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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
WORKING PAPER

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

Vol. V No. 7

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Two Week Ending
23 February 1950

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

TURKEY

Assembly votes electoral reform: The government party's long-awaited electoral reform bill, now in the final stages of being enacted into law, represents a landmark in the development of the Turkish Republic. The bill obviously will not guarantee Turkey free elections on the Western model. Nevertheless, it does represent a major step toward a more democratic system--a point recognized by the principal opposition party in affording the measure its support in the Assembly. By providing for secret ballots, openly counted, and for judicial supervision of the voting, the bill promises that this year's elections will be characterized by a degree of freedom virtually unthinkable five years ago, when President Inonu first broached the idea of a multi-party system in Turkey. All in all, the imminent enactment of the bill offers remarkable evidence that Turkey's leaders, despite their fears about their Soviet neighbors, are going ahead with their gradual extension to the opposition of greater opportunities for attempting to unseat them by constitutional means.

IRAQ

Suweidi's statement of policy: Prime Minister Tawfiq Suweidi's recent enunciation of policy tends to confirm the suspicion that Nuri Said is still pulling the strings. In part, Suweidi's statement represented sentiments almost any Iraqi prime minister would express: the usual lip service was paid to such desiderata as improved health standards, highway construction, and education, and in a patent effort to speed a favorable decision on the pending IBRD loan application Suweidi approved the establishment of a Development Board to carry out projected economic improvements. Two key points in the declaration, however, indicate that a harmonious working relationship exists between the two leaders. The stress placed by Suweidi on his determination to strengthen Iraqi ties with the UK echoes a point of view long associated with Nuri, who (perhaps coincidentally) is now in London, ostensibly on private business. Suweidi's pledge to maintain friendly relations with other countries, "especially our neighbors," implies that Nuri's aspiration for union with Syria will receive discreet government support even though a whirlwind courtship is not on the books. A question remains, however, as to how long Suweidi will be willing to head the team with Nuri calling signals from the bench--or how long Nuri will be satisfied with Suweidi as his field captain.

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LIBYA

The amiable Saadawi: Bechir Saadawi, the foremost political leader in Tripolitania, is a most agreeable man on the subject of Libya's future government. The others directly concerned with this subject have found it a controversial one. Egypt backs a unitary state, believing that its domination by Cyrenaica can be averted. The Emir of Cyrenaica has been quoted as approving the British and French plans to establish three separate and semi-autonomous governments with Libya, but he recently indicated to UN Commissioner Pelt that a unitary state, with himself at the helm, would not be distasteful. For his part, Pelt opposes implementation of these steps at the present time, on the ground that the UN has called for the Libyans to work out the problem themselves, even though he considers a federated state the only practical solution in the long run. Despite these substantial differences of opinion, however, Saadawi has managed within a span of some two weeks to express agreement with the Egyptians, the Emir, Pelt, and the British Administrator for Tripolitania.

Saadawi has since attempted to explain his apparent multiplicity of views as resulting from interpreter trouble. However, his difficulties probably stem more from a desire to champion Arab interests without coming out too strongly in favor of the Emir, whom Saadawi considers a British puppet. Saadawi's explanatory statement that he favored three separate administrations which might eventually be united under the Emir suggests that he really wants a federation in Libya--though one loose enough to prevent his being overshadowed, as leader in Tripolitania, by Prime Minister Omar Mansour of Cyrenaica, who would probably be the Emir's choice as head of a Libyan Cabinet.

AFGHANISTAN

Pakistan hits back: The Afghan Government is now discovering that its open attempts to subvert Pakistan's border tribesmen under the banner of an independent "Pushtoonistan" have opened the way to what may prove to be far more effective attacks on its own position. In countering Afghanistan's propaganda among its tribesmen, Pakistan has included in its appeal their tribal brethren across the border, on whose loyalty the stability of the Afghan Government ultimately depends, and there is more than a suspicion that the Pakistanis hope that a change of government in Kabul might ultimately result. An additional unsettling factor for Afghanistan is the rivalry between two highly ambitious

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members of its small ruling group: Prince Daud, the Minister of National Defense, who probably can depend on the support of the army, and the astute Minister of National Economy, Abdul Majid, who is greatly admired by Kabul's young intellectuals and probably could marshal more popular support than Daud. Should either tribal unrest or the Daud-Majid rivalry produce a revolutionary situation, Pakistan would probably attempt to assist to power Amin Jan, outlawed half-brother of ex-King Amanullah, or the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar, Afghanistan's leading mulla - either of whom could be expected to secure considerable popular backing.

NOTED IN BRIEF

The recently proposed amalgamation of the Turkish police and gendarmerie would undoubtedly simplify a confused administrative situation of long standing. There has never been any precise line of demarcation between the duties of the two forces and, in addition, the gendarmerie has been in the dubious position of having its peacetime duties supervised largely by the civilian Ministry of the Interior, despite that fact that it remained under the general orders of the General Staff and was paid and equipped by the Ministry of National Defense. Unification of these two security organizations may well result in the achievement of greater economy as well as efficiency.

ECA officials and the Turkish Ambassador in Washington have agreed upon a formula whereby counterpart funds, applied to specific projects approved by ECA, may be utilized to reduce and even eliminate an estimated deficit of 155 million Turkish liras (about \$55 million) in the Turkish budget for 1950-51. The principal remaining difficulty arises from the fact that these projects have not been submitted to, or approved by, ECA in advance of passage of the budget by the National Assembly. The government is presumably hopefully assuming that it will be able to satisfy ECA requirements by the submission for approval of a number of projects (e.g. for economic rehabilitation and debt reduction) during the course of the coming Turkish fiscal year.

Sale of last year's Turkish tobacco crop continued at satisfactory prices and in good volume following opening of the Black Sea region

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market. If the Black Sea region sales and those in the Marmara region (which have not yet begun) turn out to be as good as those in the Aegean Sea area, the year 1950 should prove to be an excellent one for Turkey's principal export commodity.

Palace-Cabinet relations in Egypt are running into troubled waters. The cabinet, flouting the King's wishes, is preparing retroactive legislation which would permit the ouster of Sanhuri Pasha, a Saadist and King's man, as President of the State Council. Another point of conflict has arisen from the King's demand that Wafd Minister of the Interior Serageddin continue the ban on the Moslem Brotherhood unless it changes its name and abandons politics entirely. The Brotherhood's refusal to promise anything leaves Serageddin a choice between further antagonizing the King and alienating the Moslem Brotherhood, which strongly supported the Wafd in the elections. Although neither of these issues appear to be major ones, they may terminate the shaky Farouk-Wafd "honeymoon" which has existed since the January elections.

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