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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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### War or Peace: *Dilemma on the Subcontinent*

Prime Minister Gandhi returned to New Delhi on 13 November after a three-week foreign tour of five West European countries and the US. She told her hosts that India's problems with almost 10 million refugees from East Pakistan were rapidly nearing the point where war would be difficult to avoid. So that the refugees might return in safety, she urged that immediate and intensified international pressure be applied to the government in Islamabad to negotiate a political settlement with the rebel leaders of Bangla Desh. As if to reinforce her serious assessment of the situation, cross-border firing and guerrilla fighting in East Pakistan intensified during her absence and is continuing.

Back in India, Mrs. Gandhi struck a cautious note. The foreign talks produced few demonstrable results, but she met no flat rebuffs. She closed no options, but her homecoming statements implied that the world community would be given only a limited amount of time to convince Islamabad to negotiate a political settlement and that no good would come of "forcing a military conflict with India."

Although Mrs. Gandhi's statements, both public and private, have served to reduce political tensions, there are no indications that she intends to defuse the military situation. The Mukti Bahini's fall offensive has begun, and both Mrs. Gandhi and her key ministers, especially Defense Minister Ram, continue to laud the guerrillas' increasing effectiveness. The rebels control territory along the border in several districts in East Pakistan, and many groups are able to expand their activities and control in interior areas. Guerrilla attacks have made all transportation routes dangerous, and one international shipping line has decided to divert its traffic from the port of Chalna in southwestern East Pakistan following attacks by naval commandos on two ships en route there.

Guerrilla successes along the border owe much to supporting Indian troops, who are more willing to cross the border—in as much as battalion strength—to fight limited engagements with the Pakistanis. The Indians withdraw only when Mukti Bahini control seems assured. New Delhi is anxious to see continued Mukti Bahini gains and

"Mukti Bahini carrying military supplies to Bangla Desh"



appears willing to expand joint Indian-guerrilla operations. In any event, India cannot abruptly stop these coordinated attacks without risking guerrilla disaffection and possibly lowering Indian troop morale.

Despite the growing Mukti Bahini strength, it is doubtful that Islamabad yet feels under sufficient pressure to negotiate a settlement even approaching the rebels' demand for immediate independence. In the meantime, Islamabad is proceeding doggedly ahead with its own version of a political solution to the Bengali problem. Elections to National Assembly seats vacated by members of the banned Awami League are scheduled to be held next month; candidates for 55 of the 78 seats have already been declared elected unopposed. Yahya has managed to convince seven other parties to form a coalition that will dominate the new assembly. Nurul Amin, a prominent progovernment East Pakistani, leads the group. If the coalition holds together, it will give Yahya a chance to form a friendly civilian government with Amin as prime minister.

Such a government would have almost no support in East Pakistan, but Yahya would have difficulty in preserving his own position were he to deviate markedly from his established course. Even should Yahya be able to open negotiations with the imprisoned Bengali leader, Mujibur Rahman, Mujib might be repudiated by the guerrillas if he were to settle for anything less than immediate and complete independence for East Pakistan.

Against the background of Mrs. Gandhi's assertion that she would not make a decision in "haste and anger," India is continuing its steady preparations for war. Reams of red tape must be unraveled before foreigners obtain the permits



now essential for travel to refugee camps and border areas, and New Delhi's charges of Pakistani border and airspace violations—matched by similar charges from Islamabad—continue as each builds a case that it is a victim of aggression. Mrs. Gandhi has not set a limit on Indian patience but Indian leaders, perhaps with an eye to the effect on the major powers, warn that time is running out. Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal has stated that after another month or two it will be increasingly difficult to maintain the military establishment at its present rate of readiness, and on 14 November Defense Minister Ram stated that a "great conflagration could occur at any moment."

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### Thailand: *Military Take Full Command*

The Thai military establishment announced its complete take-over of the government on 17 November under a new "Revolutionary Party." The 1968 constitution has been annulled, the parliament abolished, the cabinet dismissed, and martial law declared. All ministries are being run, at least for the time being, by under secretaries under the direct leadership of the Revolutionary Party commander, Field Marshal Thanom. The government announced that there would be no immediate changes in military or police commanders.

The imposition of military rule appears to have resulted when the leaders' impatience with Thai democratic processes reached the breaking point. The military had become increasingly exasperated over its difficulties with opposition elements and particularly with parliament. The military leaders have had serious reservations about the suitability to Thailand of constitutional government ever since the constitution was promulgated in 1968. The military leaders, who were inept in dealing with a sometimes recalcitrant legislature, lately were quite vocal about their unhappiness with parliament. Parliament's slowness in passing appropriations and the calls of some parliamentarians for the early opening of relations with Peking were particularly annoying. The government prefers a policy of caution toward Peking and some leaders are afraid that undue haste would encourage the spread of Communist sympathies among Thailand's Chinese minority.

The events this week in Bangkok do not appear to be a direct consequence of arguments within the military establishment over substantive policies, either domestic or foreign. There is no evidence so far that issues of direct interest to the US figured in the considerations that led to the government's moves. The reassertion of full power by the military should have little significant effect on the way Thailand is governed or on the country's foreign policies.

The decision to rule by military decree comes at a time when another flurry of restiveness has been noted among junior officers. The suspension of the constitution and parliament will be popular all through the military and will give a sense of decisiveness and direction that has been absent at the top. It will not, however, reduce resentment among younger officers over poor promotion prospects caused in part by the failure of top leaders to retire on schedule.

The chances are good that the military will bring off its assumption of full power with a minimum of difficulty. It seems unlikely that any troop commanders will challenge the leadership, particularly since the immediate targets of the government are civilian elements. There is some grumbling among politicians, but the Bangkok citizenry seems to be taking the change in stride.

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Field Marshal Thanom: Still in Charge

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## Uruguay: *Anti-US Charges Highlight Final Campaign*

Shrill leftist charges of US interference are highlighting the closing moments of the campaign for general elections on 28 November.

The leftist Frente Amplio has seized on two recent episodes to deliver broadsides against the US. On 7 November, the Frente's presidential candidate, Liber Seregni, received a slight injury from a knife-wielding drunk. In another incident, a child was killed by a stray shot as a Frente caravan was stoned by a hostile crowd in the interior. Seregni at once linked the attacks to rightist plots, directed by US and Brazilian experts. The leftist press has since kept up a well-orchestrated campaign denouncing the presence of CIA agents in the US Embassy. On 14 November, the left was given another opening to attack the US when an accident involving two navy helicopters recently purchased from the US left 8 dead and 40 injured. Communist press organs alleged the planes had been bought under US pressure and that this constituted more interference in Uruguayan military affairs.

