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THE KATANGA

A KEY REGION IN THE EVOLUTION OF AFRICA

I. The Significance of the Katanga

Among all the areas in Africa that have recently achieved or are moving toward independence, the Belgian Congo seems best assured of becoming a self-supporting nation -- primarily because it includes the Katanga. The economic viability of the country, however, would depend upon the continuation of European managerial guidance. Administratively the Katanga is the southernmost province of the Belgian Congo, but geographically it is the beginning of Southern Africa. Located in the approximate geographic center of Africa South of the Sahara, the Katanga has presented several problems to the Belgians. The region is not a truly integrated part of the colony, lacks easy access to the oceans, and has been subject to unsuccessful European separatist influences that have looked to Southern Africa for inspiration.

Instead of being overwhelmed by these difficulties the Belgians have developed their resources to the point where the Katanga alone -- possessing only a fifth of the area of the colony, and a third and an eighth of the European and native populations respectively -- contributes more than one-third of the Belgian Congo's budget. Over the years this contribution has enabled the Belgians to establish in the Congo social services unequalled in other colonial areas of Africa. Much

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remains to be done along the lines of "investing in the people," but any such work would be sharply limited without the wealth of the Katanga.

No colonial power in Africa has ever surrendered a prize comparable to the Katanga. The recoveries of Belgium after World Wars I and II would have been substantially limited had it not been for the wealth of the province. The Belgians are anxious to retain a share of this wealth as long as possible, regardless of the political fate of the province. The USSR and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat, on the other hand, have appeared equally anxious to thwart this Belgian objective. The USSR has denounced the Belgian practice of transferring profits outside the colony; and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Secretariat, in an unsubstantiated statement, implied that the population of the Belgian Congo declined from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000 during the last half century as a result of Belgian exploitation of ivory, rubber, and "the world's richest mines of the Katanga."

The fate of the province is also being closely watched by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Union of South Africa. In their thinking, the implications of a Katanga dominated by Africans are intensified by their feeling that the province is geographically a part of Southern Africa, and that the political boundary between the two would be no barrier to the spread of African nationalism.

II. Mineral and Metallurgical Production

Copper is the most important of the minerals of the Katanga. In noting the importance of copper to Belgium and its colony, the salient

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facts are that the Katanga has been and still is able to produce copper cheaply and has had a ready market during key periods of the past half century. Between 1914 and 1917 the production of copper nearly tripled -- from 10,000 to 27,000 metric tons.* By 1939, production had risen to over 135,582 tons a year. From 1939 to 1945 the Katanga produced 1,082,105 tons as against a total of 1,841,898 tons in the 29 preceding years. From 1946 to 1954 -- covering the postwar recovery era, the Korean War, and the start of the Cold War -- the Katanga's production of copper amounted to 1,603,174 tons, or over half a million tons more than was produced during World War II.

A wide variety of factors influenced copper production between 1948 and 1957 (see table). The low production of copper in 1948-49 for example, was caused by a shortage of hydroelectric power that, in turn, was the result of abnormally low rainfall; the marked increase in copper production in 1950 was directly related to increased exploitation of the Ruwe deposit, located some 8 miles northeast of Kolwezi (see Map 27714). The rise in copper production since 1951 is explained by: (1) the opening of the Bia Hydroelectric Plant; (2) the substantially increased production of the Prince Leopold Mine; (3) the use of sulfide concentrates from Kolwezi to supply the Lubumbashi Smelter, where the installation of a second converter raised output to a record figure; and (4) the introduction of modern equipment and transportation facilities.

* All tonnage figures in this paper are given in metric tons.

Principal Mineral and Metallurgical Production in the Katanga: 1947-57 a/
(in metric tons)

Year	Copper (metal)	Cobalt b/ (metal)	Tin (refined)	Coal	Limestone	Cement	Zinc (electrolytic)
1948	155,515	4,627 c/	3,873	117,333	175,375	56,192	0
1949	141,399		3,299	152,370	218,189	84,900	0
1950	175,920		3,382	159,967	184,766	104,060	0
1951	191,959		3,059	219,000	357,902	98,887	0
1952	205,749	6,831	2,809	252,885	463,063	126,370	0
1953	214,116	8,278	3,375	315,198	486,107	121,600	7,200
1954	223,791	8,609	2,498	378,790	492,166	200,844	32,000
1955	235,106	8,566	2,817	479,850	617,228	227,085	33,968
1956	250,380	9,089	2,815	419,499	749,742	257,644	42,084
1957	240,662	8,115 d/	2,434	432,863	755,839	243,879	49,194

- a. Unless otherwise noted the source is Rapports et Bilans de l'exercice 1957, Comité Spécial Du Katanga, p. 35.
b. U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbook, 1956, Vol. I, Metals and Minerals (Except Fuels), Washington, 1958, p. 388. (Figures given converted to metric tons).
c. 1947-51 average.
d. U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbook, 1957, Vol. I, Metals and Minerals, preprint of chapter on "Cobalt," Washington, 1958. (Figure converted to metric tons).

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The extent to which the mineral wealth of the Katanga has been exploited also suggests that here, at least, an "industrial Africa" has begun to impose itself upon a "bush Africa." Of the many minerals of the Katanga other than copper, cobalt is most important. During the 1948-57 period the output of cobalt made the Katanga by far the world's major source of cobalt and the supplier of approximately two-thirds of the world's total production. Recent developments indicate that the chief mining company, Union Minière du Haut Katanga, is headed toward producing not only the highest grade commercial cobalt metal in the world, but also the cheapest. Anxious to increase cobalt consumption and possessed of adequate reserves for a great many years, the Union Minière recently reduced the price of cobalt significantly.

The Katanga also possesses the chief coalfields of the Belgian Congo. In a decade, production has more than tripled as a result of demands made by the local railways and the cement and metallurgical industries. The increasing electrification of railroads may limit coal production. The coal has a high sulphur content, catches fire easily in the open air, and is therefore difficult to stock or to haul over long distances. Current Belgian research is being conducted on the possibility of utilizing coal as the basis of a synthetic liquid fuels industry.

