

Official Diary
(AD/RR Acting)

19 September 1952

1. Attended PRC meeting.

25X1A9a 2. Conferred at some length with AD/NE on the revision of NIE-46 (Iran). We are both agreed that a well rounded estimate dealing with all reasonably conceivable actions and reactions should be prepared if for no other reason than to protect us against the charge of riding on an obsolete estimate in view of grave indications of trouble. I think this should be pushed no matter how strenuously OIR balks. Found out at lunch that [REDACTED] of OIR, is in favor of going ahead although his most knowledgable guy is in Iran.

3. Met with Brigadier General Porter, 1400-1500, 19 September. Also present were Cols. Dunn, Lansing, and Hibbert of the Joint Staff.

25X1A2g a. Porter presented me with the "war-gaming" comments on NIE-64 which I, in turn, delivered to AD/NE who can now proceed to button up NIE-64 fairly expeditiously. The revision of MC-33 is the primary topic, but this report is necessarily fuzzy because of my not being cleared to see it or to receive its substance. Have asked [REDACTED] to clear you and me for this [REDACTED]

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25X1A8a b. It appears that December 15 is a firm date for the meeting of the NATO Standing Group. At any rate, only action by the Secretary of State on a multi-national basis could change it. Working backward from this date, General Ridgway requires some six weeks to prepare his contribution on forces available, two weeks are required for the tri-partite meeting here, and so said meeting will convene on 2 October. In that meeting, American delegation must have staff guidance covering not only military, but also economic and political matters. A joint staff team are preparing same, and [REDACTED] OIR has indicated that State will want to participate on the political aspects, i.e., intentions.

c. I agreed, as AD/RR, that my office would review the economic sections with two objects in mind: to make them as accurate as possible and to be sure that no generalization or detail therein would unnecessarily contradict similar portions of our contributions to NIE-65.

d. Porter stated that he had urged Cabell to defer this paper until after 65 is done, but such action is totally beyond the scope of JCS.

e. The problem remaining for you, as I see it, is whether this exercise constitutes national intelligence within the meaning of NSCID/1 amended, and if not, should the matter anyway be handled through the IAC. Porter's view and hopes are that both parts of the question be answered in the negative. As a tyro, I venture the opinion that this is

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not national intelligence despite the fact that it covers most of the ground that will be covered in forthcoming estimates because it provides guidance not to the NSC but to a foreign body which has dealings with specific US Departments. The analogy I would draw would be to the intelligence portions of a policy paper prepared by State to guide its UN delegation.

25X1X7 f. Substantively, I believe there will be no difference between ourselves and [REDACTED] on the basic capabilities portions of the intelligence and that the dispute will come on the intentions, with our people taking the position that since this is a revision exercise, basic conclusions of the MC-33 statement should not be altered in the light of the absence of positive intelligence as to changes in intentions since the basic paper was prepared.

SPECIAL PAPER ON MIDDLE EAST

25X1A9a On return from Presidential briefing this morning, DCI directed [REDACTED] to have prepared a two-page round-up of the Middle East to give the Candidates at their next briefing. (Eisenhower, 25 September; Stevenson, 1 October.) It was agreed by [REDACTED] and myself, and others, that this should cover Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Afghanistan.

25X1A9a [REDACTED] discussed the matter with [REDACTED] and Sheldon who have a paper in hand for submission of draft Monday or Tuesday. Somewhat uncoordinatedly, I spoke to AD/NE to alert him and he is prepared to have the Board, or a special panel thereof, consider the estimative aspects of the paper upon receipt of the O/CI draft. He stresses the importance of having the O/CI people present to support their position or any criticisms of suggestions by Board of Estimates members. When I explored this arrangement with AD/CI I received a calm but firm reaction of extreme displeasure and was informed that AD/CI feels you have, or are about to adopt, a policy whereby hasty internal CIA estimates not looking more than six months into the future shall be the prerogative of O/CI. I can assure you, from my earlier conversation, that this will not sit well with AD/NE. Not wishing to get involved in this unnecessarily, I have let the matter rest for the weekend on the basis that O/CI will prepare a draft and that you will make any decisions as to O/NE participation in the exercise.

25X1X7 [REDACTED]