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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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31 March 1972  
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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## El Salvador: Rebels' Fate



After the Coup

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The angry and emotional mood within the Salvadoran Government following the failure of the coup attempt last weekend appears to be changing to one of calm and reason. President Sanchez has assured the US ambassador that there will be no executions. Even so, the loss of some 150 lives and the extensive property damage preclude lenient treatment of the coup leaders.

About 80 persons are under arrest, and a number of others, including most of the leaders,

have sought asylum in local embassies or have fled the country. Colonel Benjamin Mejia, instigator of the revolt, is believed to have taken refuge in the Vatican Nunciature, although the nunciature has denied this.

The question of Mejia's whereabouts has been overshadowed by a storm of protest over the treatment accorded defeated presidential candidate Napoleon Duarte. Duarte, whose radio appeal for popular support for the rebellion

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enraged Sanchez, was beaten and forcibly removed from a Venezuelan diplomatic residence by security forces. Appeals by members of the diplomatic corps and a stiff protest from Venezuela hinting at a possible rupture in relations apparently obtained his release; members of his family say he has arrived in Guatemala.

President Sanchez told reporters that the right of diplomatic asylum would be respected; presumably, persons already under the protection of various embassies will be given safe conduct out of the country. Those under arrest, he said, will be tried in accordance with the law. As for the soldiers involved, Sanchez feels they were merely following orders, some having been told they were defending the government. The interior minister added that civilians will be tried in civil courts because the country is not under a state of siege.

The revolt, which started during the early hours of 25 March, had the support of little more

than the 1st Infantry Brigade and the Artillery Brigade, both located in the capital city. The rebels gained an early advantage by capturing President Sanchez. Duarte was brought into the act well after the coup was under way, and his radio appeal apparently did not have the blessing of his Christian Democratic Party. It also did not have the desired result, since popular support for the rebels failed to materialize.

Since his release that afternoon, President Sanchez, realizing that military support is the mainstay of any Salvadoran government, has been busy patching the cracks in this part of the foundation. Order has been restored, and the curfew hours have been reduced each day. The government may now be able to turn its attention to the legislative program it had begun just before the revolt and recover some of the popular support lost during the disputed elections.

## The European Communities

### CAUTION ON BREZHNEV

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has confirmed that Brezhnev's overture to the EC last week marked a significant shift in Soviet policy and had been approved by the Politburo. Community circles have accepted it as a turning point. They have long held that sooner or later Moscow would have little choice but to temper its attacks on the EC and seek some way of dealing with the organization.

Now that the Russians seem to be moving in this direction, and perhaps toward eventual recognition of the EC, the reaction is cautious. Community members are aware that Brezhnev's remarks were timed to influence the debate in

West Germany over ratification of the Eastern treaties and that the Ostpolitik debate in turn will influence the Soviet position. More substantially, there is concern in some quarters that Brezhnev's "formula" may imply recognition of CEMA as the sole bargaining agent for the East in future dealings with the EC. To pay this price for Soviet recognition would mean acquiescing in increased Soviet controls over East European states. As EC Commissioner Deniau noted in a recent article forecasting the new Soviet position, it could also narrow the community's own freedom of action by preventing direct contact between it and the individual East European countries.

Despite their bows to regional solidarity, both sides are reluctant to give up the possibility

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of bilateral dealings between members of the two organizations. Thus, Brezhnev spoke with deliberate ambiguity of the USSR's relations with the "participants of the Common Market." In reacting publicly to this, French Foreign Minister Schumann emphasized Moscow's "realism and concern for maintaining individual relations with the community states independent of the USSR's relations with the community as a whole."

livestock products were raised by an average of eight percent. Beef prices were raised by only four percent, however, because the price of meat could be an important issue in the upcoming Italian elections. An additional increase in beef prices probably will be approved later in the year.

Corn and rye prices were boosted by five percent and most other grain prices by four percent. The new prices probably will stimulate EC grain production modestly, and the impact on US grain sales to the EC may not be great. Rising production costs will offset at least part of the price increases. An enhanced demand for livestock feed will help to sustain US feed grain sales and should increase already large US exports of soybeans, a feed grain substitute.

Recent discussions in NATO about a European security conference show that the Europeans are well aware that Moscow still hopes to restrain the development of the EC. It is thus unlikely that, for the immediate future, the community will do more than listen attentively for friendly signals from the East. The real test of Soviet and Eastern European attitudes will be their willingness to begin substituting trade arrangements negotiated with the community for the present network of bilateral agreements. Under the EC's common commercial policy, no new bilateral agreements may be negotiated after next January. The shift in Soviet attitudes nevertheless assures lively debate this spring in preparation for discussing EC relations with the East at the EC summit meeting in October.

The council's farm modernization measures, which establish community guidelines for assistance on farm modernization, extension services, and pensions to induce farmers to retire, will not significantly increase efficiency or productivity in the near future. Most member states already have such programs in effect, and the community will provide only limited financial support. The council rejected, for the present, a commission proposal for a radically new program under which income deficiency payments would be made to poor farmers. This measure, which is gaining support in the community, especially in Germany and Italy, would break the link between farm income and farm prices.

#### AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE

Agricultural ministers of the EC countries last week agreed to substantially higher farm prices and farm modernization measures. This shifts the Common Agricultural Policy's production goals from grain to livestock and emphasizes raising farm income through modernization instead of through higher prices.

Farm product prices were increased by an average of more than six percent. The prices of

The council decided not to revalue the unit of account in which agricultural prices are stated. To avoid reductions in farm prices and incomes in the Benelux countries and Germany as a consequence of their currency revaluations, those countries will be permitted to maintain compensatory border taxes and subsidies. The council also agreed to exceptional treatment for Italy by permitting continuation of the import levy reduction on corn that encourages Italian livestock production and US corn sales.

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## Indochina

### VIETNAM: BATTLES ON TWO FRONTS

During the week, Communist forces kept up heavy shellings and launched several coordinated ground attacks near the DMZ; they also put pressure on South Vietnamese forces in central Thua Thien Province.


Despite this pressure, the South Vietnamese are holding their positions on the mountains southwest of Hue and, with the help of air and artillery strikes, have inflicted heavy casualties on the Communists.

In the highlands province of Kontum, as many as three enemy battalions surrounded a South Vietnamese battalion north of Ben Het early in the week. Heavy Communist antiaircraft fire made reinforcement and resupply difficult but, after six days of fighting, the Communists pulled back to avoid further casualties from allied aircraft and artillery. Losses were high on both sides; some 340 Communists and 35 South Vietnamese reportedly were killed.

In the south, the government has ended another stage of its cross-border operation west of Tay Ninh Province after several weeks during which large quantities of enemy food and other supplies were destroyed.

#### Opposition Stirs In the South

There are signs of political activity from various opponents of Thieu for the first time since the presidential election last October. The renewed opposition activity may be an outgrowth of Thieu's offer last January to resign as part of a peace settlement with the Communists. Anti-



government groups have thus far confined themselves largely to talk and do not appear to represent a serious threat. More strenuous anti-government activities could be in store if these groups can find some issue to exploit or if further doubts are raised about Thieu's tenure in office.

Militant student groups hope to foment a new anti-government campaign in the near future.

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They are demanding the release of student leaders, and may try to play on anti-American themes as they have in the past. The protest strikes and demonstrations so far have been easily contained by police. By detaining student leaders, the government has apparently been able to weaken the protest movement, and the police are confident that they can prevent future disturbances from getting out of hand.

A group of An Quang Buddhist legislators, meanwhile, has been working for several weeks on preparations for a projected mass political meeting. They hope it will stimulate development of a national consensus on the peace issue and somehow lead to a negotiated peace settlement. The legislators have sent delegations to the provinces in search of support. Not much support has been forthcoming and the plan may never get off the ground. An Quang clerical leaders have given little encouragement.

Big Minh also has been holding political discussions with a wide spectrum of prominent opposition figures, including An Quang representatives who were associated with his abortive bid for the presidency last year. Despite Minh's ineffective campaign, many opposition leaders still see him as the only possible alternative to President Thieu. The Minh camp is now better organized than it was during the election campaign.

#### THE WORD IN NORTH VIETNAM

While Hanoi's propagandists continue to criticize the Chinese for their dealings with the US, elite party cadres in North Vietnam are being urged to pay more attention to Hanoi's own brand of Marxism-Leninism and less to what is going on in the outside world. A recent issue of a party journal takes the position that no Com-

munist party has the right to dictate policy to another. Describing Marxism-Leninism as a general set of principles, the article argues that loyalty to these principles means simply applying them "creatively" to national conditions.

Instruction such as this is almost certainly meant to play down the importance for North Vietnam of China's recent dealings with the US. Indeed, there is a strong suggestion in the article that whatever happens in the international sphere, the North Vietnamese Communists will still be master in their own house.

At the same time, the emphasis on the "sovereignty" of Hanoi's current policy line may also be intended as a reminder to cadres of their own basic responsibilities to hew to that line. The repeated contention in the article that only the Vietnamese Communists can know what is right for the Vietnamese revolution seems a bit prickly, as if Hanoi were trying to warn cadres that dissidence or disagreement could be read as disloyalty to the regime. There is even a hint that the leadership already suspects that some cadres are overly attached to alien doctrine. "Most of the party's cadres have demonstrated their steadfast political standards," the journal says, but adds, "We are not complacent with the results achieved." The article goes on to prescribe further political indoctrination to strengthen party members' sense of "independence and sovereignty." Such language can only suggest to cadres that someone at the top is not entirely happy with the way they have responded to the present need for doctrinal flexibility and an independent national line.

#### ~~New Road System~~

~~The North Vietnamese are putting together a major new road system in southern North~~

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
25X1 Vietnam. Photography [ ] reveals several north-south road segments in the early stages of construction. They extend over 150 miles, mostly in high terrain paralleling the Laotian border, and will take several months to complete. There are long gaps, and the terrain is difficult. The North Vietnamese appear to be building the road segments as straight and level as possible. When finished, the new system will be less vulnerable to seasonal flooding. It will also be superior in structure and alignment to the coastal roadnet that has been a mainstay of Hanoi's transport system so far.