Production of other minerals depends on a wide variety of factors. Silver and gold are found in limited quantities and are associated with the copper deposits. The working of new gold deposits

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is dependent upon more hydroelectric power, the increase of which has thus far saved gold mining in the Katanga. The future for the production of tin is bleak. Relatively low prices, quotas on exports, and increasing costs have retarded the development of the industry. When these factors are considered in conjunction with the particularly unfavorable mine location, which necessitates a large number of transshipments, it is apparent why Katanga tin is mined at a loss and production is declining. Zinc production, on the other hand, has been increasing. In 1958, the imposition of zinc import quotas by the United States and the methods used to arrive at these quotas produced highly unfavorable Belgian reactions. The Katanga produces a major share of the Belgian zinc supply, and the United States action is claimed by the Belgians to cost them as much as \$10,000,000 annually. Germanium, though present in only small quantities, is significant because of its applications in the electronics and chemical industries. Uranium production continues to be relatively small. The manganese output continues at a relatively high level. Ample reserves of high-grade ore and a modern plant (already amortized) make this one of the most economically sound mining operations in the Belgian Congo.

III. Hydroelectric Resources and Development

The exploitation of mineral resources was and still is the major stimulant for the development of hydroelectric power in the Katanga. Today, the province has the largest hydroelectric powerplants in

Central Africa, together with well over one-half of the high-tension lines in the Belgian Congo. Other regions in the Belgian Congo, however, have many times the hydroelectric power potential of the Katanga. In fact, it is these other regions of the Belgian Congo that give the colony about one-fifth of the world's resources of dry-stage hydroelectric potential, or a little less than one-half that of the entire African Continent. The Katanga, however, is the major industrial stimulus for large-scale hydroelectric development. In the decade 1948-57 the Katanga nearly quadrupled its production of hydroelectric energy -- from 525,824,030 to 2,011,775,796 kilowatt hours. Although the Katanga in years of low rainfall uses thermal power to supplement hydroelectric power, the trend is overwhelmingly in favor of hydroelectric power. Thus, the production of hydroelectric energy in 1957 was about 140 times that of thermal energy.

Four installations (centrales) in 1956 produced 1,292,940,500 kilowatt hours, or over 90 percent of the total hydroelectric output of the Katanga. These installations are: Centrale Franqui and Centrale Bia on the Lufira River, and Centrale Delcommune and Centrale Le Marinel on the Lualaba River (see Map 27714). These installations are located within the mineral-producing area. The Le Marinel plant, with a potential totaling more than that of the other three installations combined, sends power as far as Kitwe in the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia. This will continue to be of great importance to the Rhodesian Copperbelt until the Kariba Dam is completed.

The major power consumer is the mineral industry, principally Union Minière du Haut Katanga, which also is the major producer. Other major local consumers are the Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (B.C.K.) and the cities of Elisabethville, Jadotville, and Kolwezi. Electrified sections of the railroad consumed some 30,000,000 kilowatt hours during 1956. In 1958 the B.C.K. completed the electrification of an additional 103 kilometers, making a total of 445 kilometers of electrified railway in the Katanga. During 1959, 81 more kilometers of electrified line will be added.

The major external consumer, the Rhodesian Copperbelt, stabilized its demand at 53,000 kilowatts in 1956. When the Rhodesian Copperbelt can be supplied by its own internal source, the Kariba Dam, the power now exported from the Katanga will be available for the increased urban demand resulting from an anticipated rise in the African standard of living. Indications thus far suggest that the Katanga will have power enough to supply such increased needs during the foreseeable future.

IV. Agriculture

In contrast to the mineral resources of the Katanga, its agricultural resources are poor -- the result of a long dry season, poor soils, a natural vegetation deficient in nutritive value, and, to a much lesser extent, terrain. Except for the major river valleys, that part of the province lying south of 08°S has an elevation of more than 3,200 feet; but the land to the north is lower and permits more adaptation to tropical agriculture.

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The soils of most of the Katanga are clayey silt, but large areas of sandy soil are found (1) along the frontier with Angola, (2) in the highlands north of Sandoa, and (3) in an interrupted north-south zone 60 miles wide that stretches from Mato (08°02'S-24°55'E) to the Rhodesian frontier (see Map 27714).

North of the Dilolo-Mitwaba axis the country is grassland, but to the south the vegetation consists largely of tall brush interspersed with grassland. Large areas both to the north and to the south of this axis are burned over periodically by the Africans to rid the countryside of pests and to encourage fresh growth of grass. In large measure, this burning contributes to the haunting uniformity of desolate landscape common to so many parts of the Katanga.

Temperatures are remarkably uniform throughout the year in the north, but vary noticeably in the higher south. Daily maxima are usually in the high 80's at Kongola (elevation 3,000 feet) and minima are near 70°F. Elisabethville at 4,500 feet has maxima in the 80's nearly all year, but minima range from the low 40's in winter (July) to the low 60's in summer (January). Europeans find this seasonal variation pleasant and healthful.

Rainfall is sharply seasonal. The long dry season occurs in the winter and lasts about 5 months at Kongola and 7 at Elisabethville, although both towns receive about 48 inches of rain per year.

Although many climatic factors are important in determining what crops can be raised in the Katanga, the length of the dry

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season appears to be the most important. All of the Katanga has a dry season of 160 or more days. The panhandle southeast of Elisabethville has a dry season of 180 days per year. Because the dry days are concentrated in a single dry season instead of being spread out over the year, the effects are pronounced. By the end of the dry season hunger among the natives is traditionally acute throughout the Katanga.

The Africans have made partial adjustments to climatic conditions. For many years prior to 1885; they raised maize almost exclusively; but, in that year, manioc was introduced by one of the important chiefs of the Baluba Empire, which included the Katanga. The people themselves became known as the Bena Kalundwe or "manioc people." Manioc was well received because it could be harvested late in the dry season, when hunger was most acute. In addition to its ability to resist drought, manioc gives fair yields on depleted soils and has a high calorie yield per acre.

The chief crops that supplement manioc are maize, millet, and sorghum. Maize is easy to cultivate and, like the millets and sorghums, does fairly well even when grown under primitive conditions. At present, maize is raised chiefly in the western part of the Katanga, whereas the millets and sorghums are raised in the eastern part. Maize has one great disadvantage -- it is particularly difficult to store because of its susceptibility to insect and rodent damage.

Storage is also a problem for potato growers, since the climate of Katanga is not cold enough for natural storage after harvest.

