

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

Log of Summary Evaluation Action

<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
26 Nov	NSC Action and Presidential directive to DCI to confer with JCS	
17 Dec	DCI and JCS confer	
29 Dec	JCS agree in principal to proposed machinery	5 working days
30 Dec	CIA detailed paper submitted to Lt. General Lemnitzer acting for JCS	1 working day
2 Jan	Lt. General Lemnitzer and CIA concur in draft to be submitted to other committees	1 working day
5 Jan	CIA representatives confer with Coyne	
6 Jan	CIA-JCS draft submitted to Messrs. Papich and Whearty for IIC and ICIS	2 working days
13 Jan	IIC and ICIS "staff comments" submitted to CIA representatives and modifications in draft agreed to	5 working days
14 Jan	JCS and ICIS approve revised draft	1/2 working day
15 Jan	Director FBI only "hold out"; his office has had paper for 9 days (6 working days)	

ROBERT AMORY, JR.

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

ADD/I Diary Extracts

5 Nov. - 24 Dec. 1952

Items of Possible Continuing Interest

I. Relations with other Agencies

- a. NSC, JCS - Summary Evaluation 25X1A2g1
- b. Air Force - Project [REDACTED]
- c. Technical Services
- d. NSA

II. Overseas Relations

- e. Senior Rep. Europe
- f. [REDACTED]
- g. [REDACTED] 25X1X7
- h. [REDACTED]
- i. [REDACTED]
- j. Strategic Division
- k. [REDACTED] 25X1X7

III. Intra-CIA Relationships

- l. DD/P
- m. Id - Preparation for Jackson Review of Psychology

IV. IAD Problems

- n. ONE Program
- o. Collaboration Between ONE & OCI
- p. [REDACTED] 25X1A5a1

V. Miscellaneous Substantive Problems

- q. Darkest Africa
- r. Flying Saucers

VI. Miscellaneous Administrative

- s. Personnel
- t. Ceilings
- u. High-level Recruiting
- v. Supergrades

Items that might be read at leisure for general background:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>
25X1A9a [redacted] on Iran 25X1A9a	26 November	6
ID & [redacted] on Turkey	2 December	8
Amory on Iran (i) 25X1C8c	28 November	Appendix
General Discussion with [redacted]	3 December	6
IAC Talkfest on Future	1 December	3 & 4
ORR Consultants Panel Discussion	13 December	2
Soviet Production Overtaking U. S.	24 November	2
Lecture by Ass't. Sec'y. McNeil	25 November	2
Trip to Brief Eisenhower	19 December	4 & 6
Conference, DCI, Dodge, Lawton on Budget	25 November	3
Russian Attaches & U. S. Scientific Conferences	15 December	2 & 3
Congressional Committee Barging into JAEIC	20 December	3
Admiral Espe Briefing	22 December	5

SUMMARY EVALUATION

Monday, 24 November 1952 (6)
25X1A9a

Conferred with [redacted] and Allen Dulles on the summary evaluation paper. Then attended with Mr. Dulles the meeting of the Steering Group. Mr. Dulles had to leave after approximately a half an hour and I remained for nearly two hours more while all sorts of sniping and nit-picking went on with respect to DCI's proposals. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that I should attempt to obtain clarification to some doubtful points from DCI and have a draft of recommended action for Senior Staff to consider placing before the Council when it meets on Wednesday. Upon return, took a hand at this and checked with Mr. Dulles, and did it once more.

Tuesday, 25 November 1952 (1)

First thing reported to DCI the results of yesterday's Steering Group Meeting and of my conferences with [redacted] Kent, Dulles, et al, on DCI's recommendations and letter of transmittal. Presented him with a draft of NSC's actions to implement all three paragraphs and secured his consent to these plus his directions to have [redacted] attend in the absence of Dulles and myself. Instructed [redacted] accordingly. Told them not to yield on essential issues. They did attend the meeting and secured approval to the first two recommendations with minor changes. Admiral Wooldridge was adamant against taking staff action on third item - an examination of commander estimate machinery by DCI - [redacted] thought in view of this he could not assent; so this matter was left with no staff action, DCI being free to present the matter individually at the Council Meeting. 25X1A9a

Wednesday, 26 November 1952 (2)

Briefed DCI on yesterday's Senior Staff Meeting regarding this proposals in letter of transmittal of the Summary Evaluation. He accepted the minor changes worked out in Paragraphs A and B and announced his determination to [redacted] individually for Council action on his C as revised by myself, [redacted]. He asked me to prepare a brief, [redacted] oral statement to back this up. I did so, checked the draft with [redacted] and presented it to him together with brief set of notes. He accepted these and after reading the JCS memorandum, he appeared more determined than ever to press the point. Talk appended. 25X1A9a

Summary Evaluation (cont'd.)

Friday, 28 November 1952 (B & 8)

At morning meeting, DCI in response to questions from DD/CI gave a brief description of the proceedings at the NSC on the 26th. Apparently, DCI did most of the talking, the others present not having read, with the exception of Foster, the Joint Chiefs' memo or otherwise done their homework. DCI characterized the Joint Chiefs' memo as "silly" and got some degree of agreement as to this from Foster. The action taken approved the recommendations of the Senior Staff but did not include any action on the Director's larger project. The President apparently concluded the discussion with the suggestion that DCI will see if he can work things out with the JCS. DCI went on to comment that he thought a good approach henceforth would be through Foster, who seemed to have some understanding of the problem. In response to my question, he indicated that we should move right ahead with the staff work necessary to implement Paragraph B, i. e., the terms of reference for summary evaluation and machinery for "such an estimate" which I once more pointed out could be very broadly interpreted.

25X1A9a

[redacted] and I went over the NSC action with respect to the summary evaluation. Expressed the desirability of proceeding immediately to outline best possible terms of reference, including in tabular form the detailed percentage of destruction estimates under various assumptions as to weapons available and delivered on target. When such terms of reference have been refined, it will then be appropriate to consider who can best answer the questions posed, and out of that consideration, to develop machinery aspects of the NSC decision.

