


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Official Diary

Thursday, 28 August 1952

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2. Matt Baird phoned and complained that trainees were avoiding training assignments upon the ground that they would no longer have a slot in an Intelligence Office when they returned from training. I explained the difficulty being encountered by the Intelligence Offices under the current man-power situation, which rendered it impossible for them to hold open slots for trainees, but did agree that this question was worthy of discussion with the IADs. Certainly, a rational long-term training program will have to take account of the increased value of graduate trainees to the Intelligence Offices.

3. Attended IAC meeting.

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4. Following the IAC meeting, I spoke briefly with Gen. Samford regarding the progress of a summary evaluation of U.S. vulnerability to Russian attack. Gen. Samford indicated belief that a compromise paper was being worked out with [REDACTED] I later spoke to [REDACTED] on this and he, too, thought that a compromise paper could be worked out, although he was not completely happy with it. It is Gen. Samford's view that after we have an agreed paper, the Senior Committee members should sit down with Gen. Smith and review it.

5. I also spoke to Gen. Samford about the lack in our Governmental system of a mechanism for preparing a Commander's estimate for the President. Although the JCS might take a leading role in such a task, they were limited by law to a staff of 200 which was at present fully occupied with other duties. Moreover, the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence set-up should be brought into such a procedure. I was going to study the situation and might propose a directive, or even possibly supplementing legislation, and would very much desire any thoughts which Gen. Samford had on this subject. He agreed with the lack and also agreed with my feeling that there is at present too high a wall between Operations and Intelligence, a block which has to some extent been cut down in the Air Force. Gen. Samford undertook to take this matter under consideration.

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6. Discussed with [REDACTED] of O/CI the following:

- a. Approved forwarding to IAC a paper outlining the proposal for a counter-espionage center.

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25X1A2g b. Received an explanation for the delay in implementing USCIB's decision that CIA would provide cars for [REDACTED]. This had been an oversight and I requested that we apologize to Col. Pulling for the delay. Appropriate instructions have now been issued.

25X1A9a c. [REDACTED] indicated that as a member of the Selection Board under Matt Baird, he had insisted that final determination of an applicant's suitability for work in CIA could only be determined after a trial period on the job. There would have to be some latitude in the selection by this Board to permit this to be done, and I concurred with his views. This point will have to be made with our next designee on the Selection Board.

7. Mr. Dulles inquired as to the importance of an operational cable expressing some alarm as to the situation in Iraq. I informed him that, from what I had seen, the urgency here was one requiring operational planning, but there was no immediate threat from the intelligence point of view. Nevertheless, I said I would ask our people to look into it and later related such a request to Dr. Kent.

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8. Spoke to [REDACTED] of O/CI respecting the lack of coordination in contacts with AFSS, Brooks Field. Recently, [REDACTED] had 25X1A9a visited this establishment without any advance notice to either O/CI or myself and I had noted an item indicating some contact by O/RR, although I was not certain of the latter. In any event, I requested O/CI to inform all concerned that contacts with AFSS must be coordinated with O/CI and that I desired to be informed fully respecting such contacts. This also applied to AD/Commo. I also asked that this subject be placed on the next IADs' Agenda.

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25X1A9a 25X1A9a 9. Pursuant to his recent request, informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was replacing [REDACTED] for liaison with PSB.

10. Chatted with Gen. Morris respecting problems of personnel. I emphasized the constant complaints that I had been receiving about lack of adequate clerical personnel. I also suggested that Personnel might consider the principle recently suggested by O/CI of having a backlog or fund of cleared potentially employable individuals, so that the unreasonable delay that we are now experiencing between employment and clearance could be minimized. It was not clear in my own mind as to how this could

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be worked out, but if CIA had to compete with other Governmental agencies who could employ without delay, it might be necessary to offer higher grades.

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12. Discussed with Dr. Kent the format for the briefing of estimates in the Presidential candidate briefings.

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14. Arranged with ^{25X1A9a} [redacted] various details relating to the candidate briefings.

15. In a discussion with Mr. Reber, indicated that I would like to see a draft paper recommending an inter-Agency study on intelligence support for psychological warfare. Gen. Balmer had now put this problem into the PCCC (Psychological Warfare coordinating committee) which was composed of representatives of the operators. I plan to attend the next meeting of that group in order to discuss this proposal. Later mentioned this to Mr. Dulles.

16. Passed to Mr. Reber the ^{25X1A9a} [redacted] cable respecting ^{25X1X7} [redacted] proposed historical study on Soviet military policy and requested that he ascertain what material bearing on this study was already available and what external research agencies might appropriately conduct such a study. I explained that both Sherman Kent and I felt that this would be inappropriate for O/NE; nor were we aware of any existing agency which had resources to accomplish such a project. Nevertheless, the subjects suggested were extremely important and [redacted] might well be interested. ^{25X1A5a1} This, incidentally, might be an excellent project on which to give certain selected analysts and other intelligence officers a sabbatical for intensive study on these subjects.

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17. Upon seeing Cable [REDACTED] I raised the point with O/CI that the matter in question was not within the jurisdiction of G-2, but lay in the field of FI's exclusive jurisdiction under NSCID 5. Was later informed that Gen. Partridge agreed that this was not a matter of G-2 competence and had referred it to the USCIB coordinator.

18. Lunched with Mr. Shackelford and met his successor as counsel for Pace, a Mr. Monahan. Shackelford had accompanied the Secretary on his recent European tour and I was interested in his comment, based on relatively brief contact, that Gen. Papagos was finished, both physically and mentally.

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19. [REDACTED] spoke to me on legal officers abroad. I felt that knowledge of the Agency and maturity were highly important factors and that the local office should prepare to spread itself rather thin in order to put appropriate strength in the field. I undertook to give him any suggestions I had as to new recruits for the legal office and also undertook to speak to Mr. Wolf as to the considerations on which the choice of foreign representatives should be based.

20. Chatted with Mr. Galbraith on his study of trade intelligence. I indicated that my comments did not deal with the details of the study, but rather with the premises upon which it was based. I did not agree that foreign trade intelligence could be evaluated aside and apart from the over-all intelligence problem. I also felt that CIA's contribution in that field could not be determined without considering the work being done by other agencies. As to his attempt to "evaluate" CIA's contribution, I could not make any comment until I had read same. Finally, I queried whether a man/dollar allocation was really representative of the amount of work being done in various parts of the field. In view of the limited time Mr. Galbraith was able to leave his paper with me for consideration, I suggested that he have it typed without bothering to obtain my views and that I would consider it at some later date.

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