

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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the House to the Senate amendment No. 5 to H.R. 4861, and that the Senate recede from amendments numbered 3 and 4 to the aforesaid bill.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I move that the action which has just been taken be reconsidered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

SENATE RESOLUTION 416—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION REGARDING THE 1974 MEETING OF THE BOARDS OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK GROUP

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I call up a resolution at the desk expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 1974 meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 416) expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 1974 annual meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I object to its consideration today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Did the Senator from Ohio request immediate consideration?

Mr. TAFT. Yes, I asked for immediate consideration. Objection has been made by the majority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard, and the resolution will go over under the rule.

The resolution, with its preamble, is as follows:

S. Res. 416

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the 1974 Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group

Whereas world economic stability is presently threatened by the drastically increased transfer of wealth to oil producing nations and by other international economic developments;

Whereas these developments could have devastating effects on some of the world's less developed nations;

Whereas disruptive flows of monetary reserves threaten to imperil world financial institutions and to overwhelm international capital markets;

Whereas the present governmental and private financial institutions may not be able to recycle funds to oil importing nations in a manner which minimizes the economic impact of increased oil import prices;

Whereas government policies designed to mitigate the effects of international economic problems in a particular nation often worsen the economic situation in other nations, ultimately to the detriment of the nations involved; and

Whereas possible methods of alleviating

these problems will be a major topic of the 1974 Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group: Now, therefore, be it resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that:

(1) The present economic situation demands greatly increased international economic cooperation among nations;

(2) The International Monetary Fund be supported in its efforts to discourage unilateral economic actions which could affect other nations' economic situations adversely, including its guidelines for government management of floating exchange rates and its promotion of the Voluntary Declaration on Trade Measures;

(3) The Annual Meetings should give urgent and detailed consideration to the adequacy of present and proposed international facilities for providing necessary financing to oil importing nations in view of both the short-term and long-term economic prospects of these nations;

(4) The Annual Meetings should recognize fully the emergency needs of the poorest oil importing nations;

(5) Other types of international cooperation to help alleviate the present economic situation should continue to be pursued vigorously.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, the majority whip.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 10:30 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until the hour of 10:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATORS CURTIS, McCLURE, AND EASTLAND, DESIGNATING PERIOD FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS AND FOR RESUMPTION OF THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS TOMORROW

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order tomorrow, the following Senators be recognized, each for not to exceed 15 minutes and in the order stated: Mr. CURTIS, Mr. McCLURE, and Mr. EASTLAND; that there then be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to exceed 15 minutes, with statements therein limited to 5 minutes each, at the conclusion of which the Senate resume the consideration of the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (S. 3394) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in order to expedite our action on this matter today, I first ask unanimous consent that the committee amendment be agreed to and that the bill as thus amended be considered as original text for the purpose of further amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee amendment, which was to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert new language, is as follows:

That this Act may be cited as the "Foreign Assistance Act of 1974".

FOOD AND NUTRITION

SEC. 2. Section 103 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended—

(1) by inserting the subsection designation "(a)" immediately before "In";

(2) by striking out "\$291,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$291,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974, and \$491,000,000 for the fiscal year 1975"; and

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(b) The Congress finds that, due to rising world food, fertilizer, and petroleum costs, human suffering and deprivation are growing in the poorest and most slowly developing countries. The greatest potential for significantly expanding world food production at relatively low cost lies in increasing the productivity of small farmers who constitute a majority of the nearly one billion people living in those countries. Increasing the emphasis on rural development and expanded food production in the poorest nations of the developing world is a matter of social justice as well as an important factor in slowing the rate of inflation in the industrialized countries. In the allocation of funds under this section, special attention should be given to increasing agricultural production in the countries with per capita incomes under \$300 a year and which are the most severely affected by sharp increases in worldwide commodity prices."

POPULATION PLANNING

SEC. 3. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended as follows:

(1) In section 104, strike out "\$145,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975" and insert in lieu thereof "\$145,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974, and \$165,000,000 for the fiscal year 1975".

(2) In section 292, strike out "\$130,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$150,000,000".

EDUCATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

SEC. 4. Section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "\$90,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1974 and 1975" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$90,000,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974, and \$92,000,000 for the fiscal year 1975".

HOUSING GUARANTIES

SEC. 5. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended as follows:

(1) In section 221, strike out "\$305,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$405,000,000".

(2) In section 223 (1), strike out "June 30, 1975" and insert in lieu thereof "June 30, 1976".

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

SEC. 6. Section 302(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "for the fiscal year 1975, \$150,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "for the fiscal year 1975, \$186,900,000".

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 7. Section 504(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "\$512,500,000 for the fiscal year 1974" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$550,000,000 for the fiscal year 1975."

SPECIAL AUTHORITY

SEC. 8. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is repealed.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

SEC. 9. Section 513 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended as follows:

(1) Strike out "Thailand and Laos" in the caption and insert in lieu thereof "Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam".

(2) At the end thereof add the following new subsection:

"(c) After June 30, 1975, no military assistance shall be furnished by the United States to South Vietnam directly or through any other foreign country unless that assistance is authorized under this Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act."

EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES

SEC. 10. (a) Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 514. LIMITATION ON THE GRANT OF EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.—(a) The value of any excess defense article furnished to a foreign country or international organization by any agency of the United States Government shall be considered to be an expenditure made from funds appropriated under section 504 of this Act. Unless such agency certifies to the Comptroller General of the United States that the excess defense article is ordering is not to be transferred by any means to a foreign country or international organization, when an order is placed for a defense article whose stock status is excess at the time ordered, a sum equal to the value thereof (less amounts to be transferred under section 632(d) of this Act) shall (1) be reserved and transferred to a suspense account, (2) remain in the suspense account until the excess defense article is either delivered to a foreign country or international organization or the order therefor is canceled, and (3) be transferred from the suspense account to (A) the general fund of the Treasury upon delivery of such article, or (B) the appropriation made under section 504 of this Act for the current fiscal year upon cancellation of the order. Such sum shall be transferred to the appropriation made under section 504 of this Act for the current fiscal year, upon delivery of such article, if at the time of delivery the stock status of the article is determined in accordance with section 644(g) or (m) of this Act to be nonexcess.

"(b) The President shall promptly and fully inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of each decision to furnish on a grant basis to any country excess defense articles which are major weapons systems to the extent such major weapon system was not included in the presentation material previously submitted to the Congress. Additionally, the President shall also submit a quarterly report to the Congress listing by country the total value of all deliveries of excess defense articles, disclosing both the aggregate original acquisition cost and the aggregate value at the time of delivery."

(b) Section 644(m)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended to read as follows:

"(1) with respect to an excess defense article, the actual value of the article but not less than 33 1/4 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time the defense article was acquired by the United States;"

(c) Sections 8 and 11 of the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for other purposes", approved January 12, 1971 (84 Stat. 2053), as amended, are repealed.

STOCKPILING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 11. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by section 10(a) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 515. STOCKPILING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds, other than funds made available under this chapter or section 401(a) of Public Law 89-367 (80 Stat. 37), or any subsequent corresponding legislation, may be obligated for the purpose of stockpiling any defense article or war reserve material, including the acquisition, storage, or maintenance of any war reserve equipment, secondary items, or munitions, if such article or material is set aside, reserved, or in any way earmarked or intended for future use by any foreign country under this Act or such section.

"(b) The cost of any such article or material set aside, reserved, or in any way earmarked or intended by the Department of Defense for future use by, for, or on behalf of the country referred to in section 401(a) of Public Law 89-367 (80 Stat. 37) shall be charged against the limitation specified in such section or any subsequent corresponding legislation, for the fiscal year in which such article or material is set aside, reserved, or otherwise earmarked or intended; and the cost of any such article or material set aside, reserved, or in any way earmarked or intended for future use by, for, or on behalf of any other foreign country shall be charged against funds authorized under this chapter for the fiscal year in which such article or material is set aside, reserved, or otherwise earmarked. No such article or material may be made available to or for use by any foreign country unless such article or material has been charged against the limitation specified in such section, or any subsequent corresponding legislation, or against funds authorized under this chapter, as appropriate.

"(c) This section shall not be construed as conferring any authority to stockpile defense articles or war materials under this Act or such section 401(a), or subsequent corresponding legislation."

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS AND MISSIONS

SEC. 12. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by sections 10(a) and 11 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 516. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS AND MISSIONS.—An amount equal to each sum expended under any provision of law, other than section 504 of this Act, with respect to any military assistance advisory group, military mission, or other organization of the United States performing activities similar to such group or mission, shall be deducted from the funds made available under such section 504, and (1) if reimbursement of such amount is requested by the agency of the United States Government making the expenditure, reimbursed to that agency, or (2) if no such reimbursement is requested, deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts."

TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY

SEC. 13. (a) Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by sections 10(a), 11, and 12 of this Act, is

further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 517. TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.—(a) (1) The President shall gradually reduce assistance (other than military training) provided under this chapter so that, not later than September 30, 1977, no assistance (other than military training) shall be provided under this chapter.

"(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not apply to funds obligated prior to October 1, 1977.

"(b) For each of the fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977, the President is authorized to finance procurements of defense articles and defense services (other than military training) by any foreign country receiving defense articles or defense services during fiscal year 1974 under this chapter on terms providing for payment to the United States Government in United States dollars (1) of the value of such articles and services which value shall not exceed during each such fiscal year the value of such articles and services (other than military training) furnished that country in fiscal year 1974 under this chapter, (2) at a rate of interest of not less than four per centum a year, and (3) within ten years after delivery of the defense articles or rendering of the defense services.

"(c) (1) By not later than September 30, 1977, all the functions of a military assistance advisory group, a military mission, or other organization of the United States Government in a foreign country performing activities similar to any such group or mission, shall be transferred to the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission to that country. Upon the transfer of such functions, that group, mission, or organization, as the case may be, shall cease to exist.

"(2) On and after October 1, 1977, the total number of military attachés assigned or detailed to the United States Diplomatic Mission of a foreign country shall not exceed by more than twenty-five per centum the total number of military attachés authorized to be assigned or detailed to that mission on June 30, 1974.

"(3) On and after October 1, 1977, no military assistance advisory group, military mission, or other organization of the United States Government in a foreign country performing activities similar to any such group or mission, shall be established or continued unless such group, mission, or organization is authorized by law specifically for that country."

(b) Effective October 1, 1977—

(1) the heading of chapter 1 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended to read as follows:

"CHAPTER 1—PROVIDING MILITARY TRAINING";

(2) sections 501, 502A, 514, and 516, subsection (g) of section 644, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 are repealed;

(3) section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out the caption "Utilization of Defense Articles and Services" and inserting in lieu thereof "Providing Military Training", by striking out of the text "Defense articles and defense services" and inserting in lieu thereof "Military training", and by striking out the last sentence;

(4) the heading of chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended to read as follows:

"CHAPTER 2—MILITARY TRAINING";

(5) sections 503-505 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 are stricken out and the following inserted in lieu thereof:

"SEC. 503. GENERAL AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this Act as the President may determine, military training to any foreign country or international organization. Funds for such training shall be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to authorization for that fiscal year. After September 30, 1977, no such training shall be conducted outside the United States except by specific authorization of law."

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(6) section 511 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out of the section caption "Assistance" and inserting in lieu thereof "Training", and by striking out of the text "military assistance" and "such assistance" and inserting in lieu thereof "military training" and "such training", respectively;

(7) section 636(g)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "defense articles and defense services on a grant or sales basis" and inserting in lieu thereof "military training"; and

(8) section 644(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out subparagraph (1) and by striking out of subparagraphs (2) and (3) "nonexcess" wherever it appears.

TERMINATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH KOREA

SEC. 14. Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by sections 10(a), 11, 12, and 13(a) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 518. TERMINATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH KOREA.—(a) The total of (1) the amount of funds obligated under this chapter to furnish assistance to South Korea, and (2) the value of excess defense articles "(A) \$91,500,000 during the fiscal year 1975; furnished to South Korea under this chapter, shall not exceed—

"(B) \$61,000,000 during the fiscal year 1976; and
 "(C) \$30,500,000 during the fiscal year 1977.

"(b) The aggregate total of credits extended, including participations in credits, and the principal amount of loans guaranteed, under the Foreign Military Sales Act with respect to South Korea shall not exceed—

"(1) \$42,450,000 during the fiscal year 1975;
 "(2) \$28,300,000 during the fiscal year 1976; and

"(3) \$14,150,000 during the fiscal year 1977.
 "(c) On and after October 1, 1977, no assistance shall be furnished South Korea under this chapter, and no credits, including participations in credits, shall be extended, and no loans shall be guaranteed, under the Foreign Military Sales Act with respect to South Korea. The preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to funds obligated prior to such date."

SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE

SEC. 15. Section 532 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "for the fiscal year 1974 not to exceed \$125,000,000, of which not less than \$50,000,000 shall be available solely for Israel" and inserting in lieu thereof "for the fiscal year 1975 not to exceed \$585,500,000".

TRANSFER BETWEEN ACCOUNTS

SEC. 16. (a) Section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended as follows:

(1) In subsection (a), immediately after "any other provision of this Act", insert (except funds made available under chapter 2 of part II of this Act)".

(2) Add at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(c) Any funds which the President has notified Congress pursuant to section 653 that he intends to provide in military assistance to any country may be transferred to, and consolidated with, any other funds he has notified Congress pursuant to such section that he intends to provide to that country for development assistance purposes."

(b) (1) Section 614 of such Act is repealed.
 (2) Such Act is further amended as follows:

(A) In section 109, strike out "sections 610 (a) and 614(a)" and insert in lieu thereof "section 610(a)".

(B) In section 210(c), strike out the comma and "nor may the authority of section 614(a) be used to waive the requirements of this title".

(C) Section 251(c) is amended to read as follows:

"(c) The authority of section 610 may be used to transfer funds made available for this title only to funds made available for title I of this chapter."

(D) Section 302(b)(2) is amended by striking out "or 614(a)".

(E) Section 610(b) is amended by striking out "sections 451, 506, and 614" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 451".

(F) Section 634(d) is amended by striking out "or 614(b)".

(G) Section 652 is amended by striking out "section 506(a), 610(b), or 614" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 610(a)".

(H) Section 653(b) is amended by striking out "and may not be waived under the provisions of section 614(a) of this Act".

ACCESS TO CERTAIN MILITARY BASES ABROAD

SEC. 17. (a) Chapter 3 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 659. ACCESS TO CERTAIN MILITARY BASES ABROAD.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for foreign assistance (including foreign military sales, credit sales, and guaranties) under any law may be used to provide any kind of assistance to any foreign country in which a military base is located if—

"(1) such base was constructed or is being maintained or operated with funds furnished by the United States; and

"(2) personnel of the United States carry out military operations from such base; unless and until the President has determined that the government of such country has, consistent with security authorized access, on a regular basis, to bona fide news media correspondents of the United States to such military base."

(b) Section 29 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 is repealed.

PROHIBITING POLICE TRAINING

SEC. 18. (a) Chapter 3 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by section 17(a) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 660. PROHIBITING POLICE TRAINING.—(a) None of the funds made available to carry out this Act, and none of the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other internal security forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.

"(b) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply—

"(1) with respect to assistance rendered under section 515(c) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, or with respect to any authority of the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Federal Bureau of Investigation which related to crimes of the nature which are unlawful under the laws of the United States; or

"(2) to any contract entered into prior to the date of enactment of this section with any person, organization, or agency of the United States Government to provide personnel to conduct, or assist in conducting, any such program.

Notwithstanding clause (2), subsection (a) shall apply to any renewal or extension of any contract referred to in such paragraph entered into on or after such date of enactment."

(b) Section 112 of such Act of 1961 is repealed.

LIMITATIONS UPON ASSISTANCE TO OR FOR CHILE

SEC. 19. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of assistance that may be made available for Chile under this or any other law during fiscal year 1975 may not exceed \$65,000,000, of which amount

not to exceed \$10,000,000 may be made available for the purpose of providing military assistance (including credit sales and the face amount of guaranties).

POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INDOCHINA

SEC. 20. (a) The Congress finds that the cease-fire provided for in the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam has not been observed by any of the Vietnamese parties to the conflict. Military operations of an offensive and defensive nature continue throughout South Vietnam. In Cambodia, the civil war between insurgent forces and the Lon Nol government has intensified, resulting in widespread human suffering and the virtual destruction of the Cambodian economy.

(c) The Congress further finds that continuation of the military struggles in South Vietnam and Cambodia are not in the interest of the parties directly engaged in the conflicts, the people of Indochina, or world peace. In order to lessen the human suffering in Indochina and to bring about a genuine peace there, the Congress urges and requests the President and the Secretary of State to undertake immediately the following measures:

(1) to initiate negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to arrange a mutually agreed-upon and rapid de-escalation of military assistance on the part of the three principal suppliers of arms and material to all Vietnamese and Cambodian parties engaged in conflict;

(2) to urge by all available means that the Government of the Khmer Republic enter into negotiations with representatives of the Khmer Government of National Union for the purpose of arranging an immediate cease-fire and political settlement of the conflict; and to use all available means to establish contact with the Khmer Government of National Union and to urge them to participate in such negotiations. The United States should urge all Cambodian parties to use the good offices of the United Nations or a respected third country for the purpose of bringing an end to hostilities and reaching a political settlement;

(3) to utilize any public or private forum to negotiate directly with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the Republic of Vietnam to seek a new cease-fire in Vietnam and full compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, including a full accounting for Americans missing in Indochina;

(4) to reconvene the Paris Conference to seek full implementation of the provisions of the Agreement of January 27, 1973, on the part of all Vietnamese parties to the conflict; and

(5) to maintain regular and full consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress and report to the Congress and the Nation at regular intervals on the progress toward obtaining a total cessation of hostilities in Indochina and a mutual reduction of military assistance to that area.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ECONOMIC AID TO INDOCHINA

SEC. 21. (a) Congress finds that, after expending over a billion dollars in funds for economic purposes in Indochina last year, and vast amounts in previous years, little in lasting economic benefit remains. A large proportion of the funds expended have been used for consumable items related to the war effort. Very little of our money has found its way into capital investments of a lasting productive benefit to the people. Congress calls upon the President and Secretary of State to take immediately the following actions designed to maximize the benefit of United States economic assistance:

(1) to organize a consortium to include multilateral financial institutions to help plan for Indochina reconstruction and de-

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velopment; to coordinate multilateral and bilateral contributions to the area's economic recovery; and to provide continuing advice to the recipient nations on the use of their own and outside resources;

(2) to develop, in coordination with the recipient governments, other donors, and the multilateral financial institutions, a comprehensive plan for Indochina reconstruction and economic development;

(3) to develop country-by-country reconstruction and development plans, including detailed plans for the development of individual economic sectors, that can be used to identify and coordinate specific economic development projects and programs and to direct United States resources into areas of maximum benefits;

(4) to shift the emphasis of United States aid programs from consumption-oriented expenditures to economic development;

(5) to identify possible structural economic reforms in areas such as taxation, exchange rates, savings mechanisms, internal pricing, income distribution, land tenure, budgetary allocations and corruption, which should be undertaken if Indochinese economic development is to progress; and

(6) to include in Indochina economic planning and programming specific performance criteria and standards which will enable the Congress and the executive branch to judge the adequacy of the recipients' efforts and to determine whether, and what amounts of, continued United States funding is justified.

