


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YEMEN (ADEN) - SAUDI ARABIA:

AIR ATTACK

110 [Saudi Arabia does not intend to take retaliatory action for the attack last week by two Adeni MIG-17s on a Saudi Army post at Wudayah. The attack apparently caused little damage, although some Saudis were injured.]

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The Saudis themselves have tried to avoid a direct confrontation with Aden. Since the Adeni air raid, the Saudis have augmented their air strength in the south, and their caution will be tested if Aden attempts further harassment, which is a distinct possibility.

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
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NIGERIA: ARMY POLITICS

117 [The armed forces top job has been vacant for some time, and General Gowon's procrastination in filling it has made his senior officers impatient and contributed to a spate of coup rumors. Tribal interests are involved since the leading contenders are a Yoruba from western Nigeria and a Hausa-Fulani from the north. In the end, Gowon should be able to find a compromise that would alienate neither tribe.]

114 [It had long been expected that the senior army officer, Major General Adebayo, a Yoruba, would be elevated to the vacant post. The delay apparently stems from competition within the army and from high-level suspicion about Adebayo's personal loyalty to Gowon,] [who comes from a small northern tribe.]



General Gowon

25X1 115 [Adebayo is being challenged for the top job by Major General Hassan Katsina, the army's ranking member of the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy that ruled Nigeria from independence until the military seized power in 1966.]

11 [measures were taken when Gowon returned from a state visit to Mali early this month] [Despite these developments, however, no action is known to have been taken against officers incriminated by the recent coup rumors.]

116 [Gowon recently took steps to tighten his personal security, suggesting that he felt threatened by the growing tension among his senior officers. The army's brigade of guards, including Gowon's bodyguard, has been expanded, and some of its commanding officers have been reassigned or replaced. Unprecedented protective

117 [Gowon is always put to the test when it is time to shuffle the military hierarchy. In the end, he may well effect a compromise, possibly by creating equivalent positions for the generals involved. If he can find the proper formula, the generals will almost certainly grudgingly accept, thus reducing tensions and curtailing coup rumors.]

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
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PANAMA: SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT

127 [General Torrijos' "consultations with the people" since the Security Council session ended have not yet provided any solution to his foreign policy predicament.]

127 [The basic quandary which Torrijos faces is whether he should in effect abandon efforts to work out differences with the US and exploit the willingness of certain countries to back Panama in international organizations; or whether he should try to move to what he has termed "face-to-face" discussions on the major issues separating the two countries.]



Foreign Minister Tack

135 [In deciding whether to pursue the "pressure" option, Torrijos must take account of the rapid evaporation of prospects that the vocal support of Communist and nonaligned countries will be translated into cash. The mirage of \$100 million in loans from Libya seems to have grown fainter as that country evaluates Panama's possibilities as an ally.]

129 [At the same time, Torrijos and his advisers have painted themselves into a bit of a corner from which the prospect of a quick resumption of talks with the US looks highly embarrassing. His "consultations with the people" may be designed to get him out of this corner.]

130 [Torrijos was out touring the interior all last weekend and again at mid-week. His speeches have reflected his lack of a definite policy, but he may be merely taking his time to analyze the results of the meeting. He probably wants some manifestation of public support before moving forward with formal negotiations. Torrijos con-

tinues to raise veiled hints of violence, but in a context suggesting that he wants the decision to pursue such a course left to him.]

129 [Torrijos may be in no real hurry to have the problem resolved. His foreign policy advisers are waiting in the wings with a full Third World program to press upon him, and the longer he delays a decision, the longer he avoids their solicitations. The "consultations" are likely to drag on for some time, and while they do, Torrijos has administrative reorganizations in Panama City with which to distract himself. There is, however, a real time constraint in the longer run; the tenth anniversary of the riots in January 1964—from which Panamanians date the current treaty talks—is only nine months away.]

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MEXICO: PROMOTION TOUR

130 [Luis Echeverria, already Mexico's most traveled president, departed yesterday on a month-long trip to promote his two favorite causes: the Third World and the Mexican economy. Billed in Mexico as a "mission for peace," 137 his journey will take him to Ottawa, London, Brussels and Paris. He will go on to Moscow and Peking, the first Mexican president ever to visit 134 either country.]