25X1 Photography [ ] also shows that a road through the Demilitarized Zone into South Vietnam has now been completed as far south as Khe Sanh. This new road is generally east of the mountains and will provide an alternate route when heavy rains, which begin in May, make movement difficult over the network in Laos.

#### LAOS: TANKS DRIVE ON SKYLINE

The North Vietnamese renewed their attacks on Skyline Ridge on 30 March and for the first time used tanks. Communist troops and tanks assaulted government strongpoints guarding the road from Sam Thong, while Communist gunners directed heavy artillery and mortar fire on positions at the center of the ridge. Vang Pao's irregulars destroyed two of the three tanks and at mid-day on 30 March were holding their ground.

The attacks on 30 March came after a week's stalemate. The Communists held four positions on the central and western portions of the ridge but limited their attacks on adjacent irregular positions to intermittent shellings. The irregulars tried to retake the lost strongpoints, but their efforts were hampered by poor weather which severely limited tactical air support.



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
To the northeast, advance elements of two government task forces remain within five miles of Nong Pet and Phong Savan in Communist rear areas. So far, this operation has failed to divert enemy forces from the Long Tieng sector.

**PROMISES TO KEEP IN CAMBODIA**

The political atmosphere in Phnom Penh has cooled somewhat, and Lon Nol's new government has begun to get down to business. In an apparent effort to rally flagging popular support for the government and to help dampen continuing student unrest, the President handpicked a committee to produce a new draft of a republican constitution by the first week in April. Lon Nol simultaneously let it be known that he hopes to hold an election in government-controlled areas for a new National Assembly "in three months."

Thus far, moderate student elements appear to have reacted favorably to such prospects for a more constitutional form of rule, but some activist student leaders have persisted in pushing unrealistic demands such as recognition of a "student assembly" to monitor government actions until a legislature is in fact elected. To counter their agitation, the regime has arranged for government-sponsored groups to conduct a series of demonstrations in Phnom Penh for "national solidarity" and against "anarchy."

Communist activity in the Phnom Penh area was highlighted by several acts of sabotage. Communist sappers caused considerable damage to one of the capital's two main bridges, temporarily closing it, and also damaged a fuel barge anchored in the Mekong near Phnom Penh's docks. The latter incident was the third of its kind this month. A sustained campaign against commercial shipping on the Mekong could have serious con-



sequences, since most of Phnom Penh's supplies are received via that waterway.

The Communists probably intend to keep up their harassment of government positions and installations in and around Phnom Penh, but there is no sign they are preparing to carry out significant or prolonged military operations similar to those they conducted in the capital region late last year. On the contrary, the infantry elements that led that campaign are the units that are moving southward away from Phnom Penh and toward South Vietnam's Military Region 4.

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## Korea: Seoul Scores

South Korean charges of North Korean violations of the Demilitarized Zone have received considerable publicity in the past two weeks and have drawn an unusually sharp riposte from Pyongyang. These developments suggest that Seoul has at last hit upon an exploitable issue in its attempt to discredit North Korea's "peace offensive."

Pyongyang has for some months been slowly increasing its military construction activities and personnel in the northern portion of the DMZ in violation of the armistice agreement. The most dramatic aspect of this has been the construction since last August of some 52 miles of fence within the western portion of the zone. None of this activity has any particular military significance. Nevertheless, the South Koreans drummed up a propaganda campaign to expose Pyongyang's activities and to force the North Koreans to abide by the terms of the armistice. On 10 March, South Korea informed UN officials about Pyongyang's violations and, a few days later, passed the information along to all foreign military attaches and the domestic and foreign press corps.

The South Koreans have been successful in obtaining favorable international publicity for



North Korean construction in DMZ:  
fortified position (upper arrow) and fence.

these charges and the cooperation of the UN command in reviving, at this week's Military Armistice Commission meeting, a proposal for real demilitarization of the DMZ. Seoul has maintained that acceptance of demilitarization under UN auspices is one of the ways Pyongyang could prove its peaceful intent and draw a positive South Korean response to its overtures for a political dialogue. By zeroing in on this possibility, South Korea has markedly intensified pressure on the North to match its words with deeds.

Pyongyang's response has been sharp. In a series of statements over the past two weeks, it has shown considerable irritation at the international coverage given Seoul's charges and expressed suspicion that the South Koreans might be planning to follow up with military action. The North Korean defense minister, in his first major statement in over a year, linked a denunciation of Seoul with a warning that the North's army stood ready to retaliate against any South Korean military adventures.

Pyongyang has also felt compelled to lace this essentially negative response with something more positive. Without directly referring to Seoul's claims, the North Korean party newspaper, in an editorial broadcast on 25 March, renewed the North's pitch for talks with the South. It stressed that problems such as "the barrier that has existed between the two Koreas" could be resolved through negotiations. The editorial indicated that Pyongyang has no intention of making any concession on the demilitarization issue to achieve a dialogue with the South.