(b) This section is not meant to imply continuation of a United States financial commitment beyond the authorization provided for in this Act or amendments made by this Act.

INDOCHINA POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

Sec. 22. Section 802 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 802. AUTHORIZATION.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to furnish assistance for the relief and reconstruction of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as authorized by this part, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, for the fiscal year 1974 not to exceed \$504,000,000, and for the fiscal year 1975 not to exceed \$550,000,000. Of the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1975—

"(1) \$420,000,000 shall be available only for the relief and reconstruction of South Vietnam in accordance with section 806 of this Act;

"(2) \$70,000,000 shall be available only for the relief and reconstruction of Cambodia in accordance with section 807 of this Act;

"(3) \$45,000,000 shall be available only for the relief and reconstruction of Laos in accordance with section 808 of this Act;

"(4) \$3,750,000 shall be available only for the regional development program; and

"(5) \$11,250,000 shall be available only for support costs for the agency primarily responsible for carrying out this part.

Such amounts are authorized to remain available until expended."

ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE CHILDREN

Sec. 23. Section 803 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended as follows:

(1) In subsection (a), strike out "rights, particularly children fathered by United States citizens" and insert in lieu thereof "rights".

(2) In subsection (b), between the second and third sentences, insert the following: "Of the sums made available for South Vietnam under section 802(1) of this Act for fiscal year 1975, \$10,000,000, or its equivalent in local currency, shall be available until expended solely to carry out this section."

LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Sec. 24. Part V of the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 806. LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH VIETNAM.—(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other law may be obligated in any amount in excess of \$1,280,000,000 during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, for the purpose of carrying out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam. Of that amount, there shall be available during such fiscal year—

"(1) \$700,000,000 for military assistance;

"(2) \$160,000,000 only to carry out the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954; and

"(3) \$420,000,000 only for economic assistance, of which there shall be available—

"(A) \$95,000,000 for humanitarian assistance, of which there shall be available—

"(i) \$68,500,000 for refugee relief;

"(ii) \$8,200,000 for child care;

"(iii) \$10,300,000 for health care; and

"(iv) \$10,000,000 for the City-to-Farm program;

"(B) \$188,000,000 for agricultural assistance, of which there shall be available—

"(i) \$150,000,000 for fertilizer, POL, and pesticides;

"(ii) \$20,000,000 for rural credit;

"(iii) \$10,000,000 for canal dredging;

"(iv) \$4,000,000 for low-lift pumps; and

"(v) \$4,000,000 for fish farm development;

"(C) \$95,800,000 for industrial development, of which there shall be available—

"(i) \$85,000,000 for commodities;

"(ii) \$10,000,000 for industrial credit; and

"(iii) \$600,000 for development planning; and

"(D) \$41,400,000 for miscellaneous assistance, of which there shall be available—

"(i) \$30,000,000 for transportation; and

"(ii) \$11,400,000 for technical support.

"(b)(1) No funds made available under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a) may be transferred to, or consolidated with, the funds made available under any other paragraph of such subsection, nor may any funds made available under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section be transferred to, or consolidated with, the funds made available under any other such subparagraph.

"(2) Whenever the President determines it to be necessary in carrying out this part, any funds made available under any clause of subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (a) of this section may be transferred to, and consolidated with, the funds made available under any other clause of that same subparagraph.

"(3) The President shall fully inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of each transfer he intends to make under paragraph (2) of this subsection prior to making such transfer.

"(c) In computing the \$1,280,000,000 limitation on obligational authority under subsection (a) of this section with respect to such fiscal year, there shall be included in the computation the value of any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers provided to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam in such fiscal year by gift, donation, loan, lease, or otherwise. For the purpose of this subsection, 'value' means the fair market value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam but in no case less than 33 1/3 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time

such goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were acquired by the United States.

"(d) No funds may be obligated for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1975, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section. In no case shall funds in any amount in excess of the amount specifically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated for any such purpose during such fiscal year.

"(e) After the date of enactment of this section, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

"(f) The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1974, a written report showing the total amount of funds obligated in, to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam during the preceding quarter by the United States Government, and shall include in such report a general breakdown of the total amount obligated, describing the different purposes for which such funds were obligated and the total amount obligated for such purpose.

"(g)(1) Effective six months after the date of enactment of this section, the total number of civilian officers and employees, including contract employees, of executive agencies of the United States Government who are citizens of the United States and of members of the Armed Forces of the United States present in South Vietnam shall not at any one time exceed four thousand, not more than two thousand five hundred of whom shall be members of such armed forces and direct hire and contract employees of the Department of Defense. Effective one year after the date of enactment of this section, such total number shall not exceed at any one time three thousand, not more than one thousand five hundred of whom shall be members of such armed forces and direct hire and contract employees of the Department of Defense.

"(2) Effective six month after the date of enactment of this section, the United States shall not, at any one time, pay in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the compensation or allowances of more than eight hundred individuals in South Vietnam who are citizens of countries other than South Vietnam or the United States. Effective one year after the date of enactment of this section, the total number of individuals whose compensation or allowance is so paid shall not exceed at any one time five hundred.

"(3) For purposes of this subsection, 'executive agency of the United States Government' means any agency, department, board, wholly or partly owned corporation, instrumentality, commission, or establishment within the executive branch of the United States Government.

"(h) This section shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to South Vietnam for its defense."

LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA

Sec. 25. (a) Part V of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by section 24 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"Sec. 807. LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA.—(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other law may be obligated in any amount in excess of \$347,000,000 during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, for the purpose of carry-

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ing out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia. Of that amount, there shall be available—

- "(1) \$200,000,000 for military assistance;
- "(2) \$77,000,000 only to carry out the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954; and
- "(3) \$70,000,000 only for economic assistance, of which there shall be available—
- "(A) \$20,000,000 for humanitarian assistance;
- "(B) \$31,000,000 for commodity import assistance;
- "(C) \$17,500,000 for multilateral stabilization assistance; and
- "(D) \$1,500,000 for technical support and participant training.

"(b) No funds made available under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section may be transferred to, or consolidated with, the funds made available under any other paragraph of such subsection, nor may any funds made available under any subparagraph of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section be transferred to, or consolidated with, the funds made available under any other such subparagraph.

"(c) In computing the \$347,000,000 limitation on obligation authority under subsection (a) of this section with respect to such fiscal year, there shall be included in the computation the value of any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers provided to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia in such fiscal year by gift, donation, loan, lease or otherwise. For the purpose of this subsection, 'value' means the fair market value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia but in no case less than 33 1/3 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time such goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were acquired by the United States.

"(d) No funds may be obligated for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1975, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section. In no case shall funds in any amount in excess of the amount specifically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated for any such purpose during such fiscal year.

"(e) After the date of enactment of this section, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

"(f) The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1974, a written report showing the total amount of funds obligated in, to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia during the preceding quarter by the United States Government, and shall include in such report a general breakdown of the total amount obligated, describing the different purposes for which such funds were obligated and the total amount obligated for such purpose.

"(g) (1) The total number of civilian officers and employees, including contract employees, of executive agencies of the United States Government who are citizens of the United States and of members of the Armed Forces of the United States (excluding such members while actually engaged in air operations in or over Cambodia which originate outside Cambodia) present in Cambodia at any one time shall not exceed two hundred. Effective six months after the date of enactment of this subsection, such total number

shall not exceed at any one time one hundred and seventy-five.

"(2) The United States shall not, at any one time, pay in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the compensation or allowances of more than eighty-five individuals in Cambodia who are citizens of countries other than Cambodia or the United States. Effective six months after the date of enactment of this section, the total number of individuals whose compensation or allowance is so paid shall not exceed at any one time seventy-five.

"(3) For purposes of this subsection, 'executive agency of the United States Government' means any agency, department, board, wholly or partly owned corporation, instrumentality, commission, or establishment within the executive branch of the United States Government.

"(4) This subsection shall not be construed to apply with respect to any individual in Cambodia who (A) is an employee or volunteer worker of a voluntary private, non-profit relief organization or is an employee or volunteer worker of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and (B) engages only in activities providing humanitarian assistance in Cambodia.

"(h) This section shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.

(b) Section 655 and 656 of such Act are repealed.

LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO LAOS

SEC. 26. Part V of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by sections 24 and 25(a) of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 808. LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO LAOS.—(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other law may be obligated in any amount in excess of \$100,000,000 during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, for the purpose of carrying out directly or indirectly any economic or military assistance, or any operation, project, or program of any kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos. Of that amount, there shall be available—

- "(1) \$55,000,000 for military assistance; and
- "(2) \$45,000,000 only for economic assistance, of which there shall be available—
- "(A) \$13,000,000 for humanitarian assistance;
- "(B) \$9,900,000 for reconstruction and development assistance;
- "(C) \$17,500,000 for stabilization assistance; and
- "(D) \$4,600,000 for technical support.

"(b) No funds made available under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section may be transferred to, or consolidated with, the funds made available under paragraph (1) of such subsection, nor may any funds made available under any subparagraph of paragraph (2) be transferred to, or consolidated with, the funds made available under any other such subparagraph.

"(c) In computing the limitations on obligation authority under subsection (a) of this section with respect to such fiscal year there shall be included in the computation the value of any goods, supplies, materials, equipment, services, personnel, or advisers provided to, for, or on behalf of Laos in such fiscal year by gift, donation, loan, lease or otherwise. For the purpose of this subsection, 'value' means the fair market value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of Laos but in no case less than 33 1/3 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time such goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were acquired by the United States.

"(d) No funds may be obligated for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1975, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section. In no case shall funds in any amount in excess of the amount specifically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated for any such purpose during such fiscal year.

"(e) After the date of enactment of this section, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos, for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

"(f) The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1974, a written report showing the total amount of funds obligated in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the preceding quarter by the United States Government and shall include in such report a general breakdown of the total amount obligated, describing the different purposes for which such funds were obligated and the total amount obligated for such purpose.

"(g) This section shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Laos for its defense."

TRANSFER OF FUNDS

SEC. 27. Part V of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by sections 24, 25(a), and 26 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"SEC. 809. TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—(a) The authority of section 610 of this Act shall not apply with respect to any funds made available to South Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.

"(b) Any funds made available under any provision of this or any other law for the purpose of providing military assistance for South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia may be transferred to, and consolidated with, any funds made available to that country for war relief, reconstruction, or general economic development."

MIDDLE EAST ASSISTANCE

SEC. 28. (a) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new part:

"PART VI

"SEC. 901. GENERAL AUTHORITY FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.—The President is authorized under section 902 of this Act to furnish, by loan or grant, assistance authorized by this Act, and to provide credits and guaranties authorized by the Foreign Military Sales Act. Any such assistance, credits, and guaranties shall be provided in accordance with all the purposes and limitations applicable to that type of assistance under this Act and applicable to credits and guaranties under the Foreign Military Sales Act.

"SEC. 902. ALLOCATIONS.—(a) Of the funds appropriated to carry out chapter 2 of part II of this Act during the fiscal year 1975, not to exceed \$100,000,000 may be made available for military assistance in the Middle East.

"(b) Of the funds appropriated to carry out chapter 4 of part II of this Act during the fiscal year 1975, not to exceed \$577,500,000 may be made available for security supporting assistance in the Middle East.

"(c) Of the aggregate ceiling on credits and guaranties established by section 31(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act during the fiscal year 1975, not to exceed \$330,000,000 shall be available for countries in the Middle East.

"SEC. 903. (a) SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FUND.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year

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1975 not to exceed \$100,000,000 to meet special requirements arising from time to time for the purpose of providing any type of assistance authorized by part I of this Act, in addition to funds otherwise available for such purpose. The funds authorized to be appropriated by this section shall be available for use by the President for assistance authorized by this Act in accordance with the provisions applicable to the furnishing of such assistance. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

"(b) The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives currently informed on the programming and obligation of funds under subsection (a).

"(c) (1) Prior to obligating any amount in excess of \$1,000,000 from funds made available under this section, the President shall transmit a written report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on the same day giving a complete explanation with respect to such proposed obligation. Each report shall include an explanation relating to only one proposed obligation.

"(2) (A) The President may make such obligation thirty days after the report has been so transmitted unless, before the end of the first period of thirty calendar days of continuous session of Congress after the date on which the report is transmitted, either House adopts a resolution disapproving the proposed obligation with respect to which the report is made.

"(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph—

"(1) the continuity of a session is broken only by an adjournment of the Congress sine die; and

"(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the thirty-day period.

"(3) Paragraphs (4) through (11) of this subsection are enacted by Congress—

"(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in the House in the case of resolutions described by this subsection; and they supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

"(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

"(4) For purposes of paragraphs (2) through (11) of this subsection, 'resolution' means only a resolution of either House of Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That the _____ does not approve the obligation for _____ and explained in the report transmitted to Congress by the President on _____, 19____, the first blank space therein being filled with the name of the resolving House, the second blank space therein being filled with the name of the foreign country or organization on whose behalf the obligation is to be incurred, and the other blank spaces therein being appropriately filled with the date of the transmittal of the report; but does not include a resolution specifying more than one proposed obligation.

"(5) If the committee, to which has been referred a resolution disapproving a proposed obligation, has not reported the resolution at the end of ten calendar days after its introduction, it is in order to move either to discharge the committee from further consideration of the resolution or to discharge the committee from further consideration of

any other resolution with respect to the same obligation which has been referred to the committee.

"(6) A motion to discharge may be made only by an individual favoring the resolution, is highly privileged (except that it may not be made after the committee has reported a resolution with respect to the same proposed obligation), and debate thereon is limited to not more than one hour, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

"(7) If the motion to discharge is agreed to, or disagreed to, the motion may not be renewed, nor may another motion to discharge the committee be made with respect to any other resolution with respect to the same obligation.

"(8) When the committee has reported, or has been discharged from further consideration of, a resolution with respect to an obligation, it is at any time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. The motion is highly privileged and is not debatable. An amendment to the motion is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to.

"(9) Debate on the resolution is limited to not more than two hours, to be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. A motion further to limit debate is not debatable. An amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is not in order, and it is not in order to move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to.

"(10) Motions to postpone, made with respect to the discharge from committee, or the consideration of a resolution with respect to an obligation, and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business, are decided without debate.

"(11) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution with respect to an obligation are decided without debate."

"(b) Section 620(p) of such Act is repealed.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT AMENDMENTS

SEC. 29. The Foreign Military Sales Act is amended as follows:

(1) Section 3(d) is amended to read as follows:

"(d) A country shall remain ineligible in accordance with subsection (c) of this section until such time as the President determines that such violation has ceased, that the country concerned has given assurances satisfactory to the President that such violation will not recur, and that, if such violation involved the transfer of sophisticated weapons without the consent of the President, such weapons have been returned to the country concerned."

(2) Section 22 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(c) No sales of defense articles shall be made to the government of any economically developed country under the provisions of this section if such articles are generally available for purchase by such country from commercial sources in the United States."

(3) Section 23 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 23. CREDIT SALES.—The President is authorized to finance procurements of defense articles and defense services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations on terms requiring the payment to the United States Government in United States dollars of—

"(1) the value of such articles or services

within a period not to exceed ten years after the delivery of such articles or the rendering of such services; and

"(2) interest on the unpaid balance of that obligation for payment of the value of such articles or services, at a rate equivalent to the current average interest rate, as of the last day of the month preceding the financing of such procurement, that the United States Government pays on outstanding marketable obligations of comparable maturity, unless the President certifies to Congress that the national interest requires a lesser rate of interest and states in the certification the lesser rate so required and the justification therefor."

(4) In subsections (a) and (b) of section 24, the parenthetical phrase in each is amended to read as follows: "(excluding United States Government agencies other than the Federal Financing Bank)".

(5) Section 24 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(d) The President may guarantee under this section only those payments for any defense article or defense service which are due within ten years after that defense article is delivered or that defense service is rendered, except that such guaranty may be made for not more than twenty years if the President certifies to Congress that the national interest requires that the period of guaranty be longer than ten years, and states in the certification the country or international organization on whose behalf the guaranty is to be made, the period of the guaranty, and the justification for the longer period."

(6) In section 31—

(A) in subsection (a), strike out "\$325,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974" and insert in lieu thereof "\$455,000,000 for the fiscal year 1975"; and

(B) in subsection (b)—

(1) strike out "\$730,000,000 for the fiscal year 1974" and insert in lieu thereof "\$872,500,000 for the fiscal year 1975"; and

(2) add at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Of the funds made available under subsection (a) of this section, \$100,000,000 shall first be obligated with respect to financing the procurement of defense articles and defense services by Israel under section 23 of this Act, except that Israel shall be released from contractual liability to repay the United States Government for the defense articles and defense services so financed."

POLITICAL PRISONERS

SEC. 30. Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "(Commencing with respect to 1974, the President shall submit annually to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a written report setting forth fully the steps he has taken to carry out this section.)"

GORGAS MEMORIAL INSTITUTE

SEC. 81. The first section of the Act entitled "An Act to authorize a permanent annual appropriation for the maintenance and operation of the Gorgas Memorial", approved May 7, 1926, as amended (22 U.S.C. 278), is amended by striking out "\$500,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$1,000,000".

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN VIETNAM

SEC. 32. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 1975 not to exceed \$16,526,000 for payments by the United States to help meet expenses of the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam. Funds appropriated under this subsection are authorized to be made available for reimbursement to the Agency for International Development of amounts expended by the Agency during fiscal year 1975 as interim United States payments to help meet expenses of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

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(b) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State not to exceed \$11,200,000 for reimbursement to the Agency for International Development of amounts expended by the Agency for International Development to help meet expenses of the International Commission on Control and Supervision in fiscal year 1974.

(c) Reimbursements received by the Agency for International Development under this section may be credited to applicable appropriations of the Agency and shall be available for the purposes for which such appropriations are authorized to be used during fiscal year 1975.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dan Spiegel of my staff, and Norvill Jones, John Ritch, Robert Dockery, and Richard Moose of the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations be permitted to remain in the Chamber during the remainder of the Senate's consideration of S. 3394.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, it is my responsibility to bring the foreign assistance authorization bill, S. 3394, to the Senate. This follows, of course, our extended discussion on the continuing resolution with all of its amendments.

I am hopeful that during the consideration of this bill, into which a great deal of work by the Committee on Foreign Relations has gone, we will be able to expedite the consideration of amendments. There are several Members of this body with other pressing duties who have amendments to offer, and we have had much debate already on most of the items which will be brought up for consideration. Actually, I have a feeling that we are going to see what they call in football parlance some instant replay here, and I am fully aware of what the score is going to be on the instant replay.

