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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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India and Pakistan Focus on Diplomacy

Troops of India and Pakistan remain massed on the borders, but both countries are undertaking diplomatic initiatives. Some of these seem more designed to score propaganda points than to attack the crux of the problem. Islamabad publicized UN Secretary General Thant's offer on 20 October to assist in defusing the crisis, as well as the full text of President Yahya's affirmative reply. Yahya called for UN observers on both sides of the borders to oversee a mutual withdrawal of military forces and requested the secretary general to visit both countries to discuss a pullback.

Islamabad probably hopes this gesture will induce major powers to press India for an equivalent response or, at least, for restraint. The Pakistanis undoubtedly consider it highly unlikely that there will be a change in India's resistance to UN mediation or to withdrawal from the borders. They probably hope this gambit will help counter the impact of Prime Minister Gandhi's three-week tour of Western European capitals and the US.

Mrs. Gandhi justified her trip at this time by the need to exchange views with world leaders and to explain to them the "reality of our situation." Last week, she told visiting President Tito that she could not rule out war as a solution and that unless major powers used their influence with Pakistan to bring about a return of the refugees, India "would use all available means to force a solution."

Before departing on her foreign tour, Mrs. Gandhi met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, who arrived on 22 October for allegedly routine biannual talks.

According to a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the talks, the Indo-Pakistani situation dominated the agenda. According to press reports, a Soviet military delegation headed by Deputy Defense Minister Kutakhov, commander in chief of the air force, was to arrive in New Delhi on 29 October, probably to assess



Prime Minister Eyskens Greets Indira Gandhi in Brussels

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India's use of Soviet military equipment, possibly to discuss further military aid.

On the military side, Mrs. Gandhi on 23 October called up all of India's army reserves and selected navy and air force reserves. Although India has about 700,000 army reserves, only some 44,000 are sufficiently trained and equipped to be considered near ready for military action. The remainder are primarily college students who would require considerable training before being able to function effectively. In practical terms, therefore, the call-up of reserves provides an only marginal strengthening of India's already superior military position.

Along the India - West Pakistan border, where the largest concentrations of troops and equipment are, the Indians now have at least 200,000 men facing a Pakistan force of some 160,000. India has been deploying ground troops as well as aircraft to the border area since August.

although by now all of the larger ground units have been moved. India's only armored division recently moved from its home base in the Jhansi-Babina area in north-central India toward the border with West Pakistan, placing most of India's 1,300 tanks near the border areas. Pakistan probably has moved most of its available forces to the border area.

In the East, India has more than 100,000 troops nearly surrounding East Pakistan, with at least four more divisions near the border with China. The Pakistanis have a force of about 80,000 in the East, if the 10,000 or so police and guard units are counted. India's Air Force tips the scales decisively in the East, where it has stationed three squadrons of 16 MIG-21s each and at least six squadrons of ground-support aircraft. The Pakistanis have just 20 aging F-86 ground-support aircraft, only about half of which appear to be combat ready. Pakistan's ability to resupply its forces in the East is at best questionable. In any case, the Pakistanis need all of the forces they can muster in the West, particularly aircraft, in

which the Indian Air Force has a nearly two-to-one edge in fighters.

In sharp contrast to the usually bleak prognostications about the food situation in East Pakistan, the latest assessment by the US Consulate in Dacca is that the danger of famine in the East has subsided, at least until next spring. The improved situation results from the outflow of over nine million East Pakistanis, the intensive program to distribute imported foodgrain in the countryside, and the normal monsoon rice crop, which will be harvested shortly. Localized food shortages have been reported, but there have been no indications of widespread hunger or starvation. If relief efforts go on expanding, there should be enough food available during the winter period to assure reasonably adequate supplies in all but limited pockets. The consulate thus concludes that hunger is unlikely to be a reason for a continuing large refugee flow to India this winter.

As for India's economy, at a meeting this week in Paris of the 13-nation consortium of aid donors India was successful in securing a pledge of additional funds to assist in shouldering the costs imposed by the deluge of Pakistani refugees. This sort of aid to India so far has been slow to materialize. At the same time, the consortium declined to consider Pakistan's request that its debt be rescheduled. Islamabad may now be forced to negotiate with each consortium member individually to extend its six-month unilateral moratorium, which saved Pakistan \$60 million in scarce foreign exchange. The moratorium expires this week.