134 [The trip is another indication that Echeverria wants to give Mexico more exposure in the international arena and more independence of 135 big-power influence. He would like to be accepted as a spokesman for the developing nations and, to 136 this end, takes the industrialized powers, including the US, to task for what he calls their mistreatment of the underprivileged countries. He has advanced a "charter of economic rights and duties," which calls for special treatment for the poorer nations. It has been received warmly by some of the developing nations, and Echeverria hopes to place it before the UN this year. Among the countries on his trip, only China, intrigued by the charter's anti-imperialist overtones, has expressed any fondness for it.]

134 [While he hopes the Third World will pay close attention to what he says on his trip, many 135 of his remarks will be calculated to please audiences back home. Mexicans, as a rule, expect their leader to speak bluntly to the great powers. 136 Echeverria has shown he is quite capable of castigating all the big powers, but many in his audiences will read the US into his preachings.]

136 [While salesmanship for the underprivileged will be part of his pitch, Echeverria will be just as interested in specific economic prizes for Mexico. In Canada and Western Europe he will try to attract foreign investment. He will stress that Mexico welcomes foreign capital that meets its development needs. In the Communist countries, he will probably emphasize trade. Mexican trade delegations have already done some spadework in China. No fundamental changes in Mexico's trade patterns are likely to come out of the trip; about all he can expect are limited trade and cultural agreements and technological assistance.]

URUGUAY: MILITARY INCREASES PRESSURE

137 [For the second time within two months, the military has rapped the knuckles of civilians who have balked at the armed forces' role in government.] [The latest warning, ostensibly directed at congressional opposition to the military's plans for economic recovery, was really aimed at squelching civilian criticism of the armed forces' control of the executive branch and encroachment into other areas once reserved for civilians.]

137 [Apparently to undermine the little support the politicians have among a largely apathetic public, the warning dwelt on civilian corruption. Among other charges, it accused all but one of the major political factions of failing to pay off loans made by the government bank to finance their 1971 election campaigns. No names were given, but the lack of strong reaction from political circles suggests that the charges were well founded.]

138 [To consolidate the military's position, President Bordaberry has reaffirmed his support for the armed forces. He has charged that the top leaders of the leftist Frente Amplio coalition and the opposition Blancos have joined together to try and force his resignation.]

137 [So far, the only major political leader to answer the military has been Jorge Batlle, of the Colorado Party. His reply was confined, however, to the corruption issue and did not touch on the broader question of the military's involvement in government. The opposition Blancos have not commented on either the military's or the President's charges.]

139 [Regardless of how the parties respond, it is clear that the continued existence of the already weakened civilian institutions in Uruguay depends on their acquiescence to the dictates of the generals.]

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CHILE: SOCIALIZATION AHEAD

(140-142)

President Allende's cabinet reorganization on 27 March appears to be a stopgap intended to alleviate dissension in his Popular Unity coalition. The end of military participation in the cabinet after less than five months is the most important aspect of the latest shift. The make-up of the cabinet is now like it was before three military ministers were included last fall to help restore calm after prolonged opposition protests.

The departure of the military is a sop to the radical wing of Allende's Socialist Party, but the President did not include leaders of this group in the new line-up. In line with the election results, the Socialists still have one more post than the Communists; Allende added three ministers from the coalition's miniparties, which now hold six posts, all out of proportion to their dismal election showing. These small parties have proved useful in giving the government the appearance of broad support desired by both Allende and the Communists.

Allende has given the cabinet the task of enforcing "drastic new policies" to solve his most urgent problem, the serious deterioration of the economy. These will include a strong crackdown on the pervasive black market, tough new controls on business and industry, and probably food rationing. The president said that the armed forces will play a leading role in future economic programs, probably because he knows military leaders are concerned that the faltering economy is weakening the country's defense. The armed

forces are less likely to be given any real authority now that they are out of the cabinet. At the same time, their continued collaboration at the working level in transportation and distribution will facilitate the extension of controls and overcoming politically bothersome consumer shortages.

Since the election, there have also been unmistakable signs that Allende has new plans for strengthening his government's hand in dealing with education, the media, the church, and the unions as well as the unorganized bulk of the Chilean work force. President Allende may also be preparing a new campaign criticizing the US, following recent Senate hearings on ITT and talks with the US that he regarded as unproductive.

On the political front, Allende is trying to fashion his quarreling coalition into a more coherent political force. The Socialists and Communists will be particularly jealous of their prerogatives, but Allende may be getting some support for his goal of making the Popular Unity more broadly representative and more responsive to his leadership. His plans may appeal more to the coalition miniparties and to Chileans who support him than to the Socialist and Communist parties, which exert conflicting pressures in his government. In any case, Allende took the results of the elections on 4 March as a mandate to continue his program of socialization at all feasible speed.

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