It was my judgment that we should have proceeded with the foreign assistance authorization bill, S. 3394, prior to the continuing resolution, but there were those in the administration who felt that was not desirable. I can understand their concern. But that is the past, and we shall proceed now with this proposed legislation.

Let me add that the foreign assistance authorization bill before us is greatly different from other legislation that we have adopted in this area on other occasions.

Foreign aid bills, Mr. President, have never been popular. I believe that is probably the understatement of the year. But in this time of galloping inflation, belt tightening by every American, and a mounting Federal budget, the task of defending this bill in the Senate is less palatable than ever. But, as distasteful as foreign aid is to most Americans, year in and year out since the beginning of the Greek-Turkish aid program, every Congress and every President have agreed that foreign aid is a key element in America's foreign policy. Congress may grumble and growl, and indeed it does, and it has, and I have done my share. But, in the end, a majority of the

electd representatives of the American people have always come to the conclusion that continuation of a foreign assistance program is in the national interest and a part of our national security effort. Within that majority there is much argument about form and content but there is no substantial disagreement over the Nation's obligation and indeed our desire to help the world's poor.

The bill recommended to the Senate by the committee, by a vote of 11 to 5, will bring an end to one major aspect of the foreign aid program.

I wish that this Chamber were better occupied today, so that my colleagues would know the importance of this particular action. The aspect of the foreign aid program to be discontinued is the military grant assistance program. For many years the Committee on Foreign Relations has sought to bring about major changes in foreign aid policy. Last year significant improvements were made in the economic aid program, and I want to compliment in particular our esteemed colleague from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN) for his help in this effort. I joined with Senator AIKEN in designing that bill. It was designed to insure that the benefits of American tax dollars reached the rice bowls and bread baskets of the poor and did not lodge in the pockets of the rich or the corrupt. This year the committee has continued its work at reform, concentrating on the military assistance program and aid to Indochina. And may I add that the committee dispatched to Indochina two of its most able staff members. Those staff members made an intensive study of our foreign assistance program in the Indochina area.

The staff members brought back recommendations to us, and those recommendations were presented to every member of the committee. They were discussed in committee and, subsequently, amendments were drawn from some of those recommendations.

I am proud to say that a number of those recommendations I offered as amendments so that they could be included in the proposed legislation now before us, the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act of 1974.

This year, as I have said, we continued our efforts at improvement and reform and fiscal discipline.

The bill recommended by the committee would authorize a total of \$2,527,626,000 in appropriations for certain foreign assistance programs in the 1975 fiscal year. This represents a reduction of \$724,600,000—or 22 percent—in the executive branch's requests for these programs.

I submit that no bill has been brought before the Senate that has had that much reduction applied to it. We went over every item in this bill, and I hope that my colleagues will take the time as they consider this measure to look at what we have done. The President has called for Congress to exercise fiscal restraint to help in the fight against in-

flation. The committee has acted in a responsible manner to help in that effort.

Before I explain the major provisions of the bill, a few words of background are necessary. Last year Congress approved a 2-year authorization for foreign economic development assistance, but only a 1-year authorization for military grants, military credit sales, security supporting assistance, and only 1 year for economic aid to Indochina.

The principal purpose of the bill before the Senate is to provide a number of supplemental authorizations for economic development programs and to provide new authorizations for the programs which were authorized for only 1 year during the last session of Congress. In addition, the bill contains authorizations of appropriations for a Middle East contingency fund which was requested by the President and the Secretary of State, and for U.S. contributions to the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam which was set up under the Paris Agreement.

For many years the Committee on Foreign Relations has urged that military and economic assistance authorizations be considered in separate bills. In reporting a bill containing authorizations for both economic and military assistance, the committee recognizes that, on the surface, its action appears inconsistent with its traditional position. However, this is a unique bill where military and economic aid issues are inextricably combined. In Indochina, for example, the committee believes that the Senate should consider the total flow of U.S. resources to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

It would be inadvisable and confusing to try to deal with policy toward those countries in separate economic and military aid bills. Similarly, in the Middle East, the committee's singling out this region for special attention has resulted in a mix of economic and military aid authorizations. Next year the committee fully expects to deal with foreign assistance authorizations in two separate bills, as outlined in section 9 of the State Department/USIA Authorization Act, S. 3473, now in conference, which requires consolidation of future requests to Congress for foreign affairs and foreign assistance authorizations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point three tables: the first showing the authorizations proposed by the executive branch and the recommendations by the Foreign Relations Committee; the second showing the executive branch's foreign assistance request, including programs already authorized; and the third, a country-by-country breakdown of all foreign assistance programs proposed by the executive branch for the 1975 fiscal year.

There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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TABLE I.—FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATIONS RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

(In thousands of dollars)

	Fiscal year 1975 authorization request			Fiscal year 1975 authorization request		
	Committee recommendation	Difference from request		Committee recommendation	Difference from request	
1. Food and nutrition.....	255,300	-55,300				
2. Population planning and health.....	126,000	+20,000				
3. Education and human resources development.....	12,000	+2,000				
4. Gorgas Memorial—Panama.....	500	+500				
5. International organizations and programs.....	36,900	+33,900				
6. Indochina postwar reconstruction.....	556,000	-389,800				
7. Security supporting assistance.....	585,500	+200,000				
8. Middle East special requirements funds.....			100,000	100,000		
9. Military assistance program.....			985,000	550,000	-435,000	
10. Foreign military credit sales.....			555,000	455,000	-100,000	
11. International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam.....			27,726	27,726		
Total.....			3,252,226	2,527,626	-724,600	

¹ Supplemental to current authorization.

² Of this amount, \$100,000,000 is to be in the nature of a grant to Israel.

TABLE II.—COMPARATIVE DATA ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975

(In thousands of dollars)

	Fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1975 request ¹		Committee recommendation	Fiscal year 1974		Fiscal year 1975 request ¹		Committee recommendation
	Authorization	Appropriation	Appropriation	Authorization		Authorization	Appropriation	Appropriation	Authorization	
Development assistance:										
Food and nutrition.....	291,000	284,000	546,300	255,300	260,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	258,900	258,900
Population planning and health.....	145,000	135,000	145,000		20,000	150,000	150,000	150,000	939,800	550,000
Education and human resources.....	90,000	89,000	90,000		2,000	45,000	45,000	45,000	385,500	585,500
Selected development problems.....	53,000	40,500	53,000			(²)	4,800	5,900		
Selected countries and organizations.....	39,000	36,500	39,000						100,000	100,000
Total, functional development assistance.....	618,000	585,000	873,300	255,300	222,000	905,434	986,050	1,142,800	259,200	258,900
International organizations and programs:										
UNDP and other programs.....	150,000	125,000	193,900	36,900	36,900	594,000	499,000	939,800	939,800	550,000
India Basin Development Fund.....	(³)	2,000	200			125,000	112,500	385,500	385,500	585,500
India Basin Development Fund grants.....	14,500	9,000	14,500				(⁴)	25,000	25,000	
UNRWA (expansion of training).....	2,000	2,000	2,000			1,684,434	1,597,550	2,568,100	1,684,500	1,494,400
U.N. Environment Fund.....	(⁵)	7,500	10,000			42,500	42,500	42,500		
Total, international organizations and programs.....	166,500	145,500	198,600	36,900	36,900	42,500	42,500	42,500	42,500	42,500
American schools and hospitals abroad.....	19,000	19,000	10,000			(⁶)	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000
Contingency fund.....	30,000	15,000	30,000			512,500	450,000	985,000	985,000	550,000
National Association Partners of the Alliance.....	934	750				325,000	325,000	555,000	555,000	455,000
Albert Schweitzer Hospital.....	1,000	1,000				2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000	2,200,000
Total, foreign assistance items.....	4,764,434	4,790,050	4,175,600	3,224,500	2,499,400	4,764,434	4,790,050	4,175,600	3,224,500	2,499,400
Gorgas Memorial Institute.....	(⁷)	500	500	(⁸)				500		
International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam.....	4,500		27,726	27,726	27,726	4,500		27,726	27,726	27,726
Grand total.....	4,768,934	4,790,550	4,203,826	3,252,226	2,527,626	4,768,934	4,790,550	4,203,826	3,252,226	2,527,626

¹ Request includes the following additional amounts not included in the President's fiscal year 1975 budget transmitted to the Congress on Feb. 4, 1974: Indochina postwar reconstruction, \$150,000,000; security supporting assistance \$322,500,000; Middle East special requirements, \$100,000,000; foreign military credit sales, \$240,000,000; military assistance program, \$60,000,000.
² Supplemental to existing authorization.
³ Appropriation request authorized by FAA of 1967 which made available \$51,200,000 until expended.
⁴ Authorized by Public Law 93-188 which made available \$10,000,000 until expended.

⁵ Permanent authorization for such sums as may be necessary.
⁶ Includes \$49,000,000 supplemental appropriation.
⁷ Excludes \$250,000,000 in defense stocks provided to Cambodia under sec. 506 of the FAA of 1961.
⁸ Not authorized.
⁹ Permanent authorization of \$30,000 per annum.
¹⁰ Includes \$16,526,000 for fiscal year 1975 contribution to the ICCS and \$11,200,000 for reimbursement to AID for fiscal year 1974 expenses of the ICCS.

TABLE III.—U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND CREDIT SALES PROGRAMS PROPOSED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975

(In thousands of dollars)

	Economic assistance programs					Military assistance and credit sales programs				
	Total economic and military assistance and credit sales	Total economic assistance	AID	Peace Corps	Public Law, 480 ¹	Total military assistance and credit sales	Military assistance grants (MAP)	Foreign military credit sales	Excess defense articles	Military assistance service funded
Summary.....	8,368,726	4,872,226	2,842,415	82,256	995,928	3,465,500	1,024,000	872,500	150,000	1,450,000
Africa, total.....	293,753	251,468	168,992	26,103	56,373	42,285	14,785	24,500	3,000	
Algeria.....	1,409	1,409			1,409					
Botswana.....	1,736	1,736		394	1,342					
Burundi.....	425	425			425					
Cameroon.....	1,311	1,311			825					
Central African Republic.....	260	260			139					
Chad.....	448	448			444					
Congo (Brazzaville).....	412	412			4					
Dahomey.....	499	499			398					
Ethiopia.....	47,938	25,039	25,037	2,798	1,204	14,900	11,300	5,000	2,600	
Gabon.....	530	530		204	326					
Gambia.....	442	442		235	187					
Ghana.....	15,686	15,625	13,746	1,187	692					
Guinea.....	333	333			333					
Ivory Coast.....	2,091	2,091		1,469	622					

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	Economic assistance program				Military assistance and credit sales programs						
	Total economic and military assistance and credit sales	Total economic assistance	AID	Peace Corps	Public Law 480	International narcotics control	Total military assistance and credit sales	Military assistance grants (MAP)	Foreign military credit sales	Excess defense articles	Military assistance service funded
Kenya	8,951	8,951	7,493	1,159	299						
Lesotho	1,739	1,739		98	1,641						
Liberia	4,626	9,026	7,206	1,362	458		600	100	500		
Malagasy	168	168			168						
Malawi	410	410		351	59						
Mali	1,286	1,236		356	880		50	50			
Mauritania	290	290		54	236						
Mauritius	1,219	1,219		79	1,140						
Morocco	49,182	34,522	15,210	1,331	17,781		14,860	860	14,000		
Niger	1,957	1,957		1,061	897						
Nigeria	6,133	6,133	3,682	151	2,300						
Rwanda	2,947	2,947	2,500		447						
Senegal	1,870	1,845		606	1,239		25	25			
Seychelles	26	26		26							
Sierra Leone	2,566	2,566		1,655	911						
Sudan	15,960	15,910	10,850		5,060		50	50			
Swaziland	572	572		452	120						
Tanzania	12,054	12,054	10,659		1,395						
Togo	2,089	2,089		1,069	1,028						
Tunisia	21,368	17,468	5,809	1,072	10,587		3,960	2,000	1,500	400	
Upper Volta	2,230	2,230		527	1,710						
Zaire	15,294	11,494	6,013	5,141	336		3,800	300	3,500		
Zambia	8	8			8						
Economic regional programs:											
Central West Africa and Sahel	26,874	26,874	26,874								
East Africa	1,563	1,563	1,563								
Southern Africa	10,123	10,123	10,123								
Africa regional	21,988	21,988	20,527	1,461							
Self-help projects	1,700	1,700	1,700								
Regional military costs	30						30	30			
Asia, total	4,762,069	2,086,017	1,375,949	15,627	680,246	14,198	2,676,052	787,902	318,000	120,150	1,450,000
Afghanistan	17,185	16,985	14,467	1,299	1,175	50	200	200			
Bahrain	83	83		8							
Bangladesh	104,669	104,669	65,220	29	39,449						
British Solomon Islands	116	116			92						
Burma	5,000	5,000				5,000					
Cambodia	550,761	187,011	110,000		77,011		363,750	362,500	80,000	1,250	
China (Taiwan)	80,409						80,400	400			
Cook Islands	14	14		14							
Cyprus	571	571			571						
Fiji	606	606		606							
Gilbert and Ellice Islands	21	21		21							
Greece	71,000						71,000		71,000		
India	113,894	113,794	75,500	21	38,083		100	100			
Indonesia	221,369	192,469	71,460		120,909	100	28,900	22,700		6,200	
Iran	1,569	1,569		1,569							
Korea	416,368	182,068	25,176	1,907	154,909		234,300	161,500	52,000	20,800	
Laos	143,505	57,405	56,000		253	1,152	86,100	85,200	10,000	900	
Lebanon	10,150						10,150	150	10,000		
Malaysia	12,938	2,653		2,409	156		10,285	285	10,000		
Micronesia	1,061	1,061		1,061							
Nepal	6,991	6,956	5,721	812	402		35	35			
Oman	181	181		181							
Pakistan	123,074	122,794	78,745		43,299	750	280	280			
Philippines	103,715	78,315	49,844	2,138	26,043	250	25,400	17,900	5,000	2,500	
Saudi Arabia	220				220		220				
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	18,801	18,786	8,000		10,786		15	15			
Thailand	88,587	14,087	6,005	1,238		6,864	74,500	56,000		18,500	
Tonga	338	338		338							
Turkey	232,492	27,492	23,064		4,396	32	205,000	80,000	90,000	35,000	
Vietnam	2,396,553	991,553	751,000		160,553		1,485,000			35,000	1,450,000
Western Samoa	321			321							
Yemen Arab Republic	13,734	13,734	11,496								
Economic regional program	25,365	25,365	24,251	1,114	2,078						
Regional military costs	417						417	417			
Latin America, total	592,306	372,206	267,461	19,878	78,137	6,630	220,100	18,250	200,000		1,850
Argentina	30,900	200					200	30,700	700	30,000	
Belize (British Honduras)	275	275		275							
Bolivia	35,959	29,459	22,239		7,175	45	6,500	3,300	3,000	200	
Brazil	69,309	8,508	2,800	3,227	2,178	243	6,800	800	60,000		
Chile	84,976	63,676	26,035	1,116	37,097	28	21,300	800	20,500		
Colombia	52,848	35,148	21,908	2,717	9,986	537	17,700	700	17,000		
Costa Rica	2,147	2,147	834	1,101	209						
Costa Rica	15,855	14,055	5,456		7,882		1,850	1,300	500	50	
Dominican Republic	18,976	7,076	2,050	1,594	3,327	326	12,900	400	12,500		
Ecuador	17,381	12,731	11,561		833		4,650	1,100	3,500	50	
El Salvador	21,305	18,955	17,090	1,021	791		2,350	1,300	1,000	50	
Guatemala	3,624	3,624	3,550		74						
Guyana	11,055	10,855	8,179		2,676		200	200			
Haiti	28,152	23,502	22,038	765	898		4,650	1,100	3,500		
Honduras	11,399	11,399	8,450	1,357	1,558					50	
Jamaica	10,100	5,000				34					
Mexico	33,558	29,108	27,826	294	688		5,100	100	5,000		
Nicaragua	22,266	21,716	21,360		338		4,450	1,100	3,000	350	
Panama	7,770	5,420	4,756	350	69	18	550	500		50	
Paraguay	38,630	17,330	13,489	1,355	2,513	10	2,350	1,400	500	450	
Peru	16	16		16		93	21,300	800	20,500		
Trinidad and Tobago	5,486	786	775								
Uruguay	19,557	1,857		1,857		11	4,700	1,600	2,500	600	
Venezuela	6,443	6,443	5,500	1,814	33	43	17,700	700	17,000		
Caribbean regional	1,674	1,674	1,634			2					
Central America regional (ROCAP)	17,650	17,650	17,650			40					
Inter-American programs	23,646	23,646	22,281	1,365							
Economic regional programs	350						350	350			
Regional military costs											

Footnotes at end of table.

TABLE III.—U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND CREDIT SALES PROGRAMS PROPOSED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975—Continued

(In thousands of dollars)

	Economic assistance programs					Military assistance and credit sales programs				
	Total economic and military assistance and credit sales	Total economic assistance	AID	Peace Corps	Public Law, 480 ¹	Total military assistance and credit sales	Military assistance grants (MAP)	Foreign military credit sales	Excess defense articles	Military assistance service funded
Middle East, total.....	969, 050	519, 807	478, 175		41, 632	449, 243	94, 243	330, 000	25, 000	
Egypt.....	253, 144	253, 144	250, 000							
Israel.....	378, 211	78, 211	50, 000		3, 144					
Jordan.....	237, 695	88, 452	78, 175		28, 211	300, 000		300, 000		
Middle East Special Requirements Fund.....	100, 000	100, 000	100, 000		10, 277	149, 243	94, 243	30, 000	25, 000	
Europe, total.....	15, 053	12, 522	12, 500	22		2, 531	2, 531			
Austria.....	24					24	24			
Finland.....	24					24	24			
Malta.....	9, 527	9, 522	9, 500	22						
Portugal.....	860					860	860			
Spain.....	4, 600	3, 000	3, 000			1, 600	1, 600			
Regional military costs.....	23					23	23			
Other.....	827, 968	721, 079	539, 338	20, 529	139, 540	66, 289	106, 289			
U.S. contributions to international financial institutions, total.....	909, 127	909, 127								
African Development Bank Special Fund.....	15, 000	15, 000								
International Development Association.....	320, 000	320, 000								
Inter-American Development Bank:										
Paid-in capital.....										
Callable capital.....										
Fund for special operations.....	500, 000	500, 000								
Asian Development Bank:										
Paid-in capital.....	24, 127	24, 127								
Callable capital.....	(96, 508)	(96, 508)								
Special funds.....	50, 000	50, 000								

¹ Public Law 480 estimates are planning levels which will be reexamined later in the year in light of revised price estimates, U.S. commodity availabilities and recipient country requirements. If availabilities permit, a title I concessional sales program will be planned for Guinea.

² Includes \$909,000,000 U.S. contributions to international financial institutions.

³ Largely or wholly funded from security supporting assistance or Indochina postwar reconstruction accounts.

⁴ Includes West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza.