Yams have the added disadvantage of being relatively demanding in their soil requirements. If storage problems can be overcome, it would be cheaper to grow potatoes in the Katanga than to import them, as is now the case. The amount grown would not have to be great at present since they are primarily a European food, and Europeans are relatively few in comparison with the number of Africans. If a successful method of storing potatoes can be devised, their use will undoubtedly increase.

The Katanga is a food-deficit area primarily because of the increasing urbanization of the population brought about by the development of its mineral wealth. The rural African who once supplied his own limited needs has moved to the city and at the same time has increased his food consumption.

Belgium is making a major effort to relieve the deficit. The agricultural station at Keyberg outside Elisabethville is experimenting with fruit, vegetable, and fodder crops that would be feasible to grow under local conditions. Results vary with the species of fruit tree or vegetable. Of the temperate fruits, only the Chinese peach and the Rome Beauty apple seem promising. The results of experiments with subtropical plants also vary. Thus far the quality of oranges and grapefruit has been low, but mandarins and lemons of high quality can be raised. Tropical plants such as mango and avocado suffer during the dry season and can be grown successfully in favorable places only. Strawberries, melons, and tomatoes show more promise than do pineapple, banana and pawpaw.

Fodder production is another problem. By reason of the small food value of natural pasture vegetation, experimentation has been directed toward increasing its nutritive value. Local conditions, however, are unfavorable, and pastures -- even those that have been improved -- cannot provide food enough for an entire year of dairy-cattle grazing. During the rainy season, low-value pastures have been converted to fodder production in areas where the soil is suitable. Maize fodder, for example, is a good rainy season crop and, when used as ensilage, provides feed for animals during the dry season. Elephant grass has also been raised with success. It is well adapted to local conditions, is easily grown, and is well-liked by cattle. It is also used for the regeneration of soils that have been overstocked and eroded. Despite the demanding soil requirements, experiments with sweet potatoes are also proceeding because they are of value in milk production, and cattle like both the leaves and tubers.

Whether these experiments will substantially meet the needs of the Katanga is problematical. In the near future the region will probably continue to be a food deficit area but perhaps to a lesser extent than formerly. Assuming progress in some sectors of the agricultural economy, much still needs to be accomplished in the agricultural education of the Africans.

V. Population

Those Belgians who years ago recognized that the African was an economic resource have been richly rewarded. True, important gaps

still exist between the productivity of European and African labor, and African labor is not cheap considering its output. Nevertheless, the records strongly indicate that African productivity is rising in the most important segment of the economy, the mineral industry. Today, the question is not whether the African is a resource, but rather how soon his productivity can be raised to new heights.

The Katanga has an estimated population of over 1,630,000 Africans and about 30,000 Europeans, giving an average density of 3 inhabitants per square kilometer. Of the 4 districts in the Katanga, only Elisabethville, the site of the capital, had an average population density as great as 4 people per square kilometer in 1956. Excluding Elisabethville district, only 8 of the 23 subdistricts in the Katanga had an average population density exceeding 3 people per square kilometer in 1956.

High population-density areas occur as peripheral islands from Dilolo eastward through Kolwezi, Jadotville, and Elisabethville, northward to areas north and south of Lake Moero, Baudouinville, Albertville, and Kangolo, and then westward to Mani. In the center of the Katanga is the large population island of Malemba-Nkulu.

Considering the mode of living, the Katanga possibly epitomizes the transition of the African native from a bush to an industrial society. Of all the provinces of the Belgian Congo the Katanga has the highest percentage of Africans living within a relatively modern, nontraditional society. Thirty-six percent of the population of

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Katanga Province lives in what the Belgians call nontraditional centers as against a figure of 28 percent for the next ranking province, Leopoldville. The mining centers of Kasai and Kivu are farther down the scale. Apparently one of the principal factors in this difference is the relatively easy acceptance of urban living by Katanga wives, whereas others find the adjustment difficult and retreat to the more protected tribal life.

The recent large increase in the number of children living in urban centers of Katanga in relation to the number of men results partly from increased birth rates, lower infant mortality rates, and better school facilities; but it also indicates that the corporations, notably Union Minière, are succeeding in their effort to encourage African workers to keep their families with them -- a factor basic to the stability of African communities. Today, several Katanga centers include second- and third-generation urban families.

Health is a problem throughout the Katanga: malaria, schistosomiasis, trypanosomiasis, and leprosy are widespread. The vast majority of those afflicted are Africans. Probably the best sources of information for estimating the number of natives afflicted with a disease are the mining companies or medical missionaries. The doctor in charge at the hospital built by Beceka Manganese at Kisenge estimates that about 65 percent of the people in his area have malaria. A medical missionary in the Kasaji area, about 140 miles east of Dilolo, estimates that within his mission area 2 or 3 percent of the natives are suffering from leprosy.

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An improved health program will, among other things, result in a lower death rate. Meanwhile, health conditions among Africans in the Katanga leave much to be desired, and improvement is essential if the problem is to remain a nonpolitical one. The Belgians evidently realize this, for they are spending relatively large sums on medical aid for the Africans. For example, in 1957 the Beceka Manganese, with a net profit of just under 32,000,000 Belgian Congo francs, spent about 6,000,000 Belgian Congo francs (about U.S. \$120,000) for medical-social assistance to Africans who were not employees of the company.

VI. Defined Interests in the Katanga

A. Belgium

The lack of unity between the Katanga and the remainder of the colony is a factor of major concern to the Belgians. This lack of unity moved Maurice Robert, the noted Belgian geographer, to write in 1923 that the Katanga would be lost to Belgium if more attention were not given to its development. In the following year Dr. Walther Kühn, writing in the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, asserted that on any economic map of Africa the Katanga should be shown as belonging within the South African sphere of influence.

The idea that the Katanga was really a separate entity still persisted in 1956. Some colons or white settlers, though definitely a small minority, felt that geographically and economically the Katanga had arrived at the point where its eventual destiny lay with

southern white-dominated Africa. Although affiliation with Southern Africa was not ruled out, reports from Elisabethville at that time indicated that Belgian nationalism far outweighed any Katanga secessionist sentiment. The thought was that the chief financial interests would control the direction the Katanga took rather than any extremist minority white group.