The coalition has not yet attracted a significant following in the interior of the country, which contains about 50 percent of the population, and the Frente hopes to parlay its charges into a sympathy vote. In Montevideo, where the latest polls show it trailing the incumbent Colorados by a narrow margin, the Frente hopes these last-minute accusations will boost it past its opponents in the important mayoralty contest. It remains doubtful, however, that these patently manufactured issues will have much impact, as the anti-US stance is not as persuasive nor automatic a rallying point in moderate Uruguay as it is elsewhere in the hemisphere.

The Colorados remain slight favorites in the election, despite internal problems. The furor over President Pacheco's choice of an unpopular alternate candidate—Minister of Agriculture Bordaberry, whose candidacy will be valid if the constitutional amendment permitting Pacheco a second consecutive term falls short of majority approval—has subsided somewhat. It had caused the resignations of three cabinet members, and



President Pacheco:  
In the home stretch

several nationally prominent Colorados attacked the Bordaberry candidacy. The dissatisfaction, however, is still apparent. For example, in another bit of confusion added to the already complicated election, the anti-Pacheco Colorado candidates joined the Frente and the traditional opposition Blanco Party in opposing the Electoral Court's recommendation that the candidates run on two duplicate slates—one for the Pacheco constitutional reform and one without it. Their action means that if the amendment should pass, Pacheco's candidates would fill all offices. The decision reflects the other Colorado candidates' confidence that the proposed reform is a dead letter. By treating it as such, they hope to attract Colorados away from Pacheco and his alternate Bordaberry.

The Blanco Party is improving its electoral chances. Support for it is growing in the interior, and it hopes to pull out an upset victory by minimizing its losses in the capital. The Frente, on the other hand, hopes that its strength in Montevideo will offset its weak position in the interior. Both face an uphill battle against the Colorados in the campaign's last days.

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## SALT and US-Soviet Relations

The sixth round of SALT opened in Vienna on 15 November with expressions of good will and signs of a general improvement in the climate of US-Soviet relations.

Exchanges of high-level delegations are under way with an eye to improving economic dealings between the two countries. Secretary of Commerce Stans is expected to be in the USSR by the end of the week, and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Alkhimov is already in Washington. The Soviets have recently contracted to purchase about \$140-million worth of American grain, the US has authorized the \$280-million sale of foundry equipment for the USSR's Kama truck project, and bilateral dealings on a number of other subjects ranging from maritime issues to cultural exchange matters appear to be moving smoothly if not swiftly.

The announcement on 12 October of President Nixon's planned visit to Moscow next spring undoubtedly was a fillip to this positive trend. Since that announcement, the Soviets have taken pains to highlight areas of mutual interest and to downplay current tensions. An article this month

by the Kremlin's leading expert on American affairs, Yury Arbatov, seems best to exemplify this approach. Arbatov warmly endorsed the forthcoming presidential visit, called it a "positive act," and expressed hope that it will promote an across-the-board improvement in US-Soviet relations including success on SALT. Arbatov balanced these statements, however, with the assertion that it was impossible to believe that an "era of undisputed harmony" would suddenly be inaugurated.

The guarded optimism of Soviet political commentators has occasionally been accompanied by expressions of suspicion, sometimes outright distrust, of US intentions. Domestic audiences in the Soviet Union were told this week by a group of prominent news commentators that the US still tries to deal from "positions of strength," to gain military advantages over the USSR, and to exploit its new relationship with China at Soviet expense. Similarly, a leading Soviet military theoretician, V. Larionov, recently wrote in regard to the concept of military sufficiency that the Nixon administration still pursues military programs aimed at outstripping the USSR. The Larionov article appeared alongside Arbatov's discussion of US-Soviet relations.

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A Toast to SALT (Austrian President Jonas, left, welcomes US and Soviet negotiators in Vienna)





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## Ostpolitik: *Chances Improve*

Bonn has become much more optimistic about the immediate prospects for its Ostpolitik. Its inter-German negotiator, Egon Bahr, now believes that by early December he can conclude the East-West German accord called for by the quadripartite Berlin Agreement. Moreover, Bonn probably considers that the talks with the Czechoslovaks that resumed on 18 November can now get down to serious negotiation.

West German officials came away from the unprecedented four-day negotiating sessions, 10-13 November, convinced that Pankow is under pressure to complete the negotiations early enough to allow the December NATO ministerial to approve multilateral preparations for a Conference on European Security. Bahr's East German counterpart, Michael Kohl, confirmed this appraisal in answer to a direct question by Bahr. In the Bahr-Kohl talks, as well as in the parallel West Berlin - East German talks, East German negotiators moved closer to Bonn's and West Berlin's position on several points.

Bahr, for his part, believes that Bonn is in an excellent negotiating position, but he is concerned that by holding the line on still-unresolved details he may be accused of deliberately delaying the talks and thereby jeopardize Bonn's present advantage. Bonn's objective in negotiating a comprehensive

agreement has been to head off future East German chicanery. West Berlin negotiator Mueller has taken a similar tack. Bonn feels pressed, however, both by recent East German and Soviet public statements that an agreement can be reached by the end of November and by the necessity to wrap up its Ostpolitik package in order to assure orderly parliamentary ratification of the controversial German-Soviet and German-Polish treaties.

Bonn enters the fourth round of its discussions with the Czechoslovaks with enhanced hopes of normalizing relations. Czechoslovak negotiators in September indicated a willingness to seek a compromise to get around the stalemated issue of the 1938 Munich Agreement. Prague presumably may be prepared to avoid troublesome issues regarding reparations and legal problems surrounding the status of the Sudeten Germans. Bonn has already indicated it would be willing to meet Prague's fundamental concern and affirm the validity of Czechoslovakia's 1937 western borders. In anticipation of a Czechoslovak - West German movement, a top-level East German delegation traveled to Prague last week to coordinate the negotiating positions of the two countries toward Bonn and to ask that East German interests not be overlooked.

## Indochina

### Thieu's Economic Reform

The broad economic reforms that the Thieu government began to implement this week are drawing heavy criticism in some quarters, but the measures hold promise for encouraging development over the longer term.