Wednesday, 3 December 1952 (25X1A9a)

Met with Messrs. Kent, [redacted] on the question of drafting terms of reference for the new summary evaluation. Informed them that a preliminary paper must be available by Thursday, December 11, so that DCI could study it before his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 15 December. The chief points I stressed were the necessity of working backwards from critical objectives in the United States, determining these, the number of twenty or fifty Kiloton bombs necessary to damage each "critically" (whenever that may be), then considering the ability to deliver bombs on target in terms of percentage and finally bringing into play the limitations of the Russian stockpile probably using three or four alternative hypotheses as to the size thereof. As a final cut an estimate of the amount needed to neutralize our overseas retaliatory power should be considered. Left the meeting before it was fairly underway, but believe there was general agreement on the scope of the study.

Summary Evaluation (cont'd.)

Thursday, 4 December 1952 (12)
25X1A9a

With [redacted] conferred with Messrs. Lay and Gleason at the NSC office with respect to summary evaluation. Agreed that the very detailed terms of reference in the nature of questions that must be answered should be prepared irrespective of the machinery for obtaining the answers. Further agreed that the machinery should consist of a high level Steering Group to be chaired by a presidential appointee and including as members, a representative of the IAC, of the JCS, and of both IIC and the ICIS. Each of these should be men of real authority and should be supported by top flight deputies for actual work. It is important that the Steering Group be constituted from the outset of the program and concern itself with the entire exercise, starting with reviewing and finalizing the terms of reference presented to the NSC. [redacted] will have a revised draft reflecting these and yesterday's discussions for my consideration by Saturday.

Saturday, 6 December 1952 (1)
25X1A9a

Conferred with [redacted] on rough draft of Summary Evaluation Terms of Reference, outline and machinery. Made several concurrent recommendations and he agreed to have a discussion on Monday. He also furnished me AIE-1, which is extremely valuable to the summary evaluation problem.

Monday, 8 December 1952 (5)

Lunched with Everett Gleason and broached with him the possibility of his serving on the Board of Estimates if his present NSC job was not continued. This had been informally cleared with Allen Dulles and Sherman Kent. I made no specific commitment but merely sounded him out as to interest which he expressed very diffidently, but very definitely. Gleason also gave me a detailed description of the NSC Meeting at which General Smith and others discussed the summary evaluation recommendations. Apparently, the line of patter I prepared for the General was pretty well followed.

Tuesday, 9 December 1952 (10)
25X1A9a

Spent two hours with [redacted] revising [redacted] draft machinery and terms of reference for the summary evaluation. [redacted] will have a fair copy which we can put in the form of a staff paper for DCI tomorrow or early Thursday.

Summary Evaluation (cont'd.)

Wednesday, 10 December 1952 (1)

25X1A9a

25X1A9a morning meeting reported that the special informal group [redacted] and myself had completed a first draft of the Summary Evaluation Terms of Reference and Mechanics and would submit it in 24 hours to DCI. DCI indicated that I was to go to the JCS Meeting and "do most of the talking." At my suggestion, he agreed to enlarge the team to attend to include [redacted]. So informed him.

Friday, 12 December 1952 (6)

DCI hastily read the Summary Evaluation paper and said it was O. K. He also agreed to the changes I proposed on the basis of Jimmy Lay's suggestions. I then went over to [redacted] and worked the changes in with him and arranged for re-production. Later in the day Lay called to say that he had made a careful study of the substantive outline of the Evaluation and found it "excellent" and extended his congratulations to all concerned.

Tuesday, 16 December 1952 (3)

25X1A9a

Offered DCI draft, prepared by [redacted] of remarks before the JCS. He just glanced at it and said, "Haven't I seen this before?" to which I replied, "No, sir." He said, "What the hell, you're going to do the talking anyway." Then, returned them to me, saying all he was going to do was sit back and say "That's my boy!"

Wednesday, 17 December 1952 (4)

25X1A9a

With DCI, [redacted] attended Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting. Present for the JCS were:

General of the Army Bradley	Major General Eddleman
General Hull	Vice Admiral Fife
Admiral Duncan	Rear Admiral Wooldridge
Lt. General White, USAF	Rear Admiral Lalor and a
Lt. General Cabell	Colonel acting as Secretary

at General Smith's direction, I outlined the new Summary Evaluation paper in substance as indicated in the attached memorandum, mutatis considering I rather than DCI was doing the talking. The reception seemed very favorable and the questions from General Bradley, General Hull and Admiral Duncan all related to minor details and all were satisfactorily answered. Seven copies were delivered to appropriate services and secretaries and at General Bradley's direction the paper will be considered and commented upon promptly. I was struck by the fact that General Bradley seemed totally unaware of our present gross estimates

Summary Evaluation (cont'd.)

Wednesday, 17 December (cont'd.)

because he initially stated the proposed action should await determination by the Intelligence community of the total Russian resources for attack, including stockpile of bombs, etc. I assured him that this step was already complete for the years in question, and shortly will be completed thru '57 and that, therefore, we had reached the stage where we must start to pull the two things together. He appeared satisfied.

Thereafter, there took place a lengthy discussion of a mechanism for coordinating behind-the-lines activities in the event of hostilities. DCI outlined clearly his concept of the subordination and responsibility of CIA units under his Senior Representative to the Theater Commander. It was agreed that more general information should be exchanged between the Army people and the DD/P as to present plans. DCI expressed grave doubts as to the feasibility of some of General McClure's expansive plans.

Tuesday, 23 December (9)

Rear Admiral Lalor, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised Acting DD/I, "off the record", that the Joint Chiefs had considered our Summary Evaluation paper shortly following our joint conference and that General Bradley would call the Director to suggest a further conference at which details could be ironed out and personalities considered for the Steering Committee. Meanwhile, Lalor was of the opinion that coordination with IIC and ICIS should be deferred. From the tone of his comments, it may be inferred that the Chiefs had favorably considered our general proposals.