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The Sadat Visit to Moscow

Moscow and Cairo are trying to create the impression that President Sadat's three-day visit to the USSR has deepened Soviet-Egyptian friendship, but there are signs that the talks were tough enough to leave a healthy residue of resentment on both sides. Relations between the two countries have been clouded in the past six months by the removal and trial of leftists from the Egyptian Government and the anti-Communist purge in the Sudan which was supported by Sadat. These factors may have been the primary reason for Sadat's visit.

officially on the role of the Confederation of Arab Republics and the threat of anti-Communism in the Middle East. The Soviets hitherto have been lukewarm in their praise of the confederation, fearing that Libya's role in the triad is not in Moscow's interest. The communiqué's strong condemnation of "attempts to spread anti-Communism in the Middle East" offers a reminder to Sadat that his support for the purges in the Sudan last summer was anathema to the USSR. The communiqué also notes that the two sides have agreed on "measures aimed at further strengthening the military might of Egypt."

Egyptian news media are claiming full Soviet support for Cairo's position in the wake of the visit, but two articles by a member of the Egyptian delegation state that the two sides were "extremely frank and outspoken" in discussing their differences. Lutfi al-Khuli, a member of the central committee of Egypt's only political party, wrote that the Soviets wanted an explanation of Sadat's description of 1971 as the "year of decision" and of Cairo's connection with the anti-Soviet slogans being heard in the Middle East. The Egyptians reportedly wanted a Soviet comparison between arms they have given the Arabs and US arms given the Israelis. They also wanted Soviet views on how high an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory ranked in the general framework of Soviet strategy on world issues. Al-Khuli did not say what answers were given to these questions but noted that the discussions enabled Arab-Soviet relations to pass over a "pool of troubled, putrid water." An Egyptian journalist who was with Sadat agreed that the early sessions were tense.

The communiqué that capped the visit indicated that the two sides could only agree super-

So far, there has been no sign of a Soviet airlift of materiel, which has followed previous successful visits of an Egyptian president to Moscow. The USSR already has provided Cairo with nearly all types of modern conventional arms in the Soviet inventory. In ground armaments only a new tank and an armored personnel carrier might be offered to Egypt, but these would not significantly alter Israel's superiority over Egyptian ground forces. In both naval and air forces, the Soviets could supply some new types of weapons but these either would offer no significant improvement in capabilities or would be beyond current Egyptian capabilities to operate. In surface-to-air missiles, the combination of the SA-2 and SA-3 is the best the Soviets have for the Egyptian theater of operations. Continued training in the operation and maintenance of existing weapons systems—and not new systems themselves—offers the most practical method of improving Egyptian military capabilities. All of this, of course, does not rule out the provision of additional conventional weapons.

Moscow is taking the line that while it continues to provide military assistance to the Arabs,

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UNEASY COMARADERIE: Sadat in Moscow with Podgorny, Kosygin, and Brezhnev



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Perhaps in response to Soviet admonitions during his visit, Sadat has been referring less frequently to the decisive nature of 1971, and has blunted the sharp edges of his earlier rhetoric.

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China

The UN—A Change of Chinas

The General Assembly's expulsion of Nationalist China late Monday night is sure to increase the erosion of Taipei's international position, but should not have an immediate impact on Taiwan's internal stability. Peking is certain to make full use of this dramatic blow to Nationalist prestige to undermine Taipei's diplomatic relations even further. Belgium announced recognition the day after the vote, and such states as Argentina, Peru, Togo, and Senegal are likely soon to open diplomatic relations with Peking.

Chinese Nationalists: Bloody but Unbowed

The Chinese Nationalist UN mission has said that Taipei's withdrawal statement applied only to the UN and its subsidiary organs, not to spe-

cialized agencies, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The mission said Taipei has decided in principle to attempt to stay on in all specialized agencies, which will decide individually on the modalities of Chinese representation. The wide margin in favor of the Albanian resolution suggests, however, that Taipei will in most cases face great difficulties in maintaining a position. The Chinese Communist acting foreign minister said on 26 October that Peking, for its part, was already considering sending a delegation to New York, but this is unlikely before Taipei's position is clarified.

The General Assembly vote did not come as a complete surprise on Taiwan either to officials or to the public.



Nationalist China Walks Out of UN

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[redacted] A series of forthright articles in the island's controlled press had prepared the populace for the possible defeat of the US-sponsored resolutions supporting Taipei's membership. The loss of UN representation has thus far not aroused popular emotion on Taiwan, and there is no indication that antigovernment reactions will take place as a result of the repudiation of the regime's claim to represent all China—the stock justification for mainlander minority rule on the island.


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Soviet Reaction

Despite Moscow's unhappiness with the idea of Peking's UN membership, the Soviets apparently engaged in no behind-the-scenes maneuvering to forestall Peking's admission prior to the decisive vote. In fact, the Soviets spoke in favor of Peking's entry earlier in the debate and in each case voted in a way favorable to the eventual adoption of the Albanian resolution. *Pravda* subsequently called the vote a "triumph of common sense."

