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#### WORKING PAPER

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### PART I

#### MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD COMMUNISM DURING NOVEMBER

World Communism still leans heavily on the gullibility of fellow-traveling "liberals" and opportunists to achieve its ends. Only by exploiting man's reluctance to face political realities have the Moscow tacticians been able to create and re-create the illusion of a "united front". The month of November furnished ample demonstrations for an increasing implementation of this Communist tactic in Europe and even more strongly in the Far East, where it appears to have a good chance of success.

At two high-level Communist meetings, in Hungary and in China, leaders gave new meaning and impetus to the use of this device. The Cominform meeting at Galyateto, Hungary, while dealing chiefly with the problem of Tito's liquidation, published a significant resolution by Togliatti for "unification" of the "large masses of the working class" regardless of their political and religious affiliations. In Peiping, keynote speeches at the WFTU's Congress of Asian and Australasian countries, went farther, calling for extension of the united front campaign into new political and geographical areas. In both meetings, Communist leaders did not hesitate to recommend cooperation with non-Communist groups of all complexions so long as they were in opposition to the existing regimes. Confronted with steadily diminishing returns from its "defense of the peace" campaign in the West, the Kremlin is now seeking to revive the older concept of uniting all "moderate" and "democratic" elements in a united front.

While the success of this tactic in politically sophisticated Europe remains as doubtful as ever, its potentialities in the Far East, particularly in Southeast Asia, are from the standpoint of US security, very serious. The "directives" for Communist conquest along united front lines which were issued in Peiping, leave no doubt about their Stalinist motivation but are sugar-coated with tactical moderation. They are almost certain to impress large groups of Asians by the powerful and simple

principle of "cooperation" among the exploited classes. At the same time, the anti-foreign feelings of these Asian masses are carefully diverted from the USSR and channelled toward the Western powers, notably the US.

The achievement of the Chinese Communist victory opens great opportunities for Communism in the Far East and will be increasingly exploited by the Communists as a means of diverting attention from the rising tide of anti-Communism in Europe and the stalemate in the Near and Middle Eastern areas. A comprehensive program for the exploitation of this Communist opportunity in the Far East has been devised. Soviet Politbureau member Malenkov, in his speech at the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the October Revolution, made this quite clear when he implied that Moscow would by no means rest on the laurels of the Communist victory in China. He characterized China as a springboard rather than as a goal achieved and significantly linked India with China as decisive factors in the East-West struggle. Meanwhile. Chinese Communist leaders in Peiping will apparently direct their efforts toward penetration of Southeast Asia, hoping to acquire the same status in that area as the USSR has acquired in China; in any case, the Chinese Communist effort in Southeast Asia should prove an effective instrument of Soviet expansion.

From a long range point of view, the magnitude of the Far Eastern program is umprecedented in the history of Communist expansion. It dwarfs the scope of Soviet-Communist endeavors in Europe and other parts of the world and is almost certain to achieve a large measure of success among the discontented masses of the Far Eastern areas.

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#### PART II

# SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

This survey of significant trends in the international Communist movement which have become apparent during the month of November, contains only those developments which are believed to have an important effect on the potential of World Communism.

# 1. UNITED FRONT TACTICS

Wherever the power of the Kremlin cannot be backed with the threat of action by the Soviet armed forces, where the influence of the local Communist parties has yet to be firmly established, or where its strength is declining rather than increasing, the Communists seek to enhance their status by trying to co-operate with sympathetic non-Communist factions who are, at the moment, in opposition to their governments. Such cooperation may take the form of collaboration with other political parties, religious groups, etc., in which case it is termed the "united front from above." If the collaboration is primarily on an individual rather than an organizational basis, it is called a "united front from below." Once established, either of these united fronts is exploited and dominated by the Communists. Eventually those participating non-Communists who have not completely surrendered to Communist discipline will be discarded and possibly liquidated.

#### International

Although the application of the united front tactics within many national areas indicates a shift in Communist party tactics, the international front groups continue in their efforts to attract non-Communist followers by exploiting the grievances

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and nationalist tendencies of various social groups. During November, it became apparent that the major front organizations were beginning to implement the long-planned coordinated offensive in Southeast Asia. Although the WFTU has been assigned the key role in these efforts, all the front organizations will probably accelerate their activity in this area in the coming months.

