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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP

MONTHLY MEMORANDUM NO. 5

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Volume II

The International Week:

Another stage in the developing pattern of Western European cooperation was reached last week when the Brussels Pact powers agreed in principle on a Council of Europe. In the UN, the SC passed the four-power resolution establishing a timetable for transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia. With the Rhodes armistice talks still deadlocked, the prospective inclusion of Transjordan may introduce new complications.

Possible complications at Rhodes. While the Rhodes armistice talks between Israel and Egypt remain deadlocked, possible entry of Transjordan into the negotiations might well place Israel in the position of being able to play off the two Arab countries against each other. King Abdullah is reportedly anxious to settle definitively his frontiers with Israel; he also desires to put in a claim for the Gaza strip now held by Egypt. The Israelis would probably rather have Transjordan in this area than Egypt, as the former is not only the weaker state but also the one with which Israel feels it could get along better. Should Transjordan be invited to Rhodes and present a claim for the Gaza area, it would have the simultaneous effect of shifting the focus of the talks from armistice terms to territorial settlement and of enabling Israel to beat down the Egyptians by threatening to back Abdullah. Fears of being placed in an isolated position vis-a-vis the rest of the Arab states may, however, cause Abdullah to hesitate over going too far.

Developments in the Berlin dispute. The failure of Stalin in his recent press interview to mention the currency aspects of the Berlin dispute further emphasizes that this issue with which the six-power committee of SC "neutrals" has been struggling is no longer even nominally the nub of the controversy. Stalin's utterance shows that the currency issue has now taken its place along with earlier explanations of "technical" transportation difficulties as a patent Soviet pretext for blockading Berlin and reaffirms that what the USSR really seeks is a halt in the unification of

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the three western zones of Germany. If the USSR is seriously looking for a tactical detente in East West relations, however, the lifting of the Berlin blockade would be an ideal starting point.

✓ USSR makes new propaganda move in EC. As another move in the propaganda war against the "colonial" powers, the USSR has sponsored an amendment to Trusteeship Council Rule 75 which proposes that the inhabitants of trust territories be allowed to send representatives of their "social, cultural and educational organizations" to participate in TC discussions concerning these territories. Were this provision adopted, Communist spokesmen of indigenous populations could be expected to appear at TC meetings prepared to attack the "colonialism" of the administering powers, thus lightening considerably the heavy propaganda burden borne at present by the Soviet delegate.

A ** Western labor leaders discuss new international as WFTU attempts to recoup losses. **Following their secession from the World Federation of Trade Unions, the British, US and Dutch national unions have induced the fifteen-nation ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee to: (1) circulate a report on the WFTU split to all non-Communist national unions, asking their approval; (2) prepare the ground for a new labor international by discussions with prospective members. The French and Italian non-Communist unions, anxious to consolidate their internal positions, urge prompt convening of a conference to establish the new international. The Swiss and Scandinavian unions, although sympathetic to the idea of a new federation, will probably pursue a "wait-and-see" course until concrete proposals are advanced.** Of the non-Communist national unions remaining in the WFTU, only the Belgian and Irish have so far pledged themselves to follow the three western groups into a new federation.

The Communist-led WFTU Executive Committee, meeting without the three western dissidents, will attempt to counteract their secession by declaring the vote on WFTU suspension "illegal" and by creating sixteen new "trade departments" in a pretense of representation for the international craft unions. The probable inclusion of left-wing US and UK unions in these trade departments and the announced WFTU intention of maintaining relations "with trade unions in all countries with no exceptions" suggest that the USSR will attempt to go over the head of the dissident national organizations and appeal directly to rank-and-file western labor. It is reported that the WFTU intends to participate actively in the current Soviet "peace offensive" and that relations with the US and UK unions are to be maintained through "trade union councils for peace." The Communist WFTU leadership may also attempt to offset the withdrawal of the three western organizations by

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exploiting the recent admission of Communist-approved labor groups in Chile, the Philippines, Siam, Southern Rhodesia, Tunisia and Malta and the continued adherence to WFTU of the labor movements of Australia, the Far East and the colonial areas. Such moves will be relied on to reinforce the fiction that the WFTU is the only broadly based and genuinely representative international workers' organization.

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USSR may reiterate disarmament and atomic energy proposals as part of peace offensive. The Soviet request for a week's postponement on SC consideration of the GA disarmament resolution lends some credence to the press forecast that the USSR may repeat its propaganda proposals for atomic energy control and a one-third Big Five disarmament. Such a move would be in complete accord with the current Soviet "peace offensive." The USSR gained a certain propaganda advantage from both proposals despite their resounding defeat at the recent GA and, although they stand no better chance of SC acceptance, the USSR has everything to gain from reverting to them.

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Significance of UN role in Indonesia. SC passage of the Indonesian resolution marks a new development in UN political activity -- active intervention in the colonial problem. The UN has intervened in an attempt to mediate one part of the growing conflict between the European colonial powers and the vigorous nationalisms of their dependencies, a conflict which the parties themselves are in many cases unable to resolve. This new type of UN political activity is induced by the following factors: (1) growing world interest in the colonial problem, particularly on the part of the ever more important bloc of Asiatic anti-colonial powers; (2) open conflicts between European states and their dependencies, creating threats to the peace on which the UN must act; (3) reliance of dependent peoples on the UN for aid in their struggle; and (4) increasing recognition by the Western Powers of the need to utilize the UN in settling colonial differences to prevent anti-colonial powers from by-passing the UN and the USSR from exploiting these issues. The states at the New Delhi Conference comprised almost one-third of the present UN membership and their weight in the UN will force it to assume an active role in the colonial problem.

The UN has already shown great interest in the colonial problem and the related one of economic underdevelopment, through such agencies as the Trusteeship Council, the International Bank, regional and other UN economic commissions, UNESCO and FAO. The efforts of these groups, however, have been devoted mostly to the economic and social development of these areas and they are not geared or allowed to deal with political issues.

As unrest grows in Asia and Africa during the transition from the colonial period to development of new independent states, the UN is certain

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to be faced with many more colonial issues besides Indonesia. Such issues may include Indo-China, Malaya, French North Africa and the former Italian colonies. It should be noted, however, that UN intervention of the Indonesian type may not be possible in the cases of the larger states, such as France and the UK, which possess the veto power and may therefore be able to restrain UN action in their own sphere subject only to the pressure of world opinion. In such cases the UN may be unable to interfere in these areas to the extent of establishing a specific timetable for transfer of sovereignty, as in Indonesia. Moreover, the Netherlands had already conceded quasi-sovereignty to the Republic and had "promised" to carry out much of what the SC ordered it to do. It is also possible that in future colonial problems before the UN, the USSR may, through its veto power, deter effective action. Despite these difficulties, however, it appears that the UN will henceforth play a new and more dynamic role in the process of liquidation of the former colonial world.

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