Mon 29 Dec - WRS said Brad agreed if we'd take 15 gen I # Edwards as chmn, Lalor said JCS had given action to 25X1A92222.

Tues 30 with [redacted] went to Lennig with Draft NSC directive based on my paper. He agreed to have Brad approve it by tomorrow.

25X1A2g
[REDACTED]

Wednesday, 19 November (1 - P,3)

25X1A2g

Project [REDACTED] - I told him (the D/GI) that I had been advised by AD/SI that General Craigie A-3 will probably address a letter to him asking further CIA support for this project on exploitation of capabilities now in the research stage. O/RR and O/SI have already collaborated extensively, e. g., in preparing elaborate target map. Same forwarded to D/GI for information.

Wednesday, 26 November (4)

25X1X4

Showed D/GI the O/RR-O/SI contribution to Air Force's Project [REDACTED]

envisaged in

Project [REDACTED] are brought to fruition.

25X1A2g

Tuesday, 23 December (7)

25X1A9a

25X1A2g
Conferred Seriatim with [REDACTED] and Wisner on Project [REDACTED]. Much somewhat uncoordinated staff study has gone on throughout the Agency as a result of the ill-advised low level contacts made by Air Force Colonel Leghorn. In my opinion after consulting with all concerned and also Wisner the time has come to present this thing formally to the IAC and to recommend that the latter appoint an ad hoc committee to present the intelligence viewpoint with respect to this huge development program. Composition of a committee could well be the Chairmen, respectively, of the EIC, SEC, Watch Committee, and IPC. That would produce representation of the Services, DD/P and the DD/I with an approximative reasonable balance between them. For the moment, it is left with me to call Colonel Shriver and then General Samford to find out what, if any, intra-Air Force politics were involved in the relative exclusion of A-2 from the Project so far. Assuming that there is no objection, I shall then recommend to DCI that the matter be noticed for the next IAC Meeting and that General Craigie be informed accordingly. Leghorn, unfortunately, is away on leave until 5 January.

Wednesday, 24 December

Investigation into the nature and scope of the intelligence guidance needed by Air Force development to plan the major program [REDACTED] referred to in letter to Director from Lt.-Gen. L. C. Craigie, dated December 3, tentatively indicates the desirability of IAC consideration.

25X1A2g

██████████ Cont'd.

Wednesday, 24 December Cont'd.

Before proposing such, ADD/I talked with Colonel Shriver, General Craigie's executive, to ascertain whether such general consideration would be regarded as appropriate at this time by the Air Force. He informed me that the key individuals handling this project would be away until 5 January and that he preferred to await their return and confer with them and us informally prior to any high level consideration of the problem.

He undertook to inform General Craigie accordingly and on his behalf stated that no further response to the latter's letter would be expected in the interim.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

Wednesday, 12 November (15)

Called Col. Whipple, G-2, to protest the failure of G-2 to live up to the promises made by Whipple at a meeting in August, attended by DD/I and most of the IADs. Specifically called to his attention two requests for visits that had been either rejected or diddled around for months. He promised action by himself or Cloverdale, to remedy the matter. I indicated that he better had clear this thing up or I would present the matter to General Partridge.

Thursday, 13 November (2)

25X1A9a

Col. Saunders of G-2 called with regard to efforts of [redacted] of 25X1A9a and [redacted] RR/I/AM, to visit technical installations. The [redacted] visit has apparently been arranged satisfactorily, the delay being explained by the fact that there are two William Stevensons in the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, one of whom, not knowing [redacted] raised a question about the visit. The trip of [redacted] to the Chevrolet plant has been turned down primarily because a request did not include enough detail to enable Ordnance to put him in touch with the proper officials at the plant. Saunders agreed that such visits were desirable as background information and training for our analysts and that, therefore, highly detailed questions could not be submitted in advance. I, on the other hand, agreed that we owed the military a reasonably full explanation of the gain we expected from the visit.

Wednesday, 3 December (3. c.)

Question of getting access to Camp Dietrich was again reviewed and brief discussion held with General Porter over the phone. He undertook to be helpful in the matter.

NSA

Wednesday, 26 November (11)


25X9A8999/ 25X9A8

Sheldon reported a 3-1/2 hour discussion with [REDACTED] in which the most specific advance was the willingness shown by [REDACTED] to explore the possibility of having CIA take over his [REDACTED]. I undertook to explore on a very sensitive basis what the reactions of Service and State would be to such an arrangement.

25X1X4□

Monday, 1 December (1)

25X1X4□



Tuesday, 23 December (6)

25X1A9a

Conferred with [REDACTED] on paper to form basis of Sheldon discussion with [REDACTED]

25X1X4

SRE

Friday, 7 November (8)

After a brief review of the correspondence and cables regarding making intelligence available to Draper and General Anderson, participated in conference with Messrs. Dulles, Sheldon and General Anderson in which no change of policy was agreed to and CIA's basic position effectively restated by Mr. Dulles. Since I was called out from the room for nearly half the period of discussion, I have asked, through [REDACTED] that AD/CI prepare a minute for this log.*

*At a meeting 7 November, 1600-1620, in Mr. Dulles' room, with Ambassador Anderson, Deputy to Ambassador Draper, there being present the Acting DD/I, Mr. Amory, and the undersigned, Mr. Dulles outlined to General Anderson CIA's position with respect to the dissemination of its publications, in verbal reply to a request that Ambassador Draper's staff be furnished with the publications of this Agency.

Mr. Dulles stated that CIA viewed intelligence as produced primarily in support of the policy makers in the Government, and that it was not CIA's practice to disseminate intelligence directly to the field, emphasizing that he felt it more appropriate that such intelligence as Ambassador Draper's staff needed should be furnished by a policy-making Agency.