The many-faceted reform package aims at making the South Vietnamese economy more stable and more nearly self-sufficient although dependent on US aid for a long time to come. It includes such specific belt-tightening actions as a devaluation of the piaster and increased taxes. These measures are intended eventually to curb the black market, in-

crease government revenues, stimulate the country's almost nonexistent export trade, and attract foreign investment. Sweeteners in the package include substantial salary increases for government officials and soldiers (including a combat bonus), and plans to increase benefits for veterans and war widows.

The reforms are expected to cause Thieu political difficulties for weeks to come. The initial impact of the package is likely to boost the cost of living an additional five to ten percent. Indeed, prices began to rise even before the program was announced. There was speculation over the approaching devaluation, fears of a US aid cutoff, and concern over the possibility of rice shortages. These uncertainties still complicate the economic situation and, combined with the new reforms, could produce more price

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increases. When inflation was rampant early in 1970, it brought complaints and protests from nearly all classes of Vietnamese and contributed to disturbances in a number of cities. Later in the year, government price stabilization measures proved successful and, until recently, inflation has been kept within tolerable limits.

President Thieu has personally taken a strong hand in launching the new economic program, and he is much more closely associated with economic policy now than in the past. It appears that he is prepared to accept fairly heavy criticism in coming days as the price he must pay in order to project an image of strong leadership and because his advisers have convinced him that the package is vitally necessary. Thieu may also feel that he is in a position to deal from strength following the recent election.

Opposition to the new program will probably be most vocal in the National Assembly, from which Thieu must obtain cooperation in order to implement essential features. The leader of the opposition in the Senate has already roundly condemned the plan as a "betrayal" of the Vietnamese people and nearly half of the members of the Lower House reportedly have expressed some dissatisfaction. Many legislators are likely to link some of the unwelcome reforms to the uncertainties over US aid, and it is possible that there will be anti-American overtones in their handling of the new decrees. Thieu's organizers have been hard at work trying to line up support in the assembly with promises, threats, and cajolery, however, and are likely to obtain passage for the essential parts of the reform package.

#### Dry Season Plans for Cambodia

South Vietnamese commanders are formulating plans for offensive operations against Communist forces and base areas across the Cambodian border during the winter months. Such operations are designed to keep the Communists off balance and pre-empt anticipated military operations in some parts of South Vietnam. At the present time, there are nearly 10,000 South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, mostly just across the border from Tay Ninh Province. During last year's dry season campaign,

more than 20,000 South Vietnamese operated in Cambodia.

General Ngo Dzu is developing plans for a campaign initially directed at enemy base camps in northeastern Cambodia near the South Vietnamese border. These highland bases constitute a threat to Dzu's forces. Each winter, the Communists stage incursions from the bases into Kontum and Pleiku provinces.

Dzu will encounter a number of operational problems in mounting his offensive since it requires considerable mobility and aggressiveness by his forces. There have been improvements, however, in the performance of some of his regular units this year. If Dzu can organize his thinly spread forces for an effective assault against the enemy's border bastions, their over-all military timetable in the western highlands would be disrupted.

Farther south, military caution along with political concerns may influence South Vietnamese planning for operations against Communist units in Cambodia during the coming dry season. General Minh, commander of the South Vietnamese forces that normally would be used in such operations, says he would like to go after some of the enemy's main forces in Cambodia but that he needs another division to help protect the provinces surrounding Saigon before he can conduct any wide-ranging operations in Cambodia. Minh is concerned that the three Communist regiments still operating in this area will try to take advantage of the withdrawal of Australian and Thai forces to move closer to Saigon.

Though Minh's concerns are real, he has a reputation as a very cautious commander and also is clearly aware of the political importance of protecting Saigon and its environs. There apparently also is some rivalry between Minh and other senior commanders over the disposition of South Vietnam's 9th Division, which is now in the delta. Minh would like to see it moved to support his forces, but the local commander, General Truong, is anxious to retain the division for expanded operations in the delta.

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**Cambodia: War on the Doorstep**

During the past week, the Communists had main force infantry regiments closer to Phnom Penh than any time since the Cambodian war began. Elements of the Communist Phuoc Long Front, including headquarters and three regiments, are about 15 miles west of the city and apparently are responsible for the recent sharp increase in enemy activity throughout the area. At midweek, the Communists had overrun government troops in Tuol Leap and were continuing an almost daily rocketing of Pochentong Airfield.


The government has been forced to divert several reserve units and armored elements from the Chenla II area and throw them into the defense of Phnom Penh. Several large clearing operations are underway along the western and north-western perimeter of the city in an effort to

re-establish control and push the Communists out of rocket range of the capital.

*Chenla II: Digging In*

The government appears to be abandoning its efforts to reopen Route 6 but may try to maintain its positions along the road. Prime Minister Lon Nol has divided the Chenla II task force into two separate commands and has assigned them essentially defensive missions.

During the past three weeks, government forces apparently suffered heavy casualties, perhaps as high as the equivalent of four to six battalions. The breakup of the task force will increase the vulnerability of the troops, but it is not clear whether the Communists, who probably also have taken heavy casualties, are in position to take early advantage of the situation.



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### South Korea: *More Economic Growth*

Seoul's new economic plan is geared to put growth on a sounder footing by promoting balanced development rather than keeping the emphasis on export expansion. This shift comes in the face of dramatic changes in the trade policies of its most important trading partners, the US and Japan.

Seoul will close out its present economic plan (1967-71) with one of the most impressive records among the developing nations. Since the early 1960s, the economy has grown at an average real rate of about ten percent annually, and gross national product reached \$8.2 billion last year. Exports, which had been increasing at the phenomenal rate of some 40 percent annually, were in the forefront.

There was a more than 13-percent gain in growth during the first half of this year. An inflation of ten percent was an undesirable side effect, however, and it continues to be the object of considerable popular discontent. Moreover, the expansion boosted imports, while a slower export growth of 26 percent, largely the result of the US west coast dock strike, will probably lead to a trade deficit in excess of last year's \$879-million shortfall. The Korean *won* was devalued in June in an effort to counter these trends.

As in previous years, the trade gap will be more than offset by an inflow of foreign capital. A large portion is private US and Japanese capital attracted by Korea's rapid growth, low labor costs, political stability, and liberal investment laws. The pace of the inflow this year appears

faster than in 1970 when US direct investment and commercial loans totaled \$193 million and Japanese investments were \$99 million. While this capital has provided the fuel for Korea's economic achievements, it has been accompanied by more than \$2 billion in external debt. Debt repayments this year will absorb over 30 percent of export earnings.

