


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Weekly Summary

DIA review
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CONTENTS *(April 9, 1976)*

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary,

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Middle East-Africa

LEBANON 1-3

Lebanese leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt finally gave in to Syrian pressure on April 2 and agreed to a ten-day truce. Within the time limit—a condition demanded by the leftists—the Lebanese parliament is supposed to amend the constitution, elect a new president, and thus make way for President Franjyah's resignation. Muslim leftist forces remain poised to resume the fighting should these conditions not be met.

The parliament is scheduled to convene April 10 to amend the constitution. If this session is successful, election of a new president presumably will follow within a matter of days. Franjyah, according to his Christian colleagues, has agreed to step down after the election of his successor.

Syria has increased its military presence in Lebanon during the past week in an effort to keep up the pressure on Jumblatt.

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
These forces, along with Syrian-controlled Palestinian troops, have taken control of major ports, border-crossing points, and key supply and communications facilities throughout the country in what appears to be an effective blockade of arms and supplies to Jumblatt's forces and their allies. Damascus has kept most of its regular forces in the north near Tripoli instead of in central and southern Lebanon to minimize the chance of an Israeli counter-move.

The Israelis, as of midweek, did not appear concerned that conditions in Lebanon might lead to a new Arab-Israeli war, although defense officials announced

publicly for the first time that significant numbers of Syrian regulars have, in fact, entered Lebanon.

Damascus is gambling that Tel Aviv will continue to act with restraint and that the show of Syrian force will intimidate Lebanese leftists and their Palestinian supporters into going along with the plan to replace Franjyah and extend the cease-fire. The danger is that Syria might fail to intimidate Jumblatt and misjudge the limits of Israeli tolerance. (An analysis of the growing military and political strength of Lebanon's Muslim leftists appears on page 9.)

[Redacted]



USSR-LEBANON

Not Sourced

The USSR is giving strong support to Syria's effort to achieve a truce in Lebanon.

On Thursday, a Pravda article signed "Observer" to denote the Kremlin's en-

dorsement, backed Syrian mediation and called for the preservation of a united and independent Lebanese state. It was the most authoritative Soviet statement to date on the Lebanese situation.

[Redacted]

Soviet diplomatic intercession in Beirut may have been prompted by a meeting between Vinogradov and Syrian President Asad on March 29. At about that time, Damascus was soliciting Western reaction to more open and extensive Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and Asad may have convinced the Soviets of the gravity of the situation.

Moscow wants to avoid an expanded conflict in the area, but it has other reasons for supporting the Syrian proposal. It does not want Asad's prestige to suffer, particularly at a time when Soviet problems with Egyptian President Sadat have intensified. Moscow may also fear that Syrian failure in Lebanon could lead to political instability in Damascus.

US naval movements have led the Soviets to talk publicly about possible US intervention in Lebanon, and they have formally asked Washington for an explanation of US intentions. The Soviet actions appear designed to show the Arabs that Moscow is protecting their interests.

[Redacted]

USSR-EGYPT

Not Sourced

Moscow is taking a tough public line on President Sadat's abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty. Privately, it has indicated it is not planning any dramatic retaliation against

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4-6

Cairo.

A Soviet government statement issued last week put Moscow's formal denunciation of Sadat's action on the record. The statement did not berate President Sadat by name, but it did reject some of his accusations against Moscow on the armaments and debt questions and made clear that it was Sadat's reorientation of Egypt's foreign policy that has caused the rift.

The statement, as well as a torrent of Soviet comment that followed, rejected assertions by Egyptian officials that the abrogation will not cause any changes in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Moscow said Sadat will have to face up to the Egyptian people for the consequences of his policy—a statement designed to sow doubts in Egypt about the wisdom of Sadat's action.

Soviet officials have privately indicated that the USSR does not intend to take any dramatic action against Sadat.

In justifying their decision to sit tight, the Soviets are asserting that Sadat's isolation in the Arab world and Egypt's economic difficulties will eventually lead to his removal. They probably want to avoid any action that might lend substance to Sadat's charges that they are seeking to undermine him. Some Soviet officials are worried that Sadat may expel the many Soviet citizens still in Egypt and act against the Soviet cultural centers, which give Moscow entry to the Egyptian left.

The Soviet public statements have stirred an outpouring of charges from the Egyptian press and public figures of Soviet meddling. The Egyptians are trying to show widespread support for President Sadat to counter the Soviet campaign, but their failure to publicize some of the specifics of the Soviet rebuttal suggests concern that the attacks might fall on receptive ears in Egypt. [redacted]

FRENCH TERRITORY OF THE AFARS AND ISSAS

Paris has met a quick rebuff to its efforts to begin the peaceful decolonization of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

Somali President Siad last week refused to give Paris a formal guarantee that Somalia will respect the sovereignty of the territory after it becomes independent. Siad, who wants to annex it, told a special French emissary that he would only give verbal assurance.

The Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast—a Somali puppet organization—and the African People's Independence League—the legal opposition party in the FTAI—last week rejected French proposals for a meeting that would include them, the pro-French governing party led by Ali Aref Bourhan, and the Ethiopian-backed Djibouti Liberation Movement.

The Front and the League called on

France to negotiate only with them, excluding Ali Aref and the Djibouti Liberation Movement. The Front accused France of trying to conceal its true aim—the transfer of power to Ali Aref after a sham referendum.

The special French emissary had visited Addis Ababa before he went to Mogadiscio. The Ethiopians reiterated their determination to prevent Somalia from dominating the FTAI. They expressed concern about the weak domestic position of Ali Aref, whom they favor to lead an independent government.

The Ethiopians said they oppose "foreign bases" in the territory after it becomes independent, but made no explicit objection to French troops remaining there to protect its sovereignty. Ethiopian officials said they would prefer guarantees by the Organization of African Unity. [redacted]

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
RHODESIA

7-12

The four southern African presidents who support the black Rhodesian nationalists are pressing ahead with efforts to increase military pressure on Ian Smith's white minority regime.

Tanzanian President Nyerere, Mozambican President Machel, Zambian President Kaunda, and Botswana President Khama reportedly agreed, at their recent meeting in Lusaka, that the insurgents should be permitted to launch guerrilla attacks into northwestern Rhodesia from Zambia. No such attacks have occurred yet, but the Zambians have reportedly been making plans to support such operations.

The African leaders were unable to persuade the leaders of the two principal nationalist factions—Joshua Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa—to bury their differences.



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
Nyerere and Machel are trying to tighten their control over outside aid to the nationalist guerrilla forces because they are concerned that direct aid by the Soviets, Cubans, and Chinese to the factions each favors could widen existing divisions and weaken the guerrilla effort. The Tanzanians informed communist countries last week that all outside aid is to be sent through Tanzania and Mozambique.

The four presidents want to avoid a repetition of what happened in Angola. They have agreed that no Cuban or other foreign combat troops will be allowed to join the fighting in Rhodesia. The pressure to allow communist participation will increase, however, if the fighting drags on, as is likely.