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Indochina

Vietnam: Worries for the Communists

An authoritative Hanoi foreign policy article has added to earlier indications that North Vietnam fears that its ability to set an independent course in the war is threatened by the prospect of negotiations between its major Communist patrons and the US.

The review, written by Foreign Minister Trinh and published in the October issue of the Hanoi theoretical journal *Hoc Tap*, is designed to pass the current Vietnamese Communist foreign policy line to key officials. It conveys a bleak message. In resurfacing the concern over big-power summitry that produced a rash of anti-Chinese polemics last summer, Trinh leaves the clear impression that the Vietnamese have not been fully reassured by Moscow's and Peking's continued protestations of support or by the visits to Hanoi of President Podgorny and Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien.

Trinh seems particularly concerned over the possibility that Soviet and Chinese military aid may be reduced. He is lavish in his praise of the economic assistance from Peking and Moscow, but expressions of satisfaction with military support are conspicuously absent. Instead, the officials are given standard exhortations to be self-sufficient and slightly defensive passages are designed to remind them of the war's importance to the Communist movement as a whole.

Trinh also displays great sensitivity over Hanoi's loss of initiative in its negotiations with the US. He promises to step up Hanoi's diplomatic activities in support of its war effort. He resurrects a line, which has not been prominent for some time, to the effect that diplomacy is a "front of strategic importance" in its own right.

The article naturally reveals few specifics about what Hanoi intends to do on the diplo-

matic front. It could, of course, presage some reformulation or change in Hanoi's terms for a war settlement. There is nothing in the text of the article, however, that indicates this is in the offing. It does appear that Trinh's article conveys a message to the officials that Hanoi is going to have to rely to a greater extent in the coming period on diplomatic and political efforts to achieve its objectives in Indochina. Although Trinh nods to the importance of military action, pledges a continuation of protracted warfare, and promises total victory eventually, he significantly omits its importance in reinforcing diplomacy and leaves the net impression that Hanoi realizes the war is entering a phase in which political maneuvering on both sides may play a greater role in the development of the conflict than in the past.

Communists Withdraw from Border Fighting

The Communists appear to be abandoning their month-long military campaign in South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province and along the Cambodian border. Although some scattered fighting continues, the Communist 7th Division and its three subordinate regiments have departed the South Vietnamese battlefields.

When the fighting began, it appeared that the Communists intended to sustain their offensive for several months. Captured documents indicate that the campaign was launched to tie down Saigon's forces in northwestern Military Region 3 and thereby prevent the South Vietnamese Army from staging a major push against Communist base areas in Cambodia. However, Saigon's forces, supported by massive US bombing, blunted the Communist offensive and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.


Buddhists Debate Anti-Thieu Tactics

The An Quang Buddhists apparently are still discussing tactics for dealing with President Thieu, although their most influential leaders apparently intend to continue pursuing a relatively

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25X1 moderate course, avoiding an open confrontation.




The An Quang monks are concerned that they might lose prestige and influence within the Buddhist community if they appear too moderate and willing to cooperate with Thieu. The senior monks are being challenged by a group of younger activists who are hopeful that some of their seniors can be discredited through identification with a policy of cooperation with Thieu. The activists believe this would give them an opportunity to gain influence within the Buddhist community. Thus far, the senior monks have been able to block the activists from instigating Buddhist antigovernment demonstrations. But pressure from the activists may have been responsible for the An Quang's adoption of a harsher position in opposition to Thieu's re-election in the final days before the referendum.

Although relatively moderate leaders still seem to have the most influence within the An Quang, continued pressure from activist elements could eventually induce them to move toward more open opposition to Thieu. This would be particularly true if An Quang's legislative representatives prove ineffective or if some new situation develops in which the government shows signs of weakness. Internal divisions among the Buddhists persist and this could weaken their force of any opposition they try to mount.

Lower House in the Political Spotlight

The National Assembly, which began its fall term after the presidential election, has been slow to organize itself. The process should pick up steam next week after President Thieu's inauguration. Attention has been focused on the newly

elected Lower House, where various political factions have been trying, behind the scenes, to set up coalitions.



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The government also wishes to limit the amount of time available for the house to consider the budget for 1972. The constitution stipulates that the Lower House must act on the budget and forward it to the Senate by 30 November. The budget has been a frequent source of friction between the executive and the assembly, and Thieu may be anticipating considerable trouble this time in view of the apparent increase in opposition strength in the Lower House.

The government's concern about its position in the house may be well-founded, since some ostensibly progovernment deputies are really lukewarm toward the palace and others dislike being regarded as government lackeys. Opposition blocs have been coalescing around the An Quang Buddhists and the Progressive Nationalist Movement. When the house gets down to business, however, the government still seems likely to retain majority support on most issues.