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## UK-Malta: An Accord at Last

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An agreement was signed in London on 26 March after prolonged and often bitter negotiations. In return for an annual payment of \$36.4 million for seven and a half years, Malta granted the British continued base rights with provision for the use of UK installations on the island by NATO members. Prime Minister Mintoff has said that at least Italy and West Germany would be permitted access. Warsaw Pact states will be denied use of Malta

The withdrawal of British troops and material has ended, and London will restore its military contingent to approximately its former dimensions. The UK does intend, however, to reduce its Maltese labor force by about 20 percent, beginning early next year.

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In Malta, the agreement has been hailed by all except the most partisan opposition. Mintoff's success in almost tripling the amount received under the previous arrangements with the UK will



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enhance his stature and may encourage him to call a snap election in the hope of increasing his one-seat majority in parliament.


Mintoff's image is likely to be reinforced further by his trip to Peking scheduled to begin 30 March.



The Chinese will stage a warm welcome for Mintoff but are unlikely to give him all he wants.

The extended treaty negotiations have exacerbated the island's economic difficulties. Unemployment has increased significantly, several manufacturing firms have folded, some retail outlets have closed, and the flow of tourists has slowed. Moreover, the evacuation of British dependents last January removed much needed purchasing power. The agreement is not apt to alleviate these problems immediately.

Mintoff's preoccupation with foreign affairs, combined with his reluctance to delegate authority, has resulted in little long-term economic planning. He now has the opportunity to concentrate on his goal of making Malta economically self-sustaining.



## French Defense Policy

In a recent interview, Defense Minister Michel Debre warned of the possible adverse consequences of a European defense force. Debre contended that both the Soviets and the Americans would be opposed to such a force, which could cause "neutralist" pressures to grow within Europe. Although not explicitly stated, French concern over the role Germany would play is a key reason for Debre's aversion to a European defense grouping.

Debre in effect was arguing for the status quo, both in over-all European and in US-European defense relations. President Pompidou himself recently said that defense cooperation was not a current European concern and earlier called discussion of possible Franco-British nuclear co-operation "premature."

For a variety of reasons, Paris may find it advantageous to follow a "wait and see" policy on these questions. France, like the rest of Europe, is preoccupied with the enlargement of the European Communities and the impact it will have on European political and economic developments. Then, too, while Paris continues to express concern over the possibility of a unilateral US troop withdrawal from Europe, most French officials do not believe such a departure is imminent. Finally, France still has well over a year before it must decide whether to locate its Pluton tactical nuclear missile system in Germany—which would necessitate some cooperative arrangements between France and its NATO allies.

France is still wrestling with the problem of Germany's role in any defense arrangement, particularly one that would include nuclear weapons. Bonn's growing economic and political strength and its increasing willingness to act independently has not been lost on Paris. The French fear, and rightly so, that Bonn would not be content to remain an outsider in any European military arrangements.

France at some point will be forced to come to grips with these questions, but even then it will be guided by long-held principles. Chief among these is insistence that France retain absolute control over its nuclear forces. Nor will France allow itself to be reintegrated into NATO's military command structure as constituted. Paris may become somewhat more flexible on questions of cooperation on conventional armed forces, a shift suggested by Pompidou's less strident attitude toward NATO and the US.




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## Yugoslavia: Smallpox Adds Woes

SMALLPOX STRIKES YUGOSLAVIA



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Despite strenuous efforts to contain it, a smallpox epidemic is threatening to get out of control. Belgrade has sought international medical aid, and it is on the way. Unfortunately, damage to Yugoslavia's economy will be difficult to avoid, and the spread of the disease beyond Yugoslavia itself is already a fact.

Smallpox first appeared in mid-March in Kosovo to which it had been carried by Moslem pilgrims returning from Mecca. By 29 March, the disease had spread throughout the republic of Serbia and the autonomous province of Vojvodina. Fifteen people died and nearly 200 were hospitalized. An important factor in the rapid spread was the small number of people who had been vaccinated against the disease. Furthermore, an estimated 20-30 percent of the Yugoslav vaccine proved to be ineffective. At the end of March, the disease was still localized in the general area of Serbia, but Yugoslav experts were afraid that it would break out with renewed vigor and spill over into the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Belgrade is taking steps to control further contagion. Most central government meetings—including an unprecedented joint meeting of the state presidency and party presidium—have been indefinitely postponed to avoid exposing high federation officials to infection. Sports events and public gatherings in the affected areas have been canceled as has the military callup in Kosovo.

The Yugoslavs are seeking 20 million doses of vaccine from the World Health Organization,

the US, the USSR, the UK, France, and West Germany. The US has sent three million doses, modern inoculation equipment, and six specialists to assist in their use. If the other medical aid also arrives in timely fashion, the Yugoslavs will have a better chance of reducing the projected re-infection to manageable limits.