A recent British initiative aimed at restarting settlement talks shows little sign of bearing fruit. British Minister of State Ennals was given a sympathetic hearing in Tanzania and Mozambique last week, but Nyerere and Machel both expressed their belief that further fighting would be necessary before there could be any meaningful negotiations. Kaunda, who had been the prime backer of the settlement talks, reportedly has come to the same conclusion.

13-16;
ALGERIA-MOROCCO

Algeria last week renewed its efforts to keep the UN involved in its dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara. A senior Algerian Foreign Ministry official told the US ambassador on April 1 that the return to the area in late March of UN Secretary General Waldheim's special envoy shows that the international community is still involved. The official urged the US to encourage UN efforts to resolve the dispute. He did not suggest any softening in Algeria's position.



The envoy's mission was abruptly suspended this week. Neither Morocco nor Mauritania would receive him because he had met representatives of the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas and inspected Saharan refugee camps during his visit to Algeria.

The Moroccan army reportedly is poised to launch a massive sweep to clear remaining pockets of Polisario resistance in Western Sahara. Moroccan officials are counting on this offensive to halt—at least through the hot summer months—Polisario raids on Moroccan forces in southern Moroccan and Western Saharan towns.


Algeria continues to strengthen its forces and defensive positions in the tri-border area. [redacted] major elements of three armor battalions and up to four motorized infantry battalions, plus supporting artillery, deployed in defensive strongpoints west of Tindouf.

Algiers is also increasing its air strength in the area. Six MIG-21 fighters were on a highway strip northeast of Tindouf. This is the first time such aircraft have been

seen in the southern border area. Sixteen new aircraft revetments were observed nearby, suggesting that the Algerians intend to build at least an auxiliary landing strip there. Seventeen MIG-15s or MIG-17s were at Tindouf airfield, about double the number previously located there. (A discussion of the background and the character of the Polisario Front appears on page 16.)

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ITALY 19-20

The Socialist Party is maneuvering to bring down Prime Minister Moro's two-month-old Christian Democratic minority government. The Socialists, whose abstention in parliamentary votes is crucial to Moro's survival, seem to want an early national election but hope to avoid sole responsibility for the political and economic uncertainty that would follow the fall of Moro's government.

The maneuvering by the Socialists is part of the political fallout from a clash in parliament last week over legalized abortion. The Socialists were infuriated by the Christian Democrats' willingness to rely on the support of the neo-fascists to thwart a Socialist attempt to make abortions readily available. The neo-fascists have Italy's fourth largest party, but they are treated as political pariahs by the six other parties.

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Parliamentary debate on abortion has been suspended until next week. The Christian Democrats, who failed to agree on a party strategy at their recent congress, are trying to patch things up. The Socialists, however, are in no mood to compromise and appear determined to force decisions on basic political issues.

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A meeting of the Socialist directorate this week showed strong sentiment in favor either of an early parliamentary election or an emergency government in which the Communist Party would have a limited but openly acknowledged role. The directorate gave Socialist chief De Martino a mandate to solicit the views of major political and labor leaders on a broad range of Italian problems. The Socialists are hoping to persuade others to agree that Moro's minority government is too weak to act effectively.

De Martino is clearly trying to bring the government down by consensus in order to avoid the kind of criticism his party faced when it toppled Moro's previous government early this year.

UNITED KINGDOM 21-25

James Callaghan became prime minister and leader of the Labor Party on April 5 after a third-ballot victory over left-winger Michael Foot.

The policy direction of the Labor government probably will not change significantly. Callaghan will put his personal stamp on the government, but there will be little change even in the style of leadership. Callaghan, like Wilson, has a knack for avoiding controversy and for seeking out the middle ground on potentially divisive issues. His sense of tactics, however, at times leaves Callaghan open to charges that he lacks conviction and originality.

In his first television address as prime minister, Callaghan warned that Britain continues to live beyond its means and that more sacrifices will be necessary. He reaffirmed that the government must control inflation before turning full attention to reducing unemployment. This order of priorities was confirmed by Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey in his budget message the following day.

Most key ministers have remained in Callaghan's new cabinet if not always in the same job. Most importantly,

Healey—the symbol of the government's economic recovery program—stays on as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Anthony Crosland succeeded Callaghan as foreign secretary. Crosland, while not an avid "European," will probably follow Callaghan's pragmatic approach to EC affairs. British foreign policy will continue to reflect Callaghan's pro-American outlook.

Foot's impressive and dignified performance in the leadership race may gain him the deputy party leadership, a stronger say in setting policy, and a key role in maintaining party unity. He has already been named Leader of the House of Commons, the government's business manager in Parliament.

Many Labor politicians, probably including Callaghan, hope to put off an election until next year in the expectation that inflation and unemployment levels will be lower. Callaghan might still be tempted to call a snap election, however, if the opinion polls and local election results later this spring show that Labor has a good chance of winning.

Budget Announced

Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey announced this week a mildly reflationary budget that reaffirms the government's commitment to reducing inflation through cooperation with the labor unions.

The budget, which entails a \$22-billion deficit in the fiscal year running through March 1977, calls for selective tax cuts if the trade unions accept tougher wage controls.

Included in Healey's tax package are certain unconditional tax relief measures as well as a few minor investment aids. Higher excise taxes are planned for alcohol, cigarettes, and gasoline. Personal income growth from an expanding economy is supposed to provide a higher base to tax, increasing the overall revenue take.

The largest part of the tax relief, however, is contingent on labor's acceptance of an annual limit on wage increases of about 3 percent. Healey is likely to have a hard time selling this to the unions.


He may have to accept a higher pay limit coupled with less tax relief. Under current guidelines, wage increases have averaged 10 percent.

Healey has scheduled a 13-percent increase in government spending in the fiscal year ending next March. This is down sharply from the 29-percent rise registered last year; in real terms, it amounts to almost no change.

Healey emphasized that economic recovery must be based on the expansion of exports and import substitution rather than massive government spending. He ruled out the prolonged use of import controls, but indicated the government might use selective controls.

Len Murray, general secretary of the Trades Union Congress, objected to a 3-percent pay limit on the grounds that it is inflexible and does not take pay differentials into account. Margaret Thatcher, head of the Conservative Party, objected to the conditional nature of the tax cuts and to the large role that the unions play in deciding on tax cuts that affect other citizens as well.

UPI



Denis Healey

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31-36

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The EC summit in Luxembourg last week failed to agree on solutions for the pressing economic and institutional problems facing the Community. The political fallout will probably be most damaging for French President Giscard. His ideas on monetary cooperation and his proposal to resolve the deadlock on direct elections to the European Parliament were blocked.