The undersigned suggested during the meeting that it might be appropriate to explore the possibility of setting up the State Department as the channel through which intelligence should be furnished Ambassador Draper and his staff.

With this in view, both Mr. Dulles and General Anderson concurred that they would get in touch with Park Armstrong of State and explore this possibility.

During the conversation Mr. Dulles also suggested as an alternate possibility that it might be desirable to get a determination of this problem from the NSC.

It was also pointed out to General Anderson that since a substantial amount of COMINT appeared in CIA's publications, a security consideration was also involved in carrying out his desires.

AUSTRALIA

Thursday, 20 November (3)

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

25X1X7

Conferred with [redacted] of FI Plans and [redacted] with respect to briefing for [redacted]

25X1X7

25X1X7

[redacted] as requested in memorandum by D/DCI after conversation with [redacted] This visit is set up for early 1953 and I agreed that we would take over one day of his projected visit for a series of briefings on the DD/I side. [redacted] to follow up).

Thursday, 4 December (4)

25X1X7

Conferred with [redacted] the recently-arrived liaison officer [redacted]. He is an outstanding economist and one of their best analysts and should certainly be put to more use than acting as a mere mail pouch for transmission of material. I suggested that after he was briefed on our operations and had his feet on the ground, I would welcome specific proposals from him as to participating in our research work with particular reference to our studies of the Chinese economy. He will also work closely with [redacted] on the NIS program.

25X1X7



Wednesday, 12 November (11) 25X1A9a

came in to report the results of his [redacted] on the 25X1X7 Joint Rubber Estimate. I was somewhat disappointed that though [redacted] 25X1X7 people accepted our figures as probably preferable to theirs, they refused to revise their estimates because that would embarrass them vis a vis [redacted] to which they had already issued their paper as a firm position. Thus the result is a brief memorandum agreeing that [redacted] is a maximum and the CIA/US Services one a minimum. I shall express my disappointment at this outcome to [redacted] when he arrives.

25X1C8c □

Thursday, 13 November (4) 25X1B4d

Spent nearly two hours reviewing the general situation with Colonel [redacted]. Among items covered were [redacted] to 25X1A9a operate out of [redacted] and its relations with [redacted] agreed 25X1A9a that [redacted] were its best base and that [redacted] should be readily 25X1A9a agreeable to this as it removed one more pressure on his T/O. Discussed the O/HR people in [redacted] and their 25X1X7 problem; all of which were minor. Compared notes on relationship between [redacted] and IAC and Board of Estimates. I filled 25X1C8c him in on our discussions with [redacted] and described the fiasco of the [redacted] conference. He was an courier 25X1C8c all and gave a most vivid description of the poor impression made on [redacted] and their report thereof to [redacted]. Apparently [redacted] 25X1C8c believes that [redacted] is the chief trouble-maker with respect to the present arrangements for dealing with [redacted]. Query whether [redacted] has complained to him and enlisted him as an ally. [redacted] apparently will arrive here convinced that he has what it takes to straighten this matter out and reestablish [redacted] in the same 25X1X7c relative position which [redacted] holds. [redacted] agrees that even if this does not come about, [redacted] will not take any drastic action because of their conviction that they must advise and counsel [redacted] if it is to 25X1X7c follow the most prudent paths and that the best way this can be accomplished is by taking [redacted] to their bosom.

Friday, 5 December (1)

At morning meeting, asked DCI to elaborate on his conversation with [redacted] which the latter reported to me last night, consisted of "receiving unfavorably" certain suggestions [redacted] had made with respect to [redacted] mission. DCI, at considerable length, reviewed the problem without stating anything new and merely stated that [redacted] had proposed

25X1C8c

25X1X7



Cont'd

Friday, 5 December (1) Continued

25X1C8C0050001-9

that [redacted] be allowed to sit in on the early stages of O/NE consideration before the IAC deputies came into the picture and that the Director had said that this was not possible. He stated that [redacted] indicated that in that case it was not unlikely that [redacted] would have to ask for [redacted] withdrawal, to which D/CI replied that that would be too bad but if that was the way it was to be, then that was the way it was to be.

25X1X7

Thursday, 18 December (2)

25X1X7c0050001-9

25X1A2g

attended IAC meeting which approved Special Estimate on Albania and Project [redacted] SE-35. It was decided to release neither of these [redacted]. Later, following up on this matter with regard to [redacted], I suggested to DCI that it would be inadvisable to let the [redacted] paper of last September go completely unanswered as our silence might be treated as assent in discussions at the policy level. [redacted] agreed to my suggestion that an informal memorandum be prepared for [redacted] use which would include the gist of SE-35 without disclosing its existence as an independent paper.

25X1A2g

25X1X7c

25X1X7



Wednesday, 12 November (17)

25X1X7

Discussed with Mr. Sheldon, [redacted] and [redacted] and action to be taken as a result of [redacted] 25X1A9a with [redacted] and [redacted] cabled report thereon. Sheldon and [redacted] had studied all the relevant documents, were in touch with FI and, upon receipt of finalized agenda, would prepare the necessary briefs.

25X1X7

Thursday, 14 December (6)

25X1A9a After the meeting, conferred with Admiral Espe, in company with [redacted] of FI, on the latest developments in CIA's position at the [redacted]. Showed them the cables, explained that we had gotten ourselves in a box and realized that withdrawal at this late minute might be quite annoying to Capt. Layton, but that in view of the positive recommendations of [redacted] we at this end could not see our way clear to do other than withdraw the presence of our individual, while at the same time giving the Captain all possible intelligence substance, which is already accomplished. Adm. Espe was very cordial and agreed to advise us of any cables from Layton and planned to do his best to smooth any ruffled feathers.

25X1X7

25X1A9a

Friday, 5 December (7)

Talked to 25X1X7 Admiral Espe, who informed me that Layton had sent a message to [redacted] regretting the inability of his staff officer to accompany him on account of illness. This means that this incident is well in hand. Espe again promised to keep us advised of any reaction Layton had to our last minute decision.