By early 1959 the people of the Belgian Congo had been promised the chance to choose freedom at an indefinite date. The chief financial interest, Union Minière, with many years to go on its mineral-concession lease from the Belgian Government, and desirous of keeping a large measure of economic control, had already considered the possibility of making an agreement with an independent Congolese Government. Although the desire to keep the Katanga under Belgian domination is strong, the desire to retain economic control over the Katanga is even stronger. Although there has been some talk of an alliance between colon secessionists and Union Minière, no tangible proof of this bond exists. In fact, the colon secessionists are still thought to be playing a minor role in the formulation of the Katanga's fate; Union Minière, in cooperation with the Belgian Government, is still thought to be playing the major role.

B. African or Congolese People

Although the Africans stand to gain the most of any group concerned with the Katanga, the vast majority of them are uninformed about the major political and economic issues relating to the future of the

region. The issues at stake are largely beyond their comprehension, but this should not obscure the fact that small segments of the body politic are attempting to speak for the group as a whole. Thus far, these segments have lacked unity because of their different tribal origins; and Belgium has made little effort to change this compartmentalization.

One Congolese faction, the Union Congolaise, which is predominantly Roman Catholic, advocates "gradual independence" through the attainment of political, economic, and social maturity under European guidance. The organization, however, is vulnerable to the charge that it is an instrument for continued European control of the Katanga -- an allegation that would be leveled at any African organization advocating "gradual independence." The close relationship between the white-dominated Roman Catholic clergy of the Katanga and the Union Congolaise does not free it from criticism by the clergy and other conservative elements.

The idea of "immediate independence" seems to be gathering strength. Perhaps the foremost exponent of this policy in the Katanga has been the Baluba Central, the General Federation of Baluba People in the Central Katanga, which has now been dissolved by the Belgians. This organization increased its strength by attacking the Union Congolaise and the Union Katangaise. The latter is a colon organization that advocates a federation of the eastern Congo provinces that will have equality with Belgium. The Baluba

Central has demanded the appointment of Congolese (native) district commissioners and police, a demand not likely to be agreed to by the Belgians.

The Baluba Central, however, must contend with other adversaries, notably the Katanga tribal groups, who have formed a rival organization known as the Confederation des Associations du Katanga (Conakat). The role of Conakat, especially as it relates to the "immediate" versus "gradual" independence line, has not yet been clarified.

C. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

The Federation is separated from the Katanga by the Congo-Zambezi watershed but is linked to the Katanga by road, rail, and powerline. The Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia directly adjoins the Katanga. From Kipushi and the Prince Leopold Mine, the boundary of the Katanga with the Federation is a mere turn in the road away (see Map 27714). Terrain and climate in the southern Katanga and the Rhodesian Copperbelt are similar. Although the whites of the Katanga and the whites of the Copperbelt differ in many ways, they also have much in common.

Basically the whites of the Katanga and the whites of the Federation Copperbelt feel a vague sort of kinship because both form islands of white people surrounded by Africans agitating for independence, with all that this implies. Out of a total population of 250,000, the Europeans or whites in the Copperbelt number only 25,000. The reason for the relatively large concentration of both whites and natives is

the mines of the Copperbelt, which alone accounted for over 12 percent of the world's production of copper in 1957. Just as the Katanga provides the basis for prosperity in the Belgian Congo so the Copperbelt provides the Federation with a basis for economic development. White Rhodesians ask themselves, "If the Katanga is lost to Black Nationalism can our Copperbelt be far behind?"

D. The Union of South Africa

The Union of South Africa like its neighbors to the north has a far larger African than European population. The Union has adopted the policy of apartheid, or separation of the races. Although many of the Europeans within the Union do not agree with the apartheid policy -- or do not think that it will work -- most of them are convinced that if Black Nationalism is not restrained the day of the whites in southern Africa will be ended. Representatives of the Union stationed in the Katanga argue that if the African dominates that province today he will be on his way to dominating all of Southern Africa tomorrow.

These representatives say that South African strategy is to form a so-called protective frontier of white-dominance that will include the Katanga. Representatives of the Union in the Katanga preach this doctrine and emphasize the tangible ties between the whites in the Katanga and those of South Africa. These ties were considerably strengthened during World War II when the white Katanga youths could not go to Belgium for their university education and were forced to

go to the Union instead. So disturbing to Belgian authorities was this trend toward closer association with the Union that it was a large factor in the foundation of a nonsectarian Belgian University at Elisabethville.

E. The USSR


The USSR may regard the Katanga as a special problem area apart from the remainder of the Belgian Congo because of its mineral wealth. This possibility is suggested by the fact that copper and cobalt are in short supply in the USSR and the Soviet Bloc as a whole, whereas they are the minerals that Katanga has in greatest abundance.

In the case of cobalt, the Soviet shortage is expected to continue for several years. Not only is cobalt the alloy element in shortest supply within the USSR and the Bloc as a whole but it is also unavailable from the Free World as a result of trade controls. Consequently, economy in the use of cobalt is stressed by Soviet planners. Future requirements for cobalt cannot be estimated. Should it become increasingly important, as a result of research and development in the field of high-temperature alloys, the Soviet shortage may become critical.

In the case of copper the USSR has tried to alleviate its chronic shortage by substitution, by stockpile withdrawals, and by importation. From 1953 through 1958, copper imports averaged nearly 70,000 tons annually, a large part of which was obtained from the U.K., West Germany, Finland, and Belgium. Currently the Katanga is the fifth

largest producer of mine copper in the Free World. In view of the dependence on Free World countries for copper supplies and considering the Katanga's present production of about 250,000 tons of copper annually, a potential Soviet interest in the political developments of the region would seem natural. (SECRET)

KATANGA



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MOROCCO'S "LAND OF THE FREE"

When the French turned Morocco back to the Moroccans in 1956 -- following 44 years of protectorate rule -- there appeared to be a better-than-even chance that the diverse Moroccan elements would be able to coalesce their varied interests and form a relatively stable nation. Now, just 3 years later, the honeymoon appears to be over; the unity achieved during the struggle for independence is threatened once again by the ancient rivalry between highlander and lowlander.

Morocco is a mosaic of different peoples who speak diverse languages and live in different physical and cultural environments. Arabs, Berbers, Arabized-Berbers, and Berberized-Arabs make up the vast majority of the population; but Jews, Europeans, and others also contribute unique ways of life to the national scene. Many of these people have submerged their differences and learned to work together toward more or less common goals or, at least, have been swept along in the current toward the development of a national state. The Berbers living in the rugged Atlas and Rif Mountains, however, have so consistently resisted amalgamation and refused to relinquish their traditional way of life that the area in which they live has come to be known as the "Bled as Siba," the Land of the Free, as differentiated from the remainder of Morocco, the "Bled al Makhzen" or Land of Government Control.