The most immediate problem facing the heads of government at Luxembourg was the disparity in economic conditions that had led France again to withdraw from the joint float—an action that emphasized West Germany's relative strength within the EC. Chancellor Schmidt made no bones about Germany's unwillingness to underwrite further EC programs to benefit the weaker members unless they accept binding pledges to follow more stringent economic policies. The French and British, in particular, found this condition politically unacceptable. The leaders fell back on charging the finance ministers with examining later this month EC Commission proposals for policy cooperation.

Prime Minister Wilson failed in his bid to have the Community adopt a common approach to unemployment. Schmidt insisted that each member must alleviate its own unemployment problem and do it by non-inflationary means.

The Council was unable to devise a formula for apportioning seats in a directly elected European Parliament in 1978. While new proposals are possible, it is not yet clear whether the issue can be unblocked at the next European Council in July.

Prime Minister Tindemans' report on European Union was given short shrift; the long-term development of the EC could not be discussed objectively in an atmosphere so lacking in common purpose. The foreign ministers were given a vague mandate to come up with "concrete proposals," based on Tindemans' report, for the European Council in December.

The leaders did reach a number of

foreign policy decisions. They issued, for example, a declaration on Rhodesia supporting British objectives there. In Luxembourg, the political directors agreed to make a demarche to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to encourage continuation of the Clerides-Denktaş talks.

The absence of results from the summit contrasts with progress registered during the first joint meeting of EC foreign and finance ministers this week. The ministers made a long-overdue start on discussing how the EC budget could be more rationally used to direct greater resources into regional and social programs.

SPAIN

26-27

Madrid's efforts to isolate the Communist Party suffered a serious setback last weekend when two major Christian Democratic groups decided to join the opposition alliance recently formed by the merger of Communist- and Socialist-led coalitions. The government will come under more pressure to speed up moves toward democratic reform. The political right, in turn, will galvanize its campaign against reform.

In separate meetings last weekend, the Christian Democratic Left, led by Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez, and the more conservative Popular Democratic Federation, led by Jose Maria Gil Robles, agreed to join the new alliance—the Democratic Coordination.

The willingness of the Gil Robles faction to discard its previous rejection of cooperation with the Communists apparently stemmed from its long-standing desire to merge with the Christian Democratic Left. Both factions agreed to unite and pledged to work toward cooperation between all Christian Democratic groups in Spain.

The two groups stipulated that their participation in the new opposition front depends on its renunciation of the use of violence.

The government has taken a tough line

toward the Democratic Coordination, claiming it is just another Communist front. The regime struck back at the Communists by arresting several party members who tried to hold a news conference to publicize the new front. If the Communists are brought to trial, the Madrid government is almost certain to be the target of a campaign throughout Europe charging it with the kind of political repression practiced during the Franco regime.

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
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
East Asia-Pacific

CHINA *Not Sourced*

The removal of Teng Hsiao-ping from all his offices, announced by Peking on Wednesday, and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as premier and party first vice chairman do not necessarily mean sidetracking of the broad range of policies associated with Teng.

The shift is apparently not an unqualified victory for the party's left wing and does not provide a long-term solution to China's leadership problems. A *People's Daily* editorial on Tuesday acknowledged that the party's Central Committee remains split.

Another round in the leadership struggle is almost certainly in the cards, perhaps even before Chairman Mao dies. *(An analysis of the current state of play in the Chinese leadership struggle appears on page 18).*




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THAILAND *63-69*

Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot lost his seat in the National Assembly in Sunday's general election, and with it any chance of forming the new government. His defeat was the result of a conservative backlash against his hard-nosed approach to negotiations on a residual US military presence. Key military leaders were concerned that Khukrit's handling of the negotiations had jeopardized Thailand's close relationship with the US and the continued flow of US arms and equipment, and they worked actively against him.

The clear winner is the center-based Democrat Party, which won some 40 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. The runner-up Thai Nation

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
Party won only 20 percent. Democrat Party leader Seni Pramot, Khukrit's older brother, is in line to form the next government.

The size of the Democrat plurality puts Seni in a strong position to form a more stable government. He has only to gain the support of one of the three political parties that received between 10 and 20 percent of the votes to gain a majority. Last year, Khukrit was forced to rely on a shaky seven-party coalition to win a vote of confidence in the assembly.

Seni has the backing of key military leaders, including former army commander Krit Siwara.

The prospect of a relatively stable center-right coalition backed by the military clearly lowers the odds of a military take-over anytime soon. The presence of Krit in the cabinet would assure the military leadership that its interests are being protected.

for almost everyone. Some could see it as a promise to moderate the leftward drift of his government. Conservatives, however, are clearly not convinced that the President intends to take a firmer hand and rid his government of prominent leftists like the Prime Minister, General Fernandez Maldonado.



economic activity. Some specific proposals provide for cuts in federal spending, tax breaks and other incentives for industry and agriculture, and measures to attract foreign capital.

The minister also plans to seek international assistance in covering the country's estimated \$1.4-billion foreign exchange gap.

The plan is an attack on virtually all Argentina's economic problems at once. Some measures, notably freeing the foreign exchange rate, are already in effect. The generals are clearly betting that they can produce an early, demonstrable success for the benefit of both critics at home and prospective creditors and investors abroad.

Though not so presented, the new program is a categorical rejection of all aspects of Peronist economics. Wage limits and permission for producers to raise prices as needed will depress living standards for labor, long the favored group under Peronism. Cuts in federal spending are to trim the bureaucracy—long a source of Peronist patronage. Private firms are urged to join state enterprises in energy exploration and development. The intention to repeal laws inhibiting foreign investment also runs counter to the Peronists' nationalistic line.

Organized labor still has the potential to disrupt the military's plans, but the government has taken steps to foster compliance with its policies. Top labor leaders are under arrest or in exile; the major confederation and important labor unions are under government control. All strikes are illegal and stiff penalties face those who disrupt essential services or productive activities.

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Western Hemisphere

PERU 58-62

In a major speech last week, President Morales Bermudez tried to defuse coup plotting by rightist military officers. He was not successful.

The President admitted that errors had occurred and that there is talk that the government is weak. He blamed failing confidence in the government on ideologues of the left and the right.

The President gave a spirited defense of the seven-year-old revolution led by the military and affirmed that it would continue firmly, but gradually, on a "Christian, humanist, social" course.

The President's speech had something

ARGENTINA 56-57

Argentina's new civilian economy minister, Jose Martinez de la Hoz, has outlined a comprehensive package of tough measures to slow runaway inflation, curb wide-scale illegal economic activities, and provide investment incentives.

The program amounts to an invitation to domestic business and agriculture, as well as to foreign capital, to line up behind the new military government. It is a direct challenge to labor, which stands to lose its privileged position.

The program, the product of months of work, calls for expansion of the private sector and a decrease of the state's role in

BRAZIL 46-49

President Geisel has once again drawn the line on what the Brazilian government considers unacceptable political behavior. Last week he stripped three opposition congressmen of their offices and suspended their political rights for ten years. All

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three had invited the action by attacking directly and in public the armed services' domination of the government. This is the sixth time Geisel has taken such action since he came to power two years ago. On every occasion, the punishment has been the same and directed only at the individual offender. Repetition reduces the dramatic impact of each incident, but their frequency has a cumulative effect and indicates that some politicians see provocation as a useful way to dramatize Geisel's dictatorial powers.