To keep the debt manageable, the upcoming economic plan (1972-76) calls for imports to be held to a 13-percent annual rise, while exports are to increase at a reduced, but still impressive, annual rate of about 20 percent. In addition, a stepped-up anti-inflation policy will try to keep export prices attractive, thus retaining the trading advantage gained by the June devaluation. These measures, combined with an increased effort to mobilize domestic savings, are expected to stabilize the demand for foreign investment and aid at about \$800 million annually.

Exports will continue to play a key role in economic development. Korea's exports to the US, its largest market, will be inhibited by the surcharge as well as by the recent textile agreement limiting volume, but the impact probably will not be too great. Low-priced Korean goods are virtually without competition in the US, and a probable upgrading in the quality of textiles to be exported is likely to bring greater earnings. Moreover, the appreciation of the Japanese *yen* has improved the position of Korean exporters by making Korean products less expensive than competing Japanese products in both Japan and other world markets.

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## The USSR

### Plan Nears Adoption

The Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meet next week to adopt the five-year economic plan for 1971-75 and next year's plan and budget. The Central Committee may also make some changes in the positions of key leaders.

The public proceedings at these sessions will appear even more pro forma than usual since it was announced on 17 October that the Politburo had approved the five-year plan. Its final adoption, although delayed to the end of the plan's first year, will be a significant achievement for the regime and for party chief Brezhnev. Controversies among the leaders and planning complexities prevented a final and complete version of the 1966-70 plan from ever being published.

The Politburo's statement on the five-year plan highlighted the tasks of improving living standards and aiding the agricultural sector, themes emphasized in the draft directives and at the party congress earlier in the year. Both programs emerged from years of controversy and only upon Brezhnev's decisive intervention. Brezhnev finally sided with the lobby for investment in agriculture in the spring of 1970, a time of high tension among the leadership when even his position may have been under attack.

The definition of raising living standards as "the main task" of this and future five-year plans followed decisions taken by the leadership soon after Khrushchev's fall and in 1967. The theme emerged in full form, however, only with publication of the plan draft directives in February and Brezhnev's elaborate justification in his speech to the party congress. Brezhnev's public embrace of the theme followed the Polish disturbances of December 1970 and coincided with the Soviet peace offensive, his most ambitious effort at personal image building to date.

The basic decisions on the plan have apparently held since early this year, and the authorities have probably used the interval principally to fill in the details. Adoption of the plan means that the contest

among economic claimants will come to focus on its interpretation and implementation. For example, the plan's emphasis on living standards is still controversial, and the Belorussian and Ukrainian first secretaries, Masharov and Shelest, have sharply and publicly criticized the attention being devoted to consumerism.

The Central Committee plenum will provide the first opportunity to adjust leadership posts since the election of an inflated Politburo at the congress. Voronov, who openly clashed with the victors in the agricultural debate, seems destined to lose his Politburo seat after his loss of the premiership of the Russian Republic last summer. His successor in the latter post, Solomentsev, should now move to the Politburo. Other changes are possible. For example, the election to the Politburo at the congress of both top Ukrainian leaders—Shelest and Premier Shcherbitsky—was unprecedented and increases the chances of eventual changes in the status of one or both men.

### Lunar Orbital Mission

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Luna 19—the unmanned Soviet moon probe—has been in lunar orbit six weeks. It appears to be functioning properly. Present evidence suggests that the probe will remain in orbit around the moon to conduct further experiments.

Luna 19 was launched from Tyuratam on 28 September and was placed in orbit around the moon on 2 October. A few days later, the Soviets maneuvered the probe into a slightly lower orbit in which it has remained. Luna 19 was the second Soviet lunar probe launched this year. The first—Luna 18—crashed while attempting to land on the moon in early September.

According to TASS, Luna 19 is intended "to conduct scientific investigations of the moon and near lunar space from the orbit of an artificial satellite." The statement differs from those given for all previous lunar probes in stating that Luna 19 will operate in lunar orbit. Possible amplification of its mission appeared a few weeks ago in an *Izvestiya*

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article that discussed Soviet objectives in lunar exploration. The article discussed the need for lunar landings such as Lunokhod, but also stressed the value of orbital probes to provide information on the space near the moon, to study lunar gravitational anomalies, and to photograph the moon's surface.

Thus far, Luna 19 operations seem to support these indications of an orbital mission.

It is not certain that the activities so far are all that is intended for Luna 19. TASS announcements generally understate mission objectives, and the probe may yet attempt to land, perform some other experiment, or even return to earth. Luna 19 can remain in lunar orbit for an extended period because of the lack of atmospheric drag unless gravitational irregularities significantly alter the orbit. Another possibility is that the probe has not functioned properly and is unable to carry out its primary mission. As yet, however, there is no firm evidence to support a further mission or to indicate any difficulties with the probe.

#### **Military Aid Activity Quickens**

In addition to a recent increase in the level of Soviet military deliveries to India, there are indications that the USSR may be stepping up shipments of equipment to Cuba and Algeria. Deliveries to Egypt continue at a high but reduced level as Moscow maintains its military support.

An increase in the level of military deliveries to India aboard Soviet ships first became evident last month.

In late October, Cuba received five MIG-21s from the USSR, the first indentified delivery of fighter aircraft to Cuba since September 1967. The arrival of a second shipment of military goods in mid-November brings deliveries thus far in 1971 slightly past the level for all of 1970. Havana undoubtedly is in need of hardware to replace and to some extent modernize its aging military inventories. The past level of deliveries may have been inadequate to accomplish this, even in light of Cuba's efforts to reduce the size of its military forces.

An increase in deliveries to Algeria also appears under way. At least 2 of 50 MIG-21s on order arrived in Algeria recently. The jet fighters, together with helicopters, medium tanks, and missile patrol boats reportedly were included in an agreement signed last February estimated to be worth some \$100 million. The equipment will be used largely to replace Soviet military hardware supplied in the mid-1960s and presumably lost through attrition.

Soviet seaborne military deliveries to Egypt thus far in 1971 are well below 1970 levels, when large quantities of air defense equipment—surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft—were shipped. Although shipments in October dropped to their lowest monthly level since January 1970,

Deliveries in recent months probably are supplies needed to keep the earlier large influx of new equipment operating, as well as additions to and maintenance of Egypt's arms inventories.

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## France: *Another Missile Submarine*

France plans to launch its third nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, *Le Foudroyant*, at Cherbourg on 4 December.

