, there have not even been any changes in the ranking. Hanoi's rulers are only exceptionally durable, not immortal, and any backlog of dissension may start to surface when succession questions begin to loom larger.

Strengthening the North: The Problem of Motivation

Inefficiency at home has been a perennial problem to North Vietnam. Although this shortcoming has not seemed to impinge seriously on the prosecution of the war itself—probably because the sheer magnitude of a war effort tends to offset most organizational shortcomings—its existence continues to hamper efforts to improve performance on the home front. To complicate the regime's problems, since the end of the bombing the people at all levels seem to have decided that they could rest on their oars a bit. Worker productivity, which declined during the bombing, has not improved significantly since then. Profiteering and other forms of corruption within the administration have persisted, peasants have

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"I was born in the days when the co-op reaped its first five tons of autumn rice per hectare."

neglected their duties in the agricultural cooperatives to work their private plots of ground, and the black market has continued to flourish. To the regime's intense displeasure, Hanoi even has a few home-grown hippies.

By early 1970 the leadership had spent two years trying with no particular success to overcome these maladies. Along with the standard propaganda exhortations, and motivation campaign, it introduced some basic changes in domestic priorities. Development of heavy industries, for instance, which had received priority before the bombing, was downgraded in favor of agriculture and light industry, and the regime started trying to make more consumer goods available. Nothing seemed to do much to stimulate popular devotion to the cause, however. Then the safehaven and supply channel that Cambodia represented disappeared. It soon became apparent that Hanoi would have to start sending more men off to war than it had planned and that this drain would continue longer than it had hoped. Moreover, the prospect of an expanded and even longer war must have aggravated the morale problem at home just at the moment when solving that problem took on new urgency.

Essentially Hanoi's answer to its dilemma was to intensify the programs it had already introduced. As Le Duan had prescribed in his article of February 1970, North Vietnam's effectiveness was to be improved through the widespread use of technology, through improved administrative techniques, through decentralization, and even through the use of incentives. Farmers, for instance, have been guaranteed that for five years or more the state will take only a certain percentage of their crops, leaving them free to sell any surplus to the government or on the open market. Central direction of the society and economy was mellowed with pragmatism, and the heavy emphasis was on efficiency, not on Marxist orthodoxy.

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Wielding the Carrot

A good example of the regime's technique is a campaign still in progress to increase agricultural production. Articles promoting the campaign have been full of administrative *mea culpas:* the officials who supervise operations on the cooperatives have been self-seeking, party cadre have set poor examples, the system for distributing consumer goods to the peasants is inadequate to provide incentives for higher production. Almost totally lacking are condemnations either of the peasants themselves or of the highly unsocialist free market into which many agricultural goods are channeled. In fact, although the government has called for the eventual elimination of the free market, it apparently finds the market necessary, not just to provide incentives for increased agricultural production but as a supplement to official channels of distribution.

In dealing with the broader problem of general slackness in the populace, Hanoi has followed a similar line based on friendly persuasion. A press campaign urging respect for law and order—covering everything from petty pilfering and disrespect for one's elders to major crimes and large-scale malfeasance—was carried out intermittently through much of 1970. On the whole, its emphasis too was hortatory rather than punitive. And when legislation finally was written to back up the exhortations, it was aimed at cleaning up the system rather than at coercing the individual. Two decrees, one to protect "socialist property" and the other to protect "private property," were issued in late October. The first of these was aimed at those in and out of government who divert property belonging to the state (i.e., most of the goods, real estate, and money in the country) to their own benefit. The targets of the second were mainly officials who use their positions to fleece their fellow citizens. Wrongdoing under either decree carries stiff penalties, embezzlement can be a capital offense, for instance.

The government clearly regards the socialist property decree as the more important of the two. It has already made highly publicized examples of several errant officials who were caught with their hands in the till. The decree on private property seems by comparison a sop to public opinion. Nevertheless, the two edicts taken together—but particularly the open decision by the regime to defend the sanctity of private property—further attest to the unorthodox methods by which Hanoi is trying to solve the problems it sees.

Whither Revisionism?

The regime's current domestic policies have struck more than one orthodox observer from elsewhere in the Communist world as revisionist, excusable (if at all) only because a nation at war has special needs. One East German visitor, for instance, was appalled that so much of the output of the agricultural cooperatives found its way to the free market. Some members of the regime almost certainly share these views. Although nobody in Hanoi seems to be arguing very hard at the moment for ideological purity, the long-term implications of the conflict between orthodoxy and revisionism still exist and could be important for the leadership and the party.

North Vietnam's domestic policies have been pragmatic since Hanoi intensified the war effort in the 1960s. The bombing that began in earnest in 1965 administered a particularly heavy blow to orthodox precepts of centralization and orderly planning; since then the ambitious five-year plan has been replaced by a series of one-year plans. Even after the bombing stopped, however, a practical outlook on domestic policies persisted. The present decentralized, uncoercive approach to the problem of revitalizing the North continues the trend.