The epidemic has begun to spread abroad. A Yugoslav worker from Kosovo has been hospitalized in Hanover, West Germany. Austria and Bulgaria have sealed their borders with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has warned that Albania is infected. The other countries bordering on Yugoslavia—especially Romania and Hungary, where health facilities are poor—may also be considering closing their borders.

As for the Yugoslav economy, it is just beginning to rebound from a serious trade imbalance and inflation. A widespread epidemic could hit it hard. If, for example, the infestation lingers beyond six weeks or if it receives alarmist press coverage in Western Europe, the tourist industry will be seriously injured and the 1972 balance of payments will be undermined. If more neighboring countries close their borders, export earnings will begin to suffer. Furthermore, shortages may result from disruption of imports as well as dislocations in production and internal trade. Economic damage can be limited, however, if the disease is controlled in Vojvodina—a major agricultural supply area—and kept out of the highly industrialized Slovene and Croat republics.

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## Poland: New Faces of 1972

The personnel shifts effected at the first session of the new *Sejm* (parliament) this week cap party leader Edward Gierek's campaign to remold the Polish power structure. To supplement the party leadership that he chose at last fall's party congress, Gierek now has a government team free of politically embarrassing holdovers from the Gomulka era.

The *Sejm* elected 62-year-old Henryk Jablonski, who had been education minister, to the ceremonial post of chief of state. Jablonski replaces Jozef Cyrankiewicz, a political anachronism who had been stripped of all political power. He was not even elected as a deputy to the *Sejm*. In all, 11 new members were named to the 17-member presidential council, indicating that it will remain representative of diverse domestic views.

The cabinet changes announced by Premier Jaroszewicz, who was re-elected, affect economic and social portfolios. They include the appointment of two new deputy premiers and six ministers, and the creation of three new ministries. The two new deputy premiers, Olszewski and Tejchma, are expected to be responsible for trade and for economic reforms, respectively. Virtually all of the new appointees appear to be competent professionals who will focus on areas of high priority for the Gierek regime.

A meeting of the party central committee prior to the *Sejm* session relieved the youthful, liberal Tejchma from the party secretariat, although retaining him as full member of the policy-making politburo. On the secretariat, Tejchma had long been in charge of youth affairs and, under Gierek's leadership, had responsibility for cultural policy and, at least in part, for relations with foreign parties. His new post as deputy premier, an appointment heralded by a virtually unprecedented announcement by the central committee, indicates that Tejchma has not been demoted. Had Gierek been dissatisfied with Tejchma's performance, he would certainly have replaced him at the party congress last December.

Parliamentary elections on 19 March provided a prelude to this week's government shifts. Over 97 percent of the electorate voted, and a sizable number exercised their option of crossing out the names of candidates they did not like from the party-approved single slate. While Gierek received 99.8 percent of the vote in his district, some full members of the politburo stood as low as 96 percent. Nevertheless, the result represented an endorsement of Gierek's regime, an outcome he sought and expected. The fact that two thirds of the 460 parliamentary seats were filled by persons who were not in the last *Sejm* reflects the success of Gierek's effort to put his own stamp on the legislature. Among the tasks that Gierek has already indicated he will present to parliament are the drawing up of a new constitution and local government reform.



Henryk Jablonski

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## International Oil Developments

Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will begin bargaining sessions next month on participation in oil company operations within their borders. Saudi Petroleum Minister Yamani will represent the other gulf states in the talks. The negotiations will be contentious, but a compromise settlement is likely before the end of the year. The main sticking points will be compensation for the companies' assets, the price of oil to be marketed by the companies for the governments, and a schedule for moving toward the long-term goal of 51-percent participation, i.e., a controlling interest in company operations in a country.

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25X1 The Shah of Iran is not interested in OPEC's method of achieving participation and is discussing his separate package of demands with representatives of the consortium this week. Libya, which also intends to hold bilateral talks on participation, is still embroiled in negotiations on compensation for the devaluation of the dollar.

[redacted]  
An agreement is unlikely until Libyan oil policy-maker Deputy Premier Jallud becomes involved, which could be soon now.

Kuwait has joined Libya in restricting its oil production. In an apparent move to forestall debate on oil conservation measures proposed by opposition members in the assembly, the government has instructed the Kuwait Oil Company to hold oil production this year at or below the level of 1971. Increased production from other sources such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Nigeria will satisfy expected growth in oil demand, but these actions demonstrate the continuing ability of the oil-producing countries to exert control over their oil resources even without participation.

In Venezuela, Creole and Gulf, two of the three largest producers, have attempted to create an impression of a gradually improving situation by announcing an increase in production; even so, Venezuelan exports this year still will be below the "quotas" imposed on all companies. As a result, the two companies face fines for not meet-

ing export quotas, but they are trying to get a waiver based on adverse market conditions.

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## Progress on Drug Controls

Amendments to strengthen the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs were adopted by a large vote at a UN-sponsored conference in Geneva last week. Key provisions give the International Narcotics Control Board more power and make it easier to extradite drug traffickers who flee across national boundaries. The USSR and its allies cast nine of the 12 abstentions, but the chief Soviet delegate has told the US privately that Moscow may sign the amendment protocol. It will enter into force when ratified by 40 of the adherents to the 1961 convention.