Inaugural Preparations

The government is heavily engaged in preparations for President Thieu's inauguration this weekend. Thieu appears determined that an impressive ceremony be held as a further demonstration of his strength and popularity. Thousands of members of the military and the bureaucracy are being transported from the provinces to Saigon for the affair. Security officials are somewhat concerned about possible attempts by the Viet Cong or by extremist non-Communist groups to disrupt the inauguration, but most of the officials are confident that any incidents will be minor.

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Laos: The Open Road

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[REDACTED]

Route 23, the main road across the western portion of the Bolovens Plateau, has been reopened to civilian traffic, although some portions are subject to harassment by Communist units in the area. Sweep operations and patrols are being conducted but, despite the presence of two companies, enemy troops on 25 October were able to ambush a government convoy near Paksong. Defense forces in Paksong town have been strengthened by the arrival of two more irregular battalions, bringing the total to six irregular battalions plus a three-battalion regular army task force.

North Laos: Preparations Continue

Although military activity around the Plaine des Jarres has been confined to small-unit actions, probes, and shelling attacks, there is evidence that the Communists are continuing to prepare for a dry season offensive. Enemy activity has been particularly heavy northeast of the Plaine. Route 7, the principal line of communication into the Plaine from North Vietnam, carried sustained heavy traffic last week. Road cuts from air strikes were quickly bypassed or repaired. Pilots have also noted a continuing supply buildup in the Khang Khay area on the northeastern edge of the Plaine.

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Pilots have also spotted large groups of North Vietnamese in the open during the last several days. The troops were in new uniforms and failed to take cover when the planes approached, suggesting that they were newly arrived from North Vietnam.

[REDACTED]

Communist Radiophoto



After the Bombs and Floods . . .

Cambodia: Lon Nol Sticks to His Guns


Seemingly unperturbed by the adverse international reaction or by the limited displays of domestic disapproval to his strong speech of 20 October, Lon Nol is maintaining the position that authoritarian measures are called for under present wartime conditions.

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
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Lon Nol has wisely used a much more moderate approach in dealing with Buddhist elements in Phnom Penh who demonstrated against the transformation of the National Assembly and who wanted him to replace Cheng Heng as chief of state. He informed the Buddhists that the government wants to adopt a new constitution as soon as possible in order to hold general elections, after which he implied he could become the republic's first president. Thus reassured, the Buddhists have not followed through on earlier threats to stage additional protest demonstrations.



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Wrestling With the Economy

Early in the week, Finance Minister Sok Chhong announced the government's reforms to help stabilize the economy. The program includes cuts in spending, higher tax rates, stronger credit control, and a possible relaxation of price controls. The key elements are liberalization of imports and abandonment of the official exchange rate of 55 riels per US dollar in favor of a flexible rate. These moves are essential if inflation is to be checked.

Implementation of the reforms will clear the way for a \$20 million US cash grant needed to bolster Cambodia's critically low foreign exchange reserves. Action on the reforms is also considered a prerequisite to obtaining foreign contributions to an exchange support fund, now under active consideration. Cambodian officials hope to complete plans for the fund at a donor's meeting in Paris in early November.

The Military Situation

The Communists moved against several main roads during the week. Enemy forces launched a coordinated series of ground and rocket attacks on 27 October against a number of Cambodian positions on Route 6 between Rumlong and Tang Krasang. Four government battalions in and around Rumlong reportedly have suffered substantial casualties. Reinforcements are being sent from Skoun to Rumlong, and the army high command apparently is confident that it can withstand the increased pressure against Route 6.

The Cambodians are concerned, however, over the major bridge farther south on Route 6 that has been partially destroyed by the Communists. It apparently will be difficult to repair, thus hampering the government's ability to move supplies to its troops strung out along the road.

In the southwest, light harassing attacks in the Pich Nil Pass have temporarily closed two miles of Route 4. Government forces have not yet made any sustained effort to reopen the highway.

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
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PHILIPPINES: The long-smoldering Muslim dissidence in the southern Philippines flared up again on 25 October when insurgents launched a series of attacks in Lanao del Norte Province. In the most serious incidents, 17 men of a 22-man government force were killed while en route to relieve a besieged constabulary garrison. Armed violence between the private armies of Muslim and Christian political leaders has been endemic on Mindanao for some time, though most observers have regarded the problem in Lanao as less deeply rooted than that in nearby Cotabato Province.

The Lanao dissidence has been closely associated with a personal struggle for supremacy between the area political boss, Nacionalista Party Congressman Dimaporo (a Muslim) and Liberal Party Governor Quibranza (a Christian). When violence broke out in early September, President Marcos resolved it primarily through a political settlement by which Governor Quibranza agreed to withdraw from the gubernatorial race in favor of a compromise candidate. Quibranza later had second thoughts, but the election commission rejected his bid to file as an independent candidate. In an effort to discover what triggered the latest antigovernment violence, President Marcos is trying to contact Dimaporo and other Muslim leaders. At the same time, he has ordered more troops into the province and has placed the army in charge of security operations.