⁵ Includes the following: American schools and hospitals abroad, \$10,000,000; administrative expenses, AID, \$47,100,000; State, \$5,900,000; contingency fund, \$30,000,000; international

organizations and programs, \$200,100,000; operating costs, \$123,400,000; interregional population program, \$50,400,000; and other interregional programs, \$69,100,000.

⁶ Includes worldwide support, \$6,600,000; Peace Corps share of action support, \$13,300,000.

⁷ Includes emergency reserves allocated title I, \$35,300,000; ocean freight, \$103,200,000; grants of title I currencies under sec. 204 of title II, \$1,000,000.

⁸ Includes international organizations, \$5,100,000; interregional programs training and support costs, \$6,700,000; unprogramed, \$3,800,000.

⁹ Includes administration, \$25,300,000; supply operations, \$78,700,000; inspection, general, \$175,000; storage and maintenance stockpile, \$1,000,000.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I ask also that there be printed in the RECORD a summary of the major policy provisions of S. 3394 as reported by the Foreign Relations Committee:

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

SUMMARY OF MAJOR POLICY PROVISIONS IN THE BILL

I. INDOCHINA

1. *Policy*.—States a Congressional policy concerning the political/military situation in Indochina and principles to guide the U.S. economic assistance program.

2. *Spending Ceilings*.—Imposes fiscal year 1975 ceilings on obligations for assistance to Indochina: \$1.28 billion for South Vietnam; \$347 million for Cambodia; and \$100 million for Laos.

3. *Project and Program Authorizations*.—Authorizes funds for economic assistance to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos by specific project or program.

4. *Personnel Ceiling in South Vietnam*.—Imposes a ceiling on U.S. direct hire and contract personnel in South Vietnam of 4,000 to be reached within six months after enactment and a further reduction to not more than 3,000 by the end of fiscal year 1976.

5. *Personnel Ceiling in Cambodia*.—Reduces the ceiling on U.S. direct hire or contract personnel in Cambodia from 200 to 175. Contract personnel of humanitarian relief agencies are exempted from the ceiling.

6. *Transfer authority*.—Allows military aid funds to be used for economic assistance purposes.

II. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. *Phase Out of Military Grant Assistance and Military Missions*.—Requires a phase out

over a three-year period of military grant assistance and United States military aid missions to foreign countries.

2. *Costs of Military Missions*.—Requires that all costs of United States military missions abroad must be charged against appropriations for military grant assistance.

3. *War Reserve Stockpile for Foreign Countries*.—Requires that any stockpiling of military equipment or material for foreign countries be financed out of funds appropriated for military assistance. No material can be provided to a foreign country from previously stockpiled materials unless the cost of the materials is charged against funds appropriated for the regular military assistance program or military aid to South Vietnam.

4. *Authority to Draw on Defense Stocks*.—Repeals the authority to draw on Department of Defense stocks for the purpose of providing additional military grant assistance to foreign countries.

5. *Excess Defense Articles*.—Tightens restrictions on the use of excess defense articles for foreign military aid by requiring that all grants of excess articles be charged against funds for military aid at not less than one-third the acquisition cost of the article.

6. *Military Aid to Korea*.—Imposes a ceiling on military grant aid and credit sales to Korea of not more than three-fourths the FY 1974 level and phases out such assistance over a three-year period.

7. *Arms Sales Through Commercial Channels*.—Prohibits government procurement of arms for economically developed countries if the equipment or material is available through commercial channels.

8. *Interest Rate On Credit Sales*.—Imposes a minimum interest rate on credits extended to foreign countries for purchases of arms under the Foreign Military Sales Act

of not less than the interest rate paid on Treasury borrowings of comparable maturity.

III. GENERAL

1. *Chile*.—Imposes an FY 1975 ceiling of not more than \$65 million of which not more than \$10 million can be in military credits or grants.

2. *Waiver Authority*.—Repeals the President's general authority to waive restrictions in the Foreign Assistance Act.

3. *Police Training*.—Prohibits use of foreign aid funds for training foreign police, prison, or internal security forces.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In its work on the President's foreign aid request the committee's primary focus was on two major categories: the military grant assistance program and assistance for Indochina. In addition, the committee gave considerable attention to the provisions concerning assistance to countries in the Middle East. I will comment briefly about the committee's action in each of these areas. I will not burden the Senate with a description of all of the other provisions recommended by the committee. The details are contained in the committee report.

I commend to Members of the Senate and to the public a careful reading of that committee report.

First, on military assistance: The committee approached its consideration of the proposed military assistance program for fiscal year 1975 with the long-held belief, expressed in committee reports of past years, that the United States should provide grant military aid to for-

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foreign countries not as a habit, but only in specific instances where such assistance is clearly warranted by U.S. security or foreign policy interests. At present, the farflung network of U.S. military missions gives bureaucratic momentum to the perpetuation of an extensive program, the rationale of which has become increasingly more dubious each year, in the view of the majority of the committee. Through this bureaucracy, the United States continues to dispense hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons each year in pursuit of such vague goals as "stability," "balance," and the "maintenance of friendly relations." Yet, there is little evidence that such general purposes have actually been served by this extravagant program.

Experience indicates that the availability of grant military aid induces recipient countries to maintain larger and more expensively equipped military forces than they would otherwise find necessary or prudent. By encouraging recipient countries toward increased militarization, the program not only escalates the destructive potential of international conflict but also enhances the relative power of the military within those societies. Thus, it often serves to stifle the very democratic processes which the program, in its origins, was intended to defend.

Only Congress is in a position to put an end to the near-addictive habit which the military aid program represents. Like all longstanding programs, this program has been institutionalized, and it is simply in the nature of things that the State Department and our embassies abroad will want to perpetuate the status quo rather than risk offending a foreign government, even if an objective evaluation indicates that the program no longer serves a useful purpose. Congress, however, can ease the potential diplomatic problem by requiring reductions which give the executive branch no alternative and thus relieve it of the embarrassment of being importuned by foreign governments for a continuation of aid.

Last year, the Foreign Relations Committee made significant reductions in the amount requested for military grant aid and also added a requirement that the entire program, including the overseas network of military missions, be phased out over a period of 4 years. Regrettably, from the committee's view, the Senate, by a narrow margin, voted to strike that provision. This year the committee renewed its effort by reducing the executive branch's authorization request from \$985 million to \$550 million, and added a requirement that the entire military grant aid program, other than grants for training, and all military missions be phased out over a period of 3 years. During the phaseout period, the committee authorized limited concessional credits to countries where grant programs are being terminated.

It was my privilege to make the motion to cut the \$985 million requested for what we call the military grant aid program to \$550 million. That is a reduction of \$435 million.

And, again talking to a relatively empty Chamber which, I think, is most unfortunate as we consider legislation of this

importance, I would hope that our colleagues would take note of the fact that—if they read the RECORD, and we presume that such is done in preparation for important votes—we made a reduction of 44 percent in foreign military assistance. No other committee has made reductions of the size that the Foreign Relations Committee has made in this foreign assistance program. This seems to be the desire of the Senate, and we have tried to comply with that judgment.

In addition to reducing the authorization for military grant aid and providing for a 3-year phaseout of the grant program and overseas missions, the committee closed off auxiliary sources of military assistance which have allowed for greater volumes of military aid than could be clearly perceived either by the Congress or the American people. In addition to regular military grants and military credits, military assistance has been provided in the past by the following means:

Military Assistance Service-Funded—MASF—a Defense Department budget category now used only for military aid to South Vietnam;

Defense Department funding of most of the costs of U.S. military missions abroad;

Grants of "excess defense articles"; and

Grants of weapons and equipment drawn from Defense Department stocks, which are replenished through subsequent appropriations.

The committee dealt with each of these four categories.

The bill requires that Department of Defense funding of military aid to South Vietnam end on June 30, 1975, and that any subsequent military assistance to South Vietnam be funded through appropriations for the regular military assistance program.

It also requires that all expenditures relating to support of military missions be charged against the appropriation for military assistance.

Under the bill all "excess defense articles" must be valued at a minimum of one-third acquisition cost and all grants of such articles charged against appropriations for military aid; and

Finally, the bill reveals the basic authority which has permitted Defense Department stocks to be used as a supplemental source of military aid.

The committee believes that enactment of these provisions will have a salutary effect by making the annual military assistance appropriation a more accurate measure of the actual cost to the American taxpayer of military aid during the phaseout period.

I wish to emphasize that the phaseout of the military grant assistance program will, by no means, require a total cessation of all U.S. military assistance activities. The foreign military credit sales program will continue, so that American arms and equipment will be available on favorable credit terms to developing countries after they have carefully analyzed their security needs within the constraints imposed by normal budgetary considerations. Also, grant aid for military training will still continue. And, after the phaseout is completed Congress

can always authorize military grants or concessional credits on a case-by-case basis whenever a country's circumstances warrant such aid, as was done in the case of Israel last year.

INDOCHINA

Now, I turn to the provisions in the bill relating to Indochina. The Foreign Relations Committee has acted to reduce the scope of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to establish guidelines for future U.S. activities and programs in that region.

To place a clear and definite limit on our financial involvement in Indochina, the committee imposed a ceiling for each country on all U.S. obligations for foreign assistance purposes. In addition, the bill establishes a ceiling on U.S. personnel in Vietnam and lowered the current personnel ceiling for Cambodia.

To establish guidelines for future activities, the committee approved statements of policy relating to both military and economic assistance. On the military side, the policy statement calls upon the President and the Secretary of State to take new initiatives to bring about an effective cease-fire throughout Indochina, reduce arms shipments to the area, and conclude a lasting settlement of the issues which have fueled the past quarter century of tragic conflict.

On the economic side, the committee incorporated in the bill specific guidelines designed to promote the effective utilization of any economic aid Congress may provide for the countries of Indochina and authorized aid on a program or project basis. The committee believes that the specific plans and performance criteria called for in the guidelines and specific allocations are essential if U.S. assistance is to be used wisely. These plans and criteria will also provide a basis for future evaluation of the effectiveness of the program approved for this fiscal year.

For South Vietnam, the committee has established a fiscal year 1975 ceiling on obligations of \$1.28 billion. Within this ceiling, the committee has recommended \$420 million for economic assistance, \$160 million for Public Law 480 commodities, the amount programmed by the executive branch; and \$700 million in military assistance, the amount approved by both the Senate and the House in the Department of Defense appropriations bill.

The \$700 million is compared to \$1.45 billion that was requested by the executive branch.

The \$420 million approved by the committee for economic aid to South Vietnam is \$330 million below the administration's request.

For Cambodia, the committee established a ceiling of \$347 million. Within this ceiling, the committee allocated \$70 million for economic assistance; \$200 million for military assistance; and \$77 million for Public Law 480 commodities, the amount programmed by the executive branch. The \$70 million recommended by the committee for economic aid is \$40 million below the administration's request of \$110 million.

In the committee's view, Cambodia has long since ceased to have a national

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economy, and the amount approved is intended simply to sustain Cambodia until a cease-fire can be arranged between the Phnom Penh government and the Khmer insurgents. The reductions in the Cambodian economic request also reflect the elimination of what the committee believes to have been padding in the proposed program.

The committee made a reduction of \$191 million in the request for military aid to Cambodia. The war in Cambodia is more clearly than ever a civil war, one in which the United States is, in significant measure, supplying the forces on both sides. Of the military aid program proposed by the executive branch, some \$300 million would have been used solely for ammunition, allowing continuation of the present extravagant rate of consumption. The committee believes that the \$200 million authorized should be ample for military aid if some measure of discipline is exercised by the government forces, which far outnumber the insurgents. It will serve neither our interests nor those of the local population for the United States to continue to sustain both the wasteful practices of the government forces and the arms needs of the insurgents.

For Laos, the committee established a ceiling of \$100 million for the 1975 fiscal year. Within this ceiling, the committee has recommended \$45 million for economic assistance and \$55 million for military aid, representing reductions of \$11 million and \$30 million, respectively, from the executive branch's requests. U.S. economic aid in Laos is used primarily to support the economy of the capital city, Vientiane. The \$45 million approved should be sufficient to accomplish that objective. On the military side, the committee could find no valid justification for the administration's proposal to provide more military assistance during a year of expected cease-fire than was provided during the past year.

MIDDLE EAST AID

Let me explain briefly the provisions relating to assistance to countries in the Middle East. Administration officials, including Secretary of State Kissinger, have placed great stress on the importance of U.S. foreign assistance in furthering peace in the Middle East. The committee has demonstrated its support of the administration's initiatives in the region by approving all of the amounts requested for assistance in that area. And it has approved additional funds for Israel.

The administration's request was for a total of \$907.5 million in assistance for nations of the Middle East—\$807.5 million in allocations by country and \$100 million for a Middle East special requirements fund.

The proposed allocations by country were as follows: First, Israel—\$50 million in economic aid and \$300 million in military credit sales; second, Egypt—\$250 million in economic aid; and third, Jordan—\$100 million in military grant aid, \$30 million in military credits and \$77.5 million in economic aid. The committee approved these allocations and authorized an additional \$200 million

in economic aid for Israel, which, by the way, was overwhelmingly supported today as an amendment to the continuing resolution.

It also specified that, of the \$300 million in military credit sales to Israel, \$100 million shall be forgiven and, thus, be in the nature of a grant. The committee believes that Israel's serious economic situation justifies this additional assistance. In approving the special requirements fund, part of which may be used for Syria, the committee prohibited use of the fund for military assistance and added a requirement that Congress be notified in advance of significant commitments from the fund.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, in its consideration of the foreign aid bill the Foreign Relations committee was well aware of the serious problems afflicting our economy and of the need for budget austerity. We believe, Mr. President, in recommending this bill to the Senate, the committee has attempted to strike a responsible compromise between the need for continuity in American foreign policy and the pressing need for reductions in the fiscal year 1975 Federal budget, both of which have been stressed by President Ford. The committee believes that S. 3394, as recommended, represents a responsible compromise between those objectives.

I urge that it be approved by the Senate.

Now, Mr. President, let me just emphasize a little bit some of the work I believe went into this. I say this with some personal feelings.

I have given, as one Senator, a great deal of attention to the subject of our economic assistance program, or our foreign assistance program, because I think we need one, but we need one directed toward the appropriate objectives.

The Foreign Relations Committee has reported to the Senate a foreign aid bill for fiscal year 1975 which is prudent in its spending recommendations, constructive in its policy statements and mindful of our humanitarian responsibilities in a world beset by poverty and growing food shortages.

In other words, I say with a sense of confidence that this is a responsible bill and this is a good bill. It deserves strong bipartisan support for the new and responsible principles it enunciates and for the strong policy guidelines it has established for the administration of American economic and military assistance.

As I have noted already, the administration originally requested that the Congress authorize \$3.2 billion for foreign assistance. Such a sum would be excessive in view of our present domestic economic situation. In addition, the very substantial increases in the President's fiscal year 1975 request for military assistance over the previous fiscal year are out of line with the actual needs of the recipient countries and the external threats which they face.

And the very large increases requested for economic and military assistance to Indochina clearly run counter to the de-

sires of Congress and the American people that Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos shoulder a greater share of their own financial burden and that our presence in Southeast Asia be further diminished. Thus, the Foreign Relations Committee decided to make substantial reductions in many of the act's funding categories.

I have already reported, Mr. President, that the committee has reported a bill authorizing \$2.5 billion for foreign military and economic assistance for fiscal 1975. This represents a reduction of 22 percent, or \$724.6 million from the President's original request. These savings were achieved by rather sharp reductions in the following areas:

One hundred million dollars from the program of foreign military credit sales, representing a cut of 18 percent.

Four hundred thirty-five million dollars from the military assistance program, representing a reduction of 44 percent.

And \$389.8 million from the Indochina postwar reconstruction program, representing a cut of 41 percent.

The action taken by the Committee on Foreign Relations is fully consistent with the President's desire that Congress regard no budget as sacrosanct and that it make every effort to cut Government spending in a responsible fashion.

The committee has carefully examined the total foreign assistance budget. We eliminated all of the waste and padding we could find. In addition, we made spending reductions where we believed that they could be sustained without adverse effects on the foreign policy interests of the United States. No one can fault the committee for its generosity to one program or one area of the world.

When additional funds were added to the bill, it was done only after close and careful scrutiny of established need. An example of this is the committee's action to supplement the administration's request for security supporting assistance for Israel by \$200 million. The original request of \$50 million was insufficient in light of the very great burdens on the Israeli economy following the October war and the continued flow of Russian arms into Syria and Iraq.

Mr. President, the Committee on Foreign Relations spent a great deal of time and effort on the sections of this act relating to Indochina. In fact, the committee's actions on the Indochina programs represent new policy departures in the ever-evolving economic and military situation in Southeast Asia. I personally was involved in the committee's work concerning our aid programs in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and would like to discuss the legislation in some detail.

It was clear to many members of the Committee on Foreign Relations when we began to consider the administration's economic assistance request of \$939 million for Indochina and the \$482.2 million military program for Cambodia and Laos that we had an obligation to do more than simply approve or reduce these spending recommendations.

We had an obligation to begin to formulate an American policy for Indochina. We have done this. It is now 21 months following the signing of the Paris

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Peace Agreement. We must wait no longer. In fact, it is almost 22 months.

The administration's aid programs do not constitute an acceptable substitute for American policy for an area of the world where our Nation has sacrificed so much. To be sure, the provision of billions of dollars to Vietnam and Cambodia represents a continued commitment to the preservation of the political and economic status quo in these countries—but little else.

The programs and amounts proposed do not represent a positive or constructive solution to the problems posed by the failure of the Paris agreement to bring peace and a political settlement to Vietnam.

Neither do they represent an acceptable alternative to the never-ending tragedy of Cambodia civil war. And our billions do very little to alleviate directly the widespread human suffering which is compounded daily in Indochina.

Frankly, as I said, we have no policy in Indochina today that looks 6 months into the future, let alone 1 or 2 years down the road. We are adrift. The American people know this, the Congress knows this and certainly Communist insurgents throughout Indochina are keenly aware of this policy vacuum.

But I do not believe that providing billions in foreign assistance constitutes an acceptable American policy in Indochina.

Nor do I believe that funding maximum military confrontation indefinitely is what the American people want our Government to do.

Nor should our billions of assistance be used to perpetuate corruption, oligarchy, and waste in the name of humane relief and reconstruction.

The policy vacuum existing in Indochina is a direct result of the preoccupation of many American foreign policy-makers with urgent problems elsewhere in the world. This is understandable, but it is still a factor.

Congress shares part of this blame. Too often, past congressional actions relating to Indochina have constituted either simple acquiescence to executive branch policies or obstructionism. But we cannot be accused of obstructionism or acquiescence in our handling of the Indochina section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.

We had a choice to make. We could have continued to fund these programs at the high levels recommended by the administration, knowing full well that these funds were not an effective substitute for policies which might bring true peace to Vietnam and Cambodia. This would have been the path of least resistance. We could have continued to ignore gaping loopholes in the law which allowed the executive branch to greatly increase Indochina funding in violation of the intent of the Congress. Instead, we acted with restraint and responsibility in reducing the flow of dollars to Indochina, specifying where the funds should be spent, closing the loopholes and proposing specific economic and political policies to be taken by the President and the Secretary of State, which could lead to the cessation of hostilities and decreasing

amounts of American assistance in the years to come.