Soviet and Chinese Communist labor leaders at the WFTU Asian Conference, held in Peiping during November, stressed the importance of measures to hasten liberation of "the oppressed peoples of Asia," while their speeches at the conference indicated that the contemplated "assistance" would be extended principally through an Asian Liaison Bureau in Peiping, Communistcontrolled national labor federations, and the Chinese overseas labor unions. At the same time, the heavy Chinese representation on the conference presidium suggested that the leadership in WFTU penetration efforts in the area will be largely the responsibility of the well-disciplined All-China Federation of Labor.

The Asian Women's Conference, which the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) will hold in Peiping in December, will probably provide additional support for the Soviet drive in Southeast Asia.

#### National

#### <u>China</u>

In his inaugural address to the WFTU-sponsored Trade Union Congress of Asian and Australasian countries in Peiping, LIU Shao-ch'i, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leading Marxist theoretician, outlined the program which had led the CCP and which, he claimed, could lead the Communist parties of other Asian nations to victory. LIU emphasized that the victory could not be achieved without the creation of a Communist-led army, the establishment of bases for it, and the coordination of military operations with the activities of workers and peasants in enemy territory. LIU advocated, as an essential first step, the formation of a united front with whatever classes, parties, groups and individuals are

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willing to work against "imperialism and its lackeys." He warned, however, that it was up to the Communist Party to control this united front. This tactic, a "united front from above," is particularly applicable to what the Kremlin defines as colonial areas.

This "directive" for revolution in Asia was further elaborated upon by LI Li-san, the CCP's principal labor leader, who re-stated the united front tactic by asserting that the "Chinese working class was able to lead the revolution to victory" through its ability to unite with the peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie in the cities, and that part of the "national" bourgeoisie which opposes "imperialism."

#### Thailand

Apparently responding to "directives" embodied in the statements by Communist leaders in Peiping, Chinese Communists in Thailand and other pro-Communist Chinese political groups are forming a permanent Democratic Forces Union Committee. The aims of this Committee are, reportedly, to form similar committees uniting all Chinese democrátic associations in Thailand, and to issue a secret propaganda paper. Dissident elements of the Kuomintang are to be included in the organization. Also, a new group of young Thai socialists is reported tentatively willing to cooperate with Communists in order to obtain "political and social reforms" through a "united Front." They believe that later it will be "time enough" to break with the Communists. In view of the new Peiping directives there is a good possibility that a union will be formed between Chinese Communists and the Thai socialist group which won a recent Bangkok municipal election.

#### <u>Indonesia</u>

A different but hardly less dangerous trend toward the united front tactic is indicated in Indonesia where the "nationalist" Tan Malaka Communists are reported to have reached an agreement with the Moscow Communists and where the Darul Islam (fanatic

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Mohammedan) forces are reported to have accented Communist leadership in certain instances. This strange association has developed chiefly by the agreement of the parties involved that they cannot accept the results of the Hague Round Table Conference. If this move toward consolidation should materialize, a much graver threat to the stability of the new Indonesian Federal Government will be posed than if these groups acted separately.

Iran

The clandestine Azerbaijan radio transmitting from the USSR has urged the formation of a national front in Iran, appealing to the "center opposition" elements to support the front. The Communist radio declares that a united front of all opposition elements is the only effective course of action.

#### French Equatorial Africa

Communist members of the Assembly of the French Union have reached French Equatorial Africa in the course of a propaganda tour of French North and West Africa. They are urging that Nationalists and Communists unite for purposes of combatting US economic penetration of French overseas territories.

#### Italy

The "moderate" united front policy under the leadership of Togliatti will probably be continued in Italy, at least until the spring of 1950.

This conclusion is based on Togliatti's attendance at the mid-November meeting of the Cominform in Hungary, and the unanimous adoption there of his resolution calling for the unification of "large masses of the working class" regardless of their political, labor-union, or religious orientations.