*Le Foudroyant*, scheduled to be operational in 1974, will be the first French 16-tube nuclear submarine to carry missiles with thermonuclear warheads, each with a yield of about one megaton. By then, the first two units, launched in 1967 and 1969, will have entered service

which will enter service about 1975. Defense Minister Debre confirmed France's intention to build a fifth unit when he told the National Assembly earlier this month that construction material for it already had been ordered.

By the late 1970s, the French plan to have five nuclear submarines carrying a total of 80 missiles

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*Le Redoutable*, France's first missile submarine, began its final 40-day test cruise late last month and will start its initial operational patrol at the end of this year. The second, *Le Terrible*, has completed initial sea trials and will begin operational patrols in late 1972. Each submarine has two 135-man crews. The crews will alternate; each will be aboard the submarine for a period of 100 days—72 days on patrol and 28 days in port.

The French already have begun construction of a fourth nuclear submarine, *L'Indomptable*,

The nuclear submarine base at Ile Longue near Brest, begun in 1967, has been completed. This base is able to service most nuclear, missile, and ship components of the force. It has two covered docks to facilitate work and to provide secrecy in the servicing and movement of the submarines. Some minor servicing may also be done at the French naval base at Diego-Suarez in

*Le Redoutable* on first sea trials, July 1969





**SECRET****French Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines**

Displacement	7,900 tons surfaced; 9,000 tons submerged
Length	420 feet
Beam	34.8 feet
Missiles	16 tubes amidships
Torpedo tubes	4
Nuclear reactors	1 pressurized water-cooled
Speed	20 knots on surface; 25 knots submerged

Madagascar, off the east coast of Africa, should France assign one of the submarines in that area.

Little is known about French plans for deployment of their ballistic missile nuclear submarines. Earlier intelligence reports, however, have indicated that two of the submarines will patrol in the Norwegian Sea and one in the Bay of Bengal.

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**Western Europe: *New Free Trade Arrangements***

Negotiations will begin soon on arrangements to bring within the framework of the European Community those European Free Trade Association countries that are not applying for full EC membership—namely Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Iceland. The agreement to talk was reached by the EC Council earlier than expected, partly because of the general uneasiness in Europe over the direction of US economic policy. Community views may also have been crystallized by the US demarche, delivered on the eve of the council session on 8 November, warning against any new discrimination affecting US exports.

The major goal of the EC is the establishment over five years of free trade in industrial goods between the enlarged community and the nonapplicants. An effort is being made to reduce to a minimum the list of "sensitive" products that the community will want to exempt from free trade. The question of special arrangements for EC agricultural exports, which could prove particularly harmful to US trade interests, has been left to the EC Commission to explore in the negotiations. The six nonapplicants, however, are not receptive to Dutch, Italian, and French pressures for special deals on agriculture, and the commission is also opposed.

Despite the industrial exceptions and the likely exclusion of agriculture, the Europeans maintain that the arrangements will be compatible with the GATT rule requiring free-trade areas to include substantially all trade. In so far as GATT is violated, the Europeans concede they must compensate the US for demonstrated injury to its commerce. They increasingly believe, however, that the impact of the arrangements should be dealt with, following the community's enlargement, in general trade negotiations that might have the additional objective of a more general liberalization of trade among all countries.

The loudest protests against the US demarche came from the European neutrals, particularly the Swiss and Austrians, who tend to interpret the US position as a political attack. They view the free-trade arrangements as the only way open to them to assure their continued close ties with Western Europe—a view the EC shares. Denmark and Norway, candidates for full EC membership, have particular reasons for fearing any new obstacles to the successful conclusion of arrangements between Sweden and the EC. A setback to Stockholm would severely strain the promembership campaigns in Norway and Denmark. These are based, in part, on assurances that the larger Scandinavian market will be preserved

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after the community is enlarged. Both Oslo and Copenhagen are already having trouble with popular opposition to membership.

The present idea is that these free-trade arrangements should come into force at the same time as the community is enlarged, presumably on 1 January 1973.

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### Malta: *Where's the Aid Coming From?*

Prime Minister Mintoff has been promoting trade and seeking aid recently in Romania, Poland, and Yugoslavia. His travels have provided him with the opportunity to underscore his claim to an alternative to a settlement with the UK. Mintoff received his warmest welcome in Romania, where he probably was angling for technical advice and assistance for Malta's prospective oil development. Meantime, he has continued his economic talks with Libya and his efforts to get the NATO countries to raise their aid offers.

would follow. The initial understanding was that NATO members would be expected to give supplemental bilateral aid in the form of loans or technical assistance, but Mintoff has recently made clear that he expects additional cash grants. For this reason, he rejected formal aid offers in the form of loans from West Germany and Canada.

A Maltese delegation left for Tripoli on 14 November for talks on economic cooperation. Discussions are expected to include, among other things, working conditions for Maltese in Libya and possible work for the Malta drydocks.

Although the prime minister hopes to get another \$20 million annually to supplement the \$24 million already promised, the allies have thus far been unwilling to come up with concrete offers to satisfy that demand. Italy recently offered to increase its contribution to the UK-NATO package if the US, UK, and West Germany did likewise. Rome's reluctance to raise its offer unconditionally is probably an effort to avoid assuming a leading role in the negotiations. Bonn believes that it is already carrying its full share of the burden and is unwilling to take on more. Moreover, the British would like to hold the line and call Mintoff's bluff, as they are convinced he has no real alternative.

On the domestic front, most Maltese appear to believe that Mintoff's East European trip will be beneficial to Malta, although there is some uncertainty because of the absence of specific information on what was accomplished. There also seems to be a consensus that an agreement with the UK eventually will be signed. Mintoff may have to settle for less than his cash-aid goal, but it will be difficult for him because it is public knowledge that he is demanding about \$44 million annually.

In September, Mintoff implicitly accepted a UK-NATO cash aid offer of \$24 million annually as the basis for a new defense agreement on the understanding that project aid negotiations with NATO countries

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## The Arab World

### *Arafat at Arms Length in Moscow.*

Once again, fedayeen chieftain Yasir Arafat has traveled to Moscow to seek direct military assistance and more visible recognition. Once again, he has failed. Arafat and his delegation were in the USSR on 20-29 October but not as official guests of the Soviet Government. They were largely limited to meetings with the Soviet Committee of Solidarity of Afro-Asian Countries and received minimal coverage in Soviet media.

This treatment is consistent with Moscow's attitude toward the fedayeen, who represent a far greater threat to the stability of Arab governments than to Israel. The communiqué capping the visit did not identify any of the Soviet officials who saw the Arab warrior.