Such episodes also strengthen opposition to Geisel among conservatives within the government. There are many, especially in the armed forces, who think the President has already gone too far toward political liberalization.

Geisel is now trying to bring the security forces under his personal control, and political outbursts can only make his task more difficult. One ousted congressman may still be trying to exploit this tension by asserting that he is receiving anonymous death threats.


Government spokesmen are trying to squelch rumors that more disciplinary actions are planned, but some observers believe Geisel intends to remove almost all of the opposition's most appealing and interesting politicians. Such talk strengthens the probability that the opposition will gain even more in the municipal elections in November than it did in the congressional election in 1974.

COLOMBIA 50-55

The unrest that has been growing in Colombia for more than two months has finally led the government to impose strong security measures. Last week, the government closed the troubled National University and two smaller schools in the capital and authorized the army and police to fire on anyone who attacks them.

Disorders, including student riots, guerrilla raids in the interior, and the kidnapping of a labor leader in mid-February,

have heightened public concern. Last weekend, three bombs exploded in the capital, causing extensive damage but no casualties. Public apprehension is especially pronounced now because the violence coincides with preparations for departmental and municipal elections scheduled for later this month.



65-69


ARAB BOYCOTT MEETING

The semiannual Arab boycott meeting ended last week in Alexandria, apparently without any major changes in the boycott criteria. The large US companies seeking to invest in Arab countries evidently were not removed from the boycott list. A special ad hoc session to consider the application of the boycott to these companies will reportedly be held in Damascus in the near future.

The main items of business were to remove British Leyland and Phillips Electric Company of the Netherlands from the blacklist. Leyland already had garnered Arab contracts after reducing its operations in Israel. Phillips has just been awarded—without competitive bidding—a contract from Saudi Arabia worth \$3 billion to install an automatic telephone system. The US company ITT, which is not on the blacklist and which has superior technology, had been actively seeking the Saudi contract.

Egypt and Syria have asserted that they

were seeking relief for US companies willing to make major investments in Arab countries. Saudi Arabia, however, is taking a harder line on easing the boycott against US companies.



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
DEMAND FOR OPEC OIL

World demand for oil from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries appears likely to increase by about 7 percent in 1976 to an average of 29 million barrels per day. Even so, OPEC production this year will remain substantially below the nearly 31 million barrels per day produced in both 1973 and 1974.

Output during January and February this year averaged only slightly above 27 million barrels per day, as oil companies held down liftings in order to dispose of excess stocks. Stocks are now down, and OPEC output for the remainder of the year will probably average more than 29 million barrels per day. This level of output should ease the production and revenue problems faced by many OPEC members over the past year.

Global economic recovery is the main reason for the likely resurgence in demand for OPEC oil. With the economic revival picking up momentum, energy consumption will probably rise substantially for the first time since 1973. Because output of alternative fuels will rise only slightly, oil consumption in the non-communist world will probably rise by about 5 percent; it fell 3 percent in both 1974 and 1975.

We estimate that oil production in Western countries that are not members of OPEC will edge up to 17.8 million barrels per day this year. Output will expand by about 500,000 barrels per day in the North Sea and by about 300,000 barrels per day in Mexico, and will probably fall by another 400,000 barrels per day in the US.



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The rapid rise in the political and military power of Lebanon's radical and leftist groups has brought a new and unpredictable dimension to the Lebanese scene. No single group inside or outside the country has dominant influence on the loose alliance of leftist factions.

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Lebanon: The Left's Ascendancy

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Radical Muslim and leftist groups are emerging from the prolonged fighting in Lebanon with considerable new popular support, military strength, and political resolve.

Even before the collapse of the Syrian-sponsored cease-fire in early March, the leftists had proved they were a formidable political as well as military force that could intimidate old-line Muslim politicians and directly challenge the Christian military establishment.

During the renewed fighting last month, the radicals showed they could virtually silence old-line Muslim leaders and could inflict chastening defeats on the major Christian militias. Leftist military successes were due in part to support from independent fedayeen groups, especially Yasir Arafat's Fatah. The military and political prospects of the left hinge to a large extent on whether it continues to receive support from Arafat.

Whatever the relationship between Palestinian and leftist leaders, the leftists will be a powerful and influential factor on the Lebanese scene for some time to come. It is conceivable that they may gain the upper hand during the critical weeks and months ahead.

The Leftist-Muslim Coalition

The task of controlling or even negotiating with the extreme left is complicated by the fact that it is a collection of fringe groups allied mainly by a sense that together they can gain the advantage in Lebanon. There is no dominant leader or faction that can be brought into what

remains of the old political system.

Kamal Jumblatt comes closest to being the leader of the leftist-Muslim coalition. His long record of speaking out against the Christian and Sunni Muslim establishments and his agitation for minority rights and economic and social change have gained him stature among younger Muslim radicals in many parts of the country. His private militia, moreover, is the largest in the leftist front.

Although Jumblatt by no means controls his radical allies, his ability to exploit the inherent weaknesses in Lebanon's traditional political fabric—its inequities and rigidities—has been the key to his success, and, as his allies seem to recognize, to their recent rise as well.

Most other leftist leaders are locally based and urban. They have no well-defined ideology beyond a strong commitment to Palestinian and Arab causes, a desire to overturn Christian minority rule, and a general penchant for radicalism. Their support has come from disadvantaged Muslim and minority groups.

The most successful of these local leaders are Ibrahim Qulaylat and his ally Isam al-Arab in Beirut, Faruq Muqaddam in Tripoli, and Mustafa Saad in Sidon. Muqaddam and Saad are scions of old-line political families, and their political and social views may be relatively tempered. They are far outnumbered, however, by men like Ibrahim Qulaylat.

[Redacted]

These newly emerged leftist leaders have loosely coordinated their military actions and together may command fighters numbering in the thousands, but they

would probably have differing points of view in negotiations for a political settlement.

The rebel Lebanese Arab Army headed by Ahmad Khatib has been a key component in the leftist coalition. We estimate that Khatib's followers have swelled from several hundred in late January to between 2,000 and 3,000 now. Many of these may be only hangers-on, but most are trained soldiers who brought with them arms, ammunition, and some heavy weapons. Khatib has probably not been able effectively to organize his band, and there does not appear to be any abiding allegiance to his leadership within the renegade army, except among a core group of several hundred.

We have only scant information on Khatib's political leanings. The success and fame he has won by cooperating with the left may lead him to adhere to leftist political demands. Even so, he may not be able to deliver all of his following.

Outside Sponsors

The rapid ascendancy of the Lebanese left has triggered intense competition among outsiders for influence over individual leftist groups. Syria, its Palestinian client Saiqa, and Yasir Arafat's Fatah have been the left's primary patrons.