However, the presence of two prominent Longo followers, DrOnofrio and Cicalini, at this meeting may indicate the existence accounts

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of an alternative plan of direct action, to be introduced possibly in the spring. (Longo and Secchia were reportedly conferring with Satellite envoys in Rome at the time the Cominform meeting was taking place.)

The Italian communal elections due in March and April of 1950 may bring about severe losses for the moderate, mass party policy, resulting in a change of leadership from the Togliatti group to the direct action policy of Longo and Secchia. Such a shift would become even more probable should, by that time, the Cominform's winter campaign against Tito have failed and guerrilla warfare on the Yugoslav borders become a necessity.

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### 2. <u>DISSENSION AND DEVIATION</u>

#### Non-orbit Areas

#### <u>Spain</u>

Disillusionment with Soviet leadership, resentment over Cominform action against Communists who fought in the Spanish Civil War, and Spanish regionalism have caused a spread of dissidence which is weakening the Spanish Communist Party (PCE). These factors are likely to induce among the dissidents a more sympathetic attitude toward Tito, in view of his service in the International Brigades during the Civil War and his more palatible nationalist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.

The alleged arrest of Dolores Ibarruri, who reportedly has been at odds with Moscow because she objected to the treatment of Spanish Communists in the USSR, and the ouster of Juan Comorera, who resisted the Cominform order to morge the Catalan and Basque Communists with the PCE, have further increased the tension within the Party. Although Ibarruri has, since her alleged arrest, participated in a conference in Moscow, she has probably lost favor with the Kremlin and only her ability to

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prevent the complete disintegration of the PCE has caused this tolerance. This struggle for power among the Communist leadership probably is primarily responsible for the postponement of the overdue Party Congress.

#### France

The French Communist Party (PCF) is trying hard to prevent the spread of Titoism among its intellectual members and fellow travelers. The appointment of Billoux, an ardent Stalinist, who will now handle the party's dealings with intellectuals (formerly the task of Casanova), will result in efforts to return Jean Cassou to the fold. It was Cassou who first broke away from the Soviet camp to sing the praises of Tito.

There is no evidence of critical dissension in the PCF, however. Rumors concerning the removal of Thorez as Secretary General of the Party appear to be unfouded. Even thrugh Cachin, after a visit to Moscow, revealed that Stalin has more faith in such militants as Mauvais, Fajon and Marty than in Thorez and Duclos, the generous publicity accorded by the party organs to Thorez's new book <u>Fils du Peuple</u> seems to indicate that, at least for the time being, Thorez is not out of favor or about to be removed from office.

#### United Kingdom

The Tito-Cominform rift has even reached fellow-traveling circles in the United Kingdom resulting in a split in the British-Yugoslav Friendship Society at a meeting on 16 November. The Stalinists proposed a resolution denouncing Tito and pledging support of the true Stalinists in Yugoslavia. The resolution passed by a vote of 72-54, but it reflected such an irreconcilable division of opinion that Zilliacus announced that he would form a new pro-Tito Society. The intensity of the division on this subject could conceivably affect the UK Communist Party (UKCP).

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#### <u>Norway</u>

As a corrollary to the recent expulsion of the leaders of the so-called Furubotn faction, the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) is presently in a state of turmoil. While this situation greatly weakens the Party, there is little reason to conclude that this state of affairs will be permitted to continue much longer. An extraordinary Party Congress, scheduled for February 1950, will in all probability confirm the action already taken by Party Chairman Løvlien and his supporters. Although the dissident element may form an independent organization, it is not likely that it will assume significant proportions because the Løvlien group ropresents the official party, retains control of the NKP administrative machinery and press, and has almost three months in which to insure that the majority of the Congress delogates will be Løvlien supporters.

#### India

P. C. Joshi, former secretary-general of the Communist Party of India, is reportedly attempting to organize a rival organization under the name of the Red Flag Communist Party of India. Joshi, whose minority faction was recently expelled from the CPI for advocating that the party employ non-violent tactics at present, may be joined by members of the Andhra Communist Party, which was recently expelled from the CPI for its nationalist tendencies. If Joshi can weld these diverse elements into an organized political party, such a party may come to have considerable importance in Indian politics.