Even before we considered the Foreign Assistance Act, the committee agreed to an amendment I had offered to the State Department authorization bill, requiring the administration to develop a detailed plan for future economic and military assistance to Vietnam that would include a specific timetable for the phased reduction of such assistance.

I realize that the administration believes that the restrictions contained in this bill on aid to Indochina amount to unnecessary congressional interference in an area of executive branch jurisdiction. However, I want to remind my colleagues that the Committee on Foreign Relations took this unusual step of depriving AID with broad program flexibility in Vietnam in order to assure that American aid dollars were spent for those who needed them most and on viable economic projects which would result in tangible benefits for the people. In the past, great portions of our funds were used for consumable items related to the war effort, with far too few dollars going for capital investments of a lasting productive nature. While we recognize the severity of our budgetary and program restrictions, they are warranted by continued reports of a lack of adequate planning, waste, and mismanagement of U.S. assistance funds in Vietnam.

It was the committee's judgment that the administration's fiscal year 1975 aid plans for Vietnam offered little from past strategies. Under the title of "reconstruction and development," the Congress was asked to approve large sums of money in order to fill the trade and budgetary gaps of a faltering Vietnamese economy.

I do not doubt that economic solvency is critical to the military capabilities of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. And I am convinced that there can be no real reconstruction and development in a country whose national economy has totally disintegrated.

Unfortunately, reliance on massive foreign exchange grants and crisis management rather than serious economic planning have characterized the thinking of both the Vietnamese and the American officials. Nor has there been any serious American initiative to have the South Vietnamese undertake the type of structural reforms in their economic life which will enable them to achieve greater self-sufficiency and a more equitable distribution of economic benefits to their people.

The American aid program has been superimposed on an economic structure still geared to massive dollar flows of the past and the presence of a large U.S. military establishment. The Vietnamese economy is in a precarious situation today.

The situation in Cambodia is even more alarming, with the near total collapse of the Cambodian economy now taking place as a result of the heavy fighting and the inability of the Lon Nol government to prevent the separation of heavily populated areas such as Phnom Penh from rice growing areas and seaports. The Cambodian capital is undergoing slow economic strangulation

which causes triple digit inflation. It is questionable which will come first—the total economic or military collapse of the Cambodian Government.

The losers in this sorry amalgam of poor planning, waste, corruption, and military conflict are the people of Vietnam and Cambodia—and especially the poor in cities and in rural areas. The refugee populations in both countries face unending economic hardship with the tragedy that those who manage to obtain resettlement may soon become refugees again or remain immersed in abysmal poverty and deprivation.

In light of the very depressing economic situation in Indochina and the failure of our Government to come to grips with the situation, the Committee on Foreign Relations adopted a series of six economic directives which are badly needed to maximize the benefit of our assistance. They are as follows:

First. Organize a consortium to include the multilateral financial institutions to help plan for Indochina reconstruction and development; to coordinate multilateral and bilateral contributions to the area's economic recovery; and to provide continuing advice to the recipient nations on the use of their own and outside resources.

Second. Develop in coordination with the recipient governments, other donors and with multilateral financial institutions a comprehensive plan for Indochina reconstruction and economic development.

Third. Develop country-by-country reconstruction and development plans, including detailed plans for the development of individual economic sectors, that can be used to identify and coordinate specific economic development projects and programs and to direct U.S. resources into areas of maximum benefit.

Fourth. Shift the emphasis of U.S. aid programs from consumption oriented expenditures to economic development.

Fifth. Identify possible structural economic reforms in areas such as taxation, exchange rates, savings mechanisms, internal pricing, income distribution, land tenure, budgetary allocations, and corruption, which should be undertaken if Indochinese economic development is to progress.

Sixth. Include in Indochina economic planning and programing specific performance criteria and standards which will enable the Congress and the executive branch to judge the adequacy of the recipients' efforts and to determine whether, and what amounts of, continued American funding is justified.

I recognize that there is no way to force the President and the Secretary of State to implement these proposals. However, I believe that unless they take action and seriously consider these guidelines, the economic situation in Indochina will further worsen. In addition, Congress will be unwilling to consider another substantial authorization for Indochina in fiscal year 1976 in the face of continuation of past practices and policies.

The economic aid levels we have determined suitable for Indochina will not prove to be an undue hardship for Viet-

nam, Cambodia and Laos. I recognize that our spending recommendations are austere. But austerity is needed to advance economic self-sufficiency and structural economic reform. Without it there is no other way to begin what I am sure will be a painful political and economic process.

We have an obligation—a moral obligation—to help the people of Indochina rebuild their war-torn countries. But somehow we seem to have lost sight of this worthy goal. The process of reconstruction and alleviating human suffering is a long way from our current program which now only postpones through reliance on the generosity of America the hard economic and political choices which the Vietnamese and Cambodians have to make.

The legislation before us provides the administration with a clear and precise way to reorient our foreign economic assistance in Indochina.

At present, beyond the infusion of American capital into the faltering economies of Vietnam and Cambodia, the United States refuses to adopt policies which deal with the two most critical issues in Indochina: The failure of the Paris Agreement to halt the fighting in Vietnam; and the approaching collapse of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia.

After years of war, the struggle continues. After millions of words about the "lessons of Vietnam," we ignore the most important lesson that political battles cannot be resolved by force of arms.

We learned this lesson at great sacrifice to our Nation. Yet our policymakers now are engaged in a course of action which does not recognize this basic reality of Indochina. The United States has embarked upon a course of encouraging the funding of maximum military confrontation, hoping that somehow those we are supporting can prevail.

By dint of unlimited U.S. funds, the Thieu government has managed to hold its own, and the Lon Nol government still manages to exist, though its position is steadily deteriorating.

But what about the future? How can the policy of military confrontation be sustained when it is clear that neither the Congress nor the American public are willing to fund the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia at high levels for the indefinite future?

The Ford administration must open its eyes to the political reality in America and the military reality in Southeast Asia.

The Secretary of State has said that, as a signator of the Paris agreement:

The United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which make the cease fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self determination.

I share Secretary Kissinger's assessment of our obligation and commitment. But I know that we cannot accomplish the goal of achieving a cease-fire through fueling continued military confrontation. And as to the noble cause of Vietnamese self-determination, this can be had only if the fighting stops and a political settlement is allowed to evolve which will reflect the realities of the current Vietnamese scene.

I recognize that a large portion of the blame for the failure to obtain a real cease-fire in South Vietnam rests on the North Vietnamese and those who supply Hanoi with arms and materiel. But 21 months after the cease-fire, the issue now is not who violates the cease-fire, but how we can help bring about a new cease-fire and stop the incessant warfare which has, since January 1973, killed more than 13,500 South Vietnamese and 51 North Vietnamese and Vietcong.

Unfortunately, I have received no indication, either privately or publicly, that the United States is currently engaged in any efforts whatsoever to renegotiate a cease-fire and peace settlement in South Vietnam. Once again, our leaders look mistakenly to the battlefield for a solution which must be found at the conference table.

A policy which amounts only to large doses of military assistance and rhetoric from Washington is doomed to failure. In reality, it is a nonpolicy. It is a fantasy to expect that somehow the Paris Agreement will work without further efforts to make it work. The problem will not go away and no Vietnamese party to the Paris Agreement will abide by its terms unless the United States and other nations are willing to begin intensive diplomatic efforts to scale down the flow of supplies and get the parties to the conference table once again.

As I stated earlier, the military situation in Cambodia is even more precarious than in Vietnam. Americans serving in Cambodia at the highest levels and visitors who come away from the beleaguered capital of Phnom Penh report that it is only a matter of time before the Lon Nol government collapses totally and completely. A continuation of the military struggle in Cambodia is a hopeless exercise in futility. Yet our Government seems unwilling to recognize this fact and fails to use all of its skills and talents to bring to the conference table all the parties to the conflict. We continuously have avoided any official or private contact with the Khmer insurgents as we witnessed the economic, military, and political position of the Lon Nol government disintegrate. It may be too late to reverse the process and avoid a total collapse and overthrow of the government before negotiations can begin.

Aware of these many factors governing the political and military situation in Vietnam and Cambodia, the Foreign Relations Committee has urged President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to undertake certain measures that we believe may bring peace to Indochina. Let me read the five steps voted by the committee:

First. Begin negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China toward a mutually agreed upon and rapid deescalation of military assistance on the part of the three principal suppliers of arms and materiel to all Vietnamese and Cambodian parties engaged in conflict.

Second. Take all necessary measures strongly requesting that the Government of the Khmer Republic enter into negotiations with representatives of the Khmer Government of National Union which will lead to an immediate cease-

fire and political settlement of the conflict. Use all available means to establish contact with the Khmer Government of National Union and to urge them to participate in such negotiation. The United States should urge all Cambodian parties to use the good offices of the United Nations or a respected third country for the purpose of bringing an end to hostilities and reaching a political settlement.

Third. Utilize any public or private forum to negotiate directly with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Republic of Vietnam to seek a new cease-fire in Vietnam and full compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

Fourth. Reconvene the Paris conference to seek full implementation of the provisions of the Agreement of January 27, 1973, on the part of all Vietnamese parties to the conflict.

Fifth. Maintain regular and full consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress and report to the Congress and the nation at regular intervals on the progress toward obtaining a total cessation of hostilities in Indochina and a mutual reduction of military assistance to that area.

The only possible way to stop the fighting in Vietnam and Cambodia, the only way to reduce the large expenditure of American aid dollars which currently support the war efforts, is through the process of political negotiation. This is what the Committee urges and recommends to the President and Secretary of State. We ask for negotiations at many different levels and in many different forums. But the process must begin soon.

It is clear that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are critical of this negotiating process. They are the principal sources of economic and military assistance to North Vietnam.

It makes little difference which outside power or powers give more aid to its Vietnamese client. The issue is how all three aid suppliers can mutually agree to limit their military assistance in a way to stop the fighting. I recognize that this will not be an easy objective to attain. However, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China appear anxious to maintain the improved relations with the United States and the many economic benefits which are derived from détente. It is virtually important to inform these countries most strongly of our belief that their cooperation in bringing peace to Indochina is a critical element in the further normalization of relations with the United States. In this connection, we must also convince them of our readiness to allow the Vietnamese and Cambodian people to work out their own destiny, provided Hanoi's allies will do the same.

If negotiations are to begin and then be successful, they must involve the direct and personal participation of Secretary Kissinger. I do not believe that he has given the situation in Vietnam and Cambodia the personal attention it merits. I say this with full understanding that he has been preoccupied with a very dangerous situation in the Middle East and in the eastern Mediterranean.

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I want to commend him for what he has been able to achieve in other areas of the world where he has invested his time and attention. But he and the Department of State now must turn their attention once again to Indochina. Furthermore, President Ford must involve himself intimately in this process.

Finally, in advance of any negotiations, the United States must make contact with the leadership in Hanoi and the leaders of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam. There is absolutely no reason why the United States should not maintain more regular contact with the North Vietnamese. I call upon the President to take this step. In the Cambodian context, there is little chance for successful negotiations unless our Government makes contact with the Khmer insurgents and Prince Norodom Sihanouk. We are deluding ourselves that a negotiated settlement is possible in Cambodia without early and high level contact with these elements of the Khmer insurgency.

I was personally dismayed that President Ford has chosen the path of opposition to what the Committee on Foreign Relations has done in reference to Indochina.

I hope that opposition has by now moderated.

Mr. President, I am saddened that he has not seized the opportunity to announce a new departure in American policies in Indochina. Instead, he has urged the Congress to increase American economic and military assistance to Vietnam, following the course of his predecessor.

I have supported the administration in the field of foreign policy when I thought it was doing the right thing. That, indeed, has meant that I have supported a good deal of what this administration has wanted in the foreign field area.

But I will not support any amendments offered to restore the aid levels the committee has reduced. This would be fiscally irresponsible and detrimental to the chance of a true political settlement in Cambodia and Vietnam.

It is unfortunate that neither the President nor the Secretary of State has recognized what the Committee on Foreign Relations was trying to do in its treatment of the Indochina portions of the Foreign Assistance Act.

I hope, again, may I say, that we have their support in this bill.

We were saying to Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger that we recognize a serious policy vacuum caused by many factors, and we were ready to make our contribution to the formulation of American policy in Indochina. We were offering to cooperate and to share in the responsibility in ending the nightmare of continued conflict in Indochina. I refuse to sit back and help perpetuate the delusion that massive American military aid some how will end the fighting.

I sat at Lyndon Johnson's side during his years of agony over Vietnam. I supported his policies because I believe they would bring peace to that country and allow its people to determine their own political destiny. But President Johnson's policies did not bring peace to Vietnam.

The policies of Richard Nixon brought about the withdrawal of American troops 4 long years after he took the oath of office. But the fighting still continues and our Nation still is spending billions of dollars in Southeast Asia as yet another President urges the American people to stand firm and support policies which mean only more fighting and destruction in Indochina.

This is not a course which I support. This is not the course the Senate should support as the elected representatives of the people. I urge adoption of the committee's approach to the development of American policy toward Indochina as the only viable path to peace in that troubled part of the world.

Our proposal does not represent a cop-out. It does not represent retreat. It represents responsible planning and organization of our assistance.

Let us seek the path of negotiation once again. Let us stop this official self-delusion which says, "just a little more, and victory will be certain."

Mr. President, I stand here as one who went through 4 years of the kind of self-serving rhetoric, and I supported the policies of that administration. I have paid my price. I heard again and again, "Just a little more and victory will be certain."

Mr. President, we have heard that since 1961—"Just a little more, and victory will be certain."

Let us turn our attention to obtaining political settlements in Indochina, so that we can end the expenditure of billions of dollars in Vietnam and Cambodia while widespread starvation and poverty rage throughout the developing world.

I know this task is not easy, and I am not one to pretend for a moment that it will be accomplished quickly. But it is absolutely essential that we lend every effort toward the diplomatic and political solutions which are the only solutions that we ought to be giving our attention to.

Commonsense, if nothing else, should tell us that our policies need to be rethought and options reevaluated after years of fruitless war.

Mr. President, a little later I am going to be offering an amendment that relates to the Portuguese African territories. It is a policy statement. As a matter of fact, I doubt that there will be any objection to it at all. That amendment merely calls upon the President and the Secretary of State to take actions that will make clear the U.S. support of Portugal's policy of independence for African territories. This amendment is supported, of course, by the responsible officials in our Government.

Mr. President, I shall also offer an amendment that relates, as a statement of policy, to assistance to Africa. It has been my judgment that in our foreign assistance programs we have had no real policy toward Africa. We have had some financial assistance in moderate and indeed modest degree. But we have had no policy.

Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk that is known as the Humphrey-McGee amendment on Portuguese African territories. I will send it to the

desk now, and I am not asking for its immediate consideration because the Senator from Idaho has an amendment which is pending, but I ask to have this amendment printed.

It is a statement of policy on assistance to Africa. We shall take that amendment up tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and printed.

Mr. HUMPHREY. So, Mr. President, I have tried to lay before the Senate, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which recommends this bill to us by a majority of 11 to 5, the arguments for S. 3394. I consider this piece of proposed legislation the most responsible effort that we have made in recent years in the area of foreign economic and military assistance.

I yield the floor.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, as the Senate begins consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1975—S. 3394—one can expect a debate which will be marked by emotional appeals either to reduce drastically the funding levels approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations, or to abandon our foreign assistance programs altogether.

The traditional foes of foreign assistance in the Senate will seize upon our domestic economic difficulties as compelling reason enough to abandon the international community. We will be told that the largess of the United States is already too great. Under this guise of concern for the American taxpayer, we will be asked to cloak ourselves in the indifference of isolationism.

While the Congress of the United States is under considerable fiscal restraints this year, I would hasten to point out that the Committee on Foreign Relations has responded in a meaningful and responsible manner to our domestic concerns. S. 3394 contains an authorization level of \$724.6 million less than the executive branch's request, or a cut of 22 percent. No other authorizing committee in the Senate has cut so deeply into proposed fiscal 1975 programs before floor action than the Committee on Foreign Relations. However, those of us who are members of the committee and who support this bill are fully cognizant that we bring this legislation to the floor after slashing the request to a bare-bones level. Those of us who supported reporting S. 3394 to the floor realize that while this legislation will allow us to pursue an effective foreign policy, further cuts will only undermine our ability to do so.

Thus, it is in this context that I want to address myself to the issue of what the United States is actually doing in the way of foreign assistance, particularly in the area of economic development. I do so as an effort to clarify any misrepresentations of U.S. largess which will most certainly be argued throughout the course of debate of S. 3394.

Since 1949, there has been a distinct downward trend in foreign economic aid programs when seen in relation to total Federal budget outlays and the U.S. gross national product. The figures recently reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on

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official development assistance are somewhat startling when we compare U.S. efforts to those of other free-world industrial nations. For purposes of this debate, Official Development Assistance consists only of grants and loans at concessional terms which are extended to developing nations.

In 1949, when the Marshall plan was implemented, foreign economic development assistance amounted to 11.5 percent of the Federal budget. Today, this share is less than 1.5 percent.

In 1949, economic development assistance represented 2.78 percent of our gross national product, and has moved downward ever since. By 1973, the figure had fallen to 0.23 percent.

The declining trend is also evident when measured in relation to the economic assistance provided by other industrialized nations in the free world.

Of the 17 member nations of the Development Assistance Committee—DAC—the United States ranked second in 1964 in value of economic development assistance expressed as a percentage of gross national product. Since then, the downward drift has been steady. According to OECD figures, our position had dropped to 14th by last year.

In 1963, some 62 percent of the total dollar value of aid from DAC country sources came from the United States. This share has also fallen steadily. In 1973, while the value of U.S. economic aid still exceeded that provided by any one of the other DAC member nations, it represented 32 percent of the total value of DAC assistance.

It is interesting to note what other DAC nations are doing in the way of official development assistance in comparison to the United States. First, despite economic difficulties of much greater magnitude than our own, other DAC nations have restated their determination to make all possible efforts to maintain and enlarge their aid flows to developing countries and to improve the terms of their aid. Other DAC nations have also expressed their determination to extend relief assistance in various forms to the poorer developing countries which have been most seriously affected by the prices of oil and other essential imports and, in channeling their aid, to give priority to countries whose needs are the greatest and most urgent.

It is interesting to note that, in 1973, the poorest nation in Europe, Portugal, contributed more than three times what the United States contributed in official development assistance as a percentage of gross national product. While the U.S. official development assistance in 1973 represented 0.23 percent of our GNP, Portugal's contribution was more than 0.70 percent of their GNP for official development assistance, both bilateral and multilateral.

Other nations which contribute a larger share of their gross national product to official development assistance than the United States include France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, and Japan.