The international community is moving against the drug problem in other ways. About \$3 million has been pledged to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, most of it by the US. Sweden agreed this week to serve as the non-regional member of a special UN committee on illicit drug business in the Middle East. Participants from the area are Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. Ratification of the 1971 draft convention on psychotropic (mind-bending) substances such as LSD—which are not covered by the 1961 convention or the proposed amendments—is under consideration in more than 20 states.

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## Turkey: New Tremors


There are signs of new uneasiness in top government circles, and the authorities, contrary to earlier indications, extended martial law on 25 March for two more months. The next day five heavily armed terrorists kidnaped three radar technicians—two British and one Canadian—from a small town on the Black Sea coast. The technicians were to have been used as hostages in an attempt to gain the release of three terrorist leaders who have been sentenced to death. The scheme failed, however, when the kidnapers were found on 30 March following a major manhunt. Ten terrorists—including the kidnapers—and the three kidnap victims were killed when ammunition exploded in the mountain village house where they were surrounded by Turkish troops.

Following an emergency session prompted by the kidnappings, the military-dominated Na-

tional Security Council issued a statement that highlighted the continuing difficulties of the government, charged that certain leading politicians were guilty of irresponsibility, and urged parliament to get on with the task of enacting reform legislation. The council implied it may take the place of the cabinet as the prime expeditor of legislation if the government and parliament do not act soon.

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In a related move, Prime Minister Erim has publicized a letter to the top political leaders in which he also admonished parliament to get on with the task of passing reform legislation. Among the measures Erim wants are special security courts to handle cases involving alleged



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terrorists, a streamlining of parliamentary procedures, and an increase in the government's control over civil servants and the public media.

Erim also expressed concern over the deteriorating security situation and reiterated that Turkey faces an international conspiracy.

Cypriots. His major interest, as always, is to ensure the continuation of his power and the status quo on Cyprus.

Makarios appears to have thwarted the Cypriot bishops' call for his resignation as President. When the three bishops repeated their demand last week, they failed to set a time limit and did not renew their threat to strip Makarios of his ecclesiastical duties if he refused to step down. The bishops also gave Makarios a new opening in their latest statement by giving his failure to move Cyprus toward union with Greece—enosis—as one important reason why he should resign.

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### Cyprus: A Byzantine Minuet

President Makarios' long-distance debate with the Greeks goes on. Athens is settling down to a protracted war of political maneuvering hoping to wear down the Archbishop. Makarios—looking for immediate gains—has rallied the Greek Cypriots to his side, but, sensitive as to the limits to which he can go, he has avoided arousing his followers to the point of inviting Greek intervention. The Turkish Cypriots are alarmed over the possibility of a violent outburst on the island.

The Archbishop has successfully parried all of the Greek demands so far. He may make a few concessions eventually, if he can do so without limiting his own strength. Makarios could, for example, agree to tighter UN controls over the Czechoslovak arms and partially reshuffle his cabinet, actions which might go part way in placating the Greeks, the Turks and the Turkish

Makarios can turn this against the Greeks by trading on the widely held assumption that Athens is behind the bishops, portraying the bishops' support of enosis as being Athens' goal as well. If the Archbishop succeeds, it will no doubt harm Greece's good relations with Turkey, where suspicion over Athens' ultimate goal in Cyprus is never far below the surface. Makarios could even attempt to fan these suspicions by seeking a rapprochement with retired Greek General Grivas, an enosis zealot.

The Turks have stood apart from the dispute so far, except to insist on the safety of the Turkish Cypriots. If the enosis issue raises its head once again, Ankara will have to take a more active role. Athens, above all, does not want to risk another confrontation with Turkey and, to avoid it, would move to end the dispute with Makarios. Meanwhile, Makarios' skill at political maneuvering will keep Athens busy.

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## Arab Parleys and Peregrinations

The Arabs have been traveling and talking more than usual these past few weeks, discussing the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the light of such matters as Husayn's Palestinian plan and the President's trip to Moscow in May.

Egypt seems to be taking the lead. On 8 March, President Sadat began a three-day visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He was shortly followed to the same countries by Egyptian War



King Faysal with Sadat

Minister Sadiq. They were probably seeking, in view of the two countries' role as sources of financial support, further backing for Egypt's efforts to prepare itself for the confrontation with Israel.

The presidential council of the Confederation of Arab Republics met in Cairo in mid-March, but accomplished little. The sessions appear to have been marked once again by differences between the three heads of state. Consultations continued even after the official sessions ended. A subsequent visit to Libya by

Sadat was followed by Qadhafi's arrival in Egypt for further talks with the Egyptian President. They may have been considering further the confederal reaction to King Husayn's plan for a new Palestinian-Jordanian state. An effort may be made to convene an Arab summit to provide a coordinated response to King Husayn's proposal.