### Eastern Europe

Dissension within the Communist hierarchy is not limited to areas outside the Soviet orbit. It is also apparent in the Satellite parties where nationalism, opportunism and incompetency have resulted in widespread purges designed to strengthen the hold of the ruling clique on the state and thereby to consolidate Soviet control.

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### <u>Częchoslovakia</u>

The Czechoslovak Communist Party will undergo a purge in December to "rid the Party of hostile elements." The purge will probably be a relatively moderate affair, springing less from any specific "nationalist deviation" than the necessity to impress upon Party members the responsibilities of their membership.

#### Bulgaria

Continuing purges of all ranks within the Bulgarian Communist Party are intended to eradicate Bulgarian nationalism and facilitate the extension of Soviet control over the Bulgarian state apparatus. Nevertheless, despite the purge, the majority of Bulgarian Communists would welcome a greater degree of independence from the Kremlin and this attitude will probably persist as long as Tito is successful in his defiance of the Soviet Union and as long as Soviet exploitation of Bulgaria continues.

#### Rumania

Rumanian Communist leaders, whose firm control has prevented the emergence of any widespread anti-Soviet trend within the Party, are pursuing a quiet but effective party purge begun in June. The Rumanian purge, which has been conducted without fanfare, does not appear to have produced the feeling of terror that has developed among all ranks of the Bulgarian Party as a result of the ruthless Bulgarian purge. As a result, the Rumanian Party will emerge from the current shake-up a stronger and even more reliable instrument of Soviet policy than at present.

#### Poland

The dismissal from their Party positions of leading nationalist Communists Gomulka, Spychalski, and Kliszko, as well

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as the removal of lesser Communists and former Socialists from their Government and party jobs, indicates that the Polish Communist Party is endeavoring to tighten its control of the Government and Party apparatus. Besides dismissal from the Communist Party and Government of unreliable and deviationist elements, other steps recommended by President Beirut for Poland's first purge include: (1) demotion of some party members to candidate status, (2) new elections of party officials throughout the party hierarchy from cell groups through provincial committees, and (3) the development of mass party training, stronger cadres, and greater self-criticism.

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### 3. CHANGE IN TACTICS

#### <u>Greece</u>

The Greek Communist leadership has finally formalized the shift in emphasis away from military matters which has been taking place since last August's defeats. On 4 November, after all hopes of a favorable UN compromise of the Greek issue had faded, the "Free Greece" radio announced that the party Central Committee, meeting on 9 October, had decided on a "temporary withdrawal" of the main guerrilla forces to prevent their annihilation and a shift in the party effort's "center of gravity" to political and economic struggles. The approximately 1,400 guerrillas still in Greece have evidently been instructed to reorganize into small squads under political commissars, for sporadic sabotage and terrorism. The rebuilding of the Communist intelligence, supply, and recruiting network, broadcast on 25 November, cutlined a broad program for utilizing labor unrest as a basis for an "open political struggle."

At the moment, the Communists are too weak to match these words with deeds. Nevertheless, the preliminary work now being done may yield significant results in coming months. If winter conditions hamper Greek security forces, guerrilla organizers will enjoy a certain freedom of action in outlying communities. In the cities, the long-deferred surge of labor agitation for higher wages--while not inspired by the Communists--may eventually provide them with a substantial labor following, if government ineptitude in handling the situation continues. Gradual government

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release of former political prisoners will undoubtedly contribute to the Communist political reserve. Meanwhile, the guerrillas outside Greece, although they pose problems of morale and discipline, still represent a force-in-being of some 12,000.