Particularly noteworthy are the following observations by the OECD:

DAC Members as a whole moved away from the 0.7 percent of GNP target which the United Nations has recommended that each donor achieve by 1975. DAC Members have taken various positions with regard to this target. Four of them (the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway) have accepted it without reservation; eight (Australia, Denmark, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) have accepted a date after 1975 and five have not subscribed to it at all.

Eight DAC Members achieved some progress in their aid effort as measured in terms of ODA (Office Development Assistance) to GNP ratio—Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, and Sweden. But a fall in this ratio for some of the major donors (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) outweighed this progress, and the DAC average declined. In particular, the United States, which is the largest donor (32 percent of DAC Members combined ODA in 1973), recorded a fall in its provision of ODA, not only in relation to GNP, but also in absolute value.

Our largess as a nation also pales in comparison to the fact that with only 6 percent of the world's population, the United States consumes 30 percent of the Earth's resources. By virtue of this fact, the less developed nations have every right to expect the United States to do more in providing official development assistance. Yet, we are doing less.

In essence, while our economic development assistance programs are aimed at helping those countries less fortunate than ours, we also have a vital stake in the success of these efforts over the long term. Today, we exist in a very fragile international economic system. A unilateral withdrawal from the world on the part of a major industrialized nation, such as the United States, can only provoke a further deterioration of this system. We would pay heavily for the ensuing chaos as the interdependent nature of the global community has never been more evident than now. The Arab oil boycott of last year and the consequences of a fourfold increase in petroleum prices demonstrates that the United States cannot insulate itself from dependence upon the international community if our own economic viability is to be maintained.

Therefore, if opponents of foreign assistance are serious in their efforts to doom the program, then it is incumbent upon them to explain to the American people and their constituents the consequences of this action. If we withdraw into isolationism, then it should be absolutely clear that we do so fully cognizant of the economic peril we bring upon our people. While our present domestic economic situation is working a hardship on many Americans, will we ask our people to endure much greater suffering as a price for the folly of the U.S. Senate should we reject S. 3394.

Thus, the fate of S. 3394 is directly tied to the question of whether the U.S. Senate can actually function, or is even capable of functioning, as a responsible partner in the foreign policy formulation of this Nation. The price of world stability and peace does not come cheap-

ly. Yet, if we are not willing to pay this price, the inevitable consequences will be much more costly for all of us.

AMENDMENT NO. 1923

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1923, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CEILING

SEC. 34. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount which may be obligated during fiscal year 1975 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, and section 401 of Public Law 89-367 providing military assistance to South Vietnam, may not exceed \$5,000,000,000.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time on this amendment is limited to 40 minutes, equally divided.

Who yields time?

\$5 BILLION CEILING ON FISCAL YEAR 1975
FOREIGN AID

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I believe that most of the Senate recognizes that the aggregate U.S. foreign aid program, which totals in excess of \$8 billion as proposed by the executive branch for fiscal year 1975, bears very little relation to the high-blown claims which are made for it as being a carefully modulated contribution to international peace, order, and justice. To be sure, a certain number of foreign assistance activities can be justified; but for the most part, the U.S. foreign aid program as it is now constituted is best described as the coagulation of old assumptions, outdated policies, bad habits, and bureaucratic inertia. At a time of such serious economic conditions in our own country, Congress simply cannot countenance such a vast and ill-considered expense as has been proposed by the executive branch.

I have therefore introduced an amendment to S. 3394, Mr. President—amendment No. 1923—which will serve the very useful purpose of keeping a lid on foreign aid spending during the current fiscal year. My amendment relates to all foreign aid provided under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act, under which economic grants and loans and military grants are made; the Foreign Military Sales Act, under which military credits are given; Public Law 480, under which grants and loans are made for both economic and military purposes; and, finally, the military aid program in South Vietnam, which is financed this year through the Defense Department appropriations bill. In short, my amendment concerns all U.S. foreign aid, with but two exceptions: the Peace Corps and American contributions to the international financial institutions such as the World Bank. What my amendment does is to place a ceiling of \$5 billion on all foreign aid obligations during fiscal year 1975, with the two exceptions I cited: the Peace Corps and international financial institutions.

Now, how does this \$5 billion ceiling

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relate to the expenditures which would be made without such a ceiling? Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point a table which answers this question quite clearly. Such a table is also available to Senators on their desks.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CHURCH AMENDMENT

Provisions: Places a \$5 billion ceiling on total FY1975 foreign aid obligations (except for the Peace Corps and U.S. contributions to the international financial institutions such as the World Bank).

	Fiscal year 1974 (actual)	Fiscal year 1975 (proposed)	Fiscal year 1975 (as amended thus far by the Senate)
Economic:			
AID	\$1,929	\$2,885	\$2,695
Public Law 480	1,152	996	996
Military:			
Grants	11,678	2,474	1,289
Credit sales	325	553	455
Total	5,084	6,910	5,435

¹ Does not include 2 expenditures of a 1-time nature: emergency aid to Israel and emergency drawdown for Cambodia.

Effect of amendment:

(1) Reduces spending by an additional \$435 million, while allowing the Executive Branch some flexibility in determining where those economies can best be made.

(2) Limits spending to the FY 1974 level (approximately), thereby holding the line against the inflationary spiral.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, not counting the Peace Corps and contributions to the international financial institutions, which are not covered by my ceiling, the foreign aid program proposed by the administration totals \$6.9 billion. From that \$6.9 billion request, the Senate has already made reductions totalling approximately \$1.45 billion. These cuts came in two places: in military aid to Vietnam, which was cut \$750 million in the DOD appropriations bill; and another \$700 million in military and economic aid which has been eliminated thus far from the bill now before us. These reductions, totalling \$1.45 billion, leave the fiscal year 1975 program at a What my amendment will do, in imposing a ceiling of \$5 billion, is to require a further savings of over \$400 million—\$435 million to be exact, level of approximately \$5.45 billion. Where these reductions will be made will be left to the Administration to decide. Allowing the executive branch this discretion, Mr. President, is, I am quick to acknowledge, contrary to my usual inclination. But, in this case, I believe allowing some executive flexibility is justified. With my amendment, what the Senate will have done is to make a total cut of \$1.9 billion—from \$6.9 billion down to \$5 billion—but to specify only \$1.45 million of those cuts. Thus, the administration would be allowed flexibility in determining only where the final \$435 million in savings could best be achieved, out of a total cost of \$1.9 billion. This, I believe, is a reasonable and I think justifiable concession to executive flexibility.

Briefly again, Mr. President, I shall summarize the overall effect of the

amendment. The administration proposed foreign aid programs for fiscal year 1975 totalling \$6.9 billion, not counting the Peace Corps and the international financial institutions. The Senate thus far has made specific cuts of \$1.45 billion. My amendment would require a further reduction of \$435 million, bringing total expenditures down to \$5 billion, but would allow the administration flexibility in determining where that final \$435 million in savings will be achieved.

Mr. President, I should point out that \$5 billion was the level of foreign expenditures actually made during fiscal year 1974. Thus, this amendment, in addition to saving over \$400 million, would serve to make a clear statement to the American people that the Senate is prepared to take substantive action in the fight against the inflationary spiral—that at least we are prepared to hold the line this year against a further expansion of the foreign aid program.

Unless the amendment is adopted, Mr. President, we will be ratifying a program that is substantially larger than the current level of spending—that is to say, substantially larger than the amount spent on these very programs during fiscal 1974. One would think that, with the economic problems that face this country, with an inflation that is now running out of control, with a President who is asking that the budget be balanced, the very least the Senate might want to do would be to hold the line against extending foreign aid above last year's level of spending.

There is little more that needs to be said, Mr. President. The confused and misguided purpose of much of our vast and largely outdated foreign aid program is now manifest. The sad state of the American economy is clear for everyone to see. The only question which remains is whether Congress, which holds the purse strings of Federal spending, has the will to take corrective action.

I believe that my amendment, by placing a responsible limit on foreign aid expenditures, constitutes such action; and I urge its adoption by the Senate today.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time; but I say to the distinguished manager of the bill that I am prepared to yield back my time, if he is prepared to yield back the remaining time available to him, in order that we might expedite a vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Minnesota yield back his time?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I will take a moment or two in which to state the case.

Mr. CHURCH. In that event, Mr. President, I withhold whatever time may be remaining to me.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, the point I should like to make is that we have sought—and no one has been more vigorous in this than the Senator from Idaho—to get congressional control over these authorizations and appropriations. For example, as I recollect, the Senator from Idaho submitted an amendment last year that gave Congress, in last year's bill, authority to get control over the recycling of funds and not to leave it in the discretion of the executive.

If the amendment proposed by the Senator from Idaho were agreed to, it would result in a \$435 million cut in U.S. bilateral assistance for fiscal year 1975.

I simply have to ask the question: Where does the Senator think that the administration will make those cuts?

They are not going to make any cuts in Indochina, because they already want more. They are not going to make any cuts in military assistance, because we have already cut \$435 million out of military assistance. I think we are going to see the cuts made out of African programs, which are so minimal. We are going to see the cuts made out of the Public Law 480 programs.

I really believe that, no matter what the desire may be of the Senator from Idaho for further reduction, this blanket authority is simply saying to the President or to the Secretary of State or to the AID Administrator, "You go ahead and now decide where you want to take off another \$435 million." It is really turning back everything we have tried to do.

We have set country ceilings in this bill. We have denied transferability in this bill.

For example, we have placed in this bill, under military assistance, that even if there are excess articles taken out of the Department of Defense, they have to be charged to the military assistance program. Up until now, substantial amounts of so-called excess military equipment were shipped here and there at ridiculously low cost to the military aid program. They just declared it excess and said that we really did not need to charge very much for it.

I wish just to state the argument that this amounts to giving up a large share of congressional control over how our bilateral assistance money should be spent. The ceiling that is set is \$435 million lower than the committee recommendations, and it leaves the executive branch to decide where the cuts are going to be made. I think that is the wrong policy, even though the objective may seem desirable to certain Senators.

I believe we have been a responsible committee in cutting as we did. We cut this bill \$724 million; in military assistance grants and credits we cut it \$535 million. We made a 22-percent reduction in assistance overall. We have, I think, demonstrated the kind of fiscal discipline and responsibility that was asked for. No other authorization has come out of any committee of this Congress with a 22-percent reduction, and we have performed that, I believe it ought to stand.

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE CHURCH AMENDMENT RE CEILING ON OBLIGATIONS FOR FOREIGN AID

Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from Idaho would put a ceiling of \$5 billion total obligations for several specified foreign aid activities—AID economic aid programs, the military grant and credit programs, and the Public Law 480 program.

This is the wrong way to go about cutting foreign aid. If the Senate wants to cut the programs covered by the Senator's amendment, it should reduce the amounts in this authorization bill and in the foreign aid and agriculture appropriation bills. Under the approach taken

in the Senator from Idaho's amendment, the Senate would, in effect, pass the buck to the President as to where cuts were to be made. This is not responsible decisionmaking. This is decision avoidance.

For a number of years the Senate has slowly, but surely, taken steps to regain its proper role in the setting of national policy. The Senator from Idaho has often spoken eloquently of the need for the Senate to reassert itself in order to restore a proper balance between Congress and the executive branch. But this amendment goes in the opposite direction. It would say to the President: "We think that no more than \$5 billion should be spent on these programs, but we do not know enough—or care enough—about where the cuts should be made. You do it."

In this bill the committee has taken a number of important steps to take away discretionary power that Congress, in the past, has given to the President over foreign aid matters. The adoption of this amendment would be contrary to the basic thrust of this bill. And, of greater significance, it would be contrary to the spirit of much that we have tried to do to restore the integrity of this body over the last several years.

I, for one, do not believe that we should give the President discretionary authority to nullify decisions that Congress takes in authorizing and appropriating funds for specific foreign aid activities. If Congress decides to appropriate a amount for food assistance, for example, that should not mean "x minus whatever amount the President wants to cut out." If Congress thinks that a foreign aid activity should be supported at a certain appropriation level, then it should stand by that decision. The Senator from Idaho's amendment would give the President the power to pick and choose which programs to fund at some lesser level than the amount Congress authorizes and appropriates.

Under the Senator's amendment the President could, if he chooses, make the supporting assistance or military credit sales programs bear much of the burden of the additional cuts necessary. Senators can appreciate the effect this could have on a country like Israel. We simply do not know what the ramifications would be from the Senator's amendment.

In this bill we are dealing only with authorizations for a portion of the overall foreign aid program. We have made significant cuts. I am confident that the Appropriations Committee will recommend further reductions in programs already authorized—as well as those in this bill. But the way to make further reductions is by offering amendments to reduce the specific authorizations in this bill and specific items in the foreign aid appropriation bill. The pending amendment is not the appropriate way to go about it.

I hope that the amendment will be rejected.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a "Summary of the Impact of a Ceiling Reduction on all foreign aid programs." Reduction on all Foreign Aid Programs."

There being no objection, the summary

was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF A CEILING REDUCTION ON ALL FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS

1. The reduction is totally arbitrary and without reference to the merits of the many and various activities included in the categorization.

2. The Congress has full opportunity to consider the merits of individual appropriation requests. Imposition of a blanket ceiling reduction subsequent to Congressional review of these programs obscures the merits of each and undercuts original Congressional intent.

3. The reduction applies to an "apples and oranges" categorization of programs cutting across separate authorization bills, program purposes and organizational jurisdictions. It would, therefore, be exceedingly difficult to administer in a rational manner.

4. In the context of deep reductions already taken in individual appropriation requests, the additional \$435 million cut would fall most heavily on:

Development assistance to small farmers and the rural poor in countries facing major food shortages and possible famine;

Research on improving agricultural production, including efforts to improve the effectiveness of fertilizer, seeds and pesticides and thereby cope with the world food crisis;

Humanitarian assistance to the Sahelian nations in their struggle against drought, famine and the degradation of their fragile environment;

Assistance to poor countries in their efforts to deal with the critical problem of unconstrained population growth and to provide them with the basic family planning services;

Assistance to U.S. and overseas private and voluntary organizations designed to engage these institutions in the development process and tap their considerable skills and experience;

Food contributions under PL 480 to private and voluntary organizations for overseas distribution to needy children and to young nursing mothers;

Food assistance to such countries as Bangladesh, the Sahelian nations and Pakistan to help them deal with short run shortages, crop failures and possible starvation;

U.S. contributions to multilateral and international organizations—the UNDP, the IFTs, the UN Fund for Population, the Organization for American States—which would seriously affect their capacity to continue critically important development assistance programs;

Probable reductions in: overseas Peace Corps activities, U.S. narcotics programs designed to curb illegal trafficking in narcotics, the capability of the U.S. to respond to natural disasters (the Honduran floods, Cyprus, floods in Bangladesh).

Mr. AIKEN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I wish to say that the committee spent about 5 months with this bill, from the time of its introduction in April. I think we did a pretty good job on it. I did not agree with everything that was done, but I realized that it must come to the floor, and also go to conference later.

As the Senator from Minnesota has said, we reduced the total amount by 22 percent. If we accept the amendment offered by the Senator from Idaho, that will make about a 30-percent reduction, which I believe is too much for 1 year. The 22-percent reduction the committee arrived at is very substantial. I hope that we do not reduce Public Law 480, and I

hope that the Senator from Idaho does not intend to do that, because that plants a seed for over \$20 billion in exports of food commodities from this country to other countries.

I think that we had better take what the committee recommends at this time.

I know that other countries, particularly in the Middle East, are undertaking to grow more of their own food. I think that is true also of southeast Asia. We should help them do that, because they will live better, and, as they live better, perhaps they will like us better.

I shall not go along with the amendment offered by my friend from Idaho at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it seems to me, I might say to my colleague managing the bill, that the real problem with this amendment is that it is premature and aborts the work of the Senate. We are taking great pride in the fact that we are now running the show more and more—a budget committee, a war powers resolution, much greater attention to detail, the President's papers, Watergate, and many other things.

Here we are asked to make a meat-axe cut without any regard to our determining the priorities. Every Member of the Senate will be able to vote as he wishes on any amendment for any particular item, whatever it may be. But simply to cut right off the top and then turn it over to the Executive is going exactly the other way from what we want to do.

There is no reason in the world why, if Members wish to make this \$5 billion or \$4.8 billion or \$4 billion, they cannot do it. They can do it and they should do it if that is the will of the Senate. But it ought to be done with a scalpel and not a meat-axe or a cutlass. That is what this is all about.

I believe every one of us is under the gun on the economy, but people have sent us here to use our heads, not blindly to vote on everything that anybody says is economy. I ask my colleague, is it not a fact that this is really a test of this program? If we believe that the United States has no interest in its own security, in equating foreign aid with any other expenditure in the budget, then vote against the whole thing. Throw it out in the ashcan. We should not do it.

If we do vote for it because a certain portion of our substance needs, in our own interest, to go in this direction, then we should do it prudently, not in advance and not without ourselves taking responsibility for what we want to cut.

Those are the reasons, Mr. President, that I shall personally vote against the amendment. I think it should be rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in response to my good friends and colleagues on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I take no issue with the proposition that the committee and

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the Senate, as a whole, should exercise as much control over the foreign aid program as is feasible. We have done this in the bill that the committee has reported out on the floor, which we are presently debating.

However, I point out that if this amendment were adopted, the total cut in foreign aid expenditures from the level requested by the administration, \$6.9 billion, would be \$1.9 billion. All but 20 percent of that cut is mandated by the Congress. Only the last 20 percent would be left open to the President, giving him the flexibility to make the savings where the State Department feels, and the AID Agency and the other Government departments concerned with these programs feel would be best. I do not think we are abandoning the principle of congressional control at all in passing this amendment.

I have observed in my years in the Senate that whenever one is opposed to an amendment, it is a meat-ax amendment. Whenever one is in favor of it, it is a scalpel.

I do not know whether these phrases are really helpful. The object of this amendment is simply to hold the line on foreign expenditures. It is simply to prevent a further expansion of the program above last year's level of spending. I think that is highly responsible, in view of the state of the American economy and our need to effect an end to the deficit spending, which all economists agree is adding further fuel to a very serious inflation.

That is my purpose in offering this amendment, and I would hope that the Senate would support the amendment, and thus, if it is not prepared to cut back on foreign aid spending this year, at least broadcast the message to the American people that it is prepared to hold the line against further increases in foreign aid above the level of spending in fiscal year 1974—a very modest objective, Mr. President, eminently reasonable considering the present state of the American economy.

I, therefore, urge the Senate to approve the amendment.

Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, unless there are others who wish to speak, I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, do we have any time limitation on the call of the roll?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. No; 15 minutes.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. METZENBAUM). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH). On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from

Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are necessarily absent.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. ELLMON), the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is absent on official business.

The result was announced—yeas 62, nays 21, as follows:

[No. 440 Reg.]