Libya and Iraq also supply some small arms and money, but they have been prevented by the Syrians—who control the major supply routes into Lebanon—from gaining sponsorship over any one group or establishing any significant influence over the leftist movement as a whole.

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SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND MILITARY GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE LEBANON CRISIS

Leaders of the Leftist Coalition

Kamal Jumblatt, parliamentary deputy and leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, is the commonly accepted leader of the leftist coalition. He is head of Lebanon's Druze minority, and under the old confessional system of government, could not hold the presidency or prime ministership. His 3,000-man militia—the largest in the coalition—depends on Syria and the main fedayeen groups, Fatah and Saiqa, for arms and training.

Ibrahim Qulaylat, head of the Independent Nasirite Movement, is one of Jumblatt's chief allies in the leftist front. His 2,000-man militia is based in Beirut and has been active in the struggle for the hotel and commercial districts. Qulaylat has close ties with Fatah and receives some aid from Libya.

Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib, is leader of rebel Muslim army soldiers whose seizure of army installations in southern Lebanon triggered the collapse of the cease-fire in early March. His following has increased from several hundred in mid-January to roughly 4,000 men. His followers have brought with them most of the supplies and heavy weapons of the Lebanese army.

Brigadier General al-Ahdab, led the attempted coup against President Franjyah on March 11. Ahdab appears to have very little backing from army commanders. An initial endorsement from Khatib's forces has not materialized into any real support, but his challenge to the President and his control of Beirut radio have been important psychological boosts for the leftists.

Major Palestinian Leaders

Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and chief of Fatah, leads the 400,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon. He commands 8,000 Fatah regulars in Lebanon and a 1,000-man contingent of the Palestine Liberation Army—the Ayn Jallut Brigade—normally based in Egypt.

Zuhayr Muhsin, member of PLO Executive Council, is chief of the Saiqa fedayeen organization controlled by Syria. In effect, he is Syria's voice in the Palestinian movement. All of Saiqa's 3,000 troops are now in Lebanon and are directed from Damascus.

Brigadier General Budayri, Commander of the Palestine Liberation Army, has 5,000 troops now in Lebanon. With the exception of the contingent under Arafat's command, PLA units are controlled by Damascus. The PLA was used earlier this year to enforce the cease-fire, but the sympathy of top PLA commanders for Lebanese leftists and fellow Palestinians involved in the fighting has undermined the PLA's effectiveness as a neutral police force.

"**Rejectionist**" fedayeen leaders, including George Habbash, Ahmad Jabril, and others, have fought with leftist militias against the Christians.

Traditional Muslim Leaders

Prime Minister Rashid Karami, a Sunni Muslim, has lost much of his grass-roots support in northern Lebanon to a local leftist leader and has become dependent on Syrian backing. He still has a certain national standing that may help him hold on to the prime ministership. Karami's private militia—the Arab Liberation Army—was involved in the defense of Karami's home town of Tripoli in the fighting against the Christians last year but has not actively participated in the current leftist-Christian struggle.

Saib Salam, former prime minister, was once the most powerful Sunni Muslim political boss in Beirut, but has lost most of his popular backing to radical Muslim leader Ibrahim Qulaylat. Salam continues to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a settlement and has generally supported Karami.

Kamal Asad, Speaker of Parliament, is a prominent leader of Lebanon's Shia Muslim community. He heads a powerful bloc of parliamentary deputies from the south, which signed a recent petition for Franjyah's resignation. Asad is currently helping to arrange passage of a constitutional amendment that would provide a legal, face-saving way for the President to resign before the end of his term.

Key Maronite Christian Leaders

President Sulayman Franjyah, who has never had enthusiastic backing from his fellow Maronites, has lost the support of most Christians. He personally commands a small militia based in the northern city of Zagharta and a 300-man Christian contingent from what is left of the Lebanese army.

Pierre Jumayyil, parliamentary deputy and leader of the Phalanges Party, is the founder of the conservative Phalanges—the largest Christian party in Lebanon—and is the most powerful spokesman on the Christian side. He commands the Phalangist militia, which has well over 10,000 well-trained fighters, and perhaps as many as 8,000 irregulars.

Camille Shamun, interior minister, former president, and chief of the National Liberal Party, generally played a spoiler's role in settlement negotiations last year. He has been the most inflexible and unpredictable player on the Christian side. His 2,000-man militia has been active in fighting in Beirut and areas south of the capital.

Raymond Edde, parliamentary deputy and leader of the National Bloc, is the son of Lebanon's first president, and leader of the third largest Christian party. A leading candidate to succeed President Franjyah, Edde has a broad following in parliament and among conservative Muslims, but is opposed by Syria and conservative Christians, like Jumayyil.

Ilyas Sarkis, governor of the central bank, is Edde's chief competitor to replace Franjyah. Sarkis has no personal following but is favored by the Syrians, the Phalanges, and Franjyah.

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emerged to become the principal obstacle to Syrian mediation. On March 15, Cairo agreed to Yasir Arafat's request that the remainder of the Palestine Liberation Army's brigade based in Egypt be sent to Lebanon. [redacted]

[redacted] The Egyptians have also dropped any pretense of neutrality toward the Lebanese factions, and have been openly praising Jumblatt for his anti-Syrian posture.

A Look Ahead

The loose alliance under Jumblatt may fragment to some degree as a result of the cease-fire, and the left will not necessarily be as formidable politically as it has been militarily. There are differences among the leftists in terms of personality,

ideology, regional interests, and constituencies that will make it difficult for Jumblatt to present a united position on every issue. He will, for example, have some difficulty balancing the concerns of his rural conservative Druze followers with the demands of the Muslim "street" constituency of Qulaylat.

The leftists, however, have sufficient common ground to enable them to remain the most powerful voice on the Muslim side and a force that cannot be isolated and weakened by the old-line Muslim leaders, by the Christians, or by Syria. The leftists appear united in seeking substantial reduction in Christian political influence, economic adjustment in favor of the Muslims, an end to quotas by religion in the government and the army, close ties with the Palestinians, and a reduction in Syrian influence in Lebanon.

Most importantly, the leftists appear to have eroded significantly the political constituencies of moderate Muslim leaders like Rashid Karami and Saib Salam. The old-line leaders have proved unable either to arrest or to capitalize on the leftists' momentum, and they will probably be intimidated in any future negotiations by the leftists' political and military potential.

The leftists are not in a position to dictate a political settlement, but they will not accept a refurbished version of the Syrian-backed reform package achieved in February. They will insist on concessions, and their strength will ensure continuation of de facto partition and will complicate the problem of reconstituting an effective national security authority in Lebanon.

The Palestinians and Muslim leftists together now control about two thirds of Lebanon and have reduced Christian control in Beirut itself. This means that any new government in Beirut will continue to be weak and, in effect, will be operating within a confederation framework.