Friday, 19 December (2)

25X1A9a

Conferred with Wisner and [redacted] on Friday cable concerning particu- 25X1X7
larly the CIA non-participation in the special security committee of the [redacted] with Cdr. Kelso Dely of JHI sitting for the U. S. It was my impression that Layton had 25X1A9a agreed not to convene this committee. (IN 22027). Will discuss this with [redacted] on his return. Wisner feels that this is primarily a DD/P activity???????

This document is part of an integrated file. It must be subjected to individual system.

BECKER'S TRIP

Wednesday, 10 December (2)

DCI commented ^{25X1A6a} on Ambassador Henderson's blocking Mr. Becker's visit to [REDACTED] (IN 18981). I came to the Ambassador ^{25X1A9a} and said that Byroade had been the "nervous No. 2" and that [REDACTED] and I had drafted the cable ^{25X1A9a} as to his activities in [REDACTED]. Also pointed out that [REDACTED] itinerary had apparently been changed to omit [REDACTED] prior to receipt of our message. DCI was not particularly mollified by this explanation.

25X1X7

STRATEGIC DIVISIONS

Friday, 21 November (2)

25X1A9a

After the meeting, talked briefly with Wisner and [redacted] regarding the [redacted] of DD/I personnel, now manning Strategic Division in [redacted] or shortly to be shipped thereto, in the event that Strategic [redacted] was curtailed or eliminated in the course of reducing the [redacted]. Both emphatically agreed that these people were the property of the DD/I Offices [redacted] whence they came and that they would not be reassigned from the [redacted] except to their former offices.

Friday, 5 December (6)

25X1A9a

25X1A6a

Spent an hour talking to [redacted] recently of the [redacted] and shortly to become Chief of [redacted] East. Very impressive individual. We covered the workings of [redacted] which he said were in all respects exemplary as of now and favorably regarded by the military as well as DD/P. [redacted] discussed in general terms the problem of a strategic division for [redacted] and the need for keeping it small because of the low number of people in [redacted] headquarters which, in turn, is governed by the low number of people in [redacted] headquarters. We agreed that on interrogation guidance and some other activities in which the DD/I offices might be interested [redacted] it would not be necessary to have the individual assigned to the Admiral's headquarters, rather he could operate from any of the other covert installations [redacted] equally well. The general suggestion was we should [redacted] for such of this work as we do not think is being covered adequately at present. I gave him some fill-in on our views as to the Philippine situation.

25X1C4a

25X1A6a

25X1C4a

Monday, 15 December (7)

25X1A6a

Talked to [redacted] about [redacted] agreed to send one guy right away on TDY [redacted] but suggested that balance of those requested on TDY be held up for about ten days so that [redacted] world-wide views on this matter could be taken into consideration.

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

HONG KONG

Wednesday, 5 November (12)

25X1A9a
 Discussed with [redacted] 25X1A9a
 O/RR and FE 25X1A9a to hire [redacted] 25X1A9a and decided that we
 would let [redacted] be the judge as to where he would be most effective
 in the Agency. Also discussed, at length, measures to increase the
 effectiveness of collection of economic intelligence on China and Hong
 Kong. He was very receptive to the idea of an O/RR analyst being
 permanently stationed in [redacted] 25X1A6a but felt that he would do better if
 25X1A9a stated openly [redacted] I said I would explore this with
 [redacted] later this month. 25X1X7

Friday, 28 November (2 & 11)

25X1A9a
 Reported on [redacted] cable regarding the flood of White Russian
 employees discharged from Manchurian Rmys. expected to exfiltrate
 through Hong Kong in the near future. Green light received from Wisner
 and D/OI to go ahead in conjunction with State on setting 25X1A9a
 25X1A9a adequate
 25X1A9a interrogation of personnel. Specifically mentioned possibility of Joe
 [redacted] now under clearance. 25X1A9a Meanwhile, alerted [redacted] and
 had AD/IO confer with him. Reber and [redacted] reported to me later in the
 morning and suggested that because of the sensitive nature of such an
 operation it would not be wise to use someone until fully cleared. 25X1A9a
 25X1A9a suggested that the [redacted] could wait awhile while [redacted]
 [redacted] of O/SI conducted the initial work [redacted] I indicated
 that there was no immediate rush in terms of days and that the project 25X1X7
 could well be set for after Christmas. Meanwhile, DD/P shops are being
 alerted and State is [redacted]

25X1X7

25X1A6a

25X1A6a

25X1A9a
 Upon advice of Reber, and after consultation with [redacted] 25X1A9a
 that he wire [redacted] 25X1A9a man's reaction to the White Russian influx
 possibility. Left [redacted] question as to whether CIA man should consult
 with [redacted] or not.

Monday, 8 December (4)

25X1A9a 25X1A6a
 Conferred with [redacted] on the [redacted]
 and agreed that [redacted] (ORR) was an ideal choice. [redacted] to proceed 25X1A9a
 from here in conjunction with FI as to matters of cover, travel orders,
 etc. 25X1A9a

RELATIONSHIP WITH DD/P

Friday, 12 December (9 & 11)
25X1A9a

Conferred with [redacted] on the Guatemalan situation. This is pretty horrifying from procedural point of view. As I get it, DCI is annoyed at Assistant Secretary Miller's calling off assistance to a revolutionary group. [redacted] boys thereupon produced intelligence which would support renewing our assistance. This intelligence was then evaluated by the Inspector General, who drafted a memorandum for DCI to send to the Under Secretary of State. Only at this last stage did it occur to DCI and D/DCI that this really raw information should be evaluated by the DD/P evaluators and O/CI; so this is laid on more as a matter of final editing of a finished policy opinion than as part of the intelligence process. Wisner feels just as grimly about this as I do.