YEAS—62

Abourezk	Gravel	Muskie
Allen	Gurney	Nelson
Bartlett	Hansen	Nunn
Beall	Hartke	Pastore
Bentsen	Haskell	Pearson
Bible	Hatfield	Pell
Biden	Helms	Proxmire
Burdick	Hollings	Randolph
Byrd,	Huddleston	Ribicoff
Harry F., Jr.	Hughes	Robt.
Byrd, Robert C.	Jackson	Schweiker
Cannon	Johnston	Scott.
Chiles	Long	William L.
Church	Magnuson	Stafford
Clark	Mansfield	Stennis
Cranston	McClellan	Stevens.
Curtis	McClure	Symington
Dole	McGovern	Thurmond
Domenici	McIntyre	Turney
Eagleton	Metcalf	Weicker
Fannin	Metzenbaum	
Goldwater	Montoya	

NAYS—21

Aiken	Hart	Mondale
Brooke	Hathaway	Scott, Hugh
Case	Hruska	Stevens
Cotton	Humphrey	Taft
Eastland	Javits	Tower
Fong	Kennedy	Williams
Griffin	McGee	Young

NOT VOTING—17

Baker	Cook	Moss
Bayh	Dominick	Packwood
Bellmon	Ervin	Percy
Bennett	Fulbright	Sparkman
Brock	Inouye	Talmadge
Buckley	Mathias	

So Mr. CHURCH's amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HATHAWAY. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

AID FOR INDOCHINA IN THE FOREIGN AID BILL

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, of particular interest in this year's AID bill are the provisions on economic assistance to the countries of Indochina. The action taken by the Foreign Relations Committee represents, I believe, a major change in the congressional approach to foreign aid—and it deserves, I believe, a careful hearing by the full Senate.

The committee has taken a number of significant steps. First, the committee made major reductions in the level of dollar aid to both Cambodia and Vietnam, and a lesser cut in our aid to Laos. In making these reductions the committee for the first time set ceilings on how much can be spent in any of these coun-

tries. In the past, money from a variety of programs was ploughed into both Vietnam and Cambodia, sometimes without the approval of Congress. The result was that our economic and military expenditures in this area of the world ran into the billions of dollars a year.

The most severe funding cut in this year's bill is for Cambodia, both for military and economic aid. It is the committee's view that it is pointless to contemplate spending huge amounts of money with little prospect that the Phnom Penh government can survive in the long run. Instead the committee hopes, by cutting funds, to stimulate a negotiated end to the warfare there. In the meantime the committee supported further humanitarian aid and wants to encourage humanitarian relief agencies to continue their work.

For Vietnam the administration requested economic aid in the amount of \$750 million. The U.S. Agency for International Development contended that this dollar level would help in the redevelopment of Vietnam. The committee agrees that a good program is needed, but it reduced the request from \$750 million to \$420 million in economic assistance.

Of more far reaching significance, I believe, is an amendment I proposed that was approved by the committee. In the past the Congress has been asked to vote funds for foreign aid with only the sketchiest idea of how these funds would actually be spent. While AID and the State Department provided some justification for their requests, it was impossible to tell from the categories presented to the Congress exactly what the United States was doing and why. Much of our aid, quite frankly, was used to prop up client governments without much thought of what those governments did with the money we gave them.

It was clear to me that such an approach made no sense at all.

At my direction my staff and the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee spent many weeks trying to untangle our Indochina AID program and look for ways to make it a sound program that will accomplish the goals AID proposed for it. The result was the committee agreed to four general programs for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and approved a number of subprograms which, under the committee's bill, will be carefully audited by Congress to insure the programs are really carried out.

Let me tell you a little about the programs approved under my amendment. The chief programs are humanitarian assistance, agricultural assistance and industrial development aid. The main thrust of the humanitarian assistance program is to resettle war refugees on reasonably good farmland that will enable them to be self-supporting. Where possible, the program emphasizes the return of families to their own home villages. This program also provides for child care services and health care. The agricultural assistance program is designed to make Vietnam, once the rice-bowl of Southeast Asia, self-sufficient in rice and other food commodities in the shortest possible time. And the industrial development program is designed to help the country begin to produce goods which can be sold for foreign exchange, thus

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helping to make the economy of South Vietnam more viable and less reliant on outside aid.

If properly administered and vigilantly watched by Congress, I think these programs have a fair chance of paying off. And if they fail, then there is not much point to continuing to give economic assistance to Vietnam or to Indochina generally.

Americans are a generous people but the time has come, I believe, when they quite rightly want to know how their money is being spent abroad—they want and deserve an accounting so they can determine where we stand. On the success of our effort to build these features into the AID bill this year rides, I believe, the future of the foreign aid program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt on assistance for Indochina from the Foreign Relations Committee report on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXCERPT

Section 20. Statement of policy—Indochina

Section 20, initiated by Senator Humphrey, is a statement of policy by Congress relative to the situation in Indochina.

Congress finds that the cease-fire promulgated in the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam has not been observed by any Vietnamese party to the conflict. Hostilities of an offensive and defensive nature still continue in South Vietnam. In Cambodia, the conflict between insurgent forces and the Lon Nol government has intensified resulting in widespread human suffering and the near total collapse of the Cambodian national economy.

The Congress further finds that continuation of the military struggles in South Vietnam and Cambodia is not in the interest of the parties directly engaged in the conflicts, the people of Indochina or world peace. In order to lessen the human suffering in Indochina and to bring about a true peace there, the Congress hereby urges and requests the President and the Secretary of State to undertake immediately the following measures:

(1) Begin negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China towards a mutually agreed upon and rapid de-escalation of military as-

sistance on the part of the three principal suppliers of arms and material to all Vietnamese and Cambodian parties engaged in conflict.

(2) Take all necessary measures strongly requesting that the government of the Khmer Republic enter into negotiations with representatives of the Khmer Government of National Union which will lead to an immediate cease-fire and political settlement of the conflict. Use all available means to establish contact with the Khmer Government of National Union and to urge them to participate in such negotiation. The United States should urge all Cambodian parties to use the good offices of the United Nations or a respected third party for the purpose of bringing an end to hostilities and reaching a political settlement.

(3) Utilize any public or private forum to negotiate directly with representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Republic of Vietnam to seek a new cease-fire in Vietnam and full compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

(4) Reconvene the Paris Conference to seek full implementation of the provisions of the Agreement of January 27, 1973 on the part of all Vietnamese parties to the conflict.

(5) Maintain regular and full consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress and report to the Congress and the Nation at regular intervals on the progress toward obtaining a total cessation of hostilities in Indochina and a mutual reduction of military assistance to that area.

Section 21. Statement of principles to govern U.S. economic aid to Indochina

Section 21, initiated by Senator Humphrey, is a policy statement by Congress concerning the principles which should guide U.S. economic assistance programs to Indochina.

Congress finds that after expending over a billion dollars in funds for economic purposes in Indochina last year, and vast amounts in previous years, that little in lasting economic benefit remains. A large proportion of the funds expended has been used for consumable items related to the war effort. Very little of our money has found its way into capital investments of lasting productive benefit to the people.

Congress calls upon the President and Secretary of State to take immediately the following actions designed to maximize the benefit of United States economic assistance.

(1) Organize a consortium to include the multilateral financial institutions to help

plan for Indochina reconstruction and development; to coordinate multilateral and bilateral contributions to the area's economic recovery; and to provide continuing advice to the recipient nations on the use of their own and outside resources.

(2) Develop in coordination with the recipient governments, other donors and the multilateral financial institutions a comprehensive plan for Indochina reconstruction and economic development.

(3) Develop country-by-country reconstruction and development plans, including detailed plans for the development of individual economic sectors, that can be used to identify and coordinate specific economic development projects and programs and to direct U.S. resources into areas of maximum benefit.

(4) Shift the emphasis of United States aid programs from consumption oriented expenditures to economic development.

(5) Identify possible structural economic reforms in areas such as taxation, exchange rates, savings mechanisms, internal pricing, income distribution, land tenure, budgetary allocations, and corruption, which should be undertaken if Indochinese economic development is to progress.

(6) Include in Indochina economic planning and programming specific performance criteria and standards which will enable the Congress and the Executive Branch to judge the adequacy of the recipients' efforts and to determine whether, and what amounts of, continued American funding is justified.

None of the foregoing is meant to imply continuation of American financial commitment beyond the authorization provided for in this legislation.

Section 22. Authorization of economic assistance for South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos

Section 22 amends section 802 of the Foreign Assistance Act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1975 to provide economic assistance, other than Public Law 480 assistance, to Indochina. The Committee recommends an authorization of \$550,000,000 for fiscal year 1975, a reduction of \$389,800,000 from the Executive Branch request of \$939,800,000. This is an increase of \$46,000,000 above the authorization for fiscal year 1974. \$448,000,000 was appropriated for this purpose in fiscal 1974.

The table below compares the Committee's recommendations with the Executive Branch request and the program for fiscal year 1974:

INDOCHINA ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Program	Fiscal year 1974	Executive branch request, fiscal year 1975	Committee recommendation, fiscal year 1975	Reduction in executive branch request
South Vietnam	\$399,000,000	\$750,000,000	\$420,000,000	—\$330,000,000
Cambodia	95,000,000	110,000,000	70,000,000	—40,000,000
Laos	40,000,000	55,200,000	45,000,000	—10,200,000
Regional programs	2,000,000	9,400,000	3,750,000	—5,650,000
AID support costs ²	13,000,000	18,700,000	11,250,000	—7,450,000
Total	549,000,000	\$943,300,000	550,000,000	—393,300,000

¹ Includes a \$50,000,000 development loan.

² The pro rata share of AID's worldwide technical and administrative activities which support the Indochina program. Separate in-country AID support costs are included in the country amounts.

³ Includes \$3,500,000 in reimbursement and recoveries.

Section 23. Assistance to South Vietnamese children

This section insures that \$10,000,000 will be available for assistance to child care programs in South Vietnam in fiscal year 1975, a \$5,000,000 increase in the earmarking for that purpose from the fiscal year 1974 requirement. Funds for the child care program can be derived from a combination of funds made available through the authorization in this bill and local currencies. The Committee has approved a specific line item of

\$8,200,000 for child care programs. Thus, an additional \$1,800,000 must be made available in local currencies.

One of the most tragic results of the Indochina war is the plight of millions of disadvantaged children left in its wake. The orphaned, the maimed, and the homeless are continuing victims of the violence in Indochina.

The Committee has noted the affirmative response of AID to the Congressional mandate of last year.

Section 24. Limitations with respect to South Vietnam

Section 24 contains limitations relative to South Vietnam which will be added as a new section 806 to the Foreign Assistance Act.

The new subsection (a) of 806 establishes a ceiling of \$1,280,000,000 on amounts that may be obligated in fiscal year 1975 for the purpose of providing economic or military assistance to South Vietnam. Under that ceiling up to \$700,000,000 can be for military assistance, \$160,000,000 for Public Law 480

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commodity assistance, and \$420,000,000 for economic assistance as specified in the bill.

COMPARATIVE DATA ON THE CEILINGS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

(In millions of dollars)

	Estimate, fiscal year 1974	Executive branch proposal, fiscal year 1975	Committee recommendation for fiscal year 1975
South Vietnam:			
1. Military assistance (MASF) ¹	864.5	1,485.0	700.0
2. General economic assistance (IFR)	2349.0	750.0	420.0
3. AID loan	50.0		
4. Public Law 480	304.7	160.6	160.0
Total, South Vietnam	1,568.2	2,395.6	1,280.0

¹ New obligational authority and excess defense articles.
² Includes supplemental appropriation of \$49,000,000.

Similar ceilings have been enacted in the past for Laos and Cambodia. They were generally effective in both instances. Whereas actual U.S. expenditures in Laos had consistently been almost twice what had been previously reported to Congress before the ceiling was imposed. Thereafter spending stayed substantially within the limits prescribed. The ceiling was effective in Cambodia but it was allowed to lapse in fiscal year 1974. The Executive Branch subsequently grossly exceeded the overall amounts projected at the beginning of the year for all categories of aid to Cambodia. Public Law 480 deliveries escalated, for example, from a \$30 million projection to \$194 million. For military assistance, the Administration originally requested \$187,200,000. A total of \$399,300,000 was ultimately used for that purpose, including \$250,000,000 in materials taken from Defense Department stocks.

In Vietnam, the accounting under the Military Assistance Service funded (MASF) program is now acknowledged to have been inaccurate over the years. No one really knows how much was spent in Vietnam for military support between 1966 and 1973. When this fact came to light, the Senate Committee on Armed Services acted decisively to correct the many loopholes in the management and accounting for this program. The inclusion of military aid in the ceiling for South Vietnam is intended to complement the actions taken by the House of Representatives and the Senate on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill.

Paragraph (3) of 806(a) provides authorizations by major categories and by program or project under each of these categories. This provision and the specific authorizations for Cambodia and Laos were initiated by Senator Case.

The Committee has approved four major programs for economic assistance to South Vietnam. These are: (A) Humanitarian Assistance; (B) Agricultural Assistance; (C) Industrial Development Aid and (D) Miscellaneous which includes funds for purchase of petroleum and for support of the USAID mission in Vietnam.

Each of these four categories is complete in itself. No transfer of funds between these four general categories is permitted except that petroleum procured in Part D of the authorization may be used for the support of any of the other three major programs. Transfers within any of the subcategories of the four major categories of a reasonable kind of response to changing circumstances are permitted provided timely notice is given to Congress before any transfer is carried forward.

Under an amendment, also initiated by Senator Case, approved by the Committee, funds available for military assistance to Indochina may be transferred for humanitarian

relief and economic development programs within each country, on a country-by-country basis. Transfers cannot be made from one country to another. This discretionary feature of the bill should assist further the development of humanitarian assistance programs the Committee deems crucial for Vietnam.

The most crucial of the programs approved for Vietnam is that for humanitarian relief, for which the Committee has allocated \$95,000,000. The Committee hopes that a concerted effort will be made to prevent the use of United States funds for the support of so-called refugees activities which have direct political or military objectives. One way in which this can be done is to begin to provide more United States support to voluntary and international agencies working in the refugee field. This is largely a local cost program and the Committee seeks to insure that both dollars and the piasters which they generate are used for the intended purpose.

Assistance in agricultural production is the next most valid need in South Vietnam. The Committee has recommended that \$188,000,000 be used for this purpose. The Committee is of the view that AID should move away from placing further emphasis on capital intensive agriculture.

Additional data concerning the Committee's recommendations follows:

I. Humanitarian assistance

Millions

A. AID recommended budget:	
Refugee relief and resettlement	\$86.5
Child care	8.2
Health care	10.3
City to farm program	30.0
Total AID recommendations	135.0

B. Committee authorization:	
Refugee relief and resettlement	68.5
Child care	8.2
Health care	10.3
City to farm program	10.0
Total authorization	95.0

The Committee approved the full requests made for child care and health care. Child care funds should be targeted to help provide immediate necessities such as food stuffs and training supplies. Moreover, every effort should be made to bring child care concepts to foster homes which are in dire need of upgrading. Every effort should also be made to find ways to make child care centers self-sufficient if possible.

Urban squalor, both in Saigon and other urban centers, is a result of years of war. Hundreds of thousands of refugees try to make a living as best they can under the circumstances. While this was possible when large numbers of American soldiers and support personnel were in Vietnam, it is far more difficult today. Soaring inflation and a depressed economy and the continuing war make the urban poor a very real threat to the regime. If it is possible to work out a land acquisition program to relocate many formerly agrarian people, such an effort should be supported. However the prospects for a rapid transfer of poor urban families to the country side seems dim. Consequently, only part of the request for the "City to Farm" program is approved in this recommended budget.

The problem faced by the South Vietnamese government concerning refugees and the urban masses was summarized in this way in a recent report by the Committee staff:

"The refugees and urban unemployed present a real dilemma to the Vietnamese government. If the people remain in the camps and cities, they present a political problems as well as a further welfare burden on an already over-extended national budget. Mov-

ing them to rural areas, as proposed, would shift the economic support burden from the national budget to the people themselves and to the natural resources of the land—presuming land is available. However, the transfer of people out of camps and the cities creates a population control problem by exposing them to contact with the Viet Cong. The compromise between military control and economic survival is the placement of war victims on previously uncultivated land in government controlled or marginally controlled areas. But these new lands require large amounts of capital investment for roads and land clearing to make them accessible and arable. The losers are the war victims themselves who see destined to suffer no matter where they are."

II. Agricultural assistance

A. AID recommended budget:		Millions
Fertilizer, OL, and pesticides	\$185	
Rural credit	60	
Canal dredging	10	
Low lift pumps	4	
Fish farm development	4	
Salt water intrusion	11	
Total AID recommendations	274	

B. Committee authorization:		
Fertilizer, POL, and pesticides	150	
Rural credit	20	
Rural credit	20	
Canal dredging	10	
Low lift pumps	4	
Fish farm development	4	
Total authorization	188	

The Republic of Vietnam has the capacity to become self-sufficient in essential food-stuffs and, even with its increased population, a major exporter of food products and forestry products such as raw and finished lumber. But radical change will be needed for this to come about. A significant problem is the continuation of the war which makes the development of the forestry and rubber industries virtually impossible. The war also diminished the amount of available crop growing land—especially rice areas—and interrupted the food distribution system.

Even in light of these conditions progress has been made in expanding food production, especially rice, through the introduction of hybrid rice plants which require fertilizer and pesticides for growth. The United States should encourage South Vietnam to continue to work toward self-sufficiency in food production.

Less funds than were requested are being made available for the purchase of fertilizer, POL, and insecticides as an inducement to the Government of South Vietnam to work toward converting the currently subsidized agricultural system to self-sufficient system.

III. Industrial development

A. AID recommended budget:		Millions
Commodities for industrial production	\$155.0	
Industrial credit	40.0	
Industrial park	5.0	
Urea plant	80.0	
Export processing zone	5.0	
Highway construction	3.4	
Development planning	.6	
Total AID recommendations	289.0	

B. Committee authorization:		
Commodities for industrial development	85.0	
Industrial credit	10.0	
Development planning	.6	
Total authorization	95.6	

The Committee has made substantial reductions in the industrial development cate-

gory. In the Committee's view, humanitarian and agricultural needs are the most important to the Vietnamese and industrial development is of far less significance when it comes to deciding how to divide the limited funds available.

IV. Miscellaneous

	Millions
Transportation	\$30.0
Support of AID mission	11.4

The last category is assistance to help provide fuel and other commodity support to Vietnam's transportation system and to pay for the costs of AID's administrative and technical activities which are not directly chargeable to a specific project.

Implementation of ceiling

The new subsections (c), (d) and (e) contain further specifics concerning the ceiling imposed on spending for South Vietnam.

New subsection (c) provides that in computing the limitations on obligation authority under subsection (a) with respect to any fiscal year, there shall be included in the computation the value of any goods, supplies, materials, equipment services, personnel or advisers provided to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam in the fiscal year by gift, donation, loan, lease or otherwise. For the purpose of the subsection, "value" means the fair market value of any goods, supplies, materials, or equipment provided to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam but in no case less than 88 1/2 per centum of the amount the United States paid at the time the goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were acquired by the United States.