Nevertheless, Moscow's role as the great power champion of the Arab cause compels the Kremlin to support Arabs who claim to be actively fighting on behalf of revolutionary causes. By championing the fedayeen, the Soviets align themselves with a national liberation movement that displays the kind of militant opposition to Israel so popular in the Arab world. Moscow also may believe that the fedayeen contribute something to keeping pressure on the US and Israel to



Arafat in Moscow: Little to smile about

For the past several years, the Soviet Union has been seeking to curry favor with these organizations but has remained reluctant to provide them with direct military assistance or heavy weapons. Direct aid to the terrorist groups would pose problems for the Soviets, who prefer to work through certain governments in the area. Egypt and Syria in particular have insisted that they act as middle men in arms deals, and the Soviets have acquiesced. Moreover, the Soviets, apprehensive about the fedayeen as an uncontrolled element in a dangerously unstable situation, have refused to supply the guerrillas, even indirectly, with anything other than light arms such as assault rifles and machine guns.

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make concessions to the Arabs. Soviet dealings with the fedayeen thus far indicate that Moscow is confident it can continue to provide them with indirect military assistance without running the risk that these arms will cause tensions in the Middle East to reach a flash point.

*Fedayeen at Low Ebb*

Never cohesive, the Palestinian fedayeen movement has been divided even more by an acrimonious debate among its leaders over the merits of the Palestine Liberation Organization's talks with Jordanian officials in Jidda. The smaller, radical organizations, which want to bring down King Husayn, have publicly charged that Yasir Arafat and Fatah have sold out to Husayn.

Aside from these internal divisions, the commando units have been hobbled by recent actions of Syria and Lebanon. Damascus has imposed stringent border regulations that have effectively restricted fedayeen passage to and from Syria. Those fedayeen units remaining on Syrian soil have found themselves surrounded by Syrian Army units and can no longer move freely. The Lebanese Government, while allowing the fedayeen to mass men in the rural south, has imposed restrictions on the commandos' presence in urban areas. Guerrilla incursions into Israel from Lebanon have been so hampered by Israeli countermeasures that the fedayeen are able to do little more than set up delayed-action rocket firings across the border, and most of these have been discovered and defused by Lebanese Army patrols.

*Talks at Jidda*

The Jordanian-fedayeen talks in Jidda were suspended last weekend while the principals concerned went to Cairo for the Arab League foreign ministers' conference. During the recess, lower ranking delegates were said to be focusing on the "technical details" of an eventual agreement, in-

cluding the distribution and control of fedayeen arms, the location of possible guerrilla camps within Jordan, and the updating of the agreements that governed relations between Amman and the commandos in the past. There is some slight optimism that an agreement of sorts can be worked out. The post-Ramadan holidays may delay the resumption of formal talks until the last week of November.

*Talks in Cairo*

The Arab League foreign ministers meet in Cairo earlier this week in yet another effort to "purify the Arab air." The ministers established a five-nation committee to help settle Arab differences before further ministerial meetings, the debate in the UN, and a possible heads-of-state conference. Chances for any general success in this search for unity are marginal, but President Sadat will at least be able to say he has consulted his allies on future tactics in dealing with the Israelis.

The ministers discussed some of the other factors that have inhibited concerted Arab action against Israel. There was consideration of new means of strengthening the so-called eastern front, for restoring normal relations between all Arab states, and for continuing the Saudi-Egyptian mediation to end the Jordan-fedayeen dispute. The Iraqis distributed a memorandum on the situation in the Persian Gulf—they call it the "Arab" Gulf—and Libya highlighted the importance of the "pan-Arabization of the battle." A proposal to consider the status of Arab relations with West Germany was postponed until the next meeting of the Arab League Council in March.

*Talks at the UN*

The Egyptians appear to have drawn up their diplomatic battle plan for isolating Israel in the United Nations.

Egyptians terms may be hard. The authoritative newspaper *Al Ahram*, amplifying President

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Sadat's speech of 11 November, reported this week that Egypt now demands a "positive answer" to Ambassador Jarring's February request for Israel's requirements for a final settlement before discussions on opening the canal can go forward. This stand, if accurately stated by *Al-Ahram*, would represent a considerable stiffening of the Egyptian position.

The Egyptians intend to raise the Middle East in the General Assembly around the beginning of December. Sadat is expected to send a personal representative to New York to take charge of the Egyptian delegation during the debate. Egypt will ask that the UN require Israel to clarify its stand regarding implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 which, in the Egyptian view, stipulates Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. If Israel, as is likely, rejects this ploy, Egypt will call for an arms embargo and economic sanctions against Israel, among other things. While not binding on members, such action by the assembly would further erode the Israeli diplomatic position.

The Israelis have thus far chosen not to meet Cairo's maneuvers head on. Instead, Deputy Premier Allon reminded the press that Israel, in any case, prefers a comprehensive settlement to President Sadat's initiative for opening the canal.

#### **The Yemens: Border Frictions**

Adeni troops have several times in the past month crossed over the border into Yemen (Sana) in an effort to destroy the sanctuaries of Adeni dissidents. As a result, Sana is considering the adoption of a tougher policy toward the radical government in Aden.

President Iryani and Prime Minister al-Ayni of Yemen (Sana) are apparently among those taking a hard line toward Aden, even though they have been reluctant to risk a confrontation in the past. They are probably being pressed to adopt a more aggressive position by military officers embarrassed by the Adeni raids.

Meanwhile, a high-level Adeni delegation arrived in Sana this week, purportedly to discuss economic matters. The presence of military and security personnel on the delegation indicates that Aden may raise more vital issues.

The Sana government is as usual short of money, troubled by a resurgence of tribal unrest, and experiencing a cooling-off in its relations with the Soviet Union—the major supplier of past military aid. Sana does not appear to be ready for a showdown with Aden, even if Saudi arms and money were made available. Aden, despite its own political and economic difficulties, is gloating over its successful offensive against the dissidents and is confident that it has crippled those who sought the regime's overthrow.

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CEYLON: The new economic program announced last week strengthens the leftists in Mrs. Bandaranaike's cabinet. There had been talk by the Trotskyite and Communist parties of withdrawing from the government, and if they had done so some of the leftist members of her own party might have followed suit. These elements had been concerned that the program would lack "anti-capitalist" measures to counterbalance proposals for cutting back Ceylon's costly welfare system. The program as announced makes provision for further restricting the private sector and for limiting the size of landholdings. The Trotskyites and Communists seem mollified.

help to weaken their opponents' economic base and their influence in the government.