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Kosygin in Canada: *A Mixed Picture*

Canadian and Soviet officials breathed a sigh of relief on 26 October, when Soviet Premier Kosygin departed alive and unhurt for Cuba. The Canadian visit probably is looked upon by both sides as a qualified success. It provided Prime Minister Trudeau an opportunity to underline his efforts at diversifying Canada's foreign affairs. It allowed the Soviets to draw attention again to their detente policies and to take another step in developing a special relationship with an ally of the US.

Efforts by minority groups to remove some of the luster from the visit were successful. Demonstrations, bomb threats, and an assailant who mauled the Soviet premier managed to distract

from the favorable notice given the trip. The Canadian press gave predominant space to the demonstrations. The press also distorted and sensationalized Trudeau's remarks about Soviet-Canadian friendship. Although most Canadians approve of Trudeau's efforts to provide Ottawa with more variegated political and economic contacts, the public generally was indifferent to the visit.

For the most part, the two leaders were careful to avoid statements that would give offense to Washington. One exception was Kosygin's luncheon toast given on 19 October, attempting to fan Canadian resentment over US economic policies. The Soviet premier did not

Kosygin in Canada: *Smoking the Pipe of Peace?*



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repeat this effort, however, and at a news conference the following day passed up several opportunities to be critical of the US. For his part, Trudeau balanced his professed desire for warmer relations with Moscow with acknowledgment of the many differences between the two countries.

On bilateral issues, the two sides agreed on a general exchanges agreement. The Soviets rebuffed Trudeau's suggestion for an international conference on the arctic, even though both sides agreed to expand bilateral cooperation on arctic

problems, particularly the prevention of pollution. Kosygin repeated the Soviet proposal, raised during Trudeau's May visit to Moscow, for a separate agreement covering economic development and technological and industrial cooperation, but the final communiqué noted only that the Canadians promised to give further study to the proposal. The two countries also agreed to continue discussions on maritime shipping and air transportation as well as to negotiate an extension of the bilateral trade agreement for another four years.

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Soviet Economy Dances to Agriculture's Tune

Moscow reported that by the end of the third quarter industrial growth, although still at a respectable rate, had slipped from its midyear pace. As for agriculture, the Soviets are continuing to buy grain from the West despite a near-record grain crop this year.

Civilian industrial output is estimated to have grown by about five percent during July-September over the same period in 1970, compared with nearly seven percent achieved at midyear. The growth in industrial materials and consumer nondurables such as food and clothing fell several percentage points below the rate achieved during the first six months. Growth in the civilian machinery sector, however, exceeded the relatively high rate of growth reached at midyear.

As in 1970, the third-quarter decline can probably be attributed in large part to the diversion of labor and trucks from the industrial sector to support harvest operations in August and September. Strong support for the agricultural sector also is indicated by the high growth rates of mineral fertilizer and agricultural machinery.

Unusually good weather during the recent harvest period improved the prospects for this year's grain crop. The grain harvest will be at least

145 million tons and may approach the 1970 record level of 150 million tons. Nevertheless, the Soviets are still in the market for Western grain. By September, they had contracted for about 4 million tons of Canadian and Australian wheat worth about \$305 million. Market sources report negotiations for \$300-350 million more, mainly feed grains. Altogether these deals equal about one-fourth of the country's annual hard-currency earnings.

Both foreign and domestic demands probably influence Soviet decisions to buy grain. Demand for grain by Soviet client states could reach 7.5 million tons during this fiscal year, which began in July. Domestically, harvesting conditions and storage problems in the past two years reduced the quality of some wheat stocks. More importantly, the program to increase livestock holdings, as a long-run solution to meat supply problems, has drawn down stocks of wheat and intensified the need for greater amounts of fodder. Large grain imports, in addition to the measures taken to ensure a good harvest, illustrate the regime's firm intention to improve the quality of consumer diets. This year, there has been a moderate upturn in the amount of wheat available per capita after several years of stagnation.

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
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Belgium: Political Tempo Rises

Both parties in the present government, Social Christians and the Socialists, should win additional seats in the parliamentary election on 7 November. This would reverse the electoral trend of recent years. The key question, however, is whether the Socialists can win enough seats to become the dominant partner in a new coalition with the opposition Liberal Party.

Few policy changes have been promised in the campaign. Rather, the ruling parties take

Lower House of Belgian Parliament

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strength from constitutional reforms that have eased tensions between the country's French- and Dutch-speaking communities and have weakened the appeal of the militant communal parties, such as the Volksunie.