25X1A9a

Conferred with [redacted] who are highly exercised because despite the agreement worked out with [redacted] in a meeting chaired by Lofty Becker, the DD/P people were insisting that all pouched material come over open and then be edited to see whether it had been properly sanitized from the background material so the net result is that a wheelbarrow load of O/SI documents have been [redacted] back in their face with the word that they cannot [redacted] unless made to conform to DD/P type papers. Called [redacted] who said he had no idea this was going on and did not approve of it and would stick by his words to the extent he had action in the matter. He called back to say that this had come out of [redacted] and other administrative [redacted] the DD/P and that one [redacted] had the action. I then designated [redacted] as the DD/P representative we had working out with [redacted] and failing this to report to me the exact state of the difference so I could [redacted] it out with Frank Wisner in person. It is utterly foolish as [redacted] has cubic yards of unsanitized material that has been sent over there during the past two years.

25X1A6a

25X1A9a

Monday, 15 December (6)

Lunched with Colonel Bradford Butler and Colonel Lewis Levell. Butler, who is Chief of Training for Army Para. Military, raised the question of the split in the Intelligence community as to the availability of indigenous resources as of D-Day behind the Iron Curtain. Apparently, G-2 feels that there is such, and on the basis of its views, is expending approximately one hundred million dollars each year in preparing 100 teams to drop shortly after D-Day. Air and Navy are very dubious but what bothers me is that "CIA" is reported to have two views, one on the senior level and one on the working level, the latter of which backs the Army. So far as I am aware, we have

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Relationship with DD/P Cont'd.

Monday, 15 December (6) Cont'd.

never estimated in detail on this matter; so the so-called CIA views must be various emanations from 25X1A9c along side of the Reflection Pool. Later 25X1A9c Sherman Kent and [redacted] about this and also asked Lt. Col. [redacted] to see what G-2 had on this with an eye to doing a special estimate if such deemed desirable.

PREPARATION FOR JACKSON COMMITTEE

Monday, 1 December (6)
25X1A9a

Conferred with [REDACTED] on arrangements to be made for providing the Special Board to consider American political warfare techniques and policies, with adequate intelligence background. He told me he had been in touch with Sherman Kent and given him a list of key estimates and also that Kent had agreed to review the estimate the DD/P section is preparing on the amount of propaganda, bribery, etc., that the bloc engaged in country by country. This was laid on originally in response to a request by Senator Fulbright and is now being expanded to take care of the needs of this panel. The specific request on DD/I was that we present the Board with a paper, measuring in quantitative terms, the relative costs of the various fringe wars, especially Korea, Indochina, Malaya, to the Soviet bloc as a whole and the USA separately on the other. I indicated that:

a. This was virtually impossible to do with any degree of significance as the cost of these specific wars would not be sensibly separated from the cost of the US' and its allies' preparedness programs, nor could these costs be aggregated or contrasted.

b. To the extent that material was available, it was much more apt to be available in the Department of Defense, particularly all items concerning our own costs and losses. We closed the discussion on the basis of my suggestion that he consult with Charlie Noyes, OSD, to see if by any chance they had done some study along these lines that would be satisfactory, and if they didn't, whether Defense would undertake to prepare the friendly side of the picture while we came up with our best rough guesses as to the enemy side.

Friday, 5 December (8)
25X1A9a

At [REDACTED] request and with Sheldon's consent, made [REDACTED] of O/GI available to assist DD/P shops in preparing their balance sheet of propaganda and psychological warfare effort for the Jackson Committee.

Saturday, 20 December (1)

25X1A9a
Conferred briefly with Helms on the telephone and then with [REDACTED] on O/GI assistance to DD/P in the summary of intelligence on magnitude of Russian external propaganda effort. Stated flatly that Wisner's people had hogged the show and after wasting several weeks, had now come up with a goose egg; nevertheless, we would do the best we could to get the necessary data together.

ONE Program

Friday, 28 November (6) 25X1A9a

Talked briefly with [REDACTED] about the necessity of cutting O/SI and O/RR in the Agency discussion of the Board of Estimates Program for 1953, and I told him I had found several instances where I thought the deadlines had been set too early and urged the necessity of making haste slowly so as to get good substance on the critical estimates.

Monday, 22 December (4)

Spent two hours at a meeting of the Board and IAC representatives on 1953 program of estimates. Considerable modification was made therein primarily pushing back deadlines that were entirely unrealistic. I made a strong plea that the Board not get in the middle of the research co-ordination activities, including external research because machinery more than adequate for the problem if properly administered was already available. Most of the Board seemed to agree and I believe the item will come out.

CI/NE

Wednesday, 19 November (4)

Conferred with Kent and Sheldon re co-operation in the production of estimates. Basis for the discussion was the recent memorandum from AD/CI to AD/NE and DD/I upon the inadequacies of 21/1. I got away from this and patched the discussion as much as possible on memorandum from Kent to ██████████, dated 1 February 1942, and found Sheldon completely unaware of this concept of his responsibilities. I stated that for the next six weeks I would expect CI to participate at all essential stages in the estimating process wherein they had matters of substance to contribute to the end that the final product would represent the best intelligence available in CIA as well as elsewhere. I also stated that if CI felt that its views were not accepted on any critical point it was duty-bound to furnish me with a memorandum so I could advise D/CI as to the split in view. It was agreed that the forthcoming Albanian estimate would be used as a test to perfect necessary working arrangements to achieve foregoing objectives.

Monday, 22 December (8)

Talked with Dr. Kent about the effectiveness of the O/CI contribution to the Albanian estimate. He reported that the O/CI people had attended the first meeting but no subsequent ones.

25X1A5a1

Wednesday, 26 November (8)
25X1A5a1

Conferred with [redacted] very briefly. He is troubled by O/NE's reluctance to be the point of contact with respect to Project on China Vulnerabilities. I did not have time to explore the subject in detail with him but will do so the next time he is in town. He also had some concern with the O/RR overall program--although states it is directed to details rather than to broad concepts. He undertook to submit his thoughts in writing.