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A serious rebellion has recently been suppressed in the Bled as Siba, and trouble can be expected to reappear. The timetable for future eruptions cannot yet be foreseen; nevertheless, some light can be shed on the probable role of the Berbers in the life of the nation, and the reasons for their dissidence, by taking into account their cultural peculiarities, their means of livelihood, and the environment with which they must contend.

Background of Recent Berber Dissidence

Long-smouldering Berber resistance to the domination of the central government flared last fall with the development of an armed Berber movement. Various tribes, apparently loosely organized and coordinated, began resisting the government in the mountainous area from Alhucemas (Villa Sanjurjo) in the north to Marrakech in the south (see Map 28028). When the rebellion appeared to be reaching a critical stage, King Mohammed V -- to whom most Moroccans, including the Berbers, profess both religious and civil fealty -- broadcast an appeal for an end of the fighting. In his appeal, he brandished both carrot and stick; he promised that the government would give immediate attention to the needs of the area and would seek to improve the standard of living of the tribal peoples. He also warned that unless the insurrection ceased, "all measures prepared to restore order and respect for law" would be used.

The king's promise of a more bountiful future and a subsequent show of military strength has proved effective. Almost all groups

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have ceased fighting, and action taken by the Royal Moroccan Army to contain the movement has had some success, but significant numbers of hard-core dissidents remain unconvinced.

Economic and political first aid together with continued pressure by the army probably will avert full-scale tribal rebellion, but the situation remains perilous. There is considerable doubt that the Royal Moroccan Army would prove effective if an all-out internecine war developed, particularly since many of the members of the army are Berbers and would either desert to the hills or be extremely reluctant to fight their fellow Berbers.

One of the principal causes of dissidence among the Berbers is the Moroccan Government's attempt to extend its control and to centralize its authority by appointing Moroccans from such Arab and urban centers as Casablanca and Rabat to nearly all official government positions among the Berber tribes inhabiting the Rif Mountains of northern Morocco and the Atlas Mountains, which extend in a northeast-southwest arc through the whole country. The government has consistently refused to appoint Berbers to positions of authority over these tribes, and instead has filled even local offices from among the stalwarts of the ruling Istiqlal Party, a largely urban and Arab assemblage with little or no support in the areas populated primarily by Berbers. Berber tribes, long accustomed to independent rule and fiercely proud of their time-honored social and political codes, resent pressure applied by government officials to make them

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forsake their Berber customs. They believe that the officials have little sympathy with or understanding of their tribal institutions and that the forceful adoption of what they consider to be modern or Arab ways will result in the gradual disintegration of the tribal system.

Various measures now being taken to reestablish respect for central authority, together with long-term programs aimed at removing the basic causes of unrest, should eliminate or at least alleviate popular discontent. The rebels' demands include local recruitment of civil servants to fill local government posts; freedom from reprisals for participation in the rebellion and the return from exile of the rebel leader Abd al Krim; more adequate representation in the central government; greater local autonomy; elimination of taxes; creation of more rural schools; and various measures to relieve the depressed economic conditions in Berber areas. However, even if it were possible for the Moroccan Government to meet all of these demands, it is unlikely that unrest would be completely eliminated. The traditional tribal leaders will probably continue to create difficulties in order to maintain their feudal positions, which are threatened by extension of central authority and the reform of the rural social structure.

Traditional Attitude of the Berbers Toward Centralized Authority

The present-day refusal of the Berber tribes to submit to the rule of the central government is deeply rooted in the traditions

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of Morocco. In the past the tribes have been most vehement about their independence. They paid taxes only when an armed tax-gathering expedition was dispatched to their tribal areas, and refused to supply the monarch's army with troops or in any way acknowledge his overriding secular authority. Marshall Lyautey, the famed French administrator of Morocco during the protectorate period, found that the most effective method of governing the country was to allow the Bled as Siba considerable local autonomy. The French encouraged the separation of the Berbers from the other Moroccans, and even attempted to establish a Berber Bloc by fostering special laws for them.

Probably the most significant and spectacular Berber rebellion was the so-called Rif War which lasted from 1921 to 1926; it is a good example of the kind of guerrilla warfare the Berbers are capable of conducting. The leader of the Rif rebellion was Abd al Krim. Although now living in Cairo, he is the spiritual leader of the dissident forces in Morocco today. The major factor underlying the Abd al Krim uprising of the 20's was native opposition to the establishment of a Spanish zone and to the regime that prevailed there after 1912. The Rif War was a struggle between a relatively powerful European nation and one tribal chieftain with no resources beyond those of the limited area under his control. On the one hand were the well-equipped armies of Spain; on the other, primitive Berber tribes depending upon such weapons as chanced to come their way. By the end of 1924, the situation of the Spanish armies was becoming

desperate and Abd al Krim was pressing on toward the border of the French-occupied zone. Within the French zone the successes of this solitary chief were putting new heart into the yet unconquered tribes and were beginning to impress the more restless elements in the already subjected regions. When the unrest began to explode along the borders of the French zone, France and Spain began a joint large-scale counterattack. Abd al Krim was defeated but it took the combined efforts of 3 marshals (including Marshal Petain), 40 generals, almost 1/2 million troops, and the use of aircraft and tanks to bring an end to the Rif War.

Berber Characteristics, Tribal Grouping, and Livelihood

Moroccan population statistics must be treated with a great deal of caution and skepticism, but it is probably not too inaccurate to say that the Berbers, who are considered the original inhabitants of Morocco, number about 6 million and constitute between 60 and 70 percent of the total population. They are of mixed stock closely akin to the people of Sicily and southern Italy (Figure 1). Probably no more than 5 percent of the present inhabitants can honestly lay claim to pure Arab descent since the Arab incursions of the seventh and eleventh centuries -- which converted the Berbers to Islam -- involved only a small number of Arab tribesmen. Among both Berbers and Arabs, there has been some intermarriage with Negroid people.