The Social Christians, stressing continuity and expertise, are hopeful that they can recover votes lost to the Volksunie in Flanders. They are, however, vulnerable to charges that Prime Minister Eyskens called the election to avoid legislation promised the French-speakers as part of the reform package. The co-president of the Socialists, Leburton, who would like to be the next prime minister, has been particularly vocal on this score. He has made little political mileage, however, and the Socialists' self assurance, is waning. They are now stressing standard "progressive" themes.

The Liberals, the other major party, are split on social and linguistic issues. Like the other opposition parties, they were caught off guard by the government's call for early elections and have not campaigned effectively.

The contest is particularly hard fought in Brussels. The government's municipal reform program has done little for the city's predominantly French-speaking population and, as a consequence, the government parties may suffer badly.

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GERMANY: The inter-German talks have produced agreement on some technical details affecting sealed freight in transit between West Berlin and West Germany. No progress has been made on thornier issues such as one-day passes for West Berliners to visit East Berlin. The West Germans have expressed satisfaction with the "business-like" way the East German negotiators are approaching the talks, but warn against overoptimism and believe that the negotiations will not be concluded before the end of the year. The East Germans appear willing to agree on those issues that do not impinge on their notion of statehood

but apparently hope to gain concessions by dragging out talks and playing on West Germany's desire for progress in its Ostpolitik. There is, however, speculation that the Soviets may not support prolonged foot-dragging by the Pankow regime. This is fueled by the achievement of peripheral progress following the 20 October whirlwind trip to Moscow by the East German foreign minister and senior East German negotiators. The East German leadership may also find it more difficult to appear unreasonable in dealing with the new Nobel Peace Laureate, Chancellor Brandt.

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Gierek's Poland: *Calm Without Contentment*

During his first ten months as party leader, Edward Gierek has reduced the hostility of the workers with selected ad hoc solutions to their complaints and by creating channels through which they can communicate new grievances. Gierek's policies have established a freer atmosphere and have been well received, even though they have not satisfied all of the populace's demands. These same tactics have proved unpopular, however, with many of the party's middle and lower cadre who believe that Gierek's "renewal" has encouraged the public to become too assertive in pressing demands upon the regime.

One of Gierek's more popular innovations—a television program called the "citizens' tribune," through which the people can question national leaders and voice opinions about the country's problems—has been adopted for use in several of the large industrial enterprises. Earlier this month, workers at the Lenin Combine in Krakow submitted 3,600 questions to party and industrial leaders, including the provincial party chief. This type of dialogue has become a permanent fixture at the Warski shipyard in Szczecin. In Poznan, provincial government leaders man phones two hours a week answering questions from the citizens.

The dialogues reveal that the workers want a broad spectrum of economic and social benefits, especially better living accommodations, modern work facilities, and recreational opportunity. A worker summed up one aspect of the problem when he asked, "In the summer we can go to the

park, but where can we go in the winter?" The authorities neither have a satisfactory answer, nor can they ignore the question after last winter's riots.

Gierek believes it is better to explain why all inadequacies cannot be overcome immediately rather than have them smoulder, but he cannot count on the cooperation of large segments of the party bureaucracy inherited from Gomulka. These include mossbacks who are unaccustomed to making decisions on their own, or to defending their actions from public scrutiny. They would have been unable to cope, for example, at a recent meeting with a worker who, amidst the cheers of his co-workers, told his director, "We shall force the authorities to finance the construction of a cultural center."

Top party officials have served notice that passive resistance of local bureaucrats to Gierek's programs will not be tolerated. Most recently, politburo member Jan Szydlak warned that party officials who avoid the "inconvenience" of establishing links with the workers should prepare for the consequences. Indeed, three cabinet ministers and several deputies lost their jobs this week. The middle layer of the party apparatus may be extensively overhauled next month at the provincial party conclaves that precede the party congress in December. By contrast, Gierek is in firm control of the top levels of party and government, although he may make some additional personnel shifts at a pre-congress party plenum. [REDACTED]

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UN-DRUGS: Despite a final report that was opposed by the US, basic American objectives were achieved at the recently concluded 24-day meeting of the UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Most delegates favored US proposals that would amend the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to give more latitude for action to the International Narcotics Control Board. The

amendments will be considered formally at a conference in March 1972. Illicit trafficking in the Middle East received special attention at the session, and an ad hoc committee was created to deal with the problem. Little support was given, however, to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to which the US has provided \$2 million in recent months. [REDACTED]

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Panama: *Torrijos Thinks Ahead*

With one eye on the status of canal negotiations with the US, General Torrijos is considering changes in the cabinet and in the National Guard. This would prepare the way for revision of the constitution and legalization of the junta government. Torrijos' domestic moves will be well considered and cautiously executed but, at least in the short run, he is likely to adopt a more aggressive posture on the canal issue.