Tuesday, 2 December (9)
25X1A5a1

At the Deputies' Meeting, Friday, 28 November 1952, Mr. Dulles reported that [redacted] had raised the question of publishing on an unclassified basis certain nonsensitive [redacted] and that Under Secretary Bruce was inclined to favor this; however, he (DDCI) recommended that the Director place this problem before the PSB at their next luncheon or possibly State should act on this request. The Director noted that the Russians were quick to dry up any sources when they became aware of information obtained therefrom. After some discussion, the DCI undertook to discuss this matter with the members of the PSB.

Wednesday, 3 December (11)
25X1A9a

25X1A5a1

Conferred with Mr. Reber and [redacted]. Agreed generally that this was far more than an intelligence study and that the intelligence ingredient of it was not sufficient to justify it as a DD/I project. On the other hand, it would be of auxiliary value to intelligence and was so obviously worthwhile that DD/I should impose no objection to its being undertaken on behalf of State and DD/P as a service of common concern. Will so advise Mr. Dulles.

Thursday, 4 December (13)
25X1A9a

25X1A5a1

[redacted] reported that DCI had discussed at the PSB luncheon request for guidance on policy as to be followed in publishing [redacted]. The Director stated that items (a) and (b) of my memorandum were approved, i. e., that unclassified materials should be published. As to classified studies, there was serious doubt because of the fact that CIA would have to take responsibility for the sanitizing and could not afford to expend valuable resources in this process. I undertook to discuss this matter informally with [redacted] with an eye to determining the amount of effort needed on our part and the extent of the problem generally.

25X1A5a1

██████████ Cont'd.

Saturday, 6 December (3, a. & b.)
25X1A5a1

Publication of ██████████ informed him that DCI had no objection to publication of unclassified materials, whether or not the author had had access to classified information. As to sanitizing for publication classified ██████████ told him that DCI felt that this was CIA responsibility which could not be delegated and that it would involve a very serious expenditure of effort and that he was therefore dubious about undertaking any such publication. On the other hand, while recognizing the spirit of DCI directive, it was agreed between us that on any specific case, such as Volume I of the Vulnerability Study, they would examine same to see whether or not relatively simple surgery would not make it clearable. Thereafter, I would go over it and if it seemed not too difficult, would submit it to the I & S people to clear in the same way we would a speech or an article written by one of our own officers. Confirmed this in writing.

Project on vulnerability of China to political warfare. Showed him note I had sent down to Dulles and agreed to push the matter generally for the D/DI side but to regard it as essentially operational. Suggested that once ██████████ project was approved the best point of liaison would probably be ██████████ who will become Chief of Far East around 1 January. Also suggested that in the future such major projects with operational overweighing intelligence aspects might well be brought initially to the attention of ██████████ as DCI assistant in charge of projects rather than thru the DDI-OIC complex. Agreed we would take no action on this before consulting with ██████████ upon his return.

Monday, 22 December (2)

25X1A5a1

Wisner brought up the question of ██████████ request for access to Volume I of the Vulnerability Study, as background dope for the February FORTUNE's symposium on Russia. After checking with Jim Reber, I called ██████████ and pointed out to him that ██████████ should have no direct dealings with ██████████ on this question and also inquired as to the status of preparation of the unclassified version. ██████████ later called up and indicated that in his opinion an unclassified version could be prepared by the middle of next week in manuscript form which would eliminate Part I, include Section A of Part II unchanged and Section B revised; it would further retain of Part III only Sections B and D, the former slightly modified and the latter substantially. He assured me that conversation between ██████████ had been entirely at the latter's initiative and

25X1A5a1

25X1A5a1

25X1A5a1

██████████ Cont'd.

Monday, 22 December (2) Cont'd.

that all question of release had been handled by referring to the Agency's prerogative in the matter. In a final check with Wisner, I was informed that DCI had told ██████████ today that he couldn't have it because Wisner had already said he couldn't have it. Left it that we would go ahead and prepare the unclassified version and give ██████████ a 24-hr. scope on that. ██████████ is sending a memorandum of conversation with ██████████ for our records. F. Wisner has prepared a memo for DCI and furnished copy to this office.

25X1A5a1

CENTRAL AFRICA

Friday, 21 November (1)

At the Director's morning meeting, Wisner and Dulles raised, for discussion, the inadequacy of our actions to combat Communism in darkest Africa. DCI indicated the desirability of having a Special Estimate within a reasonable time to cover the situation there with particular reference to Communist infiltration of 25X1A9a movements such as the Mau-Mau. After the meeting, I asked [redacted] to survey what we had concerning Africa and what more was needed to complete an intelligence picture on the Continent.

Saturday, 22 November (1)

25X1A9a

25X1A6ax
Conferred with [redacted] on the survey on Africa. Generally agreed that this should be accomplished in the first instance by O/CI which has two recently acquired experts in this area. It should include country-by-country coverage in short form and be pointed to items of interest to the [redacted] people. Among the products should be a comprehensive picture and an illustrated map showing, if nothing more, the relative state of our ignorance on this part of the world. O/NE should be brought in at the end for value judgments on estimative features but the center of gravity of the effort should be O/CI.

25X1A9a

25X1X7ax
January 5 is latest deadline for this survey. It was held up because [redacted] took so long getting the [redacted] memorandum over to this side. [redacted] is aware of this and content with present schedule. See also inclusion in National Estimate 1953 program of estimate in this area despite boob poohing by G-2 representative.

25X1A9a

FLYING SAUCERS

Wednesday, 3 December (3. d.)

Flying saucers: Received capsule briefing on recent indications which have caused us to take a far more serious view of unexplained observations. Reviewed the course the Director should take and availability of outside resources for assistance. Apparently, [redacted] is so thoroughly swamped by [redacted] that it will not be able to assist, therefore, efforts are being made with [redacted]

Thursday, 4 December (2 & 5. a.)