The distinction between Arabs and Berbers is not primarily one of physical appearance, but depends largely on linguistic and other

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Figure 1. A variety of costumes and physical characteristics are found among the hundreds of Berber tribal groups in Morocco. Within each group or community, however, a distinctive style of clothing and certain physical resemblances are usually apparent.

cultural characteristics. The Berbers are distinct from Arabs and Arabized-Berbers in having various dialects peculiar to them alone, different cultural values, and a more egalitarian social and political tradition. Until recently they also had a separate body of law. The traditional distinctions, however, are rapidly losing their former political and social significance. A central government that is determined to extend its authority throughout the country, Moroccan nationalism, and modernism are producing greater cultural homogeneity among the diverse segments of the population.

The linguistic boundaries are also becoming less definite. The Moroccan form of Arabic is the country's paramount language; it is the language of government, commerce, and learning. As a result,

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the younger generation of Berbers are usually eager to learn Arabic and may even have a feeling of inferiority about their own languages, which lack a standard written alphabet and do not permit the same freedom as Arabic in expressing abstract thoughts. In 1955, it was estimated that only 25 percent of the total population was solely Berber-speaking. On the other hand, more than 50 percent was thought to be bilingual (Arabic and Berber).

Berber dialects themselves differ so radically from place to place within Morocco that a member of one tribe sometimes finds it difficult to understand a member of another. The Berbers of the Rif area along the Mediterranean, for example, can barely understand the dialects of central Morocco if they can understand at all. This virtual tribalization of dialects can be attributed largely to the absence of a standard written alphabet, the large size or isolation of the areas involved, and the lack of sustained contact and communication between tribal communities.

Although there are some 600 distinct tribal units in Morocco, the various Berber tribes fall into 4 major groupings on the basis of linguistic and other cultural similarities: the Shluh, the Beraber, the Djebala-Ghomara-Riffian group, and the Zenata (see Map 27845).

The southern Berbers, the Shluh of the western Great Atlas and of the Anti-Atlas, are estimated to number about 3 million. They practice mixed farming, the exact nature of which depends upon local

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environmental conditions. In the southwestern part of the Shluh area, agriculture, which is almost entirely of a subsistence nature, is dependent on an elaborate irrigation system. Vegetables and olives are cultivated in small family plots, and the food obtained from them is supplemented with milk and meat from goats. Elsewhere in the south -- in the Saharan and near-Saharan zones -- increasing aridity has reduced the importance of agriculture and encouraged nomadism. The tribes in these semidesert areas engage in riverbed agriculture and also graze large numbers of animals. Their fortified villages are entirely limited to oasis locations.

Farther north, in the higher elevations of the mountains, lower temperatures and increased rainfall permit the Shluh to practice intensive agriculture. Every possible patch of ground is cultivated. Wheat, barley, almonds, grapes, and other fruits are grown. Irrigation ditches, laboriously cut into mountains, water the vegetable gardens. Normally, each village has a fortified depot for its stores, but in some cases there may be only one for a tribe as a whole (Figure 2).

Another area inhabited by the Shluh is the high country above 7,000 feet, with its coniferous forests, high barren plateaus, and deep gorges. Here ingenious irrigation techniques enable the Shluh to grow barley and rye. In severe winters the widely scattered villages may be abandoned temporarily while the residents move down toward the plains.

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Figure 2. The village generally occupies land that is unsuitable for cultivation in the Great Atlas. Traditionally, the buildings have been huddled around a high kasbah, the residence of the chief and a place of refuge against attack.

East and northeast of the Shluh, on the southern slopes of the eastern Great Atlas and in the Middle Atlas, live approximately 500,000 Berabers (Figures 3 and 4). Their dialect is relatively uniform over the whole area, although Arabic is widely spoken among the southern groups bordering the Sahara.

The dominant feature of Beraber life is a type of pastoralism characterized by the seasonal movement of livestock between lowland and highland pastures (Figure 5). Unlike the sedentary Shluh, who adjust their agricultural activities to conditions in one place, the Berabers base their economy upon the fact that pasturage in

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Figure 3. Faces such as this are frequently seen in the Middle Atlas area. A hooded mantle of heavy wool and a long cotton band rolled as a turban are standard articles of clothing.



Figure 4. Berber horsemen taking part in one of the most popular events -- a fantasia. The horsemen line up and charge wildly across the field, raising a great cloud of dust. At a given signal, they fire simultaneously while brandishing their rifles above their heads.

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Figure 5. Sheep occupy an important place in the life of the Moroccan Moslem, for whom pork is forbidden. The wool is regularly clipped, spun, and woven; the hide provides raw material for the leather worker; and the meat is the basic food of the country.

different climatic zones matures at different seasons. Some of the Beraber tribesmen who own permanent houses and collective granaries in the mountains move their herds to the winter pastures in the valleys. Others have permanent homes at the base of the mountains and send their herds up to the higher pastures in late spring. Still others have houses midway between the summer and winter pastures but spend most of their time in the pasture areas away from the permanent villages.

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North of the Beraber country, and separated from it by the expansive valley south of the Rif Mountains, is another area of Berber speech and culture. This is the Djebala-Ghomara-Riffian region along the Mediterranean Sea, which includes the mountainous terrain swinging in a large arc across the northern part of Morocco. Of this area, only the eastern part properly falls within the so-called Land of the Free, the tribes to the west being in an intermediate stage -- neither completely submissive nor openly rebellious in the face of domination from without. The Djebala-Ghomara people have been almost completely Arabized linguistically; nevertheless, they are Berber in origin and culture. The Riffians still tend to speak only their Berber dialect.

Of incidental interest is the fact that numerous Riffian Berbers are not at all Mediterranean in type but have characteristics commonly associated with northern Europeans. They are ruddy in complexion, tend toward freckles, and generally have reddish beards and hair. They also seem to indulge more frequently in feuds than any other people in Morocco. An outstanding authority on life among the Riffian people claims that, in the days before independence, the Riffians were happiest when they had an opportunity to snap their homemade flintlocks at the Spaniards or to thumb their noses at the Sultan. When there were no foreign invaders to repel, they kept fit and cheerful by indulging in tribal wars, feuds, and various punitive raids.