The austerity aspects of the program are not likely to shift enough resources from consumption to investment to bring the economy into balance and alleviate Ceylon's chronic unemployment problem. There was some public protest when the belt-tightening measures were announced, but Mrs. Bandaranaike quickly moved to stem this by rescinding the proposed increase in the price of flour—and by raising the sugar ration.

the program  
not only gives the leftists what they want but will

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
## Ecuador and the Tuna Wars

The largest haul of the skipjack tuna season in waters off South America's west coast has been made by Ecuador, which has netted some 15 fishing boats and \$500,000 in fines and license fees. As a result, the US has extended the suspension of military sales until November 1972, and relations between the two countries again are strained.

On 1 November, Foreign Minister Garcia Velasco informed the US ambassador that Ecuador intended to enforce its regulations strictly. He added that if the US retaliated in any way, Ecuador would take the issue not only before the OAS, as it did in January, but also before the UN and any other forum available. An official US protest followed the first seizures, but it was rejected with the comment that it should be presented to the "deceitful fishermen" of the American Tuna Association. The matter was discussed when Presidential Counselor Finch visited Ecuador on 14 November, but there has been no softening in the Ecuadorean position.

President Velasco now is ruling with dictatorial powers, and has indicated that he might postpone or cancel the elections scheduled to be held in June 1972. Should he so decide, he probably would move early next year before the election campaign is fully under way. The season for yellowfin tuna opens on 1 January, and more US seiners will be operating off the Ecuadorean coast at that time. Their presence could serve Velasco well to distract public attention should he decide to prolong his term.

The recent controversy with the US has had a mixed reaction within the Ecuadorean armed forces. The US defense attaché comments that he has rarely seen such an air of confidence among the senior officers, particularly the commanders



"Per pound, they bring a much larger return than fish!"

of the army and navy. They allege that the only way to get the US to move on a problem such as that of the 200-mile limit is to force the issue.

Others, however, are unhappy because the government's policy has complicated the problem of acquiring new military equipment.

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many officers like the vision of little Ecuador standing up to the giant US. In addition, alternate sources of military supply are available; some of the tuna seiners were captured by the navy's newly acquired patrol boats built in Germany.

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## Castro in Chile: *Company Manners*

Fidel Castro's first week in Chile has reinforced early suspicions that the visit would be less a working trip than an attempt to improve Castro's image and reduce Cuba's isolation.

Castro has been well behaved and has avoided the fiery language for which he is noted. He has gone out of his way to be both cordial and discreet in all his public pronouncements. He has indeed gone so far as to moderate temporarily his attacks on the US.

Castro told one crowd he had never ruled out elections as an alternative to armed struggle to gain power. During a two-hour debate with students at Antofagasta, he said he had not come to Chile to "teach the subject of revolution and did not even consider himself an expert on the subject." On the OAS, Castro reaffirmed his well-known position of completely rejecting any renewal of ties with the organization, although he did so in a tone of uncharacteristic mildness.

Castro's circumspection slipped a little when he exhorted Chilean miners to avoid sectarianism and self-interest. Opposition newspapers and politicians were quick to criticize this as "objectionable intrusion," but media treatment in general has been factual. The orthodox Communist Party has played an active role in organizing receptions for Castro

Overt opposition to his presence in Chile has been limited. A bomb blast near Antofagasta on 12 November, before his scheduled arrival, knocked out some communications lines and temporarily disrupted a local television station. The blast was blamed on a small right-wing extremist group that has condemned Castro's visit.



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The length of Castro's stay in Chile is still not known. Perhaps it will depend on how well he lasts. There have been reports that his strenuous schedule and a severe cold forced him to cancel one full day's activities. Speculation centers on a stay of about two weeks.

On his way home, he apparently intends to stop briefly in Lima to meet with President Velasco, at which time Peru's intentions on bilateral relations with Cuba and an initiative on Cuba in the OAS may be clarified.

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### Chile: *The Pace Picks Up*

President Allende's constitutional reform bill has turned out to be sweeping indeed. In addition to proposing a unicameral legislature with a curtailed capacity to obstruct the executive, the measure published on 11 November would broaden the President's already extensive powers, make important changes in the conservative Supreme Court, and nationalize key sectors of the economy now beyond the government's grasp. Some apparently minor features are tailor-made to provide the governing Popular Unity coalition with new weapons in its quickening effort to consolidate political power. One, for instance, would legalize the formation of joint electoral slates by parties that agree on a formal political program.

The breadth of the reforms increases the chance of congressional opposition, but the bill's complexity and vagueness may assist Allende in getting approval of changes that he most wants. The multiplicity of items included serves both to placate the demands of his diverse coalition and leave some room for Allende to maneuver in response to political and popular reaction.

The bill will also help to divert attention from new problems that have risen to complicate the government's task. Copper workers at the big Chuquicamata mine hardly waited for Castro to leave town before they announced their decision to ignore Allende's personal appeal to scale down their demands for a 50-percent wage hike. Coalition parties are in a minority position on the union council at Chuquicamata. Thus far, the

~~government has failed to enlist support of Popular Socialist union leaders who hold the balance of power. The Popular Socialists bolted Allende's Socialist Party several years ago in a leadership fight but cooperate with the government when it suits their purposes. In this case, they know that it may be crucial to the government to keep wages down and to avert a copper strike, so the price for their cooperation is stiff.~~

The escalating struggle to avert government control over the University of Chile is another headache. Under the guise of effecting badly needed reforms at the mushrooming national university, its coalition-dominated governing council is trying to consolidate the numerous autonomous units into four divisions that can be dominated from the center. The university rector, a political independent with Christian Democratic ties, is leading the fight against the council. Several university sections have been taken over by antigovernment forces, others have been disrupted by professors' walkouts. Violence may bring the matter to a boil. Government slates have been defeated in several student elections recently, which may have encouraged opposition forces to unify their efforts in the far more important university issue. The university has a large role in national life, so victory for the government would be a key contribution to consolidation of its political position.

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
## Venezuela Seeks Caribbean Leadership

The Caribbean Conference of Foreign Ministers, set for 24-26 November, is the Caldera government's latest and most ambitious effort to establish Venezuela as the major Caribbean power. The avowed purpose of the meeting is to discuss geographical issues affecting the Caribbean (especially the law of the sea), to foster an increase in commercial, cultural, and tourist exchange, and to examine other topics of mutual interest. The Venezuelan initiative is meeting a welter of criticism, with neighbors on all sides less than willing to regard Venezuela's policy as totally benign.