New subsection (d) provides that no funds may be obligated for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) in, to, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1975, unless the funds have been specifically authorized by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section. In no case shall funds in any amount, in excess of the amount specifically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated for any purpose during the fiscal year.

New subsection (e) states that after the date of enactment of the section, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which the funds are to be used in the fiscal year.

New subsection (f) requires the President to submit to the Congress within thirty days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1974, a written report showing the total amount of funds obligated in, for, or on behalf of South Vietnam during the preceding quarter by the United States Government and specifies that it shall include a general breakdown of the total amount obligated, describing the different purposes for which the funds were obligated and the total amount obligated for each purpose.

New Subsection (g) Limitations on U.S. Personnel in Vietnam.—Subsection (g) establishes ceilings on the number of Americans and enactment of this bill. This ceiling applies to both direct hire and personnel employed by government contractors. Further reductions in the ceilings are to become effective twelve months thereafter. Within the ceiling on American personnel a subceiling is imposed on the number of members of the U.S. armed services and all direct hire and contractor personnel of the Department of Defense. The intent of the Committee is that these limitations shall apply to both permanently authorized and so-called temporary duty personnel.

The ceilings are as follows:

	Overall personnel	DOD	3d country nationals
As of 6 months from enactment	4,000	2,500	800
As of 12 months from enactment	3,000	1,500	500

Of the 5,200 total personnel who were in South Vietnam as of May 1974 some 3,850 were military or DOD; of these approximately 850 were civilian direct hire DOD employees, 2,600 were DOD contractors and 200 were uniformed military (50 attachés and 150 Marine guards). The Committee was informed a year ago that by January 1974, all DOD direct hire personnel and all but 2,000 contractors would be phased out. It was further assured that "very soon thereafter" contractor personnel would number only 500. As indicated, these pledges have not been met. The principal reason for this is that U.S. personnel are continuing to provide substantial direct maintenance and operational support to the Vietnamese armed forces. By this time, the contractors were to have trained South Vietnamese to take over their jobs but this has not occurred. Imposition of these ceilings should stimulate the turnover to the Vietnamese of jobs that are now being performed by U.S. contractors.

The progressively declining ceiling for U.S. supported third country national personnel is also intended to foster South Vietnamese self-sufficiency. Unless the so-called "TCN's" are controlled, departing Americans will simply be replaced with other foreigners. Given the skill and resourcefulness of the South Vietnamese and their long exposure to American training and example, there is no justification for continuing this practice.

New subsection (h) states that nothing in the new section shall be construed as a commitment by the United States to defend South Vietnam.

Section 25. Limitations with respect to Cambodia

Section 25 would add a new section 807 to the Act providing for limitations with respect to Cambodia.

The new subsection (a) would set a ceiling of \$347,000,000 in fiscal year 1975 on obligations for the purpose of providing economic or military assistance to Cambodia. It further specifies categories of assistance within the overall ceiling as follows: military assistance \$200,000,000; Public Law 480 commodity assistance \$77,000,000; and economic assistance \$70,000,000.

COMPARATIVE DATA CONCERNING THE CEILING FOR CAMBODIA

(In millions of dollars)

	Estimate, fiscal year 1974	Executive branch request, fiscal year 1975	Committee recommendation, fiscal year 1975
Cambodia:			
Military assistance ¹	239.3	391.3	200.0
General economic assistance (IPR)	95.0	110.0	70.0
Public Law 480	154.2	77.0	77.0
Total, Cambodia	688.5	578.3	347.0

¹ Includes supply operations and excess defense articles.
² Includes \$250,000,000 in Department of Defense stocks.

The Committee has specified four areas of approved programming for use of the \$70,000,000 in economic assistance recommended for Cambodia. These are humanitarian, commodity imports, multilateral stabilization and technical support. Clearly the most urgent of these is humanitarian relief for

which the Committee has allocated \$20 million. Unfortunately, both the Executive Branch and the Cambodian Government have been slow to respond to the humanitarian needs of the Cambodian people. At present almost all relief work in Cambodia is being carried out by voluntary agencies. The Committee strongly approves of this means of providing relief and will expect the Agency for International Development to provide the maximum possible support to such agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, from the funds authorized. In this connection, the Committee has written into the bill a provision which exempts voluntary agency personnel from the ceilings on American and third-country national personnel.

The Committee has reduced the commodity import authorization for Cambodia from \$71 million to \$31 million. Even the most casual observer in Phnom Penh is keenly aware that, while the mass of the Cambodian population is suffering intensely from the war, Cambodian government officials and businessmen are enjoying an improved standard of living—which can only have come from one source—the U.S. taxpayer. Cambodia is perhaps the outstanding example of the failure of the "trickle-down" on which U.S. aid to Indochina appears to be predicated.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CATEGORIES, CAMBODIA

(In millions of dollars)

	Executive Branch proposal	Committee recommendation
Humanitarian	20.0	20.0
Commodity import	71.0	31.0
Multilateral stabilization	17.5	17.5
Technical support and participant training	1.5	1.5
Total	110.0	70.0

The new subsection (b) prohibits the transfer of economic assistance or Public Law 480 funds for use for military aid purposes and also prohibits transfers within the four categories of economic assistance.

The new subsections (c), (d), (e) and (f) relate to the implementation of this ceiling on obligations for Cambodia requirements identical to those explained in the analysis of the new section 806.

The new subsection (g) reduces the current ceiling on U.S. personnel in Cambodia from 200 to 175 and on U.S. financed third-country national personnel from 85 to 75. It would exempt personnel of voluntary relief agencies in Cambodia from the ceiling. Language is included to make it clear that the ceiling on U.S. personnel includes contract personnel.

The reductions contained in subsection (g) are designed to reduce our official involvement in Cambodia and to begin the process of eliminating Cambodian dependence on the United States. They parallel the Committee's action in reducing the level of U.S. military expenditures in Cambodia. In the event the war is still going on in Cambodia next year the Committee expects to lower the personnel ceilings still further in FY 1976.

While it would appear that the Embassy in Phnom Penh has made an effort—not always successful—to remain within the letter of the personnel restrictions, it is evident that American personnel have become increasingly involved in a vast range of support and advisory efforts, generally not including tactical military advice, designed to compensate for the inadequacy of the Cambodian Government. This expansion of the American role in Cambodia is contrary to the

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ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CATEGORIES, LAOS¹

	Executive branch request	Committee recommendation
1. Humanitarian.....	\$15,300,000	\$12,000,000
2. Reconstruction and development.....	22,400,000	9,900,000
3. Stabilization.....	17,500,000	17,500,000
4. Technical support.....	(6,300,000)	4,600,000
Total.....	48,900,000	44,000,000

intent of the original Congressional personnel restriction. The Committee believes that by limiting the number of Americans in Cambodia the degree of American involvement in Cambodian affairs can be more effectively controlled and, thus limits can be put on Cambodia's dependence upon the U.S. Government. It is now evident that the Committee underestimated the energy and resourcefulness of 200 Executive Branch representatives in Phnom Penh.

While reducing the level of U.S. personnel in Cambodia, particularly the military, the Committee also adopted an amendment offered by Senators Case, Symington, and Humphrey, designed to encourage expansion of private relief activities in Cambodia. At present these are being carried out almost exclusively by American voluntary nonprofit organizations and by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Committee has been informed that these organizations are willing to expand their operations in order to meet the increasing humanitarian needs of the Cambodian people. In order to do so, however, the relief organizations need U.S. funds to support their personnel since they have now reached the limit of their own resources. To date, AID has been unwilling to provide personnel support funds to the relief agencies since, if it did so, the personnel supported would be subject to the personnel ceilings. The Committee questions the appropriateness of the Embassy's decision to give priority in its personnel allocation to military personnel, who now account for 124 of the authorized total of 200, rather than to increasing the number working on relief programs.

The new subsection (h) carries over the provision from subsection 655(g) which states that the section shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to defend Cambodia.

Subsection (b) of section 25 repeals sections 855 and 856 of the Foreign Assistance Act since they will become obsolete upon the enactment of this act.

Section 26. Limitations with respect to Laos

Section 26 will enact a new section 808 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1981 which will establish a ceiling on and specify the distribution of United States assistance to Laos for fiscal year 1975. Subsection (a) of the new section 808 imposes a ceiling of \$100,000,000 on obligations for the purpose of providing military and economic assistance to Laos in fiscal year 1975. Under the ceiling, \$55,000,000 is allowed for military assistance and \$45,000,000 is allowed for economic assistance, which is allocated into four categories. The table below provides comparative data on assistance for Laos.

ASSISTANCE TO LAOS

[In millions of dollars]

	Estimate fiscal year 1974	Executive branch request, fiscal year 1975	Committee recommendation, fiscal year 1975
Laos:			
Military assistance.....	81.0	90.9	55.0
General economic assistance (IPR).....	40.6	55.2	45.0
Public Law 480.....	3.6	.3
Total, Laos.....	125.2	146.4	100.0

¹ New obligational authority and excess defense articles.
² Military assistance service funded.
³ Includes supply operations and excess defense articles.

Four categories of assistance authorized for Laos are: humanitarian; reconstruction and development; stabilization; and technical support. For these categories the Committee recommends the following:

The Committee has not reduced the Lao program in proportion to other Indochina programs. Laos alone among the Indochina states has reached a political settlement and the Lao people deserve encouragement and assistance in making their government work. The amount approved reflects the limit of what they can effectively absorb. It will not be sufficient, however, to sustain Vientiane society in the manner to which it became accustomed in the days of the massive American presence. The reduction made in the Lao program came primarily out of "reconstruction" where AID requested \$11 million to build two dikes, neither of which required any dollar inputs. The AID request for dollars for this purpose appeared to be out an effort to obtain additional free foreign exchange for Laos from the Congress.

United States policy in Laos is designed to facilitate the establishment of peace and national reconciliation. To this end, United States assistance must operate within the terms of the agreements on a cease-fire and a coalition government signed by the Laotian parties in February and September, 1973. Since that latter agreement establishes a Provisional Government of National Union, American aid should be channeled to the extent possible through that government. Also, insofar as is possible, U.S. programs for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and development should be available to all areas of Laos and should be directed wherever the need is greatest and the assistance desired.

The new subsection (b) prohibits transfer of economic assistance funds authorized for Laos for use as military assistance. Military assistance funds may be transferred to and used in the economic assistance categories in accordance with the new section 809. There shall be no transfers of funds between the four economic assistance categories.

The new subsection (c) through (f) relate to implementation of this ceiling for Laos, and are identical to those explained in the analysis of section 805.

The new subsection (g) states that the new section shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to defend Laos.

Section 27. Transfer of Funds

Section 27 adds a new section 809 to the Foreign Assistance Act.

Subsection (a) prohibits use of the transfer authority of section 810 of the Act to add to, or take away from, the funds appropriated for assistance to South Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.

Subsection (b), initiated by Senator Case, provides that any funds made available for military assistance for South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia may be used for war relief, reconstruction, or general economic development purposes.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. KENNEDY Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 12471, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12471) to amend section 522 of the United States Code, known as the Freedom of Information Act, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

(The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 25, 1974, at page H9525.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, as a conferee on this bill, I have seen several significant changes made to the bill which, in my view, makes it a more workable measure. However, I do not believe that these corrections go far enough.

While we were in conference, the President sent a letter to the conferees pointing out his objections to the bill. The provision that appears to concern the executive branch the most is the section of the bill that places the burden of proof upon an agency to satisfy a court that a document because it concerns military or intelligence secrets and diplomatic relations is in fact properly classified. If the court is not convinced that the agency has adequately carried the burden, the document will be disclosed.

Yet, while this bill transfers the authority to declassify documents from the executive branch to the courts, it provides no standards to govern the review of the documents. The judge is given the documents and then is cast upon a sea without any lighthouses or buoys to point out the shoals and rocks to make his decision whether the documents are properly classified.

No standards are created to guide a judge in reviewing the documents. He can release the documents if, in his own view, they are not properly classified, even if the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or any other agency head certifies that the documents are properly classified. This is a provision that is not only distrustful in nature; it is unreasonable.

President Ford, in his letter to the conferees cited these concerns and said: "I simply cannot accept a provision that would risk exposure of our military or intelligence secrets and diplomatic relations because of a judicially perceived failure to satisfy a burden of proof. My great respect for the courts does not prevent me from observing that they do not ordinarily have the background and expertise to gauge the ramifications that a release of a document may have upon our national security. The Constitution commits this responsibility and authority to the President."

Despite these strong words and valid concerns, the majority of the conferees

refused to change the provision vesting a power in the courts to declassify documents classified by a Government agency.

Mr. President, I realize that there are some mistakes in judgment about classification and that there are some abuses of the system. But there are administrative procedures for dealing with these mistakes and abuses. If a citizen wants access to a classified document, he may request declassification under Executive Order 11652. If his request for declassification is refused, he may appeal to the head of the agency. If his request is again refused, he can appeal to the Interagency Classification Review Committee—a committee designed to correct erroneous classifications and in general, be a watchdog over the classification system.

This bill, however, ignores this administrative mechanism and vests in the courts the power to declassify documents and release them to all the world.

The President, in his letter to the conferees, said that he could not accept a provision that would risk exposure of our national defense or foreign relations secrets. I cannot accept such a provision either.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of President Ford's August 20 letter be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, Aug. 20, 1974.

Senator EDWARD KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR TED: I appreciate the time you have given me to study the amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (H.R. 12471) presently before you, so that I could provide you my personal views on this bill.

I share your concerns for improving the Freedom of Information Act and agree that now, after eight years in existence, the time is ripe to reassess this profound and worthwhile legislation. Certainly, no other recent legislation more closely encompasses my objectives for open Government than the philosophy underlying the Freedom of Information Act.

Although many of the provisions that are now before you in Conference will be expensive in their implementation, I believe that most would more effectively assure to the public an open Executive branch. I have always felt that administrative burdens are not by themselves sufficient obstacles to prevent progress in Government, and I will therefore not comment on those aspects of the bill.

There are, however, more significant costs to Government that would be exacted by this bill—not in dollar terms, but relating more fundamentally to the way Government, and the Executive branch in particular, has and must function. In evaluating the costs, I must take care to avoid seriously impairing the Government we all seek to make more open. I am concerned with some of the provisions which are before you as well as some which I understand you may not have considered. I want to share my concerns with you so that we may accommodate our reservations in achieving a common objective.

A provision which appears in the Senate version of the bill but not in the House version requires a court, whenever its decision grants withheld documents to a complainant, to identify the employee responsible for the withholding and to determine whether

the withholding was "without (a) reasonable basis in law" if the complainant so requests. If such a finding is made, the court is required to direct the agency to suspend that employee without pay or to take disciplinary or corrective action against him.

Although I have doubts about the appropriateness of diverting the direction of litigation from the disclosure of information to career-affecting disciplinary hearings about employee conduct, I am most concerned with the inhibiting effect upon the vigorous and effective conduct of official duties that this potential personal liability will have upon employees responsible for the exercise of these judgments. Neither the best interests of Government nor the public would be served by subjecting an employee to this kind of personal liability for the performance of his official duties.

Any potential harm to successful complainants is more appropriately rectified by the award of attorney fees to him. Furthermore, placing in the judiciary the requirement to initially determine the appropriateness of an employee's conduct and to initiate discipline is both unprecedented and unwise. Judgments concerning employee discipline must, in the interests of both fairness and effective personnel management, be made initially by his supervisors and judicial involvement should then follow in the traditional form of review.

There are provisions in both bills which would place the burden of proof upon an agency to satisfy a court that a document classified because it concerns military or intelligence (including intelligence sources and methods) secrets and diplomatic relations is, in fact, properly classified, following an *in camera* inspection of the document by the court.

If the court is not convinced that the agency has adequately carried the burden, the document will be disclosed. I simply cannot accept a provision that would risk exposure of our military or intelligence secrets and diplomatic relations because of a judicially perceived failure to satisfy a burden of proof.

My great respect for the courts does not prevent me from observing that they do not ordinarily have the background and expertise to gauge the ramifications that a release of a document may have upon our national security.

The Constitution commits this responsibility and authority to the President. I understand that the purpose of this provision is to provide a means whereby improperly classified information may be detected and released to the public. This is an objective I can support as long as the means selected do not jeopardize our national security interests. I could accept a provision with an express presumption that the classification was proper and with its *in camera* judicial review only after a review of the evidence did not indicate that the matter had been reasonably classified in the interests of our national security.

Following this review, the court could then disclose the document if it finds the classification to have been arbitrary, capricious, or without a reasonable basis. It must also be clear that this procedure does not usurp my Constitutional responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief. I recognize that this provision is technically not before you in Conference, but the differing provisions of the bills afford, I believe, grounds to accommodate our mutual interests and concerns.

The Senate but not the House version amends the exemption concerning investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. I am concerned with any provision which would reduce our ability to effectively deal with crime. This amendment could have that effect if the sources of information or the information itself are disclosed. These sources and the information by which they

may be identified must be protected in order not to severely hamper our efforts to combat crime.

I am, however, equally concerned that an individual's right to privacy would not be appropriately protected by requiring the disclosure of information contained in an investigatory file about him unless the invasion of individual privacy is clearly unwarranted. Although I intend to take action shortly to address more comprehensively my concerns with encroachments upon individual privacy, I believe now is the time to preclude the Freedom of Information Act from disclosing information harmful to the privacy of individuals. I urge that you strike the words "clearly unwarranted" from this provision.

Finally, while I sympathize with an individual who is effectively precluded from exercising his right under the Freedom of Information Act because of the substantial costs of litigation, I hope that the amendments will make it clear that corporate interests will not be subsidized in their attempts to increase their competitive position by using this Act. I also believe that the time limits for agency action are unnecessarily restrictive in that they fail to recognize several valid examples of where providing flexibility in several specific instances would permit more carefully considered decisions in special cases without compromising the principle of timely implementation of the Act.

Again, I appreciate your cooperation in affording me this time and I am hopeful that the negotiations between our respective staffs which have continued in the interim will be successful.

I have stated publicly and I reiterate here that I intend to go more than halfway to accommodate Congressional concerns. I have followed that commitment in this letter, and I have attempted where I cannot agree with certain provisions to explain my reasons and to offer a constructive alternative. Your acceptance of my suggestions will enable us to move forward with this progressive effort to make Government still more responsive to the People.

Sincerely,

GERALD FORD.

AMENDMENT OF THE NATIONAL BANK ACT, THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT, AND THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate reconsider the vote by which S. 3817, a bill to amend the National Bank Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the National Housing Act, the Small Business Investment Act, and for other purposes, was passed.

Inadvertently when the bill was passed, the last page was left off and the bill passed without opposition. It has been agreed to. It does affect interest rates in three States, Montana, Tennessee and Arkansas, so it is not controversial.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Was this matter cleared with the majority?

Mr. TOWER. This was cleared with the distinguished Senator from Montana who has a personal interest in the matter.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I know he has a very important public interest in that matter.

Mr. TOWER. It has been cleared with the committee.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Would the Senator include in his unanimous-consent request that the bill be returned to second reading, the amendment adopted,