Meanwhile, Iraqi representatives have toured various Arab capitals attempting to sell a larger scheme for Arab unity, ostensibly as a counter to Husayn. Aside from the predictable general expressions of support, little has resulted from Baghdad's efforts, although the Iraqi delegation received considerable high-level attention in Cairo. Qadhafi is said to have registered his opposition to the Iraqi plan because it did not include Libya and posed a potential threat to the Arab Confederation. Syria did little more than agree to submit the idea to the Confederation's council.

Intra-Arab bonds are brittle at best, and this latest effort of the Iraqis to emerge from their diplomatic cocoon will fall far short of achieving real unity. In fact, Baghdad probably has few




The Leaders of the Arab Confederation

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THE LAST DAYS HAVE WITNESSED AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVEMENT OF DELEGATIONS BETWEEN ARAB CAPITALS.



illusions that it could bring about such a union, but it would like to see some improvement in its bilateral relations with Syria and Egypt. This would be an accomplishment of note for Iraqi leader Tikriti. If any improvements do evolve, it should be pleasing to Moscow, which has been working hard to improve its own relations with the Arabs and has been urging closer Syrian-Iraqi cooperation on projects of mutual interest such as the development of the Euphrates River basin.

Fatah chieftain Yasir Arafat also has been on the road, visiting virtually all of the states of the Middle East and North Africa at least once, but concentrating on Cairo. Arafat has been attempting to provide guidance for an Arab response to Husayn's plan, but he may also have been discussing how to increase the effectiveness and participation of the fedayeen in the confrontation with Israel.

Preparations for further consultations and initiatives are under way. Cairo is planning a new political move that is to include "total Arab mobilization on the various fronts" and may involve new initiatives toward West European countries. The details of this plan are to be made public before May, according to Cairo press reports. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ghalib is planning a tour of North African states and will visit the Soviet Union at the end of April. Some of the Egyptian moves are inspired by the continuing need to project a sense of activity on the Arab-Israeli front, but they also are being undertaken with an eye to President Nixon's trip to Moscow in May. Egyptian leaders are probably hoping that a demonstration of urgency will somehow have a favorable effect on Arab interests at the Moscow summit.

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### CABINET CHANGES IN DAMASCUS

President Asad has included more non-Baathists in his new cabinet. Their appointments followed the recent formation of the "National Front," a paper organization of the ruling Baath party and Syria's other "progressive" political groups.

The changes demonstrate Asad's flexible style of governing, although they will not change the realities of Syrian political life. Baathists now occupy fewer positions, but they still hold all the key civilian positions as well as those within the military, the real base of Syrian political power. Asad's decision to give other groups ostensible participation in the government is in sharp contrast to the tight grip exercised by earlier Baathist regimes. While he will make no converts among doctrinaire party members at home, moves such as this do find favor with other Arab states long at odds with the ruthless Baathist rule in Damascus.

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### Sudan: An Accord in Doubt

A number of stumbling blocks stand in the way of full implementation of the peace agreement ratified this week by the government and the southern rebels. There was bitter quarreling among the Anya-Nya rebels regarding the terms of the settlement prior to the ratification ceremony in Addis Ababa on 27 March, and there are, as a result, serious questions about the southerners' ability to unite in honoring the truce.

threatened the Anya-Nya with denial of their countries' sanctuary if they did not sign. Lagu, subjected to these pressures and apparently convinced that he could not gain further concessions, cut off the debate and ratified the agreement.

The enormous task now facing Lagu is to sell the settlement to the Anya-Nya commanders in the field. A number of southern "lieutenant colonels" have threatened to break with Lagu if he failed to get the government's acceptance of changes in post-armistice security arrangements.

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Unless Lagu was able to satisfy their demands, obstreperous Anya-Nya chieftains are perfectly capable of breaching the truce in an attempt to overturn the settlement.

Even if the two sides are able to overcome their ingrained mutual distrust, they still face staggering problems. An estimated half million refugees who fled the fighting over the years must be resettled, and the economy of the backward southern provinces must be built up. The government, with limited financial resources and administrative talent, is ill-prepared for this effort and is soliciting the aid of international charitable organizations.

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When government delegates became aware of the rebel bickering, they moved to convince Lagu of President Numayri's sincerity and commitment to meet the needs of the black southern provinces. They may have enlisted the support of Ethiopian and Ugandan officials who implicitly

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## Uganda-Israel: Fractured Friendship

President Amin closed the Israeli Embassy on 30 March and gave its staff ten days to leave the country. Amin's action followed quickly after his expulsion of all Israeli civilians and the approximately 50-man Israeli military advisory contingent in Uganda. Amin also had stopped Israeli sponsored construction projects and canceled arms purchases from Israel.

countries, notably Libya. Premier Qadhafi may have given Amin financial encouragement to break with Israel.

Amin's rift with Israel may well have an unsettling effect on the army, the President's principal source of strength. The Israeli military training program has been both effective and popular with the armed forces. The withdrawal of the Israeli advisers will diminish the army's limited capabilities. Moreover, Amin's main support in the army comes from soldiers who have tribal ties with the southern Sudanese; these soldiers are aware of Tel Aviv's aid to the Anya-Nya and have been unhappy with Amin's recent pro-Muslim stance. The reaction of these troops could add to Amin's troubles with an already unruly army.