A number of factors have combined to turn Venezuelan interests northward. These include the desire of the Christian Democratic administration to show independence of the previous government's Andean orientation, a surge of assertive nationalism, President Caldera's particular interest in Haiti, Trinidad-born Foreign Minister Calvani's paternalistic feeling toward the islands, and the obvious significance of the Caribbean in terms of security and trade potential. Both the President and Calvani have traveled extensively to the islands and have hosted island visitors in pursuit of increased influence in the area. In proposing a foreign ministers conference to deal

especially with law of the sea issues, Venezuela is attempting to establish itself as leader of a moderate position between the 200-mile territorial claims of its continental neighbors and the still inchoate policies of the Central American and Caribbean countries. Venezuelan officials have become fairly expert in law of the sea matters through the extensive research required in their bilateral negotiations with Colombia over territorial disputes.

The round of criticism provoked by the Caracas convocation is a gauge of the other Caribbean states' suspicion of Venezuela's motives. These governments have not forgotten Venezuela's readiness to send troops to Trinidad-Tobago during disturbances in 1970, and some may suspect Venezuela's earlier clandestine instigation of an insurrection in Guyana as part of its irredentist policy there. The Colombians privately disdain the Caracas meeting as hastily and poorly prepared, and say the lack of a technical *raison d'être* is a telltale of Venezuela's political and propaganda intentions. Haiti has accepted an invitation, tendered despite the break in relations, but Foreign Minister Raymond, while indicating willingness to resume diplomatic exchanges, says he does not intend for the Venezuelan chancery once again to become a base for subversion.

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The most serious embarrassment raised by the conference has been the exclusion of Guyana, an omission that has stirred the sleeping dog of the border dispute, involving Venezuela's claim to five eighths of Guyana. Hypersensitive to what it perceives as Venezuelan hostility, Guyana asked its friends to boycott the conference. The friends are sympathetic but believe their attendance will better serve Guyanese interests. Several ambassadors have challenged Calvani's decision to ignore Guyana, but Venezuela officially holds to the view that Guyana is an Atlantic, not a Caribbean state. Several diplomats in Caracas have remarked on the invitation to El Salvador, which has no Caribbean coast. Venezuela's snub of Guyana is in fact a necessity of domestic politics and essential in Venezuelan eyes to the continued application of the 1970 protocol of Port of Spain, which imposes a 12-year moratorium on either country's pressing a claim to the region in dispute. There is some possibility that Guyana, miffed at this cavalier treatment, may succumb to

the temptation to declare a 200-mile territorial sea.

The Venezuelans and their Caribbean fellows have a good deal to overcome if the conference is to have any lasting meaning. Possibly the meetings will work out at least a tentative position on Calvani's favored formula for a "patrimonial" sea in lieu of an excessive territorial sea. The patrimonial formula generally provides for two ocean zones, a limited 12-mile territorial sea jurisdiction, and a wider zone up to 200 miles wherein the coastal state has special rights over economic resources. The Caldera government will probably put the best light on its Caribbean thrust, no matter what the outcome. It is by no means turning a cold shoulder to neighbors on the continent. Caldera, for example, still has his lines open to the Andean Pact and may well join that experiment in regional integration.

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BRAZIL: Recent terrorist activities demonstrate the capability of guerrilla groups to field small tactical teams to bedevil and embarrass the government.

The National Liberating Action, the most active group of late, has been strengthened by the return of exiled revolutionaries from Cuba, according to Brazilian security officials. Earlier this month, the terrorists carried out a half-dozen, low-level, anti-US actions in Sao Paulo. A portion of the Sao Paulo team, considered the terrorists' best assault group, then moved to Rio. This has heightened concern in the security forces that the group's activities will be expanded in an effort to sabotage President Medici's planned trip to the US in December.

While the return of exiles has strengthened the group's ranks somewhat, it has split the Sao Paulo group, the leaders of which are unwilling to yield posts to the returned terrorists.

The group is not likely to present a serious problem for the Brazilian security forces. Over the last several years, the military has efficiently checked, if not eliminated, terrorist groups. The security forces' reaction to returned exiles is especially vigorous, and such captured terrorists are subject to immediate execution. In the absence of much activity by other groups, the spurt of activity by this small group will draw heavy attention from the armed forces.

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## Mexico: *Opening Up the System*

President Echeverria sent a package of proposed constitutional and electoral changes to Congress last week for enactment prior to the lower house elections in 1973. Although described by the President as a "democratic opening," the proposals fail to touch that part of Mexican politics generally considered to be most in need of democratization: the inner workings and policies of the government party itself.

The proposed changes are nevertheless being hailed by the government as logical steps in the continuing process of "perfecting democracy."

### Constitutional Amendment Proposals

- Increase the number of proportional representation seats for minority parties from 20 to a maximum of 25 per party;
- Lower the threshold for such representation from 2.5 to 1.5 percent of the nationwide vote;
- Lower the minimum age for election as a federal deputy from 25 to 21 and for senator from 35 to 30;
- Raise the population base for representation in the lower house from 200,000 to 250,000 per deputy.

### Proposed Legal Changes

- Reduce membership requirements for formation of new parties;
- Give all parties access to communications media and franking privileges during campaign periods;
- Grant all parties voting participation in federal and local electoral commissions;
- Reorganize the system of registering voters.

but practical results may be hard to come by. For example, the change that would seem the most significant "democratic opening"—the revamping of the minority party representation system—still falls short of what the government has been doing anyway. In the 1970 balloting for the lower house, two of the minor parties got less than the required 2.5 percent of the total vote. They were nevertheless given seats because the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party wished to balance opposition representation between right and left. On the other hand, the leader of the largest opposition party, the National Action Party, complains that his party's 14.1 percent of the 1970 vote should have yielded 28 seats, eight more than it received and three more than the proposed maximum.

These proposals take their place alongside other measures by which the government is trying to open up the political system and recapture the loyalty of youth and other alienated segments of society. The government has not had much success. It is still fending off criticism of its involvement in the bloody repression of student demonstrators last June, and nothing has been heard of its promised full and honest investigation. A new, youth-oriented, leftist political party has appeared. The government hopes the party will have appeal, but so far it has not been greeted enthusiastically because of the widespread assumption that it is government backed, ~~as in fact it is.~~

The new constitutional and electoral reforms are indeed a sign of some give in the rigid political system. But they will not satisfy political outsiders who are looking for rapid movement toward real reform, democratic processes, and decentralization of power within the ruling party. They will regard the government's steps as little more than window dressing.

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