He has measured his strength against that of the church, the economic elite, and the political parties. He has gained control over the news media. He has even co-opted the Communist Party, and has built at least the beginnings of a political base among students, labor, and peasants. Having done all this, Torrijos has taken the first steps toward legitimizing the revolutionary government. The 1946 constitution is to be amended within six months, and election of an assembly has been promised no later than August 1972. The assembly will approve the new constitution and elect a president and vice president of the republic, thus replacing the provisional government with a constitutional one.

After three years in power, Torrijos is more confident of his ability to govern, but he is also more aware of the complexity of his country's problems and the intractability of the bureaucracy. In an effort to get greater efficiency and a new sense of dynamism, Torrijos may go ahead with his second cabinet reorganization this year, without waiting for any constitutional change. As any feasible cabinet would be as loyal as the

present one, changes might have more administrative than political significance.

More important would be changes within the National Guard to deal with known rivalries, especially those between staff officers Lt. Colonel Noriega and Lt. Colonel Paredes. Noriega, who has been Torrijos' hatchet man, is sympathetic to the government-Communist modus vivendi, while Paredes is suspicious of growing leftist influence. Torrijos is believed to be interested in becoming the next president—a position in which he would have considerably less time to devote to guard matters. With this in mind, he may wish to review the performance of his military commanders and eliminate rivalries that might lead in the future to political problems. Since his primary base of support is the guard, Torrijos would have to move with great circumspection.

At the same time, he is well aware that canal negotiations may hold the key to his political future. He could, of course, win popular acceptance of any treaty that met Panama's primary objectives: an end to the perpetuity clause, increased compensation, and significant jurisdiction over the zone. Nevertheless, concerned about his place in Panamanian history, Torrijos may feel compelled to push hard in the next couple of months for maximum concessions from the US. Not until he is faced with the choice of a treaty in early 1972 or waiting until after the US electoral campaign is Torrijos likely to decide whether to compromise or go for broke.

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ARGENTINA: The Lanusse government is faced with a new round of labor problems in Cordoba, where labor strife has led to serious rioting twice in the past three years and has contributed, at least indirectly, to the ouster of the presidents in power at the time. Following a successful general strike last week, the government ordered the take-over of the extreme leftist labor unions at the Fiat automotive plant and the public employees union. It apparently hopes to eliminate the extremist and Trotskyist influence in these

major unions. If successful, it should help defuse the volatile Cordoba political situation over the long term. President Lanusse apparently believes that his generally good relations with Peronist labor and rank-and-file disenchantment with political strikes—ten so far this year in Cordoba—will limit the adverse reaction. The more moderate unions in Cordoba, however, will probably feel constrained to demonstrate some active support for the affected unions.

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Cuba Dusts Off Its International Image

After a long period of preoccupation with domestic concerns, the Castro regime is entering the world spotlight with a burst of activity designed to demonstrate that the continued international isolation of Cuba is neither popular nor feasible.

One manifestation of this activity is the current visit to Cuba by Soviet Premier Kosygin. Havana pulled out all the stops to welcome Kosygin when he arrived on 26 October. The current meeting of the two leaders, unlike the visit in June 1967, comes at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations appear to be on an even keel. Economic problems would appear to be the major topic of discussion. Castro's coming visit to Chile and Cuban relations with other Latin American countries may also come in for attention. The duration of the Kosygin visit is uncertain, but Castro will be eager to portray it as a further indication of solid Soviet support.

Havana's apparently deliberate efforts this week to embarrass the US by sending Cuban delegates without US visas to a privately sponsored international conference of sugar cane technicians in Louisiana may be a further reflection of Castro's current interest in world recognition and publicity. The fact that the delegation arrived unexpectedly and refused to leave without orders from Havana, and the identification of the Cuban pilot as a senior civil aviation official who has led Cuban delegations to international air safety conferences, suggest that Castro engineered the incident primarily for its propaganda potential.

At the same time, Cuba is showing considerably more interest in regularizing and expanding its

diplomatic contacts with Latin American and other governments. One aim of such contacts is to show that OAS sanctions against Cuba are no longer viable. The most recent example is Cuba's having become a member of the so-called "Group of 77." At the recommendation of Peru, Cuba was accepted on 20 October as the 95th member of this loose group of developing countries that seek to formulate a joint strategy to protect their economic interests. Cuba has sent a high-level delegation headed by Foreign Minister Raul Roa to attend the meeting of the "Group of 77" that opened in Lima on 25 October.