The potential political ascendancy of the leftist Muslims and Palestinians in southern Lebanon will make the Israelis look at the area as an even greater security threat.

Rivalry between Syria and Fatah for controlling influence over the left, combined with challenges from Iraq and Libya, have given the major leftist leaders a measure of independence from any one outside sponsor. Jumblatt, for example, appeared relatively immune to Syrian demands earlier this year to stop his trouble-making, and more recently, blatantly defied Syrian insistence that he accept a cease-fire. Only the combined decision of Syria and Fatah to cut off military support to Jumblatt finally brought him to heel.

The Egyptian Angle

Egypt's preoccupation throughout the Lebanon crisis has been with the prospect that Syria might strengthen its leadership in the Arab world by a successful effort to settle the conflict. Above all, Cairo wants to prevent anything that would so entrench Syria's influence in Lebanon as to give it virtual control of the country and, with it, control of the Palestinian movement.

The Egyptians do not have much influence, but they are doing their best to thwart Syria, and they have lately become a disruptive influence. They seem blinded to the prospect that the alternative to Syria's political intervention could be the ascendancy of the left in Lebanon, and they seem undismayed by the possibility that the conflict could lead to Syrian-Israeli hostilities.

Egypt's efforts to aid Muslim leftists have recently increased as these forces



Kamal Jumblatt

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The implications for Syria of the leftist gains in Lebanon could be serious. Perhaps the most significant is that Syria's ability to influence the situation without the insertion of additional Syrian regular forces has been seriously reduced.

[Redacted] Popular support within [Redacted]

have inhibited Asad from pursuing an even-handed policy.

The limits of Syrian influence in Lebanon have also been exposed by the cooperation of Muslim leftists and Fatah to resist the Syrians. The more direct a role Syria has attempted to play, the more the left has united against Damascus' policy. The leftists and Arafat, in particular, can be expected to continue trying

to preserve their freedom of maneuver and to exploit any opportunity for playing off other Arab states, both radicals and conservatives, against Syria.

President Asad's actions are also likely to be constrained by growing opposition within his military and ruling party to his Lebanese policy because it has tended to favor the Christians.

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Recent violence in the Israeli-occupied West Bank reflects rising Palestinian nationalism, and more trouble seems likely. The Israelis show no sign that they are considering significant modifications in their occupation policy.

70-80

Israel: West Bank Arabs Restive

Growing Palestinian nationalism has fanned two months of violent anti-Israeli demonstrations by Arab students in the occupied West Bank. The outbreak will probably make it more difficult for Israeli occupation authorities to secure the cooperation of local Arab leaders to administer the troubled area.

More serious terrorist violence on the West Bank against Israeli rule seems likely. On a different level, many Palestinians are expected to show their hostility toward the Israeli occupation by supporting candidates in the West Bank municipal elections on April 12 who are sympathetic to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Arab students have been demonstrating since late January. The demonstrations were triggered by the ruling of an Israeli magistrate permitting Jewish prayer services on Jerusalem's Temple Mount—the site of Islam's third holiest shrine.

The students are also protesting against Jewish settlements in the West Bank, par-

ticularly one set up illegally last December at Sebastia near Nablus. The Israeli government has not authorized the Sebastia site for permanent Jewish settlement, but the demonstrators fear that Tel Aviv's decision late last year to permit a small group of the would-be settlers to remain temporarily at a nearby Israeli army camp is a first step toward permitting a permanent settlement.

On March 21, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the right of police to prevent Jewish prayer services on the Temple Mount. This decision has helped to pacify West Bank Arabs and the demonstrations have subsided. The territory is tense, however. The general strike on March 30 in Israel staged by Israeli Arabs was supported by many West Bank Palestinians who held widespread but mostly non-violent sympathy strikes.

The Israelis have responded to the West Bank agitation by reinforcing their military and police forces in the West Bank and imposing strict curfews on par-

ticularly rebellious towns. The Israelis will probably institute military rule of the West Bank if further disturbances should appear to jeopardize essential city services or Israeli security.


These measures, however, will not resolve the political problem underlined by the West Bank violence.

The Israelis are not insensitive to the problems caused by their occupation of the West Bank. The Israeli Education Ministry, for example, will soon make available to East Jerusalem's 6,000 Arab junior and senior high school students a curriculum nearly identical to the courses taught when Jordan governed the West Bank before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The new system is intended to enable East Jerusalem students to enter Arab universities—something previously made difficult by the Israeli requirement that Arab students study essentially an Israeli curriculum.

The change in courses suggests that Tel Aviv, while continuing to regard East

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Jerusalem as an integral part of Israel, feels compelled to acknowledge the existence there of strong non-Jewish cultural and social ties to the West Bank and the rest of the Arab world.

The Israeli government, however, has no apparent intention of revamping its occupation policy in any major way to placate the West Bank Palestinians. The government, as well as the Israeli public, tend to view the West Bank primarily as territory necessary to strengthen Israeli security.

Moreover, the Israelis generally believe that their occupation of the West Bank has been enlightened, that it has brought economic prosperity to the area and that most West Bankers, while not supporting the occupation, are willing to live with it as long as it continues to be benign and does not hinder trade and family contacts.

The recent disorders have prompted increased criticism of the Rabin government from both moderate and conservative leaders of the ruling Labor Alignment. Some moderates, like ex - foreign minister Eban, have expressed understanding for Arab grievances and criticize the government for not being more responsive to Palestinian demands.

Hard liners, on the other hand, blame the demonstrations on a politically active minority of Arabs determined to provoke trouble. They fault the government for not acting more quickly and forcefully against the rioters.

There is also disagreement within both the Alignment and the broader government coalition over the cabinet's handling of the Sebastia issue. Leaders of the Alignment's left-wing Mapam faction, and moderates like Foreign Minister Allon have echoed Arab demands that the government remove the settlers.

Labor Party conservatives, however, as well as the National Religious Party, the Alignment's largest coalition partner, insist that the Sebastia site be authorized as a permanent Jewish settlement. Prime Minister Rabin has postponed a full cabinet debate on the settlement issue until late April.

The West Bank municipal election next



Defense Minister Peres

week has contributed to the current unrest. The PLO, the Israelis, and King Husayn are all working to strengthen their positions through the election. The election will be held in 24 towns throughout the West Bank, with candidates contesting 205 municipal council seats. The councils, in turn, will elect mayors.

The PLO, reversing its past practice of encouraging West Bankers to boycott Israeli-sponsored elections, has instructed its members and supporters to participate actively in the current campaign. PLO-backed council candidates may be elected in several towns, including Nabulus, Hebron, Ram Allah, Jenin, and Tulkarm.

The elections pose a new problem for West Bank clan leaders who traditionally have headed town governments. For the first time, many of them face a strong challenge from candidates campaigning on pro-PLO platforms. Many of the notables are verbally embracing the PLO during the election campaign to minimize

the damage to their positions.