Raised question of intelligence effort on flying saucers as per Chadwell memorandum. He said, "Raise it at the IAC."

NIE-70, Latin America, was approved with a little discussion and only one minor change suggested by State.

Friday, 5 December (3)

Finally, at the morning meeting, I reported briefly on the IAC discussion of the flying saucer problem. Later, went over [redacted] minutes of that part of the meeting which seemed to cover it very satisfactorily.

Wednesday, 10 December (3)

25X1A5a1

25X1A5a1

Flying Saucers — Conferred with Chadwell and [redacted] on the initial phases of examination into unexplained evidence, including today's report from Iran. They are going to ATIC, at Wright Field, with General Sanford's blessing and will have recommendations for the next stage, including a panel of approximately eight scientists and engineers, when they have completed a preliminary review of the estimates.

Friday, 12 December (2)

DCI brought up the vacuity of O/SI memorandum on flying saucers and I explained that AD/SI did not wish to go further until he had checked the evidence, that he was en route to ATIC at Wright Field and therefore recommended to DCI that he not brief the President on this subject this morning. He concurred.

Flying Saucers Cont'd.

Tuesday, 16 December (7)

Conferred with Dr. Chadwell and asked for a report on his flying saucer investigation so that the General could have something to talk from at the White House Friday. He said that he was considerably less alarmed as one of the flying saucers' identifications most difficult to disprove, had now been shown to be a sighting of Jupiter.

PERSONNEL.

Wednesday, 19 November (6)

25X1A9a discussed with Sherman Kent the question of a replacement for
25X1A5a1 [redacted] upon his departure next summer. He spoke highly of
[redacted] I urged that he con-
sider strongly Everett Gleason because of his general competence and
particularly his ability as an effective presiding officer plus his
knowledge of the needs of the primary consumers of our estimates.

Monday, 8 December (5)

Lunched with Everett Gleason and broached with him the possibility
of his serving on the Board of Estimates if his present NSC job was not
continued. This had been informally cleared with Allen Dulles and Sherman
Kent. I made no specific commitment but merely sounded him out as to
interest which he expressed very diffidently, but very definitely. He
also gave me a detailed description of the NSC Meeting at which General
Smith and others discussed the summary evaluation recommendations. Apparently,
the line of patter I prepared for the General was pretty well followed.

Thursday, 11 December (3)

25X1A9a
In talking generally about rotation, DCI mentioned a replacement
for [redacted] and indicated he would offer the post first to George
Carey. I said in my opinion [redacted] was fully 25X1A9a competent to take over
as AD/O and further that I saw no objection to [redacted] as DAD/O.

CEILINGS

Saturday, 22 November (3)

Sought out and obtained a conference with General Smith to discuss following matters:

- (a) Problems we were having with OIR and effect of this upon the General's planned decision to assist the R section in obtaining more bodies.
- (b) The O/RR problem in general and the impact upon it of the recently announced ceilings.

He bought my point of view rapidly on Item (a) and agreed to go slow and to back me in discussing, as Chairman EIC, his coordinating responsibility and enforcing reasonable allocations of responsibility to avoid duplication.

Saturday, 20 December ~~25~~ 1A9a

Conferred with [REDACTED] on ceilings. Stated that I wanted to get this matter settled quickly and particularly to obtain ID/A's concurrence while the effect of my special plea to DCI still lasted.

Monday, 22 December (7)

Talked on the telephone to Jamie Andrews and Chadwell on the ceiling proposal because they have the only two shops who will have ceilings reduced under my plan. Both seemed to understand clearly that the "reduction" was completely academic when related to current recruitment rates and effective limitation on the paper of six months.

Tuesday, 23 December (4)

Conferred with Walter Wolf. Raised ceiling proposal. He took it under advisement but did not hesitate to indicate his general concurrence and willingness to stimulate recruiting up to the T/O level, provided actual "on boards" did not exceed the ceilings.

HIGH-LEVEL RECRUITING

Wednesday, 26 November (9)
25X1A9a

Conferred with [REDACTED] on the subject of high-level recruiting contacts. Discussed personnel in the Boston area, San Francisco area, and briefly mentioned Dillon Anderson as an ideal fellow for the Southwest. I stressed the point that this must be carefully co-ordinated with the DD/A people because while it was all right to spread stratospheric structure over the present personnel procurement, it would not be very sensible to have us create one and the DD/P offices another one to do the same thing. It was agreed that we would continue as planned by Mr. Becker but that once any of the arrangements in the various regions were operational, DD/P should be invited to submit its particularly difficult high-level recruiting problems to the same people.

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SUPERGRADES

Monday, 24 November (8)

Conferred with Mr. Andrews regarding the forthcoming meeting on the supergrade paper. Expressed my view that although nothing could now be done, O/SI had come out of the picture with an unduly large number of such supergrades and that first-class economists and industrialists were no more readily available at low wages than were scientists. Also feel FDD when properly reorganized in accordance with the [redacted] memo will definitely rate a GS-16.

Official Diary

Saturday, 27 December 1952

25X1X7

1. Worked on SE-35 in attempt to sort out paragraphs that might safely go to [REDACTED] Will take this up with [REDACTED] 25X1A9a
2. Conferred with [REDACTED] of OCI on the following:
 - a. Errors in CIR on Indo-China map and Shah's Rome Bank Account.
 - b. Suggested article on Indian unemployment be issued as "Secret" to ORR and DD/P/NEA for comment.
 - c. UP, AP and FBID report of Polish Broadcast announcing capture of "American Intelligence Service" spies dropped by air, 4 November, giving names, details, etc.
3. Called Polish Broadcast Item, above, to DGI's attention. He asked me to take steps to be sure services, as well as we, took a "no comment" and/or "it's a damn lie" position if queried by the press. Called Colonel Grogan at his home and so instructed him. He said he would call the appropriate Pentagon characters.