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Unlike many of the Beraber tribes to the south, the Djebala, Ghomara, and Riffian peoples are primarily sedentary agriculturists. Their habitat is mountainous and rugged. The once dense forest has been removed almost everywhere except at the highest elevations, and now only low thickets dot the landscape. The rapid runoff from the denuded slopes has necessitated an extensive water control system requiring an elaborate scheme of water rights. The subsistence economy is based on the cultivation of cereals, vegetables, and fruits, and upon the raising of cattle and goats. Irrigation and terracing are highly developed, particularly in the western part of the area.

Living conditions, generally speaking, are better in northern Morocco than in the south. The mountains are lower, the climate is not so extreme, rainfall is more nearly adequate, and a greater variety of crops can be grown. Even so, this is a poverty-stricken area. Little cultivable land is available and, despite clever irrigation procedures, the water supply barely meets agricultural needs, particularly in the very dry eastern part of the Rif (Figure 6).

Tied in with the limited quantity of food that can be produced is the problem of an increasingly large number of people who must be supported by the meager resources. In earlier times, the paucity of agricultural products was less critical than during the past several decades because tribal and intertribal vendettas kept the size of the population more or less in balance with the available

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Figure 6. Berbers in the central square of a town in the Rif Mountains on market day, an occasion for both social and commercial activities.

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food supply. Following the suppression by the colonial powers of these bloody feuds, however, the population increased to such an extent that there soon were more people than the land could support. The problem of this excess population was solved by a large annual exodus of able-bodied tribesmen to the plains of western Algeria. There they harvested cereals, olives, grapes, and oranges on the farms of French colons (settlers). A particularly disastrous drought in the Rif in 1945 was a major stimulus to emigration. In 1951, however, the French authorities closed the Algerian frontier to migrant workers and unemployment has since become increasingly serious.

Idle laborers -- in an area where belligerency is an accepted and even hallowed tradition -- have been ready recruits in the irregular forces created by local leaders to harass government authorities. Until this underlying cause of discontent is corrected or ameliorated, the central government can expect little wholehearted support from these mountaineers. The government recognizes this situation and has inaugurated a public works program in the area to absorb some of the unemployed. In order to create maximum employment with the limited public funds available, all work reportedly is to be done by manual labor.

Directly east of the Riffians, as well as on the Algerian border near Oujda and on the northeastern spur of the Middle Atlas, are a number of Berber tribes commonly called Zenata. The Zenata in the

Middle Atlas practice the seasonal migration common among many Berbers, moving their animals to the lowland plains just before winter starts in the mountains. The Zenata east of the Riffians combine elements of the Djebala-Ghomara-Riffian type of subsistence and those of the nomadic Arab pattern to the east and south. For example, those nearest the Riffians place a heavy emphasis on irrigation and terracing, as do the Riffians; but farther east these practices vanish. Sheep, horses, and camels largely replace goats and cattle; and stone houses give way to black goat's-hair tents.



The Problem of Creating a Unified Modern Morocco

Although the customs and attitudes among the various Berber groups are similar in many respects, there also are many differences. Some of these differences are relatively minor -- such as the distinctive clothing worn by each tribal group. Other differences -- in language and allegiance to traditional parochial leaders, to mention just two -- are more significant. Between the Berbers living in the rugged Atlas and Rif Mountains and the lowland Berbers, the differences are even greater. By and large the sedentary farmers of the lowland, the villagers, and the city dwellers speak Arabic; have their own interpretation of the tenets of Islam; and are somewhat disdainful of their "country cousins," the Berber mountain tribesmen. They are faced with a different set of day-to-day problems than are the highland Berbers.

The Moroccan Government is confronted with the task of making these divergent conservative masses politically conscious, of convincing them of the wastefulness of the antiquated agricultural techniques, of demonstrating the inadequacy of their traditional tribal social structure. All these things must be done if the Moroccans are to be welded into a cohesive nation able to make full use of the resources of the country. Progress has been made among the city folk and the Arab or Arabized lowland farmers. Some of the new ideas have seeped out into the mountainous hinterland, but the highland Berbers are still far from being integrated into the contemporary national life.

(SECRET)

MOROCCO



THREE BOOK REVIEWS

Durban, a Study in Racial Ecology by Leo Kuper, Hilstan Watts, and Ronald Davies, with introduction by Alan Paton, Jonathan Cape, London, 1958. 254 pp.

This remarkably objective study by three sociologists of the racial residential zoning of Durban, South Africa, immediately prior to the formulation of compulsory segregation laws is based on 1951 census data. The purpose of the book is to provide a basis for continuing study of the consequences of Durban's planned experiment in racial residential segregation.

Inasmuch as the long-standing pattern of residence in Durban is based on racial segregation, one might wonder at the present concern over compulsory segregation. The premise of this study is that whereas the racial ecology of a city not committed to mandatory residential segregation can be considered to be an expression of natural causes, the racial pattern under compulsory segregation benefits one group while penalizing others. Under the laws that apply to Durban, Europeans will be allowed to extend their land holdings at the expense of Non-Europeans.* Alan Paton, South African

* In South African usage the term "European" includes all white people except Indians. The term "Non-European" includes all other segments of the population, divided into four main categories: Asiatic (mostly Indian), African, Coloured, and Cape Malay. According to the 1951 census, Durban had a total population of more than 430,000.

author and critic of the present government, has estimated that the current plans for compulsory segregation call for the displacement of 3,100 Europeans, 55,000 Indians, and 80,000 Africans. The South African Indian Congress estimates that the Indians affected stand to lose more than \$84,000,000 under the current plans.

In the battle for land occupancy within the city of Durban, the major contenders are not the small European minority pitted against the very large African group, but instead are the European minority against the Indians. The Indians can propagandize their cause and mobilize their patterns of noncooperation against the Europeans much better than can the Africans.

The compulsory segregation proposals call for the elimination of all Non-European competition for land within the present city limits of Durban. All Indians and Africans resident within the present city limits would be resettled on currently undeveloped land peripheral to the city. This peripheral land would then be incorporated within the city limits. The Durban town council and the South African Government claim that racial harmony can be achieved by this major social adjustment. The chief conclusion of the authors of this study, however, is that such a policy of racial dispersion through extension of territory would spread to larger areal units and ultimately to the nation itself. They summarize their study thus: "Taking South Africa as a whole -- rural and urban areas -- the effects of this policy are to stimulate a drive for territorial

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expansion, not so much for the sake of markets in the Imperialist tradition, as for land for Non-European settlement. In the same way that the incorporation of undeveloped land provides an ideal solution for some European Town Councils, so, too, the incorporation of undeveloped territories beyond the borders of South Africa would provide an ideal solution for the Government. The incorporation of the British Protectorates, for example, would assist the Government to find additional living space for Non-Europeans, without sacrifice by Europeans."