This tactic and the political power usually wielded by the clans will likely re-elect most of the incumbent mayors who are running. Pro-PLO councilmen probably will be elected in some towns, however, putting increased pressure on the mayors in those places to be more accommodating to the PLO.

Israeli Plans

Defense Minister Peres, the cabinet official responsible for administering the West Bank, hopes to counter the PLO's popularity by encouraging the election of candidates sympathetic to his plans for instituting a limited measure of Arab self-rule in the area. Ideally, Peres would like to confer broader powers on receptive municipal officials after the elections and to this end he has long pressed a number of West Bank leaders to agree to his plan.

He has met with little success because relatively few West Bankers are willing to cooperate publicly with Israeli occupation authorities.

To improve the dim prospects for his plan, Peres has stepped up government efforts against the most blatant anti-Israeli groups. At the beginning of January, he prohibited "hostile Arab organizations, especially groups belonging to the PLO" from participating in the municipal elections.

On March 27, the Israeli government deported to Lebanon two prominent Arab leftists, both of whom were important pro-PLO candidates in the municipal election. Israeli occupation officials also have the legal authority to veto the mayors elected by municipal councils, and they may make use of this prerogative if pro-PLO candidates do well in the election.

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The Czechoslovak party congress that begins Monday will stress stability and loyalty to the USSR. The speeches may give some clue as to how President Husak is faring in his struggle with hard liners in the party over how to overcome the legacy of 1968.

81-85

Czechoslovakia: Party Congress

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Public preparations for the Czechoslovak party congress that begins on Monday have stressed continuity and stability. A central theme of the congress will be the correctness of Prague's policies since Gustav Husak came to power in 1969, with stress placed on Czechoslovak loyalty to the Soviet Union and Husak's personal friendship with Brezhnev.

Behind the facade, there are signs that

disputes over fundamental policies have sharpened with the approach of the congress. It is unlikely that the disputes will come to a head at the congress itself; there are too many signs that party leaders want an appearance of stability. Speeches at the congress may provide clues, however, as to whether Husak is gradually winning out in his battle with hard liners in the party over how to overcome the legacy of 1968.

Perhaps the thorniest issue is what to do with Aleksander Dubcek and the other leaders of the "Prague Spring" who are still in Czechoslovakia. Though discredited and maligned, they are visible and sometimes vocal reminders of the Soviet invasion.

Their fate is closely linked to the problem of rehabilitating almost 500,000 former members of the party who were purged or who simply turned in their cards in the post-Dubcek era. These men constitute a pool of badly underutilized talent in a suffering economy that is chronically short of labor on the production line and at the managerial level.

The state of the economy, in turn, has added to the tension between Czechs and Slovaks, especially during a time of Slovak political dominance. The Czechs resent the fact that a disproportionate share of capital investment goes to Slovakia to bring up its level of development to that in the Czech lands.

Husak is trying to deal with the rehabilitation issue by separating the problem of Dubcek and other leaders from the thousands of rank-and-file party members who were "duped" by the "Prague Spring" and can thus be redeemed. The policy, called "differentiation," has been stubbornly opposed by party secretary Vasil Bilak and the rigidly orthodox conservatives who support him.

Recent evidence indicates that the balance in the party may be swinging toward Husak and the moderates. The



President Husak receives decoration from Soviet leader Brezhnev

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tone of last month's congress of the Slovak party—the home constituency of Husak and Bilak—was much more restrained than in 1971. Surprisingly little attention, for example, was devoted to the “threat from the right”—the Dubcek reformers—that has been a favorite Bilak theme.

Also, on the eve of the Slovak congress, presidium member Alois Indra published an article that the US embassy says offered unbridled support for Husak and constituted a thinly veiled attack on Bilak. Indra has long been regarded as a hard-line rival of Husak. His apparent conversion may be another indication of Husak's growing strength.

Even if Husak's position has improved, it probably is not strong enough to permit him to ride roughshod over Bilak and his firmly entrenched supporters in the party bureaucracy. Speeches at the congress may show, however, a trend in the party toward Husak's position.

Any decision on rehabilitation would almost certainly come at party plenums after the congress, when Husak might get the party to back selective rehabilitation of most former party members in return for a continuing policy of no compromise toward Dubcek and his leading supporters.

Major changes in the top leadership are unlikely at the congress. As at the Soviet

and Bulgarian congresses, some minor adjustments may be made. Former president Ludvik Svoboda, who is senile and sick, may leave the party presidium to retire with full honors. If Svoboda is replaced, a leading candidate for his place is Foreign Minister Chnoupek, a staunch Husak supporter.

Party secretary Frantisek Ondrich will probably lose his position because of his recent transfer to a government ministerial position. There will probably be some government shifts following the congress. Some reports suggest that state planning chief Vaclav Hula may become a scapegoat for the country's economic problems.

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The Polisario guerrillas of Western Sahara are capable of carrying out hit-and-run attacks over a wide area in southern Morocco and northern Mauritania as well as Western Sahara. They are dependent on Algerian support and could not increase their operations substantially without much greater Algerian help.

86-88

The Polisario Front

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The Algerian-backed Polisario Front has become a significant guerrilla force capable of conducting harassing operations in southern Morocco, northern Mauritania, and Western Sahara.

Estimates of the number of Polisario guerrillas range from 1,000 to more than 5,000; we estimate the figure to be between 2,000 and 3,000. A number of the partisans were recruited from nomads and territorial police disbanded when Spain left its former territory.


The Front depends mainly on Algeria for arms, training, supplies, and financial support; some Algerian military personnel are accompanying the guerrillas in combat operations. A substantial increase in guerrilla operations could occur only as

part of an Algerian move to up the ante in its dispute with Morocco over Western Sahara.

Before mid-1974, when King Hassan intensified his efforts to acquire the Sahara, the Front got most of its arms from Libya, which continues to provide some weapons and financial support through Algeria.

The guerrillas, although no match for Moroccan and Mauritanian forces in conventional fighting, continue to carry out sabotage and hit-and-run attacks over a wide area. In addition to small arms, the guerrillas have used mortars, machine guns, grenade launchers, and occasionally SA-7 surface-to-air-missiles in skirmishes with Moroccan and Mauritanian forces.

So long as the Front has Algerian back-



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Guerrillas during training at Polisario sanctuary

ing, it can continue a war of attrition indefinitely. Morocco can contain, but not eliminate, Polisario harassment.

The bulk of Polisario partisans are from the Reguibat tribe, one of the most powerful of the Saharan peoples. They traditionally have followed a nomadic lifestyle, ranging with their camels across wide expanses of southern Morocco, Algeria, Western Sahara, and Mauritania.

The Reguibats are known for their ferocity, pride, and ability with firearms. Reguibat tribesmen—possibly including some of the present Polisario leadership—were prominently involved in anti-Spanish demonstrations in the territorial capital of El Aaiun in 1970.