Castro's real chance for grandstanding in the Latin American arena will come when he makes his long-awaited trip to Chile. It will be his first trip abroad since 1964. Latin American media have been giving extensive play to stories about the trip and have speculated that Castro will arrive in time to help celebrate the first anniversary on 4 November of President Allende's inauguration. Both Cuban and Chilean officials have refused to pinpoint the dates of the visit, however, and it is quite possible that Castro might arrive a little later to be on hand for the first anniversary of Chile's resumption of diplomatic relations with Havana on 12 November.

Castro may boost his prestige even further by meeting with other Latin American leaders during his travels to and from Chile. Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa may arrange for talks with Peruvian officials should Castro's plane make the usual technical stop in Lima. Peruvian President Velasco has indicated an interest in meeting Castro at the airport.

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USSR/CUBA: The Soviet naval task group off Florida's east coast is scheduled to arrive in Havana on 31 October for a ten-day visit. A week ago, Moscow announced, "Two antisubmarine ships, two submarines, and a tanker will pay a friendly visit to Cuba," and the ships have since been slowly moving south in the Atlantic about 200-300 miles off the US east coast conducting training maneuvers and carrying out some ASW operations.

In addition to the pending naval call, two Bear D naval reconnaissance planes flew to Havana's Jose Marti Airfield on 27 October. The Soviets have made five such flights since April 1970, and this is the third time one has been made in conjunction with a naval visit. These planes will probably remain in Cuba a few days and may provide reconnaissance support for the naval force before returning to the USSR.

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Uruguay's Election Stage Set Amid Strife

President Pacheco's long awaited selection of an "alternate" candidate in Uruguay's complicated election next month has provoked an unfavorable reaction. It has probably erased any lingering hopes that the President might win his re-election bid. Despite the intraparty strife caused by Pacheco's choice, the country's unique electoral system helps to cushion the party against damage to its prospects, and the governing Colorados remain favored to win.

On 22 October, a presidential spokesman announced that Minister of Agriculture Bordaberry and Minister of Labor Sapelli were Pacheco's "designated" presidential and vice presidential candidates. The voters on 28 November will consider: 1) a constitutional amendment allowing for immediate re-election of an incumbent president; 2) a slate of presidential candidates that will include Pacheco; 3) a separate ballot, which will list Bordaberry in place of Pacheco and which will be valid in the event the proposed amendment fails.

Several significant defections from the Colorado group promoting Pacheco's re-election followed the selection of Bordaberry. Vice President Abdala and Director of the Budget Lanza, both disappointed "alternate" aspirants, withdrew. Both the Civil Service director and the secretary to the presidency resigned. Those opposed to Bordaberry can cite his former membership in the Blanco government coalition of 1962 and his lack of Colorado credentials. Another facet of the trouble is that the President again trampled on political sensitivities by failing to consult with close supporters before announcing his decision.

These defections further dim the prospects—never bright—for approval of the constitutional amendment. With several other Colorado candidates in the combined primary-general elections, however, most of the dissatisfaction should be expressed in the form of votes for other Colorados rather than result in a bolting of supporters to their major opponents, the Blancos. In

addition to the Pacheco slates, the final election line-up includes three other Colorado candidates, although only one—Jorge Batlle—can come close to equaling President Pacheco's drawing power. The Blancos have entered two slates, and the leftist coalition, Frente Amplio, has put up a single presidential candidate. The most-voted candidate of the most-voted party wins the presidency.

An electoral survey last month showed the Colorados leading on a country-wide basis, with the Frente running second in the important capital area but trailing both established parties in the country as a whole. More than 25 percent of the voters were still undecided, and all three parties will be making a major effort in the campaign's closing weeks.

Although the law-and-order question is the primary campaign issue, the terrorist scene has been subdued in recent weeks. The most recent political kidnaping, that of a prominent newspaper publisher, has been claimed by a new terrorist group, the Popular Revolutionary Organization-33, which is probably an anarchist group of limited capabilities.

Armed forces leaders, recently charged with responsibility for counterterrorism, have emphasized that they plan no major effort against the chief terrorist group, the Tupamaros, prior to the elections. The Tupamaros have done little to provoke military reaction since their mass escape in early September, and security forces have been slowly recapturing some of the fugitives:

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MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA

25X1 THE YEMENS: Further border incidents are likely in the wake of the military incursion last week by Adeni forces of at least brigade strength into Yemen (Sana). The three-day foray, which ended on 19 October, was directed at anti-Adeni dissidents who have been conducting terrorist operations against targets in Yemen (Aden) from Yemen (Sana). The

operation apparently was successful. Over 100 rebels allegedly were killed, and a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and documents was captured. Only one day after the conclusion of the operation, a land mine explosion—the second fatal one in ten days—took the life of an Adeni officials.

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