The more orthodox members of Hanoi's leadership almost certainly are unhappy with the way things are going. Whether they eventually make a serious attempt to reverse the direction of events will depend largely on the extent of their support in the lower echelons of the party; this

will depend in turn on the extent to which the party has absorbed the pragmatic habit of thought it has been exposed to for so many years. There is a chance, in other words, that by giving pragmatism in their domestic policies priority over ideology, Hanoi's present leaders may be laying the groundwork for long-lasting and substantial changes in North Vietnam's basic philosophy.

"Everything for the Front Line"

But for now, Hanoi's outlook is shaped mainly by the requirements of the war, and its policies are summed up in the slogan "everything for the front line." The idea that North Vietnam must be kept strong, stable, and in a position to provide the manpower to support the war is deeply entrenched in these policies, and what Hanoi is doing to improve the situation on the home front is aimed mainly at supporting the longer war the Communists now believe lies ahead.

In late 1968 and in 1969, when Hanoi thought it might obtain US concessions that could lead to a political settlement, there were some signs that the North Vietnamese were beginning to think about traditional postwar problems of reconstruction and development. There were strong suggestions that some of those looking down this road were pressing for an early return to economic orthodoxy, for further collectivization of agriculture, and for a harsher type of domestic discipline. Such indications have long since disappeared, along with any signs that the Vietnamese Communists anticipate an early end to the war.

The priority needs of the war are seen clearly in the accelerated military mobilization campaign that got under way not long after Sihanouk was overthrown. It is impossible to ascertain with any precision the number of North Vietnamese mobilized. It seems reasonably certain that more men entered the army last year than in 1969, but not as many as in 1968, when

WELCOME SPRING '71
by To Huu

Goethe: Man should act
Lenin: Man should know how to dream

'71 comes, serious, like a soldier
Setting out upon receiving orders, combat-ready,
His face beaming calmly,
Fresh and strong in his green, light uniform,
The Central Committee met, on a chilly day
A home-returned swallow from the opposite window looked this way;
The high command sat—grizzled hair, silky heads;
With Uncle still there, serene, looking down, mildly.
The plan was worked out,
The front shall step up attacks,
The rear shall give all-out support.
The Fatherland, entering spring, calls the paddy fields
Alive with the new five-ton strains
Which stand upright like young lads eager to achieve exploits,
How lovely they are, those plots of barren land,
Those waste hills gnawed by erosion!
At the party's words, they suddenly find themselves rich again.
The sap of youth rises, faces shine,
This land remains green even in winter.
The Yanks destroy, we build anew.
We fill up bomb-craters to install blast furnaces,
Our factories lean against the walls of deep, solid caves.
We lean on our own hearts, full of pride.
Our great life sees with the party's eyes,
Which, beyond each step now, show us vistas of longer dreams.
This spring Uncle no longer writes poems,
With the Central Committee's call burning hot in its heart,
Our nation as one man is marching, to the firing line.
We shall strike, strike thunder blows
To shatter the hawks' wings, and bash in their heads.
The Fatherland is rallying.
Fearless of a long-drawn fight, we shall grow up fast
To clear the Ho Chi Minh roads so it will illumine all posterity.
Surely Uncle will be glad
As each time we won a success,
He would laud us: "That's good."
Be worthy, O year '71!

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major offensives were under way in South Vietnam. Moreover, the call up of men into the regular army has been accompanied by a drive to expand and to improve the country's regional and militia troops—the forces that serve as a home guard. These steps seem to have returned North Vietnam rather closely to the conditions of the bombing years, when much of the population was organized along military lines to produce, to guard and maintain supply lines to the south, and to provide replacements for Communist forces in South Vietnam.

To drive home the point that "everything for the front line" is the current theme in Hanoi, the Communists convened a central committee meeting, probably in late January, to deliberate on the demands imposed by the broadened conflict. For the past several years these sessions were not publicized, but this one issued a closing communiqué and was also discussed in an editorial in the party daily. As is usual with such documents, the communiqué does not say much about the war, but its treatment of domestic issues leaves no doubt that Hanoi anticipates a long war and is going to call on the populace for greater sacrifices. The editorial makes the same point more explicitly.

The communiqué pays lip service to the longer term, orthodox socialist goals of developing heavy industry, further collectivizing agriculture, and generally building a more orthodox Marxist state. But it indicates that real pursuit of these objectives will be put off, as they have been in the past, because they are not compatible with an all-out effort to carry on the war.

Hanoi may be following its present course at home in part because some of its top leaders are inclined toward pragmatism and opposed to overreliance on rigid ideology. But the requirements of the war are the main factors in its choice. The regime does not want to rock its domestic boat by trying to carry out programs that might require considerable coercion of the population just at a time when it is asking for more sacrifices. Ideological purity simply is a luxury North Vietnam cannot afford; the most important task is to create among the people and in the economy the proper mood and conditions that are necessary to carry on the war.

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Next 16 Page(s) In Document Denied