The Front first came to notice as an in-

surgent group in May 1973, when it attacked a Spanish frontier post along the Moroccan-Saharan border. The organization appears to be the successor of an earlier Saharan movement that opposed Spanish control of the territory.

Sporadic Polisario incidents against isolated Spanish outposts in the Sahara continued through 1974 and 1975. Following the agreement in Madrid last November, which provided for a phased turnover of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, Spanish forces gradually withdrew to a 70-mile defense perimeter around El Aaiun.

The guerrillas moved into the resulting vacuum, and operated in much of northeastern and southern Sahara. As first Moroccan, and later Mauritanian,

troops moved into the Sahara, Polisario guerrillas began to attack these forces.

Until late January, when Morocco began extensive sweep operations against the guerrillas, the Front held several towns. The Polisario has since been forced to abandon virtually all of its fixed strongpoints, but the Front continues to wage guerrilla warfare in the more remote desert regions.

Most Polisario militants are Reguibats and other indigenous Saharans. Some of the Front's known leaders, including Secretary General Mustafa Siyed el Ouali, reportedly were Saharan students who attended law school in Morocco.



There are probably a significant number of Mauritanians in the Polisario as well. The most prominent Mauritanian

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is Baba Miske, a former diplomat, who frequently appears as a Polisario spokesman.

Many Saharan tribes probably have more in common with the Mauritians than with the Moroccans. The Hassaniya Arabic spoken in much of the area is nearly identical to that spoken in Mauritania and quite different from the Maghrebi Arabic spoken in Morocco.



Political Credentials

Recently, the Polisario Front seems to have been trying to strengthen its shaky political credentials. Its provisional Saharan National Council, established last fall, proclaimed the formation of the "Saharan Democratic Arab Republic" on February 27.

The announcement of the Republic was clearly intended to counter the Moroccan-dominated Saharan territorial assembly's unanimous endorsement the day before of a motion to integrate the Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania. In further attempts to gain diplomatic support and delay international recognition of de facto control of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania, the Front has also announced an eight-man "government" and promulgated a "provisional constitution."

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The Polisario controls little territory and has in effect set up a government-in-exile. Algerian and Polisario efforts to obtain recognition of the new Saharan "state" have been less successful than Algiers expected.

Rabat's decision on March 7 to sever diplomatic relations with Algiers served as a clear warning to states that value their relations with Morocco not to recognize the new state. Thus far only Algeria, eight other African states, and North Korea have extended diplomatic recognition.



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The fall of Teng Hsiao-ping and the rise of Hua Kuo-feng this week have not resolved China's leadership struggle. The changes may be a result of a compromise between rival factions of a still-divided party leadership.

89-92

China: Teng's Removal

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[Redacted] The demonstrations in Peking on Monday, which seemed designed to put pressure on the party's left wing to ease up on its campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping, instead precipitated his removal from office.

The announcement by the Central Committee that Teng has been dismissed from all his positions specifically links this move to the demonstrations. The left

successfully seized the opportunity to bring much more serious charges against Teng. The announcement indicated that the events of Monday had changed the situation—Teng's case now required punishment rather than persuasion.

By contrast, a party directive issued in late February or early March indicated that Teng was in a relatively good position to survive the attacks on him. It reportedly stated that Teng was not to be "struck

down" and that his case was different from those of party leaders purged in the recent past.

By orchestrating the demonstrations, Teng and his supporters badly overplayed their hand. The wide international coverage of the events angered and embarrassed Mao and the left, and may have enabled them to win the support of moderates on the Politburo for the removal of Teng.

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Teng is now out of the succession sweepstakes, but he retains his party membership and has been given a chance to make amends for his errors.

His removal does not appear to be an unqualified victory for the party's left wing. Although the decision against Teng was "unanimous," the left may well have made some concessions. One could be that the announcement on Teng is to mark the end of the current political campaign.

Indeed, the editorial published Tuesday seemed more sharply focused on Teng alone than previous articles, and the reappearance yesterday of Politburo member Li Hsien-nien, one of Teng's staunchest supporters, who had been absent from public view since mid-January, suggests that other supporters of Teng will not suffer.

The appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Premier and as first vice chairman of the party may also be part of a compromise solution. Hua is not in the leftist camp and was attacked by leftists in 1974. There is also some evidence that he may have been subject to indirect attacks from the left during the campaign against Teng.

In any event, Hua's elevation to first vice chairman of the party, a spot left vacant by the death of Chou En-lai, suggests that the removal of Teng will not necessarily allow the leftists to increase significantly their influence in the top leadership. Hua was promoted over Wang Hung-wen, a young party leftist who had been next in line for the post.

The appointment of Hua to the premiership, together with the reappearance of Li Hsien-nien, the party's leading economic specialist, suggests that the current ambitious economic policies may continue with little change. The preservation of policies associated with Teng on a broad range of issues has undoubtedly been foremost in the minds of moderates in the leadership.

Teng's backers may have agreed to drop their support of him once they were assured that the relatively moderate Hua would become premier and would be promoted to a position in the party of suf-

ficient stature to give him a major say in policy issues. Hua's new party position leaves him second only to Mao.

Hua is closely identified with the effort to modernize agriculture, and when he was acting premier he frequently indicated there would be no change in China's foreign policy. Others in the leadership, who may have opposed the abrasive Teng for personal reasons but did not differ with him over policy issues, may now close ranks with those who personally supported Teng, thus giving the moderates a major voice in policy matters.

Apart from the opportunities for factional maneuvering arising out of the disturbances on Monday, the entire leadership was probably considerably shaken by the demonstrations. Although they were orchestrated to a considerable degree, they revealed a depth of popular feeling about the late premier Chou En-lai and his policies that has no real precedent since the communists took power.

Large-scale demonstrations apparently were confined to the capital, but manifestations of support for Chou also occurred elsewhere in China. To some extent, this outpouring of feeling was made possible by the continuing uncertainty about authority in Peking:

- Hua Kuo-feng was merely an "interim" acting premier.
- Teng Hsiao-ping remained under attack, but was not out of the picture.
- The leftists had not been able to generate momentum in their campaign against Teng.

Most leaders seem to have agreed therefore to paper over their differences for a decisive display of authority. All were acutely concerned about the image of confusion and unbridled rivalry in Peking that was being presented to foreign observers, particularly in the Soviet Union.

The leadership has taken the unusual step of publicizing rallies today in support of these decisions, indicating some defensiveness about the turmoil on Monday.

Yesterday's decisions, however, do not provide a long-term solution to China's



*Premier Hua (l) with
Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua*

leadership problems. The *People's Daily* editorial on Tuesday acknowledged—for the second time—that the party Central Committee remains split. Given the depth of public sentiment revealed on Monday and the relatively powerful position of the moderates throughout the country, a "backlash" against the left remains a real possibility.

Another round of struggle is almost certainly in the cards, perhaps even before Mao dies.

Further changes in the leadership may also occur at the high-level meetings now under way in Peking, but a new ranking may not be fully revealed until May 1.

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