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4. NEW AREAS OF MANIFESTED COMMUNIST INTEREST

#### Tibet - Nepal

Communist control of Tibet, which may be effected in 1950 through occupation of that country by forces of the Chinese Communist regime, under pretext of reestablishing the Panchen Lama (now a tool of the Chinese Communists), would not only increase Communist pressure along India's borders, but also would allow added infiltration of foreign Communist agents into India and render easier the subversion of elements of northeastern India not heretofore easily reached. The significance to India of Chinese Communist control in Tibet does not lie in the long but seldom-crossed common frontier to the northwest between India and Tibet. Rather it concerns the effect of Communism in Tibet on the neighboring country of Nepal and on the semi-independent Indian State of Sikkim, oth of those areas possess well-developed communication with Tibet. ' and both have much in common, culturally and racially, with the Tibetans. These peoples, at the same time, have similar ties with the neighboring hill tribes within India proper; should they espouse Communism, subversion of the populations to the South and East within the Indian borders would become a much easier task. Considerable social unrest already exists in both places. In Sikkim, there is popular dissatisfaction with both the Maharaja and the Government of India, which took over the administration of the state last June when an insurrection led by the Sikkim State Congress appeared imminent. In Nepal, there appears to be sufficient social malaise to render the people of the country vulnerable to the type of proselytizing which could be expected if their Tibetan neighbors adopt Communism; moreover, some dissident elements have already shown a pro-Communism bias.

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# 5. SOVIET FINANCING OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

### Thailand

Two independent reports indicate that Soviet sources occasionally give financial assistance to the Vietnam News Service in Bangkok and have subsidized several Bangkok Chinese language papers among which is the leading Communist-line CHUAN MIN PAO. This information constitutes the first evidence that direct Soviet financial support is being accorded to either presumably sympathetic news agencies or definitely pro-Communist newspapers in the Bangkok area. While this information is still unconfirmed, certain credence is lent by several other reports of Chinese Communist financial support of a group of Thai language newspapers. Apparently the USSR Legation, while ostensibly maintaining the position of an observation post in Bangkok, has actually entered other fields of activity, even if only on a very limited basis.

Iran

Soviet financial aid was reportedly given to at least one of the parliamentary opposition candidates who is said to have been involved in the plot against Minister of Court Hajli, who was assassinated in early November. If true, this support is another indication of the renewed vigor with which the USSR is trying to exploit the unrest precipitated by the parliamentary elections and by Hajli's murder.

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# 6. THE COMMUNIST PEACE CAMPAIGN

### International

During November the drive of the international Communist front organizations "for the defense of peace and democracy,"

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previously focussed - largely without success - in Western Europe and the US, shifted to the economically underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

#### Latin America

Continuation of the "peace" campaign was chiefly noticeable in Latin America where "peace" speeches were made by Communists in Uruguay, Brazil and Chile. Communist peace propaganda appeared in Mexico and Cuba in connection with other Communist activities. Formation of a "Peace Committee" in Mexico was started and rumors of the creation of a similar committee in Peru wore reported. Several local "peace" committees were reportedly set up in Venezuela. This campaign is probably being used to coordinate and strengthen the Latin American Communist movement, following intimations by Moscow which were critical of Latin American Communist activities.

#### India

Opposition to Nehru's commitment of India to the Anglo-American bloc was the theme of the manifesto unanimously adopted at the All-India Conference of Partisans for Peace held in Calcutta from November 24-27. Organizations participating in the conference included the Communist Party of India, the All-India Trade Union Congress, the All-India Students Federation, the Progressive Writer's Association, the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Indian People's Theatre Association and the All-India Kisan Sabha. The conference ended with a torchlight procession in which illuminated portraits of Stalin, Lenin, Paul Robeson, Mao Tse-tung and Ana Pauker were carried.

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#### PART III

# FORTHCOMING COMMUNIST EVENTS

<u>1949</u>

December	3	New York	New York Congress for Defense of Peace
	5	Brussels	Congress of International Organization of Journalists
	6	Peiping	Asian Conference, International Federa- tion of Democratic Women
	10-12	Bucharest	Preparatory Conference for WFTU Trans- port Workers International
	11-15	Prague	Congress of Czechoslovak Trade Unions
	21	ante generativo de calego de s	Stalin Day
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1950			
January or February		Mexico City	Preparatory Conference for WFTU Petroleum Workers International
January	7-21	France	Combatants for Peace Special Propa-

ganda Campaign to Outlaw Atom Bomb

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<u>1950</u> (con't)

March

Tebruary	21	<b></b>	
	17-19	Oslo	

(indefinite)

World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) Day of Solidarity of Youth of Colonial Areas

Extraordinary Congress of the Norwegian CP

First Constitutional Congress of the Italian Communist Youth Federation

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