Amin's moves were triggered by Israeli press allegations that he had postponed a trip to Cairo because of unrest at home. Relations between Kampala and Tel Aviv have been declining since early this year when Amin, a Muslim who nevertheless has long had close ties to the Israelis, began to strengthen relations with several Arab

### ARMS DELIVERIES TO GUINEA

Moscow is responding to President Toure's request for deliveries of military hardware, and China may be planning to expand its small military aid program in Guinea.

Since the Portuguese amphibious attack on Conakry in November 1970, Moscow has delivered sizable amounts of equipment. Recent shipments have included artillery, small arms, ammunition, and at least 11 medium tanks.

These deliveries probably were made under the terms of an estimated \$5 million Soviet-Guinean arms agreement signed early last year. The agreement also provides for three patrol craft and additional MIG-17s. Since 1960 Moscow has provided Conakry with at least \$15 million in military equipment.

Although China has been supplying small quantities of military equipment—vehicles, small arms, and ammunition—Conakry remains dependent on the USSR for most of its arms. Total Chinese deliveries have been less than \$2 million. Peking, however, may be preparing to send more materiel. Under a July 1971 arms accord, patrol boats and ground forces equipment will be shipped to Guinea. The Chinese also are helping Guinea construct a small-arms factory outside Conakry.

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## Chile: The Week That Was

The exposure of an inept coup plan last week gave the hard-pressed Allende government a boost. Officials appear convinced that evidence against the accused far-rightist civilians and retired military plotters is good. The incident has enhanced the ITT story, which has been treated with restraint by the Chilean Government thus far, although not by its controlled media. Allende will probably combine the charges in a rally called for 6 April to publicize alleged threats to oust and murder him. Active duty officers critical of the government will probably be reluctant to risk even the appearance of discontent, particularly after the official announcement that the government has a list of officers allegedly approached by the plotters.

Christian Democratic leaders seem to have decided that an outspoken but independent opposition stand is the best strategy. They are no longer coordinating moves with the National Party but are on the one hand launching effective selected attacks on the government while on the other carrying on a dialogue with Allende and the more moderate of the Radicals in the administration. Although the Christian Democrats did not sponsor anti-Allende marches set for 24 and 28 March, they are protesting the government's ban on them and reportedly plan to stage a massive demonstration in defense of constitutional rights on 6 April with other democratic parties.

The conservative National Party is annoyed at the Christian Democrats' aloofness but is going

ahead with its own plans to step up pressure on Allende. The Nationals are concerned over the recklessness of far right extremists and are developing legalistic arguments to use in organizing against property seizures and violations of public order and personal liberty. The party will focus its efforts in the rural areas where unrest is rising. It plans to coordinate the efforts of landowners, peasants, and other organized groups. The Nationals also hope to expand contacts with the armed forces and to run Colonel Albert Labbe, recently retired for his open criticism of the government, for senator.

The government plan to run a well-known "political independent," Felipe Herrera, for rector of the University of Chile in the election in April has hit a snag. Criticizing Herrera as a compromiser and "pseudo-Socialist imperialist," leftist extremists will run their own candidate, Andres Pascal Allende. Pascal is a top leader of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left and a nephew of the President.

Chilean officials left for the meeting in Paris of their Western creditors this week determined to force action and, if they can, to divide the US from the rest of the group. They were well aware of the fears of some creditors that a prolonged renegotiation could cause Chile to default on its large debts and might strengthen extremist political influence on Allende. The inclusion of hard-line Socialist leader Carlos Altamirano in the delegation gives grounds for apprehension.

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## Brazil Favors China Trade

The Medici administration recently has been devoting attention to Brazil's relationship to Communist China. The government does not have diplomatic relations with Peking in mind now, but has begun trade negotiations as part of a world-wide export promotion program.

The door was opened to expanded trade when a businessman with close ties to the administration visited Peking and Canton last October and November. He sold \$1 million worth of instant coffee in what was described as the first direct deal with the Chinese rather than through intermediaries.

Although no great hopes for the early development of a large volume of trade were raised during the talks, the Brazilian press reported during March that an agreement had been signed for the sale of 100,000 tons of sugar. Other press reports say that another

100,000 tons of sugar and an undetermined amount of cotton may soon be sold. In addition, a spokesman for the Brazilian Exporters Association has said that his organization will send four representatives to the Canton trade fair in October.

An administration official has said that he cannot comment on whether the government is studying the possibility of establishing formal trade relations with Peking. The administration's failure to issue any statement on the topic probably results both from Medici's usual tight hold on policy discussions and from the lack of consensus thus far on the proper course. The finance minister and other economic officials seem to be pushing for a rapid expansion of trade, while the Foreign Ministry and the military-dominated National Security Council and National Intelligence Service appear to be advising great caution because of the political implications. Peking would like to arrange an exchange of permanent trade missions as a first step toward diplomatic relations.

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