The Cartography of Vectors of Disease, Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (C.S.A.), Publication No. 29; published under the sponsorship of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.), London, 1958. 65 pp.; in English and French.

The pamphlet, essentially a report on the 1957 meetings of the C.S.A. at Bukavu and Iwiro, Belgian Congo, outlines a plan for mapping the distribution of vectors of diseases in Africa South of the Sahara. The resultant maps will be published in an atlas of diseases. The atlas will include maps showing the distribution of the major diseases of Africa and their vectors. Map scales recommended are: 1:10,000,000; 1:5,000,000; 1:2,000,000; and, for certain areas, 1:1,000,000. Aside from Madagascar, where the more suitable Laborde projection will be used, the maps will be drawn on the Universal Transverse Mercator projection.

If the project is carried out as planned, separate maps will be prepared not only for the most important diseases of Africa but for

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each species of vector. Regions for which little or no data are available and regions where a vector and/or a disease has been eradicated will be clearly indicated. A distinction will be made between data obtained from confirmed observations and those obtained from doubtful records. Provision will also be made for indicating recognized vectors whose importance in Southern Africa is unknown, and others that are locally regarded as non-vectors. The net result will be the production of a very useful "Atlas of Ignorance" as well as an "Atlas of Knowledge."

Although by no means limited to data on the following diseases and vectors, the atlas will include maps showing the incidence relationship between (1) malaria and anopheles; (2) yellow fever and aedes; (3) tsetse-borne diseases and ticks; (4) onchocerciasis and simuliidae flies; and (5) bilharzia and vector molluscs. This ambitious project attempts to achieve not only a correlation between vectors and diseases, but also a correlation between both and human and environmental factors. No less than eight human factors -- including those of demography, agriculture, and communications -- will be considered. Environmental factors that will be examined in some detail include those related to geology, climatology, zoology, and botany.

The 29 scientists who formulated the project are the foremost specialists in their fields for the vast area of Africa South of the Sahara. Their proposals reflect an intimate knowledge of both subject

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and area, and their recommendation that specific scientists be approached to fill in the gaps in knowledge indicate a comprehensive understanding of professional limitations and capabilities. The desire is to produce an atlas of scientific merit that will replace the inadequate maps in use today. No information is available on the current status of the atlas of diseases or the date of publication.

Ninth Meeting of the Scientific Council, Accra 1958, Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (C.S.A.), Publication No. 32, London, 1958. 173 pp.

The proceedings of the Ninth Meeting of The Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (C.S.A.) cover the full scope of the activities of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.). As published, they provide an invaluable reference work on present and projected activities of C.C.T.A./C.S.A.* With this publication at hand the intelligence specialist on Africa may be able to monitor certain research and planning trends of African and Colonial governments. Only two

* The C.C.T.A. was established in 1950, and its membership now consists of the governments of the following countries: Belgium, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France, Ghana, Liberia, Portugal, Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Among its other functions, the C.C.T.A. administers the Inter-African Research Fund and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (F.A.M.A.). The C.S.A. was also established in 1950 to further the application of science to the solution of African problems, and acts as the Scientific Advisor to C.C.T.A. A Joint Secretariat, with a seat in London and one in Bukavu, Belgian Congo, serves C.C.T.A. and C.S.A. This Joint Secretariat is administered by a Secretary, but it includes a separate Secretary for the F.A.M.A. and also a Scientific Secretary, who is stationed in Bukavu.

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subjects, (1) the interest of the USSR in C.S.A. publications and (2) the mapping program of C.S.A., are covered in this brief review.

The publication reveals that the USSR, through its institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, has been corresponding with the Publications Service of C.S.A. in London. The USSR presumably has been engaged in procuring available publications, and thus undoubtedly is aware of the Council's unpublished material since information on future publications is included. The 43 publications that were either issued or scheduled for issue in 1958 covered a wide variety of topics in the social sciences as well as in the biological and physical sciences.

Some of the proposed mapping projects are sponsored by the C.C.T.A./C.S.A., whereas others are merely projects to which the C.C.T.A./C.S.A. will contribute information. Mapping projects that are sponsored by the C.C.T.A. include:

1. Climatological Atlas of Africa
2. Botanical Atlas of Africa
3. An atlas showing the distribution of vectors of disease (see p. 43)
4. A pedological (soils) map of Africa
5. Population density and distribution maps
6. Maps of regions where ecological conditions are favorable to the spread of *Eichhornia crassipes* (water hyacinth)

Those projects to which the C.C.T.A. will merely contribute information are:


1. The International Atlas for Western Africa
2. The Oxford Regional Atlas for Africa
3. The Atlas of Prehistory
4. A magnetic map of Africa

The C.S.A. cautions on the indiscriminate use of maps and notes that "...specialists have sometimes been tempted to resort to maps more often than was necessary in showing the results of their work.... Maps may be attractive to the eye but may be misleading and give a wrong idea of the situation when available data do not lend themselves to such a method of presentation." The admonition is an indication of the intellectual sophistication of C.S.A. and, perhaps, even of its budgetary problems. (SECRET)

NEW POLITICAL MAP OF AFRICA

The fast-changing political map of Africa illustrates the transitional phase of a continent moving away from colonialism and proceeding toward independence. Most maps of Africa group together many disparate types of political units that are related in various ways to European powers with little indication of the fact that the units represented are in vastly different stages of political development. Map 27738, based in part on ideas used in compiling a 1944 Department of State map, in part on a 1950 CIA map, and in part on recent developments, shows the 10 independent countries of Africa and other political units according to 9 categories of administration.

The new map includes several other useful features. For example, it identifies the areas of different status within a country, distinguishing between the Protectorate and Colonial areas of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Distinctive units of the French Community are also separated -- the 17 Algerian Departments (integral parts of France), the 1 Overseas Department (Réunion), the 2 Overseas Territories (Comoro Islands and French Somaliland), and the 12 Autonomous Republics. Those countries for which independence is projected in 1960 are indicated. (UNCLASSIFIED)



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